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    Indian Women in Blue Helmets: Professionalism in Peacekeeping July-September 2022 Ingudam Yaipharemba Singh

    Majority of conflict situations in which the United Nations (UN) intervenes today are complex and as per their mandates, joint efforts of both men and women are required to make the peacekeeping operations as effective as possible. In many instances, maintaining good relations with the civilian population is a prerequisite for effective peacekeeping, as it often implies easy access to information at the grassroots level and increased security for UN personnel and the local population. In local societies where women and their dependents often constitute the majority of the population, it is advantageous to have women in various peacekeeping capacities, as it is easier for female peacekeepers to have a dialogue with local civilians than it is for their male colleagues in the peacebuilding process.

    		 United Nations, Peacekeeping
    Al-Shabaab in Somalia: Terrorist Trends in the Pandemic Years January-December 2021 Saman Ayesha Kidwai

    Challenges, such as weak infrastructure and ill-equipped armed forces, corruption, pandemic, and drought, have become intrinsic to Somalia, mutually reinforcing each other. Additionally, they have been exploited by terrorists to advance their Islamist cause. While re-evaluating counter-terrorism strategies to defeat al-Shabaab, the allied partners should carefully consider these factors’ role in sustaining the insurgency and address the security crisis – state and human security – accordingly. The failure to do that will have catastrophic results for the Somali people and the internationally-recognised government.

    A Historical Context

    Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Youth Movement), infamously known as Al-Shabaab, formally came into existence in 2006. After Ahmed Abdi Godane’s death by an American drone strike in 2014, Ahmed Umar “Abu Ubaidah” assumed the organisation's leadership. Nevertheless, the origin of its earliest leaders can be traced to jihadists who had travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Soviets. Regardless of fault lines cutting across each group member's individual objectives, their overall worldview remains centred around the creation of an Islamic state.

    After returning home, those terrorists had remained active, especially throughout the civil war, ensuing after the collapse of President Barré's administration in 1991. Among the key groups that emerged amid this crisis was the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a conglomeration of Sunni jihadist organisations, which seized control of Mogadishu, and Al-Shabaab emerged as a predominant faction. However, the Ethiopian-backed transitional government ousted the ICU in 2006 with minimal effort. Analysts like Rob Wise believe this external intervention was the fundamental reason for "transforming the group (Al-Shabaab) from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country.”1

    The formation of an Islamic state governed by Sharia remains at the core of its demands, cutting across the fault lines. Car bombs, gun and suicide attacks, and high-profile assassinations are recurring means through which al-Shabaab fighters have waged their insurgency. On the other hand, it has governed areas in Central and Southern Somalia through a harsh interpretation of Sharia.2

    Their draconian governance has resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from territories under their control. This occurred after the group disallowed contact with humanitarian workers and aid from entering those areas after the 2017 famine.3

    The Protracted Insurgency and Counter-Response

    Reportedly, some of its earliest fatal attacks are traceable to 2009; however, its deadliest attack on Somalian soil occurred on October 14, 2017. A truck bomb in Mogadishu detonated at a busy intersection; today referred to as the "October 14 junction," killing at least 587 and wounding 1,000 individuals.4 As the "deadliest terror attack" in Somalia, it compelled the fragile government to contend with the horror that had engulfed the near-failed state. In one of its most recent attacks, a suicide bomber detonated a device inside a restaurant in Beledweyne, injuring 20 and killing 13 others on February 19, 2022, reportedly killing an electoral candidate and two deputy police commissioners.5

    Its ability to wage a protracted insurgency is also visible in how it rapidly re-established control over the strategic town of Amara (Central Somalia) in August 2021, a town en-route to Harardhere, a coastal area and another Al-Shabaab bastion. The federal forces had ousted Al-Shabaab and seized control of Amara in July 2021.6 It has also entrenched itself in Somalia’s financial institutions. For example, it was reported in July 2021 that al-Shabaab controlled 85 per cent of the capital available in the International Bank of Somalia, an international bank with its headquarters in Mogadishu.7 Furthermore, according to the Hiraal Institute, a research group situated in Mogadishu, the group annually generates US $180 million, out of which US$ 24 million were allocated for procurement of weapons in 2021.8 Moreover, a humanitarian crisis, unfolding due to a rapidly worsening drought, provides Al-Shabaab a leverage against the state for intensified recruitment and indulgence in violence while setting up parallel power structures to undermine the government.9

    On the other hand, matters of jurisprudence prove to be another obstacle for the efficient functioning of government institutions. The Somali courts, bogged down by clan-based sectarianism, corruption, and in-fighting, cannot deliver swift justice,   when compared with Islamic courts governed by Al-Shabaab that rise above ethnic divisions to deliver a broadly incorruptible verdict rapidly. This however does not take away from the brutality and authoritarianism associated with their interpretation of Sharia. By weakening the apparatus from within, these terrorists could continue to sow seeds for continued socio-economic and political unrest in the country. For example, the federal government’s slow vaccine rollout and challenges with vaccine availability even until August 2021, while Al-Shabaab continued to build on their existing social services network, presumably did not bode well for an administration facing mounting opposition to its political survival.10

    Al Shabaab has also imported ammonium nitrate in vast quantities to make IEDs through licit and illicit channels, laying bare the inaptitude of the weak federal government to eliminate the rerouting of such materials in the hands of terrorist outfits.11 On the other hand, Amniyat, its much-feared intelligence network, acts as its backbone, spearheading intelligence gathering, planning and executing attacks.  It also takes the final call on all of al-Shabaab’s finance and health-related matters, and retribution against defectors. Hussein Sheikh Ali, Somalia’s former National Security Advisor, highlighted how “if the Amniyat was destroyed, there would be no Al-Shabaab.”12

