In May 2022, a Request for Information (RFI) was issued by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the construction of a National Hospital Ship (NHS) for the Indian Navy.1 The RFI has indicated that the navy seeks the construction of a task-specific ship that is capable of providing mobile and comprehensive medical care to patients on the high seas. The acquisition of such a ship for the Indian Navy’s fleet is timely, taking into consideration two important factors. First, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is increasingly becoming susceptible to recurrent natural disasters owing to the effects of climate change. Second, India is currently engaged in making efforts for the reorientation of its image from being perceived regionally as a ‘Net Security Provider’ to that of a ‘Preferred Security Partner’.2 Hospital ships play a critical role in supplementing a navy’s combat potential, enhancing its soft power capability and augmenting its ability to be the first responder to humanitarian crises.

Strategic and Tactical Naval Asset 

Major naval powers across the world possess hospital ships in their fleets. The 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits belligerent parties from attacking vessels that are designated as hospital ships. Article 22 in the Third Chapter of the Second Geneva Conventions 1949 defines military hospital ships as vessels built or equipped by navies solely for the purpose of treating the wounded and transporting them.3

Even though hospital ships are generally unarmed, they have enormous tactical and strategic significance for navies, both during combat and peacetime. The global maritime security environment is imperiled by both traditional and non-traditional threats. Hospital ships act as multi-faceted naval assets that can augment maritime capability. 

Supplement Combat Capability

Supporting combat operations has always been the traditional role of hospital ships of navies the world over. Hospital ships have played a pivotal role in supporting the US Navy’s combat operations since the American Civil War in the 19th century.4 These ships are forward-deployed by navies to provide rapid and flexible medical support to injured combatants and civilians. During the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq, the US Navy forward-deployed its 1,000-bed hospital ship, USNS Comfort, to the Persian Gulf. As the invasion progressed, hundreds of US military personnel received immediate medical treatment on board the USNS Comfort for combat-related injuries. After the combat operations, the ship provided trauma care to some Iraqi civilians injured during the invasion.5

Hospital ships have become an important requirement for navies for conducting combat operations in the distant seas. When the Falklands War broke out in April 1982, the Royal Navy was in dire need of hospital ships for supporting its combat operations over 12,000 kilometres away from the British Coast. For this purpose, three civilian liners, namely Uganda, Canberra and Queen Elizabeth,were requisitioned and retrofitted.6 These examples illustrate the fact that hospital ships are an indispensable requirement for blue water navies.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Over 40 per cent of the world’s population resides within 100 kilometres of the coast. The heavy population density and economic activity in the littoral regions puts tremendous pressure on the coastal ecosystem.7  The effects of climate change have resulted in the growing recurrences of cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and tidal surges. This creates a domino effect on poverty, famine and societal imbalances in the world’s coastal zones. As a result, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) have become key maritime security challenges for modern navies.8

Hospital Ships are best suited to undertake large-scale and complex HADR operations in the aftermath of disasters. The US Navy’s hospital ship, USNS Mercy, played an important role in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Thousands of Indonesian victims received advanced medical treatment on board the USNS Mercy deployed off the coast of Sumatra. The 2004 Tsunami underscored the importance of naval assets like hospital ships for mounting large-scale HADR operations.

Projecting Soft Power

Joseph S. Nye defined soft power as the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through appeal and attractions.9 To this end, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has extensively utilised its first hospital ship, Dhaishan Dao (also known as Peace Ark), for projecting Chinese soft power across the IOR and beyond. Since 2010, the ship has regularly embarked on voyages to South Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. During its port visits to several developing nations, the Peace Ark engages in conducting altruistic and philanthropic activities among the local populace. A notable example of this was during the Peace Ark’s first port visit to Chittagong in 2010, where the crew of the ship saved a local Bangladeshi woman with complications arising from pregnancy. This is an illustration of how these vessels can play an important role in building favourable public opinion at the grassroots level overseas, even during non-crisis times.10  

Similarly, in the post 2004 Tsunami relief operations, the US’s public opinion among the Indonesians increased. In today’s complex geopolitical environment, a state’s foreign policy objective overseas can be better achieved through winning over local populations than delivering ordnance on targets.11 Hospital ships are the most conspicuous naval assets for projecting a state’s soft power overseas.

Importance of a Hospital Ship for the Indian Navy

India has always been a de facto first responder to crises in the IOR owing to its geographical position and military prowess. However, the IOR and its littorals have become far more vulnerable to natural disasters and other calamities than any other maritime region. The 2004 Tsunami underscored the necessity for naval assets like hospital ships to spearhead large-scale HADR operations. Robert Kaplan opines that in the face of receding American naval presence in the region, the US can no longer be the prime deliverer of disaster assistance in the IOR.12 In such a scenario, naval capabilities of India, China, Australia, Japan and South Korea must be augmented to respond to future emergencies.13

India’s October 2015 maritime security document has acknowledged the fact that HADR and NEO have become a mainstay in the security dynamics of the IOR.14 As a result, the most important advantage of possessing a hospital ship is its potential to critically enhance the Indian Navy’s HADR capabilities.

Secondly, naval assets like hospital ships are essential for the Indian Navy considering its efforts to become a multi-dimensional blue water force. India’s maritime security strategy earmarks the IOR in its entirety as the Indian Navy’s primary area of interest.15 In such a scenario, hospital ships are bound to play a pivotal role in supporting the Indian Navy’s combat operations across the IOR.

Finally, given India’s endeavours to strengthen its engagement with its maritime neighbours, the acquisition of the hospital ship becomes all the more significant. The potential of a hospital ship to project India’s soft power across the IOR is in consonance with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of ‘SAGAR- Security and Growth for All in the Region’. 

Apart from these factors, considering India’s 7,516 kilometre coastline, hospital ships can play a pivotal role in responding to national emergencies. In the past, there have been several instances when hospital ships were deployed to meet domestic contingencies. After the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, the US Navy deployed USNS Comfort in the New York City harbour and hundreds of victims received treatment onboard. More recently in 2020, USNS Comfort was once again deployed in New York to relieve pressure on the city’s hospitals owing to the Covid-19 pandemic.16

These instances have also underscored the importance of reconfiguring the designs of modern hospital ships. For instance, the massive 1000-bed hospital ships of the US Navy including Mercy and Comfort, were originally oil tankers. The open-bay design and single ventilation system hindered infection control that was necessary for treating Covid-19 patients. As a result of this, the US Navy’s hospital ships were not successful in supporting America’s fight against the pandemic.

Similarly, during the 2004 Tsunami relief, USNS Mercy took five weeks to transit to the crisis location and could not participate in the immediate relief operations. Owing to these factors, US Naval officers have suggested smaller and faster hospital ships similar to China’s Peace Ark for replacing the ageing Mercy and Comfort in the US Naval fleet.17 The schematics and technical parameters that have been specified in the May 2022 RFI have indicated that India seeks to build a purpose-specific hull like that of China’s Peace Ark and induct it within four years after the finalisation of the contract with an Indian Shipyard.

