Need for Persevering with the Dialogue Process in Jammu & Kashmir
Gautam Sen
November 01, 2016
It is essential that the dialogue process continues and additional steps are taken to resolve the deep sense of alienation presently prevailing among the civil society in the Kashmir Valley.
The latest process of dialogue with Kashmir Valley separatists initiated by the Yashwant Sinha-led five-member delegation is an interesting development. Notwithstanding Sinha’s claim that the delegation does not have an official status, the efforts of his team may be viewed as a Track-II internal dialogue process between the Government of India (GOI) and the Hurriyat group of Indian separatists and other stakeholders. The composition of the delegation seems to have been worked out carefully in consultation and with the blessings and support of the authorities. Wajahat Habibullah, a member of the delegation, was a former senior government functionary and has wide experience in the state’s administrative affairs. Air Vice Marshal (retd.) Kapil Kak and journalist Bharat Bhusan have an appreciation of Kashmir affairs, while Shushova Barve, a member of the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation, has experience working on civil society issues.
During their visit which began on October 25, the delegation interacted with most of the main Hurriyat leaders, the Kashmir Chamber of Commerce representatives, and held discussions with Governor N.N. Vohra and Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti. It is significant that Vohra stressed on the need for a `sustained` dialogue with all stakeholders. It is appropriate that the dialogue process has resumed despite the continuing civil unrest in the aftermath of the death of Burhan Wani of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in a counter-insurgency operation on July 8.
The scale of the present upsurge significantly differs from past spells of unrest in 2008 or in 2010. An entire generation of youth and civil society at large seems to be involved now, even beyond the influence and control of the Hurriyat, with hardcore Pakistan-engineered militants instigating the agitators at selective places. A multi-pronged intervention is therefore required on a long-term and planned basis, to impress upon the middle rung of Kashmiri society and particularly the youth about the bona fides of the Indian state to promote economic welfare without compromising their distinctive ethnicity and culture under norms of democratic governance.
It is noteworthy that the 26-member all-party parliamentary delegation headed by Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh, deputed to the Valley in early September 2016, failed to establish contact with the Hurriyat leaders as well as groups of protestors. It appears, in retrospect, that the temporary or one-time nature of the deputation without a clear long-term mandate did not elicit any positive response from the people of the Valley and the separatist leaders. The general impression in the Valley was that the delegation’s visit was more for optics and that the delegation was of a diffuse composition and not suitably empowered with a clear set of objectives to initiate a meaningful dialogue.
The Yashwant Sinha-led delegation has made a beginning on initiating preliminary discussions at least with some of the major stakeholders. The circumstances at the time of the parliamentary delegation`s visit to the Valley and those prevailing at present, after the recent cross-Line of Control (LoC) military action by India, are contextually different. With the military situation exacerbating along the LoC and also the International Boundary (IB) portion of the India-Pakistan border in J&K, the requirement for a political accommodation within the Valley needs no emphasis.
The response from the separatists though has been one of caution. Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, leader of one of the Hurriyat factions, has noted that, given that the whole valley is burning, measures limited to the security forces deciding not to use pellet guns for crowd control would not suffice. Another Hurriyat leader, Yaseen Malik, seems to have conveyed a more nuanced response by stating that dialogue is the only way forward for resolution of disputes. There should not be any illusion among those political elements in the Valley inclined towards separatism that involvement of Pakistan in the dialogue process as the third stakeholder will be totally unacceptable to India, at least at this stage and especially directly.
Only after first reaching some understanding on the basics of what constitutes the Kashmiri socio-political entity and how it can be protected within the Indian constitutional ambit or in juxtaposition to it by constitutionally secured guarantees could Pakistan be brought into the dialogue process. This of course would be contingent on an understanding between New Delhi and Islamabad about obviating cross-border infiltration into India under an agreed, verifiable or guaranteed process. These are all future scenarios, the evolution of which will depend on many factors including on how international pressure works in dissuading Islamabad from pushing infiltrators into the Valley or destabilizing the security situation on the border or elsewhere.
It is important, however, that the dialogue process that has been initiated continues, with the state government and the stakeholders of Jammu and Ladakh regions gradually brought into the loop. Parallel action is also needed to instill confidence among the youth of the Valley and their families. Some unique steps may have to be contemplated, including the possibility of extending examination schedules to enable the teaching of the curriculum of schools and colleges to be completed. This is on account of the time lost due to the recent agitations. Most importantly, a majority of those arrested may be released except for those directly involved in the killings of security personnel or in the snatching of weaponry from security personnel or other government sources. Special recuperative treatment under complete government care for those maimed by metallic pellets fired from special guns for crowd control would be another such measure.
An assurance for an eventual `Truth and Reconciliation Commission` on the pattern adopted in South Africa as a mutual atonement measure between the Indian state and the protesters may also be inescapable as a healing touch. Such measures are likely to instill confidence among the youth about the sincerity of governmental efforts to resolve the deep sense of alienation presently prevailing among the civil society in the Valley. Some symbolic action by the Union Government, say, restricting the territorial jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) to certain specified areas like vulnerable border zones, military establishments, sensitive installations, among others, is also likely to have a major positive impact towards perception management of the presently alienated populace. Without some concomitant measures as indicated above, it may not be possible to sustain the nascent dialogue process.
Finally, the state government would have to have a defined role in the dialogue process. Though the initiative in carrying forward the dialogue process would remain with the Track-II delegation with tacit support from the Union Government, the delegation cannot succeed unless some of the confidence building steps outlined above (and more) can be put in place on the law and order and socio-economic fronts. In these respects, supportive or complementary action by the state government would be of essence. The requisite political will and adoption of a long-term view by both the union and state governments is essential for the dialogue process to succeed in the interests of the people of India and of Jammu & Kashmir.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served in senior positions of the Central Government and in Jammu & Kashmir.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Is Turkey’s insistence on a military role in Mosul a strategic miscalculation?
Md. Muddassir Quamar
October 28, 2016
Turkey’s insistence on a role for itself risks escalating the already fraught sectarian situation in Iraq, undermining Iraqi sovereignty and not yielding any significant military or political gains for itself.
Turkey’s insistence on a role for itself in the ongoing joint offensive of Iraqi armed forces and Kurdish Peshmarga supported by limited US ground forces and air strikes to liberate Mosul from the Islamic State’s control has created rifts between Ankara and Baghdad. In the run up to the operation, named Qadimun ya Naynawa (We are coming Nineveh), on 11 October, while addressing a press meet in Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to “know his place” in response to Abadi’s call for Turkey to withdraw its troops from Bashiqa. Iraq is wary of a role for Turkey as it fears that the latter can undermine the Abadi government’s ability to control Mosul after liberation from the Islamic State. For its part, Turkey insists on a role to protect its interests (see below). Attempts by the US to mediate and coax Turkey into working under the US-led coalition have not yielded results.
Turkey has multiple reasons for insisting upon a role for itself. Firstly, it argues that Turkish forces are based in Bashiqa to provide training for the Kurdish Peshmarga and that its forces have been invited by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It also argues that Baghdad had been informed of these plans and that Turkey is cooperating with the Masoud Barzai government in the fight against the Islamic State. Secondly, Turkey has interests in northern Iraq because of the domestic Kurdish question and the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Since the breakdown of Turkey-PKK peace talks in mid-2015, Turkey has intensified military action against the PKK and does not want the latter to maintain military bases in northern Iraq. The Kurdish insurgency in Turkey is a major domestic challenge and numerous peace talks have failed to resolve the issue. Moreover, Turkey has been worried about growing Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and Syria and the chances of a transnational Kurdish movement for autonomy which can provide impetus to Kurdish separatists in Turkey.
Thirdly, Turkey is also concerned about the post-Islamic State power configuration in Mosul. It is supporting the former governor of Nineveh, Atheel al-Nujaifi, and the Sunni militia loyal to him and wants him to have a leading role in Mosul after the city’s liberation. Turkey fears that a significant role for Baghdad and the Shia militia supported by Iran could lead to loss of Turkish influence in northern Iraq. Further, Turkey wishes to maintain good ties with the KRG for both economic and strategic reasons. But Iraq wishes to control Mosul and does not want it to slip under KRG control because of its oil-rich topography. Further, Iran is also insisting upon a role for the Shia militia as that will increase its own influence. Turkey also has concerns about the ability of the PKK and the Islamic State to launch attacks in its Kurdish dominated south-eastern region, which is already witnessing unrest.
Fourthly, Erdoğan has domestic political reasons to insist on an independent military role for Turkey in the battle for Mosul. His going public with criticism of Abadi and telling the latter to “know his place” serves well to trump up domestic support for the AKP. In the last few months, Turkey has witnessed several terrorist attacks leading to a number of deaths as well as a failed ‘coup’ attempt leading to opposition parties accusing the AKP government of inability to maintain peace and stability, staging a counter coup and stifling dissent. Under these circumstances, a direct military involvement in Mosul would give Erdoğan a premise to thump up AKP’s traditional support base and also appeal to Turkish nationalists. Finally, Erdogan’s insistence on a direct military role also hints at his neo-Ottoman ambitions.
Though Turkey has thus multiple reasons for insisting upon a role for itself in the battle for Mosul, the way Erdoğan has gone about it is fraught with danger. The situation in Iraq is fragile and sectarian violence frequent because of the rise of the Islamic State. Shia militias, especially those supported by Tehran such as the Kata’ib Hezbollah, have been accused of torturing and massacring Sunnis during the operation to liberate Falluja from the Islamic State’s control. If Turkey insists on a role for itself, the Shia militias will also want to have a role and that can lead to further bloodshed and an intensification of the sectarian violence. Moreover, it gives former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki a weapon to undermine the Haider al-Abadi government. It will also create problems between Baghdad and Erbil, which do not see eye to eye on Mosul’s future after its retake from the Islamic State. While the KRG wishes to bring Mosul under its control, for Baghdad this is not acceptable as it undermines the central authority.
Notably, the situation in Mosul is complicated. Although early signs indicated a fast advance by the coalition forces, the Islamic State is unlikely to give up all that easily a strategic location like Mosul. The city is not only a political base for the Islamic State but also allows it to control the supply routes to its territories in Iraq and Syria. Reports suggest that the leadership of the Islamic State including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is no more located in Mosul and it has been argued that the Islamic State can enter into a prolonged urban warfare in and around Mosul which is a highly populated area. In such a situation, the battle for Mosul can turn into a humanitarian crisis and hence demands cooperation rather than rifts.
Turkey’s unwillingness to agree to a role under the US-command emanates from domestic reasons – maintain the ruling party’s support base and underscore the Turkish ability to take military action to nullify all threats even if located outside its borders. However, such an approach is short-sighted as it can lead to an intensification of violence by PKK insurgents inside Turkey. Further, it risks escalating the already fraught sectarian situation in Iraq, undermining Iraqi sovereignty and not yielding any significant military or political gains for itself. By agreeing to work under the US command, Turkey can secure its interests without antagonizing Iraq or starting a strategic competition with Iran, and without risking further escalation in the sectarian fault lines that could engulf the entire region including Turkey. Given all this, Turkey’s insistence on a direct military role for itself in the battle for Mosul is an avoidable strategic risk.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Colombian Naval Development: Emphasis on Indigenous Capabilities
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
October 28, 2016
COTECMAR has emerged as a viable and innovative supplier of naval vessels to the Colombian Navy.
Colombia’s naval forces attract little attention outside of the Latin America-Caribbean region. The Colombian Navy (ARC) has a personnel strength of 35,000, a large percentage of of whom are naval infantry, reflecting the service’s dominant task of conducting counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations. The ARC has limited numbers of vessels designed for traditional naval warfare, comprising of four German built missile frigates of the Almirante Padilla class commissioned between 1983 and 1984 and 4 submarines (2 each of the Type 206A and Type 209 classes). In addition, a motley collection of second-hand vessels from the Republic of Korea and the United States provide the bulk of the patrol assets. Increasingly however, Colombia is relying on locally built vessels and has developed an extensive range of innovative designs to meet the needs of low-intensity maritime conflict. These include Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), Coastal Patrol Vessels (CPVs) as well as riverine surface combatants that are unique to Colombia.
At the heart of Colombia’s indigenous ship-building capabilities is COTECMAR - Corporación de Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo de la Industria Naval Marítima y Fluvial (Science and Technology Corporation for the Development of the Naval and Fluvial Maritime Industry). This is a state run entity working closely with three Colombian universities and the ARC to develop an indigenous ship design and construction capability for the Colombian military. COTECMAR is headed by a serving naval officer of the rank of Rear Admiral and its design and administrative sections are also led by naval personnel. This has ensured a very close relationship between the end-user and the designers. Feedback from the navy is quickly taken into consideration by the designers for either successor vessels or modifications to existing assets. In many ways, this strong partnership between the shipyard and the user has contributed to COTECMARs growing reputation within the region especially when combined with satisfactory build times and quality.
COTECMAR’s design bureau is small and is comprised largely of young naval architects and engineers trained at national and international institutes working under the direction of project leaders who are serving naval officers. Appreciating its limitations, the company has sought expertise from more established shipbuilders, with an emphasis on mastering design concepts rather than on reverse engineering of systems. Colombia though still imports all weapons, sensors, and propulsion systems and remains heavily dependent on imports to make local designs come to fruition as well as to undertake upgrades of ageing platforms – of increasing priority for all Latin American navies.
As the four German-made frigates began showing signs of age and systems obsolescence, Colombia embarked upon a relatively ambitious upgrade plan. Thales in association with COTECMAR undertook the work to upgrade the Almirante Padilla class with new sensors and weapons. Though Thales handled much of the integration work, the experience would have stood COTECMAR in good stead. Overhauls and limited upgrades were also conducted by COTECMAR in respect of the ARC’s submarines and logistics vessels. While its ability to manufacture and even upgrade major surface combatants is yet nascent, COTECMAR has been able to demonstrate its prowess in the production of OPVs, CPVs and a host of specialized riverine vessels.
After a long search for partners who would share design know-how and transfer intellectual property rights, COTECMAR selected Fassmer of Germany as its partner for an ambitious project to create a class of Patrulleros de Zona Marítima (PZM: Maritime Zone Patrol Boats) to be used by Chile, Colombia and Argentina. While Argentina seems to have discontinued work on the project, Chile and Colombia have pressed ahead. Chile was content with producing four of the basic Fassmer 80m OPV (Fasmer 80) design – two of which are in service and two more having been launched. Columbia though became much more ambitious. Obtaining design knowledge and guidance from Fassmer, COTECMAR redesigned the basic Fassmer 80 design to give it greater troop carrying capability, much longer range (with a lower top speed) and greater fuel economy. The resulting vessel - the 20 de Julio – was commissioned in 2012 and saw extensive service in counter-narcotics operations and Exclusive Economic Zone patrols.
The 20 de Julio was deemed to be a success in service but responding to user feedback from the navy, the follow-on ship, the 7 de Agosto (commissioned in 2014) incorporated several modifications including Colombia’s first remotely controlled weapons system (rather than the earlier Browning M2HB 0.50 machine guns), a helicopter hangar and platform capable of carrying a larger helicopter (Bell 412/UH-1N types as opposed to Eurocopter AS.355s in the case of 20 de Julio). Of particular interest is the adoption of a stern launch ramp – widely used for Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) – to deploy a full-sized Midnight Express interceptor with an attendant increase in interdiction capability.
A similar partnership with STX of the Republic of Korea for CPVs of the CPV-46 design resulted in COTECMAR developing the Fassmer 40 CPV into a much improved 46 metre design. Two of the vessels were built by STX in the ROK – PC 147 Punta Soldado and PC 148 Punta Ardita – while another PC 146 Punta Espada was built by COTECMAR. If the planned class of 16 such vessels materializes, it will provide much needed replacements for the ARC’s rapidly ageing force of CPVs, most of which are over two decades old. Colombia has also started to produce its own landing craft to replace former American vessels of that type currently in service.