    In the past, Al-Shabaab stood accused of colluding with pirates to generate revenue, more so when their funds began to dwindle.13 The terrorists received monetary proceeds, for example, bribes from pirates, presumably to halt raids launched from areas under their control. The Yemeni war has also benefitted the Somali insurgency. According to a report unveiled by The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime in 2021, “Over the course of eight months, @GI_TOC research documented over 400 illicit weapons in 13 locations across Somalia, the presence of which serves as a fingerprint of the spillover of the arms from the Yemen conflict into Somalia.”14

    Regional attempts to ward off the threat, including the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), an African Union-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia, operating with the consent of the United Nations (UN), have achieved limited success in ousting the terrorists from several of their strongholds but have proved unable to eliminate the group. Since 2008, the UN has adopted numerous resolutions, including in December 2021, to renew the mandate of international anti-piracy ships operating off the coast of Somalia to combat all manifestations of armed robbery and piracy in the maritime domain. However, the renewal of the mandate will only last three months because the Somali federal government, whose approval the UN requires, claims that no piracy-related events have occurred over four years.15

    However, AMISOM is due to transition to the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), gradually transferring the security reins to the Federal Government of Somalia by December 31, 2023, under the Somalia Transition Plan (STP).16 This announcement by the African Union (AU) in January 2022 came amid mounting and renewed violence by al-Shabaab. However, one must remember that the contested and hurried withdrawal of the international coalition from Afghanistan served as one of the core precursors of the fall of Kabul in August 2021. The AU is therefore obligated to prevent a similar occurrence in Somalia or face the potential consequences of another civil war fuelled by arms trafficking, the emergence of competing centres of power, and a cataclysmic human security and refugee crises. 

    Pandemic and Current Challenges  

    The pandemic has strained the efforts of the AMISOM to conduct counter-terrorism operations.17 It has also made information sharing and intel gathering challenging for the deployed troops due to COVID restrictions. The surge in the pandemic has fomented opportune conditions for the terrorist group to use to its advantage. The socio-economic fallout, including costs of cooking gas in Mogadishu catapulting from $18 to$30, has threatened to undermine further the legitimacy of Somalia’s federal government.18

    Continued violence underscores a stark reality – Al-Shabaab has no substantive plans to surrender arms and assimilate into mainstream society. Presumably, they remain convinced, more so after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, that the federal government could be defeated through jihadist principles and guerilla warfare. Moreover, continued low-intensity but fatal targeted attacks have “frustrated” armed forces undertaking counter-insurgency campaigns.19 For example, in one of its most recent attacks, Al-Shabaab killed 4 AMISOM officers during a patrol, using twin IED blasts in Southern Somalia.20

    On the other hand, in the eventuality of the AMISOM’s withdrawal, the empowerment of  national police and armed forces is crucial for avoiding an  Afghan-type fallout. Currently, there is an overwhelming dependence on regional forces to keep a modicum of peace and a worrying reliance on local militias to prevent the reversal of gains. This creates a further potential for instability as power brokers, such as local warlords, could transfer their allegiance to Al-Shabaab, should there emerge benefits in the potential newfound alliance.

    India and the Somali turmoil

    India has a growing interest in the stability of the African continent.  Somalia’s geostrategic significance, being positioned near the Gulf of Aden – one of the most vital trading routes worldwide, and thereby having an overarching bearing on the global supply chains – makes it all the more crucial for India to improve and build on its existing logistical and financial support, thereby ensuring the stability of the country. Its primary trading routes run through the Gulf of Aden, with the Ministry of Shipping estimating cumulative exports at US$ 60 billion and imports at US$ 50 billion.21

    India has contributed US$1 million in 2021 to the AMISOM fund to enable it to continue its anti-terror activities further.22 The Indian Navy has also undertaken anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somalian Coast.

    In June 2021, India and the European Union conducted their first joint naval exercise in the Gulf of Aden to ensure their navies “hone their war-fighting skills and their ability as an integrated force to promote peace, security, and stability in the maritime domain.”23

    Conclusion

    Challenges, such as weak infrastructure and ill-equipped armed forces, corruption, pandemic, and drought, have become intrinsic to Somalia, mutually reinforcing each other. Additionally, they have been exploited by terrorists to advance their Islamist cause. Nor has the country remained immune to arms trafficking fuelled by Yemen’s protracted war, which is responsible for exacerbating Somalia’s security crisis. Financial hardships, emanating from the pandemic, have also limited the federal government’s ability to pledge a hefty defence budget to eliminate terrorist threats as it attempts to balance its citizens' socio-economic needs in an uncertain climate. On the other hand, AMISOM’s impending transition to ATMIS will introduce its own set of dilemmas. The AU’s announcement could embolden jihadists to intensify attacks, exploiting regional troops’ limited presence in the country. This would be the case as neighbouring countries seek to gradually sever ties with an insurgency of peripheral significance to focus on their domestic turbulence. 

    Therefore, while re-evaluating counter-terrorism strategies to defeat al-Shabaab, the allied partners should carefully consider these factors’ role in sustaining the insurgency and address the security crisis – state and human security – accordingly. The failure to do that will have catastrophic results for the Somali people and the internationally-recognised government. Democracy’s survival is contingent on continued international and regional support to empower the national army genuinely. Otherwise, there will remain little or no difference between the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and an Islamist Somalia.

