On 13 April 2024, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched an aerial attack on Israel involving over 300 drones, cruise and ballistic missiles. Israel and its Western allies including the United States, the United Kingdom, France and neighbouring Jordan were able to organise a coordinated defence using fighter jets, warships, anti-missile and air defence systems intercepting most of the projectiles at the cost of more than US$ 1 billion. At least nine ballistic missiles evaded Israeli defences causing minor damages to Nevatim Air Base in Southern Israel, where Israel’s F-35 fighter jets are based.1

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council issued a statement which noted that Iran had carried out ‘minimum necessary punitive action’ within the framework of the ‘legitimate right of self-defence’ as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. On 1 April 2024, Israeli air strikes had destroyed Iran’s consulate in Damascus killing seven IRGC officers including Quds Force senior-most commander for Syria and Lebanon, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Since 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks, Israel has intensified its grey-zone attacks targeting the IRGC commanders in Syria and Lebanon with the objective of raising costs for the IRGC for its alleged involvement in targeting Israel. As Maj Gen Yaacov Amidror (Retd) observed, by targeting Iran’s consulate, Israel sent a strong signal to Iran that its continued actions are bringing Israel closer to launching a direct attack on it.2

Iran’s Retaliatory Strikes

The 13 April Iranian strikes against Israel were the first state-on-state attack and therefore entailed a new level of escalation and a significant change in Iran’s deterrence posture. Major General Hossein Salami, the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, noted that Iran’s retaliatory strikes have established a new equation with Israel and that if Israel attacked Iranian interests and citizens anywhere, the IRGC will retaliate from Iran. Salami, who served as deputy commander of IRGC until 2019 when he was appointed the Commander-in-Chief, is credited with revision of Iran's defensive doctrine along the lines of the “strategy of threat against threat” at a time when Iran faced renewed hostility from the United States and Israel under the former US President Donald Trump, who unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement.

The IRGC made first operational use of mid-range missiles in a counter-attack in June 2017 two weeks after ISIS claimed terrorist attacks in Tehran. It launched five to six Zolfaghars, solid-fuelled missiles with a range of some 700 kms from Kermanshah base at ISIS targets in the Deir el-Zour region of eastern Syria. In January 2020, Iran launched short-range missiles at Ayn al Asad and Erbil Air Bases housing US troops in Iraq following the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in a US drone attack in Baghdad. In February 2022, after an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) raid on a drone manufacturing facility in western Iran, the IRGC launched missiles on what it described as an Israeli ‘spy centre’ near the US consulate in Erbil.

On 16 January 2024, the IRGC carried out coordinated missile strikes by launching 24 Kheibar Shekan precision-guided ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 kms from different locations inside Iran to hit targets in Syria and Iraq. According to Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Forces,

four Khyber rockets were launched from southern Khuzestan at ISIS’s headquarters in Idlib, and an additional four from Kermanshah, along with seven rockets from East Azerbaijan, targeting the Zionist headquarters in Erbil.3 4

The missiles were launched from the south of the country to test if they could reach the intended range of 1,300 kms. Israeli media noted that by demonstrating the precision-strike capabilities and range of its new ballistic missiles, Iran was sending a message to Israel.5 On 13 April, in the multi-layered Iranian strike on Israel, Kheibar Shekan were the newest and the most advanced missile used together with Shahed-136 Kamikaze drones and Paveh cruise missile which have a range of 1,650 kms.

Iran’s aim was to demonstrate its credible capabilities as well as resolve or risk acceptance in engaging in escalation against a conventionally superior and a nuclear-armed adversary. On the occasion of Iran Army Day on 21 April, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stressed that the number of missiles launched or hitting their targets, which has been a focus of the enemy, is secondary.6 The primary issue was demonstrating the emergence of the willpower of the Iranian people and the Armed Forces on the global stage, and this is what has upset the other side.

IRGC Aerospace Forces Commander Hajizadeh noted in an interview that while Israel had mobilised all its military resources to counter Iran's attacks, Iran had used only minimal capability that is only 20 per cent of what it had prepared to take action against Israel.7 The fact that Iran did not use its more advanced weapons such as Sajjil 2 missile or Fattah hypersonic missiles also underscore Iran’s deterrence strategy designed for different levels of conflict. At the current stage, Iranian attacks were not designed to cause damage, but intended to be a demonstrative measure.

As part of escalation management and to assuage Iran’s neighbouring countries’ concerns about its impending retaliation, Foreign Minister Hossein Abdollahian embarked on a regional tour starting with Oman, which often plays the role of a crucial diplomatic intermediary between Tehran and Washington in times of crisis. At Muscat, Abdollahian stated that in any counter-attacks Iran’s “sole goal in legitimate defence is to punish the Israeli regime” and it was not seeking to expand the conflict in the region. Muscat reportedly relayed Iran’s message to the US that Iranian attacks will be non-lethal and calibrated to target an Israeli military facility.8 Iran also notified its Arab neighbours of its retaliatory strikes on Israel 72 hours in advance, which gave ample time for Israel and its Western allies and regional partners to activate air defences for thwarting impending Iranian strikes.

Israeli Preference for Grey-Zone Attacks

Israeli military claimed that their multi-layered air defence system had successfully intercepted 99 per cent of Iranian drones and missiles. Israel’s European and American allies hailed their ‘defensive victory’, as they pressed Israel for de-escalation. Despite calls for restraint from close allies, Israel’s war cabinet led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu favoured retaliation. Subsequently, amid the uncertainty about how Israel will retaliate, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in his address at Iran’s annual army parade, warned that the “tiniest attack” by Israel would bring a “massive and harsh” response from Iran.9 Israeli counterstrike was therefore aimed at demonstrating Israeli resolve and restore deterrence in the face of Iranian threats.

Israeli media ratcheted up the threat of a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, leading Iran to temporarily close its nuclear facilities and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi urging ‘extreme restraint’ from Israel. On 19 April, Iranian officials insisted that there had been “no air attack from outside borders”, and that three quadcopters were shot down by air defence in Isfahan.10 US officials claimed that Israeli Air Force fired three missiles from outside Iran that hit an air base in Isfahan housing Iran’s fleet of American-made F-14 Tomcats, and an air defence radar site defending Iran’s largest nuclear facility in Natanz.11

While Israel did not publicly take responsibility, the strikes exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities in order to influence Iranian cost-benefit calculus in any further escalation. By continuing with grey-zone tactic of ambiguity about the scale of attacks in Isfahan and plausible deniability about the source of attack, Israel handed Iran an off-ramp for de-escalation. Israel’s decision to not attack Iran’s nuclear facilities may have been shaped by pressure from its Western allies and Arab partners and also the messaging from Iran.

Israel attacking Iranian nuclear facilities would have led to spiral of escalation drawing a massive Iranian response against US interests in the region. On 18 April, a senior IRGC commander in charge of security of nuclear facilities, stated that if

Israel uses the threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities as a tool to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable to revise Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies and deviate from the previous declared considerations.12

Maj Gen Amidror (Retd), former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu, describes Iran's latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons as a key component of Iran's 'smart' strategy for war with Israel. He argues that Iran’s military nuclear capability will serve as an umbrella to ensure that hostile actions against Iran will not be possible, and that Tehran will be able to continue and even expand its aggressive activities throughout the region, mainly against Israel, but also against the United States.13