COTECMAR needed no foreign collaboration to produce a unique series of riverine craft which have seen extensive service against insurgents as well as narcotics traffickers. A family of eight vessels known as PAFs - Patrulleros de ApoyoFluvia – or Patrol Vessels for Fluvial Support – are encased in ballistic amour plate (which has proven to be resistant to RPG fire in combat) and heavily armed with a combination of machine guns and automatic grenade launchers. Capable of providing support to smaller riverine combatants, the PAFs have a helicopter platform and the capacity to provide rest, relief, resupply and medical treatment for Colombian forces operating far from land bases. In its latest incarnation – the PAF IV or PAF-P (for Pesada or heavy) can support operations for 20 days and can accommodate 39 marines in addition to its crew of 33.
Operating in concert with the PAFs, which act as motherships, are fast patrol launches or LPRs (LanchasPatrullerasRapidas), also built by COTECMAR to an indigenous design. These shallow-draft vessels are armed with machine guns and grenade launchers and have significant ballistic protection. With the support of the PAFs, the LPRs and heliborne troops can conduct aggressive counter-insurgency operations for prolonged periods from shore and have multiplied the efficacy of Colombia’s naval infantry manifold.
It is interesting to note that despite still being at a relatively early stage as a ship design and building entity, COTECMAR has conducted a vigorous campaign in the Latin America–Caribbean region. While the company has been able to secure the sale of LPRs to Brazil, its efforts to market the PAF, the OPVs and CPVs have been unsuccessful to date. COTECMAR’s relatively limited size necessarily means that its production capacity is also limited and meeting the demands of both the ARC and export markets seems a difficult task. In addition, in its bid to supply PAFs, CPVs and OPVs to Trinidad and Tobago, COTECMAR’s prices were noted to be quite high compared to its global competitors.
Furthermore, the ARC is not expanding its fleet to any significant degree and it is therefore questionable whether economies of scale will facilitate either a reduction in price or provide the necessary funds to expand the shipyard’s facilities. The company is also competing in a region where countries like Peru, Brazil, Chile and Argentina have well-developed shipyards that have either built, assembled or overhauled guided missile frigates in addition to less sophisticated vessels. Nonetheless, COTECMAR’s emergence as a viable and innovative supplier of naval vessels is a development worth taking cognizance of and as its capabilities develop, companies looking to break into the Latin American naval market could do well to consider the partnership prospects with COTECMAR that might emerge in the years to come.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Colombian Air Force: Innovation in Counter-Insurgency
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
October 25, 2016
While the fate of the peace process between the Colombian Government and FARC remains uncertain, innovative use of technology and tactics on the part of the Colombian Air Force has played no small part in convincing the rebel group that its military struggle was doomed to fail.
Colombia’s bloody war with the Marxist rebel group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the longest running armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere. Claiming over 220,000 lives and displacing millions, hopes for an end to the 52-year old insurgency were dealt a severe blow when the Colombian electorate narrowly rejected the terms of the peace agreement in a national referendum held on October 02, threatening the tenuous ceasefire that ends on October 31. As per the final outcome of the referendum, 49.79 per cent of the Colombians had voted in favour of the peace agreement and 50.21 per cent against it.
Whatever the eventual outcome, the conflict is noteworthy for the level of military innovation shown by the Colombian armed forces as they fought and gained an upper hand over FARC. The Colombian Air Force (FAC) has displayed a high degree of inventiveness in its use of air power. While never equipped with the most advanced of weaponry, the Colombian military has successfully mated older platforms with new ordnance and devised tactics to make effective use of its limited resources. While the United States provided valuable intelligence support, it has not been a major supplier of arms to Colombia for the better part of the last one decade. Rather, by keeping old equipment in service through upgrades and modifications and by developing tactics to maximise the capabilities of its platforms, the FAC has been at the forefront of a series of devastatingly effective operations launched against FARC, and has played no small part in bringing them to the negotiating table.
The combat strength of the FAC lies in its six Combat Air Commands or Comando Aéreo de Combate (CACOM). Each CACOM has between one and two Combat Groups – Grupo de Combate – attached to them, and these in turn are divided into squadrons operating either fixed-wing aircrafts or helicopters.The Order of Battle (ORBAT) of the CACOMs and their airbases are as follows:
Comando Aéreo de Combate No. 1 (CACOM 1) "CT. Captain Germán Olano Moreno Air Base" in Palanquero/Puerto Salgar, Cundinamarca
Grupo de Combate Nº 11
Escuadrón de Combate 111 Dardos (Kfir C10, Kfir C12)
Escuadrón de Combate 112 Mirage (Kfir C10, Kfir C12)
Escuadrón de Combate 611 (AT-27 Tucano, A-29B Supertucano)
Escuadrón de Combate Táctico 613 (AC-47T Fantasma, Bell 212 Rapaz, C212-300, SA2-37B Vampiro, UH-1H-II, Scan Eagle UAV)
Source: Individual CACOM websites, Colombian Air Force
These formations between them operate a relatively small inventory of aircrafts, with its combat assets comprising of only 20 C.10/C.12 Kfir fighters, seven surviving Cessna A-37 ground-attack aircraft, 25 Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucanos (in its AT-29 variant), 14 EMB-312 Tucanos (in its AT-27 variant) and six Bassler BT-67/ AC-47T gunships based on the DC-3 airframe. Added to these are a large fleet of helicopters, numbering over a hundred, to which must be added a further 150 operated by the Colombian National Army and an additional 65 operated by the Colombian National Police.
Even by Latin American standards, this is a very modest force, with the exception of course of the substantial helicopter fleet. The FAC’s Kfirs, though upgraded, are outnumbered and to a great extent outmatched by the Su-30MKV force of Venezuela and are barely adequate to protect Colombia’s airspace. While the Kfirs have seen service in combat against FARC, the air strikes against the insurgents were largely carried out by helicopter units and a dedicated counter-insurgency aerial strike force comprising A-37 Dragonfly and the Super Tucanos and Tucanos. Even within this force, the A-37s have depleted over the decades due to natural and combat attrition. Therefore, the core of the FAC’s combat element against FARC lies in its Super Tucanos and Tucanos.
As stated earlier, helicopters were extensively used for fire-support and troop insertion and Special Forces of both the Colombian armed forces and the national police have shown adeptness at conducting heliborne operations in hostile conditions. Yet, these operations are fundamentally conventional. The same cannot be said for the FAC’s use of its counter-insurgency aerial strike force where intelligence led precision strikes were conducted making innovative use of relatively cheap platforms mated with advanced precision guided munitions.
Colombia’s intelligence gathering efforts are spearheaded by good human and electronic intelligence and an intercept network honed by years of operations against the drug cartels and extensive use of Scan Eagle UAVs and Schwiezer SA2-37B Vampiro covert surveillance aircraft. The latter is a low-cost piston-engine aircraft based on a popular low-wing motor glider. In its surveillance role, it is equipped with a 231kg sensor payload including FLIR and can remain on station for up to 12 hours.
These intelligence gathering assets are supported by A-37s and Super Tucano/ Tucano fleets. In the 1990s, Tucano force used a mix of unguided bombs, rockets and external gunpods and bore the brunt of the initial effort against FARC. The A-37s and Super Tucanos, however, were later modified to carry much more effective weapons. The FAC modified A-37s to carry Mk.82 500lb bombs upgraded with Paveway II laser-targeting systems, while the Super Tucanos were fitted with Israeli made Griffin Laser-Guided Bombs (LGBs) aimed at using the aircraft’s Constantly Computed Impact Point (CCIP) capability. This converted the ageing A-37s and the Super Tucanos into high-tech, but not high-cost strike aircraft.
Working in concert, the A-37s and Super Tucanos played a pivotal role in Operation Fenix conducted on February 29 – March 01, 2008. Penetrating Ecuadorean airspace, three A-37s carrying Paveway II upgraded Mk.82 bombs and five Super Tucanos carrying either Griffin LGBs or standard Mk.82 bombs attacked and destroyed a FARC encampment, killing Raul Reyes, then the second-in-command of FARC, and no fewer than 20 other FARC insurgents. It is a testimony to Colombian planning and the skill of the FAC crews that the formidable Ecuadorean Air Force – battle tested against Peru – failed to either intercept or detect the Colombian raiders.
The Super Tucanos have since been effectively used in carrying out targeted strikes aimed at decapitating the FARC leadership. They were incredibly successful when targeted strikes were carried out in 2010 – in which the Super Tucanos dropped 14,000lbs of bombs - killing Mono Jojoy, FARC’s leading military strategist, and in 2011 – this time in combination with A-37s – in flushing out Alfonso Cano (then FARC’s top commander) and eventually enabling Colombian troops to kill him with gunfire. Again, in four separate air raids in 2012, commanders of FARC’s 7th, 27th, 33rd and 37th Fronts were eliminated. By 2013, no fewer than 42 FARC commanders had been killed in airstrikes conducted by A-37s and Super Tucanos, ably assisted by the Tucanos. These campaigns against FARC may mark the swansong of the A-37s as a major strike asset, though the type is ageing.
The fear of being killed in airstrikes forced the insurgents to abandon their well-established bases and move to more temporary camps, lacking the facilities of the better established ones. As temporary camps too came under attack, the insurgents were left with no option but to remain on the move. In due course of time, FARC lost close to two-thirds of its personnel – largely through desertions – and much of its combat potential and territorial influence as their bases were systematically destroyed.
While the fate of the peace process between the Colombian Government and FARC remains uncertain, innovative use of technology and tactics on the part of FAC has played no small part in convincing the rebel group that its military struggle was doomed to fail. Colombia’s experience in cost-effective use of airpower in counter-insurgency certainly has some valuable lessons to offer and could be considered worth emulating in other parts of the world.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
China’s Dam Building Spree in Tibet: Strategic Implications and India’s Options
G.G. Dwivedi
October 21, 2016
India needs to address the issue of water sharing with China in a comprehensive manner that includes both national and international initiatives.
Recent reports have pointed to China blocking the Xiabuqu tributary of the Yarlung Zangpo River (Tibetan name for Brahmaputra) for a dam project. The 195-km long Xiabuqu originates at Bainang and joins the Brahmaputra at Xigaze, close to Sikkim. The construction of the dam as part of the Lalho hydroelectric project at Xigaze reportedly began in June 2014 and is expected to be completed by 2019.
The project has been viewed with concern in India, which is a lower riparian state. The Yarlung Zangpo flows 1625 kms in Tibet before entering Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang. Further down, after confluence with the Dibang and Lohit, it is known as the Brahmaputra. In Bangladesh, it merges with the Ganga and empties into the Bay of Bengal.
China has tried to allay India’s apprehensions by stating that the project is not designed to hold water. It further claims that the Xiabuqu’s mean discharge volume is barely 0.02 per cent of the Brahmaputra’s average annual trans- boundary discharge, which latter is estimated at 142.37 cubic km. Earlier, Beijing had vehemently denied undertaking any dam construction activities on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. It was only in 2010 that the then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi formally acknowledged the construction of the Zangmu dam.
China’s closed door political system is shrouded in secrecy, leading to trust deficit. In the absence of an effective water sharing mechanism, the construction of the dam on the Xiabuqu could emerge as another irritant between India and China. Beijing’s elaborate plans to harness the waters of the rivers in Tibet have serious strategic and socio-economic implications for India.
China’s Grand Design
China’s water resources are unevenly distributed. The better developed northern region, home to 42 per cent of the country’s population, contains only 14 per cent of its fresh water. The agrarian South, which is comparatively less developed, is water surplus with a 86 per cent share of the country’s total fresh water. Over the years, industrial and domestic usage of water in China has increased significantly. As a result, Beijing has taken recourse to dam construction and water diversion to sustain economic growth.
The Tibet plateau has enormous strategic significance due to its rich water resources. Its 100,000 sq. km. surface is covered by glaciers that feed a number of river systems in South and South East Asia. The major Chinese rivers, Yangtze and Huang He, originate from the plateau. The Indus and Sutlej that flow through India also have their origin in Tibet. And the Salween and Mekong rivers, which also originate in Tibet, traverse through Indo-China.
China, as the largest consumer of energy, plans to double its current electricity generation capacity to 430,000 MW in the next couple of years. To reduce carbon emissions, Beijing aims to enhance the proportion of non-fossil fuel usage to 15 per cent by 2020. According to the Chinese Academy of Science, the hydroelectric power generation capacity of the Yarlung Zangpo basin is around 114,000 MW. The Chinese are in the process of constructing 36 dams on the rivers and tributaries in Tibet.
To tide over existing water and energy shortages, China has adopted a multi- pronged strategy. The Three Gorges project on the Yangtze generates 18,000 MW of electricity and has enabled the transfer of water to the northern regions. Another project underway is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP), which entails diverting the waters of the Yangtze to augment the capacity of the Huang He.
In Tibet, the Chinese dam building spree on the Brahmaputra includes the 510 MW dam at Zangmu, which was completed in 2015. Under the ‘New Energy Development Plan-2015’, the Chinese cabinet has approved the construction of three more dams on the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra. Two of these dams, Dagu (640 MW) and Jiexu (capacity unconfirmed), are 18 and 11 kms, respectively, upstream of the Zangmu. The third at Jiacha (340 MW) is downstream.
However, it is the northward rerouting of waters under the ‘Great Western Route Water Transfer Project’ that is of serious concern to India. The proposal involves the construction of a mega dam (38,000 MW capacity) at Namcha Barwa, where the Brahmaputra makes a steep loop before entering India. While initially the project is for power generation, subsequent plans are to divert water up to 200 bcm for irrigating the deserts of Xinjiang, Gansu and Inner Mongolia. Due to the requirement of major tunnelling effort, for the time being, the project is on hold. However, the Chinese have proven expertise in executing highly complex engineering ventures.
The Chinese are also in the process of constructing about a dozen dams on the Salween (Nu) in Tibet and Yunnan. Six mammoth dam projects on the Mekong are also in the pipeline.
Strategic Implications
Dams over the Yarlung Zangpo, even if these are ‘run of river’ projects, provide China the ability to control the flow of water in the Brahmaputra. An accidental or emergent outflow from these dams could prove catastrophic. Cases in point in this regard are: the sudden rise of water in the Siang in 2000, which resulted in the death of 26 people; and, the Pareechu episode in 2005, which led to flash floods in the Sutlej causing extensive damage.
In case China pursues the option of diverting the waters of the Brahmaputra, the consequences could be wide ranging. It could seriously affect the navigability of National Waterway-2 – the 890 km stretch from Sadiya to Dhubri – given the requirement of maintaining a minimum depth of 1.5 metres from Sadiya to Dibrugarh and 2 metres beyond that. Even ‘run of river’ projects are not benign. When water held back in pondage is released for the turbines to operate, it results in diurnal variation in the downstream flow. That, in turn, is likely to seriously impact India’s efforts to exploit the hydro potential of the region. Moreover, any disturbance in the existing ecological environment will have an adverse effect on the densely populated Brahmaputra Valley.
To counter the Chinese grand design of ‘stealing the rivers’, India has planned to construct 76 dams with an estimated capacity of 36,900 MW, taking advantage of the ‘UN advisory on the river water dispute’, whereby a downstream riparian state can ensure ‘first user right’ on the international rivers by building dams. Of these, the 44 dams on the Siang are expected to generate 18,293 MW of hydro power. But very little progress has been made on these dam projects due to numerous factors: inefficient official machinery, allegations of corruption and kickbacks, influential activist bodies opposing the construction of the dams on the pretext of environment degradation, and technical glitches, to name a few.
While China as an upper riparian state enjoys ‘restricted territorial sovereignty’ as per international law, it also has an obligation to protect the interests of lower riparian nations. Currently, there is no arrangement between India and China on water sharing. In a recent article carried by the state-run Global Times, China had expressed willingness to have multilateral cooperation with India and Bangladesh to share waters. Retracting this two days later, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official spokesperson went on to state that effective cooperation regarding sharing data on the flow of rivers already existed.
India’s Options
India needs to address the issue of water sharing with China in a comprehensive manner. New Delhi must garner the support of other affected nations – Bangladesh and Bhutan, besides Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam – to build consensus with the aim of dissuading China from going ahead with the planned projects in Tibet. There is an urgent need to formulate a national policy that factors in both the strategic and legal dimensions. Besides, the constitution of a body of experts would go a long way in addressing the issue in its entirety.
