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    LNG: Europe’s Ray of Hope? August 30, 2022 Anandita Bhada

    Europe has been reeling under an energy crisis for the last few months. Amidst the war in Ukraine, which has seen both the European Union and Russia seek to wean themselves away from their mutual energy dependencies, the most pressing issue for Europe today appears to stave-off an energy blackout. While measures such as regulating energy consumption can only a short-term measure to overcome the shortages, the key challenge will be in finding viable long-term substitutes.

    The lack of excess global oil and gas capacity to compensate for the Russian shortfall is likely to lead Europe to explore energy alternatives in the form of renewable, coal, nuclear and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), each with its own set of corresponding challenges.

    While a full transition to renewables is likely to take time, the focus on fossil fuels like coal would push back the continent’s ambitious climate and green targets – an issue close to Europe’s heart. Similarly, nuclear energy has remained unpopular, particularly in the aftermath of the meltdown of Fukushima reactors. LNG can help cushion the blow, as evident in the huge uptick in European LNG imports. Yet, capacity and infrastructure constraints as well as its impact on carbon emissions present their own set of quandaries.

    Against the backdrop of these dynamics, the pertinent question is can LNG offer Europe a lifeline amidst an unprecedented energy crisis?  

    European Efforts towards Acquiring LNG

    European imports of Russian gas have steadily declined either voluntarily or on account of Russia weaponising energy, from 174.3 bcm in 2021 to 20.5 bcm in February 2022, propelling the push towards LNG imports.1 The intrinsic nature of LNG, in terms of storage and transport which enable large quantities to be carried in shipping tankers, makes it an efficient alternative. This has led to a renewed focus on fast-tracking the commissioning of an additional 33 LNG terminals apart from ensuring efficiency of scale in the existing 29 terminals.

    Today, steps are being taken to expand capacities at the Świnoujście terminal in Poland, Adriatic Terminal in Italy, and Gate terminal in the Netherlands. With a gestation period of three to four years, these projects are expected to come online by 2025. Notably, Spain which houses the largest number of operational terminals in Europe, at six, faces structural constraints on account of limited connections with rest of Europe.

    In contrast, Germany which houses a well-connected system of pipeline for gas distribution is the only European country with a sizeable coastline lacking an LNG terminal or even a Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU). To overcome this structural constraint, the Olaf Scholz government has approved the construction of an onshore LNG terminal apart from leasing four FSRUs (at Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbuttel and Stade,) with at least the one at Wilhelmshaven becoming functional by this winter.2

    Europe’s long coastline, which is essential for receiving LNG ships, is a key enabler in attracting imported LNG. This puts countries like Spain, France and Italy, vis-à-vis the landlocked states of Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, at a considerable advantage to build regasification terminals along their shores. These countries can emerge as the fulcrum for redistribution to rest of Europe, aided by existing pipelines at a minimalist cost. 

    Similarly, FSRUs which are intrinsically mobile offer the advantage of freeing up vital real estate along the busy European coastline. They can also be readily leased out from other states, unlike the time consuming construction of on shore LNG terminals. Certain old LNG carriers are also being converted to FSRUs in a bid to provide increased alternatives in a short time span.

    This two-pronged LNG strategy is a key step in Europe’s diversification. In fact, LNG should seamlessly blend in with existing European energy infrastructure on account of Europe relying largely on gas to meet its household and commercial consumption.

    Challenges

    The biggest challenge, however, for Europe today is the lack of excess global capacity. This is notwithstanding the fact that the US has emerged as the largest exporter of LNG to Europe in the first half of 2022. It has increased its LNG supplies to Europe from 34 bcm in 2021 to 39 bcm till June 2022. 3 Unsurprisingly, US energy firms are finding it more profitable to divert their cargoes towards Europe even at the cost of paying contractual penalties to their earlier export markets.4

    Meanwhile, Europe’s attempts to buy additional LNG will reverberate across the world. Given the imbalance between demand and supply, which has pushed gas prices to their historic highs, the demand from EU is likely to create a shortfall elsewhere. This is particularly likely to be acute in Asia and Latin America.  During the period 2016-2021, US LNG supplies to South Korea, Japan, and China accounted for 1.4 trillion, 1 trillion, and 865 billion cubic feet respectively.5 In fact, last year, China surpassed Japan to become the biggest importer of LNG, accounting for 21.3 per cent of global LNG imports.6

    Even if these countries were to consider importing the European share of gas from Russia (as LNG due to the absence of gas pipelines), they would face the hurdle of low availability of LNG shipping tankers. The fact remains that a lion’s share of global shipping companies are headquartered in the West.7 And there is unlikely to be an appetite among these companies to trade in Russian energy for fear of western sanctions. They are also unlikely to forego supersized profits arising out of Europe’s pressing need for new sources of energy.