    *Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai is a Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.

    		 Terrorist
    FOCAC 2021: Key Takeaways January-December 2021 Ruchita Beri

    The latest FOCAC displayed China’s fresh efforts to enhance its soft power, as well as its engagement with the African countries. The meeting underlined some new areas of future cooperation and China’s commitment towards a win-win partnership with Africa.

    The 8th ministerial conference of the Forum for China –Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), was held on 29-30 November 2021 in Dakar, Senegal. China was represented by Foreign Minister Wang Yi.  The meeting was held in the backdrop of COVID-19 pandemic, debt distress in some African countries and increasing contestation between major powers. The core theme of the meeting was to “Deepen China-Africa Partnership and Promote Sustainable Development to build a China –Africa Community with a Shared Future in the New Era”. The 8th FOCAC highlights health, green development and climate change and security as the key areas of cooperation between China and African countries in the foreseeable future.

    What is FOCAC?

    FOCAC, established in 2000, is a triennial high-level forum between China and the African countries (all except Eswatini, which continues to maintain relations with Taiwan). In the last 21 years, eight editions of the FOCAC have been held. Of these meetings, three, were elevated to summit level (2006, 2015 and 2018) and were attended by heads of state and government. Some of these meetings have been held in China (Beijing; 2000, 2006, 2012, 2018) others in Africa (Addis Ababa, 2003, Sharm el Sheikh, 2009 and Johannesburg, 2015). The 2021 FOCAC meeting was the first to be held in a West African country. Over the years FOCAC has paved the way towards a strong partnership between China and Africa.  While in the initial years the relationship focused on enhancing trade with African countries, primarily imports of natural resources. From 2006 onwards, the relationship went beyond trade to investment, development finance and infrastructure.  In terms of financial support, during 2015 FOCAC, China peaked its commitments with the pledge of US $ 60 billion financial assistance to African countries and continued the same pledge in 2018 FOCAC.1  While development finance and infrastructure development continued as priority areas, in 2012, issues of security have been added as an important agenda item of China- Africa partnership.

    During the 8th FOCAC meeting, several important announcements were made and four important resolutions were adopted. They include, the Dakar Action Plan, the China- Africa Cooperation Vision 2035, the Sino-African Declaration on Climate Change and the Dakar Declaration of the 8th ministerial conference of the FOCAC. The most anticipated news was regarding the financial pledges. The total commitment turns out to be round $40 billion, a dip compared to $60 billion in 2018 FOCAC meeting. However, in opinion of some, this does not include the cost of vaccines and other pledges, so actual commitment may be much more than $40 billion. More importantly, during the conference, President Xi announced nine focus areas for the first three years of the China Africa Vision 2035. They include health, poverty reduction and agriculture, trade, investment, digital innovation, green development, capacity building, people to people exchanges and peace and security. Amongst these a few priority areas stand out.

    Health

    President XI Jinping announced in a live video address that China will provide 1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine to African countries.2 About 60 per cent of these will be delivered directly and rest will be produced jointly by China in select African countries. This signals China taking a step towards enhancing its health diplomacy in the region. Health has been an area of cooperation between China and Africa from the first FOCAC meeting, The COVID-19 pandemic led to an increase in this cooperation. Initially during the pandemic, China supplied African countries with masks, PPE kits and other medical equipment, sent medical teams to several countries and later supplied vaccines. However Chinese medical diplomacy in the region did not always generate a positive response in the continent. The Chinese discrimination against Africans based in Guangzhou province in China during the pandemic led to a strong response from some African diplomats.3 While China did step up its health diplomacy in the continent during the pandemic, its supply of masks and PPE kits was more effective than vaccine diplomacy.4 The 8th FOCAC pledges may go a long way in boosting China’s image in the continent and bolstering African capacities in vaccine production.

    Green Development and Climate Change

    Another major announcement made at the 8th FOCAC was on promoting green development. As the world grapples with climate change, China is advocating green and low carbon development to the African countries. This was mentioned by President Xi in his address as well in the path breaking Sino- African Declaration on Climate Change adopted at the meeting.5 This declaration is path breaking as for the last three decades, China’s development cooperation with African countries has focused on large infrastructure projects, such as, railways, roads, coal fired and hydro power plants, airports, ports, stadiums etc. under the rubric of Belt and Road initiative (BRI) with scant focus on sustainable development. At Dakar, China reiterated its promise to stop funding overseas coal fired power plants6 and also emphasised promotion of renewable energy development. Another significant pledge is regarding sharing low carbon technologies particularly space technology for agriculture growth, environmental monitoring, averting disasters, mitigation and climate adaptation with African countries.

    Peace and Security

    During the FOCAC, President Xi announced that China will undertake several security projects in Africa, continue, military assistance and training, peacekeeping cooperation, support regional efforts for security and countering terrorism in the next three years.7 Similarly the China – Africa Dakar Action plan identified military and police cooperation, counterterrorism and law enforcement as priorities. These plans suggest the increasing focus on peace and security issues under FOCAC.8 Initially, security issues were not part of FOCAC engagement. These issues found a mention for the first time in the 2012 FOCAC by the announcement of China- Africa Partnership for Peace and Security.9 However it was in 2015 FOCAC that China started financial support to the Africa Peace and Security Architecture. Over the years China’s growing economic engagement in the continent has led to increase in involvement in security sphere. This includes anti- piracy patrols, involvement in UN peace keeping, training and supply of arms to various African countries. Large Infrastructure projects particularly, oil and gas, and growing threats against Chinese workers deployed in these development projects has also led to presence of Chinese security firms in these countries. The announcements at the 8th FOCAC indicate that peace and security will remain an important priority for China in the years to come.