In the emerging geopolitical scenario, water and energy security are critical for China to realise its global aspirations. In pursuit of national interests, the Communist Party’s leadership approach is characterised by assertiveness and unilateralism. Therefore, instead of adopting a policy of appeasement, New Delhi must forcefully take up its concerns with Beijing. It is only through persistence that a formal framework for a water sharing mechanism with China can be evolved. To this end, strong political will combined with crafty diplomacy appears to be the best option.
The author is a former Assistant Chief Integrated Staff. He has served as Defence Attaché in China. He is currently Professor Security & Strategic Studies at Aligarh Muslim University.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Cross LOC Strike and India’s Reputation for Resolve
Abhay Kumar Singh
October 21, 2016
India needs to factor in the critical issue of reputation for resolve in future crisis situations in order to build its credibility and enhance its deterrence potential.
India’s cross-LoC strikes on terrorist launch pads located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) have been much discussed in recent days. While the government has officially described the attacks on terrorist launch pads as ‘surgical’ and ‘pre-emptive’, some commentators have described it as ‘punitive’ and ‘retributive’ since these were conducted soon after the terrorist attack at Uri which led to a heavy loss of life among army personnel. Violent attacks by Pakistan-based terrorist groups on Indian targets have begun to occur at worryingly regular intervals. And there has been a clamour for retribution against these elements based in Pakistan after each dastardly attack. Notwithstanding heightened public sentiments for retribution, and even though it has threatened the use of force on a few occasions, India has generally observed ‘strategic restraint’ because of the fear of escalation. But its resilience and practice of ‘strategic restraint’ has earned India the reputation of a ‘Soft State’.
Thomas Schelling's seminal work, The Strategy of Conflict, had highlighted the importance of a state’s reputation for resolve, i.e., the willingness to use of force in a crisis situation.1 The reputation theory of conflict behaviour claims that a state with an established practice of using force during crises and thus acquiring a strong reputation for resolve would enjoy bargaining leverages during future crises. And conversely, a state with a weak reputation for resolve would stand at a disadvantage.2
In the light of the above understanding, the issue that needs to be considered is whether India, through its practice of ‘strategic restraint’ in the past, has encouraged Pakistan to continue with its support for non-state actors and wage war by proxy. Further, it also needs to be considered whether the recent cross-LoC strikes have firmly signalled India’s new reputation for resolve.
What Is Reputation for Resolve?
Reputation matters in international politics. Reputation for resolve depends on the willingness to use force in following through threats and commitments. This notion of credibility and its relevance as potential deterrence has been one of Schelling’s most persuasive articulations. A state’s willingness to use force exposes it to the risk of potential escalation and a wider conflagration. Under these circumstances, the demonstration of resolve requires a careful evaluation of potential payoffs vis a vis the cost of using military force. A willingness to suffer the cost of a conflict in order to achieve an appropriate resolution of the dispute in their favour distinguishes highly resolved states from states with weak resolve. Resolve is, thus, a dispositional attribute of states. And, it can indeed change over a period of time or across issues.3
The resolve of a state indicates its propensity to use force for resolving a political dispute in its favour. However, it is the credibility of a state’s resolve that will have a critical bearing on its opponent’s approach towards a political dispute.4 Thus, a reputation for resolve refers to the external perception of a particular state’s willingness to risk war. Its past behaviour in a crisis or dispute is an important facet of this reputation that is likely to shape the perceptions of observers.5 A state with a better reputation for resolve is expected to hold its established position in future crises. Because, its established willingness to use force is likely to give it greater bargaining power in future crises. At the same time, if a state were to back down during one dispute, then that will be construed as an unwillingness to bear the costs of the conflict due to its assessment of unfavourable payoffs.6 Observers are likely to assume that the weak resolve of the state is indicative of its willingness to acquiesce and they will accordingly demand concessions. Even though the resolve of a state remains a private information, it does shape the perception of its opponents. For, states examine each other’s past behaviour or reputation to assess their current intentions. Thus, a state’s strong reputation for resolve will dissuade opponents, while a weak reputation for resolve will invite further demands for concession.
A recent analysis of 1,322 militarised interstate conflicts by Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo examined how a state’s reputation for resolve influences the likelihood of its involvement in future disputes. The findings of the study provide strong evidence that reputation for resolve matters. The study highlighted three key aspects of conflict behaviour. Firstly, “countries that demonstrated resolve in past conflicts are less likely to be challenged than countries that did not do so.”7 In other words, a lack of resolve during past conflicts will encourage more challenges in the future. Secondly, “countries that have demonstrated resolve in the past are less likely to be challenged subsequently.”8 And thirdly, the effect of reputation is stronger when the subsequent interaction more closely resembles the dispute in which the country in question earned its reputation for resolution or irresolution.9
India’s Reputation for Resolve
These findings resonate with conventional wisdom about India-Pakistan dynamics. India’s self-imposed strategic restraint has not been effective. Pakistan has kept the pot boiling through the use of non-state actors and has maintained a level of violence that is low enough to avoid the outbreak of an overt conflict. At the same time, Pakistan has also occasionally pushed the envelope wider to establish a new baseline of India’s threshold of tolerance. India’s default position in the aftermath of each terrorist attack had progressively become rhetorical and limited to a temporary freeze in bilateral engagement and diplomatic protests at the regional and international levels. Bilateral relations gradually improved during the intervening period until the next terrorist strike emanating from Pakistan. And the cycle repeated itself. According to conflict behaviour theory, India, in its approach towards countering terrorism emanating from Pakistan, has displayed a weak reputation for resolve. Since past reputation matters in similar future interactions, Pakistan had no motivation to change its policy and India continued to suffer the consequences of terrorism. But the cross-LoC strikes by Indian Special Forces may have changed that pattern of India repeatedly demonstrating its lack of resolve.
Going beyond the India-Pakistan dynamics, it is pertinent to highlight the fact that India has been largely reticent in using military force in the external domain to protect its national interest and the lives of its citizens. This is illustrated by India’s response to the hijacking of an Indian-flagged dhow, MV Bhakti Sagar, by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden in February 2006. At the time of the incident, an Indian Navy destroyer, INS Mumbai, was in the vicinity and could have intervened. However, a range of political considerations acted as a constraint in employing the warship for rescue or delivering aid. This experience has been recounted by Admiral Arun Prakash in an aptly titled article, “Appeasement Never Pays”:
“While Mumbai was proceeding with all despatch, a heated debate raged in the Cabinet Secretary’s office about the advisability of sending a warship. At the end of these deliberations, the MEA sent a written note to NHQ posing a set of rhetorical questions….. Agonising about how our African and Middle-Eastern neighbours would react to what was termed as ‘muscle-flexing’ by the Indian Navy, the note vividly illustrated why India has earned the sobriquet of a soft state. The essence of the note was contained in one plaintive query: ‘Will we sail a destroyer every time an Indian national is in trouble anywhere?’ The navy’s emphatic response: ‘Yes of course; if we have one available!’, went unheeded, and the warship had to be recalled. A few days later, the ship owner paid ransom to the pirates, and 21 Indian citizens came home, without the Indian state or its powerful navy having lifted a finger to protect them.”10
What followed was progressively bolder acts, with pirates even engaging in mid-ocean attacks on ships in the Arabian Sea. As a result, by 2010, the piracy high risk area expanded to include India’s entire Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on its west coast. That, in turn, increased the insurance premium for shipping bound for Indian ports.11 Thereafter, it took concerted efforts and robust action by the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard to eliminate piracy from the Indian EEZ, including the use of force and arrest of 119 pirates.12 It was due to this effective use of force that Indian waters were declared piracy free and the High Risk Area was redrawn to exclude the Indian EEZ on the West Coast.13 While it is true that anti-piracy operations are no comparison to inter-state disputes, the issue of reputation for resolve played out exactly according to the reputational behaviour hypotheses.
Would India’s reputation for resolve yield similar advantages in terms of bringing about behavioural changes within Pakistan in the aftermath of the recent cross-LoC strikes? Would this strike alone deter Pakistani terrorists from attempting to infiltrate and execute attacks on Indian targets in the future? While reputational behaviour theory hints at a positive outcome in this regard, definitive results are likely to show up only in due course of time. Be that as it may, the responses from Pakistan thus far tentatively confirm the theoretical postulates. Pakistan has vehemently denied that the cross-LoC strikes occurred and has not escalated the existing level of bilateral tensions. While it is too early to rule out a direct Pakistani backlash or a response through its proxies, Pakistan’s reaction has thus far remained rhetorical. It appears that India has been able to convey its message firmly about the change in its reputational posture.
There can be no divergence of views about the importance of a careful consideration of the escalatory potential of the use of force in the India-Pakistan scenario given the nuclear overhang. But, at the same time, it is evident from the events of the past two decades that India has not been able to bring about a positive change in Pakistan’s determination to continue to employ cross-border terrorism either through diplomatic outreach and persuasion or the potential threat to use force. Through the cross-LoC strikes, a novel tool of coercion, India has displayed a strong reputation for resolve However, one incident does not indicate a trend. Advantages in conflict bargaining will arise only through repeated demonstrations of similar resolve in the future. Given that, India needs to factor in the critical issue of reputation for resolve in future crisis situations in order to build its credibility and enhance its deterrence potential.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Schelling’s two classics laid down much of the foundation: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
2. Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic, “Multiple Audiences and Reputation Building in International Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 54, No.6, pp. 860-62. Also see, Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 17, 2014, pp. 374-77, doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421; and, Shiping Tang, “Reputation, Cult Of Reputation, And International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 37–41.
3. Paul K. Huth, “Reputations and deterrence: A theoretical and empirical assessment,” Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, December 1997, pp. 74-80.
4. Todd S. Sechser, “Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming) pp. 2-4, DOI: 10.1177/0022002716652687.
6. Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 69, No. 2, Spring 2015, pp. 474–79.
Enhanced Role of Japanese SDF in UN Peacekeeping Operations
Adarsha Verma
October 18, 2016
The indication by Defence Minister Tomomi Inada post her visit to South Sudan that security conditions are conducive for an increase in SDF roles points to a pragmatic outlook and mature understanding of Japan’s role in international issues.
On 8 October 2016, the Japanese Defence Minister Tomomi Inada visited South Sudan to assess the prevailing security situation for the deployment of Self Defence Forces (SDF) which would be assigned an enhanced role of protecting UN personnel, civilians and other peacekeepers. This enhanced role will be a major change from the current SDF role in peacekeeping operations, which is based on provisions of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution that permit the SDF to use their weapons only to protect themselves once they are fired upon.
The Constitution of Japan declares in Article 9 that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes"; that "in order to accomplish [this] aim, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained"; and that "the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." This article was interpreted by the Japanese political hierarchy as prohibiting the overseas despatch of the SDF for whatever purpose or for whatever activity because Japan cannot be involved directly in any armed conflict. Such views, harboured for decades since World War II, led to the formation of an inward-looking, "don't want to be involved" mentality.1
Consequently, during the Gulf War of 1990, though Japan made a substantial financial contribution of USD 13 billion, it had to face harsh international criticism for not contributing its human resources. The Japanese Government thereafter took the initiative to create a legal framework for enabling Japan to participate in the international community's peace-keeping efforts. These efforts resulted in the enactment of the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (the International Peace Cooperation Act) in June 1992 (Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryokuho in Japanese). According to this Act, before a Japanese contingent is despatched for a UN mission, five conditions must be satisfied. These are:
“Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts.
“Consent for undertaking of UN Peacekeeping Operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts.
“The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts.
“Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned principles ceases to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw Self-Defense Forces (SDF) contingent.
“The use weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc.”2
Since the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Act, Japan has made contributions for promoting international peace in more than 13 UN peacekeeping operations. The latest in this regard is the January 2012 despatch of a Horizontal Military Engineering Company (HMEC) for reconstruction and engineering tasks to Juba, South Sudan.
Meanwhile, Japan’s security environment had begun to deteriorate, with rising tensions between Japan and North Korea, growing antipathy between Japan and China, and increasing uncertainty about US commitments to Japanese security in the event of a conflict. These security concerns along with expectations of the international community on Japan to play a more proactive role in ensuring international peace and stability have led the Abe administration to enact a new security legislation3 for the purpose of reinterpreting the Constitution. This new legislation, amongst other clauses, empowers the SDF to use military force to protect civilians, aid workers and peacekeepers of other nations. Now, with the turnover of the currently deployed engineer company in South Sudan due on 31 October 2016, Japan is keen to deploy fresh troops with an enhanced role based on the new security legislation. As this planned deployment is likely to be contested by the Japanese Opposition in the Diet (Parliament) by citing the spiralling violence and fragile peace in South Sudan, the visit of the Defence Minister was important to gain a first-hand knowledge of the conditions obtaining in South Sudan and the degree of risk that the SDF in their new role would be exposed to.
Currently, the SDF Engineering Company in Juba operates only in specified areas close to the capital city. Restrictions on their employment and the limitation on their operations to comparatively risk-free areas have given rise to a reputation among other peacekeepers of the SDF being risk averse. An enhanced role of the SDF will negate this adverse image and demonstrate Japan’s acceptance of greater global responsibility to maintain international norms, values and institutions, commensurate with its national capabilities and international standing.
Secondly, an enhanced engagement in peacekeeping operations, resulting from the additional SDF roles, will also assure the African nations of greater Japanese involvement and willingness to a play a proactive role in maintaining peace in the continent. Japan hopes that this will translate into African support for its proposed reform of the UN and its inclusion as a Permanent Member in a reformed United Nations Security Council.
Thirdly, enhanced engagement will also facilitate access to the oil reserves of South Sudan in particular and Africa in general as Japan looks to diversify its energy sources. The proposed 2000 km gas pipeline from South Sudan and Uganda to Lamu (Kenyan port on the Indian Ocean) spearheaded by Toyota Tsusho, a Japanese multinational company, is an example in this regard. Such a greater involvement by Japan also appear to be motivated by a desire to negate the Chinese influence in South Sudan where currently China has a major stake in oil fields.
Fourthly, the SDF has no combat experience and has generally been confined to undertaking disaster relief tasks since its inception. An enhanced role under the UN banner may provide limited experience of conflict situations to the SDF.
Against this backdrop, the indication by Defence Minister Tomomi Inada post her visit to South Sudan in October 2016 that security conditions are conducive for an increase in SDF roles points to a pragmatic outlook and mature understanding of Japan’s role in international issues.
Since the promulgation of the Constitution on 3 May 1947, Japan has been compelled by international economic, political and security circumstances to gradually expand the role of the SDF. Current efforts by the Abe Government to assign an enhanced role to the SDF in South Sudan is a step towards the realisation of responsibilities and acceptance of a more proactive role in international affairs. This will pave the way for the SDF to shoulder greater responsibilities in peace keeping activities the world over in line with PM Shinzo Abe’s mantra of ‘Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Peace’.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. “Current Issues Surrounding UN Peace-keeping Operations and Japanese Perspective,” January 1997, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/issues.html, accessed on 17 October 2016.
3. “Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security: Seamless Responses for Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community,” March 2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/ 000143304.pdf, accessed on 17 October 2016.
Implications of a Complete Sealing of the India-Pakistan Border
Gautam Sen
October 18, 2016
Instead of erecting static structures or walls with mounted electronic complements, a more dynamic mode of border management and surveillance may be expedient and cost-effective with concomitant mobile patrols by all-terrain vehicles, hovercraft, etc.
Home Minister Rajnath Singh has recently declared that the entire India-Pakistan border is to be completely sealed by December 2018. The announcement may be viewed in the context of India-Pakistan relations reaching a particular low and uncertain threshold post the Uri incident and cross-Line of Control (LoC) operations by India on 28-29 September 2016. The above-referred decision of the Union Government is reported to have been taken after a review of gaps in border management by a high-level Committee on Security and Border Protection (CSBP) of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) (popularly known as the Madhukar Gupta Committee) set up in March 2016 to overcome the lacunae observed consequent on the Gurdaspur and Pathankot infiltration occurrences. The outcome of the review is likely to have influenced the decision on setting 2018 as the target for a total sealing of the border. As of now, Pakistan Government sources have indicated that they have no comments on this development given the absence of details. Some Chinese think-tank commentators have, however, observed that such a venture would be irrational, indicative of Cold War mentality and likely to complicate relations among China, India and Pakistan, without elucidating as to how this decision would impinge on Chinese interests.
