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  • Title Date Date Unique Author Body Research Area Topics Thumb
    Role of Women in Terrorism in Africa July 15, 2022 Saman Ayesha Kidwai, Sindhu Dinesh

    Africa has been an epicentre of violent extremist activities, for the past few decades. As per the Global Terrorism Index 2022, 48 per cent of the global terrorism deaths took place in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel region is ‘home to the world’s fastest growing and most-deadly terrorist groups’.1 The poor socio-economic conditions, ideological trends, and weak governance have been causes for terrorist outfits laying inroads into African countries. Studies indicate that women play active roles in sustaining and facilitating extremist activities on the continent.2 There has also been an increase in the cases of women being arrested in terror-related incidents.3

    Women vis-à-vis Terrorism in Africa

    Women play multiple active and passive roles in carrying out terrorist activities. They are strategic as well as tactical actors for a terrorist organisation. Each parental organisation, such as the ISIS, their affiliates, or independent terrorist organisations, have relied on women to varying capacities to attain their goals. Women have assumed the roles of propagandists, recruiters, and participated in combat operations. ISIS, in Kano, Nigeria, has created all-women morality police units, Hisbah, to ensure other women toe the line on issues like dress codes, among others.4
    While groups like the Al-Qaeda have restricted women to their societal roles of a wife and a mother, within the African context, groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia have exploited the society’s regressive understanding of women to their advantage. Women have been actively used to recruit, gather intelligence, disseminate propaganda, and shame other men into joining the jihadist cause. They have also raised funds and smuggled goods across checkpoints, evading security checks.5
    The absence of adequate women’s participation in the police forces has also played into the terrorists’ hands as they are well aware that male officers, due to gender and cultural sensitivities, will refrain from indulging in security checks on women. By February 2022, only 1,400 women had been recruited into the Somali Police Force, for instance, out of the total 14,000 individuals serving as police officers.6 Furthermore, out of 300 members in Darwish, a special unit of the police force, only 30 women have been recruited into the ranks.7
    The factors that propel women’s involvement in organisations like the Al-Shabaab stem from avenging the death of their kins on account of state-sponsored violence or due to ideological commitment. Recruiters exploit the fact that everyone in Al-Shabaab-controlled territories are mandated to receive religious education.8 Women have also married into the group for financial and physical security as the Somali state can provide neither.
    Groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria have used coercion to recruit young women into their ranks as suicide bombers. Using a similar strategy as Al-Shabaab’s, they exploit the regressive gender narrative and rely on primarily dispensable foot soldiers, i.e., women and teenage girls, to cause instability and chaos. During the period 2011–17, Al-Shabaab had used 244 women as suicide bombers.9
    A predominant factor for women to be involved in violent extremism is economic grievance and poverty. Many women who have joined Al-Shabaab are primarily from poor areas such as Majengo, Garissa and Kwale in Kenya. These women are coerced into joining extremist organisations as fighters or informants, on the pretext of securing job opportunity.10 The terrorist outfits purposefully create a situation where access to resources is denied, rendering the people with no choice but to join the outfit as a means to provide for livelihood.11 Besides, the involvement of their family members and friends in such groups also adds to the pressure. Corruption and lack of political capacities to provide for the people frustrates the local population to join terrorist groups to punish the government and state forces.
    Of the several case studies in Africa to understand the role of women in terrorism, security trends in Western Africa and the Sahel provide compelling insights. The region surrounding northern Mali and bordering Niger and Burkina Faso is plagued with multiple violent extremist outfits, including Islamic State affiliate–Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), AQIM, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and others.12
    The Islamic State has been openly receptive to including women into the rungs of its organisation and it even has a separate female brigade, ‘Al Khansaa Brigade’.13 The JNIM, while publicly denying the use of women as suicide bombers, does include them as informants and for other domestic support.14 The AQIM, on the other hand, has indulged in the practice of ‘jihadi brides’ and encouraged its members to marry the locals to gain local support.
    One of the reasons which add to the complexity of the security situation in Mali is the nexus and linkages between local insurgent rebels and external organised terrorist outfits. One dimension of this linkage is that jihadist leaders marry women of the local communities, thus securing a sense of safety, support and belongingness to the people. A classic example is the case of AQIM leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who married four women from Tuareg and Arab Berabiche communities to ‘expand his network of influence’.15

    Mitigation and DDR Measures

    The foremost step in addressing this pressing issue is the imperative of government authorities and regional organisations acknowledging this phenomenon. Unfortunately, governments are often guilty of dealing with the threat of violent extremism as ‘mambo yavijana’ (Kiswahili term denoting ‘issues of male youth’), a phrase generally used for describing violent extremism. As a result, governments overlook the fact that women are visibly important actors in the domain of violent extremism. Therefore, there is a need for gender-sensitivisation of counter-terrorism activities.
    The success of states’ mitigation strategies is contingent on developing and maintaining cohesive and efficient institutional structures which provide swift justice, holistic development, and security, across fault lines. However, this requires a long-term commitment to rebuilding the state capacities by domestic and regional actors—aided by external support, not interference.
    The short-term adhesive that should be applied includes gender sensitising ongoing rehabilitation programmes and demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) measures. This is necessary to aid women who have left behind a life of terror voluntarily or due to the death of their husbands and to help them re-assimilate with the mainstream society that would be wary of accepting them. They need additional support in dealing with the mental anguish of surviving abuse, lack of adequate access to issues relating to women’s health, or finding employment to sustain their families.
    Without adequate support, such women could suffer in detention camps or go back to violent activities. This will legitimise the propaganda of terrorist groups about the states’ indifference towards ordinary citizens while elites exploit primary resources, as in Syria’s Al-Hol Camp.16 The absence of security measures and deplorable conditions make the detainees susceptible to recidivism or indoctrination by recruiters who have maintained a visible presence. In addition, the terrorists can use such issues to convince the camp residents that they would fare better living under ISIS’ rule rather than under Kurdish control. The prospects of repatriation to their home countries where they would face persecution or be stripped from their families is another big concern.
    The role of regional organisations is also equally important. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) held an event on 19 May 2021, along the margins of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, titled ‘Addressing Gender in Preventing Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Africa: Integrating Women’s Diverse Roles and Voices’.17 UNODC’s regional partners in Africa, like the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, African Union’s (AU) Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism and other organisations, participated in the discussions. It was emphasised that there needs to be a greater understanding on the roles women play in order to develop tailored strategies against violent extremism. The need for building institutional and community resilience, empowerment of women, increase in participation and representation of women in counter-terrorism and criminal justice agencies, among others, was stressed.
    As part of fulfilling Aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063, the Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the AU could take steps to recognise the role of women in terrorism.18 With this as a launch pad, additional DDR measures could be taken. AU could empower governments with guidelines to implement the same. Any counter-terrorism measures that do not consider the subtle yet critical roles women play in extremist outfits would be ineffective.