    Incidentally, this emphasis on LNG will likely come at the cost of diverting finances from elsewhere. New investments in LNG infrastructure could eat into Europe’s green fund. Previously, European plans to consider natural gas as a bridge for green transition did not require additional investments.

    Conclusion

    Today, Europe’s attempts at raising the cost of Russia’s war in Ukraine by weaning itself off Russian energy appears to be backfiring. Energy shortages and astronomical prices have led to an unprecedented domestic turbulence. Not only is Europe scrambling to shore up supplies amidst global scarcity but is also doing so at rates which could undermine its economic and political stability. Quick solutions to Europe’s energy quagmire, however, appear unlikely. Meanwhile, Russia continues to earn an energy windfall despite shipping far lower quantities post the war in Ukraine. 

    In its diversification attempts, Europe appears to be banking on US LNG, with American imports making up for 10 per cent of imports from Russia, even if they are priced at a premium. This is likely to lead to a further strengthening of the trans-Atlantic partnership. However, Europe’s long-term energy security would perhaps lie in further diversifying energy sources apart from tapping its own green potential. For the short-term, however, Europe would likely have to brace for an acute energy pain.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 Europe and Eurasia Gas, Russia, Europe system/files/thumb_image/2015/gaspipeline-t.jpg
    Applicability of CVC Guidelines to Defence Procurement August 29, 2022 Amit Cowshish

    A question that often worries those involved in procurement of goods and services in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Services is whether the procedure laid down in the manuals they follow is complete in all respects. There are, additionally, provisions of the General Financial Rules (GFR), supplementary instructions issued by other agencies like the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), and the tender guidelines issued by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC).

    Many training programmes on acquisition include a session or two on the ‘CVC instructions’, which reinforces the impression that it is not enough to follow the departmental manuals and that one must also make sure that all CVC guidelines are complied with. Considering that the CVC has issued as many as 72 circulars containing various guidelines on public procurement till the end of June 2022, it would be an enormous task for anyone to sift through all these circulars to ensure compliance with the CVC guidelines. This impression merits dispelling.

    To set the context, in the absence of any central law on public procurement in India, spending by the ministries and departments on procurement of goods and services is governed by the general principles laid down in the GFRs, which were first promulgated in 1947, and whose latest version was released by the Ministry of Finance’s (MoF’s) Department of Expenditure (DoE) in 2017.1

    These rules deal with a wide range of subjects from budget formulation and government accounts to inventory management and grants-in-aid given by the government. There is only one small chapter that deals with procurement of goods and services, though another three even smaller chapters on works, inventory and contract management also have some bearing on the subject.

    Cognisant of the fact that the GFRs are grossly inadequate for addressing the complexities of procurement by big departments like Defence and Railways, the framers of these rules permit them to issue detailed instructions ‘broadly in conformity with the general rules contained in’ the relevant chapter of the GFRs.2 Pursuant to this enabling clause, several ministries have promulgated their own procurement manuals containing detailed procedural instructions to address the peculiarities of their acquisition programmes.

    The MoF itself has promulgated three procurement manuals: Manual on Procurement of Goods, Manual on Procurement of Works, and Manual on Procurement of Consultancy & Other Services.3 These manuals are followed by the ministries and departments which spend meagre amounts on procurement of routine goods and services and, therefore, do not need to formulate bespoke procedures for procurement.

    The MoD too has promulgated at least four such manuals. The primary MoD manuals, currently in force, are the Defence Procurement Manual 2009 (DPM 2009), Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP 2020), and Defence Works Procedure 2020 (DWP 2020). These manuals contain the procedure for revenue and capital procurements, and execution of civil works, respectively. A separate Procurement Manual promulgated in 2020 applies to all types of procurement by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).4

    Since these manuals have been, explicitly or implicitly, promulgated in terms of the aforesaid enabling clause in GFR 2017, the provisions thereof are, ipso facto, in conformity with the GFRs and other relevant government instructions, including those issued by the CVC. In fact, para 1.1.2 of DPM 2009 clearly states that it is ‘laid down in terms of Rule 135 of the General Financial Rules, 2005’, which corresponded to analogous clause in GFR 2017.

