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    Turmoil in Tunisia January-March 2021 Md. Muddassir Quamar

    Tunisia faces serious socio-economic, political and security challenges. There is a degree of political disarray on top of a serious economic problem aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. A decade after Arab Spring, Tunisia is once again at a crossroads, and its future depends on the ability of Tunisians to find a way out of the crisis, without compromising on the democratic gains made since 2011.

    On 25 July 2022, Tunisia voted in favour of a new “controversial” Constitution the drafting process of which had kept the country divided since 2021.1 Tunisia, the only relative success story of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, has witnessed serious political churn over the year. In a series of decisions, described as “unconstitutional” by political parties across the spectrum, President Kais Saied, who was elected in October 2019 in a landslide victory, dissolved the elected parliament, dismissed the government, and disbanded the highest judicial body. The president, on the contrary, described these moves as mandated by the Constitution due to the “unprecedented” and “extraordinary crisis” faced by the country. Consequently, Saied has taken control of all branches of government, accumulating power in his hands, and has even partially suspended the Constitution, raising fears of democratic backsliding.2 In October 2021, the president appointed a new technocratic government led by Najla Bouden, a former university professor and an official in the Tunisian Ministry of Higher Education, who became the first woman prime minister of not only Tunisia but of any Arab country.3

    The challenges facing Tunisia are multifaceted. In the run-up to the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections, Tunisia witnessed a series of street protests, reminiscent of the 2011 uprising, against rampant corruption, and for better services. Tunisians are also angry due to the monopolisation of power among the few political elites who emerged from the events of 2011. The Islamist Ennahda (Renaissance) Party has faced serious erosion in support and was reduced to 52 seats and 19.63 per cent votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections.4 The coalition governments formed since 2014, have failed to deliver on the primary demands of good governance and economic prosperity. It is because of these problems that the “power grab" by President Saied has evoked mixed reactions from the people, with protestors coming out both in support and opposition of the actions.5 The upheavals have opened up the question about the political and economic futures of Tunisia.

    End of Tunisian Exceptionalism?

    The most important question is related to political instability and democratic backsliding. As the majority of the Arab countries affected by the 2011 uprisings devolved into political crises, civil wars, and conflicts, or reverted to authoritarian regimes, Tunisia continued on the path of democratisation despite facing serious political, economic, and security challenges. The early political transition in Tunisia was steered by an elected National Constituent Assembly (NCA) that adopted a new constitution on 26 January 2014.6 The democratic process was strengthened due to the regular free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections carving an inclusive political system.7 The commitment of the Tunisian leaders to stick to the electoral process, and uphold the sanctity of the Assembly of Representatives of the People (Parliament) and the Constitution contributed to the democratisation. This, in turn, gave credence to the idea of Tunisian ‘exceptionalism’ to the otherwise opposing trend of strengthening authoritarian regimes or outbreak of civil wars. Although voices from within Tunisia underlined the challenges facing the country,8 the moniker of Tunisian exceptionalism continued to be widely used among international observers and media. 

    The political situation took a dramatic turn on 25 July 2021 when President Saied dismissed the government of Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and suspended the parliament.9 President Saied invoked emergency provisions enshrined in Article 80 of the 2014 Constitution underlining the “exceptional circumstances” facing the Republic.10 The suspension of the parliament was extended indefinitely on 24 August, and on 13 December, the president announced that the Assembly will remain suspended until the next elections to be held in December 2022.11 Eventually, the parliament was dissolved on 30 March 2022, after 124 of the 217 members of the suspended Assembly held an online meeting condemning the declaration of emergency by the president as an unconstitutional attempt at grabbing power.12 In September 2021, President Saied had issued a decree overtaking executive and legislative powers from the elected Assembly, and also partly suspended the 2014 Constitution, arguing that the political process in Tunisia needs a course correction.13 In February 2022, the president issued a fresh decree replacing the Supreme Judicial Council with a provisional body appointed by him, leading to fears that the president has accumulated executive, legislative, and judicial powers in his hands.14