    Conclusion

    The involvement of women in terrorist activities in Africa is nuanced, multi-layered, and dynamic. Women have advertently or inadvertently proliferated into terrorist outfits and have played supporting and enabling roles in these organisations. Violent extremist groups like the AQIM, JNIM, and others deal with the involvement of women differently. While some encourage and actively enable their role, others publicly denounce women’s inclusion even while relying on them. Furthermore, while some organisations only include women for tactical roles like cooks, recruiters, others have them for strategic roles like suicide bombers and informants.
    It is imperative for affected states to engage in capacity-building through a bottom-up approach, taking on board local religious and community representatives. The AU should play an essential role in recognising the role of women in terrorism and tackling the threat the phenomenon poses. Successful state and civil society initiatives against terrorism are also hinged on measures to ensure their ideological defeat. This is because, even if violent extremist actors are eliminated or their organisations are disbanded, their ideological influence continues to foment fear and instability.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

    Africa, Terrorism, Somalia, Boko Haram, Nigeria, Islamic State (IS) system/files/thumb_image/2015/boko-haram-t_0.jpg
    US Tech Sanctions on China July 13, 2022 Halima Z. Ansari

    Summary: China’s technology sector has faced challenges due to sanctions imposed by the United States. The acceleration of tech sanctions by the US, on account of the role these companies are playing in aiding Chinese governmental repressive activities in places like Xinjiang, coincides with the rise of China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) enterprise under the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese tech companies, on their part, are making efforts to ensure self-sufficiency in the manufacturing and production of crucial technologies, supported by government policies focused on the science and technology sector.

    Overview

    In the last five years, China’s technology sector has faced challenges due to sanctions imposed by the United States.1 Reports in May 2022 noted that the Biden Administration was contemplating placing Hikvision, a Chinese security equipment maker, on the US’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.2 Hikvision has been previously blacklisted by the White House in 2021 due to apprehensions about the use of the company’s security equipment in Xinjiang, contributing to human rights abuses on Uyghurs. The company’s relationship with Beijing and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have also raised concerns.

    The acceleration in tech sanctions by the US coincides with the rise of China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) enterprise under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Public–Private partnership in critical information infrastructure is a characteristic feature of the DSR. Hikvision, like many private Chinese companies, has collaborated with Beijing on several of DSR’s undertakings, particularly in Africa. Sanctions by the US, thus, impact these BRI projects.

    US Sanctions on Huawei and Hikvision

    The Digital Silk Road has shifted the world’s attention from BRI’s hard infrastructure projects to its softer information and technology-related projects. After Donald Trump took office, several policy measures were taken targeting Chinese science and technology policies. These include the National Defence Authorization Act 2019, Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 2020, and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act 2020, which have imposed sanctions on China-based entities.

    In May 2019, Huawei, the Chinese tech company, was subjected to some of the biggest sanctions in the tech industry. The company was added to the Commerce Department’s Entity List, leading to stricter export controls.3 Shortly after, it was unable to do business with any organisation that was based in the US. Previously, in August 2018, Australia had also banned Huawei from supplying equipment for its 5G mobile network, citing security concerns.4 By 2020, Huawei was unable to work with companies such as Google and Intel. Since Huawei smartphones could no longer support Google-owned applications, it suffered huge losses in its sales outside China.

    The Biden administration has not departed from Trump-era sanctions. In May 2022, reports of US plans to put Hikvision on its SDN List, in adherence to the Global Magnitsky Act 2016 5 , emerged.6 The SDN list usually contains entities such as terrorists or narcotics traffickers and very few firms of Hikvision’s scale find a mention in the list. SDN is one of the highest degrees of sanctions imposed by the US—the assets of any entity on the list are blocked, and US persons are prohibited from dealing with them.

    Hikvision has been subjected to sanctions by the US in previous years as well. In June 2021, Biden signed an executive order to prohibit US investments in Chinese surveillance technology companies that “facilitate serious human rights abuses” or “undermine the security or democratic values of the United States”, adding 59 entities to its new Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List which included Hikvision.7 Hikvision was prohibited from importing US-origin goods without a license or selling products to US federal agencies.

    While Huawei’s violation of US sanctions against Iran was cited as the immediate cause behind its sanctioning, along with concerns related to cybersecurity, Hikvision’s relationship with the PLA and the alleged supply of its products to camps in Xinjiang was listed as the primary cause behind the current sanctions.

    A self-described leader in AIoT (Artificial Intelligence of Things), Hikvision manufactures and sells fingerprint terminals, face recognition terminals, video intercoms, thermal cameras, checkpoint radars, surveillance cameras, among other equipment. Although Hikvision has released several ‘white papers’ on cybersecurity and its commitment to the GDPR compliance 8 , Washington’s apprehensions about the company have not been quelled.9





    Source: U.S Department of The Treasury 10

    Hikvision in its response to the SDN placement has stated that “any such sanction should be based on credible evidence and due process”.11

    The Digital Silk Road

    To understand the relationship between US sanctions and China’s DSR, it is important to survey the role private Chinese companies have played in the establishment of the latter. Companies like Huawei, Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, Hikvision and ZTE, amongst others, are the main drivers of the DSR.12 During the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019, a separate forum was dedicated to the DSR, where close to 15 companies signed new projects with various governments.13

