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| Title | Date | Date Unique | Author | Body | Research Area | Topics | Thumb |
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| Air Power in UN Peacekeeping | July-September 2022 | Manmohan Bahadur |
Air power has made its presence felt ever since the Wright Flyer took to the air in 1903. The air domain, over the years and in all conflicts, has established itself as a pivotal tool in the hands of the politician and of course, the military exponent. Its attributes of speed, reach, mobility and flexibility along with the ability to be employed in a logistics, humanitarian and/or an offensive role positions it as an ideal tool to be used in all aspects of peace operations. Indeed, India has been at the forefront of such missions for bringing-in peace in troubled lands far and wide. |
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| An Experience in Military Leadership as a Sector Commander in UN Mission in South Sudan | July-September 2022 | K.S. Brar |
South Sudan gained its independence on 9 July 2011, after an overwhelming referendum held in January 2011 and became the youngest country of the world. Although this historic event brought an end to Africa’s longest civil war, the celebrations were short-lived, as the power struggle between Mr Salva Kiir Mayardit, the President (belonging to the majority Dinka tribe) and Dr Riek Machar, the First Vice President (from the second-most populous Nuer tribe) started the cycle of violence which even continues to this day, with some other causative factors not restricted only to this confrontation. |
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| Assessment of India’s UN Missions and Impact on Host Nations | July-September 2022 | M.A.J. Fernandez |
Multifunctional peace operations under the umbrella of United Nations (UN) have become an integral part of the global society to the extent that they are now one of the major regulating institutions of international relations. Over the years, however, as the operational environment has become more complex and stakeholders have increased, peacekeeping has evolved and become just one of the many aspects of multinational peace operations that now include humanitarian assistance, election supervision, repatriation of refugees, disarmament, de-mobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, restoration of the state’s ability to maintain security and enforce rule of law. The intent is to support the founding of legitimate and effective governance institutions. |
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| James Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Role Since Apartheid | January-June 2020 | Aarushi Vikram |
James Hamill, in his book ‘Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Role Since Apartheid” debunks the perception of South Africa as the undisputed leader of Africa and paints South Africa as nothing more than a fragile hegemon. He supports this by arguing that South Africa has been reluctant to assume a hegemonic role, for a range of historical and contemporary reasons. South Africa has generated significant resentment, suspicion and even outright opposition from other African states. It has been unable to popularise its ideals in Africa or build a consensus around them. Lastly, South Africa has suffered from structural flaws in its economy, along with glaring weaknesses in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) created by chronic underfunding. He elaborates on these reasons through four parts in his book. Chapter one gives insight into the country’s regional policy under its three post-apartheid presidents: Nelson Mandela, Jacob Zuma, and Thabo Mbeki. Chapter two is an analysis of South Africa’s numerous image problems in the continent. Chapter three looks into the country’s need to focus on domestic socio-economic change, at the expense of a deep, sustained engagement with other African states and finally, chapter four examines the shortfalls of the SANDF. Hamill introduces South Africa as a hegemonic power. He writes about the perception of South Africa as Africa’s natural leader, peace and conflict manager and chief international interlocutor on security and economic development and balances it out with the contrasting reality of the South African government’s lack of strategic vision for a regional role which has led it to engage in dangerous improvisation and ad hoc decision-making. He states that this perception of South Africa as Africa’s “natural leader” comes as a result of using economic power as an instrument of coercion with non-compliance coming at a high cost along with an increasingly militarised South African state. In the first chapter, he begins by looking into the South African perception under President Nelson Mandela. Under Mandela, South Africa was extremely popular. This can be credited to the personality of Mandela, his dissonance regarding division and demagoguery, and his focus on reconciliation and nation-building. However, despite his popularity, South Africa was viewed with suspicion by some of the continent. There was also resentment which stemmed from the presumptuousness of a newly reconstituted state which was led by a movement which was the recipient of extensive African assistance throughout its liberation struggle. The word ‘hegemony’ had also been strategically replaced by the more diplomatic ‘partnership’. Even so, Hamill opines that Mandela’s foreign-policy interventions were unpredictable to the point of eccentricity. This was viewed by other states as South Africa seeking to dominate the region and impose its values, which was not received well. Contrarily, under Mbeki, there was a clear shift in the emphasis and tone of South Africa’s strategic priorities, especially in relation to the rest of the continent. Mbeki attempted to recover from the perception of South Africa under Mandela as ‘a white state with a black leader’ by developing partnerships with key African powers such as Nigeria, Ghana, Algeria, Mozambique and Tanzania. Mbeki’s reorientation of South Africa succeeded on two contradictory fronts – South Africa’s credentials among the continent’s elites, as also the country’s role as a regional norm entrepreneur seeking to promote its democratic values as wider African values, which is the behaviour of a classic hegemon. While Mbeki managed to improve South Africa’s political standing within Africa, but his diplomatic strategy risked depleting the moral capital South Africa had accumulated in Western states, even though emergence of China as an important African actor provided an alternative to the Western model of political economy. While Mandela and Mbeki’s leadership had some successes and limitations, Jacob Zuma’s presidency failed to make a significant impression on South African foreign policy and was unable to articulate the broadest contours of a ‘Zuma Doctrine’. Zuma shifted the focus of South African politics to domestic politics as a contrast to Mbeki who focused more on South Africa’s standing in the rest of the continent. However, Zuma’s achievements have been negligible, and his presidency consistently reflected his near-continuous struggle for political survival. In his second chapter, Hamill explores the image problem in Africa. Hamill recognises a dissonance in the Western perception of South Africa’s image and the continental perception. While Western states viewed democratic South Africa as one with potential for positive influence on the continent and the state best equipped to lead it, many states within the continent resented Pretoria’s paternalistic role and questioned its legitimacy to act as the leader and chief advocate for the continent. There was great distrust and at times, outright opposition, to South Africa as a leader within the continent. These perceptions