    In conclusion, the latest FOCAC displayed China’s fresh efforts to enhance its soft power, as well as its engagement with the African countries. The meeting underlined some new areas of future cooperation and China’s commitment towards a win-win partnership with Africa.

    *Ms. Ruchita Beri is Senior Research Associate and Coordinator, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & United Nations Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.
    The Revival of the Air Force of Zimbabwe January-December 2021 Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

    The Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ) has an enviable combat record among the air forces of Sub-Saharan Africa. It has a strong professional ethos and, until budgetary cuts and sanctions came into effect, was one of the most effective air forces in the region. It has gone through a period of decline and relative stagnation in strength. However, the last two years point to a revival in its fortunes though this is through the restoring of grounded equipment to service.

    On 29 April 2022, during a flypast at the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair (ZITF), one  flight of four BAE Hawk jet trainer/ light-strike aircraft of the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ), flew in a diamond formation to the delight of onlookers.1 The appearance of combat aircraft at the ZIFT flypast is nothing new but the sight of BAE Hawks was remarkable as the aircraft had long been thought grounded following the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by the United Kingdom. Indeed, the Hawks became so symbolic of alleged British support for then President Robert Mugabe that the sanctions had widespread support in the British government, opposition and the press.

    The flight of four Hawks seemed to be emblematic of a revival in the fortunes of the Air Force of Zimbabwe which had suffered heavily from a combination of sanctions, budgetary neglect and a loss of skilled personnel. Indeed, for some years, it seemed as if the combat assets of the AFZ had been largely grounded, with only a few of its assets being considered flyable, much less operational. However, evidence from 2021, and now 2022, suggests that the AFZ has restored at least some of its combat aircraft to apparently flyable status and has resurrected some of its older platforms.

    A Proud History

    The AFZ traces its history to the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF), previously the Royal Rhodesian Air Force before Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Initially equipped with ex-RhAF equipment, including such important types as Hawker Hunter fighters, Vampire fighter-bombers, Canberra bombers, Augusta Bell 205 and Alouette III helicopters, SIAI Marchetti SF.260 trainers and Reims Cessna FTB337G Forward Air Control aircraft plus a small number of transport aircraft. Moreover, the AFZ inherited a strong training system and a sound maintenance infrastructure. In addition, two well-equipped air bases at New Sarum and Thornhill were available to the AFZ and the RhAF squadrons based at the two bases were transferred to the new AFZ in 1980. These included:2

    No. 1 Squadron – Thornhill (Hawker Hunter FGA.9)

    No. 2 Squadron – Thornhill (Vampire FB.9; and Vampire T.55)

    No. 3 Squadron – New Sarum (Douglas C-47; Cessna 402; BN-2A Islander; DC-7C;  Baron)

    No. 4 Squadron – Thornhill (AL-60F5 Trojan; Reims-Cessna FTB.337G; SF.260W)

    No. 5 Squadron – New Sarum (English Electric Canberra B.2; and Canberra T.4)

    No. 6 Squadron – Thornhill (Percival Provost T.52; SF.260C)

    No. 7 Squadron – New Sarum (Alouette II; Alouette III)

    No. 8 Squadron – New Sarum (AB.205)

    The RhAF received much assistance from the apartheid regime in South Africa but also developed an impressive level of self-sufficiency in maintaining and overhauling its assets. In addition to its RhAF heritage, the AFZ was helped by the Pakistan Air Force which played an important role in aiding the new air force in maintaining training standards in its establishment.

    Expansion and Challenges

    After the new state of Zimbabwe came into being, there was a consolidation of the assets of the new AFZ and it was quickly realized that at least some assets were in dire need of replacement. The Vampires of No. 2 squadron, in particular, were obsolete and becoming difficult to keep serviceable as the type had been phased out globally by 1980. A contract for eight BAE Hawk aircraft was duly signed and the aircraft were delivered by July 1982, replacing the Vampires in No. 2 squadron. However, shortly after delivery, a terrorist attack on Thornhill airbase damaged four Hawks, nine of the surviving Hawker Hunters and one of the FTB-337Gs.3 Of the Hawks, one was a complete write-off with three others needing various levels of repair. A contract for five more Hawks was completed by September 1992, bringing the total number of available Hawks to 12. By 1992, however, the AFZ had another challenge as its primary combat aircraft, the Hawker Hunter, was becoming difficult to maintain or sustain and in dire need of replacement, with the aircraft struggling along until 2002 when No. 1 squadron was disbanded.4 In 1986, however, the AFZ obtained 12 Chinese made Chengdu F-7II fighters along with two FT-7BZ trainers to re-equip No. 5 squadron which phased out its few remaining Canberra bombers. The transport and helicopter fleets remained largely unaffected by new acquisitions, though, in time, the AFZ would acquire a few Russian Mi-17 and Mi-24 helicopters.