Government sources have indicated that a border security grid with a provision for real-time monitoring of the entire length of the border and capability for intervention as necessary is to be put in place. This will obviously involve networked coordination among the states’ home departments and their police authorities, their Central counterparts, MHA and the agencies responsible for technical and electronic surveillance. Furthermore, the works authorities at the central and state levels will have to be involved in the logistics of the forces assigned to protect the border, border fencing, sensors being installed, and providing access road network to the border outposts. It is, however, not clear whether a physical infrastructure in the form of a wall or obstacles on the pattern of the Israeli West Bank defences (in Israeli-occupied Palestine territory) is to be eventually erected.
Even a complete sealing by barbed wire fences, adequately grouted with concrete supporting bases and flood lighting, of India`s western international border stretching 3323 kms from Gujarat to Jammu & Kashmir would undoubtedly be a stupendous task. The length to be covered in the four states – Gujarat 508 kms, Rajasthan 1037 kms, Punjab 553 kms and Jammu & Kashmir 1225 kms – including 740 kms of Line of Control (LoC) northwards of the terminating point of the international boundary in Jammu is quite substantial. Moreover, the terrain conditions and socio-economic milieu in the border regions of these states as well as the engineering efforts involved are likely to make the border sealing exercise quite an exacting one. While the need for effective border protection and guarding against infiltration by anti-national elements, smugglers, etc., is undeniable, the manner in which the sealing would take place will be of the essence. Within India also, particularly in Punjab, a total political consensus in the matter has not been evident as of now. There are reports that the Border Security Force has brought to the government`s notice a proposal to shift the existing fence in some parts of the western border closer to the international boundary. The objective is to enable local farmers to cultivate their farmlands to a greater extent by releasing a part of the area presently lying between the existing fence and the international boundary line. The government may find such a proposal difficult to accede to because of cost implications, resource constraints and, even, Pakistan`s objections for tactical reasons.
So far as the geographical conditions are concerned, the border terrain varies from flat grasslands of the Punjab plains to extreme climatic sandy areas and marshy salt patches in Rajasthan and Gujarat. In Jammu & Kashmir, the LoC portion of the border to the north, beyond the 200 kms of international boundary in southern Jammu region, is hilly, forested and intersected by many mountainous rivers and numerous nallahs or drains. While a major part of the LoC and the international boundary in Jammu region is fenced, a substantial part of the international boundary has also been fenced and floodlit – 461 kms in Punjab and 1048 kms (fenced including extra fencing in some portions) with 1023 kms floodlit in Rajasthan, as per the last Annual Report of the MHA. The remaining stretches of the border are yet to be covered. Moreover, there are segments of the border like the Shahgarh bulge in Jaisalmer district of Rajasthan, which have extreme climatic conditions for a major part of the year with average daytime temperatures soaring to more than 50 degrees Celsius, where metallic fencing does not last long. 32 kms of this bulge could not be adequately fenced because of such terrain. Furthermore, there are portions in the Jaisalmer-Barmer segment in Rajasthan where even the border (presently unfenced) markings get covered by shifting sand dunes. In Gujarat, only 229 kms has been fenced and 202 kms floodlit out of the 553 kms of the border. 64 kms in the Rann-of-Kutch segment of the Gujarat border has been left unfenced owing to saltpan-marshy conditions. All these serve to highlight the extent of engineering and financial resources that will be needed to completely seal the border.
There are reports of India availing Israeli expertise towards executing its border sealing project. In this regard, it is relevant to mention that the political milieu and geographical conditions of Israel`s border areas and India`s are not exactly similar. However, in difficult stretches of the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir and certain other segments of the border, India-Israel cooperation to adopt advanced techniques like installing laser-wall coverage of border portions where physical obstacles cannot be placed or maintained in all-weather conditions may be attempted. Another factor to consider is that, along substantial stretches of the India-Pakistan border, there is traditional and ethnic affinity among the people residing on both sides of the dividing line, unlike in the case of Israeli settlers in occupied Arab territories and the indigenous Arab inhabitants. Therefore, a total replication of the Israeli pattern of border guarding or sealing may not be efficacious or judicious.
The authorities concerned both at the central and state levels may also have to reckon with the impact of the sealing of the border on trade and intercourse in the border areas. Even when bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have not been warm and totally free from tension, a modicum of trade – even in barter form – as distinct from smuggling, has prevailed between the adjoining western districts of Rajasthan and places like Hyderabad and Mirpur Khas in Sindh province of Pakistan. A complete sealing of the border should not shut off prospects for such trade. The border sealing infrastructure should not therefore be set up in a manner that its mechanisms work to the detriment of increasing trade at the formal level. This will only be feasible if facilitating trade points and infrastructure are suitably factored in within a dynamic and high-surveillance border grid.
A complete sealing of the India-Pakistan border will be a sensitive multi-dimensional endeavour with significant capital cost and recurring (for maintenance) financial implications. There are executional problems also, as is evident from the failure of the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) (assigned the primary task of constructing the border fence) in avoiding time and cost overruns, as can be observed from the Annual Reports of the MHA. For effective oversight and ground patrolling of the border, connecting roads to the border outposts are also necessary. Slow land acquisition has also been an impediment towards creating such a network of link roads to the border outposts. For effective border guarding, the inter-border outpost distance should also be reduced to 3.5 kms, apart from upgrading a number of such outposts, entailing substantial civil works by the CPWD. Instead of erecting static structures or walls with mounted electronic complements, a more dynamic mode of border management and surveillance may be expedient and cost-effective with concomitant mobile patrols by all-terrain vehicles, hovercraft, etc. A complementary arrangement which enables 24x7 satellite surveillance, may also be worked out.
The author is a retired IDAS officer who has served in Jammu & Kashmir and the North East in senior state and central government positions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Is it a matter of such transcendental importance to keep Assad in power or remove him even at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Syrians and the displacement of half of the country’s total population?
As one contemplates the ever worsening state of Syria, a few thoughts dominate. One, though Russia, the former superpower and the United States, the superpower in decline, appear to be at loggerheads, there seems to be a sinister but unacknowledged unity of purpose that brings them together; the net result of their policies has been the destruction of Syria where the death toll has reached 500,000 over five years, working out to more than 11 an hour.
Second, the quarrel over Basher al Assad’s continuing in power reminds one of Pierre Goubert’s seminal book Louis XIV and 20 million Frenchmen published in 1992. In contrast to conventional accounts, Goubert tells us a lot about the 20 million French rather than concentrate exclusively on their king. The question as applied to Syria is this: Is it a matter of such transcendental importance to keep Assad in power or remove him even at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Syrians and the displacement of half of the country’s total population of 22 million?
The third thought is the culpable inability of Russia and the United States to come to a common understanding to put an end to the carnage and move Syria towards peace and normality so that Syrians can choose a government in a democratic fashion. Russia and the United States have so much mutual distrust that they are unable to sit down and discuss differences in a rational and civil manner.
Instead of resorting to the diplomatic practice of private talks, the United States, frustrated over what it sees as Russia’s unreliability as a partner, has started the dangerous practice of publicly attacking Russia. On 3 October, Washington announced the suspension of talks with Russia over Syria. Anticipating the announcement from Washington, Moscow announced that it was ending the agreement entered into in 2000 that required each side to dispose off 34 tons of plutonium originally meant for making weapons. While the agreement on plutonium is not the core of the post-Cold War strategic understanding between Moscow and Washington, even their disagreements over Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 did not affect it. Here is a troubling instance of a clash over Syria affecting other matters.
On 7 October, Secretary of State John Kerry said that Russian and Syrian military strikes against civilians and medical facilities in Aleppo should be investigated as war crimes. Kerry is right, as attacks against hospitals and other civilian facilities are forbidden under international law. It is known that Russia has been using bunker-busting, cluster, and thermobaric bombs in Syria. It has repeatedly used bunker-busting bombs on hospitals. Thermobaric bombs, according to US experts, can send a devastating blast of pressure and extreme heat that incinerates those caught in the blast and sucks oxygen from the lungs of human beings in the vicinity.
Paris and London echoed Kerry’s call for a probe. Germany has not until now. However, there is hardly any chance of the matter being taken up at the International Criminal Court as Russia and possibly China too might use their veto powers in the UN Security Council. For, it is only the Security Council that can ask the Court to start an investigation. Obviously, the real intention is to sully Russia’s image and make it look a pariah. Already, after President Hollande expressed reservations about meeting President Putin during a scheduled visit to Paris, the latter has called off his visit. U.K. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson has warned Russia that, if it continues with bombing Aleppo, it risks becoming a pariah state. He even called for public demonstrations in front of the Russian Embassy, a call that has been dismissed by many. They have pointed out that by making such a call he is endangering the safety of the UK embassy in Moscow.
The West made an unsuccessful attempt at the Security Council to halt the bombing in Aleppo. France and Spain moved a resolution calling for such a halt when the Council met on 9 October, with Russia in the chair. The draft asked UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to propose options for a UN-supervised monitoring of a truce and refers to “further measures” in the event of non-compliance by “any party to the Syrian domestic conflict.” Russia used its veto and the resolution was rejected. To complicate matters, Russia moved a resolution that called for a cease-fire and the implementation of the failed cease-fire agreement. The resolution called on the rebels in Syria to separate themselves from UN-designated terrorists, a prime objective of Russia when it agreed to the cease-fire.
Egypt voted for both the resolutions despite their differing import. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expressed their displeasure. The latest is that Saudi Arabia’s Aramco did not send the monthly shipment of 700,000 tonnes of crude at the agreed concessional rate and Egypt had to float tenders for crude worth USD 500 million. This is an example how Syria-related issues affect bilateral relations. Of course, the vote was only the last straw as the two countries have had differences over other matters as well.
Putin was in Istanbul on 10 October and Turkey-Russia relations are warming up at a time when the West wants to treat Putin as a pariah. What is intriguing is that Turkey has recently occupied 900 sq.km. of Syrian territory as part of its Operation Euphrates Shield and intends to occupy as much as 5,000 sq.km in due course. It is not known whether Putin took up this matter with Erdogan. Is this a clear indication that Moscow does not share Assad’s plan to recover ‘every inch of territory’?
That Kerry was too much in a hurry to suspend talks with Russia became clear with the latest announcement of talks in Lausanne (Switzerland) on 15 October. Fortunately, apart from the US and Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will also be there. This is a better format as Kerry was in a disadvantageous position in his talks with Lavrov when he represented a deeply divided Administration and did not enjoy full backing from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Iran’s presence at the same table with Saudi Arabia too is a change for the better.
While dealing with the broken cease-fire agreement, it is important to bear in mind that it is a partial cease-fire as it did not apply to the UN-designated ‘terrorists’ who (Islamic State and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, a variation of Al Qaeda) control vast territory and population. In other words, even if the Lausanne meeting revives the cease-fire the carnage will continue.
There is need for fresh thinking to put an end to the senseless carnage in Syria. Will Obama’s successor in the White House provide it? Until then, how many more human lives will be lost? By the time the new US President enters office, would eastern Aleppo have fallen, creating an atrocious humanitarian tragedy?
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
More Latin American Air Forces Prepare to Resume Shooting Down Narco-Trafficking Aircraft
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
October 05, 2016
The policy of shooting down aircraft suspected of narco-trafficking is one fraught with problems without any tangible impact on the narco-trade.
On 20 August 2015, Peru’s Congress passed legislation that would allow its military to shoot down aircraft suspected of narcotics trafficking, thus resuming a policy that was discontinued after 2001 when a tragic mistake led to the killing of a missionary and her daughter.1 With this action, Peru has become the latest in a series of Latin American countries that have opted for this extreme step to curb the endemic problem of aerial narcotics smuggling. Indeed, no fewer than nine countries in the region - Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Venezuela have adopted this step though not all have made use of this option.2
As might be expected, this development is extremely controversial, with the United States government temporarily halting cooperation with Honduras after that country shot down two suspected narcotics carrying aircraft in 2012, neither of which was ever subsequently confirmed to have been carrying narcotics. To insulate itself from dependence on US radar coverage, Honduras purchased three new radar sets before enacting new legislation in 2014 to resume aggressive interceptions which once again led to a withdrawal of American support.3
Given the risk of drawing the ire of the United States and the even more daunting prospect of shooting down innocent aircraft, the question arises as to why Latin American countries are so intent on pursuing this course of action. The answer to this question can partly be found in the fact that no less than 20% of all cocaine trafficking within the area is undertaken by air.4 However, this, in and of itself, should not warrant such an extreme step.
The fact is that that narcotics traffic from Latin America by air is increasing by the day. as the aerial route has become a preferred method of transport between Latin America and Africa where from it is sent onwards to Europe and Asia. Transport of cocaine between Latin America and Africa was traditionally via sea in container ships or in private yachts. The potential to ship large quantities of cocaine through this method made the maritime route the preferred method of transit.5 However, as interdiction efforts at sea have become more effective, the cocaine smugglers have switched tactics to using second-hand cargo aircraft to deliver cocaine to their West African confederates.6
A wide range of used aircraft, available for as little as US$275,000 for a four-engined DC-8 jet, can be obtained and there is no shortage of pilots willing to undertake these flights.7 As the airspace between Latin America and West Africa is almost completely bereft of radar cover and national radar networks in most of West Africa are patchy at best, it is relatively simple for narco-flights to evade detection. In one publicised incident, for example, a Boeing 727 was set alight and abandoned after it failed to take-off at a makeshift airfield following a delivery of cocaine from Venezuela to Gao in Mali.,8
Of late, Venezuela and Brazil are beginning to emerge as major places of embarkation for narcotics bound for Europe via the West Africa-. The surge began in 2004 with seizures of 46 metric tonnes of cocaine being reported between 2005 and 2008.9 This coincided with a decision of the Venezuelan government in 2005 to suspend cooperation with the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) due to unfortunate political differences between the Chavez administration and the US Government.10
This led to an upsurge in cocaine trafficking out of Venezuela where corrupt law enforcement and military personnel, porous borders with Colombia and apparent government indifference have contributed to this trend. In the case of Brazil, the combination of porous borders with three major cocaine producing countries (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru) and a poorly patrolled coastline are combined with a thriving legitimate trade with West Africa thus facilitating the smuggling of cocaine by subterfuge, corruption or coercion of legal traders.11 South Africa has emerged as one of several preferred transshipment points for cocaine emanating from Brazil, taking its place alongside such nations as Angola, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.12 It should be noted that South Africa has also become a preferred route for Afghan heroin.13 Almost completely unmonitored airspace renders air transport particularly attractive for smugglers.
Having taken this decision, are the Latin American military establishments in a position o provide the requisite quality of evidence to ensure that unfortunate mistakes do not recur? The answer must be a qualified “no”. While decades of fighting the narcotics trade have created strong local intelligence networks, these are by no means foolproof and radar surveillance remains problematic. Even the advanced SIVAM radar network deployed by Brazil to provide surveillance over the Amazon region, has several exploitable gaps.14 Several air forces in the region are also incapable of conducting even basic intercept operations owing to a lack of suitable aircraft – Paraguay being a prime example. Combined with the inherent defects of the law enforcement and military forces of the region, it is therefore doubtful that any air force in the region could be certain of the mala fide contents of any aircraft.
