The United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPK) have been evolving continuously and Bangladesh as a country has been playing an important role in it. The country wants to remain a dominant contributor to UNPK even in future as the participation brings several advantages in military, diplomatic, economic and social arena. Meanwhile, it has also been realised that to make the UNPK more effective, women have to play an important role as there are certain functions which women can perform better. Moreover, their participation ensures that peacekeepers get access to the whole population in the conflict zone. Presence of women in a contingent makes it more acceptable to the locals. This article argues that the participation of women in the UNPK has added value to it and inclusion of Bangladeshi women in the contingent sent by their country has proved useful in implementing the ever-growing
mandate of the UN operations.

The United Kingdom and Rwanda agreed to the Migration and Economic Development Partnership on 14 April 2022. The arrangement allows the UK to send an unspecified number of its asylum seekers to Rwanda. In return, the UK is providing £120 million for a development fund and to cover processing costs for resettled asylum seekers.1 The UK has also committed to host some vulnerable refugees from Rwanda. Since the announcement, the asylum arrangement has received criticism from several international and domestic actors.

Legal Challenges 

The first flight to Rwanda on 14 June 2022 was cancelled after a last-minute intervention from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) citing its ‘Rule 39’ provisions. The ruling stated that an Iraqi man named ‘KN’ faced “risk of irreversible harm” if sent to Rwanda.2  UK-based human rights organisations, such as Detention Action and Care4Calais, have also actively and successfully petitioned in UK courts against the removal of several individuals citing threat to their well-being.

The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has claimed that this move interferes with the right to apply for asylum under the 1951 International Refugee Convention of which the UK is a signatory. It not only alters the asylum claim provisions but also threatens the international framework for refugee protection. Additionally, the deal deviates from the guiding objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees that the UK supported in 2018.3

UK’s Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, in tandem with Article 31 of the 1951 Convention, provides refugees with legal protection against penalties. However, this protection is void in case of refugees “not arriving directly” and stopping in other countries before reaching the UK.4 Such cases have been particularly chosen for relocation, wherein, dangerous journeys have been made through small boats and lorries. In order to ensure a more equitable distribution of refugees across the continent, the UNHCR has strongly reiterated that asylum-seekers are not required to seek refuge in the first country they enter and are eligible for protection under Article 31.5 Penalties can only be imposed in cases of lawful applications for settlement in other countries before entering the UK.

The arrangement is also incongruent with the international law of ‘non-refoulement’. Article 33 of the refugee convention provides protection from return to not just countries of origin but also includes in its purview third countries where the individual may feel threatened.6 The UK’s recently introduced Nationality and Borders Act 2022 has altered and diluted this criteria of a ‘safe third country’. In addition, the UNHCR guidelines require individuals to have ‘meaningful connections’ with the receiving state.7   Section 16 of the 2022 Act now allows the Secretary of State to remove asylum seekers even in absence of a connection to the third state.8 Such moves undermine and destabilise the international legal provisions dealing with human security. The controversy has also re-ignited the long-standing dissension between domestic laws and international obligations. 

It is pertinent to note that the UK–Rwanda partnership is not a legally binding agreement in international law.9 Due to the nature of the agreement, it also lies outside the purview of parliamentary review. While the agreement allows the setting up of a monitoring committee, parties are not allowed to appeal any further in case of violation of obligations. The absence of proper redressal mechanisms endangers the security of relocated individuals. Even if the host country is unable to fulfil its commitments, there is no legal provision for the individuals to move back to the UK. The legal credibility of the Migration Asylum Plan is currently under Judicial Review, with a hearing scheduled for September. 

Channel Crossings and Costs

The asylum deal is being championed on the claim that the arrangement dissuades irregular channel crossings and reduces financial burden on the state. The deal, however, has failed to deter Channel crossings. According to the UK’s Ministry of Defence data, in 2022, more than 27,000 people have already crossed the English Channel irregularly to arrive in the UK (see Figure below).10 The statistics are significantly higher than previous years. On 22 August alone, nearly 1,300 migrants crossed the channel, setting a new daily record.11   In addition, according to the Border Force Union, more than 60,000 people are expected to cross the Channel by the end of this year.12

Figure1.People Crossing the English Channel in Boats

Source: “What is the UK’s Plan to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda and How Many Could Go?”, BBC News, 8 September 2022.

Similarly, the cost saving claims require greater scrutiny. While full details of the financial arrangement have not been revealed, an initial investment of £120 million has been made to Kigali as part of a new ‘Economic Transformation and Integration Fund’. In addition, the UK has also agreed to fund the accommodation, processing and five-year integration costs of each re-located individual.13 Some estimates suggest that the government could spend nearly £20,000–£30,000 for every resettled individual.14 Home Office Minister Tom Pursglove said that “the cost would be similar to the amount of money we are spending on this currently”.15 He claimed that the deal will reduce costs in the long-term. Recently, Yolande Makolo, a spokesperson of the Rwandan government, said that in contrast to the committed 1,000 for the initial phase, the country can currently accommodate only 200 migrants due to inadequate housing facilities.16

The presence of contrary evidence weakens the government’s claims on the intended impact of the policy. As legal challenges cast a pall of doubt over the implementation and the long-term efficacy of the deal, an effective reduction in costs and crossings is not guaranteed. If the deal gets implemented, large-scale removals would be required to actually deter migrations and save costs. More importantly, a migration deterrence deal cannot be expected to work in cases where humans flee persecution and undertake involuntary dangerous journeys in an attempt to save their lives.

Financial support by the UK government might be a helpful way to solve the immediate issues confronting Rwanda. The deal is currently a five-year arrangement. As a result, its long-term ability to support the country and the immigrants remains highly doubtful. In addition, the absence of checks and balances creates a lack of incentive for the recipient state to fulfil its obligations. Whether the finances are being spent on the intended objectives, that is the welfare of relocated asylum seekers, cannot be ensured. 