    More to the point, para 1.5.1 of DPM 2009 states that ‘The provisions contained in this Manual are in conformity with other Government manuals like the General Financial Rules, Financial Regulations (Defence Services Regulations), as also other instructions issued by the Government and the Central Vigilance Commission from time to time’.

    This should have put all apprehensions at rest, but it hasn’t. There are two reasons why the doubt about the need to factor in the CVC instructions while taking decisions keeps nagging the personnel involved in procurement of goods and services, despite the specific provisions in DPM 2009 quoted above.

    The first reason is that DAP 2020, and its earlier versions, which regulates the armed forces’ capital budget, does not contain provisions analogous to the above-mentioned provisions in DPM 2009 and similar provisions in the DRDO Procurement Manual 2020. The second, more important, reason is that DPM 2009 itself nullifies the confidence generated by the aforesaid provisions by stipulating in para 1.5.4 that the ‘provisions of this Manual would be subject to general or special instructions/orders/ amendments which the Government may issue from time’.

    A notification posted by the CVC on its website in July 20225 addresses the procurement executives’ dilemma to some extent. The notification mentions that while presently, guidelines are issued by the CVC, DoE, NITI Ayog, DPIIT, etc., the Commission had come to the ‘logical conclusion’ after deliberations with the DoE, that ‘it would only be appropriate if public procurement guidelines are issued from D/o Expenditure’ only. This is because ‘multiple organizations issuing guidelines, procurement executives were facing problems in having a single authoritative source of reference’.6

    In pursuance of this decision, the DoE has already updated its manuals7 in which ‘all the CVC guidelines on public procurement have been merged’ and consequently ‘all the earlier guidelines of CVC on public procurement have been withdrawn’. The CVC notification goes on to say that all the organisations ‘are required to update/align their procurement guidelines/manuals in line with the above Manuals of D/o Expenditure and upload them on their website at the earliest for easy access of their officials and other stakeholders’.8

    The ball is now in MoD’s court, as well as that of other ministries’ which have analogous manuals, as the CVC’s notification calls for immediate review of all the manuals promulgated by it to ensure that all government instructions, guidelines, and directives issued till date that must be followed by those engaged in procurement of goods and services are incorporated therein. But this one-time measure will not be good enough.

    The MoD must institute a system to take cognisance of the instructions as and when issued by the DoE, which will henceforth be the nodal department for issuing procurement related instructions in future, and to promptly incorporate them in the MoD manuals. This alone will inspire confidence among the procurement executives and hasten decision-making. This will work if the task of reviewing the manuals is coordinated by a single authority within the MoD which, apart from immediate updating of the manuals, will also ensure that there are no ambiguities and contradictions within and across the manuals as regards the essential procedural requirements.  

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    • 1. General Financial Rules 2017, Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.
    • 2. Ibid., ‘Chapter 6: Procurement of Goods and Services’, Rule 141 which reads: This chapter contains the general rules applicable to all Ministries or Departments, regarding procurement of goods required for use in the public service. Detailed instructions relating to procurement of goods may be issued by the procuring departments broadly in conformity with the general rules contained in this Chapter.
    • 3. These manuals are posted on the DoE website but could not be accessed on 29 August 2022. See ‘Department of Expenditure’.
    • 4. With the reorganisation of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) into seven Defence Public Sector Undertakings on 15 October 2015, the OFB Procurement Manual 2018 is not mentioned here.
    • 5. The CVC notification is available at ‘Central Vigilance Commission’.
    • 6. Ibid.
    • 7. The latest version of all the three manuals, updated in June 2022, have been uploaded on the CVC website. See Central Vigilance Commission, ‘Tender Guidelines’, June 2022.
    • 8. Ibid.
    		 Defence Economics & Industry Defence Procurement system/files/thumb_image/2015/defence-t_0.jpg
    UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Lessons Learnt and the Future of UN Peacekeeping July-September 2022 Chander Prakash

    The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has seen conflict and violence ever since its independence, for varied reasons. The main causes are its abundant and ill-managed natural resources, lack of institutions, ethnic issues, lack of state authority and undisciplined and ill-trained national security forces. Taking note of the conflict, the humanitarian situation and the threat to international peace and security, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), from time to time, has authorised the deployment of peacekeeping missions to help maintain territorial integrity, stabilise the situation and assist in nation-building. In this respect, for the first time in the history of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) for peace enforcement was authorised by the UNSC, to protect civilians under eminent threat and to bring peace and stability to the country. This article describes the long history of UN peacekeeping in the DRC to highlight how peacekeeping has evolved over the years to meet the challenges encountered. It examines the issues of the use of force, the role and effectiveness of the FIB and the need for institution-building. The aim is to draw some useful lessons to improve effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. Due to global recession and adverse economic effects of Covid-19, it is unlikely that the UNSC will allot more funds and resources for peacekeeping. A change in approach for managing conflicts by the international community should therefore be expected.

