Despite looming threats of US sanctions, India has received the first of five S-400 air defence weapon systems from Russia. It will be interesting to see how this deal will affect India’s relationship with the US. Will the US impose sanctions as it has done on other countries dealing with Russia or will it choose to spare India, looking at the balance of power in the South Asian region and counter China’s increasing hegemony in the region? The US so far remains non-committal on whether it will waive sanctions on India under CAATSA. Moreover, will India’s affinity towards Russia result in stronger Indo-Russian relations than they have been in the past decade? This commentary will try and analyse India’s, US’, and Russia’s stand along with their reasoning behind taking that stand. It will also touch upon the relationship dynamics of all these countries with China and how this dynamic will have a significant impact in South Asia.

The Make-in-India campaign puts a premium on co-development and co-production of defence equipment in India. In a bid to promote such projects, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) included two specific provisions in the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP 2020) which governs capital acquisitions for the armed forces and the Indian Coast Guard.

This is not a new concept, though. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2006 recognised Foreign Direct Investment in the Indian defence industry for co-development and co-production as one of the several ways in which the foreign vendors could discharge their offset obligations. All subsequent DPPs contained analogous provisions.

Co-development and co-production projects were undertaken even prior to DAP 2020 promulgation. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, manufactured by BrahMos Aerospace—a joint venture of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya, is a prime example.

The specific provisions in DAP 2020, though, are meant to enable the armed forces to initiate co-development and/or co-production proposals like any other acquisition proposal. However, the relevant paras in DAP 2020, encapsulated below, are too cryptic to give a clear picture of how these projects are to be conceptualised, executed, and financed.

The DAP 2020 provides that the ‘cases where it is proposed to co-develop a product/ equipment offering transformative/unique/niche technology; or a futuristic equipment/ platform with a foreign country; or where co-development is likely to benefit ongoing indigenous projects in India, ….. will be progressed under an IGA/specific Project Agreement….’.1

The DAP 2020 also permits the armed forces ‘to work with a foreign entity to co-produce equipment/assemblies/sub-assemblies/spares’, if the project aims at import substitution, the equipment to be manufactured is unique, or helps in making India a manufacturing hub or boosting defence exports, or it has the potential to produce equipment that could be used by the Indian armed forces in future.

Such projects can be undertaken on a single vendor basis if no other country is willing to participate in the project or where the shortlisted vendor offers higher technology transfer and indigenous content in the locally produced equipment than the other vendors.2

Conceptual differences

Conceptually, co-development projects are distinct from co-production projects, while some of them could also be mixed co-development-cum-production projects. Typically, co-production would not involve development of a new technology or product. Such projects only need an agreement between the technology provider and the Indian manufacturer for transfer of proven technology and related wherewithal.

Most of the capital acquisitions under categories like Buy (Indian), Buy and Make (Indian), and Buy (Global – Manufacture in India) would qualify as co-production projects in some form or the other. Projects under the Make category or the Strategic Partnership Model too are fundamentally co-production projects, though some design and development may also be involved.

In the circumstances, it would be normal for co-production proposals to be initiated by the armed forces and processed as per the procedure laid down in the DPP 2020. The other two types of projects, however, are on a different footing as development of new technologies, or even new products, constitutes the core of such projects. The sheer complexity of these projects, which may also entail an element of research and design, requires them to be treated differently.

DRDO’s Role

The DRDO is best suited to steer these projects, irrespective of whether the collaboration involves only the private sector entities, or both the public and private sector entities, with or without DRDO being a party to it.

Unlike the civil and military personnel who deal with normal capital acquisition cases, the DRDO scientists do not get rotated every few years. They have years of experience in working with the Indian and foreign industry at every stage from conceptualisation of projects to commencement of production. It can, therefore, provide the much-needed continuity in stewardship of the projects by utilising its managerial expertise even if it is not directly involved in technology or product development.

In what was the first event of its kind, the 155 mm x 52 calibre howitzer used this year for the ceremonial 21-shot salute at the Red Fort on the Independence Day is a prime example of DRDO’s expertise. This Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System was successfully developed by it in collaboration with Bharat Forge Limited and Tata Advanced Systems Limited as the eventual manufacturers.  