Conclusion

The significance of hospital ships in navies has acquired greater strategic significance owing to changing maritime security dimensions. The threat to the coastal population from natural disasters, pandemics and other man-made calamities has increased substantially. Recent developments in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have also underscored the resurgence of great-power competition and the risk of state-on-state confrontation. In this context, the relevance of hospital ships to modern navies has risen considering their potential as combat enablers, first responders and symbols of the state’s soft power. As an emerging blue water navy, the national hospital ship provides great value addition to India’s maritime capability by serving as the flagship for projecting Indian soft power and as an auxiliary ship for augmenting Indian hard power across the IOR.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Krishn Kaushik, “Navy Issues RFI to Get 250-Bed Hospital Ship in the High Seas”, The Indian Express, 24 May 2022.
• 2. “Address by the President of India, Shri Ram Nath Kovind on the Occasion of the Presidential Fleet Review – 2022”, The President of India, 21 February 2022.
• 3. “Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949”, United Nations, p. 68.
• 4. “Records relating to Hospital Ships and USNS Comfort during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm”, Naval History and Heritage Command, 18 October 2021.
• 5. “USNS Comfort”, CNN International, 2003.
• 6. Michael S. Baker, Jacob B. Baker and Frederick Burkle, “The Hospital Ship as a Strategic Asset in 21st Century Foreign Policy and Global Health Crisis”, Military Medicine, March 2022, p.4.
• 7. “Percentage of Total Population Living in Coastal Areas”, United Nations, 15 June 2007.
• 8. “Disaster Risk Management”, Indian Ocean Rim Association, 21 June 2022.
• 9. Joseph S. Nye Jr, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4, July–August 2009, pp. 160–63. 
• 10. Christain Le Mière, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges, Routledge, New York,  2014, p. 6.
• 11. Michael S. Baker, Jacob B. Baker and Frederick Burkle, no. 6.
• 12. Robet D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, Random House, New York, 2011, p. 278.
• 13. Ibid.
• 14. “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”, Indian Navy, October 2015, p. 43.
• 15. Ibid., p. 33.
• 16. Bill Chappell, “Hospital Ship USNS Comfort Arrives in New York to Ease Coronavirus Pressure”, NPR, 30 March 2020.
• 17. Michael S. Baker, Jacob B. Baker and Frederick Burkle, no. 6.

Summary: The US and EU sanctions have targeted key Russian arms producing firms, their design bureaus, export organisations and their leadership, as well as the export and import of dual-use products. Given that India is one of the largest importers of Russian arms, it has been impacted by such sanctions. While suggestions to overcome these complications in the near and medium-terms have included the possible creation of escrow accounts and delayed payments, for the longer term, there is no denying the fact that the country’s ‘Aatmanirbhar’ drive for achieving defence self-reliance will have to be further strengthened.

The Russian Federation is one of the major global arms exporters. The top five importers of Russian arms during 2010–21 were India, China, Algeria, Vietnam and Egypt. Russia’s share of global arms trade, however, has gradually decreased from 26 per cent in 2011–15 to 19 per cent in 2017–21.1 In the last five years (2017–21), while Russian arms made up more than 80 per cent of China’s and Algeria’s arms imports, they accounted for 56 per cent of Vietnam’s, 46 per cent of India’s and 41 per cent of Egypt’s arms imports.

Due to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, since 2014, Russia has been subjected to sanctions measures by the United States (US), European Union (EU) and other countries. In the wake of its February 2022 military action in Ukraine, these sanctions have been further strengthened. The sanctions have targeted key Russian arms producing firms, their design bureaus, export organisations and their leadership, as well as the export and import of dual-use products. This Issue Brief examines the different US and EU sanctions on the Russian defence industry, and the implications they have had for Russian arms importing countries, like Turkey and Indonesia. Given that India is one of the largest importers of Russian arms, it has been impacted by such sanctions.

EU Sanctions

As part of EU sanctions, more than a thousand individuals and nearly 100 entities are subject to travel bans and asset freezes. Six ‘packages’ of sanctions have been imposed beginning from 23 February till 3 June, with sanctions targeting 70 per cent of Russia’s banking system (as per the EU’s contention), closed EU airspace and ports to Russian aircraft and vessels and imposed import and export restrictions on items like Russian steel (with effect from August 2022), coal, crude oil, among others.2 As regards defence and dual-use sectors, business transactions with key companies in the aviation,  shipbuilding and machine-building sectors are threatened to be sanctioned, while export restrictions on dual-use goods and technology that could ‘contribute to the technological advancement of Russia’s defence and security sector’ were tightened.3

While the prohibition on dual-use goods has been in place for military end-users, it was extended to civilian end-users too from February 2022. Analysts note that restrictions on sourcing critical components like semi-conductors, machining equipment, among others, will negatively impact the ability of Russia’s defence industrial enterprise. Micro-electronics and high-end machining equipment were described as the ‘achilles heel’ of the Russian defence industry, way back in 2015, by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin.4

Prior to the latest round of sanctions, the EU arms export and import ban has been in place since July 2014. The EU, in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP, banned the export and import of arms, including sale, supply or transfer of weapons, ammunition, military vehicles, or technical and financial assistance for military activities.5 More than EUR 900 million of defence trade took place between EU states and Russia, however, in the period 2010–20, with significant portion of it contributed by countries like France, Germany and Italy.6

Reports note that German engine parts and global positioning systems (GPS) have been found in Russian drones shot down in Ukraine. Italy has exported military trucks and semi-automatic weapons and ammunition, while infra-red systems for fighter jets and thermal imaging equipment for tanks, among other equipment, have been exported by France.7 Russian arms have also been exported to EU member states—to Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, in the past decade, though the majority of these exports have happened prior to 2012.  

To be sure, the 2014 ban did not prohibit servicing of spares, among others, for contracts entered into prior to August 2014. EU sanctions measures are also not applicable for equipment meant for civilian nuclear use, or for transactions involving companies jointly or solely owned by EU entities. There has been a reduction, though, in arms export licenses from EU states to Russia, reducing from 940 in 2013 to 86 in 2020 (see Tables 1 and 2).8 EU states insist, therefore, that they have been strictly following the sanctions measures. The EU, in April 2022, also removed this exemption relating to servicing of arms equipment brought prior to August 2014.9

US Sanctions

The Obama administration passed Executive Order (EO) 13661 and EO 13662 in March 2014 blocking the ‘property or interests in property of persons operating in the arms and related material sectors of the Russian Federation’.10 These two authorities were later codified by the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

In July 2014, the US Treasury designated and blocked the assets of Russian military enterprises like Almaz-Antey, Federal State Unitary Enterprise State Research and Production Enterprise Bazalt, JSC Concern Sozvezdie, JSC MIC NPO Mashinostroyenia, Kalashnikov Concern, KBP Instrument Design Bureau, Radio-Electronic Technologies, and Uralvagonzavod, under EO 13661.11

The Ukraine Freedom Support of December 2014 imposed sanctions on the Russian arms export organisation, Rosoboronexport and threatened sanctions on ‘any person for knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction with any Russian producers, transferors or brokers of defence articles’. The Act had an in-built waiver for not imposing these sanctions for national security reasons.12

CAATSA, meanwhile, was passed in 2017 as a measure to punish Iran, Russia and North Korea for their alleged malicious activities. Russian ‘malafide’ actions that were flagged included its invasion of Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014) and Crimea (2014) and its alleged involvement in the 2016 US Presidential elections. Section 231 of CAATSA prescribed ‘sanctions for engaging in “significant” transactions with defence and intelligence sectors of Russia’.13

These sanctions included restrictions on accessing US EXIM Bank loans, denial of export sanctions, prohibition of loans from US financial institutions totaling more than US$ 10 million, opposing loans from international financial institutions, and sanctions on principal executive officers of entities who indulge in such ‘significant transactions’. In September 2017, the US President delegated the authority to implement Section 231 to the US Secretary of State, in consultation with US Treasury Secretary.