Rwanda’s Suitability as a Host Country

The practical assimilation of these refugees into Rwanda, amidst multiple human security threats, remains debatable. Rwanda already hosts nearly 1,50,000 refugees from several African countries and most unemployed refugees rely solely on state benefits of £35 per month.17 Of its estimated 13 million population, more than half of it survives on less than US$ 2 a day.18 COVID-19 and conflict-induced crises have also reduced the availability of resources to the local population, including access to proper food. Nearly 70 per cent of the population depends on sustainable farming for survival which is inextricably linked with high rural poverty.19 Additionally, Rwanda has a Human Development Index value of just 0.543, with a rank of 160 out of 189 countries.20 Additional refugees will inevitably put more pressure on an inadequate system.

The current agreement only excludes Rwandan nationals, unaccompanied children under 18 years and asylum seekers from EU countries.21 While the UK Home Office has emphasised on a case-by-case approach for removal, certain individuals under threat find no specific mention in the arrangement. These include members of the LGBTQI+ community. The Home Office itself, in its Country Policy and Information Notes (CPIN) report on Rwanda, has recognised instances of “discrimination and intolerance” against members of this community.22 Several human rights organisations have also accused the Rwandan government of unlawful arrests and killings. According to Human Rights Watch, in 2018, Rwandan authorities were alleged to have killed 12 Congolese refugees and arrested 60 over protests against food inadequacy.23 Such reports devalue Rwanda’s ability to follow provisions of the Refugee Convention. The arrangement also abdicates all forms of responsibility from the UK. In case of violation of human rights in Rwanda after relocation, the individuals will only have access to the Rwandan justice system for remedy.

To further assess the suitability and the efficacy of such deals, historical precedence needs to be taken into account. Since 2012, Australia has transferred more than 3,000 refugees to asylum camps in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. In addition to being exorbitant, the plan has failed to deter sea crossings. Australia’s offshore asylum processing systems have also faced allegations of medical neglect and inhumane conditions.24 Similarly, from 2013 to 2018, Israel attempted to formulate a similar secretive arrangement with Rwanda to transfer refugees. As several relocated individuals eventually moved out of Rwanda, the deal was halted after severe international criticism.25  

Conclusion

Attention has to be drawn to the concerning precedent that this deal may set. The asylum arrangement runs the risk of triggering similar policy reactions from other European states. Reports suggest that Denmark and Austria are in discussions with Kigali to implement a similar strategy of relocating refugees.26 Additionally, it cannot be guaranteed that these relocated individuals will not attempt to return to their preferred EU country through North Africa and via Central and Western Mediterranean routes.27  

Such decisions to outsource migrants falls short of offering long-term structural solutions that target the root cause of the issue. Inadequate systems of protection run the risk of escalating human insecurity further. In a broader inquiry, do such deals then signify a shift away from the global governance structures built for refugee protection, and are such bilateral engagements altering the course of the international refugee protection regime? Are such arrangements also marking a resurgence of the state-centric notion of security and subsequently a shift away from the non-traditional human security approach that the UN intended to advance? As the deal faces legal challenges, better-informed deductions on its success and failures can only be made in the long term.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UK and Rwanda”, UK Home Office, 14 April 2022.
• 2. “Why are Asylum Seekers being Sent to Rwanda and How Many Could Go?”, BBC, 7 September 2022.
• 3. UNGA framework for equitable responsibility sharing of refugees.
• 4. Melanie Gower and Patrick Butchard, “UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership”, UK Parliament House of Commons Library, 12 July 2022.
• 5. Ibid.
• 6. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”, UNHCR.
• 7. “Legal Considerations Regarding Access to Protection and a Connection between the Refugee and the Third Country in the Context of Return or Transfer to Safe Third Countries”, UNHCR, April 2018.
• 8. “Nationality and Borders Act 2022”,  Legislation.Gov.UK.
• 9. “Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UK and Rwanda”, no. 1.
• 10. “Why are Asylum Seekers being Sent to Rwanda and How Many Could Go?”, no. 2.
• 11. “Migrants Detected Crossing the English Channel in Small Boats - Daily Data”, Ministry of Defence, UK, 10 September 2022.
• 12. “Why are Asylum Seekers being Sent to Rwanda and How Many Could Go?”, no. 2.
• 13. “Factsheet: Migration and Economic Development Partnership”, UK Home Office, 14 April 2022.
• 14. Rahel Philipose, “Explained: What is UK’s Controversial New Plan to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda?”, The Indian Express, 30 April 2022.
• 15. “Why are Asylum Seekers being Sent to Rwanda and How Many Could Go?”, no. 2.
• 16. Charles Hymans, “Rwanda Can Accommodate Just 200 Channel Migrants – And Can’t Stop Them Returning to Britain”, The Telegraph, 7 July 2022.
• 17. “Why are Asylum Seekers being Sent to Rwanda and How Many Could Go?”, no. 2.
• 18. Ikaba Koyi, “Analysis: Rwanda-UK Asylum Deal May Cause Regional Refugee Crisis”, Al Jazeera, 14 June 2022.
• 19. “Rwanda at a Glance”, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.
• 20. “Human Development Report 2020”, United Nations Development Programme, 2020.
• 21. Melanie Gower and Patrick Butchard, no. 4.
• 22. “Country Policy and Information Note: Rwanda, Assessment, May 2022”, UK Home Office, 11 May 2022.
• 23. Lewis Mudge, “UK’s Rights Assessment of Rwanda Not Based on Facts”, Human Rights Watch, 12 May 2022.
• 24. Eloise Barry, “Britain is Sending Asylum-Seekers to Rwanda. It Sets a Dangerous Precedent”, Time, 14 June 2022.
• 25. Daisy Walsh, “What Happened When Israel Sent its Refugees to Rwanda”, BBC, 23 June 2022.
• 26. Oliver Moddy, “Austria tells Europe to Imitate UK’s Rwanda Migrant Deal”, The Times, 8 June 2022.
• 27. Frey Lindsay, “Migrants Are Taking Ever More Dangerous Routes To Get To Europe”, Forbes, 8 January 2022.