led to two-fold outcomes for South Africa. While it offered a certain legitimacy to the state as an international actor, it was viewed as ‘a bully, a self-interested hegemon that acts in bad faith’ within the continent. For instance, while this perception led to South Africa being invited to join the BRICS group, other African states viewed this as the organisation providing an opportunity for South Africa to pursue its national interests to their detriment. Another factor detrimental to the South African image was the prevalent xenophobia within the state. As Hamill notes, a toxic mixture of deprivation and resentment repeatedly resulted in xenophobic attacks on black communities. Furthermore, the government’s post-apartheid immigration policies tended to be framed in a ‘foreigner as a threat’ discourse which only legitimised and emboldened grassroots prejudice. Hamill further characterises South African economic expansion within Africa as problematic. He argues that South Africa’s economic growth reinforced historical inequalities. The trade imbalance falls only slightly to a ratio of 5:1 in South Africa’s favour against the rest of Africa. Further, some of South Africa’s trade practices also highlight discrepancy between the state’s ideals and behaviour. Lastly, Hamill refers to barriers to democracy promotion. He opined that South Africa’s promotion of democracy and human rights has encountered significant practical, if not always public, opposition which has contributed to its flaky image within the continent. Hamill also remarked that while the world looks at South Africa as a key model for resolving intractable conflicts after the experience of the transition from apartheid to democracy, many states within the continent are concerned that South Africa may be promoting a brand of conflict resolution in Africa that is increasingly a caricature of its own peace process. Lastly, Hamill points out that many African states failed to entirely acknowledge South Africa’s experience on the continent and/or the contributions to African progress and wellbeing. In the third chapter of his book, Hamill compares the African Renaissance vis-a-vis the South African Renaissance. He observes that after two decades into the democratic era, the failure to deliver fundamental socio-economic change began to impose serious political costs on the ruling African National Congress. He points out the lack of acknowledgement of the tension between domestic and foreign-based priorities on the government and ANC’s part. In this chapter, Hamill looks into South Africa’s inability to transform due to the structural weaknesses of its economy, widespread poverty in the country and other crippling socio-economic problems that continued to persist in the post-apartheid era. He remarks that South Africa continues to be one of the world’s most unequal societies, with inequality as high as it was in 1994. Moreover, homelessness was exacerbated by the pace of urbanisation in the country. These challenges were to be addressed in an economy near stagnation, and that generated considerable pessimism across all sectors of business. This failure to transform South Africa hampered the state’s ability to provide African leadership and project its influence across the continent. Hamill opines that the event which symbolised the end of South African dominance came in April 2014, when the Nigerian economy supplanted that of South Africa as the continent’s largest. He subsequently also recognises that whereas South Africa’s disengagement from the rest of Africa is neither possible nor desirable, the challenge is to find a way to meet its African responsibilities and contribute effectively to the continental development while pursuing domestic socio-economic adjectives. Finally, in his fourth chapter, Hamill looks into the plight of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). He opines that South Africa might be considered a military hegemon within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) zone and an influential power elsewhere on the continent, despite its reluctance to engage in coercive democracy. SANDF is also viewed as relevant due to conflicts in Africa. Given its implications for state fragility, the demand for peace operations on the continent is likely to grow. These problems are likely to become South Africa’s problems due to its reputation as perhaps the most militarily capable African state. Hamill remarks that SANDF’s current crisis in capability and operational effectiveness has been a long time in the making. The practical consequences of the deterioration are such that South Africa increasingly lacks the capacity of effective intervention in other African states, both unilaterally and as part of a multilateral mission. Hamill also recognised the barriers to increasing the defence budget. In conclusion, Hamill states that South Africa’s material and ideational capabilities to assume the role of a hegemonic power in Africa in the democratic era was deficient during the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. He also concludes that the African National Congress finds itself in more strained political circumstances due to domestic socio-economic challenges which restrict the country’s ability to help Africa. He also writes that due to tangible constraints on diplomatic interventions and real limitations in terms of material sources, South Africa will have to accept a more modest role within the continent and the actual scope of having a hegemon in Africa in the near future is unlikely. Lastly, he remarks that lack of skilful leadership, intellectual agility and political finesse - especially under Jacob Zuma - is the biggest challenge for South Africa in the new multipolarity emerging in Africa. Hamill summarises the perception regarding South Africa as a key international and domestic actor under Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. He highlights all the present barriers which limit the role of South Africa as a hegemon within the African continent. However, there are certain gaps within his work. Hamill’s work is perception oriented, focusing on failures of the state. South Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction is the biggest driver towards its recognition globally as the continent’s leader. He has not effectively acknowledged the same. While Hamill’s work is insightful, it leans slightly towards personal bias. Moreover, since the release of the book, the leadership has shifted from Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa which has generated hope among the masses for an upward swing for South Africa. There is hope for growth amidst the corruption left by Ramaphosa’s predecessor. This makes Hamill’s work inconclusive as there is possibility for big changes in the near future. Despite the aforementioned factors, the book provides a much-needed insight into South Africa’s failure to meet its potential, both as an international actor and as a continental player and looks into the measures that can be taken to rectify the same. *Ms. Aarushi Vikram has been Research Intern, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA. |
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| Rising US-Iran Hostilities: Implications for Africa | January-June 2020 | Nagapushpa Devendra |