    Economic Woes

    The moves by President Saied, howsoever abrupt, were not entirely surprising as they came after months of widespread public unrest against mounting economic woes, and the inability of the elected representative to bring about the much-needed economic turnaround. Tunisia has been struggling with economic woes for a long; notably, the unrest in 2011, sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, known in Tunisia as the Dignity Revolution (Thawarat al-Karama), was primarily caused by the precipitating economic crisis. Despite the country adhering to a democratic political process, the economic problems were far from resolved. If at all, in the subsequent years, the financial and economic troubles multiplied due to a variety of factors including financial mismanagement, rampant corruption, and a deteriorating security situation.15

    In 2020, the economic problems in the picturesque North African country became graver due to the outbreak of COVID-19. The pandemic led to lockdowns and disruptions in economic activities, but most importantly it brought the tourism industry, one of the mainstays of the Tunisian economy, to a halt affecting millions of Tunisians who directly or indirectly depended on it for their livelihood. According to the World Bank, the Tunisian economy contracted by 8.8 percent in 2020, while the rate of unemployment increased to 17.8 percent, and was much higher among youth (15-25 age group) at 40.8 percent and women at 24.9 percent.16 Besides, the number of people forced to live in poverty and categorised as "poor and vulnerable" increased to 20.1 percent.17 The fiscal deficit also increased to 10 percent of the GDP. Tunisia has also been struggling with inflation (6.6 percent in December 2021), and rising food prices creating serious challenges for the poor and vulnerable people.18

    A Political Outlier

    Kais Saied, a former law professor, was a relatively unknown figure until 2019. He ran as an independent in the October 2019 presidential election and belying all expectations won with a landslide margin getting 72 percent of the popular vote. His upset win was seen as a sign of the mounting discontent, and waning patience, among the young Tunisian voters who want the government to deliver on its economic promises. Saied’s campaign was also carefully crafted projecting him as an outsider who represents the people, and whose only agenda is to work for their welfare.19 However, his lack of experience and harsh criticism of the ruling parties made him an outlier among the political class. This led to the president and the previous government being on a constant path of collision since October 2019. Saied’s proclivity for admonishing the elected lawmakers, and the political parties for their inability to take strong economic measures created serious churn within the government leading to frequent changes. Hence, Tunisia witnessed three prime ministers between October 2019 and July 2021.20 But for Saied, the populist appeal and support from the deep state provided him the stage to grab power, promising far-reaching reforms and course correction.

    The Difficult Road Ahead?

    Tunisia faces serious socio-economic, political and security challenges. There is a degree of political disarray on top of a serious economic problem aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. There are also concerns about security due to the growth of radical and terrorist Islamist groups in the Maghreb and Sahel regions. Despite some public support for the president’s actions, there remain concerns about irreversible democratic backsliding, and continuing economic downward spiral. A decade after Arab Spring, Tunisia is once again at a crossroads, and its future depends on the ability of Tunisians to find a way out of the crisis, without compromising on the democratic gains made since 2011.

    *Dr. Md. Muddassir Quamar is Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.

    		 Tunisia
    The Impact of Indian Initiatives in Africa: Reflections on the Cooperation in the Health Sector January-December 2021 Pooja Priya

    Looking forward into the post-COVID era, it can be seen that India and Africa will further come together in collaboration with respect to the development of healthcare infrastructure and the reduction of emerging health issues. Other than providing regular medical checkups and post-covid care to patients, the Indian private sector has extended other initiatives.  Health care will continue as an arena for India-Africa cooperation in times to come.

    Africa’s Health Challenges

    In recent years, Africa’s health challenges have received a considerably higher level of attention in terms of research. The conventional focus on Africa’s health issues has been on HIV, malaria and tuberculosis. HIV is said to have originated in the continent of Africa and this origin can be traced back to the 1960s during which studies have suggested that approximately 2000 people were infected with HIV in Africa. This was further proved by the stored blood samples from an American malaria research project which was carried out in Congo.1  HIV in Africa grew rapidly till the 2000s, during which although there were advancements in treating the virus such as antiretroviral therapy (ART), there still is no cure or an effective vaccine for the same.2 Further, it is also crucial to highlight how HIV and tuberculosis are correlated to one another within Africa. It has been stated that the increased rate of tuberculosis in Africa has led to a rise in antituberculosis chemotherapy, which involves using intramuscular injection for one or two months as part of the treatment. This has in turn resulted in an increase in the use of medical injections and malfunctioning of it leading to HIV infections and death.33 Another leading health issue that Africa has seen in recent years is mental health disorders due to deep-rooted beliefs in superstitions and witchcraft in African countries. In the African countries, a few of the leading reasons for the lack of focus on mental health are poor medical infrastructure and policymaking, along with the strong spiritual beliefs that individuals and communities hold regarding evil spirits and punishment from God among others. These beliefs further lead to a misunderstanding of the aetiology of mental disorders such as dementia in leading African countries being led by Nigeria, followed by Ghana and South Africa.