    Huawei, for example, has played a significant role in setting technology standards for 5G in many BRI countries. It has signed deals with several African and Latin American countries for projects related to 5G, smart city, and fibre-optic cables under the umbrella of the DSR. Heads of State of Sierra Leone and Uruguay have also visited Huawei headquarters in China. In 2019, Sierra Leone signed a US$ 30 million loan agreement with the Export-Import Bank of China to finance Huawei’s construction of the second phase of its national fibre-optic project.14 In the same year, Huawei also signed an agreement with Kenya for a US$ 173 million smart city project in Konza Technopolis.15 A MoU with Uruguay was signed for the development of 5G network, ICT training and industrial digitisation.16

    Like Huawei, Hikvision is also integrated with several DSR projects, although many of the details of these projects have not been released publicly. Hikvision has an important project in Zimbabwe, in close collaboration with CloudWalk Technology, an AI company that makes facial recognition software.17 ChinAfrica reports that Hikvision is also working on Zimbabwe’s pilot smart city project in Mutare.18 Together, Hikvision and another Chinese company, Dahua, also supply nearly 40 per cent of the world’s surveillance cameras.

    US Concerns

    Rising competition in the international tech market, and Chinese influence on technology standardisations and cyberspace norms have been some of the primary concerns of Washington. BRI’s Digital Silk Road, not only facilitates export of Chinese technology to previously untapped markets, but also gives an opportunity to private Chinese firms to expand extensively. This enables Beijing to inflate its influence on the international tech sector, which has been dominated by the West since its inception. Companies like Huawei, Hikvision and ZTE have already taken major business away from Western companies like IBM and Cisco.

    These and other concerns were voiced at a US House of Representatives meeting on ‘China’s Digital Authoritarianism’ in 2019.  It was highlighted that an increase in Chinese tech exports was bound to give developing and underdeveloped countries ‘the technological tools they need to emulate Beijing’s model of social and political control’.19

    Several policy documents from the White House detail the dangers of exporting a ‘Chinese model of surveillance state’ onto the rest of the world. The addition of smart city projects, like the ones undertaken by Hikvision, has garnered attention from policy-makers in the US. Smart Cities are municipalities that use information and communication technologies (ICTs) to automate their operations. About 114 smart city contracts involving Chinese vendors have been signed outside China since 2009.20

    Implications for Chinese Tech Companies

    US sanctions on Chinese companies has resulted in complications in two main areas—market access and production. Exclusion from US technology will lead to issues in production. A prime example of this is Huawei, which struggled to create its Kirin chipset, produced by TSMC, which uses American technology, after the 2019 blacklisting. Huawei reported having suffered US$ 30 billion in annual losses following the sanction. Huawei’s revenues fell 29.4 per cent in the first half of 2021, from the previous year.

    Although Huawei has a monopoly on 5G technology, rotating Chairman Eric Xu Zhijun, in a press briefing in 2021, stated that it would take Huawei many years before its 5G monopoly could compensate for these losses.21 Since Huawei could not support Google-owned apps, its international smartphone market declined drastically. Exports fell and smartphone sales nearly halved to 134.7 billion yuan in 2020 from 255.8 billion yuan in 2019.

    Hikvision, like Huawei, has a strong foothold in international markets and exports its products to 180 countries. Financial Times reports that the US administration has already started briefing Washington’s allies on the upcoming SDN sanction.22 This means that governments that continue to deal with Hikvision would risk violating US sanctions, which may lead to Hikvision losing many of its international markets.

    These implications may also lead to complexities in the DSR undertakings dependent on companies like Hikvision, especially in African and Latin American nations. As seen in the case of Huawei, any obstacle in logistics, supply chains, production or exports will have ramifications for the company’s operations. Since Hikvision’s sanctions measures will be on a much bigger scale than that targeted Huawei, these ramifications may multiply. Experts have opined that an SDN sanction on Hikvision might even lead to the demise of the company.23 In that event, Hikvision’s DSR project in places like Zimbabwe might come to a standstill until alternative vendors are procured.

    In addition, the sanctions on Hikvision risk creating a dangerous precedent for other Chinese tech actors integrated with the DSR, and which work on a global scale. US sanctions on Chinese companies, thus, have kept expansion of China’s influence in the tech sector in check, and have created hurdles for BRI’s DSR.   

    China’s Shift to Technological Independence

    When Huawei was initially added to the Entity List, the company responded by filing a lawsuit against the US Department of Commerce. However, little came of the legal battle that followed. Huawei soon shifted its focus and resources to navigating its operations around the ban and is now trying to function completely independent of all US-sourced technology, including Google. Its Harmony OS has been a quick replacement for Android and it is currently trying to attract developers to add their apps to its own version of an app store—the App Gallery.

    Huawei’s efforts do indicate that sanctions by Washington are pushing Chinese companies to make efforts to ensure self-sufficiency in manufacturing and production of technologies. The Chinese economy, in previous decades, has been reliant on technological support from industrially developed nations. It was quickly realised by Beijing that this disables China from exiting the West’s monopoly over critical technologies.

    US sanctions pressure is also in the context of China pursuing policies like Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025), which emphasises technological independence and self-reliance. Instituted in 2015, MIC 2025 aims to help China skip the middle-income trap by installing technology-powered production as opposed to labour-intensive production and ultimately aid in the development of an “Internet Superpower”. The 14th Five Year Plan, covering the years 2021 to 2025, also strongly emphasises the strategic importance of the development of science and technology and is further complemented by policies such as the Internet+ and the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.24

    In a direct response to Washington’s 2019 Entity List, China’s Ministry of Commerce, in the same year, also announced an ‘Unreliable Entity List’ regime, under which ‘punitive measures may be imposed on foreign entities for conduct that is contrary to China’s national interest or discriminatory against a Chinese enterprise’.25 Although there were reports of companies like Apple and Cisco becoming the primary targets for the list, no updates have been disclosed since its release.26 Beijing may respond with similar or more severe measures to Hikvision’s sanction.