Tension between the US and Iran escalated after the assassination of Iranian military commander, General Qassim Soleimani by the Trump administration on January 3, 2020. Tehran launched a series of missile attacks on a military base that hosts American troops in Iraq. This is the first direct engagement between both the countries since the naval battle precipitating the Vincennes event on July 3, 1998. Though there has been ease in tension after Iran mistakenly shoot down of Ukrainian Flight 752 amid the escalation killing all 176 people on January 8, the crisis is hardly over. At this point, the pressure for the Iranian government to retaliate against the US is considerable, but an offensive act against the American troops or bases in the region would eliminate any prospects for the US administration to reconcile with Iran. Instead, Washington will likely respond with punitive measures and sanctions. Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy in the aftermath of US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018, has deteriorated Iranian economy both internationally and domestically. Anti-government demonstrations kept erupting time to time, and its role in Syria and Iraq pushed back. Most importantly, aggressive retaliation would make it harder for Europe and its major allies like Russia and China to continue supporting Tehran in the international forum. On the other hand, Iran also cannot stay quiet given its reputation for leadership in the region. Secondly, lack of response from the government can further widen the fictions between the IRGC and the power centers in Iran, including religious authorities, bureaucracy, and traditional elites in the long-run. But for now, Iranian government is likely to focus on the internal matters and may use Solemani’s assassination to unite the country against US and its allies, particularly Israel.5 The IRGC, as well will refrain from attempting any kind of offensive act for two reasons. Firstly, after Solemani, Corps power inside the country has shrunk in the absence of a replacement leader of Solemani’s status and power. Secondly, the on-going economic crisis has placed the Corps in direct confrontation with the people who aren’t appeased with their policies outside Iran.6 Therefore, the Corps will try to show their flexibility in responding to internal pressures while not trying to attract further sanctions on their entities, which plays a major role in shaping Iranian economy.7 At the same time they will attempt to regain its status in home, which might take some time. However, unlike the Iranian government and the IRGC, its proxy groups or militias are not bound by any such internal or external pressures. Their sole purpose is to cast out American troops from parts of Africa and West Asia.8 Solemani was like a father figure to these groups. Most of the proxy groups have already vowed vengeance.9 Therefore, it seems likely that if there is any further retaliation, they may not necessarily come from the Iranian government or the IRGC, but will come from these proxy groups in the region who may look for soft targets in areas the US least expects a counterblow. These developments have put the African nations in a perplexing situation, given their geo-political and geo-economic stakes in the US on the one hand, and their developing strategic partnership with the Iranian government on the other hand. Iran has established close ties in the continent, particularly with the nations that are antagonistic towards US presence, stand against the unilateral actions, and were swift to speak out against the violation of sovereignty of weak states by the great powers in the international forum. To further strengthen Tehran’s grip on the continent, the IRGC had pushed forward its agenda of establishing Shi’ite armed forces. They managed to form several proxy groups who have been active in moving against the US and its allies’ interests in parts of the African continent. In the light of this background, Africa may face a challenging situation in future where it must deal with the American interests on the continent. Simultaneously, it needs to secure its interest vis-à-vis the Iranians and take precautionary measures to keep a tap on the activities of various Iranian proxy groups in order to protect the US personnel and civilians in the continent. Africa- new focus of US-Iran rivalryAfrica has become a new arena of contest between the US and Iran. But, since international focus remains centered on the Persian Gulf and the Levant, Africa’s significance is often overlooked. This is surprising given the fact that both sides see so much potential in the continent that they have been developing ties on both economic and security fronts. In the recent months, their race to influence Africa has sharpened. This has forced America to take an aggressive stance, at least rhetorically, to challenge Tehran’s ambitions. We also witness a robust foreign policy under the leadership of President Donald Trump. Following 9/11, the US played a major role in Africa due to the US administration’s policy of mobilizing the world on the so called, “War on Terror”. The US administration rationed out its economic aid for the African nations based on its commitment to countering terrorism, which led to the establishment of strategic US military bases and areas for military exercise.10 Under the Trump administration, Pentagon’s approach to Africa expanded beyond military cooperation. In December 2018, the Trump administration rolled out a new strategy for engaging Africa. The strategy, as outlined by then National Security Adviser John Bolton, is built on the basis of these three aspects:
In reality, this strategy’s over-arching purpose is to contain the Iranian and its allies (Russia-China) influence in the continent. In recent years, Iran’s engagement in Africa grew more rapidly than America’s. Iran adopted a pragmatic form of diplomacy towards African nations to decrease the impact of the US’s unilateral sanction. Trade has become an integral element of new Iran-Africa relationship. According to Iranian officials, the value of Iranian foreign direct investment in South Africa alone is estimated to be $135 billion, whereas for the US, despite being the largest trade partner of the continent, its trade with South Africa was $14 billion in 2018.12 In 2019, the Iranian investment in South Africa decreased to a very large extent, given its crippled economy and secondary sanctions. It was estimated that trade between Iran and South Africa was below than $100 million,13 whereas the US investment in South Africa was $7.8 billion in 2019, 6.8% increase from the previous year. Nevertheless, South Africa continued to remain committed to support Iran against the US sanctions.14 Furthermore, Iran has developed a special interest in East African countries where there is limited or reduced US naval presence,15 especially those in the Horn of Africa, and Red Sea.16 Periodic docking by warships at the ports were pointers of Iranian presence in East Africa. Iranian corps believes that establishing naval bases is not less than developing nuclear technology.17 Iranian Navy maintains the ports of Sudan,18 Eritrea,19 Djibouti,20 and Tanzania21 as its primary base in the Red Sea. There are also unsubstantial claims of Tehran using its naval bases in Africa states like Somalia to smuggle weapons22 along Tanzania for uranium23 . West Africa is vital to US interests in terms of counter-terrorism operations and energy resources. Every year, the US-led exercise is conducted in this part of Africa in order to provide critical training for regional militaries struggling to counter growing terror- activities. However, the US administration is considering the withdrawal some 5000-7000 troops across the continents. This includes 1000 military personnel from West Africa,24 particularly Niger, Chad and Mali.25 The US officials warned the administration that the withdrawal will degrade the security situation in this region of West Africa where deep religious-ethnic division, poverty and vast ungoverned space provide an ideal breeding ground for extremism.26 Taking advantage of this situation, Iran is aggressively trying to acquire political, economic and military support throughout the continent. It has multiple economic projects in states like Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Sierra