Identification of projects

It is unpropitious to leave it to the armed forces to initiate these proposals. The criteria for undertaking such projects are so expansive, and the need of the armed forces so pressing, that almost all major acquisition proposals can easily be fitted into this category, making intra- and inter-service prioritisation very difficult.

These projects require a top-level push, though even that has had little success in the past. In 2018, for example, India and the US had agreed on two ‘pathfinder’ projects for the joint production of a helmet-mounted digital display and a biological tactical detection system under the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), but not much is known about what happened to these projects thereafter. The US had also unsuccessfully offered to make fighter jets in India.

These examples illustrate how difficult it is to bring these projects to fruition, even when these are primarily for co-production and the dialogue takes place at the highest levels. Leaving the proposals to be initiated by the individual service headquarters could mire them in bureaucratic tangles at any one or more of the intermediary stages through which they must pass before even being accepted in principle. 

Challenges

The trickiest part of these projects, especially the ones that entail collaboration with the foreign entity, is estimation of the cost of technology development as a part of the feasibility study. This is important because even if the technology development is not to be funded by the MoD, this cost will eventually be borne by it as a part of the buying price of the product. It is unknown if an appropriate and universally acceptable costing methodology is in place.

It is equally important that there is a reasonable certainty of the co-developed product being bought by the MoD to make the project commercially viable for the development-cum-production agency. Dogged by perennial shortage of funds for capital expenditure—estimated by the Fifteenth Finance Commission to be Rs 5,27,491 crore for the financial years 2023–24 to 2025–26,3 success of the co-development-cum-production push in DAP 2020 would depend on the confidence MoD inspires in the potential partners as regards future budgetary allocations.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Chapter II: Acquisition Procedure for Categories under ‘Buy’ and ‘Buy and Make’ Schemes”, Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, para 127, p. 60.
• 2. Ibid., para 128, p. 60.
• 3. “Chapter 11: Defence and Internal Security”, Report of the Fifteenth Finance Commission, Volume 1, Main Report, October 2020, Table 11.5, p. 340.

Summary

The strike against Zawahiri is being hailed as a vindication of the US’s ‘over-the-horizon’ strategy in eradicating terrorism without placing boots on the ground. Al-Qaeda’s potential to expand and re-enforce itself and affiliates, however, cannot be written off. Policymakers and intelligence agencies must exploit the power struggles al-Qaeda’s emerging leadership will face to minimise the threat it and its dispersed affiliates still pose to the world. While India is engaging with the Taliban, recent developments indicate that re-adjustments would have to be made to the threat assessment matrix.

On 31 July 2022, al-Qaeda’s face of terror, Ayman al-Zawahiri, became the first major successful target of America’s ‘Over-the-Horizon’ strategy, after its polarising withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The Biden administration initiated the strategy in 2021 to conduct counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan without placing boots on the ground.1 Over two decades after the organisation’s foremost ideologue, Osama bin Laden, was eliminated in Abbottabad (Pakistan), his successor was killed when Hellfire R9X missiles were launched at a safe house in Kabul, reportedly owned by Afghanistan’s interim Minister of Interior and leader of the most powerful faction within the Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani.

Although the Pakistani Foreign Ministry has denied the allegations that their airspace was used to conduct the strike, Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif reportedly granted access to the American drone that took out al-Zawahiri, via Balochistan.2 Pakistan’s involvement in the strike could have implications for the strained Taliban–Pakistan relationship. Negotiations between the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and PM Sharif-led Pakistan Democratic Movement are underway, mediated by Sirajuddin Haqqani.3 Amid an economy that is in freefall and repeated attempts made by subsequent governments to get off the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) ‘grey list’, it would not be a surprise if a deal was struck to keep the economy afloat in exchange for the use of its airspace. Whether this damages its chances of arriving at truce with the TTP is to be seen.