Shoot-Downs of Suspected Narcotics Trafficking Aircraft 1983-2013
Date
Air Force
Aircraft
Weapon
Victim
Mission
Result
9Mar83
Honduran
Mystere B2
30mm
DC-3
Drugs
Shot down
18Jun85
Ecuadorian
Mirage F1JA
30mm
twin engined Beechcraft
Drugs
Shot down
1987
Honduran
C.101 238
30mm
C-47
Drugs
Shot down
1992
Honduran
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
1992
Honduran
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
4Nov94
Peruvian
AT-27
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
27Jun95
Peruvian
AT-27
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
28Jun95
Peruvian
AT-27
Maneuver
Light A/C
Drugs
Crashed
14Jul95
Peruvian
AT-27
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
21Jul95
Peruvian
AT-27
20mm
Cessna
Drugs
Shot down
7Jul96
Peruvian
AT-27
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
25Mar97
Peruvian
AT-27
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
Mar97
Peruvian
AT-27
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
Aug97
Peruvian
AT-27
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
1998
Colombian
A-37
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
1998
Colombian
A-37
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
1998
Colombian
A-37
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
1998
Colombian
A-37
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
8Feb99
Colombian
A-37
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
Aug99
Colombian
A-37
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
Aug99
Colombian
A-37
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
1Jun00
Colombian
A-37
20mm
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
18Jul00
Peru
Su-25
Light A/C
Drugs
Shot down
20Apr01
Peru
A-37
7.62mm
Cessna 185
Mis-ID'd
Shot down
14Apr03
Honduras
AT-27
7.62mm
Aerocommander 500
Drugs
Shot down
12Oct13
Venezuelan
F-16A
?
twin engined
Drugs
Shot down
12Oct13
Venezuelan
F-16A
?
twin engined
Drugs
Shot down
Source: Air Combat Information Group
Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, there have been multiple downings of suspected narcotics transport aircraft as shown in the table above. Aircraft such as the AT-27 Tucano and the A-37 Dragonfly have seen extensive service in an interceptor role where their excellent low speed performance has enabled them to engage aircraft that could create problems for faster interceptor aircraft. The problem with faster aircraft was graphically demonstrated on 17th September 2015 when a Venezuelan Su-30MKV crashed while trying to engage a slow flying suspected narcotics aircraft near the Colombian border, killing both crewmen.15
It seems, however, that despite the evident shortcomings and limitations of this strategy, Latin American air forces seem to be intent on pursuing this course of action. Whether they actually believe that this interception policy will have a tangible impact on the narcotics trade or this is merely a ploy for domestic political consumption is a matter of debate. Whatever the reason for the decision, one can expect a sharp rise in both interceptions and the potential of more unfortunate accidents.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
It is essential that the dialogue process continues and additional steps are taken to resolve the deep sense of alienation presently prevailing among the civil society in the Kashmir Valley.
The latest process of dialogue with Kashmir Valley separatists initiated by the Yashwant Sinha-led five-member delegation is an interesting development. Notwithstanding Sinha’s claim that the delegation does not have an official status, the efforts of his team may be viewed as a Track-II internal dialogue process between the Government of India (GOI) and the Hurriyat group of Indian separatists and other stakeholders. The composition of the delegation seems to have been worked out carefully in consultation and with the blessings and support of the authorities. Wajahat Habibullah, a member of the delegation, was a former senior government functionary and has wide experience in the state’s administrative affairs. Air Vice Marshal (retd.) Kapil Kak and journalist Bharat Bhusan have an appreciation of Kashmir affairs, while Shushova Barve, a member of the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation, has experience working on civil society issues.
During their visit which began on October 25, the delegation interacted with most of the main Hurriyat leaders, the Kashmir Chamber of Commerce representatives, and held discussions with Governor N.N. Vohra and Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti. It is significant that Vohra stressed on the need for a `sustained` dialogue with all stakeholders. It is appropriate that the dialogue process has resumed despite the continuing civil unrest in the aftermath of the death of Burhan Wani of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in a counter-insurgency operation on July 8.
The scale of the present upsurge significantly differs from past spells of unrest in 2008 or in 2010. An entire generation of youth and civil society at large seems to be involved now, even beyond the influence and control of the Hurriyat, with hardcore Pakistan-engineered militants instigating the agitators at selective places. A multi-pronged intervention is therefore required on a long-term and planned basis, to impress upon the middle rung of Kashmiri society and particularly the youth about the bona fides of the Indian state to promote economic welfare without compromising their distinctive ethnicity and culture under norms of democratic governance.
It is noteworthy that the 26-member all-party parliamentary delegation headed by Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh, deputed to the Valley in early September 2016, failed to establish contact with the Hurriyat leaders as well as groups of protestors. It appears, in retrospect, that the temporary or one-time nature of the deputation without a clear long-term mandate did not elicit any positive response from the people of the Valley and the separatist leaders. The general impression in the Valley was that the delegation’s visit was more for optics and that the delegation was of a diffuse composition and not suitably empowered with a clear set of objectives to initiate a meaningful dialogue.
The Yashwant Sinha-led delegation has made a beginning on initiating preliminary discussions at least with some of the major stakeholders. The circumstances at the time of the parliamentary delegation`s visit to the Valley and those prevailing at present, after the recent cross-Line of Control (LoC) military action by India, are contextually different. With the military situation exacerbating along the LoC and also the International Boundary (IB) portion of the India-Pakistan border in J&K, the requirement for a political accommodation within the Valley needs no emphasis.
The response from the separatists though has been one of caution. Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, leader of one of the Hurriyat factions, has noted that, given that the whole valley is burning, measures limited to the security forces deciding not to use pellet guns for crowd control would not suffice. Another Hurriyat leader, Yaseen Malik, seems to have conveyed a more nuanced response by stating that dialogue is the only way forward for resolution of disputes. There should not be any illusion among those political elements in the Valley inclined towards separatism that involvement of Pakistan in the dialogue process as the third stakeholder will be totally unacceptable to India, at least at this stage and especially directly.
Only after first reaching some understanding on the basics of what constitutes the Kashmiri socio-political entity and how it can be protected within the Indian constitutional ambit or in juxtaposition to it by constitutionally secured guarantees could Pakistan be brought into the dialogue process. This of course would be contingent on an understanding between New Delhi and Islamabad about obviating cross-border infiltration into India under an agreed, verifiable or guaranteed process. These are all future scenarios, the evolution of which will depend on many factors including on how international pressure works in dissuading Islamabad from pushing infiltrators into the Valley or destabilizing the security situation on the border or elsewhere.
It is important, however, that the dialogue process that has been initiated continues, with the state government and the stakeholders of Jammu and Ladakh regions gradually brought into the loop. Parallel action is also needed to instill confidence among the youth of the Valley and their families. Some unique steps may have to be contemplated, including the possibility of extending examination schedules to enable the teaching of the curriculum of schools and colleges to be completed. This is on account of the time lost due to the recent agitations. Most importantly, a majority of those arrested may be released except for those directly involved in the killings of security personnel or in the snatching of weaponry from security personnel or other government sources. Special recuperative treatment under complete government care for those maimed by metallic pellets fired from special guns for crowd control would be another such measure.
An assurance for an eventual `Truth and Reconciliation Commission` on the pattern adopted in South Africa as a mutual atonement measure between the Indian state and the protesters may also be inescapable as a healing touch. Such measures are likely to instill confidence among the youth about the sincerity of governmental efforts to resolve the deep sense of alienation presently prevailing among the civil society in the Valley. Some symbolic action by the Union Government, say, restricting the territorial jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) to certain specified areas like vulnerable border zones, military establishments, sensitive installations, among others, is also likely to have a major positive impact towards perception management of the presently alienated populace. Without some concomitant measures as indicated above, it may not be possible to sustain the nascent dialogue process.
Finally, the state government would have to have a defined role in the dialogue process. Though the initiative in carrying forward the dialogue process would remain with the Track-II delegation with tacit support from the Union Government, the delegation cannot succeed unless some of the confidence building steps outlined above (and more) can be put in place on the law and order and socio-economic fronts. In these respects, supportive or complementary action by the state government would be of essence. The requisite political will and adoption of a long-term view by both the union and state governments is essential for the dialogue process to succeed in the interests of the people of India and of Jammu & Kashmir.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served in senior positions of the Central Government and in Jammu & Kashmir.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Turkey’s insistence on a role for itself risks escalating the already fraught sectarian situation in Iraq, undermining Iraqi sovereignty and not yielding any significant military or political gains for itself.
Turkey’s insistence on a role for itself in the ongoing joint offensive of Iraqi armed forces and Kurdish Peshmarga supported by limited US ground forces and air strikes to liberate Mosul from the Islamic State’s control has created rifts between Ankara and Baghdad. In the run up to the operation, named Qadimun ya Naynawa (We are coming Nineveh), on 11 October, while addressing a press meet in Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to “know his place” in response to Abadi’s call for Turkey to withdraw its troops from Bashiqa. Iraq is wary of a role for Turkey as it fears that the latter can undermine the Abadi government’s ability to control Mosul after liberation from the Islamic State. For its part, Turkey insists on a role to protect its interests (see below). Attempts by the US to mediate and coax Turkey into working under the US-led coalition have not yielded results.
Turkey has multiple reasons for insisting upon a role for itself. Firstly, it argues that Turkish forces are based in Bashiqa to provide training for the Kurdish Peshmarga and that its forces have been invited by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It also argues that Baghdad had been informed of these plans and that Turkey is cooperating with the Masoud Barzai government in the fight against the Islamic State. Secondly, Turkey has interests in northern Iraq because of the domestic Kurdish question and the fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Since the breakdown of Turkey-PKK peace talks in mid-2015, Turkey has intensified military action against the PKK and does not want the latter to maintain military bases in northern Iraq. The Kurdish insurgency in Turkey is a major domestic challenge and numerous peace talks have failed to resolve the issue. Moreover, Turkey has been worried about growing Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and Syria and the chances of a transnational Kurdish movement for autonomy which can provide impetus to Kurdish separatists in Turkey.
Thirdly, Turkey is also concerned about the post-Islamic State power configuration in Mosul. It is supporting the former governor of Nineveh, Atheel al-Nujaifi, and the Sunni militia loyal to him and wants him to have a leading role in Mosul after the city’s liberation. Turkey fears that a significant role for Baghdad and the Shia militia supported by Iran could lead to loss of Turkish influence in northern Iraq. Further, Turkey wishes to maintain good ties with the KRG for both economic and strategic reasons. But Iraq wishes to control Mosul and does not want it to slip under KRG control because of its oil-rich topography. Further, Iran is also insisting upon a role for the Shia militia as that will increase its own influence. Turkey also has concerns about the ability of the PKK and the Islamic State to launch attacks in its Kurdish dominated south-eastern region, which is already witnessing unrest.
Fourthly, Erdoğan has domestic political reasons to insist on an independent military role for Turkey in the battle for Mosul. His going public with criticism of Abadi and telling the latter to “know his place” serves well to trump up domestic support for the AKP. In the last few months, Turkey has witnessed several terrorist attacks leading to a number of deaths as well as a failed ‘coup’ attempt leading to opposition parties accusing the AKP government of inability to maintain peace and stability, staging a counter coup and stifling dissent. Under these circumstances, a direct military involvement in Mosul would give Erdoğan a premise to thump up AKP’s traditional support base and also appeal to Turkish nationalists. Finally, Erdogan’s insistence on a direct military role also hints at his neo-Ottoman ambitions.
Though Turkey has thus multiple reasons for insisting upon a role for itself in the battle for Mosul, the way Erdoğan has gone about it is fraught with danger. The situation in Iraq is fragile and sectarian violence frequent because of the rise of the Islamic State. Shia militias, especially those supported by Tehran such as the Kata’ib Hezbollah, have been accused of torturing and massacring Sunnis during the operation to liberate Falluja from the Islamic State’s control. If Turkey insists on a role for itself, the Shia militias will also want to have a role and that can lead to further bloodshed and an intensification of the sectarian violence. Moreover, it gives former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki a weapon to undermine the Haider al-Abadi government. It will also create problems between Baghdad and Erbil, which do not see eye to eye on Mosul’s future after its retake from the Islamic State. While the KRG wishes to bring Mosul under its control, for Baghdad this is not acceptable as it undermines the central authority.
Notably, the situation in Mosul is complicated. Although early signs indicated a fast advance by the coalition forces, the Islamic State is unlikely to give up all that easily a strategic location like Mosul. The city is not only a political base for the Islamic State but also allows it to control the supply routes to its territories in Iraq and Syria. Reports suggest that the leadership of the Islamic State including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is no more located in Mosul and it has been argued that the Islamic State can enter into a prolonged urban warfare in and around Mosul which is a highly populated area. In such a situation, the battle for Mosul can turn into a humanitarian crisis and hence demands cooperation rather than rifts.
Turkey’s unwillingness to agree to a role under the US-command emanates from domestic reasons – maintain the ruling party’s support base and underscore the Turkish ability to take military action to nullify all threats even if located outside its borders. However, such an approach is short-sighted as it can lead to an intensification of violence by PKK insurgents inside Turkey. Further, it risks escalating the already fraught sectarian situation in Iraq, undermining Iraqi sovereignty and not yielding any significant military or political gains for itself. By agreeing to work under the US command, Turkey can secure its interests without antagonizing Iraq or starting a strategic competition with Iran, and without risking further escalation in the sectarian fault lines that could engulf the entire region including Turkey. Given all this, Turkey’s insistence on a direct military role for itself in the battle for Mosul is an avoidable strategic risk.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
COTECMAR has emerged as a viable and innovative supplier of naval vessels to the Colombian Navy.
Colombia’s naval forces attract little attention outside of the Latin America-Caribbean region. The Colombian Navy (ARC) has a personnel strength of 35,000, a large percentage of of whom are naval infantry, reflecting the service’s dominant task of conducting counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations. The ARC has limited numbers of vessels designed for traditional naval warfare, comprising of four German built missile frigates of the Almirante Padilla class commissioned between 1983 and 1984 and 4 submarines (2 each of the Type 206A and Type 209 classes). In addition, a motley collection of second-hand vessels from the Republic of Korea and the United States provide the bulk of the patrol assets. Increasingly however, Colombia is relying on locally built vessels and has developed an extensive range of innovative designs to meet the needs of low-intensity maritime conflict. These include Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), Coastal Patrol Vessels (CPVs) as well as riverine surface combatants that are unique to Colombia.
At the heart of Colombia’s indigenous ship-building capabilities is COTECMAR - Corporación de Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo de la Industria Naval Marítima y Fluvial (Science and Technology Corporation for the Development of the Naval and Fluvial Maritime Industry). This is a state run entity working closely with three Colombian universities and the ARC to develop an indigenous ship design and construction capability for the Colombian military. COTECMAR is headed by a serving naval officer of the rank of Rear Admiral and its design and administrative sections are also led by naval personnel. This has ensured a very close relationship between the end-user and the designers. Feedback from the navy is quickly taken into consideration by the designers for either successor vessels or modifications to existing assets. In many ways, this strong partnership between the shipyard and the user has contributed to COTECMARs growing reputation within the region especially when combined with satisfactory build times and quality.
COTECMAR’s design bureau is small and is comprised largely of young naval architects and engineers trained at national and international institutes working under the direction of project leaders who are serving naval officers. Appreciating its limitations, the company has sought expertise from more established shipbuilders, with an emphasis on mastering design concepts rather than on reverse engineering of systems. Colombia though still imports all weapons, sensors, and propulsion systems and remains heavily dependent on imports to make local designs come to fruition as well as to undertake upgrades of ageing platforms – of increasing priority for all Latin American navies.
As the four German-made frigates began showing signs of age and systems obsolescence, Colombia embarked upon a relatively ambitious upgrade plan. Thales in association with COTECMAR undertook the work to upgrade the Almirante Padilla class with new sensors and weapons. Though Thales handled much of the integration work, the experience would have stood COTECMAR in good stead. Overhauls and limited upgrades were also conducted by COTECMAR in respect of the ARC’s submarines and logistics vessels. While its ability to manufacture and even upgrade major surface combatants is yet nascent, COTECMAR has been able to demonstrate its prowess in the production of OPVs, CPVs and a host of specialized riverine vessels.
After a long search for partners who would share design know-how and transfer intellectual property rights, COTECMAR selected Fassmer of Germany as its partner for an ambitious project to create a class of Patrulleros de Zona Marítima (PZM: Maritime Zone Patrol Boats) to be used by Chile, Colombia and Argentina. While Argentina seems to have discontinued work on the project, Chile and Colombia have pressed ahead. Chile was content with producing four of the basic Fassmer 80m OPV (Fasmer 80) design – two of which are in service and two more having been launched. Columbia though became much more ambitious. Obtaining design knowledge and guidance from Fassmer, COTECMAR redesigned the basic Fassmer 80 design to give it greater troop carrying capability, much longer range (with a lower top speed) and greater fuel economy. The resulting vessel - the 20 de Julio – was commissioned in 2012 and saw extensive service in counter-narcotics operations and Exclusive Economic Zone patrols.
