India should try and broaden its engagement with all sections of Pakistani society which is getting differentiated due to the simultaneous multiple crises in that country.
Indian strategists may well find that many of the tactical quandaries faced today by the US carrier fleets cruising through the Asia Pacific are destined to become those of the Indian Navy in the not-too-distant future. Devising an AirSea Battle concept would enable it to parry blows and reassert sea control.
The legal status of Gilgit-Baltistan, which is part of Jammu and Kashmir that is under Pakistani occupation, has remained undefined in successive Pakistani constitutions. Pakistan governs the region with ad hoc presidential ordinances, resulting in transitory political arrangements. It was Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto who first introduced the so-called Northern Areas Governance Order of 1994, after shelving the draconian and inhumane Frontier Crimes Regulation, with which Pakistan ruled the region like a colony.
India has very little leverages in shaping a peaceful, stable and friendly Pakistan but its own progress can make Pakistani society, fearful of being left behind, force a change in the state’s policy orientation.
The promise of 'massive' nuclear retaliation may prove inadequate in staying Pakistani nuclear hand in face of Indian offensives. Inflicting 'unacceptable damage' may appear disproportionate to its leadership if in response to lower order nuclear first use. Therefore, nuclear retaliation could well be of quid pro quo or quid pro quo plus levels with damage not amounting to an 'unacceptable' order.
Afghanistan was a test case for our foreign policy resolve, an arena where while leveraging other tools of foreign policy, use of instruments of force and military diplomacy/intelligence should have been predominant.
The Indian armed forces appear to be driving defence budgets rather than a cold calculation of the country’s desire for ‘adequate’ military capability.