Turkey has been at the receiving end of US sanctions pressure on account of its US$ 2.5 billion purchase of the S-400 system, announced in December 2017. Negotiations for the system had commenced in June 2016, after the deal for a similar Chinese system was cancelled in November 2015, over contentions regarding transfer of technology (ToT) issues.14 The Chinese system was chosen in September 2013. After the Chinese deal was cancelled, negotiations were also held with US companies like Raytheon and Lockheed Martin—makers of the Patriot system—but disagreement over ToT stymied the deal.

Turkey began constructing S-400 base in September 2018. The US removed Turkey from the F-35 programme in June 2019. Turkey was to get nearly 100 F-35 jets and Turkish companies were making F-35 centre fuselages and cockpit displays. Reports noted that approximately 7 per cent of the jet’s parts were being made in Turkey.15

While the F-35 removal was not prescribed under CAATSA sanctions, the US took the decision after Turkey sent personnel to Russia for training on the S-400 system. The US insisted that the S-400 procurement would lead to Turkish strategic and economic overdependence on Russia. The White House asserted that the F-35 cannot co-exist with a Russian intelligence collection programme (S-400) and that its acquisition undermines the commitments of NATO allies to move away from Russian systems.16 In December 2020, Section 231 CAATSA sanctions were finally imposed on Turkey’s arms procurement agency (SSB), including asset freezes and visa restrictions on its president and other officers.

As for recent developments on Turkey–US defence ties, the US State Department, in letter to Congress on Turkey’s request for F-16 fighters, stated that ‘compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as US national security, economic and commercial interests are supported by appropriate US defense trade ties with Turkey’ and noted that Turkey had already paid a ‘significant price’ on account of its removal from the F-35 programme and the CAATSA sanctions.17

Apart from Turkey, other countries that have been sanctioned by the US over their arms relationship with Russia include China. CAATSA sanctions were imposed on the Chinese arms procurement agency, EDD, and its director, in September 2018. The Chinese purchase of the Su-35 fighter jet in 2017 and the S-400 system in 2018 were deemed as ‘significant’ transactions with the Russian defence industry.18 Indonesia in December 2021 also backed out of deals to buy 11 Su-35 jets for more than US$ 1 billion.19 Reports in 2019 had noted that Morocco was reconsidering an option to buy the S-400, in view of the threat of US sanctions. In January 2021, the US approved the sale of the Patriot air defence system to Morocco.20

Consequences for India

US and EU sanctions measures have added pressure to India’s strategic options. India is one of the largest importers of Russian arms, accounting for nearly 34 per cent of Russia’s exports, during 2010–21, followed by China, at 13.5 per cent.21 The head of Rostec, the Russian arms conglomerate, in August 2021 stated that the cumulative value of defence deals between India and Russia since 2018 was US$ 15 billion.22 The Russian arms deals signed during the period 2018–22 are mentioned in Table 3.

Reports in May 2022 flagged that India has halted negotiations for 10 additional Ka-31 early warning helicopters—to the 14 it has in its inventory, due to uncertainties arising on account of US sanctions measures.23 The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) plan to upgrade its frontline Su-30 MKI fighter jets has also reportedly been put on hold.24 US sanctions pressure was also cited as one of the reasons for lack of progress in finalising the deal for the Ka-226T light utility helicopters, powered by French engines.25

Earlier in March 2022, US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Donald Lu, while responding to a question from Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen whether India’s abstentions at the United Nations on Ukraine-related resolutions will impact the administration’s decisions on a possible CAATSA waiver going forward, stated that India has cancelled orders for Mig-29 fighter jets, anti-tank weapons, and helicopters ‘in just the last few weeks’.26 There has been no formal confirmation, though, from Indian officials, of these cancellations.

As for the S-400, India entered into the US$ 5.4 billion deal with the Russian Federation in October 2018 for five units of the system. The first unit was deployed in December 2021 while the deliveries for the second unit began in April 2022. Even as US officials have been maintaining that India should reduce its dependence on Russian equipment, as on date, the US Secretary of State, in consultation with the US Treasury Secretary, has not made the determination for the US President that India’s purchases of the S-400 constitute a ‘significant’ transaction with the Russian defence sector.

US legislative support for granting India such a waiver, though, is strong. Republican Senators and Congressmen, led by Senator Ted Cruz, introduced the Circumspectly Reducing Unintended Consequences Impairing Alliances and Leadership Act of 2021 (CRUCIAL) legislation in both the Senate (October 2021) and the House of Representatives (November 2021), urging the US President not to impose CAATSA sanctions for a 10-year period, if he certifies to the US Congress that India is cooperating with the US on ‘security matters that are critical to United States strategic interests’ in the Indo-Pacific.27 Republican lawmakers, though, have been critical of India’s voting stance at the UN on Ukraine. At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in March 2022, Senator Cruz enquired from Assistant Secretary Lu if India’s votes reduced the incentives for the US to continue to consider the CAATSA sanctions waiver.28  

The US House of Representatives, meanwhile, on 14 July 2022, overwhelmingly passed an amendment to the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA), introduced by Congressman Ro Khanna, urging the Biden administration to provide India with a CAATSA waiver ‘to support India’s immediate defense needs’ in the face of ‘serious border threats from China’. The amendment also urges the US to take additional steps to ‘accelerate India’s transition off Russian-built weapons and defense systems’.29

The amendment was passed with 330 members voting in favour (214 Democrats and 116 Republicans) and 99 against (5 Democrats and 94 Republicans).30 Representative Khanna, a Democrat from California, affirmed that the amendment was the most significant bipartisan legislative action pertaining to India–US relations, since the 2005 nuclear deal.31 While the US President will still have to provide the waiver, the amendment is an important indication of strong bipartisan support that acknowledges India’s need to ‘maintain its heavily Russian-built weapons systems’.32

Analysts have also flagged possible issues that Indian and Russian defence joint venture companies could face in fulfilling export orders or in bagging new orders.33 India entered into a US$ 375 million contract with Philippines in January 2022, for the supply of the Brahmos missile system. The Office of Foreign Assets and Control’s (OFAC’s) ‘50 per cent rule’, states that sanctions will be imposed on ‘any entity owned in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons’.34 Brahmos JV is not owned 50 per cent or more owned by the Russian JV partner, NPO Mashinostroyenia (which is under US sanctions since 2014). Recent reports have also noted that Indonesia was in advanced talks with India to procure the Brahmos missile.35 The trend indicator values (TIV) of Russia’s arms exports to India during the period 2010–21 are mentioned in Figure 1.