The 20 de Julio was deemed to be a success in service but responding to user feedback from the navy, the follow-on ship, the 7 de Agosto (commissioned in 2014) incorporated several modifications including Colombia’s first remotely controlled weapons system (rather than the earlier Browning M2HB 0.50 machine guns), a helicopter hangar and platform capable of carrying a larger helicopter (Bell 412/UH-1N types as opposed to Eurocopter AS.355s in the case of 20 de Julio). Of particular interest is the adoption of a stern launch ramp – widely used for Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) – to deploy a full-sized Midnight Express interceptor with an attendant increase in interdiction capability.
A similar partnership with STX of the Republic of Korea for CPVs of the CPV-46 design resulted in COTECMAR developing the Fassmer 40 CPV into a much improved 46 metre design. Two of the vessels were built by STX in the ROK – PC 147 Punta Soldado and PC 148 Punta Ardita – while another PC 146 Punta Espada was built by COTECMAR. If the planned class of 16 such vessels materializes, it will provide much needed replacements for the ARC’s rapidly ageing force of CPVs, most of which are over two decades old. Colombia has also started to produce its own landing craft to replace former American vessels of that type currently in service.
COTECMAR needed no foreign collaboration to produce a unique series of riverine craft which have seen extensive service against insurgents as well as narcotics traffickers. A family of eight vessels known as PAFs - Patrulleros de ApoyoFluvia – or Patrol Vessels for Fluvial Support – are encased in ballistic amour plate (which has proven to be resistant to RPG fire in combat) and heavily armed with a combination of machine guns and automatic grenade launchers. Capable of providing support to smaller riverine combatants, the PAFs have a helicopter platform and the capacity to provide rest, relief, resupply and medical treatment for Colombian forces operating far from land bases. In its latest incarnation – the PAF IV or PAF-P (for Pesada or heavy) can support operations for 20 days and can accommodate 39 marines in addition to its crew of 33.
Operating in concert with the PAFs, which act as motherships, are fast patrol launches or LPRs (LanchasPatrullerasRapidas), also built by COTECMAR to an indigenous design. These shallow-draft vessels are armed with machine guns and grenade launchers and have significant ballistic protection. With the support of the PAFs, the LPRs and heliborne troops can conduct aggressive counter-insurgency operations for prolonged periods from shore and have multiplied the efficacy of Colombia’s naval infantry manifold.
It is interesting to note that despite still being at a relatively early stage as a ship design and building entity, COTECMAR has conducted a vigorous campaign in the Latin America–Caribbean region. While the company has been able to secure the sale of LPRs to Brazil, its efforts to market the PAF, the OPVs and CPVs have been unsuccessful to date. COTECMAR’s relatively limited size necessarily means that its production capacity is also limited and meeting the demands of both the ARC and export markets seems a difficult task. In addition, in its bid to supply PAFs, CPVs and OPVs to Trinidad and Tobago, COTECMAR’s prices were noted to be quite high compared to its global competitors.
Furthermore, the ARC is not expanding its fleet to any significant degree and it is therefore questionable whether economies of scale will facilitate either a reduction in price or provide the necessary funds to expand the shipyard’s facilities. The company is also competing in a region where countries like Peru, Brazil, Chile and Argentina have well-developed shipyards that have either built, assembled or overhauled guided missile frigates in addition to less sophisticated vessels. Nonetheless, COTECMAR’s emergence as a viable and innovative supplier of naval vessels is a development worth taking cognizance of and as its capabilities develop, companies looking to break into the Latin American naval market could do well to consider the partnership prospects with COTECMAR that might emerge in the years to come.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While the fate of the peace process between the Colombian Government and FARC remains uncertain, innovative use of technology and tactics on the part of the Colombian Air Force has played no small part in convincing the rebel group that its military struggle was doomed to fail.
Colombia’s bloody war with the Marxist rebel group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the longest running armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere. Claiming over 220,000 lives and displacing millions, hopes for an end to the 52-year old insurgency were dealt a severe blow when the Colombian electorate narrowly rejected the terms of the peace agreement in a national referendum held on October 02, threatening the tenuous ceasefire that ends on October 31. As per the final outcome of the referendum, 49.79 per cent of the Colombians had voted in favour of the peace agreement and 50.21 per cent against it.
Whatever the eventual outcome, the conflict is noteworthy for the level of military innovation shown by the Colombian armed forces as they fought and gained an upper hand over FARC. The Colombian Air Force (FAC) has displayed a high degree of inventiveness in its use of air power. While never equipped with the most advanced of weaponry, the Colombian military has successfully mated older platforms with new ordnance and devised tactics to make effective use of its limited resources. While the United States provided valuable intelligence support, it has not been a major supplier of arms to Colombia for the better part of the last one decade. Rather, by keeping old equipment in service through upgrades and modifications and by developing tactics to maximise the capabilities of its platforms, the FAC has been at the forefront of a series of devastatingly effective operations launched against FARC, and has played no small part in bringing them to the negotiating table.
The combat strength of the FAC lies in its six Combat Air Commands or Comando Aéreo de Combate (CACOM). Each CACOM has between one and two Combat Groups – Grupo de Combate – attached to them, and these in turn are divided into squadrons operating either fixed-wing aircrafts or helicopters.The Order of Battle (ORBAT) of the CACOMs and their airbases are as follows:
Comando Aéreo de Combate No. 1 (CACOM 1) "CT. Captain Germán Olano Moreno Air Base" in Palanquero/Puerto Salgar, Cundinamarca
Grupo de Combate Nº 11
Escuadrón de Combate 111 Dardos (Kfir C10, Kfir C12)
Escuadrón de Combate 112 Mirage (Kfir C10, Kfir C12)
Escuadrón de Combate Táctico 113 Fantasma (AB212 Rapáz, AC-47T Fantasma, AH-60L Arpía III)
Escuadrón de Combate 116 Tango (T-37B, T-37C)
Comando Aéreo de Combate No. 2 (CACOM 2) "CT. Luis Fernando Gómez Niño"
In Apiay/Villavicencio, Meta
Grupo de Combate Nº 21
Escuadrón de Combate 211 Grifos (A-29B Supertucano)
Escuadrón de Combate 212 Tucanos (AT-27 Tucano)
Escuadrón de Combate Táctico 213 (AH-60L Arpía III, C212-300, C208-675, SA2-37B Vampiro, SR-560)
Grupo de Combate Nº 22 located in Yopal, Casanare.
Escuadrón de Combate 221 Bronco (North American OV-10 Bronco) – retired in November 2015
Comando Aéreo de Combate No. 3 (CACOM 3) "MG. Alberto Pauwels Rodríguez"
In Malambo/Barranquilla, Atlántico
Grupo de Combate 31
Escuadrón de Combate 311 Dragones (A-37 Dragonfly).
Escuadrón de Combate 312 Drakos (A-29B Supertucano).
Escuadrón de Combate Táctico 313 (AC-47T Fantasma, Bell 212 Rapáz, C-95A, SA2-37B Vampiro, SR-26B Tracker, UH-1 Huey II).
Comando Aéreo de Combate No. 4 (CACOM 4) "TC. Luis Francisco Pinto Parra"
In Melgar, Tolima
Grupo de Combate 41
Escuadrón de Combate 411 Rapaz (Bell 212).
Escuadrón de AsaltoAéreo 412 (Bell UH-1H/P).
Eccuadron de Ataque 413 Escorpion (MD 500/530).
Grupo CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue).
Escuela de Helicópteros de las Fuerzas Armadas.
Escuadrón de Vuelo (Bell UH-1H, Bell 206, Bell OH-58 Kiowa).
Comando Aéreo de Combate No. 5 (CACOM 5) "GR. Arturo LemaPosada" in Rionegro, Antioquia
Grupo de Combate 51
Escuadrón de Combate 511 (AH-60L Arpía III)
Escuadrón de Operaciones Especiales 512 (Ce208-675, UH-60A/L Halcon)
Comando Aéreo de Combate No. 6 (CACOM 6) "CT. Ernesto Esguerra Cubides"
In TresEsquinas, Caquetá
Grupo de Combate 61
Escuadrón de Combate 611 (AT-27 Tucano, A-29B Supertucano)
Escuadrón de Combate Táctico 613 (AC-47T Fantasma, Bell 212 Rapaz, C212-300, SA2-37B Vampiro, UH-1H-II, Scan Eagle UAV)
Source: Individual CACOM websites, Colombian Air Force
These formations between them operate a relatively small inventory of aircrafts, with its combat assets comprising of only 20 C.10/C.12 Kfir fighters, seven surviving Cessna A-37 ground-attack aircraft, 25 Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucanos (in its AT-29 variant), 14 EMB-312 Tucanos (in its AT-27 variant) and six Bassler BT-67/ AC-47T gunships based on the DC-3 airframe. Added to these are a large fleet of helicopters, numbering over a hundred, to which must be added a further 150 operated by the Colombian National Army and an additional 65 operated by the Colombian National Police.
Even by Latin American standards, this is a very modest force, with the exception of course of the substantial helicopter fleet. The FAC’s Kfirs, though upgraded, are outnumbered and to a great extent outmatched by the Su-30MKV force of Venezuela and are barely adequate to protect Colombia’s airspace. While the Kfirs have seen service in combat against FARC, the air strikes against the insurgents were largely carried out by helicopter units and a dedicated counter-insurgency aerial strike force comprising A-37 Dragonfly and the Super Tucanos and Tucanos. Even within this force, the A-37s have depleted over the decades due to natural and combat attrition. Therefore, the core of the FAC’s combat element against FARC lies in its Super Tucanos and Tucanos.
As stated earlier, helicopters were extensively used for fire-support and troop insertion and Special Forces of both the Colombian armed forces and the national police have shown adeptness at conducting heliborne operations in hostile conditions. Yet, these operations are fundamentally conventional. The same cannot be said for the FAC’s use of its counter-insurgency aerial strike force where intelligence led precision strikes were conducted making innovative use of relatively cheap platforms mated with advanced precision guided munitions.
Colombia’s intelligence gathering efforts are spearheaded by good human and electronic intelligence and an intercept network honed by years of operations against the drug cartels and extensive use of Scan Eagle UAVs and Schwiezer SA2-37B Vampiro covert surveillance aircraft. The latter is a low-cost piston-engine aircraft based on a popular low-wing motor glider. In its surveillance role, it is equipped with a 231kg sensor payload including FLIR and can remain on station for up to 12 hours.
These intelligence gathering assets are supported by A-37s and Super Tucano/ Tucano fleets. In the 1990s, Tucano force used a mix of unguided bombs, rockets and external gunpods and bore the brunt of the initial effort against FARC. The A-37s and Super Tucanos, however, were later modified to carry much more effective weapons. The FAC modified A-37s to carry Mk.82 500lb bombs upgraded with Paveway II laser-targeting systems, while the Super Tucanos were fitted with Israeli made Griffin Laser-Guided Bombs (LGBs) aimed at using the aircraft’s Constantly Computed Impact Point (CCIP) capability. This converted the ageing A-37s and the Super Tucanos into high-tech, but not high-cost strike aircraft.
Working in concert, the A-37s and Super Tucanos played a pivotal role in Operation Fenix conducted on February 29 – March 01, 2008. Penetrating Ecuadorean airspace, three A-37s carrying Paveway II upgraded Mk.82 bombs and five Super Tucanos carrying either Griffin LGBs or standard Mk.82 bombs attacked and destroyed a FARC encampment, killing Raul Reyes, then the second-in-command of FARC, and no fewer than 20 other FARC insurgents. It is a testimony to Colombian planning and the skill of the FAC crews that the formidable Ecuadorean Air Force – battle tested against Peru – failed to either intercept or detect the Colombian raiders.
The Super Tucanos have since been effectively used in carrying out targeted strikes aimed at decapitating the FARC leadership. They were incredibly successful when targeted strikes were carried out in 2010 – in which the Super Tucanos dropped 14,000lbs of bombs - killing Mono Jojoy, FARC’s leading military strategist, and in 2011 – this time in combination with A-37s – in flushing out Alfonso Cano (then FARC’s top commander) and eventually enabling Colombian troops to kill him with gunfire. Again, in four separate air raids in 2012, commanders of FARC’s 7th, 27th, 33rd and 37th Fronts were eliminated. By 2013, no fewer than 42 FARC commanders had been killed in airstrikes conducted by A-37s and Super Tucanos, ably assisted by the Tucanos. These campaigns against FARC may mark the swansong of the A-37s as a major strike asset, though the type is ageing.
The fear of being killed in airstrikes forced the insurgents to abandon their well-established bases and move to more temporary camps, lacking the facilities of the better established ones. As temporary camps too came under attack, the insurgents were left with no option but to remain on the move. In due course of time, FARC lost close to two-thirds of its personnel – largely through desertions – and much of its combat potential and territorial influence as their bases were systematically destroyed.
While the fate of the peace process between the Colombian Government and FARC remains uncertain, innovative use of technology and tactics on the part of FAC has played no small part in convincing the rebel group that its military struggle was doomed to fail. Colombia’s experience in cost-effective use of airpower in counter-insurgency certainly has some valuable lessons to offer and could be considered worth emulating in other parts of the world.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
India needs to address the issue of water sharing with China in a comprehensive manner that includes both national and international initiatives.
Recent reports have pointed to China blocking the Xiabuqu tributary of the Yarlung Zangpo River (Tibetan name for Brahmaputra) for a dam project. The 195-km long Xiabuqu originates at Bainang and joins the Brahmaputra at Xigaze, close to Sikkim. The construction of the dam as part of the Lalho hydroelectric project at Xigaze reportedly began in June 2014 and is expected to be completed by 2019.
The project has been viewed with concern in India, which is a lower riparian state. The Yarlung Zangpo flows 1625 kms in Tibet before entering Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang. Further down, after confluence with the Dibang and Lohit, it is known as the Brahmaputra. In Bangladesh, it merges with the Ganga and empties into the Bay of Bengal.
China has tried to allay India’s apprehensions by stating that the project is not designed to hold water. It further claims that the Xiabuqu’s mean discharge volume is barely 0.02 per cent of the Brahmaputra’s average annual trans- boundary discharge, which latter is estimated at 142.37 cubic km. Earlier, Beijing had vehemently denied undertaking any dam construction activities on the Brahmaputra in Tibet. It was only in 2010 that the then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi formally acknowledged the construction of the Zangmu dam.
China’s closed door political system is shrouded in secrecy, leading to trust deficit. In the absence of an effective water sharing mechanism, the construction of the dam on the Xiabuqu could emerge as another irritant between India and China. Beijing’s elaborate plans to harness the waters of the rivers in Tibet have serious strategic and socio-economic implications for India.
China’s Grand Design
China’s water resources are unevenly distributed. The better developed northern region, home to 42 per cent of the country’s population, contains only 14 per cent of its fresh water. The agrarian South, which is comparatively less developed, is water surplus with a 86 per cent share of the country’s total fresh water. Over the years, industrial and domestic usage of water in China has increased significantly. As a result, Beijing has taken recourse to dam construction and water diversion to sustain economic growth.
The Tibet plateau has enormous strategic significance due to its rich water resources. Its 100,000 sq. km. surface is covered by glaciers that feed a number of river systems in South and South East Asia. The major Chinese rivers, Yangtze and Huang He, originate from the plateau. The Indus and Sutlej that flow through India also have their origin in Tibet. And the Salween and Mekong rivers, which also originate in Tibet, traverse through Indo-China.
China, as the largest consumer of energy, plans to double its current electricity generation capacity to 430,000 MW in the next couple of years. To reduce carbon emissions, Beijing aims to enhance the proportion of non-fossil fuel usage to 15 per cent by 2020. According to the Chinese Academy of Science, the hydroelectric power generation capacity of the Yarlung Zangpo basin is around 114,000 MW. The Chinese are in the process of constructing 36 dams on the rivers and tributaries in Tibet.