    		 UN Peacekeeping
    India's Role in Global Governance: Assessment of Engagement with Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Arpita Anant

    An analysis of India in global governance showcases India as a versatile actor. Its role in the governance of different issue areas namely climate change, development assistance, trade and disarmament has been tempered by the nature of the regime in each case. As an actor in the governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, India has been active participant on various fronts and has made interventions on various issues in the global governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It has shown the will to stay engaged with the many forums in the UN which deal with these issues over the years. It has gone out of its way to participate in the Security Council debates on peacekeeping and peacebuilding even while it is not serving a term on the Council. It is keenly aware of the normative, administrative and operational aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. More importantly, it has demonstrated the way to work with the system to improve the governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

    About The Author

    Dr. Arpita Anant is Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. She holds a PhD in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University. Her Ph.D thesis was entitled “Group Rights in the Indian and International Discourses”. She was awarded the ICSSR Doctoral Fellowship and the Commonwealth Visiting Fellowship (Canada) during 2001-02 to undertake doctoral research. Her current area of research is India's multilateralism at the United Nations with particular focus on peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and sustainable development. Her wider areas of interest are global governance and India's foreign policy. She is the editor of Non-State Armed Groups in South Asia: A Preliminary Structured Focused Comparison (New Delhi, Pentagon Security International, 2012) and author of Beyond Stereotypes: Contours of the Transition in Jammu and Kashmir (IDSA Monograph No. 16, April 2013) and Development and India's Economic Multilateralism: Where From…Where to? (IDSA Monograph No.68, December 2020).

    		 Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN India, Global Governance system/files/thumb_image/2015/monograph78-t.jpg
    UN Peacekeeping in Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2003–2010 July-September 2022 Rajesh Isser

    Air power has played a critical role in counter-insurgency and irregular warfare across the world. India’s own rich experience is full of documented
    roles of air power in such campaigns. This article documents the unique experience of Indian air power in ‘robust’ peacekeeping under the
    United Nations (UN) flag in Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003–2010. A modelling is attempted to understand doctrinal and conceptual issues of this experience. Lessons are gleaned to improve air power’s effectiveness in such less-than-war situations. This is an imperative in light of the increasing importance of protection of civilians during conflicts.

    		 Air Power, UN Peacekeeping
    Contemporary Technology in Peacekeeping Operations July-September 2020 Swaim Prakash Singh

    Since the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping has evolved from monitoring peace treaties to multidimensional peacekeeping operations tasked with rebuilding states and their institutions during and after conflict. In June 2014, An Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping recommended investigating how innovative technology can strengthen peacekeeping missions. The report suggested greater use of advanced technologies, such as increased use of ground and airborne sensors and other technical data sources, advanced data analytics, and information fusion to aid in data integration. Since then, the United Nations has continuously pursued efforts in this field. India, during its tenure of the presidency of the UN Security Council in August 2021, raised three significant issues. These were ‘Accountability of Crimes against UN Peacekeepers’, ‘Technology for Peacekeeping’ and ‘UNITE Aware Situational Awareness Technology Platform’.

    This article attempts to highlight these issues with possible solutions from contemporary technology that can be used on a larger scale by UN security forces in various missions for maintaining peace, situational awareness with rapid decision-making and conflict resolution. In addition, this article highlights the importance of sticking to the basics to arrive at specific solutions. It also presents a perspective on exploring United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Africa as a potential market for self-reliance under the ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan’.

    		Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN Solar Energy, Peacekeeping
    UN Peacekeeping and Ambiguity in Normative UN Norms July-September 2022 A.K. Bardalai

    When UN peacekeeping missions get deployed, adherence to the UN norms helps the missions get legitimacy, earn credibility, and find better acceptance in society. The UN norms namely the three principles of peacekeeping, which were conceptualised in 1958 have further evolved with different interpretations making the norms ambiguous impacting the performance of the UN peacekeeping operations.