What the recent exchange of fire has demonstrated is that neither Iran nor Israel can claim escalation dominance that is having decidedly superior capabilities over the other to deter it from engaging in further escalation. However, the controlled or limited escalation by both countries suggest that they are determined to maintain a ‘balance of resolves’, where none is willing to accept the other’s deterrent red lines. Both sides have shown preference for a carefully controlled escalation while avoiding a conflict spiral.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Jon Gambrell, “Satellite Image Analyzed by AP Shows Damage after Iranian Attack on Israeli Desert Air Base”, The Associated Press, 20 April 2024.
• 2. Yaakov Amidror, “Iran’s Ring of Fire”, JINSA, 8 April 2024.
• 3. Ibid.
• 4. “IRGC Announces Details of its Operation in Erbil”, Al Mayadeen, 16 January 2024.
• 5. Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran Attacked Syria with Long-range Missile in Message to Israel – Analysis”, The Jerusalem Post, 18 January 2024.
• 6. “Operation 'True Promise' Manifested Willpower of Iranian People in International Arena”, Tehran Times, 21 April 2024.
• 7. “Iran Employed Only 20% of its Resources to Punish Israel”, Mehr News Agency, 2 May 2024.
• 8. Parisa Hafezi and Jonathan Landay, “Iran Aims to Contain Fallout in Israel Response, Will Not Be Hasty, Sources Say”, Reuters, 12 April 2024.
• 9. “Iran’s Raisi Reiterates Warnings as Israel Mulls Response to Air Attack”, Al Jazeera, 17 April 2014.
• 10. Anan Tello, “Have Deaths of Quds Force Commanders in Iran-Israel Shadow War Dented IRGC’s Public Image and Confidence?”, Arab News, 20 April 2024.
• 11. “In ‘Message,’ IDF Said to Fire Missiles at Radar Defense for Secret Iran Nuclear Site”, The Times of Israel, 18 April 2024.
• 12. Ronny Reyes, “Iranian Commander Says Tehran Could Review ‘Nuclear Doctrine’ Following Israeli Threats”, New York Post, 18 April 2024.
• 13. Yaakov Amidror, “Iran’s Ring of Fire”, no. 2.

Summary

One of the major challenges to water management in Central Asia is the transboundary nature of the water resources combined with conflicting interests of upstream and downstream states. Although regional governments have taken initiatives to strengthen regional water management, much work remains to be done to connect national interests with regional water and energy security goals.

Water management in Central Asia has been a cause of contention between the five neighbouring countries, often generating an uneasy political climate in the region. The Central Asian Republics (CARs) comprise the ‘energy-poor but water-rich’ upstream states (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and ‘energy-rich but water-poor’ downstream states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan). The upstream states utilise water resources within their boundaries to generate enormous amounts of energy through hydropower. At the same time, water-intensive crops such as wheat and cotton contribute significantly to the GDP of the downstream countries.

The main sources of water in Central Asia are the two rivers—Amu Darya and Syr Darya—which closely connect the riparian states. The region's five countries collectively consume nearly 127 billion cubic meters (bcm) of water each year, with agriculture accounting for over 80 per cent.1   However, only about half the water allocated for agriculture is used effectively. Almost 50 per cent of the water is lost along the way as a result of poor irrigation facilities and wasteful farming practices. Unevenly distributed among the five countries, these water sources pose a serious economic and political cost.2

This has given rise to various complexities amongst the regional players, with any changes in the water usage of one nation impacting its availability in the other riparian states. This has led to a spurt in regional tensions over water. For example, between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley, between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over Rogun dam, and the recent constructions of Qosh Tepa Canal raising tensions between Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, among other conflicts. Additionally, the unequal distribution of energy resources further tax the region’s already fragile water resources. The poor infrastructure that was inherited from the Soviet Union raises concerns about climate change and its detrimental effects on water levels.

Water Management during the Soviet Period

The Soviet Union’s system of water management kept the Central Asian nations closely integrated. This was done by establishing a trade-off linking the glacial mountains of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with the arid lands of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which are rich in gas, coal and oil.3

The Soviets built 20,000 miles of canals, 45 dams and more than 80 reservoirs across the region, turning the land of sand and dust into one of the world's largest cotton-growing regions.4   Since there was an increase in the area of irrigated land for cotton in the 1960s and 1970s, the region experienced a significant increase in its water usage. An impressive network of irrigation canals and reservoirs was constructed to support cotton cultivation. Massive water reservoirs were built in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for cotton production in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  However, these developments in the cotton industry had terrible consequences for the ecology. With the main two rivers fully diverted for cotton irrigation, the water level of the Aral Sea significantly shrunk from 68,900 sq kms in the early 1960s to 7,352 sq kms  in 2021.5 Little consideration for the local environment led to drastic consequences, especially for the region's water bodies.

Post-Soviet Agreements on Water Management

Since gaining independence in 1991, water sharing has become one of the most sensitive issues in the region. The issues surrounding the use and management of water acquired an interstate dimension as the newly independent nations witnessed the fragmentation of the once-unified system of managing water in Central Asia.6 Their sovereign status brought new socio-economic hardships. For example, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could not bear the costs of maintaining their reservoirs and dams due to their poor financial status and lack of interest. Moreover, the infrastructure mostly benefitted the downstream states.

For a short period of time, the nations continued the water management system that existed in the Soviet period mainly due to the lack of an alternative. This was possible through the ‘Agreement on Cooperation in Joint Management, Use and Protection of Water Resources of Interstate Sources’ in 1992.7 The agreement created a legal framework for regional water cooperation through the joint management of water distribution. Under the 1992 agreement, the Interstate Commission for Water Cooperation (ICWC) was established ‘to deal with issues related to regulation, rational use and protection of water resources from interstate sources’.8 It was responsible for determining regional water policy, developing key directions, and approving annual water consumption quotas for each republic. Integrated and rational use of water resources was prioritised alongside long-term regional water supply programmes.

The five republics further signed an ‘Agreement on joint actions to solve the problem of the Aral Sea and the Aral Sea region, environmental rehabilitation and ensuring the socio-economic development of the Aral region’ in 1993.9 The main objectives of this agreement were rational use of the limited land and water resources in Aral Sea basin, maintaining the quality of water in rivers, reservoirs and underground sources, a guaranteed provision of ample amount of water supply to the Aral Sea for maintaining its reduced but stable water area, amongst others.10

In 1998, an agreement on the ‘Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya River Basin’ was signed by the republics, except Turkmenistan.11 One of the reasons for Turkmenistan not signing this agreement was that it followed a ‘Neutrality-based Foreign Policy’ which ensures limited participation in regional initiatives.12 The agreement related to the sustainable use of energy and water resources in the basin of the Syr Darya River.

International organisations, alongside other nations, have also tried to improve the situation relating to water in Central Asia. One such example is the launch of the Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP) in 2009 by the World Bank, in partnership with the European Union, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. It aimed to strengthen the enabling environment to promote energy and water security at the regional level and in the beneficiary countries. CAWEP works with governments and civil societies to encourage new projects aimed at improving regional water management.13

Challenges to Water Management

One of the major challenges to water management in Central Asia is the transboundary nature of the water resources combined with conflicting interests of upstream and downstream states. After the collapse of the resource-sharing system of the past, upstream states increased their hydropower production. Water releases from the reservoirs were increasingly driven by upstream winter electricity requirements rather than downstream summer irrigation needs. The change in water release patterns severely impacted downstream countries, resulting in reduced irrigation, water availability and uncontrolled winter flooding. The construction of more dams by the upstream states will lead to more altered release patterns and increase the vulnerability of downstream states to seasonal scarcity.

Climate change is another major concern for the region’s water reserves. Central Asia is already suffering from a seasonally warming climate, increased air temperatures, precipitation changes, and extreme weather events. These changes in weather patterns are leading to the melting of key glaciers, irregularities in water availability, increased competition for water resources, and changes in energy demand and production capacity. These changes in the recent decades are expected to accelerate in the 21st century.14 Furthermore, higher temperatures will have an impact on the natural vegetation and evaporation from these areas will lead to less water availability in the streams and rivers.15

One of the most prominent examples is the drying up of Aral Sea. It has led to numerous environmental problems in the region, including the collapse of the fishing industry, contamination of drinking water and salinization of soil.16 The Aralkum Desert, which has appeared on the seabed once occupied by the Aral Sea, also contributes to the proliferation of dust storms. The surface area of the salty soils and barren areas around the Aral Sea expanded from 40 per cent in 2000 to 54 per cent in 2008, contributing to a more arid local climate, with hotter summers and colder winters.17 The negative consequences of climate change would intensify competition for water among countries in the region, with long-term and severe repercussions for the region’s food, energy and environmental security that would have a bearing on politics.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the CARs made several attempts to reach a consensus on the continuation of water sharing. These attempts led to the creation of several regional water cooperation institutions, particularly the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) in 1992 and the Interstate Fund for saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) in 1993.  However, these agreements were undermined as the countries failed to balance regional water cooperation with the requirements of energy sector. This alienated the upstream countries whose interests lie more in hydropower than the water storage function of existing and potential reservoirs. The ICWC and IFAS have been unable to fully reflect the evolving national interests of the CARs.