    The Second Congo War

    The AFZ and the Zimbabwean army were heavily committed to combat operations in the Second Congo War which took place between 1998 and 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Zimbabwe’s main period of action was between 1998 and 2001 with the AFZ sending detachments of Hawks, helicopters, FTB-337Gs and even armed CASA C-212 transports. The Hawks, armed with unguided rockets, 30mm guns and locally made (as well as captured ex-Zaire Air Force) bombs, were to prove themselves extremely effective in supporting ground forces and inflicted heavy damage on hostile forces whenever deployed. The Hawks were also deployed with PL-7 air-to-air missiles to serve as makeshift interceptors, hoping to interdict transport aircraft flying from Rwanda and Burundi to supply DRC rebels as well as Rwandan forces operating in support of these rebels.5 The AFZ suffered losses in the DRC, at least one Hawk was shot down and a number of aircraft were damaged. The Zimbabwe army, however, suffered over 400 dead and not insignificant equipment losses over three years of conflict.6 However, the professionalism, sound training and commitment of the AFZ and the Zimbabwe army were to prove vital to the ultimate success of the pro-government forces in the DRC, alongside, of course, a substantial commitment from Angola.

    Neglect and Sanctions

    In the year 2000, even as the Second Congo War raged, the European Union imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe, in opposition to the Mugabe government. This had the immediate effect of hurting the serviceability of Hawk fleet despite some attempts at sanctions busting.7 Mugabe was unfazed and placed the Hawks in storage in 2011 and replaced them with a total of 12 Chinese made Karakorum K-8 trainer/ light strike aircraft which reequipped No.2 squadron.8 At least two of these aircraft have crashed and one other was damaged thanks to a burst tire in South Africa. The AFZ uses the K-8s as much as combat aircraft as trainers, equipped with rocket pods, bombs and guns and they proved to be a viable replacement for the Hawks.

    The AFZ’s more effective combat aircraft – the F-7s – were joined in 2003, by at least two ex-Libyan air force MiG-23MS.9 It is not clear if these aircraft remain in AFZ use as they have not been seen since 2003 and may have been sent on to the DRC to join similar aircraft gifted to that country. The AFZ’s pilots were able to benefit from Pakistani instructors who taught them to exploit their F-7s as effectively as possible. Yet, despite China’s close ties to Zimbabwe and Pakistani support, the collapsing Zimbabwean economy and the migration of many skilled pilots and ground crews, saw the F-7s effectively grounded, with only seven being airworthy, and the AFZ being reduced to a few operational trainers, transports and helicopters and the K-8s.

    Revival?

    The first signs of revivals emerged in 2020 when video footage emerged of F-7s taking off from Thornhill.10 This continued into 2021 and 2022 when flights of up to four F-7s were seen during ZIFT flypasts in each of those respective years.11 The biggest shock was delivered in 2021, however, when for the first time since 2002, two Hawker Hunters staged a flypast in company with a BAE Hawk.12 Has the AFZ sought to put their old Hunters back into service? That is a question that remains unanswered but what is undeniable is that, from the ZIFT flypast in 2022, at least four Hawks are back in service and these aircraft will provide a significant increase in the combat capability of the AFZ. How these Hawks were restored to service is also a mystery as it could be anything from sanctions busting to indigenisation of parts to sourcing through a third party.13 In any case, the achievement is most impressive.

    Conclusion

    The AFZ has an enviable combat record among the air forces of Sub-Saharan Africa. It has a strong professional ethos and, until budgetary cuts and sanctions came into effect, was one of the most effective air forces in the region. It has gone through a period of decline and relative stagnation in strength. However, the last two years point to a revival in its fortunes though this is through the restoring of grounded equipment to service.

    *Dr. Sanjay Badri Maharaj is an independent defence analyst, security consultant and attorney-at-law based in Trinidad and Tobago.

    		 Zimbabwe
    Western Hydrocarbon Exodus and Arctic Boycott: Opportunities for India in Russia September 15, 2022 Anurag Bisen

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    Summary: India needs to seize the opportunities presented by the exit of Western companies from the Russian energy sector. Apart from providing long-term stability to India’s energy imports, it will also provide an alternative to India’s strategic and time-tested partner Russia and prevent the ceding of space to China. India also needs to hold an institutionalised annual dialogue with Russia to cover the entire gamut of activities covered under the six pillars of India’s Arctic Policy.

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while addressing the Eastern Economic Forum on 7 September 2022, expressed India’s keenness to strengthen its partnership with Russia on Arctic issues. He also underscored the immense potential for cooperation in the field of energy. Russia’s special operations in Ukraine have impacted its hydrocarbon sector and the Arctic in numerous ways. These have particular relevance for India since they present an opportunity to potentially address India’s energy security and increase its engagement with Russia in the Arctic.

    Russia’s Arctic Boycott and Hydrocarbon Sector

    On 3 March 2022, for the first time since the formation of the Arctic Council (AC) in 1996, seven of its eight members announced a historic suspension of participation in all AC activities in protest against Russia’s special military operations in Ukraine.1 Russia is the current Chair of the AC for 2021–23. Further, in a joint statement on 12 May 2022, the Finnish President and Prime Minister stated that NATO membership would strengthen the country’s security and Finland should apply for it immediately.2 Following Finland, Sweden also announced its decision to apply for NATO membership.