    India -Africa nexus in the health sector 

    Having shed light on what were and still continue to be Africa’s leading health issues, it then becomes imperative to look at how India has played a role in maintaining health diplomacy with Africa as a region and with specific African countries. This can be seen in two different eras or periods, i.e. colonial and postcolonial periods. The cooperation between India and Africa in the health sector can be traced back to the colonial period i.e. the 1890s during which Indian doctors were sent to the east coast of Africa and particularly, Kenya. This engagement in history becomes a pivotal event in the process of installation of western medicine in Kenya and gradually in other parts of Africa.4 Stating the scenario of how the nature of the partnership looks like post the independence of India and African countries, it can be seen that cooperation in the form of lines of credit was extended by the Government of India in the areas of pharmaceuticals, ICT interventions in the health sector and medical tourism among others. The origin of India-Africa cooperation in medicine can be traced back to 2001. It was around this time period that pharmaceutical giants were suing the South African government because of their efforts in sourcing cheap forms of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs. It was then that the Indian generic drug manufacturer Cipla volunteered to sell the authentic drugs for less than one dollar a day approximately in Africa and paved the way for the development of a global action plan which focused on increasing access to medicines.5

    Further, the partnership between India and Africa intensified in the year 2016 when Indian Prime Minister Modi visited four nations i.e. Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya. The goal of these     visits was to develop mutual economic interests and developmental aspirations, which co-aligned with how India planned to export medicines to Africa along with creating manufacturing units within the region. This resulted in 80 per cent of African consumption of pharmaceuticals to be sourced from India. Further, this ARV has contributed to reducing the number of HIV/AIDS in the region. For instance, in 2017, 60 per cent of people living with HIV/AIDS in the African region were receiving ARV treatment, which reflected India’s cooperation with the region in the health sector.6Further, this has contributed as an achievement to the 90-90-90 targets of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, which focused on the reduction of 90 per cent of HIV-positive cases by the year 2020. Along with the intention to intercept AIDS within the region, India has extended other health initiatives to Africa such as the use of telemedicine, mHealth, mobile neuroophthalmology services, e-pharmacy, NCG-Vishwam Cancer Care Connect, Electronic Resources in Medicine (ARMED) Consortium, National Digital Wellbeing Platform, National Digital Health Mission (NDHM) and National Nutrition Mission. One of the recent additions is medical tourism.7

    Medical Tourism: mobility from Africa to India

    In addition to the other initiatives that have been discussed with respect to India’s cooperation with Africa in terms of the health sector, there are other pathways through which India has provided support in the health sector to the latter, i.e. through medical tourism. Medical tourism can be defined as the process of travelling outside the country of residence for the purpose of receiving medical care.8 In its traditional sense, it was understood as the mobility of patients from underdeveloped countries to their developing counterparts. For instance, patients from the western and southern parts of Africa have been getting treatment; in hospitals across India.91 In recent years, patients from African countries have confided in the Indian health infrastructures due to the absence of strict healthcare policies in their country of origin, issues with accessing minimal healthcare and the unavailability of technologically advanced hospitals.10 Consequently, the Indian healthcare system provides for the lack of the above; in addition to that, it has large numbers of highly skilled doctors with various specializations, affordability of healthcare in terms of finances and varied options of the hospitals that are being offered to African patients across different Indian cities.11

    In recent years, there has been a growth in medical tourism within African countries. This can be seen in the following ways, i.e. growth of local healthcare in Africa, the region beginning to politically respond to developing countries’ healthcare underdevelopment and further focus on advancing domestic health care. Additionally, due to the increase in the growth rate of the economies of the African countries, the image of “underdevelopment” has been slowly shifting towards the category of “developing”.12 This is exemplified through the construction of large hospitals by their Indian counterparts to be able to provide regular consultation, and postoperative care to African patients. Narayana is building a 130-bed specialist cardiac hospital in Nairobi in partnership with the International Finance Corporation and the Abraaj Group. On the other hand, Medanta, established Medanta Afri-care, an ultramodern medical centre in Nairobi in 2012.13