Conclusion

US and EU sanctions have had implications for countries that import major Russian defence equipment. Turkey, India and China are pertinent examples in this regard. India could not conclude key arms procurement contracts like those for light utility helicopters, on account of US sanctions pressure, among other issues. Reports have highlighted how it could face issues with regard to paying for contracted weapons systems, for instance. Major purchases like the S-400 system have been under the sanctions cloud, though legislative support in favour of the US administration providing sanctions waiver has gathered momentum. While suggestions to overcome these complications in the near and medium-terms have included the possible creation of escrow accounts and delayed payments, for the longer term, there is no denying the fact that the country’s ‘Aatmanirbhar’ drive for achieving defence self-reliance will have to be further strengthened.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Pieter D. Wezeman, Alexandra Kuimova and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2021”, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2022; Pieter D. Wezeman, Alexandra Kuimova and Siemon T. Wezeman, "Trends in International Arms Transfers 2020”, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2021.
• 2. “Sanctions Adopted Following Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine”, European Commission.
• 3. “Council Decision 2022/430 of 15 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures in view of Russia’s Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine”, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 65, 15 March 2022. Countries like Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have also imposed restrictions on exports to Russia of critical components like semi-conductors, among others. Sebastian Moss, “Intel and AMD Halt Chip Sales to Russia, TSMC Joins In on Sanctions”, DCD, 28 February 2022; Lara Williams, “Taiwan’s Semiconductor Ban Could Spell Catastrophe for Russia”, Investment Monitor, 3 March 2022; “In Rare Stand, South Korea, Singapore Unveil Sanctions on Russia”, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2022. 
• 4. Cited in Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027”, Chatham House, May 2018, p. 30.
• 5. “Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures in view of Russia's Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine”, Official Journal of the European Union, 31 July 2014.
• 6. EU Export Data Browser, European Network against Arms Trade.
• 7. Laure Brillaud, Ana Curic, Maria Maggiore, Leïla Miñano and Nico Schmidt, “EU Member States Exported Weapons to Russia after the 2014 Embargo”, Investigate Europe, 17 March 2022.
• 8. “Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports”, European External Action Service.
• 9. Francesco Guarascio, “EU Closes Loophole Allowing Multimillion-euro Arms Sales to Russia”, Reuters, 14 April 2022; “Answer Given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission”, European Parliament, 7 June 2022.
• 10. “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine”, Executive Order 13661 of March 16, 2014, Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 53, 19 March 2014; “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine”, Executive Order 13662 of March 20, 2014, Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 56, 24 March 2014.
• 11. “Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial Services and Energy Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those Undermining Ukraine's Sovereignty”, US Department of the Treasury, 16 July 2014.
• 12. “The Ukraine Freedom Support Act 2014”, US Congress, 18 December 2014.
• 13. “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 2017”, US Congress, 2 August 2017.
• 14. Ali Ünal, “Turkey Cancels $3.4B Missile Deal with China to Launch Own Project”, Daily Sabah, 15 November 2015.
• 15. “U.S. Congressional Committee Leaders Warn Turkey on F-35, S-400”, Reuters, 9 April 2019.
• 16. “White House Says Turkey's Involvement in F-35 Program ‘Impossible’”, Reuters, 17 July 2019.
• 17. Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. Says Potential F-16 Sale to Turkey would Serve U.S. Interests, NATO: Letter”, Reuters, 8 April 2022.
• 18. “Sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA)”, US Department of State, 20 September 2018.
• 19. Alessandra Giovanzanti, “Indonesia Excludes Su-35 from Fighter Aircraft Acquisition Plans”, Janes, 23 December 2021.
• 20. “US Confirms Sale of PATRIOT Missiles to Morocco”, The North Africa Post, 21 January 2021.
• 21. “Importer-Exporter TIV Tables”, SIPRI.
• 22. Dinakar Peri, “India-Russia Defence Trade Worth $15 Billion in Three Years: Russian Official”, The Hindu, 24 August 2021.
• 23. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Halts Ka-31 Deal with Russia”, Defense News, 16 May 2022.
• 24. “Amid Ukraine-Russia War, IAF's Rs 35,000 cr Plan to Upgrade Su-30 Fighter Fleet Put On Backburner”, ANI, 8 May 2022.
• 25. Rahul Bedi, “India’s Protracted Saga to Acquire Russian Choppers Unlikely to Materialise in Entirety”, The Wire, 29 December 2021.
• 26. See “U.S. Policy Towards India”, Subcommittee on Near East, South East, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2022.
• 27. “CRUCIAL Act of 2021”, US Congress, 28 October 2021; “H.R. 6033, CRUCIAL Act of 2021”, US Congress, 18 November 2021.
• 28. “U.S. Policy towards India”, no. 26.
• 29. “Release: House Passes Khanna’s Historic Amendment to Strengthen U.S. and India Defense Partnership”, Congressman RO Khanna, 14 July 2022.
• 30. “Final Vote Results for Roll Call 332”, 14 July 2022.
• 31. “India-Russia Deal: RO Khanna Lists Out Reasons Why US Waived Off CAATSA Sanctions Against New Delhi”,  India Today, 20 July 2022.
• 32. “Release: House Passes Khanna’s Historic Amendment to Strengthen U.S. and India Defense Partnership”, no. 29.
• 33. Rahul Bedi, “India Ready to Sell BrahMos, but Exports Remain Hostage to Concerns Over CAATSA”, The Wire, 4 March 2021; Gurjit Singh, “BrahMos Export Opens Up Strategic Arena”, The Tribune, 8 February 2022.  
• 34. "Entities Owned by Blocked Persons (50% Rule)”, US Department of the Treasury, 13 August 2014.
• 35. Huma Siddiqui, “FE Exclusive: Indonesia to Buy BrahMos Missile from India? Talks in Advance Stage”, The Financial Express, 19 July 2022.

Summary: Despite Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resignation, there is a bleak possibility that the economic, political and social aspirations of the protestors in Sri Lanka will be fulfilled anytime soon. Though the protestors are determined to continue the struggle through peaceful means, the country may witness violence and unrest as the struggle prolongs.

Sri Lankans who have been chanting ‘Gota Go Home’ for the last three months finally succeeded in making President Gotabaya Rajapaksa resign from the post on 14 July 2022. The decision of Gotabaya, conveyed via email to the Speaker of the Parliament from Singapore, is being seen as a euphoric victory by the protesters who had occupied the residences of both the President and the Prime Minister as well as the President’s secretariat on 9 July. While Gotabaya’s resignation will go down in history as one of the successes of non-violent public protest, it is unlikely that the resignation alone will bring the desired political outcome and the much-needed economic relief to the people—which was the main purpose of the Aragalaya, the peoples’ struggle.

Wrath against the Rajapaksas

Unprecedented economic crisis led to political chaos in the country in the month of April, with common people in large numbers coming onto the streets demanding resignation of President Rajapaksa and his government. They held the government accountable for contributing to the crisis by implementing faulty economic policies and failing to provide effective solutions. In addition, imposition of family rule, nepotism, corruption, discriminatory racial policies and authoritarian style of governance made the Rajapaksa family a subject of public rage. The public anger erupted and took the shape of mass protests when the shortages of food, fuel, medicine and other essential items due to foreign reserves crisis affected the lives of each and every individual in the country.

The anti-government public protests compelled the Rajapaksas, who include Sports Minister Namal Rajapaksa, Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa, and PM Mahinda Rajapaksa, to resign in April and May. However, Gotabaya Rajapaksa was determined to not resign from the post of president without completing his first term. He committed that he would appoint a national unity government (NUG) or an all-party government under a consensus prime minister to address the protestors’ concerns. Following the resignation of Mahinda Rajapaksa on 9 May, he went on to appoint Ranil Wickremesinghe as the Prime Minister without consultations and formed a government of selected few backed by the ruling party instead of an all-party government, as promised.

There was public outcry and dissatisfaction over the appointment of Ranil Wickremesinghe as the PM, as he is not an elected member of the Parliament, with Gotabaya Rajapaksa continuing as the President. The protestors, civil society members, the clergy and professional groups like Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) and opposition parties, continued to demand the president’s resignation. They proposed an all-party interim government for 18 months to provide immediate economic relief to the people and make necessary changes in the constitution to reduce the power of the executive president and eventually abolish the executive Presidency.1

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe failed to positively respond to these demands and take measures to address them. The Wickremesinghe government voted out the opposition’s motion to debate displeasure against President Rajapaksa and his government in the Parliament. The government’s draft amendment bill to reduce the power of the executive by repealing the 20th amendment and restoring the 19th amendment also indicated lack of genuine desire of the ruling party and the government to reduce the power of President.