In seeking to strengthen their cooperation, governments have tried to establish more ‘explicit trade systems of water against energy’, like the 1998 Syr Darya framework agreement.18 This agreement called for the mutual supply of fuel, electricity and other energy resources amongst the basin countries with an aim to resolve disputes over water and energy. The agreement also set the scope of future regional cooperation actions related to the rational use of water, fuel and energy resources.19 However, these inter-sectoral agreements were not systematically implemented. This non-implementation due to the lack of capacity and an inability to ensure inter-sectoral coherence at the national level became a major factor for undermining cooperation in the region.20

Water Management: Prospects and Recommendations

The current water management in Central Asia is facing obstacles due to the misaligned national interests between the downstream and upstream countries, their differences in preferences of water release schedules, and the lack of clear enforcement in the interstate agreements. At an interstate level, the effectiveness of water management systems in Central Asia depends on a variety of factors. These include appropriate estimation of water demands, accurate forecasting of water availability, proper scheduling of water release and coordination of inter-sectoral requirements.

Water resource forecasting, which includes estimating supply, demand and losses, is frequently violated at river reaches, resulting in erroneous water balances throughout the water system.21 This results in an inaccurate estimate of useable water quantity due to underestimating open channel losses and low-accuracy seasonal flow forecasts, especially the long-term ones. Despite the Central Asian states having undertaken legal reforms to implement integrated water resources management (IWRM)—the full implementation of all IWRM components still remains low.22

Although regional governments have taken initiatives to strengthen regional water management, much work remains to be done to connect national interests with regional water and energy security goals. Inefficiencies in water consumption and inappropriate irrigation systems continue to be key barriers to providing sustainable water supplies in an increasingly scarce environment. 

Considering the region's high agricultural water demand and inefficient resource management, including water loss due to flooding, seepage and evaporation, new irrigation practices must be implemented to increase water productivity. Introducing advanced technologies and water management practices like drip irrigation and sprinklers could prove beneficial for agriculture, as it could reduce water consumption by 30–70 per cent compared to flood irrigation.23

The region could shift its agricultural production from cotton to less water-intensive alternatives. An increase in the production of fruits, vegetables and nuts could significantly help decrease the water footprint of cotton production. However, in countries such as Uzbekistan, which is one of the largest producers and exporters of cotton, this could seem less plausible. Rather, Uzbekistan could increase cotton yields through “drip irrigation, the use of improved or more salt-tolerant varieties, the introduction of conservation agriculture, and the promotion of appropriate crop rotations”.24

Cooperation among the CARs is critical for overcoming the water crisis. As previous initiatives have not been as successful, countries must develop and implement action plans based on efficient and sustainable use of water resources. Strengthening regional cooperation and institutional and functioning legal frameworks will provide clear guidelines on how to efficiently manage regional water resources. These frameworks could focus on aligning national priorities, learning from past successful regional projects, and highlighting the potential benefits of regional cooperation.

Interstate dialogues should seek to encourage technical cooperation in the form of data exchange to predict or avert floods and dam failures. Strengthened technical cooperation can decrease the social, environmental and political risks associated with seasonal water scarcity and floods, including ensuring better implementation of existing agreements. The establishment of cooperative monitoring and early warning systems and combined research efforts have the potential to minimise present inefficiencies. A recent example of this is the installation of upgraded flow-monitoring stations by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on transboundary canals as a measure to lay the ground for improved collective water resource management in the region. This aims to provide automated and real-time data on volumes of water passing through the two countries.25

Agreements on energy trade, cooperative management and investment, particularly in infrastructure projects could be clubbed with various new agreements on hydropower projects, wastewater treatment plants and safety upgradation of current dams. Arrangements regarding the cost-benefit sharing of these projects can be discussed among the nations at length. This would broaden the possible scope of advantageous trade-offs and boost expectations for future cooperation, thereby improving the basis for investments.

Conclusion

The Central Asian water crisis is primarily a product of climate change, inefficient water management, and lack of cooperation and coordination. Water mismanagement has significant economic implications in the form of reduced agricultural productivity and poses significant security, political and health risks. Poor water infrastructure, wasteful water usage and outdated irrigation techniques exacerbate the region's already stressed water resources. As a result, Central Asian states must strengthen their regional water cooperation and review their national interests in lieu of the common regional goals.

The future of water management in Central Asia remains one of the key concerns in the region. Timely implementation of reforms will not only improve the water security of the region, but also the energy and food security. Efficient governance and greater coordination between the five republics is required for reaching mutually beneficial approaches to water management. It is crucial to note that advancement in water cooperation will occur when the focus shifts from previous disagreements to future prospects and from defending entrenched positions to realising core interests.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Sanat Kushkumbayev, “Clock is Ticking as Central Asia Confronts Water Calamity”, Eurasianet, 14 February 2024.
• 2. S.S. Zhiltsov, I.S. Zonn, A.G. Kostianoy, A.V. Semenov, “Water Resources Management in Central Asia”, The Handbook of Environmental Chemistry, Vol. 105, 2020, pp. 1–11.
• 3. Anar Khamzayeva, “Water Resources Management in Central Asia: Security Implications and Prospects for Regional Cooperation”, CIDOB, No. 25, 2009.
• 4. Michael Wines, “Grand Soviet Scheme for Sharing Water in Central Asia is Foundering”, The New York Times, 9 December 2002.
• 5. Xiaolei Wang, “Reviving the Aral Sea: A Hydro-Eco-Social Perspective”, Earth’s Future, Vol. 11, No. 11,
  
     November 2023.
• 6. Sharmila L. Murthy and Fatima Mendikulova, “Water, Conflict, and Cooperation in Central Asia: The Role of International Law and Diplomacy”, Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2017, p. 402.
• 7. The Agreement outlined the main principles, which corresponded to international practice, among others: equality of rights to use and responsibility of the State for transboundary water resources; obligation to respect the agreed procedure and rules for the use and protection of transboundary water resources; obligation to avoid actions that would affect the interests of other Parties and would be able to harm them, etc. See “Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Management on Utilization and Protection of Water Resources from Interstate Sources”, Interstate Commission for Water Coordination in Central Asia, 18 February 1992.
• 8. Ibid., Article 7.
• 9. Considering the global impact of the Aral Sea's drying and degradation on the natural ecosystem in the region, the agreement reaffirmed to the commitment of the Central Asian republics to the principles of international water law, respecting the mutual interests of each of the sovereign states in matters of the use and protection of the water resources of the basin. See “Agreement on Joint Actions to Solve the Problem of the Aral Sea and the Aral Sea Region, Environmental Rehabilitation and Ensuring the Socio-economic Development of the Aral Region”, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1993.
• 10. Ibid.
• 11. See “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syrdarya River Basin”, Asia Pacific Energy Portal, 1998.
• 12. Jason Wahlang, “Turkmenistan’s Neutrality-Based Foreign Policy: Issues and Challenges”, Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), 20 July 2022.
• 13. “Central Asia Water & Energy Program”, The World Bank.
• 14. “Climate Change and Sustainable Water Management in Central Asia”, Asian Development Bank, No. 5, 2014.
• 15. Ibid.
• 16. “The Future of Aral Sea Lies in Transboundary Cooperation”, Bulletin, Vol. 63, No. 1, 2014, pp. 6–9.
• 17. Ibid.
• 18. “Rethinking Water in Central Asia”, CAREC, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), 2017.
• 19. Elena Antipova, Alexi Zyryanov, Daene McKinney and Andre Savitsky, “Optimization of Syr Darya Water and Energy Uses”, Water International, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2020, pp. 504–516.
• 20. “Rethinking Water in Central Asia”, no. 18.
• 21. “The Use and Management of Water Resources in Central Asia”, OECD Policy Perspectives, 2021.
• 22. Ibid.
• 23. Abror Kurbonmuratov, “Uzbekistan Seeks to Introduce New Technologies for Irrigation of Agricultural Lands”, CABAR, 9 February 2024.
• 24. N. Djanibekov, I. Rudenko, J. Lamers and I. Bobojonov, “Pros and Cons of Cotton Production in Uzbekistan”, Food Policy for Developing Countries: Case Studies, Cornell University, 2010.
• 25. “Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Install Water-Monitoring Stations on Border”, Eurasianet, 26 February 2024.