    Health cooperation in the light of the Global Pandemic

    The period of the global pandemic reflected the cooperation between India and African countries through health diplomacy. Due to the African countries’ inability to be equipped for COVID-19 due to poor healthcare infrastructure, there was a need for medical attention from India. Although the African countries depend upon several regions and countries i.e. EU, Switzerland, China, USA and others, India was estimated to have the most economically feasible health care provisions for the former. Since the start of the global pandemic, the social acceptance and medical diagnosis both seemed to have failed terribly, leading to the continent’s inability to fight the pandemic. For instance, as of 12 August 2021, the confirmed cases and deaths were recorded to be as high as 7,111,780 and 179,801 respectively. South Africa seems to be hit hardest with a substantial number of confirmed cases and deaths amounting to 2,554,240 and 75,774 respectively.14

    It is estimated that the Indian government has provided 270 tonnes of food aid to Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, and Eritrea to relieve the misery of people impacted by the pandemic.  India has also launched a capacity-building program for healthcare workers in African countries, through which teams of doctors assisted African countries such as Mauritius and Comoros to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, India has also provided medical equipment and telemedicine support with top Indian institutions such as the India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), and Raipur and engaged the local African institutions to train the frontline healthcare workers to combat and control the ongoing health crisis. Additionally, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) organized an e-ITEC course, “COVID-19 pandemic: prevention and management guidelines for healthcare professionals” to bring forward the frontline healthcare workers of the African countries. For mapping COVID-19 in rural areas, technical assistance in terms of ArogyaSetu and the E-Gram Swaraj apps have been shared with African countries.15

    Through this cooperation that was extended to the African countries by the Indian government during the COVID-19 pandemic, it can be said that the latter has maintained a cordial relationship with many African Nations in the health sector. This support has also further built Africa’s capacities in terms of meeting the Goals for Sustainable Development in meeting target number three, i.e. good health and well-being.  This cooperation has helped Africa look beyond the medical conditions that it was dealing with prior to the pandemic, for instance, the 10th Ebola outbreak in 2018, HIV and tuberculosis which according to the reports of the World Health Organisation (WHO) was already draining the medical capacities of the region.16

    Future Prospects in the post-COVID era

    Looking forward into the post-COVID era, it can be seen that India and Africa will further come together in collaboration with respect to the development of healthcare infrastructure and the reduction of emerging health issues. Other than providing regular medical checkups and post-covid care to patients, the Indian private sector has extended other initiatives. These include the setting up of Dr LalPath Labs, which is aimed to set up joint testing labs with local partners in African countries.17 Further, the Apollo group has set up hospitals and health centres within the African continent, which is educating people about the need to focus on health care and move beyond the local beliefs and notions of illness and disease. Health care will continue as an arena for India-Africa cooperation in times to come.

    *Ms. Pooja Priya is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, School of Liberal Education, Galgotias University.

    		 Africa
    Unraveling the String of Coups in Africa January-December 2021 Sindhu Dinesh

    The surge in coups threatens democratic processes and political stability in Africa. The root causes triggering the coups need attention. Government and political architecture in the continent have to be enabled and empowered. Political will, reform of organisational response and international support will play a key role in addressing the issue.

    “Africa is by no means the only part of the world where the prospect of democracy is in question. It is in question everywhere for democracy is in crisis all over the World.”

        - Claude Ake, Nigerian Political Scientist.

    In what was described as “an epidemic of coup d’états” by the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, the year 2021 marked one of the highest numbers of successful coups in a year in Africa since 1999. Although the number of coups in the continent have comparatively reduced, they still pose significant challenges to political and democratic stability in the continent.

    This article proposes to examine the spate of coups in Africa through the lens of internal factors that trigger a coup and explores the external dynamics that influence the occurrence of coups.

    Overview of the Coups in 2021

    In 2021, Africa witnessed several attempted as well as successful coups. In March 2021, there was an attempted coup in Niger which was thwarted by the country’s security forces.1 Attempted coups were reported and later investigated in Madagascar in July 2021.2 Besides these, there were successful coup d’états in Chad, Mali, Guinea, and Sudan. They raised concerns about the political stability and democratic processes in the continent.