Leon, Benin, Nigeria and Ghana. For Iran, Nigeria managed to gain particular importance in West Africa, given its largest Muslim population among which five to ten million are Shia’s,27 and strategic importance as one of the oil rich country in the continent. Also Nigeria has the history of supporting Iran, since its Islamic revolution in 1979. Since 2019, Iran is working towards improving its ties with the Nigerian government. Both the nations seek closer cooperation in areas of trade, investment, agriculture and technology transfer. The Iranian delegations have also declared it would explore investment in the automobile, community housing, and pharmaceutical industries.28 Iran also tried to influence the country’s political system by supporting the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), who does not recognize the authority of the Nigerian government, and views its leaders both Muslim and Christian as corrupt. This group was banned in 2019 over the alleged “acts of terrorism and illegality”. So far, Iran has not publically condemned the banning, possibly because it does not want to jeopardize mediation efforts to secure the release of the group’s leader Sheikh Zakzaky and his wife.29 The African continent integrates well into Iranian policies and ambition to lead an anti-US front. In fact, President Hassan Rouhani has enunciated on several occasions that Iran was with Africa during its fight against the apartheid regime and now it is time for the continent to formulate an independent policy in the face of US aggression. He further stated that Iran enjoys close political, economic, and cultural relations with countries in Africa. And that it should not let the US’s illegal sanctions affect Iran-Africa relationship.30 ChallengesThe US and Iranian attention to Africa is a blessing in disguise for the governments and the people in the continent. The competition has undoubtedly meant a financial and developmental windfall for the region as the two sides seek to re-gain their allegiance. These efforts have drawn the states into regional conflicts, not only between the US and Iran, but also among Iran and its allies like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. For example, in 2012-13, Iranian operatives (IRGC) were arrested in Kenya for planning to attack the US interests in the region.31 In 2015, Sudan completely severed its ties with Iran over its support to Omar al-Bashir’s government and participating in a Saudi-led intervention in the Yemen crisis on behalf of the Sunni Arab alliance. General Mohamd Hamdan Dagalo,32 the deputy chief of Sudan’s new Transitional Military Council, reiterated the same in 2019, when he met Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah.33 In 2016, two Iranian operatives and their Kenyan driver of local embassy were arrested on the charge of connection with a terrorist act after surveilling the Israeli embassy.34 After JCPOA, Iran re-designed its Africa policy to counter the US and its allies. IRGC and its proxy groups in the continent became more cautious and looks for plausible deniability to avoid detection of when, where and who they attack. During this period, Iran used its soft-power as its ultimate mechanism to export its Islamic ideology more aggressively in the continent. The Iranian Revolution and ensuing events since 1979 has set up Islamism as an ideology to be reckoned with, sweeping up billions around the world along with capitalism and communism. Iran’s end goal with the revolution is not to create a state; it is the expansion of the revolution - the one true way of awakening the oppressed and liberating the Third World from colonialism and neo-colonialism.35 This revolutionary vision pushed Iran to funds Islamic organizations or cultural centers which allegedly distribute Shi’ite propaganda, and recruits local population to form smaller groups of armed force. It also exports its clergies to African nations, who in turn stage seminars and conferences with local clerics in an effort to indoctrinate Khomeinist doctrine.36 Representatives from various African countries such as Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Chad, Liberia, Guinea, Nigeria, Mauritania, Senegal and Benin attend these Hajj talks. The outcome of such conferences is generally laced with anti-Saudi Arabia or anti-US propositions. Exporting its ideology among Africa’s vast Muslim community paved the path for Iran to ally with the Shia-based armed forces like IMN in the continent. It is reported that Iran has instructed its strongest ally, the Hezbollah, to increase its training of Nigerians and hoped to use Abuja as a base of operation to launch attacks and thwart Israeli and Western ambitions in the continent.37 Given the Iranian influence, it comes as no surprise that Soleimani’s death has triggered “red alert” in Nigeria, fearing reactions by the IMN or other alleged Iranian proxies who have vowed to punish the US for the Baghdad assassination.38 Iran is also alleged to be covertly engaged with al-Shabab in Mogadishu. The UN reportedly provided substantial evidence that demonstrates Iran’s arming and funding of al-Shabab.39 It stated that Somalian fighters were offered various incentives to join Iran-backed Hezbollah’s activities in the continent. As per the document, an individual fighter earns at least $2000, and if the fighters are killed, between $25,000 to $30,000 is provided to their family. Also, the fighters after returning home from Lebanon or Syria receives a monthly stipend of $100 for unspecified period of time.40 The most interesting part here is that, while the IMN was contemplating its revenge, Somalian militants of al-Shabab pulled the plug by killing three American civilians in Kenya. In past, Iranian ambassador to the UN, Majid Takht Ravanchi, stated that Iran cannot be held responsible for the actions of other groups in the region and beyond.41 Here it is notable that States often deny the fact that they are supporting or funding such groups. In most of the cases, other states may not know the amount of support a proxy group receives from another state.42 Also, proxy groups offer a way of fighting that can limit the escalations. The attack in Kenya seems to be a grim reminder of that fact that Shia proxies can target American soldiers anywhere in the continent. If we dissect the Iranian support to Shia-based groups in Africa, we discover that its influence is not limited to Nigeria and Somalia (quid pro quo, the US maintains heavy military outposts in both these countries). Though there is little information disclosed on the Tehran purported front in Africa, its activities providing social services though vast network of hospital and orphanages have increased to a large extent in recent years. Hundreds of Iranian Islamic schools and seminaries played a major role in further deepening its ties with African nations. Some of them are as follows:
Iran has already demonstrated its ability to conduct subversive activities in Africa, directly or indirectly through Hezbollah. The Baghdad assassination is likely to bolster such activities and further stimulate anti-US and anti-Israeli sentiments in the continent. Iran has ordered IRGC to establish smaller groups to target US military bases in the continent. Iranian cells are said to be active in countries like Sudan, Chad, Ghana, Niger, Gambia and the Central African Republic.47 In the long-run, the US and its allies will view Iranian activities in the continent as threats to their interests. This could trigger an aggressive policy against the Iranian proxies in the continent as they did in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Any such actions can cause profound effects in the region and beyond. *Ms. Nagapushpa Devendra is a Research Analyst, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.