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Summary

India–Oman ties have strengthened remarkably in recent years, with regular high-level exchanges between the two countries. The bilateral ties span multiple sectors including energy, trade and investment, technology, defence and security cooperation. Both countries enjoy close maritime proximity and have shared concerns about regional maritime security.

Introduction

India and Oman share strong bilateral relations marked by shared cultural, historical and economic realities. India–Oman relationship has been on an upswing since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1955. Oman is one of the closest strategic partners of India in West Asia. Oman’s strategic location near the entry point of the Strait of Hormuz, overlooking the Arabian Sea makes it an important constituent in India’s approach towards West Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.

In recent years, Oman has received renewed attention under the ‘Think West’ policy of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The high-level visits of Sultan Haitham bin Tarik to India in 2023 and Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Oman in 2018 have further consolidated the bilateral relations. The strong people-to-people ties have been enhanced by the presence of a large Indian diaspora in Oman. As of 2023, around 5,27,108 Indians are living in Oman, comprising the second-largest expatriate community in the country, after Bangladesh.1

High-level Visits and Strategic Partnership

There have been regular high-level visits between both the countries. During the November 2008 visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Oman, both countries decided to elevate the bilateral relationship to a strategic partnership. In December 2010, a Higher Committee on Economic Cooperation outlined nine areas of cooperation including agriculture, healthcare, infrastructure, tourism, chemicals and fertilisers, education, oil and gas, power and mining.2

Prime Minister Modi paid a state visit to Oman from 11 to 12 February 2018. Sultan Qaboos and Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed their commitment to deepen the strategic partnership. Eight agreements and Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed pertaining to legal collaboration, healthcare, space exploration, tourism and other areas. Both the countries committed to combat terrorism globally and highlighted the significance of undertaking reforms in the United Nations (UN). Emphasis was further laid on improving people-to-people ties between both the countries.3

Sultan Haitham succeeded Sultan Qaboos in 2020. Qaboos ruled Oman for 50 years since 1970. Modi’s 2018 visit was reciprocated with Haitham’s state visit to India in 2023. Five agreements and MoUs on culture, IT, health, defence and other subjects were signed between the two countries. During the visit, a new ‘India-Oman joint vision, a partnership for the future’ was adopted, outlining ten areas of cooperation, aligning Oman’s Vision 2040 with India's development objectives.4 Both leaders stressed on the importance of maintaining regional stability and reaffirmed their commitment to ramping up cooperation in the fight against terrorism and emphasised the need of promoting the universal principles of tolerance, coexistence, peace and moderation while underlining the necessity of rejecting all forms of violent extremism.5

Apart from the leader-level visits, there have been regular ministerial visits and meetings, especially over the last five years. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visited Oman in 2019 where both sides reiterated their commitment to further deepen defence, security and maritime cooperation.6 Jaishankar’s visit to Oman following his Iran visit came in the backdrop of US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear agreement which led to a spate of maritime incidents and insecurity in the Gulf of Oman. Oman’s Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi also visited India in 2020 and 2022. In addition to various ministerial and secretary-level visits, the Minister of State for External Affairs has made three visits to Oman in the last five years.

Oman, along with the UAE and Egypt from West Asia, were special invitees to the G20 during India’s presidency in 2023. Oman was represented at the Summit by its Deputy Prime Minister Asaad bin Tariq bin Taimur Al Said. Nine ministers and several other official delegations attended over 150 G20 Ministerial and working group meetings held in India.7

India–Oman Strategic Dialogue is an annual forum conceived to strengthen bilateral relations and increase cooperation in newer domains. During the ninth edition of the Dialogue, held on 26 February 2024 in Muscat, India’s Deputy National Security Advisor Vikram Misri discussed the regional situation in the Red Sea amidst the Gaza war, with his Omani counterparts. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to resolving current bilateral challenges and examining new areas of cooperation, including disaster management, oceanography, artificial intelligence, and the military, security and strategic domains.8

India and Oman seek convergence in their trajectory towards becoming developed nations, as envisaged by their future visions of ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ and ‘Oman Vision 2040’. Their long-term partnership is testimony to the value of building robust relationships for the overall development of India's West Asia policy as both countries negotiate the multifaceted nature of a changing geopolitical landscape.

Maritime, Defence and Security Cooperation

Oman is India’s oldest defence partner in the Gulf region. Both countries signed a military protocol agreement in 1972 which led to a three-year deputation of Indian Navy personnel to the Omani Navy in 1973. The office of the Indian Defence Advisor in Muscat began functioning in 1989. Oman opened their Defence Attaché’s office at New Delhi in 2002. India and Oman signed a MoU on Defence Cooperation in 2005 which emphasises further strengthening of defence cooperation.9 Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar visited Oman in 2016, where he discussed bilateral defence cooperation with Omani officials, and signed four MOUs and agreements to enhance collaboration in defence and maritime security. The agreements covered cooperation in tackling marine crime prevention at sea between the respective coast guards, maritime issues, and protocol on exchange of flight safety information between their air forces.10

The India–Oman Joint Military Cooperation Committee (JMCC) is the highest forum for defence engagement between both the countries. The JMCC assesses and advises the general framework of defence exchanges between the two countries. The 12th meeting of the JMCC was held in Oman in 2024 where both the countries agreed to enhance cooperation in the fields of training, joint exercise, information sharing, oceanography, ship-building, and Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO). A MoU was signed on the purchase of defence material and equipment, which would serve as the framework for further cooperation in the defence sector.11

Oman does not make major investments in the defence sector. Oman’s defence budget was reduced to US$ 7.8 billion in 2023 from US$ 9.2 billion in 2019, while the budget for equipment acquisition was reduced to US$ 1.3 billion in 2023 from US$ 2.2 billion in 2019.12 Oman’s major defence requirements include land vehicles, simulators and tactical communications systems. India has supplied Oman with INSAS rifles in 2010.13

Oman is among the few countries with which all three services of Indian armed forces undertake regular military exercises. There is a regular exchange of visits by the Service Chiefs from both sides. The fourth edition of a 13-day long military exercise 'Al Najah' between the armies of India and Oman was conducted on 1–13 August 2022 in Rajasthan.14 The sixth edition of the five-day joint air exercise ‘Eastern Bridge-VI’, between the Royal Air Force of Oman and the Indian Air Force was successfully held at Air Force Station Jodhpur from 21–25 February 2022.15 Similarly, the Indian Navy and the Royal Navy of Oman participated in the 13th edition of bilateral exercise ‘Naseem Al Bahr’ from 19–24 November 2022 off the coast of Oman.16

These exercises are crucial for creating synergies between the military personnel from both sides about each other’s operational procedures which becomes helpful in undertaking joint operations in the future, in the backdrop of any crisis or instability in the western Indian Ocean region. Soldiers from Oman undergo regular military courses and training in the various prestigious military institutes of India.