Summary

Advances in Artificial Intelligence will progressively multiply the threats, challenges, and opportunities from the national security perspective. Major Powers like the United States and China are investing big time in AI-enabled systems to enable them to maintain military lead. India is also taking steps in the field of military AI to be better prepared to face the future battlefield. Given the revolutionary implications for national security, the adoption of AI in the sphere of national security has its own challenges, spanning the ethical and regulatory realms.

Introduction

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a stream of study that involves creation of advanced algorithms that can mimic the human brain. AI is often termed as a technology but instead it is an enabler to a constellation of technologies. The unique characteristic of AI is its potential to be integrated across various applications. AI's wide applicability in almost every sector has seamlessly permeated our lives—from the service sector (where we use voice assistants like Alexa, Siri, social media platforms, e-commerce websites, and Over-the-Top [OTT] platforms), to healthcare, agriculture, climate change, and the financial sector. In the defence sector, AI has immense potential for applications like Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), cyber security, military logistics, autonomous vehicles and Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

The past decades have seen an exponential increase in the adoption of AI in public and private sectors, which has been attributed to the increased computing power, explosion of structured and digitised data with cost-effective storage capabilities and advances in machine learning algorithms. The advances in machine learning models have abled machines to surpass human intelligence in specific functional areas. For example, the famous IBM Deep Blue defeated the world's number one chess champion, Garry Kasparov, in 1996. In 2016, Deep Minds Alpha GO defeated world champion Lee Seldol in the GO game. However, these systems involved many human inputs in training, testing and validation. To achieve general AI, there is still a long way to go where systems are capable enough to perform a broad range of tasks with human-level intelligence.

This Brief explores how major powers like the United States and China are leveraging AI to bolster their national security framework in order to maintain strategic advantage. It also flags India’s efforts in the field of military AI and regulatory and ethical challenges associated with the dual-use application of AI.

AI and National Security

AI has attracted attention of policymakers and defence analysts because of its immense potential in the defence sectors. Recent developments in AI, for instance, have brought transformation in the domain of hybrid warfare.1 The US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) stated that AI "will be a source of enormous power for the companies and countries that harness them".2

The proliferation of AI is driving changes in the information domain, economic domain and military domain.3 In information operations, AI has immensely enhanced capabilities for not only data collection but also advanced analysis and creation of data. AI-enabled systems have been widely used for image classification from drone footage, geospatial data analysis, audio and video analysis and detection of forgeries, and deep fakes.

Private investments in AI rose to US$ 93.5 billion in 2021, which is more than double the investments made in 2020 and the revenues are expected to surpass US$ 300 billion by 2024.4  McKinsey estimates that AI has the potential to deliver additional global economic activity of around US$13 trillion by 2030.5 AI has penetrated the private sector so seamlessly that almost every organisation today is either implementing AI into their systems and products or is planning to adopt it in their organisational architecture. It is being widely acknowledged that AI has the potential to start another industrial revolution where the population size will become less significant for national power.

In the military domain, AI is enabling new autonomous capabilities and making them affordable to a wide range of actors. The dual use of AI has given weak states and non-state actors more visibility and options to ramp up their capabilities. The use of AI in the cyber domain has led to the automation of various tasks, from advanced persistent threat operations to intrusion detection and prevention systems that are available for both offensive and defensive purposes.

The military potential of AI has transformed the nature of battlefields, with more autonomous systems coming into the security landscape. The interplay of this technology with the defence systems has enhanced asymmetric warfare options. There are diverse applications of AI in the military,6 including in the area of ISR; Military Logistics; Cyber Space Operations; Information Operations and Deep Fakes; Integrated Command and Control; Semi-Autonomous and Autonomous Systems; and LAWS. The effective use of AI in applications in rockets, missiles, aircraft carriers, and naval assets and its integration in C4I2SR has made AI an essential factor in national security architecture.

Major Power Perspectives

Currently, more than 50 countries have published their National AI strategies to harness the benefits of this technology while addressing the challenges and risks associated with its fair use and governance. According to the Policy Note by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), national AI policies of over 60 countries have been published.7 Canada and Finland were among the first few countries to come out with their National AI strategies in 2017. Countries like the US and China have integrated AI into their military capabilities and enhanced their asymmetric means of warfare. The following sections will examine the efforts of the US, China in the field of military AI and place India’s efforts in context.