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| Technology as a Force Multiplier in Contemporary UN PKO | July-September 2022 | J.S. Lidder |
Recent years have witnessed pronounced militarization and spread of global conflicts, throwing up new challenges to the UN on managing and resolving new conflicts. With the operating environment undergoing constant transformation, UN peace operations are experiencing a paradigm shift in their entire spectrum of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Climate security and COVID-19 pandemic have aggravated international tensions escalating political violence, social distress and economic decline. |
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| Against All Odds: The Forgotten Tales of Independent India’s Tryst with Peacekeeping | July-September 2022 | D. Padma Kumar Pillay |
There is a part of history that many in India are not familiar with today. This article is an account of Independent India’s first overseas mission under the UN – The unique role that the Indian military played in the Korean conflict. |
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| Rajpal Punia & Damini Punia, Operation Khukri: The True Story Behind Indian Army’s Most Successful Mission as part of the United Nations | January-December 2021 | R. Vignesh |
Rajpal Punia & Damini Punia, Operation Khukri: The True Story Behind Indian Army’s Most Successful Mission as part of the United Nations, Penguin Random House, India, 2021. “Operation Khukri: The True Story Behind Indian Army’s Most Successful Mission as part of the United Nations” jointly authored by Maj. Gen. Rajpal Punia and his daughter Damini Punia is an enthralling first person account of the events that unfolded in the rustic town of Kailahun situated in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone between May and July 2000. The book serves as a primary literature for the important contribution of the Indian Army as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) constituted for establishing lasting peace in the war-ravaged West African nation. The most distinct aspect of the book is how it combines the personal journey of its protagonist Maj. Gen. Rajpal Punia, then a battle-hardened Major who led 233 Indian troops in enduring a three month long siege laid by the ruthless Revolutionary United Front (RUF) that eventually ended with the successful breakout staged by the Indian Army with the historical narrative of the humanitarian and socio-economic effects of lasting conflict among the population of Sierra Leone. The book explores the emotional and psychological stress endured by the Indian troops and officers deployed on foreign soil confronting an enemy infamous for its ruthless tactics and barbaric practices. To the general reader, the book serves as a testament to the indomitable resolve and the professionalism of the Indian Army who played a significant role in inflicting a decisive blow to the RUF and forcing them back to the negotiating table that laid the foundation of lasting peace in Sierra Leone. The book's contents are divided into eleven chapters that seamlessly capture the essence of the operation from its initial stages of deployment from New Delhi to the final breakout of hostilities between the besieged Indian Contingent and the RUF in Kailahun. The first chapter brings out the psychological dilemma that Maj. Punia went through before accepting the offer as a company commander in UN Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone and the role of his family in persuading him to take up the offer. Having served three years in the high altitude terrain of Jammu and Kashmir combating infiltrators and insurgents from across the Line of Control (LOC) and enduring the pain of being away from the family, the author initially makes the obvious decision to decline the much-sought offer which is viewed as a lucrative opportunity within the Indian Army. Ultimately, it is at the insistence of Mrs. Punia that the author decides to accept the assignment. This particular aspect of the book draws the attention of the readers towards the duty-boundedness of not only the men and women donning the olive-green uniform but also of their families. Between Chapters two and three, the book chronicles the initial complexities and challenges that were encountered by the Indian peacekeeping contingent en route to their principal area of operation in Kailahun, which was considered to be the heartland of the RUF. Through these chapters, the reader is made aware of the operational modalities and the vetting procedures involved in a typical UN peacekeeping deployment and the important role of the commanders of the peacekeeping contingent in ensuring the troops under their command adhere to operational standards required for such deployment. Chapters four and five narrate the journey of the Indian Contingent from Lungi to the heartland of the RUF in Kailahun. Tasked with facilitating the disarmament of the RUF under Lomé Peace Agreement, Maj. Punia and his men bear witness to the scourge of war inflicted across Sierra Leone by the brutalities of the RUF en route to Kailahun. It is also learned here that the RUF which was initially raised as a force to combat Sierra Leone Government that was perceived to be corrupt by the local populace gained mass support. But soon through the involvement of Liberia, the RUF indulged in the lucrative business of diamond smuggling, turning against the very people who once supported it. The Indian contingent shouldered the most important mandate of the UNAMSIL, a task that the contingents from other nations had declined, which is to disarm RUF in their own heartland through the establishment of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) camps. Chapter Six narrates the last leg of the Indian contingent’s journey to Kailahun, where eventually they establish contact with the RUF and swiftly earn the goodwill of the local population. In Kailahun, the author meets and knits close friendships with three individuals amidst the most unlikely situation. These three individuals are Papa Geima, the village chieftain, Sister, a native of Kailahun and a RUF sympathizer and finally Colonel Martin, a RUF field commander. To the reader, these three individuals make for compelling characters as each of them represents a distinct aspect of the conflict. While Papa Geima represents the weariness of the people in the hinterland of Sierra Leone, Sister is a manifestation of human tragedy in conflicts having lost her entire family in the war and Colonel Martin represents the humane face of the RUF, who is otherwise bound by the ruthless and malevolent ways of his organisation. The author’s personal bond with these three individuals plays a key role in shaping the developments in subsequent months of the Indian contingent’s presence in Kailahun. The bonhomie that quickly develops between Maj. Punia and Colonel Martin brings out the importance of cordial relations between the field level commanders of belligerent forces as a prerequisite for initiating Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that are necessary for carrying out operations such as disarmament. Chapter Six narrates an incident where Maj. Punia along with his men had even risked carrying out a joint patrol with RUF near the Guinea