Oman's strategic location near the Strait of Hormuz, a vital maritime choke point, and the Gulf of Oman connecting the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea, makes it pivotal for global trade and maritime security. Furthermore, Oman’s proximity to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa makes it a geopolitically important country with respect to India’s interests in the Indian Ocean and the broader Indo-Pacific region, which includes trade and energy security among others. India can access the entire Gulf region through Oman’s ports bypassing the strategic choke points of Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

India has been undertaking anti-piracy operations in the strategically important Gulf of Aden since 2008. During Modi's Oman visit in 2018, an Annexure was signed to an existing MoU on Military Cooperation between India and Oman relating to the Duqm port in Oman. This MoU helps in facilitating the Indian Navy in extending their anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden for longer durations by providing operational turn-around and logistical facilities to the naval ships docked at Omani ports.17 In the current backdrop of the instability in the Red Sea owing to resurgent attacks on commercial shipping by Somalian pirates and Houthi rebels of Yemen, India has been assigned a dedicated zone within the Duqm Port. This will further strengthen the Indian Navy's position as a net security provider and strengthen its role as a first responder during Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations.18

Apart from the Duqm Port, the Salalah Port holds importance for India’s maritime security due to its proximity to the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Red Sea. Indian naval ships and submarines make regular port calls in Salalah. The Indian Navy has been launching its P-8I long-range maritime surveillance aircraft from Salalah to carry out anti-piracy sorties in the region.19 India–Oman Joint Maritime Committee, which was set up to work towards ensuring maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region, held its first meeting virtually on 23 February 2022.20 Oman is also a member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, a forum conceived by the Indian Navy in 2008 to enhance maritime cooperation among the navies of the Indian Ocean littoral states.21

In recent times, Oman has fostered close relations with China, particularly in the fields of economic investments, oil imports and defence cooperation. Chinese warships are increasingly making use of Oman's Salalah Port for logistics during its anti-piracy operations.22 China also carries out regular naval exercises and port calls with Oman. Increasing Chinese presence in the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean Region presents a challenge to India’s traditional maritime foothold in the region. Some reports suggest that China is planning to build a new naval base in Oman.23

Trade and Investment

Bilateral trade in the last decade has more than doubled from US$ 4.6 billion in 2012–1324 to around US$ 12.4 billion in 2022–23.25 During the Sultan's visit to India in 2023, talks also focussed on a comprehensive economic agreement, and the potential for bilateral rupee trade. Much of the substantive negotiations for the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between India and Oman have been finalised.26 Under such an agreement, in addition to simplifying regulations to promote trade in services and investments, the two countries can either significantly reduce or completely eliminate customs duties on a number of products traded between them. Such an agreement will help Indian industries including iron and steel, textiles, electronics and machinery to significantly increase their exports to Oman.27 Oman will become the second country in the region, after the UAE, to have signed a CEPA with India. An India–Oman CEPA will further boost the economic and strategic partnership between the two countries.

Oman’s FDI in India from April 2000 to December 2022 has crossed US$ 588 million, whereas Indian business establishments have investment over US$ 7.5 billion in Oman.28 An Oman–India Joint Investment Fund was created in 2011. The fund is backed by the Oman Investment Authority and the State Bank of India. The fund's initial two tranches were worth US$ 100 million and US$ 200 million, which are being invested in mid-market Indian companies in various sectors such as manufacturing, financial services, and business goods and services. The third tranche of the fund was announced by both countries during the Sultan’s India visit in 2023. The US$ 300 million fund seeks to direct investments towards the Indian economy's fastest-growing sectors.29

Energy Ties

Although Oman’s oil reserves are comparatively lower than its other GCC counterparts, except Bahrain, it has been an important source of crude oil for India. In 2022, India was the second-largest importer of Omani crude oil after China. In 2022–23, India imported petroleum products worth US$ 4.6 billion from Oman.30 There exists a considerable scope of enhancing Oman’s oil trade with India. Indian companies have also made investments in the energy sector in Oman. In 2018, Indian Oil Corporation Limited acquired a 17 per cent stake in Oman’s Mukhaizna oil field worth US$ 329 million.31

In 2014, India, Oman, and Iran began discussions on constructing an Iran–Oman–India deep-sea gas pipeline that would supply 31 million cubic metres of gas per day to India.32 This pipeline can provide India with an alternative to the Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline, which encountered multiple issues due to Pakistan's reluctance in fulfilling its obligations. Though discussions have taken place in building the Iran–Oman gas pipeline,33 no major progress has been achieved in this regard. If commissioned, the pipeline will help in boosting India's energy security significantly. In the future, exporting gas from other GCC countries to India can also be facilitated via such a pipeline from Oman.

Developing renewable energy capacity is another important goal for both Oman and India, with significant potential for cooperation. India has already commissioned large-scale renewable projects to fulfil its target of attaining 500 GW of non-fossil fuel based electricity capacity by 2030. Oman has set a target to produce 30 per cent of its energy requirements from renewable sources by 2030.34 Oman is also a member of the International Solar Alliance which was co-founded by India. An Indian renewable energy company ACME India Ltd has reached an agreement to invest US$ 3.5 billion over the next three years for the construction of Oman's first commercial green ammonia and green hydrogen manufacturing plant at the Duqm port.35

Ports and SEZs

Oman's future objective is to establish itself as a hub for transportation and logistics linking East Africa, West Asia and South Asia. Ports will play an enhanced role in securing such objectives. However, the cargo handling capacity of Omani ports are comparatively lower than that of its regional neighbours such as the UAE or Saudi Arabia. In August 2020, Oman established the Public Authority for Special Economic Zones and Free Zones which oversees the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Free Zones at Duqm, Al Mazunah, Salalah, Sohar and other upcoming zones. The SEZs were established in order to bring foreign capital, stimulate economic growth and foster a business-conducive environment.

The principal aim of establishing SEZs is to push the country's economy to become more diversified and less dependent on oil revenues, apart from generating jobs, creating infrastructure, and economic development. The SEZ at Duqm is among the largest in the world. Duqm’s location at the crossroads of Asia, Africa and as one of the busiest international trade routes overlooking the Indian Ocean makes it a strategic investment location for global players. Oman though requires enormous investments to scale up its ports infrastructure and SEZs in order to become a logistics and financial hub.

Oman has initiated talks with India’s Adani Group for developing the Duqm Port.36 An Indo-Oman joint venture, Sebacic Oman, is investing US$ 62.7 million to establish the largest sebacic acid plant in the region inside the Duqm SEZ.37 Furthermore, 'Little India' is an important consolidated tourism project being undertaken in the Duqm SEZ with financing from Indian businesses. The project will undoubtedly attract a sizable number of tourists due to its sheer size and scope, which will benefit tourism and its allied industries. These projects will significantly increase India's economic footprint within Oman.38 Indian investments in Sohar Port and Free Zone have exceeded US$ 2 billion.39 There is a lot of scope for India to increase its investments in the strategic projects of Oman’s SEZs, especially in Sohar and Salalah, which are cities with a significant Indian diaspora.

The Musandam Peninsula is an exclave of Oman strategically located at the southern tip of the Strait of Hormuz. The Government of Oman has invited bids to develop the Khasab port and the surrounding region in order to promote tourism.40 Any Indian investments streamlined into this region will hold significant strategic importance in the future. Oman requires large-scale foreign investments and technical assistance to develop its ports and SEZs which will aid in its economic diversification, in order to move away from a fossil-fuel based economy. India’s role in aiding Oman’s economic transformation is a key factor behind the increasing synergy between the two countries.

Conclusion

The strategic partnership between India and Oman is firmly based on shared interests and objectives. The Sultan’s maiden visit to India in December 2023 has added new momentum to the India–Oman relationship. Regular high-level bilateral engagements have been a hallmark of this relationship. Oman’s historic relations with India in addition to their maritime proximity and common security goals make India a trusted and privileged partner of Oman amid the changing regional and international geopolitical conditions.