    Chad: President Idriss Déby who led Chad for 30 years was killed during combat with the rebels in April 2021. Following his death, a military transitional council was immediately set up and his son Lt. Gen. Mahamat Idriss Deby was declared the head and transitional leader of the council. A charter released by the President’s office repealed the existing constitution and stated that Lt. Gen. Deby would “occupy all functions of the President of the Republic as well as serve as the head of the armed forces”.3 The council promised civilian elections in 18 months and tasked the transitional government to draft a new constitution.

    Mali: In May 2021, nine months after overthrowing the elected civilian government in August 2020, the military led by transitional vice president Col. Assimi Goita detained President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane. In what has been referred to as a ‘Coup within a Coup’, Col. Goita justified his actions by stating that he was not consulted for a cabinet reshuffle and that the transitional government had acted outside of its prerogatives.4 Eventually, he was announced as the Interim President by Mali’s Constitutional Court. The newly formed transitional government pushed the deadline for civilian elections from February 2022 to 2024.

    Guinea: In September 2021, an elite group within the military arrested Alpha Condé, President of Guinea for 11 years, seized power, and promised political reform. Lt. Col. Mamady Doumbouya, Head of Guinea’s military Special Forces stated that “government mismanagement” triggered the coup.5 He was later sworn in as the Interim President of the transitional government where he promised the drafting of a new constitution along with a transition toward a civilian-led government.

    Sudan: In September 2021, an attempted coup was thwarted in Sudan. However, the following month, in a military coup led by Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the military chief and head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok and other leaders were arrested, a state of emergency was declared, the Sovereign Council was dissolved, and Lt. Gen. al-Burhan was proclaimed the new leader.6 He stated that conflict within the civilian political circles necessitated the coup to save the country from civil war and promised to appoint a transitional government until elections are held in July 2023 as set earlier.

    As evident, the triggering factors and nature of each of these coups are similar and yet different. Based on the parameters of causes and nature, analysts have classified them into different types - military coups, dynastic coups, constitutional coups and soft coups. The various connotations given to the coups may help in the academic understanding of the nature of these coups but there is a need to decode the causes, challenges and speculate on a way forward to deal with unconstitutional changes of government in the continent.

    Causes for the Coups

    Factors triggering coups in these countries are largely internally driven like the political, socio-economic conditions and role of the military. Corruption, poor governance, populist leadership, inefficient administration, lack of political will and lack of resources continue to be the defining features of the political set up in many African countries. The conduct of free and fair elections, independence of judiciary, freedom of civil societies, efficient handling of security threats, improvement in social conditions have remained aspirational goals for several African countries despite having been democracies for decades. These issues hinder development and limit the democratic potential of the continent. Poor administration, corruption and inefficiency in addressing the escalating violence and deteriorating security situation has often been cited as the triggering causes by the coup leaders. They take over power promising to the people reform of the political system.

    The prolonged security crisis and neglect from the government have disillusioned the people about democratic processes and they instead hope coups would help improve their conditions. The military too has been disappointed with the poor handling of security threats posed by terrorist groups, affiliates of Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda and local groups like the Boko Haram. Additionally, despite increasing the defence budget, governments have failed to equip their armed forces with quality weapons/ammunition to execute anti-terrorist or anti-insurgent operations. These issues have in fact forced the military to consider coups as the only alternative to take administration into their own hands and thereby slowly improve the security situation, living conditions and political environment of the country. This is evident in the speeches and announcements made by the putsch regime in these countries.

    External Dynamics that Influence the Occurrence of Coups and Challenges

    Conditions within the region and the likely response of the neighbourhood play an important role in encouraging or discouraging coups. Particularly, the response of regional organisations in dealing with unconstitutional changes in the government of its members has a determining effect.

    Organisations in the continent like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) seek to uphold democratic principles. The surge in coups raises questions about their ability to do so. The response measures of these organisations to the coups include statements condemning the unconstitutional takeover, expelling the country from the organisation’s membership, freezing of financial assets, imposing travel bans on members of the military involved in the Coup, demand for a clear timeline of elections and so on. The recurrence of coups in countries despite these measures indicates their ineffectiveness. The response of a regional or intergovernmental organisation must be able to deter other countries from treading the path of coup as a way to address political grievances. However, considering the fact that these measures have been unable to do so, perhaps it is time to explore newer response measures to deal with unconstitutional change in government.