    In the wake of the Western sanctions against Russia, western companies announced their intention to exit Russian energy sector. Shell announced its intentions to exit the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project as well as to relinquish its equity partnerships with Russia's Gazprom, including its 27.5 per cent stake in the Sakhalin-II liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility.3   BP plc announced that it was ending a partnership with  Rosneft, valued at approximately US$ 25 billion.4  

    Norway's Equinor also announced that it will exit Russian joint venture projects and withdraw personnel from the country. French supermajor Total Energies stated that it will no longer provide new capital to projects in Russia but stopped short of announcing a plan to exit investments.5 US oil major ExxonMobil also announced to end its decades-long involvement in Russia, where it operates the Sakhalin-1 oil and gas project holding a 30 per cent stake.6  

    The Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects are located off the Russian island of Sakhalin, in the North Pacific Ocean, north of Japan, off the east coast of Russia. The Sakhalin-1 Consortium members are Exxon Neftegas Limited (30 per cent interest, operator), Japan’s Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Company (SODECO), Ltd. (with 30 per cent stake), India's ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) (20 per cent) and Rosneft with the remaining 20 per cent.7 Sakhalin-1 produced some 2,27,400 barrels of oil a day (11.35 million tonnes a year) and over 12 billion cubic metres of natural and associated gas in 2021.8 The project, which has seen an investment of US$ 17 billion in developing the reserves, was joined by OVL in 20019 and production commenced in 2005.10 OVL's share from Sakhalin-1 is 45,400 barrels per day (2.27 million tonnes/year).

    Sakhalin-2 is one of the world’s largest integrated oil and gas projects, as well as Russia’s first offshore gas project. Jointly owned by Shell (27.5 per cent), Gazprom (50 per cent), Mitsui (12.5 per cent) and Mitsubishi (10 per cent), it has an LNG capacity of 11.49 million tonnes (2017) and supplies about 4 per cent of the world’s current LNG market. Japan, South Korea and China are the main customers.11 Shell’s decision to quit also put pressure on Japanese partners, Mitsubishi and Mitsui. Sakhalin-2 supplies roughly 8 per cent of Japan’s LNG supply.12

     Following Shell’s announcement, citing threats to Russia’s national interests and economic security, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on 30 June  2022 to transfer rights of the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project to a new Russian company with the stakeholders having one month to decide if they will take stakes in the new company.13 Despite Japan joining sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine, the Japanese government backed Mitsubishi and Mitsui to continue in the project. The Japanese participation in the new structure was finally approved by Russia on 31 August 2022.14

    India and Russian Energy Sector

    It was reported that ExxonMobil's exit from Sakhalin-1 will in all likelihood delay the project. OVL has reportedly offered to send more personnel with suitable expertise to partially fill the void.15 There were also reports that ONGC is considering purchasing additional stakes in Russian oil and gas fields from Western firms that plan to leave the country, and that the firm planned to bid for Exxon’s 30 per cent stake in Sakhalin-1 and Shell’s 27.5 per cent interest in the Sakhalin-2 project.16

    India, acting in its national interests, has utilised the opportunity presented by deep discounts offered by Russia on its oil exports. Between April and May 2022, India imported US$ 3.2 billion worth of crude oil from Russia compared to just US$ 210 million in March and zero in February.17 India’s decision has been stoutly defended by India’s External Affairs, Commerce, and the Petroleum Ministers in various international fora..18

    Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri on 7 September, for instance, said that the government had a "moral duty" to safeguard the interests of the citizens.19 Puri also pointed that Russian oil accounted for only 0.2 per cent of India's total oil imports in the fiscal year ending on 31 March 2022 and added "Europeans buy more in one afternoon than India buys in a quarter".20

    The pullout by the Western oil companies from Russia presents a big opportunity to the Indian fossil fuel industry. In 2020, Russia’s fossil fuel reserves amounted to about 19 per cent of the total global reserves.21   It has the largest proven natural gas reserves in the world. Russia’s proven oil reserves total about 107.2 billion barrels, nearly 6.2 per cent of the total global reserves.22 Russia is one of the top three oil-producing countries and in 2020, it produced 13 per cent of world’s oil, next only to United States (15 per cent).23 It is also the world’s leading exporter of gas, exporting 197.2 billion cubic meters of pipeline gas in 2020, and 40.4 billion cubic meters of LNG.24

    India’s net dependence on imported oil is forecast to rise above 90 per cent by 2040, up from 75 per cent currently.25 Further, the 6 per cent share of natural gas in India’s current energy mix is among the lowest in the world.26 The world average is 24 per cent and India is working to increase this figure to 15 per cent by 2030.27

    India is the third largest importer of oil in the world. India can also ill afford rising oil prices, without incurring setbacks in its efforts to sustain its developing economy and poverty alleviation of millions of its citizens. Rising crude prices could lead to a higher current account deficit and lead to higher inflation..28

    Cognisant of this reality, India has been earnestly exploring deepening energy engagement with Russia in the recent years. This is reflected in the fact that India sent its Petroleum Minister to Russia to attend the Eurasian Economic Forum in 2019 and 2021. The two countries are working towards the realisation of an ‘Energy Bridge’, which is based on robust civil nuclear cooperation, LNG sourcing, partnership in the oil and gas sector, and engagement in renewable energy sources.29

    Russia is India's single biggest investment destination for oil and gas projects. Apart from Sakhalin-1, Indian companies have acquired equity in Russian ‘Tass-Yuryakh Neftegazodobycha’ and ‘Vankorneft’ projects, making it the largest equity oil acquisition hitherto by India.  In the JSC Vankorneft, the 26 per cent stake provides OVL 7.31 million tonnes of oil. Additionally, the consortium of Indian companies OIL–IOC–BPRL have acquired 23.9 per cent stake in the field at a cost of US$ 2.02 billion, giving them 6.56 million tonnes of oil. The Indian companies combined equity is 49.9 per cent for an investment of US$ 4.2 billion while Rosneft continues to hold the remaining 50.1 per cent. The field has recoverable reserves of 2.5 billion barrels. Besides, the OIL–IOC–BPRL consortium has taken another 29.9 per cent stake in the Taas-Yuryakh oilfield in East Siberia for US$ 1.12 billion.30