United States

The US is investing heavily to develop "next generation air dominance" technology that could include sixth-generation fighters and drones.8 Some examples include AI-based projects like Project Maven, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Squad X Experimentation programme, and the OFFSET programme, which has been successfully deployed in Iraq and Syria to identify insurgents.9 Military logistic software (IBM Watson software for predictive maintenance of aircraft and Ground vehicles—Stryker fleet)10 , cyberspace operations, autonomous vehicles like the Loyal Wingman programme (autonomous F-16), RCVs, and swarm drones are some other applications that the US is developing and deploying successfully. AI-enabled software like Clearview AI, SpaceKnow and Snorkel AI support federal efforts in identifying people, gathering geospatial data and analysing signals and adversary communications for high-value information, respectively.11

The US released its National Defense Strategy in 2018 that termed AI as one of the critical technologies that will ensure the US can fight and win wars in the future.12 In 2019, the US released its AI Strategy stating that “It is paramount for US to remain a leader in AI, to increase its prosperity and national security.”13

Figure 1. US AI Timeline

Source: Author

The US Department of Defense plans to invest US$ 874 million this year in AI-related technologies as a part of the Army's US$ 2.3 million science and technology research budget. The Biden administration is requesting US$ 130 billion for the department's research, engineering, development, and testing budget for 2023, nearly 10 per cent up from last year's request. According to the AI index report of 2022, the US and China have dominated the cross-country collaborations on AI. Despite scrutiny of Chinese companies seeking partnerships or investments in the US, there are more Chinese investments in AI start-ups in the US than vice versa (See Figures 2 and 3).14

Figure 2.  Comparison of the amount of investment in AI start-ups in the US, China, and the U.K. in 2020

Source: Jaing Yang, “AI Start-Ups in China”, Communications of the ACM, November 2021, Vol. 64, No. 11.  

China

China is treading the path of military–civil fusion with PLA-supported AI developmental goals. It has made significant investments in Predictive Maintenance and Logistics, Information and Electronic Warfare, Command and Control systems, battlefield software, autonomous vehicles, training simulators and ISR systems. Some examples include the ASN-301 (a reverse-engineered copy of the IAI Harpy loitering munition), the GJ-11 "Sharp Sword" combat UAV, AI-based applications for leak detection, fault diagnosis, and ‘smart warehouses’ intended to predict and fill orders for material, AI-based knowledge mapping and combat decision support, among other capabilities. StarSee, one of China’s military AI companies, successfully demonstrated tracking US naval assets in real-time off the coast of California in June 2020.15 Due to China's lack of real-world combat experience, war gaming software have growing importance. AI-enabled war-gaming software like DataExa's AlphaWar (inspired by Deep Mind's AlphaStar) is used for professional military training.16

In addition, China in 2017 released a strategy detailing its plan to take the lead in AI by 2030. The establishment of PLASSF (People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force) in 2015 and the New Era Roadmap in 2017 outline the complete AI ecosystem for the Chinese Army. According to its AI timeline, China is on track to become the "primary" centre for AI innovation to cultivate the AI industry worth 1 trillion RMB by 2030 (Figure 4).17

Figure 4. China AI Timeline

Source: Author

India’s AI Implementation Roadmap

India started its AI journey in 2018 when NITI Aayog came out with the National Strategy on AI.18 However, it did not cover the Defence sector and was majorly for the commercial and private sectors (Agriculture, Healthcare, Education, Smart Cities and Infrastructure, Smart Mobility and Transportation). In the Defence sector, India can be seen as a late entrant but has been making decisive steps for matching up the major powers in terms of investment, indigenous development and bilateral and multilateral partnerships on the adoption of AI.

Defence AI Council (DAIC) and Defence AI Project Agency (DAIPA) have been constituted with Rs 1,000 crore annual budget specifically for AI-enabled projects.19 Centre for AI and Robotics (CAIR), a laboratory of the Defence Research and Development Organization [DRDO], a primary laboratory for R&D in different areas of Defence Information and Communication Technology (ICT), is developing an Al-based Signal intelligence solution to enhance intelligence collation and analysis capabilities of the armed forces.

In July 2022, Ministry of Defence came out with 75 AI-enabled systems in the Def (Symp) specifically for the defence sector.20 In addition, 140 AI-enabled sensor systems have been deployed across Pakistan and China borders.21 The Indian Army will soon conduct trials of indigenously developed AI-enabled, un-crewed all-terrain vehicles in Ladakh for surveillance and logistics operations.22

Figure 5. India AI Timeline

Source: Author

To develop cross-country linkages in the domain of AI and to lead technology diplomacy, the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India in 2020 announced the New Emerging and Strategic Technologies Division. The US National Security Commission on AI in 2020 had stated that the US should form a US–India Strategic Tech-Alliance (USISTA) to develop Indo-Pacific Strategy on emerging technologies, considering India's increasing geopolitical standing.23 The India–US 2+2 dialogue called for strengthening the bilateral partnership on emerging technologies.24 At the QUAD Summit 2022, cooperation in the field of AI was flagged. India and Japan, in June 2022, also discussed essential areas of bilateral cyber cooperation and reviewed the progress in the areas of cyber security, ICT and 5G technology.25 India and Finland have also agreed to work on areas involving new technologies like AI and quantum computing.26

Regulatory and Ethical Challenges

Given the revolutionary implications for national security, the adoption of AI in the sphere of national security has its own challenges. AI has brought disruption in the context of the changing landscape of security with the increased presence of hybrid warfare, cyber security threats like ransomware and the growth of technologies like Internet of Things (IoT). Cyber-physical systems have made it a complex affair. According to a report by Computer Emergency Response Team-India (CERT-In), India observed a 51 per cent increase in ransomware attack in first half of 2022 compared to the previous year.27 In another report, it is suggested that by 2025, cyberattacks alone will lead to a loss of around US$ 10.5 trillion annually.28

Due to the dual use of AI (both military and civil applications), there is higher and easy accessibility of AI-based tools to non-state actors, which has further made it challenging to control the flow of technology. In addition, with the proliferation of social media, AI has become an inherent part of such platforms where it is being used to spread misinformation/disinformation, hate speech and radicalisation, further advancing national security threats. 