US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, referred to al-Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul as a gross violation of the Doha Agreement.4 While the Afghan government initially denied the strike had happened, later, its spokesperson, Zabiullah Mujahid, decried the violation of Afghan sovereignty.5 Meanwhile, pro-Taliban Afghan factions have taken to the streets, chanting ‘down with U.S.A.’, condemning the strike that violated their country’s territorial integrity.6

Sirajuddin Haqqani, days before the strike occurred, had asserted that Afghanistan was bereft of any al-Qaeda presence. The new regime sought diplomatic breakthroughs with neighbouring countries and tried to convince them about its changed posture, particularly on terrorism. The drone strike has however reaffirmed what analysts knew heading into the post-Ghani era—al-Qaeda and the Taliban’s ties, bolstered by a decades-long terrorist network, would never cease.7

The Doha Agreement and subsequent assurances from the highest echelons of the Taliban movement about disallowing any terrorist group from using Afghan soil became null and void. Al-Zawahiri’s year-long presence on Afghan territory, and undoubtedly, far-reaching freedom to traverse Kabul (and possibly beyond), while instigating communal tensions and plotting terrorist attacks in India and elsewhere, underlines a gnarly reality.

The Implications

Al-Qaeda’s Power Struggle

Al-Zawahiri’s death might result in a power struggle within al-Qaeda, mainly because he did not name a successor. Currently, the former number two in the organisation, Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian jihadist residing in Iran (although there are reports he has now crossed the border into Afghanistan), is best positioned to assume the reins. However, as per analysts, his credibility and resonance with other members, within and beyond the parent outfit, have been under significant doubt. There have been reports about how, for example, at least three unnamed affiliates have refused to accept his authority.8

Al-Adel may also face opposition from al-Zawahiri’s son-in-law, Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, who could petition to be the natural successor to the former emir’s legacy.9 On the other hand, while al-Adel’s long-standing commitment to the jihadist cause and battlefield experience provide some legitimacy to his candidacy, it does not guarantee the continued support of the foot soldiers within the broader al-Qaeda movement.

It remains to be seen if the heir apparent can fend off opposition from rival groups like ISIS, whose expansion at its peak in 2014–15 threatened to push other terrorist groups into oblivion. ISIS cells would be inclined to persuade terrorists disaffected with al-Adel’s leadership to defect and join the organisation which remains committed to attaining jihadist goals by fighting both ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemies, using Afghan soil as a testing ground. ISIS telegram channels celebrated al-Zawahiri’s death, referring to him as ‘wicked’ and an ‘enemy of god’.10 They also sought to undermine the Taliban, taunting whether Afghanistan’s interim government would recognise the killing and offer condolences to ‘one of their own’.

Al-Zawahiri successfully weathered the storm generated by the Arab Spring in 2011.11 Whether al-Adel can prove his abilities in holding the group’s fragments will have to be seen, especially as international scrutiny of the organisation’s activities further intensifies. The power struggle among the terrorists vying for the leadership position may not drastically impact the group’s overall Salafist ideological resonance with affiliates or lone-wolves inspired by its violent extremist cause.

The core beliefs driving al-Qaeda’s agenda, including the overthrow of secular and democratic governments, and the subsequent establishment of Islamist rule globally, continue to inspire radical jihadists. The perceived contradiction of Western-imported liberalism with Islam and Sharia-based governance, including in East African countries such as Somalia, has propelled some former intelligence officials like Mahad Karate, to become the deputy leader of al-Shabab.12 The African affiliate continues to welcome hundreds of graduates from its training camps to wage jihad against the internationally recognised government in Mogadishu.

Al-Qaeda’s Ideological Battle

Online discussion forums have glorified al-Zawahiri’s ‘martyrdom’ as part of the broader jihadist struggle. Pro-al-Qaeda channels assert that Zawahiri’s death will not demoralise the cadres, noting that ‘whoever thinks the height of the peak of [camel] hump of Islam is linked to a person is delusional’.13 They hope to recruit other radicalised Islamists worldwide, by using his martyrdom as an example. They might encourage their members to stage retaliatory attacks against American targets or governments backed by them.

Over the years, al-Qaeda affiliates have spread to the Indian subcontinent, with presence in India, Bangladesh and the Maldives. They might use their leader’s ‘martyrdom’ to galvanise support among the radicalised youth. Within the various factions, rogue leaders could use the uncertainty and instability brought about by contested change of guard to fuel their ambitions. This could occur even among the supposed al-Qaeda loyalists and those who had pledged ‘bayah’ or allegiance to al-Zawahiri after Bin Laden’s death.