    Long term oil and gas supply arrangements with Russia and increased Indian oil and gas companies’ stakes in the Russian energy infrastructure and projects holds great promise to address India’s energy security. On its part, Russia has also urged India to deepen its investments in the sanction-hit country's oil and gas sector, and is keen on expanding the sales networks of Russian companies in India.31

    With the aim of further strengthening oil and gas cooperation, Russia has expressed interest in attracting Indian oil companies to participate in joint projects in the offshore Arctic fields of the Russian Federation.32  In March 2017, OVL signed a MoU with Gazpromneft on the possibility of the joint implementation of offshore hydrocarbon projects in Russia and elsewhere in the world.33 Indian workers are participating in major gas projects in the Amur region, from Yamal to Vladivostok and onward to Chennai.34

    However, all projects have not materialised. Although OVL had been in discussions with Novatek for participation in the Russian Yamal LNG project since 2013, the deal did not materialise.35 . The current Yamal stakeholders are Novatek (50 per cent), French Total (20 per cent), the Chinese CNPC (20 per cent) and Silk Road Fund (9.9 per cent).36

    It has also been reported that India’s energy companies, Petronet LNG Ltd and OVL have been in discussions for acquiring a joint 9.9 per cent stake in Russia’s planned liquefied-gas project Arctic LNG 2 from Novatek.37 Presently, Novatek has a 60 per cent stake, with the remaining shareholders comprising Total (10 per cent), China's CNPC (10 per cent) and CNOOC (10 per cent) and a consortium of Japan's Mitsui and Jogmec, (Japan Arctic LNG), with 10 per cent.38

    Russia–China Cooperation in Hydrocarbons and Arctic

    China has remained Russia's largest trading partner for 12 consecutive years, since 201039 , accounting for 18 per cent of Russia’s trade in 2021, even though Russia represented a mere 2 per cent share of China’s trade.40 Total trade between China and Russia jumped 35.9 per cent in 2021 to US$ 147.9 billion, an increase of over 50 per cent since Western sanctions were imposed on Russia in 2014.41 The two countries have set a target to boost total trade to US$ 250 billion by 2024.42

    China has also used the opportunity provided by the Western sanctions by spending US$ 18.9 billion on Russian oil, gas and coal in the three months to the end of May 2022, almost double the amount a year earlier.43

    The two countries also have a very robust energy partnership. After Saudi Arabia, Russia is China’s biggest oil supplier, accounting for 15.5 per cent of Chinese imports, averaging 1.59 million barrels per day in 2021.44 Russia is also China’s third largest gas supplier, exporting 16.5 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2021, amounting to 5 per cent of Chinese imports.45 Russia was also China’s second largest coal supplier in 2021. Almost 40 per cent of oil supplies to China from Russia are through the 4,070-km East Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline while the gas is supplied through the Power of Siberia pipeline. The gas supplies, currently at 16.5 bcm in 2021, are set to rise to 38 bcm a year by 2025, under a 30-year contract worth more than US$ 400 billion.46 A second gas pipeline, Power of Siberia 2, with capacity for 50 bcm a year, is also planned, routing via Mongolia to China.47 Separately, a deal worth US$ 80 billion was signed in February 2022, between Rosneft and China’s CNPC, to supply 100 million tonnes of oil through Kazakhstan over 10 years.48

    China has become Russia’s main investor in LNG projects in the Arctic. This has happened due to several factors, including Western sanctions on Russia thereby limiting its choices for finances and technology. China’s own exponentially rising energy demand and its willingness to quickly step in the void provided by the exit of Western oil and gas companies from Russia in 2014 have also been contributing factors. Chinese CNPC and Silk Road Fund together own a 29.9 per cent stake in the Yamal LNG project,49 while in 19.8 million mt/year Arctic LNG 2 project, China’s CNPC and CNOOC have a total of 20 per cent shareholding.50

    The Yamal LNG project has reserves of 1.3 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and an annual capacity of 25 bcm.51 Of the total funding of US$ 19 billion for the project, 63 per cent was contributed by China. Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank provided two 15-year credit line facilities for the total amount of EUR 9.3 billion and RMB 9.8 billion respectively.52 Chinese CNPC invested US$ 5 billion, while the Silk Road Fund also committed to invest US$ 5 billion, with an additional US$ 800 million to implement the project.53 Chinese enterprises were also substantially involved in the construction of the Yamal LNG plant.54 Under the terms of the contract, China will get 3 million tonnes of LNG every year. In the Arctic LNG-2 project as well, China is to get 3 million tonnes of LNG annually over a 15-year period.