    The ECOWAS attempted a new approach in the case of the coup in Burkina Faso in January 2022. Instead of falling hard on the government with difficult measures, ECOWAS sought to engage with them and understand their requirements. This perhaps was successful as it helped facilitate meaningful engagement. Harsh measures from regional organisations have also led to the population feeling alienated and oftentimes, the putsch regime has used these measures as a narrative against the organisations. A classic case in point is Mali, as mass protests erupted in the country demanding Mali to quit ECOWAS because the imposed sanctions were further deteriorating the living conditions of the people.7

    The AU is mandated to promote good governance and take measures to prevent unconstitutional changes to the government. Although it recognises the unconstitutional change of government as a threat to peace and security in the African continent, the AU has not been able to effective due to lacunas in policy, difficulty in implementing frameworks like the ‘2000 Lomé Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government’ at the national level and others.8 Additionally, inconsistency in the response to the coups adds to the ineffectiveness of its response. For instance, AU justified the coup in Chad since Chad has a strong military and plays a crucial role in the security of West Africa; while it strongly condemned the coup in Mali.9 Although these organisations have relatively fared well, the response to coups has been inadequate.

    Other external dynamics that influence the occurrence of coups include the involvement of external players in the continent and the international reaction to coups. It has been alleged that foreign powers have been involved in the internal political dynamics and have been instrumental in facilitating the coups in some of these countries.10 In a study on coups, Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne assess that the lack of concrete and uniform strong condemnation of the coups by the international community encourages the militarization of politics as the military knows they will not face global isolation.11 While some countries like US, France strongly condemn the coups and call for the restoration of the government; others like China do not involve in the political affairs and stay focused only on economic ties. This adds to the challenge.

    Fallouts of the increase in Coups

    The rise in coups indicates processes of democratisation in Africa are floundering. Although the phenomenon of coups cannot be generalised, similarities in the four successful coups in 2021 can be observed. Three of the four, Chad, Mali and Guinea face tremendous security challenges and have been dealing with jihadist insurgency since nearly a decade. The inability of the government to handle the security threats and protect the civilians triggered not only the civilians but also the military as they were not provided with upgraded equipment and they instead kept losing security personnel to the violence. These issues ring true for several other countries in the continent.

    The democratic roots and processes of many African countries are certainly under threat, especially with the growing presence of China on the continent. External players like China have a policy of non-interference in the administration and do not push for democratic values unlike the US and western counterparts.

    Another trend is the emerging debate on political stability and democratic traditions in Francophone v/s Anglophone countries. Political reputation of Francophone and Anglophone countries in Africa has always been under scrutiny.  Comparatively, Francophone countries have fared poorly. Although the merit of such distinction would surely need deeper probing, it is interesting to note that all of the four countries are former French colonies.

    As discussed earlier, several African countries are reeling under the menace of terrorism, insurgency and jihadism. Largely the government apparatus in these countries is incapable of managing the threats due to lack of resources and inadequate training. Another factor is wide-spread corruption and government neglect of its duties towards all communities and sections in the society. The triggering factors for nearly all coups in Africa since the beginning in Togo in 1963 have remained the same. Coup leaders have justified their actions stating reasons like poor governance, failing economy, corruption, inability to quell growing violence and address security challenges. The problem evidently boils down to the need for an efficient and strong government. This would automatically negate any other factors that would necessitate a coup.

    The surge in coups threatens democratic processes and political stability in Africa. The root causes triggering the coups need attention. Government and political architecture in the continent have to be enabled and empowered. Political will, reform of organisational response and international support will play a key role in addressing the issue.

    *Ms. Sindhu Dinesh is a Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.

    		 Africa
    Exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) January-December 2021 Rajeesh Kumar

    UNAMID's exit did not emerge from a context of peace or progress towards conflict resolution in Darfur. Instead, the exit decision was essentially the outcome of the reflection that keeping the mission on the ground would not change the situation. Initially, the hybrid peacekeeping model was seen as a paradigm shift in peacekeeping operations, and many hailed it as the future of UN peace operations. However, the UNAMID has proven that cooperation between the UN and regional bodies is a complex issue. If the UN takes the lessons learned in Darfur seriously, UNAMID would probably be the first and last hybrid peacekeeping mission.