    Conclusion

    Sanctions on a billion-dollar Chinese company like Hikvision will exacerbate the geopolitical rift between the US and China. This comes at a time when developments like the Russia–Ukraine crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic have added new and delicate complexities to US–China geo-strategic competition. It is, thus, not surprising to note that China’s booming S&T sector is increasingly moving towards self-reliance and self-sufficiency in an attempt to curb future disruption that can be caused by US sanctions, especially on its DSR endeavours. 

    Tech Sanctions China, US-China Relations, US Sanctions, United States of America (USA), Technology system/files/thumb_image/2015/US-china-flags-t.jpg
    China and the Pacific Islands: A New Theatre of Great Power Competition July 11, 2022 Esha Banerji

    Summary: The Pacific Island Countries have increasingly become a key area of great power competition between China and the US. China has significantly enhanced its ties with these countries, with 10 out of 14 PICs recognising the ‘One China Policy’. Wang Yi’s visit highlights Beijing’s efforts to further consolidate ties with the region, as it seeks to pursue its ambitious geopolitical agenda. China, though, still has a long way to go before it can effectively counter the influence of traditional powers like the US and Australia.  

    Introduction

    China's Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi visited eight South Pacific countries—the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea, from 26 May to 4 June 2022. Beijing aims to deepen its comprehensive strategic partnership with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) through mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields.1 China affirms that, in doing so, it gives special emphasis to the promotion of regional peace and security. However, there are concerns that China may seek to enforce non-transparent agreements with Pacific island nations, which could be detrimental to their interest in the long-term.2 This Issue Brief examines growing Chinese influence in the Pacific Islands, the importance of the region for Beijing and the challenges it faces in achieving its geopolitical objectives.

    China’s Inroads into the Pacific

    In the past few decades, China has steadily expanded its diplomatic, trade and aid activities in the Pacific Islands. Wen Jiabao became the first Chinese Premier to visit Fiji in April 2006. He inaugurated the China–Pacific Economic Development and Cooperation Forum. In November 2014, President Xi Jinping visited Fiji, when the relationship with the PIC was elevated from friendly and cooperative relationship to that of a strategic partnership.3

    At international forums such as the United Nations, each Pacific state has a vote. China, therefore, seeks their support on issues such as Hong Kong, the South and East China Seas, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and human rights. During Wang Yi's visit, many Pacific leaders vowed to stick to the ‘One China’ policy.4

    Kiribati switched its allegiance to China in 2019. A year later, China became one of the only four countries to open an embassy in Kiribati, alongside Australia, New Zealand and Cuba. China was also successful in gaining diplomatic recognition from Solomon Islands, one of Taiwan's closest allies, in 2019.  However, the diplomatic conflict between Taiwan and China is not over yet. In the Pacific, Palau, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru still recognise Taiwan. In March 2022, these four countries reaffirmed diplomatic relations with Taipei.5

    During 1992–2021, total trade volume that China had with the PICs having diplomatic relations with it registered an average annual increase of 13 per cent and expanded by over 30 times.6 China is the largest trading partner of Pacific Island Forum (PIF) countries (excluding Australia and New Zealand). In 2017, China's goods trade with these countries reached US$ 8.2 billion, surpassing Australia's US$ 5 billion and the United States' US$1.6 billion. China is also the top trading partner of the Solomon Islands. Since President Xi's 2014 visit to the region, China has increased its cumulative foreign direct investment in Pacific Island countries by 173 per cent, amounting to US$ 2.8 billion in 2016. While Beijing’s FDI has surpassed US FDI of US$ 2.4 billion, it is still far behind Australia’s FDI in Pacific Island countries, which stood at US$ 12.7 billion in 2016.7

    China has also dramatically scaled up its aid efforts. A Lowy Institute study shows that between 2006 and 2017, China provided approximately US$ 1.5 billion in aid to the Pacific Islands region through grants and loans.8 During 2011–17, China contributed 8 per cent of the total foreign aid, making it the third-largest donor in the region, after Australia (45 per cent) and New Zealand 9 (per cent). By increasing its diplomatic and economic profile in the South Pacific, analysts note that China is exercising ‘soft balancing’ behaviour against established powers in the region rather than engaging in ‘hard’ or military competition with them.9

    China has signed Belt and Road Cooperation MoUs with 10 PICs—Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. Chinese businesses have undertaken projects worth over US$ 20 billion. China has provided technical assistance, and concessional loan projects, for building critical infrastructure like roads, bridges, wharfs, hospitals, schools and stadiums.

    During his recent visit, Wang Yi stated that his purpose was to consolidate friendship and ‘build platforms of cooperation’.10 Both sides announced the establishment of the China–Pacific Island Countries Demonstration Center for Agricultural Cooperation, Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Cooperation Center, and the Juncao Technology Demonstration Center, among other initiatives.

    The strengthening of Beijing's relations with PICs gives it access to the Pacific region that have a wealth of natural resources and are strategically significant. During World War II, for instance, the South Pacific islands provided vital basing and anchorage for Japanese air and naval forces. China aims to position itself as a responsible strategic partner, at the forefront of ‘South–South cooperation’. Beijing aims to create a China-led regional security architecture, and contends that the US is not an Asian power.11

    Military officers from PICs are trained by the PLA.12 In 2016, Papua New Guinea opened its defense attaché office in Beijing to coordinate military activities between the two countries.13 Fiji had opened its defense attaché office in Beijing in 2007. Officers from the four PICs with militaries—Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Vanuatu—have bilateral meetings with their PLA counterparts. Furthermore, the PLA hosts a biannual forum for defence officials from the Caribbean and Pacific Islands.14

    Military assistance from Beijing has increased in the Pacific Islands region. Papua New Guinea's Defense Force received 62 military vehicles worth US$ 5.5 million from China in November 2017.15 The vehicles included 44 troop carriers, 10 armoured vehicles, four buses, four mobile kitchen vans and spare parts. The PLAN Peace Ark hospital ship visited Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu in 2014, and provided free medical care to its citizens. The ship visited the region again in 2018.16 Chinese naval ships have made two port calls since 2014, one in Fiji in December 2016 and another in Vanuatu in June 2017.17

    Challenges for China’s Pacific Policy

    Resistance from the PICs

    While Wang Yi was successful in inking multiple ‘win-win’ cooperation pacts in wide-ranging fields, he failed to gain consensus on sensitive areas such as policing, cybersecurity and maritime surveillance. The Chinese Embassy in Fiji attempted to brush off the issue by tweeting that "not every China-Pacific Islands ministerial meeting will necessarily produce outcome documents".18 However, this does demonstrate China's inability to influence the region and fully achieve its geopolitical goals.