border. Eventually, the Indian contingent is successful both in earning the local support from the people of Kailahun and initiating the disarmament of the RUF cadres. Despite a good start and commencement of the planned disarmament process, a stray incident that unfolded in a DDR camp in the town of Makeni far away from Kailahun had quickly led to a swift deterioration of the situation in entire Sierra Leone. RUF which until then was cooperating on disarmament suddenly became hostile when some of its cadres were killed by the UN as they were protesting the delay in disbursement of funds deemed to be received by the cadres for laying down arms. Post this incident, the situation in Kailahun turns flip side as the region is the heartland of RUF. The situation turns RUF against the UN peacekeepers and as a result Maj. Punia along with some members of international UN observers are taken hostage while on a scheduled meeting. Finally, good sense prevails among the RUF leadership and Maj. Punia along with the other International observers are released to join the Indian Camp in Kailahun. Once back in the safety of the Indian camp, the book perfectly captures the psychological dilemma that Maj. Punia went through in deliberating between laying down arms and standing firm to keep up with the traditions of the Indian Army. Being a hardened soldier Maj. Punia chooses the latter by standing firm against the RUF despite the overwhelming odds of his contingent being cut off and the fast dwindling supplies necessary for sustaining their presence. Between chapters eight and ten, the buildup of tensions between the besieged Indian Contingent and the RUF is captured in great detail. This includes Maj. Punia’s operation of relocating his men based in an abandoned Kailahun hospital to tactical high ground overlooking the town right under the nose of RUF, presented through a captivating narration of events. This chapter also captures the field improvisation that the Indian contingent carried out for staging their breakout from the RUF siege. Once again it dwells deep into Maj. Punia’s psychological dilemma between being a soldier and a moral human being. The final chapter narrates the climactic incident where the Indian contingent staged a successful predawn breakout on 15 July 2000 against an unsuspecting RUF to regroup with the Indian Contingent in Daru. The RUF being inflicted with heavy casualties by the Indian Army, suffered a major blow. This turns out to be a crucial factor that forced RUF back to the negotiating table that eventually reinstated lasting peace in Sierra Leone. However, the book also has certain shortcomings. One such issue is the lack of details on the incident in the DDR camp in Makeni wherein peacefully protesting RUF cadres were killed by UN peacekeepers eventually resulting in the derailment of the otherwise smooth process of disarmament in entire Sierra Leone. This important incident has been mentioned by the author as a passing reference on page 96 and requires to be presented in greater detail for the reader to understand how such stray incidents can play a detrimental role in the peace process for resolving entrenched conflict scenarios. Also, the Indian contingent had gained immense local support from the town of Kailahun which later turns to be an instrumental factor in the release of both Maj. Punia and other Indian peacekeepers who were held as captives by the RUF. But these very people are put in harm’s way during the breakout of the Indian contingent from Kailahun. Although the author expresses remorse for this hard decision, it generates inquisitiveness in the mind of the reader about the fate of the innocent Kailahun residents who were present on 15 July 2000 and what would have been their view about the Indian Army’s action post the incident. Despite these issues, Operation Khukri is a seminal work that throws light on the Indian Army’s lesser-known successes in UN peacekeeping. |
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| Blanche Rocha D’Souza, Harnessing the Trade Winds: The Story of the Centuries-Old Indian Trade with East Africa, Using the Monsoon Winds | January-December 2021 | Samir Bhattacharya |
Blanche Rocha D’Souza, Harnessing the Trade Winds: The Story of the Centuries-Old Indian Trade with East Africa, Using the Monsoon Winds, First published in Kenya in 2008 by Zand Graphics Ltd, Reprinted in India 2021 by Pentagon Press LLP. Pp. 204. INR 995. Historiography is a fervently debated topic. Researchers differ on the best way to decipher recorded occasions. New proof could modify our impression of the past. Some contend that western students of history are biased towards the west. Others accept that history specialists from non-western nations are one-sided against them. This book is a phenomenal illustration of what is expected to reinvigorate enthusiasm among historians in questioning established knowledge and rewriting history free of ideological constraints. By countering mainstream history, which is often biased and composed by the leaders of the time, the book aims to recognise and appreciate lesser-known actors who have been overlooked in history. Looking back at history, it appears that Indian traders played a relatively limited role in African civilization. However, some reports, papers, and even stories have taken the position that this Indian population made a significant contribution to the development of Eastern Africa, particularly the islands of South-Eastern Africa. Sadly, these reports, papers, and stories have largely been discounted by western and Asian historians. This book aims to fill that void in history. First published in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2008, this book is a non-academic essay intended for a broad audience. The hardships suffered by generations of Indians compelled to migrate to East Africa are chronicled in this book. It should be a source of great pride for them to have made significant contributions to the development of the countries where they have settled. The author persuasively establishes the contributions of little-known Indian traders to East Africa’s development. Unknown to many, people living in the Indus valley civilisation knew about monsoons and how to travel long distances. This was thousands of years ago, long before the Christian era, even before Hippalus, the Greek mariner famous for discovering the monsoon winds. This book brings to light the specifics of a particular period overlooked in history and makes a valuable contribution to the history of Indian traders on Africa’s east coast. The book also fills a significant gap in the study of India’s diaspora, as this period is still understudied. An endeavour to capture three thousand years of history in 18 chapters, a not mainstreamed history, is a valiant attempt in itself. And taking on the discipline’s hegemons could raise a ruckus among mainstream historians and others. Some may dismiss this as a naive approach to history writing. However, it is only because there is a scarcity of scholarly work in this field that the book’s claims appear to be connecting large dots. On the bright side, the book’s revelations are so many that they should prod a slew of new studies honouring some of history’s forgotten figures. The author’s most significant issue in countering the narrative