    On 22 December 2020, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to end its 13-year old peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Resolution 2559, unanimously adopted by the Council, terminated the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) mandate on 31 December 2020.1 The resolution also authorized six months for the Mission to complete the withdrawal of personnel and proposed establishing the United Nations Country Team as part of the transition and drawdown process.   

    UNAMID’s exit decision came after the landmark peace deal signed in October 2020 between the Sudanese transitional government and key rebel factions. The peace deal was a sequel to President Omar al-Bashir's ousting by a pro-democracy revolution in April 2019 and forming a transitionary government four months later. However, while UNAMID leaves Darfur, neither violence has ended nor has the human rights situation improved. It is a significant setback for the UN that the hybrid mission, which was regarded as a paradigm shift and the future of UN peacekeeping, is leaving Darfur without achieving its mandates. 

    Darfur Conflict and the AU-UN Peacekeeping Mission

    The conflict in Darfur between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) started in 2003. However, its roots and causes can be traced back for decades. Since 2003, the region has witnessed horrific civil war, violence, death, and displacement. According to the UN, from 2033-2020, nearly 300,000 people had lost their lives in Darfur, and about 2.7 million people had fled their homes.2

    This massive humanitarian catastrophe has brought international attention to Darfur. African Union (AU) was the lead regional player in mediating the conflict. Demonstrating its strong commitment, the AU took the initiative to establish political negotiations and brokered N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement between the initial two rebel groups and the government of Sudan. In July 2004, AU deployed a peacekeeping force, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor the ceasefire agreement.

    On 5 May 2006, the continuous efforts of the AU with the support of the UN resulted in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). However, it did not result in the normalisation of the security and political situation in Darfur. Often, challenges and expectations beyond its capabilities confronted AMIS. Its efforts have fallen far short of ending the violence and human rights violations in Darfur. As a result, on 31 July 2007, the UNSC adopted resolution 1769 authorizing a hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur.3

    UNAMID

    The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was the world's largest peacekeeping mission for a long period, with its authorized force of 26,000 and nearly 23,500 troops at its peak deployment in 2011. It is also the only peacekeeping operation led jointly by the AU and UN. UNAMID has the mandates under chapter VII to support the effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent armed attacks and protect civilians.4 It was also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying the implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, and promoting human rights and the rule of law.

    The deployment of UNAMID in Darfur has played a positive role in creating relatively improved life conditions in areas of their presence. During its 13-year operation, UNAMID involved more than 100,000 military and police personnel from dozens of countries. According to the UN, the UNAMID helped reduce the number of armed clashes in the region, improve access to previously denied areas, and participated in and enabled several peace talks between the Government of Sudan and armed groups.5 The mission also worked to empower women, address sexual and gender-based violence, and help the locals fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. It also contributed immensely to bringing voices from Darfur, including those of women and civil society representatives, to political discussions.

    However, UNAMID has encountered several intense challenges as well. First, the Sudanese government blocked and prevented UNAMID from accessing towns where attacks against civilians occurred. Second, its soldiers have been subject to frequent attacks and brutal killings since the beginning of their mission. UNAMID accounts for the second-highest fatalities in the history of UN peacekeeping, with 295 peacekeepers sacrificing their lives.6 Though it has been there for more than a decade, UNAMID has failed to achieve its benchmark targets such as comprehensive and inclusive peace, enhanced rule of law and improved humanitarian situation.

    UNAMID has also shown that cooperation between the UN and regional organisations is a complex issue. During the mission, the UN and the AU often sought to redefine their relationship, particularly the hierarchy of their relations. The two organizations also increasingly claimed different and competing bases of legitimacy. The mission also faced interoperability problems such as incompatible procedures between the UN and the AU.7

    Transition and Exit

    UNAMID’s transition and exit started as a “process to close the mission in the face of waning international support and overwhelming pressure from an autocratic regime that wanted it gone.”8 On several occasions, the government of Sudan undertook public campaigns demanding the exit of UNAMID. The then President of Sudan, Omar Bashir, often stated that the UNAMID forces could not defend themselves and had become a security burden for his government. He also accused that the troops came to protect the rebellion and not the citizen and demanded its early exit.9 These developments undermined the UNAMID’s effectiveness and relevance.