As Oman diversifies its economy to transform itself into a major logistics and financial hub in the West Asian region, it stands to benefit immensely with enhanced cooperation with India. In addition to enhancing bilateral cooperation, the maritime, defence and economic ties between India and Oman have also promoted regional stability. The potential for strengthening economic cooperation, particularly in sectors such as ports, SEZs and renewable energy, offers a promising avenue for mutual growth. In a complex geopolitical setting, India and Oman's growing and multifaceted strategic partnership displays a shared commitment to regional peace and economic development.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Oman Fact Sheet”, Embassy of India, Muscat, Oman.
• 2. “India-Oman Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2012.
• 3. “List of Agreements/MoUs Signed on the Occasion of the Visit of  Prime Minister to Oman (February 11, 2018)”, Press Information Bureau, Prime Minister’s Office, 12 February 2018.
• 4. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India, Oman Adopt Joint Vision Focusing on 10 Essential Areas”, The Economic Times, 17 December 2023.
• 5. “India - Oman Joint Statement during the State Visit of His Majesty Sultan Haitham bin Tarik of the Sultanate of Oman”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 16 December 2023.
• 6. “Jaishankar Holds Talks with Oman's Top Leadership”, Deccan Herald, 24 December 2019.
• 7. “Why Oman Sultan's First State Visit to India is Significant for Both Nations”, Firstpost, 15 December 2023.
• 8. Huma Siddiqui, “India-Oman Strategic Dialogue: Strengthening Bilateral Relations for Mutual Growth”, Financial Express, 27 February 2024.
• 9. "Indian Ambassador, IAF Observer and Commander RAFO visit IAF Contingent at Oman", Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 28 October 2009.
• 10. “Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar Visits Oman”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 22 May 2016.
• 11. “Defence Secretary Shri Giridhar Aramane co-chairs 12th India-Oman Joint Military Cooperation Committee Meeting at Muscat”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 31 January 2024.
• 12. Richard Thomas, “Oman Sees Sustained Dip in Defence Budget and Spending”, Army Technology, 6 June 2023.
• 13. “Oman Army All Set to Use India’s INSAS Rifles”, Hindustan Times, 22 April 2010.
• 14. “Royal Army of Oman Contingent for Joint Exercise Al NAJAH-IV Arrive in India”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 31 July 2022.
• 15. “EXERCISE EASTERN BRIDGE -VI AT AIR FORCE STATION JODHPUR”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 21 February 2022.
• 16. “EXERCISE NASEEM AL BAHR - 2022 SEA PHASE”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 24 November 2022.
• 17. Shubhajit Roy, “India Gets Access to Strategic Oman Port Duqm for Military Use, Chabahar-Gwadar in Sight”, The Indian Express, 13 February 2018.
• 18. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Amid Red Sea Crisis, India Gets a Specific Zone in Duqm Port”, The Economic Times, 8 February 2024.
• 19.  “Indian Navy's P8I Carrying Out Surveillance Sorties in Gulf of Aden”, ANI, 1 June 2019.
• 20. Sidhant Sibal, “With Focus on Counter-terrorism, Defence, India and Oman Hold Strategic Dialogue in Delhi”, WION, 19 January 2023.
• 21. Mohd Firoz Ahamed, “Security Issues in the Indian Ocean and the India–Oman Relationship”, World Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2015, pp. 130–143.
• 22. Fred H. Lawson, “Oman-China Relations and Indian Ocean Security”, Anadolu Ajansı, 29 May 2018.
• 23. John Ai, “China Betting on Oman to Expand its Military Presence in the Middle East”, Asia News, 23 November 2023.
• 24. “India-Oman Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2014.
• 25. “Oman Fact Sheet”, no. 1.
• 26. Amiti Sen, “Proposed India-Oman Free Trade Pact to Potentially Lower Import Duties on 80% Goods: GTRI”, The Hindu Businessline, 13 December 2023.
• 27. Shashank Mattoo, “India, Oman Make Progress on Free Trade Agreement”, Mint, 16 December 2023.
• 28. “Brief on India-Oman Economic and Commercial Relations”, Embassy of India, Muscat, Oman, 6 April 2023.
• 29. Huma Siddiqui, “India and Oman’s Landmark Third Tranche of Joint Investment Fund”, Financial Express, 16 December 2023.
• 30. “Indian Goods Worth USD 3.7 billion Entering Oman to Get Boost by Free Trade Agreement: GTRI Report”, The Economic Times, 12 December 2023.
• 31. “IndianOil Buys 17% Stake in Oman’s Mukhaizna Oilfield”, The Hindu Businessline, 6 April 2018.
• 32. Ankit Panda, “India, Iran and Oman Open Talks On Deep Sea Gas Pipeline”, The Diplomat, 1 March 2014.
• 33. Saleh Al-Shaibany, “$60bn Oman-Iran Gas Pipeline Project May Become a Reality”, Times of Oman, 24 May 2022.
• 34. “Oman to Produce 30% of Energy from Renewable Source by 2030”, Times of Oman, 16 March 2024.
• 35. “Brief on India-Oman Economic and Commercial Relations”, Embassy of India, Muscat, Oman, 6 April 2023.
• 36. “Duqm Port Development Deal with Adani Group is Open: Oman Official”, The Economic Times, 4 March 2024.
• 37. “Brief on India-Oman Economic and Commercial Relations”, no. 35.
• 38. Tasneem Gangardiwala, “Oman’s Big – Little India Project”, OER Live, 19 June 2019.
• 39. Mohammed Al-Hajri and Jonathan Fulton, “Navigating Asymmetry in the Indian Ocean Region:
  
  Oman in the US-India-China Strategic Triangle”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2023, pp. 6–20.
• 40. “Musandam: Development Gathers Pace with Mega Projects”, Oman Observer, 14 January 2024.

Summary

Australia’s quest for ‘strategic equilibrium’ in the Indo-Pacific has seen its diplomacy focus on building its deterrence capabilities closer with the West while trying simultaneously to reset its relationship with Beijing. ‘Strategic Equilibrium’, a term introduced by Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong is defined as multiple lines of effort applied by Canberra to secure its vision of a regional order—where countries have agency in terms of choices in their strategic partnerships, build diplomatic and economic capacity to manage and maintain balance of power but also a vision underwritten by ‘military capability’. The recent buzz around Japan joining the trilateral security pact AUKUS as a defence technology partner in Pillar 2 created momentum on the conversation of building deterrence capabilities in the region through collective action. Meanwhile a month earlier, Australia had hosted Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi after a gap of seven years attempting a cautious thaw with Beijing—aimed at both stabilising bilateral ties but also managing Chinese inroads into the Pacific, a strategic neighbourhood now seeing intense geopolitical rivalry. This Brief argues that managing expectations and perceptions while striving for strategic equilibrium has been key to Canberra’s policy priorities.

Australia’s quest for ‘strategic equilibrium’1 in the Indo-Pacific has seen it focusing on building deterrence capabilities by pursuing closer defence ties with the West while trying simultaneously to reset its relationship with Beijing. ‘Strategic equilibrium’, a term introduced by Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, is defined as multiple lines of effort to secure Australia’s vision of a regional order—where countries have agency in terms of choices in their strategic partnerships, build diplomatic and economic capacity to manage and maintain balance of power underwritten by ‘military capability’.2 The centrality of this concept in Canberra’s foreign policy has been visible both in words and action.

It wasn’t surprising then that the buzz around the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) trilateral security agreement signed in 2021, picked up during Japanese PM Fumio Kishida’s visit to Washington DC in early April 2024.3 The security pact’s Pillar 1 is designed to deliver nuclear-powered attack submarines to Australia. Reports noted that Japan could be included in Pillar 2, focused on delivering advanced capabilities and sharing technologies across a range of areas including quantum computing, undersea, hypersonic and cyber technology as well as artificial intelligence.4 Media reports suggest that the “group sees potential benefits in tapping Japan ’s strong industrial and technological capacity at a time when Tokyo has identified boosting defense production as a key national security pillar”.5 While no official announcement on ‘JAUKUS’ came during Kishida’s visit, the reportage generated enough interest and momentum about future developments.

