Beijing’s intent to incorporate the polar regions within China’s greater maritime strategy, explore their resources and subsequently emerge as a polar great power is quite evident in its initiatives like the Polar Silk Road. In light of growing global ambition and resource needs, the Arctic could become another theatre of India–China competition.
The recent statement by the former Amirs (chiefs) of Jama’at-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, which was banned in 2019, seems to be a tactical move by the leadership to save the organisational structure from any kind of damage and to continue Islamisation of the society at the grassroots level.
It may seem premature to discuss the advent of an illiberal global order, however, the numerous catalytic events of recent years and the apparent decline of American heft in shaping global norms and structures might indicate that the international system is on the cusp of a major transformation.
Given its geo-strategic importance, Indonesia’s cooperation is crucial for success of any regional security framework in the Indo-Pacific. It is therefore important that regional powers pay attention to Indonesia’s concern over Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under the newly constituted AUKUS, especially in view of the increasing US–China rivalry in the region.
The rising threat of Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) since the Taliban’s capture of Afghanistan could be a red herring as it seems to be overplayed by Pakistan to mainstream and help the Taliban regime.
The geo-strategic location of Afghanistan has tempted many dominant powers to intervene but no great power has been able to occupy or attain predominance in the country. The US failed to fulfill its geo-strategic objectives even after two decades of war and peace efforts aimed at either subduing or pacifying insurgency in the country.
Certain sections of the elite in China seem to be speaking out against the tightening political control under President Xi Jinping. Whether the Chinese Communist Party is failing to elicit loyalty among its own members, and resorting to widespread ideological control to retain its legitimacy is a pertinent question to ponder upon.
Neither Russia and China nor the Central Asian countries have a clear strategy on how to handle the rapidly changing canvas in Afghanistan. An ambivalent waiting game tied by slow calibrated response has become the sine qua non strategy for the stakeholders in Afghanistan.
Beijing’s stance on Afghanistan’s political crisis and its approach towards the Taliban regime is a critical variable that will shape the geometrics of the China–Taliban–Pakistan nexus versus India and the West.