    		 Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN UN Peacekeeping
    Multidimensional Peacekeeping Protection Mandate and Recalibration of the UN Military Peacekeepers July-September 2022 Kulwant Kumar Sharma

    The United Nations has introduced a layered approach to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) with wide-ranging enablers based on many reviews. Accordingly, a new resolution on the protection of civilians (POC) was adopted by the UN Security Council in 1999. The study attempts to understand the complexities of multidimensional PKOs, POC, 2019 policy, specific role of the UN military force and the need for new structuring and training of the UN military presence in the mission areas. A systematic reviews based study, looks at the multidimensional peacekeeping as an offshoot of the international theory of multilateralism. The study has analysed the 2019 POC policy in detail and infers that each regulation and guideline needs careful preparation by all peacekeeping components. The same has been analysed in connection with special application to the UN military, to understand the role in the execution of protection mandate. There is a need to re-orient UN peacekeeping military forces to this challenging role, which can only be accomplished by an integration of all resources and understanding protection mandates of other humanitarian components.

    		Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN United Nations, Peacekeeping, UN Peacekeeping
    China-Pakistan Ties and Kashmir: History and Geopolitics Priyanka Singh

    China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the multi-billion dollar flagship project under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has brought the Sino-Pakistan partnership at the centre stage of contemporary strategic discourse. Against this backdrop, the monograph is an attempt to understand how the decades-strong Sino-Pak relationship has evolved intertwined around the issue of Kashmir. It collates/ examines the approaches/policies on the Kashmir issue adopted by the two countries, individually and in combination, before listing out implications and options for India.

    About the Author

    Dr. Priyanka Singh is Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi and associated with the South Asia Centre. She holds an Honours degree in Political Science from Lady Shri Ram College for Women, University of Delhi, and a PhD from the University of Lucknow. Her PhD thesis was titled: “Indo-US Relations in the Last Decade - 1990-2000: Shifting Paradigms”. Her broader research interests include: Sino- Pakistan ties, China-Pakistan-Afghanistan triangular geopolitics, India-US relations, US engagement in Pakistan, Kashmir, CPEC, and the Cross Line of Control Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan. She is the editor of the book The Role of Media in Promoting Regional Understanding in South Asia (Pentagon Press, 2016), and co-editor of Proliferation and Emerging Nuclear Order in the Twenty-First Century (Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2009) and Saving Afghanistan (Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2009).

    		South Asia Pakistan-China Relations, Jammu and Kashmir system/files/thumb_image/2015/monograph77.jpg
    India–Namibia Relations Get a Boost August 22, 2022 Bulbul Prakash

    The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Namibia, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, visited India to attend the 17th CII EXIM Bank Conclave on India–Africa Growth Partnership, which was held on 19–20 July 2022. While the two-day conclave was attended by 40 ministers from 17 African countries, Namibia was one of the five countries which had a dedicated Country Session during the Conclave, apart from the Republic of The Gambia, Zambia, Mauritius and Gabon. Issues related to energy, infrastructure, agriculture and health were discussed during the session.1

    Ms Ndaitwah met Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Minister for Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Bhupender Yadav. India and Namibia signed three Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) related to wildlife conservation, sustainable biodiversity utilisation and employment of diplomatic spouses or dependants. As part of the wildlife pact, India is expected to get eight African cheetahs for captive breeding in Madhya Pradesh's Kuno National Park in August 2022, making it the world's first agreement for the transcontinental transfer of such a large number of carnivorous animals. The MoU between the National Forensic Science University (NFSU) and the Namibian Police Forensic Science Institute (NPFSI) will see India offering Namibia customised training in the fields of forensic science, cybersecurity, digital forensics, wildlife crime investigation, and homeland security.2

    Historical Aspects

    India was one of the first countries to support the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) party, founded in 1960, which led the country to independence from South Africa in 1990.3 The first SWAPO embassy abroad was established in India in 1986. It started a chain of diplomatic recognition by other countries and the inevitable process leading to Namibia's independence.4

    At the Non-Aligned Movement conference in 1986, in Zimbabwe, the 'AFRICA Fund' was established to offer financial help to southern African liberation organisations. The AFRICA Fund Committee held its first summit in January 1987 in New Delhi. Namibia’s anti-colonial struggle gained from such efforts. When the country secured independence in 1990, Prime Minister VP Singh and Rajiv Gandhi, the then leader of the opposition, attended the celebrations at Windhoek.5

    Subsequent high-level visits included those by President Shankar Dayal Sharma in 1995 and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998. Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba visited India in 2009 which resulted in the signing of a number of agreements including those on defence cooperation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Pan-African e-Network and mineral resources.6 President Hage G. Geingob participated in the 3rd India–Africa Forum Summit held in New Delhi in 2015.