This complexity could however open avenues for further exploitation by the US to build on its over-the-horizon strategy and eliminate other terrorists on Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) most-wanted list, with millions of dollars of bounty on their heads. Pitting one rival faction against the other within the same affiliate could have damaging consequences for their survival. By taking out key leaders, the US may set back the terrorist outfits’ agendas but would find it more challenging to eradicate causal factors that give rise to support for their violent acts. Hard power has rarely yielded a sustainable solution in achieving peace—in wars against opposing national armies, terrorist groups, or guerilla forces waging an insurgency.

Boost to Rival Terrorist Groups

A pro-Taliban telegram channel, Anfal Afghan Agency, blamed Islamic State in Khorasan Province’s (ISKP) leader Shahab al-Muhajir and Iran for the killing. With the killing of al-Zawahiri, as a power vacuum develops, rival organisations like the ISKP could gain momentum. The ISIS affiliate would find this an opportune moment to highlight collusion between the Taliban and the US in betraying the Islamist cause by selling out al-Zawahiri to the Americans and securing the US$ 25 million bounty placed on his head by the FBI.14 Given that Afghanistan is not able to access its international monetary assets worth US$ 9 billion, despite deteriorating economic and humanitarian crisis, could be flagged by ISKP as a reason why the Taliban leadership has turned its back on the global jihadist crusade.15

The Taliban’s growing alignment with China in the hopes of securing the latter’s continued investment in Afghanistan’s economy has already resulted in domino effects. Reports of Uyghur militants joining hands with the ISIS affiliate, support the claim. A suicide bomber, with a Uyghur lineage, attacked the Gozar-e-Sayed Abad mosque (Kunduz) in October 2021.16

Furthermore, groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), earlier in cahoots with the Taliban, might also increasingly find themselves at odds with its former ally. Fissures had arisen between the ETIM and the Taliban over the past year as the latter appeared to partially comply with China’s demands of not letting the Uyghur militants use Afghanistan’s porous border via Xinjiang province to attack the mainland.

American Domestic Politics

The successful operation to take out al-Zawahiri, who masterminded some of the most devastating attacks on American targets—9/11 and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, will bring closure to the victims’ families. It could also boost President Biden’s popularity and that of his Democratic Party, ahead of the mid-term elections in November 2022. As per a Reuters/Ipsos opinion poll, his approval ratings stood at 40 per cent on 3 August 2022, as against 55 per cent in January 2021.17

The View from India

India has refrained from making any announcements regarding the drone strike. It would not be far-fetched to assume that its policymakers and intelligence community will have some breather while re-assessing its threat matrix and adapting counter-terrorism strategies. Al-Qaeda had established its Indian affiliate in 2014. Al-Zawahiri incited communal tensions through his video messages in response to the hijab controversy in Karnataka in February 2022.

Five terrorists linked to the Ansarullah Bangla Team, an al-Qaeda affiliate based in Bangladesh, were arrested from Barpeta, Assam, in April 2022. The terror module was deeply embedded in the recruitment and radicalisation of youth in the area. As per the documents seized from Saiful Islam alias Haroon Rashid, Barpeta terror module’s reported leader, the recently inducted young men were deeply engaged in ‘working towards advocating, abetting, inciting, assisting, harbouring, recruiting and collecting funds for organising and committing unlawful & terrorist activities’.18

Furthermore, al-Zawahiri used the remarks made by Nupur Sharma about Prophet Mohammad to issue a threatening letter in June 2022 about staging suicide bombings in Delhi, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, and Mumbai as retribution.19 As per ‘The Khorasan Diary’s’ tweet on 7 August 2022, around two al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent terrorists were killed using an American drone strike in Ghazni province.20 Activities of most of the al-Qaeda terrorists have been traced to this region.

Overall, the drone strike may not drastically alter India’s foreign policy, particularly regarding humanitarian aid towards Afghanistan. The interim Afghan leadership has repeatedly extended assurances to the Indian government about disallowing their soil to be used as a launch pad to undermine the latter’s security. While India is engaging with the Taliban, recent developments indicate that re-adjustments would have to be made to the threat assessment matrix.

