Ramesh Phadke

Tellis suggests that India seriously consider the prospective fighter’s technical merit, relative cost, its place in the IAF force structure

• Published: February 07, 2011
• Book Review

• Published: 2015
• Book

It is time India devised appropriate tactics to meet the current threat. It is imperative that the armed forces prepare for ‘the most likely scenario’ rather than ‘the worst case scenario’. But to be fair, this can only be done when there exists a clear national military policy/strategy.

• Published: March 02, 2016
• IDSA Comments

The 1965 Indo-Pak War came when India was in the midst of a major military expansion. India did not want to escalate matters when Pakistani forces invaded Kutch in April 1965 and accepted a ceasefire with British mediation. Although the government allowed the use of Indian Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft on 1 September 1965, action remained localised to the Chhamb area for five days. This was primarily because of India’s desire to avoid all-out war. IAF was used for counter air, air defence, and in support of the ground forces.

• Published: July 2015
• Journal of Defence Studies

Instant, hard and yet calibrated military, diplomatic and political response is needed since mere warnings and protestations have proved grossly inadequate to change Pakistan’s behaviour.

• Published: January 10, 2013
• IDSA Comments

India should put Pakistan on parole and watch its behaviour for 20 years before even beginning to think of any concessions in Siachen or elsewhere.

• Published: November 08, 2012
• IDSA Comments

In the ongoing debate on the 1962 War, two issues have not been adequately addressed: the myth that the Indian Army had not provided viable military options, and the reasons for the non-use of the combat potential of the Indian Air Force.

• Published: October 31, 2012
• IDSA Comments

In the absence of a sustained and visible commitment to rapid indigenisation, India’s dependence on foreign suppliers for its defence needs will only increase and India will sadly remain a ‘knowledge colony’.

• Published: September 18, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The range, speed, armament carrying capacity and the ability to accurately deliver a variety of weapons against different targets make the current IAF fleet of just over 32 squadrons far more formidable than when the IAF had almost 39.5 squadrons.

• Published: February 13, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The Rafale’s upkeep and maintenance would demand a very high level of training and skills both by the pilots and technical personnel. Above all, stupid mistakes must be avoided by bringing about a fundamental change in our outlook to peacetime operations.

• Published: February 06, 2012
• IDSA Comments