To tide over existing water and energy shortages, China has adopted a multi- pronged strategy. The Three Gorges project on the Yangtze generates 18,000 MW of electricity and has enabled the transfer of water to the northern regions. Another project underway is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP), which entails diverting the waters of the Yangtze to augment the capacity of the Huang He.
In Tibet, the Chinese dam building spree on the Brahmaputra includes the 510 MW dam at Zangmu, which was completed in 2015. Under the ‘New Energy Development Plan-2015’, the Chinese cabinet has approved the construction of three more dams on the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra. Two of these dams, Dagu (640 MW) and Jiexu (capacity unconfirmed), are 18 and 11 kms, respectively, upstream of the Zangmu. The third at Jiacha (340 MW) is downstream.
However, it is the northward rerouting of waters under the ‘Great Western Route Water Transfer Project’ that is of serious concern to India. The proposal involves the construction of a mega dam (38,000 MW capacity) at Namcha Barwa, where the Brahmaputra makes a steep loop before entering India. While initially the project is for power generation, subsequent plans are to divert water up to 200 bcm for irrigating the deserts of Xinjiang, Gansu and Inner Mongolia. Due to the requirement of major tunnelling effort, for the time being, the project is on hold. However, the Chinese have proven expertise in executing highly complex engineering ventures.
The Chinese are also in the process of constructing about a dozen dams on the Salween (Nu) in Tibet and Yunnan. Six mammoth dam projects on the Mekong are also in the pipeline.
Strategic Implications
Dams over the Yarlung Zangpo, even if these are ‘run of river’ projects, provide China the ability to control the flow of water in the Brahmaputra. An accidental or emergent outflow from these dams could prove catastrophic. Cases in point in this regard are: the sudden rise of water in the Siang in 2000, which resulted in the death of 26 people; and, the Pareechu episode in 2005, which led to flash floods in the Sutlej causing extensive damage.
In case China pursues the option of diverting the waters of the Brahmaputra, the consequences could be wide ranging. It could seriously affect the navigability of National Waterway-2 – the 890 km stretch from Sadiya to Dhubri – given the requirement of maintaining a minimum depth of 1.5 metres from Sadiya to Dibrugarh and 2 metres beyond that. Even ‘run of river’ projects are not benign. When water held back in pondage is released for the turbines to operate, it results in diurnal variation in the downstream flow. That, in turn, is likely to seriously impact India’s efforts to exploit the hydro potential of the region. Moreover, any disturbance in the existing ecological environment will have an adverse effect on the densely populated Brahmaputra Valley.
To counter the Chinese grand design of ‘stealing the rivers’, India has planned to construct 76 dams with an estimated capacity of 36,900 MW, taking advantage of the ‘UN advisory on the river water dispute’, whereby a downstream riparian state can ensure ‘first user right’ on the international rivers by building dams. Of these, the 44 dams on the Siang are expected to generate 18,293 MW of hydro power. But very little progress has been made on these dam projects due to numerous factors: inefficient official machinery, allegations of corruption and kickbacks, influential activist bodies opposing the construction of the dams on the pretext of environment degradation, and technical glitches, to name a few.
While China as an upper riparian state enjoys ‘restricted territorial sovereignty’ as per international law, it also has an obligation to protect the interests of lower riparian nations. Currently, there is no arrangement between India and China on water sharing. In a recent article carried by the state-run Global Times, China had expressed willingness to have multilateral cooperation with India and Bangladesh to share waters. Retracting this two days later, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official spokesperson went on to state that effective cooperation regarding sharing data on the flow of rivers already existed.
India’s Options
India needs to address the issue of water sharing with China in a comprehensive manner. New Delhi must garner the support of other affected nations – Bangladesh and Bhutan, besides Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam – to build consensus with the aim of dissuading China from going ahead with the planned projects in Tibet. There is an urgent need to formulate a national policy that factors in both the strategic and legal dimensions. Besides, the constitution of a body of experts would go a long way in addressing the issue in its entirety.
In the emerging geopolitical scenario, water and energy security are critical for China to realise its global aspirations. In pursuit of national interests, the Communist Party’s leadership approach is characterised by assertiveness and unilateralism. Therefore, instead of adopting a policy of appeasement, New Delhi must forcefully take up its concerns with Beijing. It is only through persistence that a formal framework for a water sharing mechanism with China can be evolved. To this end, strong political will combined with crafty diplomacy appears to be the best option.
The author is a former Assistant Chief Integrated Staff. He has served as Defence Attaché in China. He is currently Professor Security & Strategic Studies at Aligarh Muslim University.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
India needs to factor in the critical issue of reputation for resolve in future crisis situations in order to build its credibility and enhance its deterrence potential.
India’s cross-LoC strikes on terrorist launch pads located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) have been much discussed in recent days. While the government has officially described the attacks on terrorist launch pads as ‘surgical’ and ‘pre-emptive’, some commentators have described it as ‘punitive’ and ‘retributive’ since these were conducted soon after the terrorist attack at Uri which led to a heavy loss of life among army personnel. Violent attacks by Pakistan-based terrorist groups on Indian targets have begun to occur at worryingly regular intervals. And there has been a clamour for retribution against these elements based in Pakistan after each dastardly attack. Notwithstanding heightened public sentiments for retribution, and even though it has threatened the use of force on a few occasions, India has generally observed ‘strategic restraint’ because of the fear of escalation. But its resilience and practice of ‘strategic restraint’ has earned India the reputation of a ‘Soft State’.
Thomas Schelling's seminal work, The Strategy of Conflict, had highlighted the importance of a state’s reputation for resolve, i.e., the willingness to use of force in a crisis situation.1 The reputation theory of conflict behaviour claims that a state with an established practice of using force during crises and thus acquiring a strong reputation for resolve would enjoy bargaining leverages during future crises. And conversely, a state with a weak reputation for resolve would stand at a disadvantage.2
In the light of the above understanding, the issue that needs to be considered is whether India, through its practice of ‘strategic restraint’ in the past, has encouraged Pakistan to continue with its support for non-state actors and wage war by proxy. Further, it also needs to be considered whether the recent cross-LoC strikes have firmly signalled India’s new reputation for resolve.
What Is Reputation for Resolve?
Reputation matters in international politics. Reputation for resolve depends on the willingness to use force in following through threats and commitments. This notion of credibility and its relevance as potential deterrence has been one of Schelling’s most persuasive articulations. A state’s willingness to use force exposes it to the risk of potential escalation and a wider conflagration. Under these circumstances, the demonstration of resolve requires a careful evaluation of potential payoffs vis a vis the cost of using military force. A willingness to suffer the cost of a conflict in order to achieve an appropriate resolution of the dispute in their favour distinguishes highly resolved states from states with weak resolve. Resolve is, thus, a dispositional attribute of states. And, it can indeed change over a period of time or across issues.3
The resolve of a state indicates its propensity to use force for resolving a political dispute in its favour. However, it is the credibility of a state’s resolve that will have a critical bearing on its opponent’s approach towards a political dispute.4 Thus, a reputation for resolve refers to the external perception of a particular state’s willingness to risk war. Its past behaviour in a crisis or dispute is an important facet of this reputation that is likely to shape the perceptions of observers.5 A state with a better reputation for resolve is expected to hold its established position in future crises. Because, its established willingness to use force is likely to give it greater bargaining power in future crises. At the same time, if a state were to back down during one dispute, then that will be construed as an unwillingness to bear the costs of the conflict due to its assessment of unfavourable payoffs.6 Observers are likely to assume that the weak resolve of the state is indicative of its willingness to acquiesce and they will accordingly demand concessions. Even though the resolve of a state remains a private information, it does shape the perception of its opponents. For, states examine each other’s past behaviour or reputation to assess their current intentions. Thus, a state’s strong reputation for resolve will dissuade opponents, while a weak reputation for resolve will invite further demands for concession.
A recent analysis of 1,322 militarised interstate conflicts by Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo examined how a state’s reputation for resolve influences the likelihood of its involvement in future disputes. The findings of the study provide strong evidence that reputation for resolve matters. The study highlighted three key aspects of conflict behaviour. Firstly, “countries that demonstrated resolve in past conflicts are less likely to be challenged than countries that did not do so.”7 In other words, a lack of resolve during past conflicts will encourage more challenges in the future. Secondly, “countries that have demonstrated resolve in the past are less likely to be challenged subsequently.”8 And thirdly, the effect of reputation is stronger when the subsequent interaction more closely resembles the dispute in which the country in question earned its reputation for resolution or irresolution.9
India’s Reputation for Resolve
These findings resonate with conventional wisdom about India-Pakistan dynamics. India’s self-imposed strategic restraint has not been effective. Pakistan has kept the pot boiling through the use of non-state actors and has maintained a level of violence that is low enough to avoid the outbreak of an overt conflict. At the same time, Pakistan has also occasionally pushed the envelope wider to establish a new baseline of India’s threshold of tolerance. India’s default position in the aftermath of each terrorist attack had progressively become rhetorical and limited to a temporary freeze in bilateral engagement and diplomatic protests at the regional and international levels. Bilateral relations gradually improved during the intervening period until the next terrorist strike emanating from Pakistan. And the cycle repeated itself. According to conflict behaviour theory, India, in its approach towards countering terrorism emanating from Pakistan, has displayed a weak reputation for resolve. Since past reputation matters in similar future interactions, Pakistan had no motivation to change its policy and India continued to suffer the consequences of terrorism. But the cross-LoC strikes by Indian Special Forces may have changed that pattern of India repeatedly demonstrating its lack of resolve.
Going beyond the India-Pakistan dynamics, it is pertinent to highlight the fact that India has been largely reticent in using military force in the external domain to protect its national interest and the lives of its citizens. This is illustrated by India’s response to the hijacking of an Indian-flagged dhow, MV Bhakti Sagar, by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden in February 2006. At the time of the incident, an Indian Navy destroyer, INS Mumbai, was in the vicinity and could have intervened. However, a range of political considerations acted as a constraint in employing the warship for rescue or delivering aid. This experience has been recounted by Admiral Arun Prakash in an aptly titled article, “Appeasement Never Pays”:
“While Mumbai was proceeding with all despatch, a heated debate raged in the Cabinet Secretary’s office about the advisability of sending a warship. At the end of these deliberations, the MEA sent a written note to NHQ posing a set of rhetorical questions….. Agonising about how our African and Middle-Eastern neighbours would react to what was termed as ‘muscle-flexing’ by the Indian Navy, the note vividly illustrated why India has earned the sobriquet of a soft state. The essence of the note was contained in one plaintive query: ‘Will we sail a destroyer every time an Indian national is in trouble anywhere?’ The navy’s emphatic response: ‘Yes of course; if we have one available!’, went unheeded, and the warship had to be recalled. A few days later, the ship owner paid ransom to the pirates, and 21 Indian citizens came home, without the Indian state or its powerful navy having lifted a finger to protect them.”10
What followed was progressively bolder acts, with pirates even engaging in mid-ocean attacks on ships in the Arabian Sea. As a result, by 2010, the piracy high risk area expanded to include India’s entire Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on its west coast. That, in turn, increased the insurance premium for shipping bound for Indian ports.11 Thereafter, it took concerted efforts and robust action by the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard to eliminate piracy from the Indian EEZ, including the use of force and arrest of 119 pirates.12 It was due to this effective use of force that Indian waters were declared piracy free and the High Risk Area was redrawn to exclude the Indian EEZ on the West Coast.13 While it is true that anti-piracy operations are no comparison to inter-state disputes, the issue of reputation for resolve played out exactly according to the reputational behaviour hypotheses.
Would India’s reputation for resolve yield similar advantages in terms of bringing about behavioural changes within Pakistan in the aftermath of the recent cross-LoC strikes? Would this strike alone deter Pakistani terrorists from attempting to infiltrate and execute attacks on Indian targets in the future? While reputational behaviour theory hints at a positive outcome in this regard, definitive results are likely to show up only in due course of time. Be that as it may, the responses from Pakistan thus far tentatively confirm the theoretical postulates. Pakistan has vehemently denied that the cross-LoC strikes occurred and has not escalated the existing level of bilateral tensions. While it is too early to rule out a direct Pakistani backlash or a response through its proxies, Pakistan’s reaction has thus far remained rhetorical. It appears that India has been able to convey its message firmly about the change in its reputational posture.
There can be no divergence of views about the importance of a careful consideration of the escalatory potential of the use of force in the India-Pakistan scenario given the nuclear overhang. But, at the same time, it is evident from the events of the past two decades that India has not been able to bring about a positive change in Pakistan’s determination to continue to employ cross-border terrorism either through diplomatic outreach and persuasion or the potential threat to use force. Through the cross-LoC strikes, a novel tool of coercion, India has displayed a strong reputation for resolve However, one incident does not indicate a trend. Advantages in conflict bargaining will arise only through repeated demonstrations of similar resolve in the future. Given that, India needs to factor in the critical issue of reputation for resolve in future crisis situations in order to build its credibility and enhance its deterrence potential.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The indication by Defence Minister Tomomi Inada post her visit to South Sudan that security conditions are conducive for an increase in SDF roles points to a pragmatic outlook and mature understanding of Japan’s role in international issues.
On 8 October 2016, the Japanese Defence Minister Tomomi Inada visited South Sudan to assess the prevailing security situation for the deployment of Self Defence Forces (SDF) which would be assigned an enhanced role of protecting UN personnel, civilians and other peacekeepers. This enhanced role will be a major change from the current SDF role in peacekeeping operations, which is based on provisions of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution that permit the SDF to use their weapons only to protect themselves once they are fired upon.
The Constitution of Japan declares in Article 9 that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes"; that "in order to accomplish [this] aim, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained"; and that "the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." This article was interpreted by the Japanese political hierarchy as prohibiting the overseas despatch of the SDF for whatever purpose or for whatever activity because Japan cannot be involved directly in any armed conflict. Such views, harboured for decades since World War II, led to the formation of an inward-looking, "don't want to be involved" mentality.1
Consequently, during the Gulf War of 1990, though Japan made a substantial financial contribution of USD 13 billion, it had to face harsh international criticism for not contributing its human resources. The Japanese Government thereafter took the initiative to create a legal framework for enabling Japan to participate in the international community's peace-keeping efforts. These efforts resulted in the enactment of the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (the International Peace Cooperation Act) in June 1992 (Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryokuho in Japanese). According to this Act, before a Japanese contingent is despatched for a UN mission, five conditions must be satisfied. These are:
Since the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Act, Japan has made contributions for promoting international peace in more than 13 UN peacekeeping operations. The latest in this regard is the January 2012 despatch of a Horizontal Military Engineering Company (HMEC) for reconstruction and engineering tasks to Juba, South Sudan.
Meanwhile, Japan’s security environment had begun to deteriorate, with rising tensions between Japan and North Korea, growing antipathy between Japan and China, and increasing uncertainty about US commitments to Japanese security in the event of a conflict. These security concerns along with expectations of the international community on Japan to play a more proactive role in ensuring international peace and stability have led the Abe administration to enact a new security legislation3 for the purpose of reinterpreting the Constitution. This new legislation, amongst other clauses, empowers the SDF to use military force to protect civilians, aid workers and peacekeepers of other nations. Now, with the turnover of the currently deployed engineer company in South Sudan due on 31 October 2016, Japan is keen to deploy fresh troops with an enhanced role based on the new security legislation. As this planned deployment is likely to be contested by the Japanese Opposition in the Diet (Parliament) by citing the spiralling violence and fragile peace in South Sudan, the visit of the Defence Minister was important to gain a first-hand knowledge of the conditions obtaining in South Sudan and the degree of risk that the SDF in their new role would be exposed to.
Currently, the SDF Engineering Company in Juba operates only in specified areas close to the capital city. Restrictions on their employment and the limitation on their operations to comparatively risk-free areas have given rise to a reputation among other peacekeepers of the SDF being risk averse. An enhanced role of the SDF will negate this adverse image and demonstrate Japan’s acceptance of greater global responsibility to maintain international norms, values and institutions, commensurate with its national capabilities and international standing.
Secondly, an enhanced engagement in peacekeeping operations, resulting from the additional SDF roles, will also assure the African nations of greater Japanese involvement and willingness to a play a proactive role in maintaining peace in the continent. Japan hopes that this will translate into African support for its proposed reform of the UN and its inclusion as a Permanent Member in a reformed United Nations Security Council.