Questions would now, more so than before, have to be asked about the kind of immunity accorded to terrorists within Afghanistan, allowing them freedom to spew propaganda and devise plans to undermine India’s national security apparatus. Since the fall of Kabul, the Taliban have stood steadfast with non-state actors sponsored by Pakistan—Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)—who have a violent, anti-India and anti-West worldview. Moreover, JeM and LeT have maintained their training camps in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The strike against al-Zawahiri is being hailed as a vindication of the US’s over-the-horizon strategy in eradicating terrorism without placing boots on the ground. In the long-term, however, its success will be measured in terms of how impenetrable it can make the US and its allies to terrorist threats. Al-Qaeda’s potential to expand and re-enforce itself and affiliates cannot be written off anytime soon. While he lacked his predecessor Bin Laden’s charisma and popularity, Zawahiri had proven adept at keeping the hollowed ties al-Qaeda shared with affiliates like al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Shabab, in particular, has emerged as the deadliest al-Qaeda affiliate worldwide, constantly undermining a fragile Somali government. Finally, policymakers and intelligence agencies must exploit the power struggles al-Qaeda’s emerging leadership will face to minimise the threat it and its dispersed affiliates still pose to the world.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Steve Szymanski, “Over-The-Horizon Operations in Afghanistan”, Lieber Institute, 8 September 2021.
• 2. Srishti Singh Sisodia, “US Used Pakistan Airspace to Carry Out Drone Strike that Killed Al-Qaeda Chief Ayman al-Zawahiri: Report”, WION, 2 August 2022.
• 3. “Pakistan-TTP ‘Peace Deal’ Doomed to Fail despite Afghan-Taliban’s Push”, ANI News, 20 June 2022.
• 4. Alisa Chung, Megan Lim and Patrick Jarenwattananon, “Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad on Ayman al-Zawahiri”, NPR, 2 August 2022.
• 5. “What We Know about the US Strike on al Qaeda Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri”, ABC News, 2 August 2022.
• 6. “Anti-U.S. Protests Erupt in Afghanistan”, Reuters, 5 August 2022.
• 7. Manoj Gupta, “Afghanistan Needs India’s Help ‘Desperately’ to Secure Peaceful Environment: Taliban Interior Minister Haqqani”, News18, 2 August 2022.
• 8. “Saif al-Adel: After Ayman al-Zawahiri, This Man Expected to Head al Qaeda”, NDTV, 2 August 2022.
• 9. Jeff Seldin, “Al-Qaida Succession Plan being Put to Test”, VOA News, 2 August 2022.
• 10. Guillermo Calderón López, “Islamic State Sympathizers Mock Zawahiri’s Death”, Militant Wire, 8 August 2022.
• 11. Lee Keath, “Al Zawahiri Killed in US Drone Strike in Afghanistan”, The Diplomat, 2 August 2022.
• 12. Jamal Osman, “Inside al Shabaab: The Extremist Group Trying to Seize Somalia”, Channel 4 News, 15 June 2022.
• 13. “Jihadist Snapshot: Daesh & AQ Trends”, moonshot, n.d.
• 14. “Ayman al-Zawahiri: From Cairo Physician to al Qaeda Leader”, Reuters, 2 August 2022.
• 15. Bruce Hoffman, “What Zawahiri’s Killing Means for al-Qaeda”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 August 2022.
• 16. Adil Rasheed and Saman Ayesha Kidwai, “The ETIM Question: Taliban’s Moment of Truth”, MP-IDSA Commentary, 29 November 2021.
• 17. “57% of Americans Disapprove of the President”, Reuters/Ipsos, 3 August 2022.
• 18. “NIA Begins Probe against Module Affiliated to al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent”, The Hindu, 10 April 2022.
• 19. Praveen Swami, “Will Tie Explosives to our Kids – Al Qaeda Warns India of Suicide Attacks over Prophet Remarks”, The Print, 8 June 2022.
• 20. “Alert: Reliable sources, aware of the development, told The Khorasan Diary that at least two militants”, The Khorasan Diary, Twitter, 7 August, 2022, 3:30 p.m.