Similarly, bills passed in the last one month show that the government was not serious about improving the governance issue. Instead of giving economic relief to the people, Wickremesinghe declared in the Parliament that the economy has completely collapsed and asked the people to brace for tougher times ahead. The plight of the people increased further in the month of June and July under the new government as fuel distribution stopped completely. Wickremesinghe, despite good rapport with the international community, particularly the Western countries, could not bring required foreign assistance to deal with the ongoing crisis.

On 29 June, ‘Gota Go Gama’ protestors had a meeting with the leaders of the opposition parties and they agreed to take collective action to intensify the pressure to remove Rajapaksa from power. There was a call from the protestors to the people across the country on social media to gather in Colombo and march towards the President’s secretariat and occupy it on 9 July. Several opposition political parties, trade unions and inter university students’ association too urged people to participate in the protest march. People across the country responded overwhelmingly and occupied the president’s residence, the presidential secretariat as well as the PM’s residence known as ‘Temple Trees’, without facing resistance from the armed forces on 9 July. 

The all-party leaders in a special meeting on 9 July chaired by the Speaker of the Sri Lankan Parliament agreed on immediate resignation of the president and the prime minister. Rajapaksa conveyed through the speaker, his decision to agree to the demand of all-party leaders and stated that he would resign on 13 July. PM Wickremesinghe too announced his intention to resign. However, neither Rajapaksa nor Wickremesinghe tendered their resignation on 13 July. Rajapaksa fled the country on a Sri Lankan Airforce Jet to the Maldives on 13 July and appointed Ranil Wickremesinghe as the acting president in his absence.2 On 14 July, Gotabaya Rajapaksa went to Singapore in a private jet from the Maldives and tendered his resignation through email to the speaker only after landing in Singapore. 

Aragalaya Continues

The failure of the president to resign on 13 July and the news of appointment of Ranil Wickremesinghe as the acting President created more unrest in Colombo. The protestors occupied the PM’s office and also reached the Parliament where violent clashes broke out between the security personnel and the protestors. Nearly 42 persons were injured during clashes including a soldier and a police constable. Reportedly, anti-government protesters confiscated a T-56 weapon and 2 magazines with 60 rounds of ammunition from an Army soldier during protests near the Parliament.3

The Aragalaya protest has been mostly peaceful, except a few cases of violence. However, developments following the occupation of president’s residence were concerning. On 9 July, Wickremesinghe’s personal residence was burnt down. There were also reports of protestors destroying artefacts in the president’s residence and secretariat. There was also a report of protestors attempting to take over the Rupavahini corporation. Though no violent method was used, protestors insisted the officials of the state media corporation to telecast the views of Aragalaya protestors only.

The unruly behaviour of some of the protestors was widely condemned. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL), the Archeology Department, Free Media Movement, the general public and the sympathisers as well as members of international community urged the protestors to refrain from destroying public property and resorting to violence.4 Ranil Wickremesinghe as acting president imposed emergency rule in the country, imposed curfew in the Western Province and empowered the military to use force to protect state property and human lives.5

On 14 July, activists representing the ‘Gota Go Gama’ campaign, respecting the public opinion and request of the BASL, withdrew peacefully from the president’s official residence, the prime minister’s official residence, Temple Trees, and the Prime Minister’s Office in Colombo.6 However, they stated that they would continue to occupy the front part of the Presidential Secretariat and the Galle Face Green to further continue their struggle until their demands were met.7

Other than the resignation of Rajapaksa government and end of Rajapaksa family rule, the demands of the Aragalaya protestors as outlined on 11 July include the following:8

1. Formation of an interim government for a maximum period of a year which subscribes to the economic, social and political aims and aspirations of the people’s struggle.
2. Formation of a ‘People’s Council’ which has legal standing, through which representatives of the Aragalaya will be able to effectively engage and mediate with the interim government.
3. Formulation of an urgent short-term course of action within six months to provide relief to the people oppressed by the current economic crisis. Among demands included a programme for the provision and distribution of essentials such as food, fuel, gas, education, health, public transport and energy; cancellation of micro-finance and farmers’ debts; release of peaceful protestors under arrest, including all political prisoners; investigation based on an audit, to recover all monies and assets stolen by the political regime; a complete revision of the current system of taxation among others.
4. A new Constitution within a maximum period of 12 months that incorporates the provision endorsing people’s sovereignty to be established through a referendum as quickly as possible; recognising right to life as a fundamental right; abolition of the Executive Presidency; an appropriate process for a fair election; a process that provides the right to recall elected representatives who are not accountable to the people; a process that enables the people to participate in making and amending the law; and to address the limitations in the current constitution on human rights and the rights of women and children; to eradicate racism and racial oppression; to strengthen the relevant legal foundations that affirm the equality of religion, language, sexuality, and other cultural identity as well as democracy and political freedom.
5. Until a new constitution that affirms the power of the people is in place, the interim government within six months of its formation would focus on reduction of the executive powers of the President; strengthen democratic institutions and wherever possible, a further democratisation of the existing constitution.

What lies ahead?

So far, the protestors have achieved their demand for resignation of the president and the end of Rajapaksa family rule. However, they seem to be utterly disappointed by the fact that Gotabaya has now been replaced by Ranil Wickremesinghe, who was rejected by the people in the last election and had entered the Parliament through his party’s national-list seat. Wickremesinghe, who once extended his solidarity with the ‘Gota Go Gama’ protestors and expressed his desire to engage with them, had also empowered the military, as acting President, to use force against those acting in a riotous manner.9

The failure on the part of Gotabaya and Ranil to tender resignation on 13 July as committed, led to intensification of the unrest. To maintain law-and-order situation in the country and control the popular uprising, government needed immediate political solution. However, the acting president has felt it prudent to empower the Armed Forces to exercise force to secure public property and human lives, rather than facilitating a political solution by tendering his resignation immediately.

All-party leaders in their meeting on 9 July agreed that President Gotabaya and PM Wickremasinghe would resign immediately, following which Parliament would be convened in seven days to appoint an acting president (as per constitutional provision, speaker would be appointed as acting president); then an interim all-party government would be formed under a new Prime Minister; and then elections can be called within a short period of time and a new government can be appointed. Later, when Gotabaya (through the speaker) and Ranil Wickremesinghe confirmed that they would resign on 13 July, all party leaders during a meeting on 11 July decided that the Parliament would be summoned on 15 July, nomination for the President would be received on 19 July and the Presidential election in case of more than one nomination would be held on 20 July through secret ballot. This would be followed by an all-party government under a new President for the future constitutional framework to be carried out and for the continuation of the existing essential services in the country.10 Due to delay in Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resignation, parliament could not be convened on 15 July and the Presidential election was finally held on 20 July, as decided. With the opposition political parties not able to nominate a common candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe was elected as the 8th President of Sri Lanka on 20 July 2022, and is expected to complete the remainder of the term of the former president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

Even though all political parties have agreed to form an interim government, it is uncertain whether the parliamentarians will be able to come to a consensus to appoint an interim PM or elect a President and a national unity government/all-party government that is acceptable to the people. This uncertainty looms large as the ruling party still holds the majority in the Parliament and opposition parties are not united even if they had common demand of ousting the Rajapaksa government and bring about changes in the political system.

Since April this year, despite the Aragalaya on the streets, parliamentarians have not felt the urgency to show some political will to address people’s concerns. The parliament in May passed the electricity amendment bill, which ended the bidding process to award contract for energy projects. This is contrary to the demand for introducing transparency to address the corruption and poor governance. The political parties have agreed to curtail the power of executive Presidency. However, three different draft bills for the purpose were put forward in the Parliament as different political parties have different takes on the issue.

