Nuclear and Arms Control

No posts of Books and Monograph.

Political Decision-Making and Nuclear Retaliation

Currently, India's nuclear doctrine is one of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in case of nuclear first use against it or its forces anywhere. The problem with this is that at current levels of vertical proliferation it is liable to face a counter strike of equal proportions. This may not be in India's interests when viewed in relation to the inevitable setback to its trajectory of progress. Therefore, there is a case for terminating nuclear exchanges at the lowest possible level in case of nuclear first use of low opprobrium quotient or violence.

India and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty: Policy Options

The international community inside and outside the Conference of Disarmament is underscoring the need for concluding a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The Indian government, for a long period, has been sponsoring the idea. Notwithstanding the international stagnation, the issue has been instigating periodic debate in India on the Indian approach. The periodic revival of the issue requires that India revisit its policy on fissile material production as well as its approach towards a possible FMCT.

A Doctrine at Work: Obama’s Evolving Nuclear Policy and What it Bodes for India

President Obama made history by coming to office with the promise of working towards a nuclear weapons-free world. Envisioning a new non-proliferation momentum, Obama promised to revive the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) system and create nuclear security and energy architectures that will secure nuclear materials and make proliferation difficult. A year later, Obama realised the difficulties of selling his vision to his bureaucratic-military establishment, which resisted efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while pushing for nuclear modernisation.

The India–China Nuclear Relationship

The India–China nuclear-strategic relationship has been surprisingly under studied, given the rising interest in the strategic interaction between the two countries. 1 Part of the reason is that India's nuclear capabilities have been relatively limited vis-à-vis China, though this is exaggerated by the tendency among Indian analysts to focus on the need to target Beijing. There is no evident reason why China should not be deterred by the targeting of other cities that are closer to India.

Integrating India with the Global Export Controls System: Challenges Ahead

The rising economic and political profile of India is making it to search for a new pattern of interaction with global forces. India's unique relationship with export controls is passing through a new and positive phase. In recent years, India is trying to integrate itself fast with global best practices for export controls. However, it is facing roadblocks in its integration with the existing system.

The United States in Central Asia: Reassessing a Challenging Partnership

This article focuses on the evolving place of the US in the Central Asian arena, analysing how US interests have changed in this region since the 1990s. It studies how strategic relations were transformed around the NATO Partnership for Peace, the growing cooperation in the Caspian Sea, and the building of a regional security architecture surrounding Afghanistan. It also analyses Washington's difficulties in promoting 'civil society' and the limits of the US economic engagement in the region.

Efficacy of Nuclear Forensics

The danger of nuclear terrorism and ways to thwart it, tackle it and manage it in the event of an attack is increasingly gaining the attention of nuclear analysts all over the world. There is rising awareness among nuclear experts to develop mechanisms to prevent, deter and deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear specialists are seeking to develop and improve the science of nuclear forensics so as to provide faster analysis during a crisis.

The Non-Proliferation Paradigm and the Restive Outlier

The nuclear non-proliferation paradigm 1 has rarely remained static. Its logic or the underlying principle has however been singular – non-proliferation should lead to nuclear disarmament, and eventually total elimination. It is the approach to the paradigm that has evolved over the years, often accentuated by, and many a time succumbing to, the transformations in the global security environment. Milestones in this evolution have often been construed as shifts in the paradigm, as newer security imperatives necessitated augmentations in existing approaches to proliferation challenges.

The Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Paradigm and India

Non-proliferation is now an accepted norm in international security and international relations. Most countries perceive global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as being inseparable in principle, although there is disagreement among countries on the ultimate objective of non-proliferation. Most countries generally want non-proliferation to be a transitional arrangement before total nuclear disarmament, which at present is a desirable though distant goal. The classical bargain for balancing the two has tilted in favour of non-proliferation.

The Political Factor in Nuclear Retaliation

That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.

India’s ASAT Test: Joining the Arms Race in Outer Space?

An ASAT in itself is not a defensive system that could ‘safeguard’ any asset. Instead, it is an offensive system that could solely be used for retribution in response to an attack on India’s space assets. In that sense, the capability can only be used as a deterrent against a potential rival.

A. Vinod Kumar
March 28, 2019
IDSA Comments

Challenges in Implementing JCPOA after the US Withdrawal

While Iran and its European interlocutors (along with Russia and China) can be expected to mount a tough challenge to continue to make the JCPOA work in the light of Trump’s May 8 decision to ‘withdraw’ from the agreement, it remains to be seen to what extent they can succeed.

Two standoffs and some nuclear lessons

The standoffs in Doklam and North Korea offer insights on how crisis stability remains subject to the complexities of deterrence, especially in theatres with multiple nuclear-armed states, and what this entails for disarmament.

A. Vinod Kumar
December 29, 2017
IDSA Comments

The Contours of a Negotiated Nuclear-Missile Deal with North Korea

Removing the Kim regime’s fears about regime change and reducing the insecurity caused by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests to the US and its allies are the essentials that must be addressed in a UN-led multinational dialogue to forge a negotiated settlement.

G. Balachandran
December 12, 2017
IDSA Comments

Blue Flag 2017 and Beyond

The Indian Air Force’s participation in Israel’s Blue Flag 2017 multilateral exercise adds an important layer to the matrix of cooperation between India and Israel.

S. Samuel C. Rajiv
December 01, 2017
IDSA Comments

How North Korea was Armed

China and to a lesser extent Pakistan have helped North Korea with its nuclear and missile development programmes.

Prabha Rao
October 30, 2017
Issue Brief

The Trump Challenge to the JCPOA

Trump’s new policy statement on Iran has enveloped the UNSC-approved Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in a shroud of uncertainty that could lead to further instability in conflict-ridden West Asia.

Does India Need Thermonuclear Weapons

While thermonuclear weapons are not necessary for maintaining a credible deterrent, they serve the purpose of enabling India to make effective use of its relatively limited fissile material stockpile.

Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
September 22, 2017
IDSA Comments

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons and the Indian Nuclear Doctrine

The nuclear escalation risk cannot be contained by the revision of India’s minimum deterrence policy but with a change in Pakistan’s behaviour.

Sanjana Gogna
September 11, 2017
IDSA Comments

The North Korean Nuclear Conundrum

A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.