    Countries like Samoa, for instance, turned down the proposed China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision Agreement, with Samoan Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mata'afa stating that an agreement cannot be signed without discussing it first among the regional countries.19 Fiji's Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama noted that protection from non-traditional security threats like climate change, Covid-19, unemployment and inflation mattered more to the nation than the ones proposed by Beijing.20 Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) strongly opposed the Common Development Vision agreement, with President David Panuelo calling it "disingenuous".21 FSM fears that the agreement would allow Chinese influence in government and promote control of key industries.

    The PICs fear that the proposed Agreement would increase the chances of great power competition and possible conflict between China and Australia, Japan, the US and New Zealand.22 These nations have deferred their decision on the issue till the next Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) meeting, scheduled from 11 to 14 July 2022. A major challenge for China is that the forum includes nations like Australia, New Zealand, Palau, Tuvalu and Nauru, all of which are formal diplomatic allies of Taiwan and not China. There is a possibility that consensus on the agreement may not be reached.

    The Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the FSM, further share a unique bilateral relationship with Washington. Each nation has special agreements called ‘Compacts of Free Association’ that offer the US military exclusive access to the land, sea and air routes of this region.23 In exchange, the US provides financial assistance and other essential services to these countries. Getting these countries out of Washington’s sphere of influence will be an enormous challenge for Beijing. China also encountered other roadblocks along the way. Prior to Wang Yi's arrival in Fiji, Fijian President Bainimarama announced that his country would join the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)24 , which China opposes.

    Following reports that China planned to upgrade a World War II airstrip in Kiribati, which would harm the already stressed fish stock in the country, local public opinion became wary of closer ties with Beijing. The opposition leader warned that not only the country’s democratic system but also its sovereignty was under attack due to the incumbent government’s closer ties with China and highlighted the need for international support to ensure their survival as a democracy.25

    Restrictions and prohibitions on the number of foreign journalists and type of questions allowed at the press conferences during Wang Yi’s visit have also raised suspicions amongst the local population at lack of transparency.26 The Media Association of the Solomon Islands asked its members to boycott the press conference to protest Beijing's restrictions on local journalists.27

    Other Major Powers in the Region

    A report by the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission in June 2018 stated that a Chinese military base or facility in the South Pacific could ‘have implications for U.S. military presence and training in the Indo-Pacific and could pose obstacles to U.S. strategic access in the Pacific Islands’.28 It added that such a facility would also affect Australia, New Zealand, and other key US partners in the Pacific Island region.

    The US launched the Indo-Pacific Strategy in February 2022, which outlined Washington’s strategy in the region.29 The strategy highlights US determination to strengthen its long- term position in the region and reaffirms its commitment to the Indo-Pacific. President Donald Trump hosted leaders of three Pacific Island Countries in May 2019—the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. The same year, Mike Pompeo became the first US Secretary of State to visit FSM.

    China has a long way to go before it can counter the influence of such traditional players in the region. In the Pacific, Australia, South Korea, Japan and the US have boosted their naval might. Australia provides the most substantial aid to the region. Penny Wong, Australia's Foreign Minister, visited Fiji, Samoa and Tonga in conjunction with Wang Yi's visit. Canberra reaffirmed its commitment to its Pacific Island neighbours.30 In Fiji, Wong reiterated that Australia will remain a critical development partner, especially in dealing with the triple challenge of climate change, Covid-19 and strategic contestations.31 She announced an eight-year partnership with Samoa to help address human development in the Pacific island nation. Additionally, Australia agreed to donate a new patrol boat to Samoa, after the one it donated two years ago ran aground on a reef in August 2021.32

    Australia and New Zealand have shown a determination in the recent past to step up their engagement in the neighbourhood out of concern at China’s rising influence. A notable example is Australia’s Pacific Step-up Policy, first announced at the Pacific Island Forum Leaders' Meeting in September 2016. Under this initiative, Australia committed US$ 1.44 billion in development assistance to the Pacific in 2020–21.33 It has undertaken projects such as the Coral Sea Cable system—which provides telecommunications infrastructure to Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, and the Pacific Labour Mobility Scheme—to provide jobs for Pacific and Timor-Leste workers, among other initiatives.

    The Quad released a Joint Statement after the May 2022 Tokyo summit.34 It pledged to further strengthen their cooperation with Pacific Island Countries in order to boost their economic well-being, improve their health infrastructure, strengthen their environmental resilience, protect their maritime security and sustain their fisheries. The Quad agreed to provide sustainable infrastructure, enhance educational opportunities, and mitigate and adapt to climate change, which poses particular challenges to the Pacific Island Countries.

    Conclusion

    The Pacific Island Countries have increasingly become a key area of great power competition between the US and China. Over the decades, China has made considerable inroads into the island nations, forged greater bilateral relations through enhanced diplomatic and development activities and has successfully got 10 out of 14 countries to recognise the ‘One China Policy’. Analysts note that China’s long-term objective in the region is to establish a military foothold in the South Pacific. For this to materialise, China is making every effort to deepen bilateral ties through developmental aid and high-level visits, and entice Pacific leaders who see political, economic, or personal benefits in allying with Beijing. Wang Yi’s visit highlights Beijing’s efforts to further consolidate ties with the region, as it seeks to pursue its ambitious geopolitical agenda.

    China and Pacific Islands China, Pacific Island Countries, United States of America (USA) system/files/thumb_image/2015/2.jpg
    India’s Great Power Politics Jo Inge Bekkevold, S. Kalyanaraman

    About the Book

    This book examines India’s foreign and defence policy changes in response to China’s growing economic and military power and increased footprint across the Indo-Pacific. It further explores India’s role in the rivalry between China and the United States.