Majoritarianism and politics based on ethnicity and racial divide are the key features of Sri Lankan politics that have empowered many of the corrupt leaders. As a result, many parliamentarians would like to maintain the status quo and may not give their consent to any systemic change. The NUG experiment in Sri Lanka during the period 2015–19 utterly failed as political parties simply refused to be united even on matters related to highest level of national security concern. Almost same bunch of leaders are continuing in the parliament. This leaves little room for optimism that things will stabilise soon in the coming days.

Without political stability, there is little hope for economic stability. To meet the immediate economic needs of the people in terms of supply of food, fuel, medicines and deal with the economic crisis, the island requires financial assistance from multilateral institutes as well as bilateral partners. Sri Lankans are relying heavily on finalisation of the IMF bailout package. UN, World Food Programme, World Bank and some bilateral partners have committed humanitarian assistance, but assistance from some countries including US and Japan will depend on the successful negotiation of IMF deal. An unsettled and unstable government will not only delay the negotiation process, but also affect the implementation of the IMF conditionalities including the debt restructure negotiation with the creditors, improving the governance system and so on.

In addition to the financial aid and assistance, Sri Lanka needs to implement policies to revive its economy by strengthening various sectors including tourism, remittances, export, agriculture, investment and so on. Political stability and a settled government are the prerequisite to revive the economy.

Conclusion

There is a bleak possibility that the economic, political, and social aspirations of the protestors will be fulfilled anytime soon. Hence ‘Janatha Aragalaya’ is likely to continue for some more time. Though the protestors are determined to continue the struggle through peaceful means, there is a possibility that as the protest continues, a section in the society that believes in anarchy or in adopting violent means to bring required political changes takes over and decides the nature and scope of the Aragalaya. Alternatively, there may be also an attempt to sabotage the people’s peaceful struggle by instigating violence.

The main onus to prevent any such situation lies not only on the perseverance of protestors who truly believe on the strength of the peaceful protest, but also Ranil Wickremesinghe and all the 224 parliamentarians who seem to be trying the patience of the protestors.

Many in the Western media have raised the possibility of military takeover. This is unlikely given that the Sri Lankan military is usually subservient to the political forces (even though there was an incident of failed military coup in 1962). Further, the depth of the ongoing economic crisis may not encourage the military to take over as it is well known that there is no easy solution to the crisis.

To address the question of political legitimacy and to effectively execute and implement plans to deal with the economic crisis and bring to an end to the popular uprising, the prudent option for Sri Lanka is to go for fresh elections. However, the situation right now is not economically conducive to conduct the elections. Elections can ideally take place only after an all-party leadership strikes an agreement with the IMF and other bilateral and multilateral partners, and eases the economic pressure on the people.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “13 Proposals from BASL to Restore Political & Economic Stability in Sri Lanka”, Newswire, 23 April 2022; “What do People at ‘GotaGoGama’ Want? 8 Key Demands”, Newswire, 13 May 2022.
• 2. “President Issues Gazette Appointing Ranil as Acting President”, Newswire, 13 July 2022.
• 3. “Parliament Protest: Protesters Confiscate Firearm & Ammunition from Army Officer”, Newswire, 14 July 2022.
• 4. “Strong Message from BASL to Protesters”, Newswire, 12 July 2022.
  
  “Protests: Archaeology Department Issues Warning”, Newswire, 13 July 2022; “Intimidating Media Institutions in the Pretext of ‘Aragalaya’ is a Wrong Precedent – FMM”, Newswire, 14 July 2022; “US Ambassador to SL Calls for the Rule of Law to be Upheld”, Newswire, 13 July 2022.
• 5. “PM Orders to Impose Curfew in WP”, Daily Mirror, 13 July 2022; “Army Empowered to Use Force to Protect Lives & State Property”, Newswire, 14 July 2022.
• 6. “Message from BASL for SL Protesters”, Newswire, 13 July 2022.
• 7. “‘GotoGoGama’ Activists Decide to Withdraw from Pres & PM’s Houses & PM’s Office”, Newswire, 14 July 2022.
• 8. “GotaGoGama Activists Issue 6 Immediate Demands”, Daily FT, 11 July 2022.
• 9. “‘GotaGoGama’ Should Continue – New PM Ranil”, Newswire, 12 May 2022.
• 10. “Press Release: Regarding the Decisions Taken at Today's Party Leadership Meeting”, Parliament of Sri Lanka, 11 July 2022.

Summary: Amid the disruption in international trade and transport routes caused by the Russia–Ukraine War and Western sanctions on Russia, Iran has seen a sudden rise in its importance as a transit and transport hub connecting China and Central Asia to Europe, and also Russia with India, along the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC). The Raisi administration, which has delinked Iran’s economic policy to the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has focussed on economic diplomacy with ‘Eastern’ powers—Russia and China—and has taken measures to improve infrastructure connectivity with Central Asian neighbours, giving a fillip to Iran’s geo-economic status in Eurasia.

On 18 June, the first freight train carrying Kazakhstan's sulphur cargo destined for Europe arrived in Iran from Incheh Borun at the Iran–Turkmenistan border.1 A day later, the cargo reached Tehran, where President Ebrahim Raisi, along with the visiting Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev launched the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran (KTI) transit corridor, also called the Southern Caspian Sea Corridor to Europe via Turkey.2 Just a week before Tokayev’s visit to Tehran, President of Turkmenistan, Serdar Berdimuhamedow, also visited Tehran, signing bilateral agreements for advancing economic cooperation, especially in transit and transportation sectors as well as oil and natural gas.

Amid the disruption in international trade and transport routes caused by the Russia–Ukraine war and Western sanctions on Russia, Iran has seen a sudden rise in its importance as a transit and transport hub connecting China and Central Asia to Europe, and also Russia with India along the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC). As Russia is focussed on its war in Ukraine, Tehran fears the United States taking advantage of ‘security vacuum’ in Central Asia. It is, therefore, actively advocating collective regional efforts to deal with terrorism, as well as drug-trafficking threats from Afghanistan.

Over the last 30 years since the emergence of independent countries in its neighbourhood in Central Asia and South Caucasus, Iran has sought bilateral and multilateral cooperation and regional linkages to allow it to take advantage of its crossroad location between Caspian Sea–Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. In the post-Cold War geopolitical environment, Tehran saw promotion of regional interactions and inter-regional linkages as part of what Edmund Herzig describes as “benign globalisation process that will limit the capacity of any single power to dominate the system”.3 In other words, it was hoped that enhanced connectivity will promote socio-economic development, foster regional stability and security and therefore help resist the hegemonic role of extra-regional powers.

Iran’s pursuit of functional cooperation, especially in transport and transit, and energy development, has been largely welcomed by the Central Asian and Caspian countries, even as they have pursued similar cooperation with rival actors such as the European Union (EU) and Turkey, whose approach, in turn, has been designed to undermine the influence of Iran and Russia. Iran’s geo-economic strategy has been to offer stable and competitive routes connecting its landlocked neighbours in Central Asia to international markets in Europe and Asia.

Importantly, the push for regional connectivity, instead of being driven by intensity of interdependent relations among regional neighbours, has come from regional states trying to address the artificially low level of such interdependence, giving the regional connectivity initiatives the character of ‘development integration’.4 Also, in the absence of limited investment and demand, enhancing the connectivity of national transport systems, including railways, has been seen as the most viable solution for regional as well as trans-regional transport and logistics development.5

Iran in Eurasian Connectivity

President Raisi’s administration has prioritised neighbourhood policy as a key pillar of ‘resistance economy’, which is aimed at reducing vulnerability to sanctions. Recently, describing it as ‘strategic’ policy, Raisi argued that neighbourhood focus will not change with international developments.6 Raisi’s first official visit abroad was to attend the summit of Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO)—made up of Central Asian and Caucasus states, apart from Iran, Turkey, Pakistan—in Ashgabat in November 2021. On the sidelines of the summit, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding on railroad cooperation.7

Map 1. Map of Iran Railway

Source: Map of Iran Railway, The Railways of the Islamic republic of IRAN, August 2014.