The ‘Artificial Intelligence in Defence (AIDef)’ symposium and exhibition, the first of its kind held on 11 July 2022, showcased 75 products based on Artificial Intelligence (AI), in keeping with the theme of ‘Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav’ celebrating 75 years of India’s independence.1 The Armed Forces, as well as research organisations, industry, defence start-ups and innovators took part in the exhibition. The exhibition was a culmination of a four-year old process of initially introducing and subsequently leveraging AI and AI-based products in defence. The aim is to speed up decision-making processes, enhance cybersecurity, strengthen perimeter security, enable predictive maintenance and use  natural language processing (NLP) algorithms for on-the-spot translation for troops, especially when facing adversaries along disputed borders.2

Ministry of Defence Initiatives on AI

An AI Task Force was set up under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in February 2018, which came out with recommendations in less than six months in June 2018.3 The report identified five areas for developing AI-based solutions for the Indian Armed Forces. These included lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), unmanned surveillance, simulated wargames and training, cyber and aerospace security and intelligence and reconnaissance.4

These recommendations were in addition to the proposals suggested by the Task Force on AI for India’s Economic Transformation of 19 January 2018, headed by Professor V. Kamakoti, which identified 10 domains where AI could be used.5 Pertaining to the sphere of national security, the four areas highlighted were related to autonomous surveillance and combat systems, adaptive communication systems, cyber-attack mitigation and counter-attack systems and multi-sensor data fusion based systems.

Based on these inputs, the Defence AI Council (DAIC) headed by the Raksha Mantri and the Defence AI Project Agency (DAIPA) headed by the Secretary (Defence Production) were formed in February 2019.6 While the DAIC has been established as a policy-making body, DAIPA is responsible for implementing DAIC’s policy decisions and has been tasked to come out with pragmatic solutions, in collaboration with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), academia and industry.7 An AI-based defence roadmap was formulated for the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) in August 2019, based on which 40 AI products were developed by March 2022.8

In the AIDef symposium, out of 75 products, 15 were based on Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), 10 on autonomous and unmanned robotic systems, 10 on intelligent monitoring systems, seven on manufacturing and maintenance, six each on process flow automation and NLP, four each on AI platform automation and perimeter security system, three each on internet of things (IoT) and operational data analytics, two on LAWS and one each on simulator/test equipment, logistics and supply chain management, block-chain based automation, cyber security and human behavioral analysis.9 Out of these, there were two projects based on Facial Recognition Technology (FRT), i.e., the iSentinel and the Silent Sentry system.10

The iSentinel notes that its capabilities will include ‘historical tracking of people’, detecting ‘emotions, facial expressions and body language for patterns of argument, restlessness and sweating’ and ‘behaviour analysis’ for threat identification.11 The Silent Sentry boasts of both ‘human detection’ and ‘facial recognition’.12 Both these products arguably use an AI-based technology known as FRT which is based on the quantification of distinctive features (80, as per one study) of a human face such as distance between eyes, distance from the forehead to the chin, etc.13 This data is then compared with a database to decipher the identity of the individual recorded by a camera.

Challenges of FRT in Counter-insurgency/Counter-terrorism Operations

Though a case can be made for the use of FRT by the Indian Army in counter-insurgency (CI)/ counter-terrorism (CT) operations in certain areas such as Kashmir or parts of the North East, there are some challenges that need to be surmounted. The basic principle behind use of FRT in a CI/CT environment is to identify threats to either an Army camp or a company operating base (COB). The AI solutions currently being marketed are for static installations, and provide an early warning for  defence measures to get activated.

The prerequisites of an effective FRT system are an exhaustive digital library or inventory of resident or terrorist facial data, excellent camera for capturing the images of individuals approaching the camp, secure and fast communications and strong processor for the mapping and matching algorithms to produce results in real time. Maintaining them in a CI/CT environment along with adequate power backup is a challenge, though these can still be taken care of.