AI's extensive influence and success have the capability to alter the current power dynamics between nations. Furthermore, underfunded countries in AI may risk weakening their future military and economic dominance. For instance, despite the US$ 300 billion difference in the defence budgets of US and China, China is equally investing in AI as compared to the US.29

Key concerns on AI usage relate to ethical and regulatory issues. In the private sector, due to its easy availability and successful implementation, technology giants have control over the resources, which can easily lead to the weaponisation of AI. Authoritative nations like China are investing very heavily in such technologies and are deploying it against their own populations and even exporting such mass surveillance technologies to over 80 countries.30  

Some concerning factors with ethical issues include data access problems as data availability or data openness is a crucial prerequisite for enablement of the AI ecosystem. Data protection regulations and protocols should be devised to promote specific open data sources for research to gain new insights from proprietary data. Biases in data like imbalanced datasets, racial issues and poisoning of data can considerably affect the efficiency of the AI algorithms and raise ethical concerns. For example, in image classification software, any discriminatory or biased information in the data can lead to inaccurate facial recognition.

Due to the black box nature or lack of transparency of AI algorithms, it becomes difficult for the decision-maker to understand the choice of the decision being made and raises concerns about the criteria used in automated decision-making, which further creates distrust regarding the use of such systems. Another issue that requires consideration is the lack of international regulation on developing and deploying AI-enabled weapon systems, including LAWS. It will enable great power competition between nations and escalate the arms race.

The question of accountability and liability is a discerning factor in cases where AI-enabled systems malfunction, where human lives are at stake. Therefore, it is indispensable to devise policies and standards that safeguard the use of AI systems. Accelerating efforts in the development of common standards and practices for the use, development and sale of AI systems will enhance better collaboration in digital space. There is an increasing debate on global platforms for devising regulatory frameworks and common standards, which is the right direction to make optimum use of advances in emerging technologies like AI.

Key Takeaways

Advances in AI will progressively multiply the threats, challenges, and opportunities from the national security perspective. The military potential of AI can be transformative as it can be a tool of weaponisation to automate weapon systems and enhance cyber warfare. Due to its dual use nature, multiple AI-enabled systems are available with state and non-state actors, making it a factor of concern for maintaining strategic stability and deterrence. AI governance, ethics, data bias issues and regulations are significant challenges in developing a thriving AI ecosystem.

Creating a supportive AI ecosystem in India will depend on investments in critical infrastructure, tapping the private sector innovation ecosystem and capitalising on the developments made by the leading nations in AI. It is essential to identify challenges and risks associated with this technology and build trust in AI through awareness, policy and regulations, and human resource development. Indigenous development will be a key in adding value to our defence systems, and so will the multilateral and bilateral partnerships towards adopting AI. These could span joint development of technology, technology sharing and partaking in global policy formulation and standardisation.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, “Artificial Intelligence and National Security”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2017.
• 2. Christopher Gorman, “Recent Developments in AI and National Security: What You Need to Know”, Lawfare, 3 March 2022.
• 3. Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, No. 1.
• 4. Daniel Zhang, Nestor Maslej, Erik Brynjolfsson, John Etchemendy, Terah Lyons, James Manyika, Helen Ngo, Juan Carlos Niebles, Michael Sellitto, Ellie Sakhaee, Yoav Shoham, Jack Clark and Raymond Perrault, “The AI Index 2022 Annual Report”, AI Index Steering Committee, Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI, Stanford University, March 2022.; Neil Savage, “Learning the Algorithms of Power”, Nature, Vol. 588, 10 December 2020.
• 5. “The Global AI Strategy Landscape”, Education Intelligence Unit, HolonIQ, 25 April 2019.
• 6. “Artificial Intelligence and National Security”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 10 November 2020.
• 7. Laura Galindo, Karine Perset and Francesca Sheeka, "An Overview of National AI Strategies and Policies", OECD Going Digital Toolkit Note, No. 14, 2021; Abhijit Akerkar, “How AI is Advancing across the World Map”, London Business School, 1 February 2019.
• 8. The aim is an arsenal that “outpaces our competitors in the high-end conflict”, said Navy Vice Adm. Ronald Alan Boxall, Director, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment of the Joint Staff. See “Comptroller Michael J. McCord and Vice Adm. Ron Boxall Hold a News Briefing on President Biden's Fiscal 2023 Defense Budget”, U.S. Department of Defense, 28 March 2022.
• 9. Forrest E. Morgan, Benjamin Boudreaux, Andrew J. Lohn, Mark Ashby, Christian Curriden, Kelly Klima and Derek Grossman, “Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence: Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain World”, Research Report, RAND Corporation, 2020.
• 10. “Deploying AI in Defense Organizations: The Value, Trends, and Opportunities”, Research Brief, IBM Centre for Business of Government, 2021.
• 11. Paresh Dave and Jeffrey Dastin, “Ukraine has Started Using Clearview AI’s Facial Recognition during War”, Reuters, 15 March 2022.
• 12. “Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America”, U.S. Department of Defense, 2018. 
• 13. Terri Moon Cronk, “DOD Unveils Its Artificial Intelligence Strategy”, U.S. Department of Defense, 12 February 2019. 
• 14. “China is Starting to Edge Out the US in AI Investment”, CB Insights, 12 February 2019; Jing Yang, “AI Start-Ups in China”, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 64, No. 11 pp. 55–56, November 2021.
• 15. Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot and Ben Murphy, “How the Chinese Military is Adopting Artificial Intelligence”, Centre for Security and Emerging Technology, October 2021. 
• 16. Ibid.
• 17. Tim Dutton, “An Overview of National AI Strategies”, Politics+AI, MEDIUM, 29 January 2018.
• 18. “National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence #AIFORALL”, NITI Aayog, 2018.
• 19.   “Task Force for Implementation of AI”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 28 March 2022.
• 20. “Raksha Mantri Launches 75 Artificial Intelligence Products/Technologies during first-ever ‘AI in Defence’ Symposium & Exhibition in New Delhi”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 11 July 2022. 
• 21. Ajay Banerjee, “140 Artificial Intelligence-based Systems along Border to Keep Watch on China, Pak”, The Tribune, 7 August 2022.
• 22. Snehesh Alex Philip, “Army to Conduct Trials of AI enabled Unmanned All-terrain Vehicles in Ladakh Next Month”, The Print, 11 July 2022.
• 23. “US Body on AI Calls For Creating India-US Strategic Tech Alliance”, Financial Express, 14 October, 2020.
• 24. Saroj Bishoyi, “India-US Forging Tech Alliance Since Long. Now Use 2+2 Dialogue to Push it Further”, The Print, 11 April 2022.
• 25. “India, Japan Discuss Cooperation in 5G Technology”, The Hindu, 30 June 2022.
• 26. T. Radhakrishna, “Quantum Computing: India and Finland Agree to Set Up Virtual Centre of Excellence for Technical Cooperation”, The Economic Times, 21 April 2022.
• 27. “India Ransomware Report H1-2022”, CERT-IN, 2022.
• 28. “Cyber Security Statistics: The Ultimate List of Stats Data, & Trends For 2022”, PurpleSec, 2022.
• 29. David Floyd, “U.S. vs. China Military Spending: Which is Bigger?”, Investopedia, 30 August 2021.
• 30. Rohit Ranjan, “US State Secy Blinken Asserts China Poses Serious Long-term Challenges To Int'l Order”, Republic World, 27 May 2022.