Iran–Turkmenistan–Kazakhstan railway, also called the North–South railway corridor because it’s part of the INSTC, has been a work in progress for years. The 80 km railway line from Incheh Borun on Iran–Turkmenistan border to Gorgan in Iran’s Golestan Province was inaugurated in December 2014.8 Given that the Incheh Borun–Gorgan railway line connects railway networks of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran, and is aligned with Russia’s objective of North–South transport corridor through Central Asia and Iran to India, Russian Railways had signed an agreement with Iranian railway in 2017 to carry out the electrification of 500 km stretch from Incheh Borun to Garmsar on the Tehran–Mashhad main line. This project was to be funded from a US$ 5 billion Line of Credit from Russia for infrastructure projects in Iran. Russia withdrew from the project in 2020, but it pledged to revive the credit line during Raisi’s visit to Moscow in January 2022.

The credit line will help complete two INSTC-related railway projects in Iran—the electrification of Incheh Borun–Garmsar railway line and the 167 km long Rasht–Astara railway, which will connect the railway networks of Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia. Russia is currently facing major logistical challenges after its European neighbours closed borders with it and Belarus. Western sanctions have led Maersk, the world’s largest container operator, and other major freight forwarding companies, to halt deliveries to Russia. In May, Russian Transport Minister Vitaly Savelyev claimed that the Western sanctions had "practically broken all" logistics corridors utilised by the country for commerce.9 As a result, Moscow is attaching new priority to Eurasian connectivity and is expediting alternative transport routes to South Asia.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Alexander Novak, while visiting Tehran in May 2022, underscored Moscow’s commitment to developing a rail cargo route from Russia to India via Iran. Novak’s visit came a month after Iranian Road and Urban Development Minister, Rostam Qasemi, signed a comprehensive document in the transportation and transit sector including agreements for activation of the INSTC and development of maritime, air, and rail cooperation.10

Earlier, in November last year, to facilitate Iran’s growing trade with the Eurasian Economic Union, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) launched six shipping lines from Iran’s Caspian Sea port of Anzali to Russian ports in Astrakhan and Makhachkala and Aktau in Kazakhstan.11 These shipping lines are now being used to operationalise the INSTC to overcome Russia’s logistics challenges and supply-chain disruptions.12 In June 2022, state-run IRISL ran a pilot test on the INSTC. It coordinated transport of containers of wood laminate sheets, weighing 41 tons, by road from St Petersburg to jointly owned Iranian-Russian terminal in the Caspian seaport city of Astrakhan to Iran’s Caspian port of Anzali, and from there by road to Iran’s Bandar Abbas port in the Persian Gulf and then on to Nhava Shava port on India’s western coast.

Kazakhstan, a crucial node in China–Europe connectivity via Russia, is seeking to protect its transit role by diversifying transport routes via Iran. The EU–China trade through the Northern Corridor (China–Kazakhstan–Russia–Belarus–Poland–Germany) has been impacted since the beginning of the year as a result of the tensions on Poland–Belarus border and diplomatic squabble between Lithuania and China over Taiwan. But the EU sanctions on Russia and European countries’ closing of their borders with Russia and Belarus have made alternative routes a necessity.13

In March, there was a flurry of high-level visits from Kazakhstan to Brussels. Apart from garnering EU support for the reforms announced by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, other important items on Kazakhstan–EU agenda included connectivity and securing unhindered trade and logistics routes and mitigation measures for the possible negative impact of the EU’s Russia sanctions on the Kazakh economy.14 Subsequently, Kazakhstan and the EU have sought to increase the capacity of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), called the Middle Corridor because it charts a middle passage by bypassing Russia in the north and Iran in the south.

The Middle Corridor is a multilateral institutional development linking China’s rail freight transport networks and the EU through Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea ports of Aktau and Kuryk to Baku port in Azerbaijan and then via Baku–Tbilisi–Kars Railway. However, analysts have pointed out its ineffectiveness for EU–China trade.15 As a sea-rail corridor passing through five borders between China and Europe, it remains primarily a regional initiative connecting Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Europe evidenced by the fact that the development of infrastructure along this corridor has not seen much involvement of Chinese finance or logistics companies.16

Kazakhstan, therefore, in its bid to become a ‘competitive transit hub’ between China and Europe, is seeking to diversify by creating competitive overland routes via Turkmenistan and Iran. In May 2022, during Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Integration Bakhyt Sultanov’s visit to Iran, the two countries signed a MoU to increase transportation cooperation and to set preferential tariffs between the two countries.17 Based on this MoU, part of the cargo passing through the northern corridor will be transported through Iran via the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey railway corridor.

The integration of regional corridors such as Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway corridor with International Transport Corridors is crucial for increasing cargo traffic necessary for the stability of the corridor. Further, the benefits obtainable to the economies of transit countries depend on the extent of integration between international transport corridors with regional and national logistics infrastructure.18 Iran has been keen to foster complementarity between the INSTC and other East–West latitudinal corridors, especially Central Asia–West Asia Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At the SCO summit in September 2021, Raisi had argued that key infrastructure projects of the “One Belt-One Road Initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union and the North-South Corridor are not competitors, but complement each other. Iran is the link between the above three infrastructure projects”.19

Iran’s Drive for Regional Security Cooperation

In the wake of the Russia–Ukraine War, Iran blamed NATO’s eastward expansion for creating tensions, while calling for dialogue and diplomacy to resolve the crisis. In a telephonic conversation with President Putin soon after the beginning of Russian operation in Ukraine, Raisi noted that “the expansion of NATO is a serious threat to the stability and security of independent countries in different regions”, underscoring Iran and Russia’s shared security objectives in limiting the Western influence in the region. Both Iran and Russia have supported dialogue and cooperation among regional countries on issues ranging from the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan and terrorism, and share membership in a number of multilateral regional groupings.20 Their geo-economic and geopolitical conception of Eurasia is based on advancing connectivity and security cooperation among regional states and exclusion of extra-regional players.

At the sixth summit of the Caspian Sea Littoral States in Ashgabat in June, Raisi described Caspian Sea as a “sea of peace and friendship” between neighbouring countries. Raisi further argued that the

cooperation among littoral countries, especially due to international developments, has become increasingly important and this interaction not only will lead to an economic boom and increased prosperity for our nations but also strengthens regional peace and stability and solves the issues of the Caspian Sea region through reliance on the littoral countries' capabilities [with no foreign powers’ presence].21

While meeting President Putin on the side-lines of the Caspian summit, Raisi reiterated that Iran pursues “strategic relations” with Russia, and called for strengthening of the North–South corridor, establishing banking and monetary relations independent of the Western financial system and cooperation in the field of energy.22

Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August, 2021, Tehran has pursued a pragmatic policy of engaging the Taliban on issues of refugee influx into Iran, terrorism, border security, water-sharing, etc., while making formal recognition of Taliban government conditional to its power sharing with ethnic and religious minorities. Iran has been keen to avoid conflict with Taliban. For instance, it sought quick de-escalation during border clashes in December 2021 and has blamed recent fighting between local Hazara leader and Taliban in Balkhab district in Sar-e-pol province in northern Afghanistan on the US intelligence trying to create “ethnic and religious warfare to victimize the Hazaras and Tajiks”.23

As it has been inking MoUs for broadening transport and transit ties with its Central Asian neighbours, it has reached out to Taliban to commission the 225 km railway line connecting Khaf in eastern Iran with Herat. The railway was inaugurated in December 2020, but some parts need reconstruction after suffering damage during the fighting that led to the Taliban control of the country. Nevertheless, shared concerns about spillover of instability and terrorism from Afghanistan have led Iran to maintain close dialogue and cooperation with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan—three Central Asian states that share long, porous borders with Afghanistan. Both Russia and Tehran are aware that the US can take advantage of Afghanistan’s neighbours’ security concerns to strengthen security partnership with these countries at their expense.