was a lack of written evidence. There are several possible explanations for the paucity of documents including those destroyed by colonisers, inadequate record-keeping and illiteracy of the Indian merchants. In the absence of adequate solid proof, written or archaeological, the author draws on a variety of sources, including non-scholarly books and reports, as well as British colonial documents. She cites evidence from ancient Sanskrit literature, the Bible and the Ramayana, and the remarks of several British government officials, like John Kirk and Sir Bartle Frere. The monsoons and marine currents are mentioned in the Rig Veda, and the author cites them. Although some of these sources are unscholarly, they reflect the realities of the time and cannot be overlooked. The author’s associations between ancient Hindu texts and current realities are astounding. She found out that the Red Sea was called Lohita Sagar in ancient India. She also found out that the Miair in Puranas was present-day Egypt. The Arabic name of Egypt was Misr and Egyptians referred to Egypt as Misr. The author also found out that the mythical place mentioned in Mahabharata was present-day Uganda. The same goes for Lake Victoria being Dev Sarovar and River Nile being Krishna. These connections need more work and more time to develop. Unfortunately, creating an ideal bibliography is difficult due to the type of documents the author had to review. As a result, the bibliography’s structure remains a little weak, as several of the referred materials could not be accurately dated. The book does have a few shortcomings; however, they are minor. While the author’s treatment of Indian contributions are detailed and well-supported, her account of indigenous efforts to establish institutions fall short. It is irrefutably true that Africans never developed into maritime powers or explored the world as Europeans did. However, the absence of an adventurous spirit among Africans appears to be a little exaggerated. This flaw, most likely, arises since the author was forced to rely only on records from the colonial era as primary source material. Similarly, generalising Arabs as having a lower aptitude for finance is not accurate. The book has a few captivating subtleties. It’s intriguing to learn about the Indians who connected Zanzibar to Bombay and other western Indian ports and how this contributed to Zanzibar’s emergence as a regional commerce powerhouse. A.M. Jeevanjee, Jairam Shewji, and Tharya Topan are conspicuous Indians who had a critical impact on the region’s development and the fight for Indian rights. The list of plants introduced by Indians throughout history is fascinating to peruse. A similar but different study of how the African agricultural system influenced Indian agriculture would be interesting. The politics played by the British over the abolition of slavery is fascinating. The depiction of the construction of the Ugandan railway will give any reader shivers. Major Macdonald, Chief engineer of preliminary survey (Indian surveyors) or Lieutenant-colonel J.H.Patterson, The man-eating lions of Uganda, are real-life people who appear surreal and exciting historical trivia. It’s a shame that the hardships Indian labourers had in building the railway line and the financial contributions of Indian merchants are lost to history. Unscrupulously, the British took credit for the entire project. The contacts between Indian merchants and other merchants are also detailed in the book. There is a graphic description of how British merchants used every trick in the book to capture the trading network that Indians and Arabs had already established. They first came in as another mercantile class. They then seized power from the local rulers at the pretence of giving protection to their Indian colonial subjects. And most of the time, this was accomplished by unethical means. They employed divide and rule to involve Indians and Africans in brutal fights and exploited the situation once they were established. The link between the 1884 Berlin race for Africa and its significant impact on East African commercial networks is well explained. History is an academic discipline that has always been a contentious field (as it should be) because there can be numerous interpretations of a previous event, depending on a historian’s point of view or ideological position or the school to which they belong. However, these disparate historians agree on the importance of first establishing facts about the past using well-defined, internationally agreed-upon social science research principles rigorously followed. These facts aren’t chosen based on predetermined and desired results. From that standpoint, this book functions as a eulogy for Indian traders, and it is supposed to instil pride in their descendants. It’s also a fascinating book for historiography students who would like to work inductively rather than deductively. In fact, the book consists of various significant events and individuals, with no room for the development of theories. The book should inspire Indian Diaspora and Indian Ocean Studies scholars to explore further, engage in academic debates, and uncover more interesting and essential details. *Mr. Samir Bhattacharya is a Research Associate at the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), New Delhi. |
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| Scope for India-Africa Cooperation in Countering Terrorism | January-March 2021 | Arpita Anant |
Both AU and the UN have identified clear areas where the capacities for counter-terrorism in Africa have been found wanting. India is in a position to share and build capacities in areas of its competence and comfort. Such help would be along the lines of the Indian policy of building state capacities. Having grappled with terrorism in a democratic set-up, India is also in a position to share its experience of making law enforcement systems respect the fundamental rights of human beings. Measures such as these will also help build the faith of the people of Africa in their own institutions and thus address one the root causes of terrorism in Africa. At the India Africa Defence Ministers Conclave held in 2020, India and Africa expressed their common desire to counter terrorism and to strengthen the United Nations (UN) mechanisms against terrorism.1 They also expressed the wish to cooperate in combating terrorism. However, so far, India’s support to Africa for this cause has been indirect at best. India has helped in the setting up of defence academies and colleges, deployment of training teams, provision of ammunition and equipment to some African countries and the hosting of Africa India Field Training Exercises (AFINDEX). All these, along with sharing of counterinsurgency and counter terrorism experiences, can be surmised to help build national capabilities in countering terrorism where the threat exists. While India recognises the growing threat of terrorism in Africa, it must contribute more concretely and visibly to counter-terrorism capacity building in Africa. Trends in African TerrorismThe year 2021 was replete with reports about the menace of Islamist terrorist groups in Africa. According to the Global Terrorism Index (cited below), 10 of the top 20 incidents of terrorism that resulted in the highest number of