    The two countries are discussing a project located in the Payakha oilfield, located on the Taymyr peninsula, in the Krasnoyarsk region. China National Chemical Engineering Group (CNCEC) and Russian firm Neftegazholdin have signed a deal relating to oil processing and storage facility as well as port development, with investment amounting to US$ 5 billion over four years.55

    Russia and China have also made significant strides in their cooperation on Arctic issues. Russia has convergence with China’s Polar Silk Road. Even before China became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2013, in 2012, they began holding the annual China–Russia Arctic Forum gathering of Arctic specialists and experts, co-sponsored by Ocean University of China and St. Petersburg State University.56 They also have institutionalised interaction between their foreign ministries in the form of China–Russia Dialogue on Arctic Affairs since 2015.57

    In 2015, the Russian Ministry for Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic and China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) signed an agreement on cooperation in the Northern Sea Route (NSR).58 In 2016, China conducted its first China–Russia joint Arctic expedition.59 In 2019, the two countries agreed to establish the Chinese–Russian Arctic Research Center to conduct joint research projects in the Far North.60

    Russia has also allowed China’s participation in Zarubino Port, close to Vladivostok, near Russia’s border area with China and North Korea. The port aims to improve transportation links in China’s northeast regions and assist in development in the Russian Far East, also facilitating the broader goal of Arctic shipping opportunities. China has provided financial support through its local government in Jinlin, and through China’s Merchant Group.61 The two countries are also collaborating on digital connectivity projects in the Arctic as well as in achieving synergy and integration of their respective satellite navigation systems, Beidou and Glonass.

    India–Russia Engagement in Arctic

    India has also sought deeper cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. The India–Russia Joint Statements during the Annual Summits have repeatedly expressed a desire for greater cooperation in the Arctic as well as collaborating with Russia on the Northern Sea Route.62 The Russian Arctic is the source for about 80 per cent of Russia’s oil and virtually all of the natural gas.63 By 2050, the deposits in the Arctic shelf are expected to provide between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of Russia’s total oil production.64

    India’s Arctic Policy, released by the Government of India on 17 March 202265 recognises the Arctic as the largest unexplored prospective area for hydrocarbons remaining on earth and seeks collaboration with Arctic states to undertake resource exploration in the Arctic.66

    After the release of India’s Arctic Policy, for the first time, India and Russia held a regular round of consultations between their foreign ministries, specifically on Arctic issues, on 29 July 2022.67 Even though it is a modest beginning, India’s cooperation with Russia on the Arctic pales in comparison with China’s engagement with Russia on the Arctic. India could take the following policy steps to further enhance its cooperation with Russia on hydrocarbons and the Arctic.

    Inter-Industry/Ministerial Task Force on Energy Collaboration with Russia

    As an immediate measure, in a whole of India approach, a Task Force comprising representatives from the Industry as well as the stakeholder ministries may be formed to identify Indian participation/investments in Russian hydrocarbon projects which are facing an exit by the Western companies. There is political consensus at the highest level between the leaders of the two countries and Indian participation in the Arctic and Russian energy sector has been has been expressed by PM Modi and welcomed by President Putin on more than one occasion.

    Institutionalised Dialogue on Arctic

    India has made a beginning by holding discussions with Russia, specifically on Arctic issues. This ought to be converted into an institutionalised annual dialogue between the foreign ministries of the two countries to cover the entire gamut of activities covered under the six pillars of India’s Arctic Policy. If required, various sub-groups covering scientific cooperation, connectivity, energy, and trade and commerce could be formed under the dialogue mechanism, led by the representatives of the stakeholder ministries. Further, Arctic cooperation between the two countries may be described under a separate heading in the Annual Summit Joint Statements.

    Conclusion

    Despite the pullout by the American, British and Norwegian oil companies, the French company, Total has decided to remain invested in Russia.  Similarly, Japan, while joining the chorus for putting a price cap on the Russian oil, has supported its two companies to remain invested in the Sakhalin-2 project. Similarly, India, in its national interests and to mitigate energy deficiencies, needs to seize the opportunities presented by the exit of Western companies from the Russian energy sector. Apart from providing long-term stability to India’s energy imports, it will also provide an alternative to India’s strategic and time-tested partner Russia and prevent the ceding of space to China. India also needs to actively engage with Russia on taking forward the elements of its Arctic policy, specifically relating to the transportation and energy sectors.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    		 Non-Traditional Security India-Russia Relations, Arctic system/files/thumb_image/2015/ind-russia-energy-t_0.jpg
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    War and Peace: Chinese Blue Helmets for National Interests?: South Sudan as a Case Study July-September 2022 G. Praveen

    The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was accepted into United Nations (UN) on 25 June 1971, replacing the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, who fled to the island of Taiwan in 1949. Chiang’s Republic of China had been among the founding members of the UN. Being one of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) with veto rights, China is presently the second largest fund contributor after the United States (US). As for troop deployment, it has the largest number of troops deployed amongst the P5 though the troop contribution of a 1,000 plus1 makes PRC the sixth largest contributor amongst others like India and Rwanda

    		 Peacekeeping
    India’s Contribution to Peacekeeping July-September 2022 P.K. Chakravorty

    The United Nations (UN) was established post-Second World War in 1945 to prevent another catastrophe of that magnitude and to promote international peace and cooperation.1 The UN Charter aims to maintain international peace and security and to that end, take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression. Of all the activities undertaken by the UN, peacekeeping missions have attracted the greatest public attention. The concept of peacekeeping evolved in 1950. During this period neither of the superpowers, the US nor the Soviet Union would permit forceful UN intervention against their allies. However, they were ready to accept peacekeeping as a non-coercive means of conflict control and tension reduction, which was devoid of offensive combat connotations.

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    Peacekeeping Operations by United Nations in Partnership with a Sub-regional Organisation: Experiment in Liberia 1993–98 July-September 2022 Mandip Singh

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    		 UN Peacekeeping

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