In different international bodies and in statements by various world leaders, universalisation and a possible revision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are figuring quite frequently. Certainly, in the emerging context for universalisation, the relationship between India and the NPT may be reviewed. Several relevant options are emerging to define the relationship between India and the NPT. This has put the relationship between India and the NPT in the international limelight.
Since its indefinite extension in 1995, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been on the sidelines, with its utility eroding in the post-Cold War security environment, as new instruments took over the anti-proliferation mantle. Being the cornerstone of the regime and near-universal in character, the NPT has nonetheless survived despite a host of challenges threatening its existence. Its future, however, is imperilled unless the member states take remedial actions, including a restructuring of the treaty to suit 21st century requirements.
Amongst the challenges that bedevil the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) today, the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) 2010 will have to particularly handle two issues: one, right of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under Article IV over the entire nuclear fuel cycle; two, identification by nuclear weapon states (NWS) of credible moves under Article VI for realising disarmament. In addressing the two interlinked issues, the RevCon has an opportunity to refocus the 40-year-old treaty into an effective instrument of non-proliferation and disarmament—its original twin objectives.
Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences.
This article lists the major issues before the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and goes into the politics behind them. It concludes that as long as the treaty remains iniquitous, it will not be able to prevent nuclear proliferation. The forthcoming nuclear summit in April 2010 provides an opportunity for all countries to work towards a nuclear weapons convention, which outlaws nuclear weapons and promotes genuine nuclear disarmament.
With the 'world without nuclear weapons' speech by President Obama and the other moves, indications are good for the next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Progress has to be made on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the proposed fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT), Negative Security Assurance (NSA), and reducing the role of nuclear weapons. On the non-proliferation side, the Additional Protocol must be made a standard, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) strengthened, and NPT withdrawal acted on decisively.
The expiry of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-1 (START-1) in 2009 and an urgent need to conclude a new US-Russian agreement on strategic nuclear weapons so that the oldest and biggest nuclear powers demonstrate some progress in implementing Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in proximity of the 2010 NPT Review Conference has drawn international attention to the interface between the progress/crisis in nuclear disarmament and strengthening/weakening of the NPT regime.
The nuclear non-proliferation regime, despite being frequently criticised for an alleged lack of effectiveness, is in fact an amazing success story. The number of states which had conducted nuclear weapons activities in various stages but which have terminated them at one point surpasses the number of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWSs) by far. At the apex of its success, however, the regime is threatened by erosion from three different directions. A small number of rule-breakers and outsiders undermine its central objective: to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
Disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, has long been a dream of world ever since it witnessed the horrors of the effects of its use in the Second World War. Nuclear disarmament is likely to be the centre of debate at the forthcoming NPT Review Conference.
Nuclear disarmament is once again fashionable. If rhetoric was sufficient, nuclear disarmament should be easily achievable. But what the rhetoric hides is not only the difficulty of achieving nuclear disarmament, but also the instrumental manner in which that rhetoric is being deployed. At the height of the Cold War, the two superpowers traded a number of detailed proposals for controlling the atom.
In international relations, the more powerful have a way of underplaying history or overemphasising it, depending on how helpful or otherwise it may be in promoting their immediate objectives. It is interesting to note that even a country like India, which is beginning to sense the stirrings of power, is tending to fall into the same pattern.
The failure of the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) almost signalled doom for the treaty. The NPT, since it came into force, has always travelled a slippery slope encountering various hurdles on the way. Its problem did not end even after it acquired the ‘near universal’ status. With the exception of India, Pakistan and Israel, all countries have joined the treaty, though North Korea withdrew from it and later conducted a couple of nuclear tests.
The last couple of decades have seen a colossal change in terms of the influence that computers can have on the battlefield, with defence pundits claiming it to be the dawn of a new era in warfare. Under these circumstances, there has been a gradual paradigm shift in military thinking and strategies from the strategic aspect to the tactical aspect of cyber warfare, laying more emphasis on it being a potent force multiplier. The author believes this is wrong and rather than cyber warfare being an enhancement of traditional operations, the latter will be force multipliers of cyber warfare.
Experts are still searching for a settled answer to the causes and aftermath of the violent unrest between the Han and Uyghurs in China's Xinjiang province that erupted on July 5, 2009. The long-simmering resentment of the native Uyghurs against the Han-dominated groups coupled with the deepening economic crisis is believed to have been the major reason for the ethnic riots. The questions being asked now are: Was it a crisis of ethnicity or economy? Why did the crisis manifest itself this way? And was the crisis a prelude to China's terrorism problem?
That a nuclear taboo exists indicates the divide between conventional and nuclear war. It is no wonder then that India – though a nuclear weapons power – deems nuclear weapons not for military use but for deterrence purposes. These are, therefore, taken as political weapons. Seeking to deter use of nuclear weapons against India or its forces anywhere, India's nuclear doctrine promises ‘massive’ punitive retaliatory strike in case of nuclear use by its enemy. This is evidence that the Indian leadership is cognizant of the special status of nuclear weapons.
The recent events in Iran have raised a number of questions: one interesting question concerns the real character of the US interests in that country. There are obvious strategic US interests like monitoring and early warning stations, oil interests, military interests, including sales of huge quantities of modern weaponry, and so on.
