Few issues have drawn as much attention and have been debated as intensely as the rise of India. There has been a plethora of literature that almost dissects various factors that have contributed to India’s rise and what the future holds for the country. Will India emerge as a major player in the international system? Will it be able to compete with a rising China as an Asian power? These are some of the questions that have confronted scholars of international relations and security.
The process of active collaboration between the practitioner and the scholar can sometimes result in desirable policy outcomes. The book under review is one such commendable initial attempt. Ambassador Navrekha Sharma retired from the Indian Foreign Service (IFS); her assignments included Joint Secretary (JS) South (1999–2001) and Ambassadorial posting to the Philippines and Indonesia. In fact, she had two postings in Jakarta, first as Minister-Counsellor (1993–1996) and later as Ambassador (2006–2008).
India is often perceived as a regional power, but a closer look reveals that it is in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis China in South Asia. The first reason is that Indian governments never had the political, economic, and military capacities to pursue their regional power ambitions with their neighbours in the long run. South Asian countries could always play the China card in order to evade India’s influence. Second, India’s new South Asia policy with the focus on trade and connectivity has improved regional cooperation since 1991.
Until the next plenary in Switzerland in 2017 or the interim meeting before the end of 2016, India should actively engage with all members and particularly with those who have expressed doubts or raised queries, including China.
Should GRSE and GSL deliver satisfactory services to their export customers, there is considerable potential for India to position itself as a competitive supplier of small and medium warships and patrol crafts.
A sound sensor array in the Indian Ocean could prove invaluable for India which has a major anti-submarine warfare handicap and a lack of operational submarines.
India cannot be taking other than a cooperative position if it wants to genuinely exploit opportunities that SCO processes may offer. Any policy on connectivity underpinned by a spirit of rivalry will make India an odd one out.