    This was followed by the highly successful visit of President Pranab Mukherjee to Namibia in 2016. India signed two MoUs during the visit, on capacity-building for civil servants and establishing the India–Namibia Centre of Excellence in Information Technology (INCEIT), at the Namibia University of Science and Technology (NUST). INCEIT is now offering IT programmes on subjects such as Big Data Technologies, among others, to Namibian students.

    Economic and Commercial Relations

    In the last two decades, strengthening economic cooperation has been the focus of India–Africa relations.7 Significant potential for economic cooperation with Namibia exists in diverse areas such as skill development, affordable housing, and agriculture and minerals, particularly gold and diamonds.

    India–Namibia bilateral trade was worth US$ 251.88 million in 2021–22.8 The Namibia Trade Commission Office was established in Chennai in 2021 by the India Africa Trade Council (IATC) in partnership with the India Namibia Trade Forum (INTF). According to  the present Indian High Commissioner to Namibia, India is currently the second largest exporter to Namibia, after South Africa.9

    The pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors have emerged as key arenas of cooperation. India was among the first countries to provide Covid-19 vaccinations, PPE kits, and other supplies to Namibia to help mitigate the impact of the pandemic.10 India is a world leader when it comes to providing affordable healthcare services and pharmaceutical products. India’s low-cost pharmaceutical industry gives opportunities for Namibia to produce medicines domestically. Namibia also offers a great avenue for Indian companies in agricultural, food processing and animal husbandry industries. The southern African country has benefitted from the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme, which provides training via innovative technical cooperation. Since its inception, the initiative has provided scholarships to over 1,200 Namibians.11

    Apart from the federal level, state governments are also pursuing cooperation. The Madhya Pradesh government, for instance, began the process of setting up a diamond park in Panna in 2021 and to send students to Namibia to learn the intrinsic details of the diamond sector. Namibia, the world's sixth largest producer of rough diamonds, issued trading licences to Indian firms as far back as 2008. Finestar Jewellery & Diamonds, an Indian firm, opened its factory in Namibia in July 2022.

    India’s diamond imports from Namibia over the last five years, accounted for more than half of the country’s total imports of the commodity, as indicated in the table below.



    Year

    2017–18

    2018–19

    2019–20

    2020–21

    2021–22

    Import of non-industrial diamonds (unworked) from Namibia (in US$ Million)

     

    53.62

     

    44.72

     

    14.89

     

    15.16

     

    0.81

    Total Import to country

    (in US$ Million)

    62.20

    53.55

    28.54

    30.23

    45.99

    Source: Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India

    Defence Cooperation

    Defence collaboration between India and Namibia dates back to the mid-1990s, when an Indian Air Force Technical Team (IAFTT) was stationed in Namibia to train the Namibian Air Force helicopter pilots and hone their technical skills.12 In 2011, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) delivered one Cheetah and two Chetak helicopters to the Namibian Air Force.13 The HAL has provided training to Namibian pilots and ground crew in addition to the supply of necessary equipment and spare parts.

    India has also sent military observers to Namibia (1989–91) as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group with the mandate to ensure free and fair elections. Namibia, along with 16 other African countries, participated in the first Africa–India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX) held from 18 March to 27 March 2019 at the Aundh Military station in Pune. The exercise aims to train participating contingents in Humanitarian Mine Assistance (HMA) and Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) under the United Nations Charter through practical and comprehensive discussions and tactical exercises.

    Nuclear Cooperation

    In 2021, Namibia emerged as the world's second largest producer of uranium from mines.14 India signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Namibia in 2009, after it got exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008. However, given that Namibia is a signatory to the Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, uranium exports to India—a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—have not materialised as yet. During former President Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Namibia in 2016, India was assured that legal implications of supplying uranium for peaceful civilian nuclear use were being studied.15 Given that India has an ambitious nuclear energy programme, made up of both indigenously developed reactors and those expected to be set up by foreign companies, a forward movement on this issue will open up economic opportunities to Namibia.

    Conclusion

    Namibia is one of the most peaceful nations in Africa, without any recent inter-group conflict or war. With the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement in place since 2018, Namibia will have access to a wider market. India is also interested in strengthening economic and trading links with African countries through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), of which Namibia is a member. While Africa benefits from India's growing interest in the region, Namibia has the potential to be a key partner.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN India-Africa Relations, India, Africa system/files/thumb_image/2015/ind-namibia-t.jpg

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