Summary: China has made forays into the Pacific Islands through economic incentives, and has sought to boost its security relationship with the island states. The United States and its allies have also increased their engagement to strengthen their existing bonds. India can become a key player in the Blue Pacific 2050 strategy along with its partners like Australia to boost sustainable growth in the region. It can also carve a niche as a capacity-builder in helping the southern Pacific countries meet developmental goals and tackle issues like climate change.

Pacific island countries are no strangers to geopolitical jostling. The region’s current geopolitics bears the baggage of its historical legacy, created as they were by the whims of a French explorer in the 1800s.1 Chinese and American plays for influence are compounding the friction of existing internal fault-lines in this small but strategic geography. The 51st Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders' summit held amidst escalating regional tensions on 11 July 2022, in Suva, Fiji, saw the launch of the 2050 strategy of the Blue Pacific Continent. This strategy was deliberated over three years across the islands.2 Seventeen Pacific Island leaders committed to deepening regionalism as part of the strategy. Given existing internal divisions, this outcome was significant.3 Adding to this complex regional dynamic is the battle for influence by extra-regional powers.

China’s Expanding Footprint

South Pacific is becoming another hotbed for China’s rivalry with the US and its allies. China has made forays into the Pacific Islands through economic incentives, and has sought to boost its security relationship with the island states. China’s increasing presence in the region has unnerved the US and has caused alarm in Australia and New Zealand—both countries closely involved in the politics and development of Pacific islands.4

High-level delegations from the US, Australia, and New Zealand have visited the region amid growing concerns of eroding influence. Following Australia's efforts to "step up"5 its participation, traditional allies like New Zealand, the UK, have attempted to strengthen their involvement with the Pacific Islands through "resets”,6 "uplifts",7 and "pledges".8

While China's development support peaked in 2016, its loans and grants amounted to 8 per cent of all foreign aid to the area between 2011 and 2017, surpassing the US's 0.3 per cent over the same time period, as per the Sydney-based Lowy Institute.9 Between 2006 and 2017, China donated almost US$ 1.5 billion in foreign aid to the Pacific Islands area through grants and loans. During the same period, the US gave US$ 1.5 billion in economic assistance to the Republic of the Marshall Islands alone.10

Notably, China’s trade volume with the 10 Pacific Island Countries (PICs)—Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga, Papua and New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Niue and Federation States of Micronesia—increased more than 30 times from 1992 to 2021. China is the PIF’s biggest trading partner, after Australia and New Zealand. Its goods trade with these nations reached US$ 8.2 billion in 2017, exceeding Australia's US$5 billion and New Zealand’s US$1.6 billion. China is also the Solomon Islands' most important commercial partner. China is one of the top three lenders to the Pacific Islands, after the Asian Development Bank.

In recent years, China has aided in accelerating PICs’ connectivity by completing several significant infrastructure projects, such as the Independence Boulevard in PNG,11 the Malakula island highway in Vanuatu, and the reconstruction of the Tonga national road, and the Pohnpei highway in Micronesia. For the Solomon Islands, logging has been the dominant focus of its economic and trade ties with China, which accounts for more than 90 per cent of its timber exports.12 China also runs extensive training programmes for human resource development, including in such areas as public administration, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishing, and education.13

PICs have until recently been among the few countries that recognised Taiwan and maintained a strong diplomatic relationship. The region has for decades been the playground for China–Taiwan influence battles, and countries have leveraged briefcase diplomacy between the two.14 Until September 2019, six PICs—Palau, Tuvalu, Nauru, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and the Solomon Islands—recognised Taiwan, which soon dropped to four after the Solomon Islands and Kiribati severed their ties with Taipei.15

China, during the visit of Foreign Minister Wang Yi to eight island states in May 2022, proposed a wide-ranging economic and security deal. The PIF rejected the proposal as many member states with connections to Taiwan were excluded, and the grouping’s most prominent member Australia, also a significant aid provider, was left out.16

US Economic Engagement

In the PIF meeting at Suva on 12 July 2022, US Vice President, Kamala Harris, participated virtually. The US made additional pledges to strengthen its engagement with the region. The US has been a longstanding development partner of the PICs, having established the ‘South Pacific Tuna Treaty’, which has been a pillar of political and economic cooperation between the US and the Pacific Islands for the past 33 years. Harris noted that the US is preparing to request US$ 60 million of economic assistance over the next 10 years from the US Congress, substantially tripling current figures, following a new Economic Assistance Agreement with the Forum Fisheries Agency.17

