With the not so unexpected North Korean nuclear test on October 9, 2006 the world has entered into yet another nuclear age. Regional tension is the inevitable corollary of the new nuclear situation. Many apprehend East Asia may become a nuclear flashpoint. Quite naturally, the international community is closely watching the emergent situation. The United States (US) as a major and traditional stakeholder both in the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and security management in East Asia is actively involved in diplomacy to deal with the fallout of the North Korean nuclear test.

• Rajiv Nayan
• October 2006
• Strategic Analysis

The October 9 North Korean nuclear test has emerged as a major diplomatic challenge as well as an opportunity for China. China has sent mixed signals in response to the United Nations (UN) 1718 Resolution of October 14 on North Korea. It has agreed to the inspection of North Korea’s inbound and outbound trade to prevent any illegal trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. China Daily reported that Chinese border officials have started checking trucks at the border with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• October 2006
• Strategic Analysis

The recent nuclear test carried out by North Korea in defiance of warnings by the international community has significantly raised Japan’s security concerns. The test conducted on October 9, 2006 made Pyongyang the second nuclear weapon state in North East Asia after China. It was carried out in the backdrop of already heightened tensions in the region following a set of multiple missile launches by Pyongyang on 5 July 2006. The missiles which had plunged into the Sea of Japan, had even evoked calls for preemptive strikes from a section of the political and defense establishment in Tokyo.

• Arpita Mathur
• October 2006
• Strategic Analysis

The testing of a nuclear device by North Korea (hereafter the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – DPRK) on October 9 has brought to the fore South Korea’s (hereafter the Republic of Korea – ROK) measured and considered response calibrated in such a manner as to force the DPRK to return to the negotiating table. The DPRK conducted its nuclear test even as the ROK President, Roh Moo-hyun was presiding over an emergency cabinet meeting called to discuss DPRKs preparations for a nuclear test.

• Raviprasad Narayanan
• October 2006
• Strategic Analysis

September 11, according to the Commission that investigated that catastrophic event, was a result of a failure of imagination. Iraq’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, on the other hand, could be characterised as a case of fertile imagination exhibited by US intelligence and the George W. Bush Administration. Intelligence failure is the facile answer given to describe what went wrong in both cases. This article offers a more nuanced answer that takes into account the political context in which the threat posed by Osama bin Laden was analysed and acted upon.

• S. Kalyanaraman
• January 2005
• Strategic Analysis

An attempt has been made in this article to assess the arguments in favour of a fundamental shift in Indo-US relations by revisiting the history of their bilateral relations since its formative period and comparing it with the present period. The paper strongly argues that the Indian decision to go nuclear in May 1998 played a catalytic role in bringing the two democracies together. It was Shakti 1998, which changed the entire scenario and augmented for a changed US policy towards South Asia, especially towards India.

• Bhabani Mishra
• January 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The conceptual discourse, contributed to in the main by Western scholars, on the security and strategic stability of new nuclear weapon states like India and Pakistan seems alarmist. In reality, however, India and Pakistan have been mutually deliberating on various aspects of nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs). This article is an effort to identify the issues of nuclear security concerns in two spheres – academic and policy formulations. The emphasis is more on the nuclear thinking of the two countries and the diplomatic challenges ahead particularly on the nuclear CBMs.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• January 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The paper examines the salient features of the principal statutory authority, the Export Administration Act (EAA), that is, at present, governing dual-use technology control in the US, and the frontiers of dual-use export control after the enactment of the new Act. An analysis of different provisions of the bills for the new Act indicates mixed features. It does not completely liberalise the control of dual-use technology, and continues to have in place a number of curbs.

• Rajiv Nayan
• January 2005
• Strategic Analysis

US President George W Bush’s whirlwind tour of Europe – Belgium, Germany and Slovakia – between February 21 and 24, can be seen as an attempt to bridge the transatlantic divide and iron out differences, so as to make a fresh start to working with the European allies rather than against them. The transatlantic rift had surfaced in 2003 when the Europeans disagreed with America’s unilateralist approach in Iraq.

• Prasad P. Rane
• January 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The new US Secretary of State, Ms. Condoleezza Rice, made her first halt in New Delhi on March 16, 2005 during her whistle-stop tour of Asia that took her across the continent to Japan and China, among other countries. The symbolism of identifying Delhi as her first destination reiterates the determination of the Bush team to consolidate the relationship with India and realise the potential hinted at during the first term, and this was emphasised by Rice during her visit.

• C Uday Bhaskar
• January 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The Prague plenary seemingly skirted the ongoing China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration, now a well known chronic weakness of the NSG. Even the public statement did not mention a single line about this collaboration.

• Rajiv Nayan
• July 11, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Japan’s endorsement of India’s candidature for the four major multilateral export controls regimes seems to be the principal achievement of the Indian PM visit to Japan.

• Rajiv Nayan
• June 11, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Fifteen years after the nuclear tests, it is relevant to examine if deterrence remains weak in South Asia or has consolidated towards greater stability.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• June 10, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Even as the uncertainty over the alleged use of chemical weapons use in Syria deepens, the cautious US response to the situation has been conditioned by the lack of viable military options as well as its Iraq war experience.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv
• June 03, 2013
• Issue Brief

India’s admission to the NSG has, as on the previous times when the India-US Nuclear Deal and the NSG exemption of 2008 were under discussion, caused many of those opposed to the Indian nuclear programme to come out with various policy suggestions on how to get India to agree on additional conditionalities. In addition there is a move by many to use the Indian admission for membership as a means to legitimize the illegitimate nuclear commerce between China and Pakistan. All these are predicated on the assumption that India is desperate to join the NSG. India should reject any move by the nonproliferation lobby to devise a criterion-based admission procedure.

• G. Balachandran
• May 23, 2013
• Issue Brief

Kenneth Waltz hailed as the ‘King of thought’ was a towering thinker in the field of IR. His two most important works, Man, The State, and War (1959) and Theory of International Politics (1979), provided a framework within which emerged the principal debate in IR.

• Rajesh Rajagopalan
• May 15, 2013
• IDSA Comments

In the aftermath of recent North Korean actions and threats, there has been in recent times some open debates and discussions about the prospects of South Korea “going nuclear” i.e. developing its own nuclear weapons. This brief argues that short of abrogating all its bilateral and multilateral treaties and obligations with heavy costs, the prospects of it doing so in the short/medium term are not that easy and may not be cost effective.

• G. Balachandran , Rukmani Gupta
• May 01, 2013
• Issue Brief

There is a lot of inaccuracy and assumption in reporting Chasma 3 nuclear cooperation between China-Pakistan. It is not conceivable in engineering terms as to how a 300 MWe Chasma 3 can be transformed into a 1,000 MWe project.

• G. Balachandran
• April 18, 2013
• IDSA Comments

By abstaining from voting on the global arms trade treaty, India has exposed the treaty’s loopholes in not addressing concerns about illegal transfer of arms to terrorist organisations, insurgents groups and other non-state actors.

• Gurmeet Kanwal
• April 08, 2013
• IDSA Comments

China and Pakistan reached a formal agreement in February 2013 to construct a third nuclear reactor in Chashma. This has caused widespread nervousness while making the NSG look weak-kneed.

• Rajiv Nayan
• April 05, 2013
• IDSA Comments