China

In the last one year, Xi’s has consolidated his position within the Standing Committee of the Party Politbureau, elevated information security as China’s core concern and focused on internal security as a result of slowing of the economy. Taking a cue from Mao, Xi has promoted the spirit of nationalism in China and like Mao he is finding a foreign target for nothing subsumes internal dissidence as does the promotion of xenophobic tendencies.

China’s border intrusions have been bolstered by a steady and committed expansion of its military hardware and infrastructure in Tibet and neighbouring provinces. The improvement of surface transportation near the LAC has resulted in larger military presence and augmented rapid deployment capacities of the PLA and the PLAAF.

There is no doubt that this an audacious foreign policy gambit played by China. Un-named Chinese officials have been quoted in the Chinese press to say that China is willing to instigate strategic confrontation against Japan and are prepared for it to last a 'long time'.

The primary aim of the ADIZ is to provide a lead time to the air force, in case of hostile aircraft intruding, and take appropriate actions to counter them. The establishment of the ADIZ in the East China Sea by China is a signal of its assertiveness and authority over the Senkaku/Diaoyu island and probably a readiness to escalate it.

China has created a furor by announcing the creation of an Air Defence identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Senkakau/Diayou islands in East China Sea. There is now little doubt that China is displaying a muscular foreign policy and most countries in Asia would be wary of a hard response because of the growing dependence of their economies on China.

In this second-part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan suggests that in the recent Indian strategic discourse, commentators have been exulting the US ‘Asia Pivot’ and seriously hoped that the idea will offset China’s regional outreach, for it also appeared similar to India’s own ‘Look East’ policy, which to an extent enabled New Delhi to ruffle a few feathers in the East Asian region.

The Arctic is beginning to test the stage-managed optics of China and Russia’s ‘strategic partnership’. Friction was most recently on display after the Arctic Council’s May 2013 decision to confer permanent observer status on Beijing. The Chinese media celebrated the move as an affirmation of the nation’s ‘legitimate rights’ in Arctic affairs.1 Russian officials were much less enthusiastic.

Clubbing the visits to Russia and China is a smart move. But the prime minister will also need to indulge in smart diplomacy to deal with a number of ticklish issues and will have to convince his counterparts that Indian foreign policy is independent and follows national interests.

For the past decade, China is known to have actively used ‘three warfares’ (3Ws) strategy—media, psychological and legal warfare—to weaken its adversaries in regions constituting what it perceives to be its ‘core interests’. While a wide range of tools have been deployed, the attacks have remained mostly confined to Taiwan and South-East Asian states involved in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. But with Beijing’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) growing, there is evidence emerging of the 3Ws strategy being put to use against India.