casualties in 2021 were in Africa. As per a report for the UN Office for Drugs and Crime2 , since 2016, North African countries have faced threats from the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) from Iraq and Syria. Returning FTFs and small cells are additional sources of concern. In East Africa, the Al Shabaab continued to unleash terror with significantly increased attacks against the airfields and aircrafts in Somalia and targeting Kenya. In Southern Africa, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), associated with the ISIL has indulged in acts of violence in northern Mozambique and the Mozambique-Tanzania border. In the West African region, terrorism has been at an all-time high with activities of the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). The AQIM has spilled over from the North of Mali to Burkina Faso and Niger. The ISIL too is acting in the region. Countering Terrorism in AfricaSeveral efforts are ongoing to combat terrorism all over the continent. Among them are national, regional, cross-regional measures as well as cooperation with external actors such as the US, EU and China. In addition, at the continental level, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and its successor the African Union (AU) have adopted several instruments to help with combating terrorism such as:
The UN too is an important player aiding in building state capacities to counter terrorism. Specifically, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime supports 23 projects in the Sahel, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Benin, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Senegal, West Africa, North Africa, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco, East Africa, Somalia, Kenya, Southern Africa and Mozambique. These projects are aimed at strengthening the criminal justice system to improve prosecution in cases of terrorism and violent extremism, preventing spread of extremism in prisons, as well as in some places, rehabilitating erstwhile terrorists.7 Lags in Counter-Terrorism MeasuresDespite all these efforts, much remains to be done in terms of strengthening the capacities of states to deal with terrorism. The Communiqué of the 1040th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU on the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Continental Efforts in Preventing and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa held on 22 October 2021 identified some areas which state capacities ought to be built. These are:
Further, in 2021, the Counter Terrorism Committee of the UN through its implementation surveys has identified areas that need to be strengthened in the implementation of various UN Security Council resolutions that specify the measures to be adopted by member states pursuant to those resolutions. It focussed on Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) criminalises the financing of terrorism, generation or distribution of funds for terrorism, freeze funds and assets of terrorist persons and related entities, prevent the provision of any kind of support to terrorists on their respective territories, increase operational exchange of information that could deter acts of terrorism and help with administrative and judicial aspects of trial of terrorists. Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), on the other hand, calls upon states to criminalise the incitement to terrorism, prevent acts of terrorism, deny safe haven to terrorists, increase security measures at international borders and airports to prevent entry of terrorists into their territory, promote a dialogue among civilisations and prevent the subversion of educational, cultural, and religious institutions, protect human rights, especially freedom of expression while in pursuit of enhanced security and counter violent extremism through appropriate counter narratives. Whereas significant progress has been achieved in the implementation of the latter resolution, it is in the case of the former that countries in Africa have been found wanting.9 Thus, in North Africa, the survey recommends that financial intelligence units need to be spruced up to repost suspicious transactions that might result in financing of terrorism; investigations and prosecution must be geared up to follow rule of law and respect for human rights; improve border controls and use of Interpol databases. In East Africa, the legislations on terrorism need to be drafted based on principles of legality; laws related to possession of weapons and ammunition need to be strengthened and firearms related offences criminalised; asset freezing regimes need to be operationalised; the capabilities of investigators and prosecutors of criminal investigation must be enhanced; intelligence and law enforcement agencies must be placed under an oversight mechanism; better border management techniques need to be put in place; due place must be given to the national human rights institutions. In Southern Africa, there is a need to develop integrated counter-terrorism strategies; conduct of threat assessments must be improved and shared at the national and regional levels; counter terrorism legislations must be made compatible with human rights; information sharing must be upgraded and Interpol databases must be used; international cooperation must be strengthened and regional protocols must be made operational. In West Africa, there is need to adopt and implement comprehensive national strategies including all stakeholders; improve the counter terrorist financing capabilities; criminalise terrorist acts and all actions that support them; have oversight mechanisms for law enforcement agencies; need for better use of Interpol data among border management services; upgrading border management infrastructure for collection of biometric and biographical information. In Central Africa, national legislation that defines terrorist acts must be brought in line with international counter-terrorism instruments; need to build in safeguards for defendants implicated in cases of terrorism; need to update and implement legislation on illicit weapons and ammunition; enhance oversight of law enforcement agencies by setting up human rights institutions; ensure better connections with Interpol for better coordination with border agencies and foreign counterparts. Scope for Counter-Terrorism CooperationBoth AU and the UN have identified clear areas where the capacities for counter-terrorism in Africa have been found wanting. India, given its vast experience in institutionalising and operationalising many of these measures in compliance with the 1373 (2001) regime, is in a position to share and build capacities in areas of its competence and comfort. Such help would be along the lines of the Indian policy of building state capacities. Having grappled with terrorism in a democratic set-up, India is also in a position to share its experience of making law enforcement systems respect the fundamental rights of human beings. Measures such as these will also help build the faith of the people of Africa in their own institutions and thus address one the root causes of terrorism in Africa. *Dr. Arpita Anant is Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.
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India-Africa Relations |