    The book looks at the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical landscape and how India is managing China’s rise by combining economic cooperation with a wide set of balancing strategies. The authors in this book critically analyse the various tools of Indian foreign policy, including defence posture, security alignments, and soft power diplomacy, among others, and discuss the future trajectory of India’s foreign policy and the factors which will determine the balance of power in the region and the potential risks involved.

    The book provides detailed insights into the multifaceted and complex relationship between India and China and will be of great interest to researchers and students of international relations, Asian studies, political science, and economics. It will also be useful for policymakers, journalists, and think tanks interested in the India–China relationship.

    About the Editors

    Jo Inge Bekkevold is Senior Adviser at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. He was previously a career diplomat, with several postings to East Asia.

    S. Kalyanaraman was Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.


    Table of Contents

    List of figures

    List of Contributors

    Acknowledgements

    Part I: India and China’s rise

    1. India’s Great Power Politics: A Framework for Analysis Jo Inge Bekkevold and S. Kalyanaraman

    2. India in China’s Grand Strategy: Change and Continuity from 1949 to Present Jo Inge Bekkevold

    3. India’s Response to the China Threat Since 1949 S. Kalyanaraman

    4. India’s China Policy under Modi: Growing Co-operation, Enduring Disagreement, Increasing Rivalry Sunniva Engh

    Part II : China’s Rise and India’s Neighbourhood Policy

    5. India’s "Neighbourhood First" Policy and the Chinese Challenge: The Cases of Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka S.D. Muni

    6. India and the Emerging Sino–Iranian Partnership John W. Garver

    7. India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation P. Stobdan

    8. Cultures of Pluralism in India’s Soft Power Strategy Constantino Xavier

    Part III: India and the Great Powers

    9. India, the United States and the Indo–Pacific Region Jayant Prasad

    10. India’s US Policy under Modi: Alignment and Strategic Autonomy Redefined Harsh V. Pant

    11. The Changing Geopolitical Landscape of India–Russia Relations P.S. Raghavan

    12. India and Japan’s Grand Bargain in the Context of China’s Rise Rohan Mukherjee

    Part IV: Concluding Observations

    13 Indian Strategies on China: Past, Present and Future Jo Inge Bekkevold and S. Kalyanaraman.

    Index.

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    Far-Right Extremism in the West July 06, 2022 Saman Ayesha Kidwai

    Summary: Far-right extremism, rooted in the Nazi and Fascist ideologies of the 20th century, has gained popularity across first world countries. Among factors that have propelled far-right extremism include Islamist terrorism, the 2008 financial crisis and European Union immigration policies—particularly after the outbreak of the Syrian war. The surge in disinformation, amidst the pandemic, has also made people susceptible to far-right indoctrination. The far-right exploits socio-economic grievances to further its cause. Effective steps must be taken to contain and roll back the far-right threat.

    Introduction

    Far-right extremism, rooted in the anti-Semitic, White supremacist Nazi and Fascist ideologies of the 20th century, has gained popularity across the first world countries due to a combination of factors. As per the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), there has been a 320 per cent increase in far-right activities during 2015 and 2020, accounting for 82 per cent of global terrorist deaths.1

    The US and European countries have been most affected by this phenomenon. The January 2021 Capitol Hill riots in Washington D.C. killed six and injured at least 150, while the mass shooting in a New York supermarket store in May 2022 killed ten black people while three were wounded. The percentage of far-right prisoners in the United Kingdom during 2018 and 2020, increased from 33 to 44 per cent.2 One of the significant far-right attacks outside of these geographies is the 2019 attack on a Christchurch mosque that killed 51 and injured 40.

    Factors Fomenting Far-Right Extremism

    Among factors that have fomented far-right extremism and propelled the movement forward is Islamist terrorism, beginning in the 1990s, which fomented fear, backlash and paranoia. The 2008 financial crisis created scepticism about the viability of the Bretton Woods framework. The period between 2015 and 2020 has proved equally consequential for the far-right movement. The immigration policies of the European Union, particularly after the outbreak of the war in Syria, the Paris terror attacks in November 2015, and the beheading of Samuel Paty, a schoolteacher, in October 2020, gave far-right extremists the mileage needed to advance their cause.

    The Ukraine–Russia conflict has also brought to the fore issues associated with the threat of the far-right. In 2014 as well as in 2022, thousands of foreign fighters have flocked to Eastern Europe to fight on both sides of the divide. While ideology has presumably acted as the driving force for their temporary migration, the conflict has also provided an opportunity for these individuals to acquire combat and arms training in a real-world scenario.

    Until the pandemic and the current phase of the conflict, Kyiv was also host to an annual far-right, hard-metal music festival. The event had long acted as the melting pot for far-right proponents to congregate and forge connections. Reports note that these individuals have also formed an association, called the Pact of Steel.3 A pact with the similar name was signed by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini in May 1939, formalising the Rome-Berlin Axis Agreement of 1936, which unified Germany and Italy, politically and militarily.

    The Covid-19 pandemic has also exacerbated the crisis. The surge in disinformation, as people have become more active on social media and online forums amidst the pandemic lockdowns, has made people susceptible to far-right indoctrination. Anti-vax protestors also are often members of far-right movements, convinced that liberal elites plan to strip them of their freedoms.4 They hold immigrants responsible for spreading the virus worldwide.

    Far-Right Ideologies

    The growing popularity of far-right propaganda, at least over the past decade, has origins in the virulent rhetoric and theories spouted by extremist ideologies. These include, among others, The Great Replacement Theory, Accelerationism, and Eco-fascism. The Great Replacement Theory was popularised by Renaud Camus in 2011.5 It states that there is a conspiracy hatched by ‘replacist elites’ to replace White Christian societies with multi-religious and multi-ethnic states. These elites are those intentionally bringing in illegal immigrants into predominantly white European countries, thereby replacing the native white Europeans. This has taken on two names—White genocide in North America and ‘EurAbia’ in Europe, i.e., Europe transforming into an Arab-dominated Islamist entity.