AUKUS is often described as a cornerstone arrangement in the Indo-Pacific and central to ‘keep the peace’ in the words of Foreign Minister Wong.6 During the Biden–Kishida summit, the announcement of a new partnership between Australia, the United States and Japan on co-operation on a networked air defence architecture to counter growing air and missile threats drew attention.7 Adding to the buzz around the AUKUS and related developments was the news that the US was scaling back export control requirements for Australia and the UK—reducing licensing burdens on trade by up to 80 per cent, which some reports value at US$ 2bn (A$ 3.11bn) for dual-use goods.8 Experts note that the new licence-free environment would support industry, research and lower technology transfer barriers and costs of trade.9

Those arguing for an AUKUS public diplomacy arm10 would be happy with the current momentum, since the domestic support for the deal in Australia has seen much polarisation.11 The furore over the US Navy ordering just one Virginia-class submarine because of the Biden administration’s defence budget cuts in fiscal 2025, as compared to the target of more than two forecasted to meet US and Australia needs had reignited debates on US ability to fulfil commitments on delivery of the submarine fleet.12 Thus the impetus and focus on Pillar 2 as the real strength of AUKUS and technology partnerships has been coordinated well between Washington and Canberra publicly— highlighting the conversation with Japan and before it the interest from New Zealand13 on possible collaboration.14

Striving for ‘Strategic Equilibrium’

Perceptions matter and clearly these lines of effort are designed to convey how Australia is going about achieving its interests in managing strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific.  The concept while not explicitly calling out China is clearly designed to manage the China relationship.15 The core idea being that ‘it cannot only be left to the US’ and thus efforts like AUKUS, Wong has often emphasised will ‘help better ensure a strategic equilibrium’.16 Wong’s colleague, Australia ’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles has also argued that ‘Australia sees these investments as a necessary and prudent response to the military build-up’ in the Indo-Pacific and would make Australia a ‘more valuable and potent partner’ in the region as nations seek more reassurance from China on its assertive behaviour. 17

Simultaneously, Canberra has tried to keep channels of dialogue open with China, with the Albanese government trying hard to reset its relationship with Beijing. For, just a month before AUKUS-related developments in Washington, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was welcomed by his counterpart Wong, after a gap of seven years for the Australia–China Strategic Dialogue. This was the first sign of a thaw in relations after the tumultuous turn of ties since 2017.18 The visit followed the meeting in November 2023 between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and President Xi Jinping, where Xi spoke of “embracing a new 50 years in China–Australia relations”.19

Reports note that plans for current Chinese Premier Li Qiang to visit Australia were “on track”, and the visit is expected in mid-2024.20 Wang also briefly met Prime Minister Albanese before travelling to Sydney for meetings with Australia ’s business community. China ’s Ambassador, Xiao Qian, discussing the return of warmth to the ties told media in January 2024 that “we will move on from stabilisation through improvement, onward to further consolidation and even development.”21

While Beijing, as Wang Yi highlighted, expects “no hesitation, no yawing and no backward steps” in the relationship,22 Wong ’s statement was more cautious in its reading of the visit. Wong said after the meeting that “a stable relationship between Australia and China doesn ’t just happen, it needs ongoing work (…) and this was the latest meeting in that process.”23 Wong went on to say that dialogue enabled both sides “to manage our differences” and both sides understood that “it does not eliminate them”.24 She further emphasised that “Australia will always be Australia and China will always be China.”25

A Cautious Thaw

Australian analysts have pointed that there is a perception gap in both sides as to what the thaw in ties translates to. The Saturday Paper carried an analysis quoting former Australian Ambassador and senior Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade official Kevin Magee arguing that “China expects more than stabilisation”.26 According to him, stabilisation for “China is a step, and then the next step is closer relations and what the Chinese see as a less hostile approach to China.” For the Australian government, on the other hand, “stabilisation is basically an end point”.27 While it is imperative for the Australian government to stabilise relations given China ’s position as Australia ’s largest two-way trading partner, the current government is also cautious of not getting ahead of public opinion which has been polarised on China.28

Ahead of the meeting, both sides had locked in work to build the momentum to the visit. Crippling trade restrictions imposed by China had cost the economy an estimated 20 billion Australian dollars (US$ 13 billion), when duties were imposed on key exports such as wine, barley and beef in 2020 after Canberra legislated against overseas influence, barred Huawei from 5G contracts and called for a probe into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.29 The Guardian had reported that “under last year ’s ‘off-ramp’ deal, Australia suspended its complaint against China at the World Trade Organization in return for China agreeing to fast-track a review of the tariffs by the end of March 2024.”30

Beijing paid up to its part of the deal by taking off punitive restrictions on export of wine even as Australian officials accepted recommendations from the Anti-Dumping Commission to discontinue anti-dumping measures against wind turbines from China.31 Even though the current government seems to have created the space for the reset of ties by toning down public criticism of China as pointed out by commentators,32 it did raise the domestically sensitive case of detained Australian Yang Hengjun, who was found guilty of espionage in a closed trial and sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in February in China. Wong said Australians were shocked by the sentence and the government would not “walk away from our advocacy for Doctor Yang”.33

Meanwhile, Wang Yi ’s visit also saw the domestic debate within Australia heating up with media headlines playing up Wang Yi ’s meeting with Former Australian PM Paul Keating, a veteran centre-left leader who has been very critical of his own party in government for stirring trouble with Beijing.34 Keating, whose push for deeper ties with Beijing was a central facet of his 1991 to 1996 term, has hailed Australia–China ties as historic at a time when the country ’s conservative opposition, called the meeting a "calculated humiliation”.35

Adding to the polarising debate was the revelation by the head of Australia's domestic intelligence organisation that a foreign spy group dubbed the "A-team" had cultivated and recruited a now-former politician.36 Following the unexpected revelations, Alex Turnbull, the son of former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, said in a presser that he had been approached about an infrastructure project by a group of suspected Chinese agents in around 2017 when his father was in government. He said the group had links to a former New South Wales state Labour Party parliamentarian without naming the person.37 In this environment, while both sides have tried to paint the Wang Yi visit in a positive light, the simmering tensions have been obscured for the time being rather than resolved.

China’s Discourse Politics on AUKUS and the Pacific

Given the tightrope walk by Canberra, it did not surprise many when Beijing fired shots stoking ‘AUKUS’ concerns in Australia’s strategic neighbourhood in the Pacific. Managing expectations in this strategic geography weighs heavily on Canberra’s mind. On expected lines, during his recent visit to Papua New Guinea (PNG), Wang Yi lashed out at “western powers in the AUKUS security pact of provoking division and risking nuclear proliferation in the South Pacific”.38 The news of possible cooperation with Japan on military technology was described as an attempt to “stoking confrontation between blocs and provoking division”, calling it “inconsistent with the urgent needs of the island countries”.39

It is reported that PM Albanese arrived hot on the trails of Wang Yi to inaugurate the 96 kilometer historical Kokoda track with PNG PM James Marape.40 It was said to be the site of fierce fighting during World War II when Australian soldiers, helped by local villagers repelled the Japanese advance on Port Moresby thus sealing the bilateral relationship.41 Albanese’s efforts have been part of his administration’s push to prioritise bilateral ties with the island nations, not only through high-profile diplomatic visits but also by stabilising relations with China and placing climate change back on the agenda. Canberra has not been immune to the mixed reactions from the Pacific Islands on the AUKUS deal.42

In fact, when the US was being criticised for congressional budget delays over the renewal of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Palau, and the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Ambassadors of Australia and New Zealand to the United States had jointly lobbied the US Congress in support of the PICs.43 They backed regional leaders in their efforts to make the Congress aware of the strategic significance of the states and funding delays playing directly into Chinese ambitions for the region.

Beijing’s signing of the security pact with the Solomon Islands in 2022 set off alarm bells in the US and Australia about the scale of Chinese presence and influence in the region. Today, Pacific Island countries find themselves leveraging the strategic jostling between China and their traditional partners—Australia, New Zealand, United States and France—where development assistance is increasingly seen as a proxy for great power competition.

With uncertainty rising with flip flops over diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, competing security assistance pacts, and new development assistance initiatives, winning the perception game has become key in the region. Currently batting for AUKUS in the US as Australia’s Ambassador is Kevin Rudd, who had famously said during his term as PM in 2022 “don't ‘lecture' the Pacific islands on China”. Instead, he urged the West to offer “different, better development options”.44 The Albanese government seems to be working hard on marshalling its resources and those of its partners in the region to do just that.