The challenges of using FRT software in a CI/CT scenario, though, go beyond the prerequisites of a solid data set and hardware/software. Firstly, a decision needs to be made regarding the kind of identification required. If the intention is to ‘negatively identify’, i.e., any individual not matching with the resident database may be deemed to be an alleged militant and liable to be handled as such, the database and processing requirement is formidable. Increased urbanisation and search for livelihood has resulted in migrations from rural to urban areas. There is an inherent population flux in the rural and semi-urban areas that needs to be accounted for in the picture library which cannot be limited to a particular area, but needs to be expanded to the entire Union Territory (UT) and maybe even beyond.

If the intent is to ‘positively identify’, i.e., confirm the identity of a terrorist, militant or an over ground worker (OGW), an exhaustive database of such terrorists needs to be maintained. Such efforts may be hampered by the lack of updated photographs of such terrorists. The legal implications of creating and maintaining this database also need to be understood in detail by the Army. As of date, only two FRT projects are being planned to run in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). These include a project by the J&K Police which has collaborated with the Srinagar Municipal Corporation to install FRT across Srinagar to weed out terror threats. The second is by the Housing and Urban Development Department for authenticating identities of the applicants for residence.14

The use and maintenance of FRT across the country and by various state governments has also been challenged by activists in court. Add to this the challenges of poor visibility conditions, changes in surroundings, quality of photographs and finally the learning algorithm. False positives and false negatives are acceptable in any AI-based systems. However, in a CI/CT scenario, such outcomes may translate into a matter of life and death. FRT-based systems need to be test-bedded, vetted and analysed before deploying them in real-life conditions.

Further, FRT broadly has two subsets when it comes to recognising an individual. The first is the ‘facial recognition’, which identifies the individual. The other is the ‘affect recognition’, which attempts to decipher the emotions and thereby, the intentions of the individual. Affect recognition, though used by a number of FRT firms around the world, is based on shaky scientific understanding and may not be accurate or even correlated with the actual emotion of the individual.15 Applying dubious scientific standards in a CI/CT scenario may lead to cases of mistaken identities. Cyber security measures for the security of the recorded data also need to be robust, lest the recorded data be  hacked, spoofed or changed.

All these challenges are formidable and need a careful and even cautious approach to operationalising FRT. The Indian Army needs to consider these issues in detail before deploying AI-based systems in a CI/CT environment.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “First ever ‘Artificial Intelligence in Defence’ Exhibition & Symposium to be held in New Delhi on July 11”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 8 July 2022.
• 2. “Artificial Intelligence in Defence: Presenting AI Preparedness of the Country in Defence”, Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2022; Dinakar Peri, “Soon AI-based Mandarin Translation Devices for Troops on LAC”, The Hindu, 11 July 2022.
• 3. “Artificial Intelligence in Defence: Presenting AI Preparedness of the Country in Defence”, no. 2.
• 4. “lmplementation of the recommendations of the multi-stakeholder Task Force constituted by the Ministry of Defence for 'Strategic lmplementation of Artificial Intelligence for National Security and Defence'”,Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2019, pp. 1–4.
• 5. “The Artificial Intelligence Task Force”, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2018, p. 32.
• 6. “Artificial Intelligence in Defence: Presenting AI Preparedness of the Country in Defence”, no. 2.
• 7. Akshat Upadhyay, “Engagement or Estrangement: Gauging Indian Army’s Relationship with the Emerging Technologies”, Issue Brief, CLAWS, 11 February 2021.
• 8. “Artificial Intelligence in Defence: Presenting AI Preparedness of the Country in Defence”, no. 2.
• 9. Ibid.
• 10. Ibid.
• 11. Ibid., pp. 20–21.
• 12. Ibid., pp. 29–30.
• 13. S.B. Thorat, S.K. Nayak and J.P. Dandale, “Facial Recognition Technology: An Analysis with Scope in India”, International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2010. 
• 14. A. Jain, FRT Systems in Jammu and Kashmir, Panoptic Tracker, 2021.
• 15. Kate Crawford, “Artificial Intelligence in Misreading Human Emotion”, The Atlantic, 27 April 2021; Douglas Heaven, “Why Faces Don't Always Tell the Truth about Feelings”, Nature, Vol. 578, No. 7796, 2020, pp. 502–05.