    Accelerationism is a belief that current liberal governments have become corrupt and inefficient and must be violently overthrown for a White-dominated order to emerge.6. For this to occur, it contends that Jews, liberal elites, ‘race traitors’ (those indulging in inter-racial relationships), and selected civilian and state personnel groups would need to be systematically targeted and eliminated. The Capitol Hill Riots are attributed to this fringe far-right ideology.

    The attack on the Tree of Life Synagogue in 2018 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in which 11 people were killed and seven wounded, including the perpetrator, Robert Bowers, was possibly one of the worst anti-Semitic attacks on American soil. Bowers believed that synagogues brought illegal immigrants from Latin America, and resettled them into the US, altering the country’s demography. A major narrative that supports these conspiracy theories is that George Soros, the influential Jewish businessman, is funding illegal migrant caravans bound for the US.7

    Such ideas have inspired American neo-Nazis, such as Dylann Storm Roof, who murdered nine African-American worshippers in a church in Charleston, South Carolina, in June 2015. Roof’s action was allegedly in retaliation for the “persecution” of Whites, especially White women, who he contended were being raped by African-Americans.8 Reports noted that he had prepared 38 bullets to be placed inside his handgun. According to White supremacist literature, 38 is a codeword for Heil (Hail) Hitler.

    Eco-fascism links cultural and environmental degradation and is rooted in the belief that immigrants bear the sole responsibility for negative climatic repercussions in predominantly European societies.9 Therefore, they believe that immigration has to be permanently halted and homogenous White communities must be carved out from existing territories. Breton Tarrant, the Christchurch shooter, was inspired by such ideas. It is pertinent to note that the idea of Lebensraum (Breathing Space) was central to Hitler’s expansionist designs and was the pre-World War II version of eco-fascism.

    The alleged legitimisation of far-right narratives by people in positions of authority and influence, such as US House of Representatives members Elise Stefanik and Matt Gaetz, Fox News anchor Tucker Carlson, political parties like the AfD in Germany and the National Rally in France, and commentators like Douglas Murray in the UK, have only worsened the situation. Notably, the National Rally increased its vote share from 8 to 89 per cent in the French parliamentary elections held in June 2022.10

    Historical and Contemporary Trends

    Far-right extremists use violence or threat of violence to advocate, among other things, ethno-White supremacy and violent overthrow of state authorities. They are both anti-feminist and anti-Semitic. Unlike Islamist radicals, far-right extremists generally do not claim responsibility for their actions in the attacks’ aftermath. They want to preserve the secrecy associated with their organisations, thereby preventing authorities from bringing the outfits onto their radar.

    These outfits or individuals also prefer to operate in a decentralised manner. Louis Beam, in Essays of a Klansman, advocated for White supremacists to form leaderless and smaller groups, to create an 'intelligence nightmare' for security agencies.11 James Mason, who advocated for the establishment of a successor state to Nazi Germany, called on his supporters (in his collection of newsletters, Siege) to selectively target and eliminate people, while fomenting a White supremacist insurgency against the host state.12

    The far-right draws inspiration from martyrdom tactics propounded by ISIS, and generally, while not always, convene online on platforms such as Telegram, Gab, Twitch, Discord, and Facebook. They also rely on social media and on seemingly innocuous posts to further their agenda.

    Far-right extremists bestow titles such as ‘saints’ on White perpetrators carrying out acts of mass violence.13 They use channels like Telegram to praise these individuals and encourage others to follow suit. Adulation of mass violence, as indicated by hashtags such as #pleaseletitbewhite on several encrypted Telegram channels every time a shooting occurs, indicates the gravity of the situation. This occurs primarily in countries such as the US, where easy access to guns exacerbates the threat of far-right terrorism.

    Such adulation, presumably, also stems from the notion, besides Great Replacement and White genocide, that violence faced by the white community is far more than what African-Americans experience frequently. The latter, referred to in derogatory terms by far-right supremacists, are opportune scapegoats to serve as targets in the impending race war, pitting the ‘superior’ White community against others.

    Far-right extremism has emerged as a counter-response to what White supremacists consider acts of attrition against their culture, values, tradition and identity. Far-right ideologies are being rebranded to become more relevant by mainstreaming it worldwide. Some of the fundamental reasons why neo-liberal model has been declining in proportion to far-right’s resonance with ordinary people is due to the re-assertion of nationalist identities, lack of trust in liberal democratic governance and moderate media platforms, and the perceived ineptitude of governments to address worldwide socio-economic and health crises.

    What ‘oppressed’ far-right find problematic is the demand for equitable rights by supporters of ‘Jewish Marxist’ elites and the latter’s attempts at replacing them from positions of authority, which they believe rightfully belongs to them. Unsurprisingly, President Barack Obama’s inauguration in 2008 sent a shock wave across the conservative Republicans, several of whom, by January 2021, tilted towards the extreme far-right.

    Fictional novels and movies have inspired some deplorable, mass-casualty terrorist attacks. William Luther Pierce’s The Turner Diaries inspired the April 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, a coordinated attack by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building which wounded more than 600, including children at a daycare centre and killed 168 people.14 Until 9/11, this was the deadliest attack on American soil and the first known significant act of violent domestic extremism.

    Far-right forces have gradually infiltrated armed forces and police as serving or retired personnel, particularly in the US, Germany and the UK. In the US, Proud Boys and Oath Keepers—far-right, armed militias comprised of former and serving service officials, stormed the Capitol Hill. A grand jury charged several of them with seditious conspiracy in June 2022. Neo-Nazi inclinations within the German army continue to haunt that country’s armed forces. In July 2020, the second company of the Kommando Spezialkräfte (Special Forces Command, KSK) was dissolved.15 The charges against this company included indulging in extreme-right rock music and performing Nazi salutes. The trigger for the unit’s disbandment came when one of its Sergeant Majors, who had served in the company for 20 years, was found to have concealed stolen explosives and ammunition, alongside Nazi mementoes.

    Counter-Strategies Adopted by the West

    Governments, social media forums, and civil society organisations have adopted several measures to counter the surge in far-right extremism. Initiatives like Verlassen Sie Deutschland or Exit Germany have become successful.16 Since its inception in 2000, it has reported at least 800 successful cases and a mere 3 per cent recidivism rate. It counsels those willing to leave the far-right lifestyle behind. It also provides practical aid to those looking to disengage from extremist movements through measures such as police protection and a new identity.