The US and its allies and partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—established the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) on 24 June 2022. This new 'informal mechanism’ emphasises ‘prosperity, resilience, and security’ through close regional cooperation. With the introduction of PBP, the partner countries will be able to drive new climate change measures, and individually and together, counter China’s outreach in the region.18

Goods exports from the US reached US$ 548 million, while imports totaled US$ 420 million in 2020. The US and Fiji signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) on 15 October 2020. Suva was granted about US$ 247,000 micro-grants to improve economic stability and enhance women's financial empowerment, including establishing the Academy for Women Entrepreneurs (AWE) to encourage skill development and networking.19 Washington is also supporting Suva’s local organisations to find innovative industrial solutions with a new US$ 20,000 grant for the Pacific Tourism Association (SPTO) to engage with small tourism enterprises in Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Tonga.

India and the Pacific Islands

The South Pacific has occupied an important place in India’s foreign policy.20 Former President Pranab Mukherjee visited the PNG and New Zealand in 2016. The 14 PIC leaders’ visited India in August 2015 for the second summit of the Forum for India-Pacific Island Cooperation (FIPIC) (The first Summit was held in 2014 in Suva, Fiji). At the meeting, Prime Minister Narendra Modi termed India–Pacific Islands relations as a “partnership of equals”.21 The FIPIC foundation has significantly facilitated India's relationship both at the G2G and B2B levels.22

The Pacific Islands are grappling to address internal and external issues while at the same time battling threats like climate change.23   India in multilateral fora like the UN and COP26 has been leading the conversation on climate change and its repercussions on low-income countries. There are many areas where India’s potential role as a stabiliser and capacity-builder for the PIC can be leveraged.

Climate Change

India has been building its presence incrementally as an important development partner in times of need. India has committed to achieving Net Zero Emissions by 2070. Its ambitious new five-fold strategy Panchamitra, or the ‘five ambrosia’ to combat climate crisis, offers a critical meeting ground for collaboration with the PICs.24 As part of the strategy, India has committed to increase non-fossil energy capacity to 500 gigawatt by 2030; meet 50 per cent of its energy requirements by 2030 with renewable energy; reduce its projected carbon emission by one billion tonnes by 2030; reduce the carbon intensity of its economy by 45 per cent by 2030; and achieve net zero emissions by 2070. The PICs can work with India on enhancing cooperation in multilateral fora.25

Maritime Security and Conservation

India can become a key player in the Blue Pacific 2050 strategy26 along with its partners like Australia to boost sustainable growth in the region.27 The fifth annual ‘Our Ocean Conference’ in Bali redefined the Pacific Islands’ commitment to safeguard and protect the ocean and its natural resources. India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiatives (IPOI), launched in 2019, draws on the cooperation mechanisms to focus on seven pillars, which include maritime security, marine ecology, and marine resources. This aligns well with the Pacific Islanders’ goal to create a sustainable blue economy in the region.28

Capacity Building

While China’s investments focus mainly on infrastructure and military aid,29 India can look at capacity-building as its key focus in the region. India has already made strides in building capacity in the South Pacific and has helped these countries become self-sufficient in fulfilling their energy requirements. The Energy Research Institute (TERI), New Delhi hosted a training session on environmental sustainability in Suva, Fiji, in March 2017.30 A significant example of India's attempts to promote the availability of inexpensive renewable energy in the PICs is a training programme held at the Barefoot College in Rajasthan for women from Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu, Samoa, Kiribati, and Nauru.31  

Resilience Building

The PICs are small island countries and are among the most vulnerable to natural hazards like cyclones, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions whilst not having the adequate means to prepare and respond to them appropriately.32 Considering its “commitment to advancing development priorities of the PICs”,33 India can help strengthen disaster risk resilience capacities to guarantee long-term growth. It can take steps to strengthen their skills on early warning systems and space-based disaster management systems. India pledged to provide Climate Early Warning Systems to seven PICs in September 2017.34 Training programmes for Pacific hydrologists were also held in India in 2018.35 There is scope for enhanced collaboration and implementation of such kinds of projects.

Economic Development

Around 13 per cent of the PIC population was unskilled or under-employed in 2016, forcing people to seek employment in neighbouring countries.36  India can be of great assistance to the PICs in building their niche markets and businesses, given its own experience and success.37 FIPIC with its present mandate could play a bigger role in connecting and facilitating this exchange. A focus on the micro, medium and small enterprises (MSMEs) can help in the creation of niche market segments and expedite the pace of economic growth in the Pacific Islands. India has offered financial aid to these nations' SME sectors, assisting numerous small-scale entrepreneurs in developing their own businesses.38

Skill-based Development

There is an opportunity for India to become a key skills partner in the region. Ambassador to Palau, Shambhu S. Kumaran reiterated that “India sees itself as a skills partner of choice for Palau in the future”. With its renewed outreach to Palau, India is set to carve new areas of cooperation with the PICs on areas such as digital economy and information technology. Other sectors in focus include health, capacity building, education, and renewable energy. In recent years, India has financed grassroots initiatives like reconstruction of remote medical facilities and cultural site revival projects. India was one of the countries that contributed to the funding of the 7th ‘Our Ocean Conference’.39

Trade Relations

India must focus on increasing its engagement with the PICs economically. Most PICs' ties with larger nations have been shaped primarily by the assistance/development aid narrative. Pacific Islands are the hub of natural and mineral resources. Exports from these countries have increased by almost 169 per cent in the past 20 years.40 While New Delhi has diversified its investments and aid which was previously only limited to PNG and Fiji, it is yet to identify the full potential of its trade relations with the PIF countries. In 2018–19 for instance, India’s total trade with FIPIC countries was around US$275 million, with half of it accounted for by PNG (See Table 1).