Internal Debates Continue to Simmer

However, despite attempts to manage perceptions and expectations, internal debates continue to simmer in the region around assurances on the AUKUS. For instance, a recent statement by US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell who made ‘a rare linkage’ between Taiwan and AUKUS at a Washington think tank event caught attention in the press.45 He was arguing that new submarine capabilities would enhance peace and stability, including in the strait that separates China and Taiwan.46 This statement drew reactions47 since Defence Minister Marles had in his defence of AUKUS previously stated that Australia "absolutely" did not promise to support the US in any military conflict over Taiwan in return for a deal to acquire US nuclear-powered attack submarines.48 The Albanese administration had also given assurances that the submarines will be thoroughly under Australia ’s sovereign control when the debates sparked last year around surrender of sovereignty.49

However, what the coverage didn’t highlight was the assertion by Campbell that for the US, AUKUS “is part of a larger framework of things”, including actions like “taking the QUAD to the leader level and institutionalizing a number of arrangements among the four maritime democracies to advance our interests in Southeast Asia and the Pacific”.50 In fact, perhaps pre-empting in hindsight questions on the relevance of Quad, with Japan now being considered a technology partner for AUKUS, Campbell’s urging of the need for collective action with a range of partners could be considered reassuring. He summed up the like-mindedness of Indo-Pacific powers well when he said

leading nations right now in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, Australia, South Korea, I would add India to that framework, increasingly operating more closely, greater capabilities more generally. I think that balance, that additional capacity will help strengthen deterrence more general.51

Perceptions matter when nations are jockeying for leverage and managing balance of power. The messaging on reassurance matters doubly when the challenge is managing China.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Transcript of National Press Club Address: Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power”, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, 17 April 2023.
• 2. Ibid.
• 3. Bryant Harris, “AUKUS Allies Float Path for Japan to Join Tech Sharing Pact”, Defense News, 11 April 2024.
• 4. William James and David Brunnstrom, “US, UK, Australia Consider Japan's Cooperation in AUKUS Security Pact”, Reuters, 9 April 2024.
• 5.  Gabriel Dominguez, “Benefits and Risks: AUKUS Looks to Take Gamble on Japan”,  Japan Times, 17 April 2024.
• 6. “Australia Seeks AUKUS Submarine Deal to ‘Better Ensure a Strategic Equilibrium ’ , Foreign Minister Says”, South China Morning Post, 14 March 2023.
• 7. Richard Wood, “Australia, US and Japan Strike Missile Agreement to Deter China” , 9news.com.au, 11 April 2024.
• 8. “US to Reduce Licensing by 80% for UK, Australia to Boost AUKUS”, Reuters, 18 April 2024.
• 9. “AUKUS Partners Relax More Export Licensing, Trade and Tech Transfer Regulations”, www.psnews.com.au, 23 April 2024. 
• 10. Euan Graham, John Hemmings and James Rogers, “Joining the Battle for the Narrative: The Case for AUKUS Public Diplomacy”, aspistrategist.org.au, 20 March 2024.
• 11. William Leben, “AUKUS Debate Shows Nation Facing a Defence Crossroads”, reporter.anu.edu.au, 12 April 2023.
• 12. “Australia Confident about Receiving Nuclear Submarines Despite U.S. Funding Cut”, www.nbcnews.com, 13 March 2024.
• 13. Tim Fish, “New Zealand in AUKUS ‘No Guarantee, ’ But Discussions Active: Defense Minister”, www.breakingdefense.com  18 March 2024.
• 14. Lewis Jackson and Sakura Murakami, “Australia Downplays Japan's Role in AUKUS, Says No Plans to Add Member to Defence Pact”, Reuters,  9 April 2024.
• 15. “Transcript of National Press Club Address: Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power”, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, no. 1.
• 16. “Australia Seeks AUKUS Submarine Deal to ‘Better Ensure a Strategic Equilibrium ’ , Foreign Minister Says”, South China Morning Post, 14 March 2023.
• 17. “Transcript of the Speech of The Hon Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Defence, Australia, at the National Defence College”, New Delhi, India, 22 June 2022.
• 18. “Transcript of Press Conference at Parliament House, Canberra by Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong on the Issue of Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue”, 20 March 2024.
• 19. Phillip Coorey, “China Hails ‘New Starting Point ’ , Albanese, Xi Stabilise Relations”, Financial Review, 6 November 2023.
• 20. Ben Westcott, “Chinese Premier Li Qiang on Track for Australia Visit, Foreign Minister Penny Wong Says”, BNN Bloomberg, 19 March 2024.
• 21. “Remarks by Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia Xiao Qian at the New Year Reception of Chinese and Australian Media”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 18 January 2024.
• 22. “China and Australia Hold the Seventh Foreign and Strategic Dialogue”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, 20 March 2024.
• 23. “Transcript of Press Conference at Parliament House, Canberra by Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong on the Issue of Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue”, no. 18.
• 24. Ibid.
• 25. Ibid.
• 26. Elena Collinson, “What China Wants from Australia ’s Stabilised Relationship”, The Saturday Paper, 20 March 2024.
• 27. Ibid.
• 28. Ibid.
• 29. Keiran Smith, “Australia Gets Its Most Senior Chinese Leadership Visit Since 2017”, The Diplomat, 21 March 2024.
• 30. Josh Butler, “China Scraps Tariffs on Australian Wine”, The Guardian, 28 March 2024.
• 31. Andrew Tillett and Michael Smith, “China Has Wins on Darwin Port, Wind Towers Ahead of Albanese Visit”, Financial Review, 20 October 2023.
• 32. Ben Scott, “Australia’s China Policy More Effective with Disciplined Messaging”, Nikkei Asia, 2 April 2024.
• 33. Keiran Smith, “Australia Gets Its Most Senior Chinese Leadership Visit Since 2017”, no. 29.
• 34. Kirsty Needham and Liz Lee, “China’s Wang Yi has 'Big Picture' Talks with Former Australia PM Keating”, Reuters, 21 March 2024.
• 35. “China's Top Diplomat Meets Australian ex-PM for Controversial Sit-down”, The Hindu, 22 March 2024.
• 36. Kirsty Needham, “Australian Politician 'Sold Out' Country to Foreign Spy Ring, Says Intelligence Chief”, Reuters, 28 February 2024.
• 37. Ibid.
• 38. “‘South Pacific Shouldn't Become Arena for Great Power Competition’: China Attacks AUKUS”, The Times of India, 21 April 2024.
• 39. Ibid.
• 40. “Marape and Albanese Begin Historic Walk at Kokoda Station”, NBC, 23 April 2024.
• 41. Ibid.
• 42. Dechlan Brennan, “Pacific Responses to AUKUS a Mix of Unease and Understanding”, The Diplomat, 18 April 2023.
• 43. “Australia and New Zeal and COFA Letter to Congressional Leaders”, The National Government of the Federated States of Micronesia, 22 February 2024.
• 44. “Australia's Rudd: Don't 'Lecture' Pacific Islands on China”, Nikkei Asia, 27 May 2022.
• 45. “AUKUS: Securing the Indo-Pacific, A Conversation with Kurt Campbell, Richard Fontaine and Kurt Campbell”, Center for a New American Security, 3 April 2024.
• 46. Ibid.
• 47. “Senior U.S. Diplomat Links AUKUS Submarine Pact to Taiwan”, CNBC, 3 April 2024.
• 48. “Australia Did Not Vow to Help U.S. Dfend Taiwan in Submarine Deal, Minister Says”, Reuters, 19 March 2023.
• 49. Katharine Murphy and Daniel Hurst, “Australia Will Control Nuclear Submarines in Any Conflict with AUKUS Partners, Albanese Says”, The Guardian, 22 February 2023.
• 50. “AUKUS: Securing the Indo-Pacific, A Conversation with Kurt Campbell, Richard Fontaine and Kurt Campbell”, no. 45.
• 51. Ibid.