In the aftermath of North Korea's second nuclear test and the launch of three short-range missiles on May 25, 2009, followed by the launch of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4, there has been widespread speculation on Japan's principled position on non-proliferation and disarmament and whether it will abandon its nuclear abstinence and acquire nuclear capability. This possibility has been echoed recently by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

• Reshmi Kazi
• November 2009
• Strategic Analysis

• Jason Miklian
• May 2008
• Strategic Analysis

• Reshmi Kazi
• May 2008
• Strategic Analysis

This article offers a Chinese perspective on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons due to nuclear weapons proliferation and its deterrent gestures, long employed since the Cold War. It is pointed out that nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant to nuclear weapons states. However, some non-nuclear weapons states may view this differently. Nuclear abolition has presented a visionary opportunity for all sides to relinquish those weapons increasingly unnecessary for nuclear weapons states.

• Dingli Shen
• July 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Being a non-NPT state with advanced nuclear capability, India's contributions to the non-proliferation movement have often been scrutinized. India was for long treated as part of the 'proliferation problem'. Since the 1998 tests, there is a steady process of integrating India with the international nuclear community. However, India is reluctant to assimilate with many of the US-promoted counter-proliferation initiatives though it has largely adopted the normative standards of the NPT system.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• September 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Improved India-Vietnam relations are guided both by their common historical experiences and their mutual concerns in the post-cold war context. Both have suffered aggression from China in the past and had good relations with the former Soviet Union. In fact, India was the only non-communist country to recognize the unified Vietnam and, ever since, they have had a friendly relationship, one that has stood the test of time. However, in the post-cold war context the shadow of China looms large over this relationship.

• Pankaj K Jha
• November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

The 1998 Belfast Agreement brought to an end over three decades of armed conflict in Northern Ireland. This paper summarizes the role of actors within and outside Northern Ireland, and the processes and mechanics of the Agreement itself. The Agreement is placed in the context of previous unsuccessful peace initiatives in the region, and elements within the political and economic environment at the time that facilitated agreement are identified. The consociational nature of the Agreement is set alongside concern about continuing sectarian division.

• Marie Breen-Smyth
• November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Despite its excellent record in the field of non-proliferation of technologies, know-how and equipment related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to other states, India has been essentially a passive actor in global non-proliferation initiatives. As a result, it does not as yet have a comprehensive framework or strategy within which it defines its anti-proliferation objectives.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• January 2007
• Strategic Analysis

The most visible manifestation of a strategic relationship between two countries is cooperation in the defence sphere. When the Defence Framework Agreement was signed in June 2005, it was widely assumed that the Agreement provided a skeleton that would be fleshed out over a period of time.

• Cherian Samuel
• March 2007
• Strategic Analysis

The article considers why New Delhi has shied away from full participation in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative despite compelling national interests in improving Indian maritime forces and cooperating with the United States at sea. Some factors examined are polarized domestic politics, Indians' ambivalence about non-proliferation arrangements that formerly targeted them, and New Delhi's desire for regional primacy. Until Indian leaders come to believe that the benefits of PSI participation outweigh its drawbacks, they will continue to hold the initiative at arm's length.

• James R. Holmes
• March 2007
• Strategic Analysis

The collective silence of the guardians and the state-parties by no means signifies the NPT’s good health, especially when they continue to emphasise upon the slow pace of disarmament and enduring pressures on the non-proliferation regime.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• March 02, 2015
• IDSA Comments

There is a general feeling among analysts that while US government lawyers may have been satisfied that the CLNDA is compatible with CSC in light of explanations offered by the Indian government, this view is being reportedly challenged by nuclear industry lawyers.

• G. Balachandran
• February 19, 2015
• Issue Brief

The Modi’s government determination to adopt a muscular stance on national security and its commitment to expedite defence modernisation are likely to translate into greater political and defence engagement with Israel.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• February 19, 2015
• IDSA Comments

India’s nuclear deal with the US is driven less by technology requirements than by the need to be integrated into the global nuclear community and gain access to uranium imports for fuelling its nuclear power expansion plans.

• Sarosh Bana
• February 10, 2015
• IDSA Comments

While the exact nature of the understanding between the two countries is yet to be announced and in fact may never be officially released, it is possible to offer an outline of the possible “memorandum” with possible understandings on all the three liability issues as well as the administrative arrangements.

• G. Balachandran
• February 10, 2015
• Issue Brief

India is already in de facto observance of the spirit of the CTBT by maintaining its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. Given that additional nuclear tests may not be needed, it could well reconsider its current position on signing the treaty.

• Reshmi Kazi
• December 24, 2014
• Issue Brief

India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act has emerged as an appropriate template that could rekindle the nuclear energy sector while also safeguarding the public interest.

• A. Vinod Kumar , Kapil Patil
• December 06, 2014
• Issue Brief

As Australia and India have to deepen their security cooperation for a peaceful prosperous and stable Asia-Pacific region, both the countries will have to manage global nuclear commerce together.

• Rajiv Nayan
• September 15, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The editorial also intrinsically marks the return of the ‘pro-Pakistan’ lobby in the US non-proliferation community, and the American media, which was culpable in encouraging the many indulgences of the Pakistani military and nuclear establishment for many decades and facilitating favourable non-proliferation policies for Pakistan to effectively pursue a clandestine nuclear programme with technological aid from Western companies.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• July 07, 2014
• IDSA Comments

“Credible minimum deterrence” is the cornerstone of India’s nuclear doctrine. It, used in conjunction with the concepts of “No First Use” (NFU) and “Non Use” against non nuclear weapon states, clearly indicates that India envisages its nuclear weapons as only a deterrent and not as a means to threaten others.

• Satish Chandra
• April 30, 2014
• Issue Brief