    UN's decision to cut its peacekeeping budget after the US decided to slash its contributions disproportionately also affected UNAMID, significantly. In 2017, UNAMID was one of the most expensive missions, with an annual approved budget of nearly one billion US dollars. However, in 2018, the UN slashed the UNAMID budget by 58 per cent, from $ 911,000,000 to $525,300,000.10

    In July 2013, against the backdrop of lack of progress on the peace process, continuous attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers, and incessant resistance from the local authorities, the Security Council called for a joint AU-UN strategic review of UNAMID.11 The strategic review held in March 2014, for the first time, discussed the idea of UNAMID's transition. Next year, a tripartite working group of the Sudanese government, AU and UN was set up to develop an exit strategy. In 2017, the UN voted to reduce the number of UNAMID troops by 44 per cent and the number of police by about 27 per cent.12 In 2018, the Security Council resolution 2429 directed UNAMID to draw down its operations in Darfur and reduce its troop ceiling by 54 per cent.13 The resolution also discussed potential exit of the UNAMID in June 2020. Since then, UNAMID has been working with United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in Sudan to prepare for its eventual drawdown and exit.

    However, while the UNAMID was preparing to exit Darfur, on the other side, a popular protest began against President al-Bashir, and he declared a state of emergency. In April 2019, al-Bashir was ousted by the military, and a Transitional Military Council (TMC) took over the power. In June 2020, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMID till 31 December 2020.14 Moreover, the UN also authorized a new mission, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), to assist the political transition in Sudan.15

    Conclusion

    UNAMID's exit did not emerge from a context of peace or progress towards conflict resolution in Darfur. Instead, the exit decision was essentially the outcome of the reflection that keeping the mission on the ground would not change the situation. Whereas many past peacekeeping missions were able to exit with a marker of political stability, UNAMID left before the conclusion of an inclusive political settlement. Active fighting continued in the mission's zone of operations when the drawdown process started, and over 2 million people remained displaced.

    Moreover, from the perspective of the UN and AU also, the UNAMID was disappointing. Initially, the hybrid peacekeeping model was seen as a paradigm shift in peacekeeping operations, and many hailed it as the future of UN peace operations. However, the UNAMID has proven that cooperation between the UN and regional bodies is a complex issue. The mission also highlighted the importance of the principle of host-state consent and cooperation in UN peacekeeping operations. If the UN takes the lessons learned in Darfur seriously, UNAMID would probably be the first and last hybrid peacekeeping mission.

    *Dr. Rajeesh Kumar is Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (            MP-IDSA), New Delhi.

    • 1. Security Council resolution 2559 (2020) on termination of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as of 31 Dec. 2020.
    • 2. 'Sudan: Intercommunal clashes displace tens of thousands in volatile Darfur region', UN News, January 7, 2020, at https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054911 (Accessed April 15, 2022)
    • 3. Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) on establishment of AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
    • 4. Ibid.
    • 5. ‘UNAMID infographic’, United Nations Peacekeeping, at  https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unamid-infographic (Accessed April 22, 2022)
    • 6. ‘Fatalities’, United Nations Peacekeeping, at  https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities (Accessed August 9, 2022)
    • 7. Security Council Report, ‘Working together for Peace and Security in Africa: The Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council,’ Special Research Report No. 2, May 10 2011.
    • 8. Daniel Forti, ‘Walking a Tightrope: The Transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS in Sudan’, International Peace Institute, February 2021, at https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Walking_a_Tightrope_Sudan.pdf (Accessed April 15, 2022)
    • 9. 'Sudan's Bashir slams U.N. peacekeepers, demands they leave', Reuters, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur-unamid-idUSKCN0JE0BB20141130 (Accessed March 31, 2022)
    • 10. 'Peacekeeping Budget Approval and Cuts Leave Fundamental Questions Unaddressed', IPI Global Observatory, at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/09/peacekeeping-budget-approval-cuts-questions-unaddressed/ (Accessed August 10, 2022)
    • 11. Security Council resolution 2113 (2013) on extension of the mandate of AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 31 Aug. 2014.
    • 12. Security Council resolution 2363 (2017) on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2018.
    • 13. Security Council resolution 2429 (2018) on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2019.
    • 14. Security Council resolution 2525 (2020) on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 31 December 2020.
    • 15. Security Council resolution 2524 (2020) on establishment of the Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS).
    		 UN Peacekeeping
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    		 Peacekeeping

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