In a major turnaround of bilateral relations, Iran and Tajikistan established a Joint Military and Defence Committee in April 2021. The committee was tasked with charting the future of military and defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation reached a new milestone as Tehran opened an Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) manufacturing plant in Tajikistan to manufacture Iran-made Ababil 2 drones in May 2022. Analysts have pointed out that the inauguration of the Iranian drone manufacturing facility in Tajikistan marks “the first serious step toward realising an official defense products export capacity” since the expiry of the UN-imposed conventional arms embargo on Iran in October 2020. Just days before Iran opened its drone plant, the US ambassador in Dushanbe announced that US will supply reconnaissance drone ‘Puma’ to Tajik border troops, in addition to financing for construction of a border post and border detachment along the Tajik–Afghan border.24

With Russia’s war in Ukraine and its support for rebel republics of Donetsk and Luhansk causing nervousness among Central Asian states about Russia’s revanchist tendencies and the negative fallout of the war on their economy, Washington sees an opening to ‘counterbalance’ Russia’s influence in Central Asia.25 A month later, General Michael Erik Kurilla, the head of the US Central Command, embarked on a 10-day tour of Central Asian states. US concerns about terrorism threat from Afghanistan, which is facing a dire humanitarian crisis, have led it to pursue counter-terrorism cooperation, especially intelligence sharing. It is also seeking to augment its ‘over the horizon’ ability from its military bases in the Gulf by seeking some basing arrangements in Central Asia to launch drones and other surveillance flights.26

As Kurilla wrapped up his tour, Special Representative of the President of Iran for Afghanistan Hassan Kazemi Qomi visited Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to emphasise the importance of regional process in dealing with post-conflict developments in Afghanistan.27  In Tashkent, Kazemi Qomi confirmed Iran’s participation in the International Conference on Afghanistan that Tashkent is hosting in July and stressed the need for Iran and Uzbekistan to carry out the infrastructure, transport and energy projects in Afghanistan.28 Earlier in March, Iran and Uzbekistan agreed to establish a Joint Security Commission for facilitating security and intelligence cooperation between the two countries.29

Conclusion

The Raisi administration, which has delinked Iran’s economic policy to the revival of JCPOA, has focussed on economic diplomacy with ‘Eastern’ powers of Russia and China and has taken measures to improve infrastructure connectivity with Central Asian neighbours. The disruption in international transportation routes caused by neighbouring European countries closing their borders with Russia and Belarus has led Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to prioritise transport and transit cooperation with Iran, giving a fillip to Iran’s geo-economic status in Eurasia. In geopolitical terms, instead of making a departure from its traditional Russia-centric Central Asia policy, where Tehran acknowledged Russian leadership as ‘a counter-hegemonic power or a Eurasian balancer’, Iran’s growing geo-economic and security role in Central Asia appears to be proceeding within the parameters of their convergent vision of Eurasia.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Transit through 'Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey' Corridor Launched”, Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 June 2022.
• 2. “Iran, Kazakhstan Launch Major Rail Transit Link”, Pars Today, 20 June 2022.
• 3. Edmund Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia”, International Affairs, 2004, Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 503–17.
• 4. Ibid.
• 5. Alexander Karavayev and Mandana Tishehyar, “International North–South Transport Corridor and Transregional Integration Scenarios”, Valdai Club, 26 June 2019.
• 6. “Iran Ramps Up Neighborhood Diplomacy”, Tehran Times, 1 July 2022.
• 7. “1st Kazakhstan-Turkey Transit Train Arrives in Iran”, Tehran Times, 19 June 2022.
• 8. Keith Barrow, “Iran – Turkmenistan – Kazakhstan Rail Link Completed”, International Railway Journal, 3 December 2014.
• 9. Anwesha Majumdar, “Russian Transport Min Asserts Western Embargoes ‘Practically Broken’ Logistics in Russia”, Republic World, 22 May 2022.
• 10. “RAI in talks with Russia to Supply Locomotives for Railway Fleet”, Tehran Times, 11 May 2022.
• 11. “Iran to Launch 6 Shipping Lines in Caspian Sea to Russia, Kazakhstan”, Port News, 15 October 2021.
• 12. Dilasha Seth, “Russian Food Retailer X5 Seeks Suppliers in India”, Mint, 22 April 2022.
• 13. Yunis Sharifli, “Crises and Consequences Along the BRI’s Northern Corridor”, China Observers, 24 January 2022; “Senior U.S. Official to Visit Lithuania in show of Support over Chinese 'Coercion'”, Reuters, 29 January 2022.
• 14. Alberto Turkstra, “Kazakhstan – EU Relations in the Spotlight in Brussels”, The Astana Times, 1 April 2022.
• 15. Saibal Dasgupta, “War in Ukraine Challenging China's Train Routes to Europe”, Voice of America, 15 April 2022.
• 16. Jacob Mardell, “On the ‘Middle Corridor’, China is Largely Absent”, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 25 October 2019.
• 17. “Iran, Kazakhstan Railway Heads Sign Contract for Cooperation”, Mehr News Agency, 23 May 2022.
• 18. “International Transport Corridors in Eurasian Space: Development of Latitudinal Routes”, Eurasian Rail Alliance Index, October 2020.
• 19. “Iran's Raisi Urges Closer Ties to Boost SCO Role in Global Economy”, Tasnim News Agency¸17 September 2021.
• 20. Nicole Grajweski, “Russia and Iran in Central Asia”, Middle East Insights, 14 July 2020.
• 21. “Raeisi Urges for More Coop. among Caspian Sea Littoral States”, Mehr News Agency, 29 June 2022.
• 22. “Raeisi, Putin Agree to Increase Coop. in Energy Field”, Mehr News Agency, 30 June 2022.
• 23. “Creating Ethnic, Religious War in Afghanistan US Priority”, Mehr News Agency, 26 June 2022.
• 24. “The United States and Russia to Finance Construction of Frontier Posts along Tajik-Afghan Border”, ASIA-Plus, 12 May 2022.
• 25. Gordon Lubold, “U.S. Courts Central Asian Nations to Combat Potential Terrorism from Afghanistan”, The Wall Street Journal, 23 June 2022;Karoun Demirjian, “US Works to Scale Up Intelligence Networks in Central Asia”, The Washington Post, 21 June 2022.
• 26. Karoun Demirjian, “US Works to Scale Up Intelligence Networks in Central Asia”, The Washington Post, 21 June 2022.
• 27. “Regional Problems, Crises Resolvable without US Presence”, Mehr News Agency, 25 June 2022.
• 28. “Iran, Uzbekistan Discuss Afghan Developments”, Tasnim News Agency, 25 June 2022.
• 29. “Iran, Uzbekistan Sign Deal on Joint Security Cooperation”, Iran International, 12 March 2022.