    In 2011, President Barack Obama instituted the Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, with an annual budget of US$ 21 million.17 After the 2016 elections—when Donald Trump took over, the budget of the office was reduced to $3 million, and there was a near-complete shift in focus towards Islamist terrorism.18 Under President Joe Biden, the budget has again increased to US$ 20 million in 2021.19

    Additional steps that need to be taken to contain the far-right threat include the need to increase funding for research into such issues. Research centres should be set up to evaluate challenges through policy and academic prisms. There is also a need to create a mutually accessible database for affected countries and their intelligence agencies to draft global strategies to counter the far-right threat, focusing on overall profiles, logos, attacks and threat assessments of various neo-Nazi and neo-fascist groups. It is vital to boost digital literacy to counter misinformation and disinformation stemming from conspiracy theories. Finally, it is paramount to set up rehabilitation programmes based on the German format, tailor-made to suit each country, for those willing to leave such lifestyles behind.

    Potential Impact on India

    India must keep a close watch on these developments, especially if the far-right elements come to power. Even if they do not form governments, individuals professing such views could occupy important portfolios. The far-right agenda is seeped with protectionist, anti-globalist, and anti-immigration attitudes, which frequently have resulted in violence in these countries. Such worldviews can negatively undermine Indian interests.

    India and other Asian countries also must no longer depend on the West, led by the US, to uphold the liberal democratic values that have sustained the post-World War II era. They must seek alternative arrangements to strengthen their guard against far-right ideologies permeating these countries. India is the world’s largest democracy and the most important bastion in regional affairs to lead this task.

    Conclusion

    The beginnings of the National Socialist Party or the Nazi Party in Germany, while initially appearing as benign, culminated in the horrors of the Holocaust and World War II. Although governments and societies now are cognizant of such nefarious tendencies, they still need to strengthen their efforts to counter this menace. Former German Interior Minister, Horst Seehofer, pointed to mounting evidence of “brutalisation” of German society on account of rising far-right crimes.20 Extremism is a sociological challenge and must be treated as such. The far-right taps into the emotions of people and exploits their socio-economic grievances to further its cause. If not tackled effectively, at the societal and governmental level, such ideologies could lead to the collapse of the liberal and rules-based domestic and international orders.

    Counter Terrorism Far-Right Extremism, White Supremacist system/files/thumb_image/2015/FRE-t.jpg
    Taliban and Al-Qaeda: The Unbreakable Relationship March 2022 Yaqoob-ul-Hassan

    After the Taliban successfully took control of Kabul through diplomatic and intimidatory means, which included using force and striking deals with warlords and local military commanders, it has reached out to other states for recognition.1 The Taliban realizes that without international recognition it would be difficult to achieve both domestic and international legitimacy. Recognition by the international community would help the Taliban to access around $9.5 billion in frozen reserves held overseas, which could help ease the current cash crunch that the Taliban regime is facing in Afghanistan.

    The Myanmar Coup: Evolving Ethnic Rebel Politics and Civil Resistance March 2022 Roshni Kapur

    Myanmar has been in a turmoil since the Tatmadaw (country’s military) ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s government and seized power in February 2021.1 The coup took place hours before the new parliament could convene following the 2020 general elections. The junta has detained her since then and reimposed military rule after running a short experiment under a power-sharing arrangement with the National League for Democracy (NLD).2 There are concerns that Myanmar could morph into another Syria with widespread displacement and hunger, aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. This commentary explores the sustained crackdown by the junta, the painstaking efforts undertaken by the ousted government to remain relevant domestically and gain legitimacy abroad, how the Tatmadaw is currently fighting a multi-front war in several areas of the borderlands, the adoption of violent tactics by members of the civil disobedience movement and ASEAN’s inability to find a permanent solution to the worsening crisis in Myanmar.

    Counterterrorism between the Wars: An International History, 1919–1937 March 2022 Georgi Asatryan

    The 11 September 2001 attacks in the US changed the course of world history and made Al-Qaeda a state-like actor in international affairs, thereby confounding a core Realist idea. The event also increased interest in terrorism studies, creating two competing schools of thought within it, the classical and the critical school. The debates between these two broad perspectives have led to many fruitful advances and insights concerning the motivations, methods, and impact of both terrorism and counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, the field has lacked a solid foundation in the use of historical examples, save for a few books and articles. Twentieth-century terrorism, particularly the terrorism of the inter-War years, remains a forgotten phenomenon in understanding the contemporary phenomenon of international terrorism. As Hannah Arendt wrote, violence is a companion of existence,1 so it behoves scholars to look at that period of time closely as well. Mary Barton’s Counterterrorism between the Wars is designed to address this apparent gap in the literature.

    A Russian Revisionist Strategy on the Rise? March 2022 Yiannos Charalambides

    This article deals with the Russian Revisionist Strategy, the redistribution of power and the changes that this policy might bring. Accordingly, it examines whether this hypothesis is correct. NATO’s policy and the wars in Crimea, Georgia, Syria and the current one in Ukraine are the case studies that the article analyses. It discusses how Russia aims to restructure the regional and global system by forming strategic arcs and ‘pincer movements’ from the North Sea to the Middle East via the Caucasus Region. The war in Ukraine is at the epicentre of the Russian revisionist strategy.

    Europe and Eurasia Russia
    Republic of Korea, Indo-Pacific and the Emerging Regional Order:Engaging without Endorsing March 2022 Jojin John

    Despite being a key stakeholder in the emerging regional order, South Korea’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has been a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’. It entails a cautious engagement with Indo-Pacific initiatives of different countries under the ambit of ‘New Southern Policy’ without endorsing the concept or articulating the Korean position on the Indo-Pacific regional construct. Explaining the Korea’s strategic outlook, this article argues that its ambiguous approach to the Indo-Pacific’ is determined by the prioritization of maintaining a ‘balanced diplomacy’ in its relations with the US and China in a context of intensified strategic competition between the two.

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