Bridge on the Bay
Look East/Act East Policy rides on the regional cooperation in the Southeast Asian region and our northeast region is the engine to further our cause.
- V.S. Ranade |
- January-March 2022 |
- Journal of Defence Studies
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Look East/Act East Policy rides on the regional cooperation in the Southeast Asian region and our northeast region is the engine to further our cause.
Air power is one of the most important elements of a military campaign and therefore, all countries strive to achieve Air Supremacy. The world has witnessed the influence of Air Power in wars, including Air Superiority of manned aircraft, in the last century. However, this paradigm of Air Superiority only through manned aircraft, and noticeably Fighter aircraft, may be challenged in this century through Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Future wars may be fought with a combination of both manned and unmanned aircraft.
As the bulk of India’s foreign trade transits through sea, it turns sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean strategically important for India. The newly independent India did not pay adequate attention to this factor. Consequently, within two decades of independence continuous flow of unprotected large volume of India’s sea trade had become a strategic target for its adversaries. In this context, during the 1971 India–Pakistan war, India efficiently protected its vital sea lanes, ensuring that goods and commodities continued to reach Indian ports.
The 1971 Indo-Pak War can be described as the Indian Navy’s (IN’s) finest hour. Until then, save for limited action in Liberation of Goa in 1961 and defensive operations in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the IN had not been called ‘into harm’s way’ or for offensive action in a major manner. Consequently, the spectacular show in 1971 may have surprised or even stunned many observers or analysts in the military/maritime realm.
India had all of two weeks to achieve the politico-military end state of liberating Bangladesh, before the international community intervened to impose a ceasefire. Speed and tempo of operations were imperative.Indian Armed Forces exploited the special operations capabilities to ensure an early fall of Dhaka. The airborne assault at Tangail, the audacious helilift of troops across the mighty Meghna by General Sagat Singh with effective support from the Mukti Bahini contributed to the early fall of Dhaka with most defences still intact.
The formation of Bangladesh resulted from the military operations undertaken in erstwhile East Pakistan by the Indian Armed Forces. The Indian Air Force established air superiority in the first few days which enabled land operations to be executed smoothly. The Indian Army outclassed the Pakistan Army by avoiding capture of towns and built-up areas. They headed for the capital Dacca which was the centre of gravity of the operations. The operations were preceded by detailed planning, logistics build up and war gaming which led to outclassing the enemy in the field.
India displayed its firm political resolve, robust military capability and deliberate decision-making process in the 1971 India–Pakistan War to achieve significant strategic success. The politico-military strategy evolved progressively from a cautious response to a firm decision to employ the Armed Forces at an appropriate time as the last instrument. India adroitly calibrated an indigenous freedom movement led by Mukti Bahini and concurrently launched a diplomatic outreach campaign to shape the environment in its favour.
Introduction
The ‘Lightning Campaign’ to liberate Bangladesh during the 1971 IndoPak War was one of the finest moments in Indian history. The ‘Battle of Garibpur’ fought on 21–22 November 1971, before the Indo-Pak War was officially declared on 3 December 1971, was a key battle in East Pakistan where a single infantry battalion, 14 Punjab (Nabha Akal) supported by a squadron of armour and intimate artillery support, successfully fought a Pakistani attack by infantry and armour.
The Partition of India in August 1947 was a colossal man-made catastrophe resulting in the formation of Pakistan, with its east and west wings.Jinnah’s two-nation theory ignored the diverse culture and geographical settings. East Pakistan got its first political shock when Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy—a popular mass leader—did not become the chief minister of East Pakistan. Further, in the initial period of state formation, there was forceful imposition of Perso-Arabic culture and Urdu language by the leadership of Pakistan, consisting majorly of Punjabis and Pathans from West Pakistan.
This article seeks to re-analyse the pattern of Pakistani response to the demands from East Bengal as a federating unit with distinct linguistic
and regional identity, which led to eventual vivisection of Pakistan, and examine whether in the post-1971 years Pakistan learnt any lesson from
its Bangladesh experience and used it to deal with similar assertions at ethnic and regional levels.
The military has been an integral part of Pakistan’s survival since the formation of that nation state. The idea of the country was based on a united Islamic religion, but series of events dampened the nation’s integrity. In the absence of robust political institutions to promote democracy, the bureaucratic and military apparatus made inroads into polity and expanded their role as dominant powerful elite in the initial years after independence.
Introduction
This article looks at the real issues that were responsible for destabilising the centre of gravity of Pakistan Army in the eastern sector. Lieutenant
The only unfettered use of air power in India’s wars was in 1971, and it produced disproportionate and decisive outcomes. IAF’s air strategy, the extent of its role in contributing to the failure of Pakistan’s strategy in the west, and the vast range of operations carried out towards the surface war on both fronts simultaneously, are relatively unknown.
The objective of this article is to analyse the role of language and culture in the creation of Bangladesh. The ethno-linguistic identity of the people
The India–Pakistan War of 1971 happened at the time when the US was developing a new balance of power relationship in Asia with US-ChinaPakistan at its core. This new balance of power initiative was based on the United States’ ‘Opening to China’ through secret diplomacy with the help of Pakistan, and this resulted in a convergence of interests of US, China and Pakistan.
While discussing the roots of strategic culture of any country, it is important to understand its core belief systems, enshrined in its spiritual, philosophical, political and military treatises that may have played a fundamental role in shaping its collective psyche and by extension, its patterns of perception and behaviour.
Constructivism argues that the behaviour of actors in international politics is shaped by factors like identity, norms, rules, etc. Though it has been well argued that these factors shape and sometimes regulate the behaviours of political actors, not much has been written about the formation of such norms and how the identity of a political actor becomes operational through them.
Kamandaka’s Nitisara was composed after the classic and the only surviving root text of Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Both the texts are important milestones in Indic heritage and tradition of political science. They share many fundamental and enduring similarities in concepts and vocabulary. There are also dissimilarities and some unique features such as Kamandaka’s strategy of Upeksha (neglect, diplomatic indifference) reused and revived during the Indian freedom struggle.