Conclusion

India needs to use its longstanding presence in the southern Pacific to carve a niche as a capacity-builder and meet their developmental needs. Mitigating climate change and development of renewable energy are two critical areas where India can play a substantial role. India’s ambitious COP26 energy and climate change commitments, together with the Blue Pacific Strategy, can drive a major climate conscious and sustainably driven economy in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, India’s initiatives like the IPOI and its leadership in the International Solar Alliance (ISA) can help add value to the Pacific countries' fight on issues like climate change and renewable energy. The time is ripe for India to become a stabilising force for the good of the countries in the Southern Pacific.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Jules Dumont d’Urville named the Pacific islands Micronesia, Polynesia and Melanesia, after the smallness of the landmass, the multiplicity of islands and the inhabitants’ supposed higher levels of the pigment, melanin, respectively. See "The Pacific Islands Forum is Derailed by a High-profile Withdrawal”, The Economist, 14 July 2022.
• 2. “51st Pacific Leaders Islands Forum Meeting Concludes on a High Note”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Fiji, 14 July 2022.
• 3. Patricia O’Brien, “The Politics Behind Who is Attending the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting”, The Diplomat, 13 July 2022.
• 4. Graeme Dobell, “Geopolitics Looms Larger Than Ever at Pacific Islands Forum Summit”, The Strategist, 18 July 2022.
• 5. “Pacific Step-up Stepping Up Australia's Engagement with our Pacific Family”, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government.
• 6. Winstons Peters, “‘Shifting the Dial’, Eyes Wide Open, Pacific Reset”, Lowy Institute, 2 March 2018.
• 7. Laura Clarke, “UK-Pacific Partnerships and Shared Values”, Government of the United Kingdom, 3 July 2019.
• 8. “U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Islands: 2020 Pacific Pledge”, U.S. Department of State, 1 October 2020.
• 9. Herve Lemahieu and Alyssa Leng, “Asia Power Index Key Findings 2021”, Lowy Institute, 2021.
• 10. Ibid.
• 11. Hu Yifeng and Gorethy Kenneth, “A Bright Shared Future”, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China.
• 12. Josh Nicholas, “The $3bn Bargain: How China Dominates Pacific Mining, Logging and Fishing”, The Guardian, 30 May 2021.
• 13. “Fact Sheet: Cooperation between China and Pacific Island Countries”, Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 24 May 2022.
• 14. Jonathan, Pryke, “The Risks of China’s Ambitions in the South Pacific”, The Brookings, 20 July 2020.
• 15. Alexandre Dayant, "How Pacific Islands Leverage the China-Taiwan Tug of War”, The Diplomat, 1 August 2019.
• 16. Henry Ivarature, “The Rejection of China’s Deal Shows the Pacific will not be Used as a Geopolitical Pawn”, The Guardian, 1 June 2022.
• 17. “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official Previewing Vice President Harris’s Engagement With the Pacific Islands Forum”, The White House, 12 July 2022.
• 18. “Statement by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the Establishment of the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP)”, The White House, 24 June 2022.
• 19. “The United States All-of-Government Response to COVID-19 in Pacific Island Countries”, U.S. Department of State, 18 September 2020.
• 20. Biman Chand Prasad, “Opportunities from India-Pacific Islands Cooperation”, Focus, December 2012.
• 21. “PM's Closing Remarks at Forum for India Pacific Island Countries (FIPIC) Summit, Jaipur”, Narendra Modi, 21 August 2015.
• 22. See Forum of India–Pacific Islands Cooperation.
• 23. “Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific”, International Labor Organization, 2014.
• 24. “PM Modi Delivers India 'Panchamrit' Gift at COP26 to Fight Climate Change: Five Commitments in detail here”, Hindustan Times, 1 November 2021.
• 25. “India Helping Pacific Islands Fight Climate Change”, South Pacific Tourism Organization.
• 26. “The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent”, Pacific Islands Forum.
• 27. “Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership”, Australian High Commission, New Delhi.
• 28. Vice Admiral MP Mulidharan, “Indo–Pacific Oceans Initiative”, Indian Defence Review, 6 January 2022.
• 29. Xiao Liang, “What can we Learn from China’s Military Aid to the Pacific?”, SIPRI, 20 June 2022.
• 30. “India-Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Conference' to Enhance Co-operation between India and Pacific Island Countries”, The Energy and Research Institute, 12 May 2017.
• 31. “From Guatemala, to India, to the Sun and Back: Indigenous Women are Securing a Brighter Future with Solar Power”, International Fund for Agricultural Development, 8 March 2022.
• 32. “Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergencies”, UNICEF Pacific Islands.
• 33. Pragya Pandey, “India’s Outreach to Pacific Island Countries”, The Diplomatist, 7 March 2020.
• 34. “Climate Early Warning Systems Project for Pacific Island States Receives India-UN Development Partnership Fund Support”, United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, 16 June 2017.
• 35. “The Climate Early Warning Systems in Pacific Island Countries Project”, South–South Galaxy.
• 36. “Economic Growth and Sustainable Development in the Pacific Island Countries”, Asian Development Bank Institute, December 2016.
• 37. Vidhi Choudhary, “Even the Niche in India is Bigger than Most Countries”, Mint, 26 February 2018.
• 38. “Annual Report 2020-2021”, Ministry of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises, Government of India.
• 39. Leilani Reiklai, “India and Palau hold Consultations Post COVID”, The Island Times, 26 July 2022.
• 40. “Economic Growth and Sustainable Development in the Pacific Island Countries”, Asian Development Bank, December 2016.