Thirdly, enhanced engagement will also facilitate access to the oil reserves of South Sudan in particular and Africa in general as Japan looks to diversify its energy sources. The proposed 2000 km gas pipeline from South Sudan and Uganda to Lamu (Kenyan port on the Indian Ocean) spearheaded by Toyota Tsusho, a Japanese multinational company, is an example in this regard. Such a greater involvement by Japan also appear to be motivated by a desire to negate the Chinese influence in South Sudan where currently China has a major stake in oil fields.
Fourthly, the SDF has no combat experience and has generally been confined to undertaking disaster relief tasks since its inception. An enhanced role under the UN banner may provide limited experience of conflict situations to the SDF.
Against this backdrop, the indication by Defence Minister Tomomi Inada post her visit to South Sudan in October 2016 that security conditions are conducive for an increase in SDF roles points to a pragmatic outlook and mature understanding of Japan’s role in international issues.
Since the promulgation of the Constitution on 3 May 1947, Japan has been compelled by international economic, political and security circumstances to gradually expand the role of the SDF. Current efforts by the Abe Government to assign an enhanced role to the SDF in South Sudan is a step towards the realisation of responsibilities and acceptance of a more proactive role in international affairs. This will pave the way for the SDF to shoulder greater responsibilities in peace keeping activities the world over in line with PM Shinzo Abe’s mantra of ‘Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Peace’.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Instead of erecting static structures or walls with mounted electronic complements, a more dynamic mode of border management and surveillance may be expedient and cost-effective with concomitant mobile patrols by all-terrain vehicles, hovercraft, etc.
Home Minister Rajnath Singh has recently declared that the entire India-Pakistan border is to be completely sealed by December 2018. The announcement may be viewed in the context of India-Pakistan relations reaching a particular low and uncertain threshold post the Uri incident and cross-Line of Control (LoC) operations by India on 28-29 September 2016. The above-referred decision of the Union Government is reported to have been taken after a review of gaps in border management by a high-level Committee on Security and Border Protection (CSBP) of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) (popularly known as the Madhukar Gupta Committee) set up in March 2016 to overcome the lacunae observed consequent on the Gurdaspur and Pathankot infiltration occurrences. The outcome of the review is likely to have influenced the decision on setting 2018 as the target for a total sealing of the border. As of now, Pakistan Government sources have indicated that they have no comments on this development given the absence of details. Some Chinese think-tank commentators have, however, observed that such a venture would be irrational, indicative of Cold War mentality and likely to complicate relations among China, India and Pakistan, without elucidating as to how this decision would impinge on Chinese interests.
Government sources have indicated that a border security grid with a provision for real-time monitoring of the entire length of the border and capability for intervention as necessary is to be put in place. This will obviously involve networked coordination among the states’ home departments and their police authorities, their Central counterparts, MHA and the agencies responsible for technical and electronic surveillance. Furthermore, the works authorities at the central and state levels will have to be involved in the logistics of the forces assigned to protect the border, border fencing, sensors being installed, and providing access road network to the border outposts. It is, however, not clear whether a physical infrastructure in the form of a wall or obstacles on the pattern of the Israeli West Bank defences (in Israeli-occupied Palestine territory) is to be eventually erected.
Even a complete sealing by barbed wire fences, adequately grouted with concrete supporting bases and flood lighting, of India`s western international border stretching 3323 kms from Gujarat to Jammu & Kashmir would undoubtedly be a stupendous task. The length to be covered in the four states – Gujarat 508 kms, Rajasthan 1037 kms, Punjab 553 kms and Jammu & Kashmir 1225 kms – including 740 kms of Line of Control (LoC) northwards of the terminating point of the international boundary in Jammu is quite substantial. Moreover, the terrain conditions and socio-economic milieu in the border regions of these states as well as the engineering efforts involved are likely to make the border sealing exercise quite an exacting one. While the need for effective border protection and guarding against infiltration by anti-national elements, smugglers, etc., is undeniable, the manner in which the sealing would take place will be of the essence. Within India also, particularly in Punjab, a total political consensus in the matter has not been evident as of now. There are reports that the Border Security Force has brought to the government`s notice a proposal to shift the existing fence in some parts of the western border closer to the international boundary. The objective is to enable local farmers to cultivate their farmlands to a greater extent by releasing a part of the area presently lying between the existing fence and the international boundary line. The government may find such a proposal difficult to accede to because of cost implications, resource constraints and, even, Pakistan`s objections for tactical reasons.
So far as the geographical conditions are concerned, the border terrain varies from flat grasslands of the Punjab plains to extreme climatic sandy areas and marshy salt patches in Rajasthan and Gujarat. In Jammu & Kashmir, the LoC portion of the border to the north, beyond the 200 kms of international boundary in southern Jammu region, is hilly, forested and intersected by many mountainous rivers and numerous nallahs or drains. While a major part of the LoC and the international boundary in Jammu region is fenced, a substantial part of the international boundary has also been fenced and floodlit – 461 kms in Punjab and 1048 kms (fenced including extra fencing in some portions) with 1023 kms floodlit in Rajasthan, as per the last Annual Report of the MHA. The remaining stretches of the border are yet to be covered. Moreover, there are segments of the border like the Shahgarh bulge in Jaisalmer district of Rajasthan, which have extreme climatic conditions for a major part of the year with average daytime temperatures soaring to more than 50 degrees Celsius, where metallic fencing does not last long. 32 kms of this bulge could not be adequately fenced because of such terrain. Furthermore, there are portions in the Jaisalmer-Barmer segment in Rajasthan where even the border (presently unfenced) markings get covered by shifting sand dunes. In Gujarat, only 229 kms has been fenced and 202 kms floodlit out of the 553 kms of the border. 64 kms in the Rann-of-Kutch segment of the Gujarat border has been left unfenced owing to saltpan-marshy conditions. All these serve to highlight the extent of engineering and financial resources that will be needed to completely seal the border.
There are reports of India availing Israeli expertise towards executing its border sealing project. In this regard, it is relevant to mention that the political milieu and geographical conditions of Israel`s border areas and India`s are not exactly similar. However, in difficult stretches of the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir and certain other segments of the border, India-Israel cooperation to adopt advanced techniques like installing laser-wall coverage of border portions where physical obstacles cannot be placed or maintained in all-weather conditions may be attempted. Another factor to consider is that, along substantial stretches of the India-Pakistan border, there is traditional and ethnic affinity among the people residing on both sides of the dividing line, unlike in the case of Israeli settlers in occupied Arab territories and the indigenous Arab inhabitants. Therefore, a total replication of the Israeli pattern of border guarding or sealing may not be efficacious or judicious.
The authorities concerned both at the central and state levels may also have to reckon with the impact of the sealing of the border on trade and intercourse in the border areas. Even when bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have not been warm and totally free from tension, a modicum of trade – even in barter form – as distinct from smuggling, has prevailed between the adjoining western districts of Rajasthan and places like Hyderabad and Mirpur Khas in Sindh province of Pakistan. A complete sealing of the border should not shut off prospects for such trade. The border sealing infrastructure should not therefore be set up in a manner that its mechanisms work to the detriment of increasing trade at the formal level. This will only be feasible if facilitating trade points and infrastructure are suitably factored in within a dynamic and high-surveillance border grid.
A complete sealing of the India-Pakistan border will be a sensitive multi-dimensional endeavour with significant capital cost and recurring (for maintenance) financial implications. There are executional problems also, as is evident from the failure of the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) (assigned the primary task of constructing the border fence) in avoiding time and cost overruns, as can be observed from the Annual Reports of the MHA. For effective oversight and ground patrolling of the border, connecting roads to the border outposts are also necessary. Slow land acquisition has also been an impediment towards creating such a network of link roads to the border outposts. For effective border guarding, the inter-border outpost distance should also be reduced to 3.5 kms, apart from upgrading a number of such outposts, entailing substantial civil works by the CPWD. Instead of erecting static structures or walls with mounted electronic complements, a more dynamic mode of border management and surveillance may be expedient and cost-effective with concomitant mobile patrols by all-terrain vehicles, hovercraft, etc. A complementary arrangement which enables 24x7 satellite surveillance, may also be worked out.
The author is a retired IDAS officer who has served in Jammu & Kashmir and the North East in senior state and central government positions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Is it a matter of such transcendental importance to keep Assad in power or remove him even at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Syrians and the displacement of half of the country’s total population?
As one contemplates the ever worsening state of Syria, a few thoughts dominate. One, though Russia, the former superpower and the United States, the superpower in decline, appear to be at loggerheads, there seems to be a sinister but unacknowledged unity of purpose that brings them together; the net result of their policies has been the destruction of Syria where the death toll has reached 500,000 over five years, working out to more than 11 an hour.
Second, the quarrel over Basher al Assad’s continuing in power reminds one of Pierre Goubert’s seminal book Louis XIV and 20 million Frenchmen published in 1992. In contrast to conventional accounts, Goubert tells us a lot about the 20 million French rather than concentrate exclusively on their king. The question as applied to Syria is this: Is it a matter of such transcendental importance to keep Assad in power or remove him even at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Syrians and the displacement of half of the country’s total population of 22 million?
The third thought is the culpable inability of Russia and the United States to come to a common understanding to put an end to the carnage and move Syria towards peace and normality so that Syrians can choose a government in a democratic fashion. Russia and the United States have so much mutual distrust that they are unable to sit down and discuss differences in a rational and civil manner.
Instead of resorting to the diplomatic practice of private talks, the United States, frustrated over what it sees as Russia’s unreliability as a partner, has started the dangerous practice of publicly attacking Russia. On 3 October, Washington announced the suspension of talks with Russia over Syria. Anticipating the announcement from Washington, Moscow announced that it was ending the agreement entered into in 2000 that required each side to dispose off 34 tons of plutonium originally meant for making weapons. While the agreement on plutonium is not the core of the post-Cold War strategic understanding between Moscow and Washington, even their disagreements over Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in March 2014 did not affect it. Here is a troubling instance of a clash over Syria affecting other matters.
On 7 October, Secretary of State John Kerry said that Russian and Syrian military strikes against civilians and medical facilities in Aleppo should be investigated as war crimes. Kerry is right, as attacks against hospitals and other civilian facilities are forbidden under international law. It is known that Russia has been using bunker-busting, cluster, and thermobaric bombs in Syria. It has repeatedly used bunker-busting bombs on hospitals. Thermobaric bombs, according to US experts, can send a devastating blast of pressure and extreme heat that incinerates those caught in the blast and sucks oxygen from the lungs of human beings in the vicinity.
Paris and London echoed Kerry’s call for a probe. Germany has not until now. However, there is hardly any chance of the matter being taken up at the International Criminal Court as Russia and possibly China too might use their veto powers in the UN Security Council. For, it is only the Security Council that can ask the Court to start an investigation. Obviously, the real intention is to sully Russia’s image and make it look a pariah. Already, after President Hollande expressed reservations about meeting President Putin during a scheduled visit to Paris, the latter has called off his visit. U.K. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson has warned Russia that, if it continues with bombing Aleppo, it risks becoming a pariah state. He even called for public demonstrations in front of the Russian Embassy, a call that has been dismissed by many. They have pointed out that by making such a call he is endangering the safety of the UK embassy in Moscow.
The West made an unsuccessful attempt at the Security Council to halt the bombing in Aleppo. France and Spain moved a resolution calling for such a halt when the Council met on 9 October, with Russia in the chair. The draft asked UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to propose options for a UN-supervised monitoring of a truce and refers to “further measures” in the event of non-compliance by “any party to the Syrian domestic conflict.” Russia used its veto and the resolution was rejected. To complicate matters, Russia moved a resolution that called for a cease-fire and the implementation of the failed cease-fire agreement. The resolution called on the rebels in Syria to separate themselves from UN-designated terrorists, a prime objective of Russia when it agreed to the cease-fire.
Egypt voted for both the resolutions despite their differing import. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expressed their displeasure. The latest is that Saudi Arabia’s Aramco did not send the monthly shipment of 700,000 tonnes of crude at the agreed concessional rate and Egypt had to float tenders for crude worth USD 500 million. This is an example how Syria-related issues affect bilateral relations. Of course, the vote was only the last straw as the two countries have had differences over other matters as well.
Putin was in Istanbul on 10 October and Turkey-Russia relations are warming up at a time when the West wants to treat Putin as a pariah. What is intriguing is that Turkey has recently occupied 900 sq.km. of Syrian territory as part of its Operation Euphrates Shield and intends to occupy as much as 5,000 sq.km in due course. It is not known whether Putin took up this matter with Erdogan. Is this a clear indication that Moscow does not share Assad’s plan to recover ‘every inch of territory’?
That Kerry was too much in a hurry to suspend talks with Russia became clear with the latest announcement of talks in Lausanne (Switzerland) on 15 October. Fortunately, apart from the US and Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will also be there. This is a better format as Kerry was in a disadvantageous position in his talks with Lavrov when he represented a deeply divided Administration and did not enjoy full backing from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Iran’s presence at the same table with Saudi Arabia too is a change for the better.
While dealing with the broken cease-fire agreement, it is important to bear in mind that it is a partial cease-fire as it did not apply to the UN-designated ‘terrorists’ who (Islamic State and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, a variation of Al Qaeda) control vast territory and population. In other words, even if the Lausanne meeting revives the cease-fire the carnage will continue.
There is need for fresh thinking to put an end to the senseless carnage in Syria. Will Obama’s successor in the White House provide it? Until then, how many more human lives will be lost? By the time the new US President enters office, would eastern Aleppo have fallen, creating an atrocious humanitarian tragedy?
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The policy of shooting down aircraft suspected of narco-trafficking is one fraught with problems without any tangible impact on the narco-trade.
On 20 August 2015, Peru’s Congress passed legislation that would allow its military to shoot down aircraft suspected of narcotics trafficking, thus resuming a policy that was discontinued after 2001 when a tragic mistake led to the killing of a missionary and her daughter.1 With this action, Peru has become the latest in a series of Latin American countries that have opted for this extreme step to curb the endemic problem of aerial narcotics smuggling. Indeed, no fewer than nine countries in the region - Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Venezuela have adopted this step though not all have made use of this option.2
As might be expected, this development is extremely controversial, with the United States government temporarily halting cooperation with Honduras after that country shot down two suspected narcotics carrying aircraft in 2012, neither of which was ever subsequently confirmed to have been carrying narcotics. To insulate itself from dependence on US radar coverage, Honduras purchased three new radar sets before enacting new legislation in 2014 to resume aggressive interceptions which once again led to a withdrawal of American support.3
Given the risk of drawing the ire of the United States and the even more daunting prospect of shooting down innocent aircraft, the question arises as to why Latin American countries are so intent on pursuing this course of action. The answer to this question can partly be found in the fact that no less than 20% of all cocaine trafficking within the area is undertaken by air.4 However, this, in and of itself, should not warrant such an extreme step.
The fact is that that narcotics traffic from Latin America by air is increasing by the day. as the aerial route has become a preferred method of transport between Latin America and Africa where from it is sent onwards to Europe and Asia. Transport of cocaine between Latin America and Africa was traditionally via sea in container ships or in private yachts. The potential to ship large quantities of cocaine through this method made the maritime route the preferred method of transit.5 However, as interdiction efforts at sea have become more effective, the cocaine smugglers have switched tactics to using second-hand cargo aircraft to deliver cocaine to their West African confederates.6
A wide range of used aircraft, available for as little as US$275,000 for a four-engined DC-8 jet, can be obtained and there is no shortage of pilots willing to undertake these flights.7 As the airspace between Latin America and West Africa is almost completely bereft of radar cover and national radar networks in most of West Africa are patchy at best, it is relatively simple for narco-flights to evade detection. In one publicised incident, for example, a Boeing 727 was set alight and abandoned after it failed to take-off at a makeshift airfield following a delivery of cocaine from Venezuela to Gao in Mali.,8
Of late, Venezuela and Brazil are beginning to emerge as major places of embarkation for narcotics bound for Europe via the West Africa-. The surge began in 2004 with seizures of 46 metric tonnes of cocaine being reported between 2005 and 2008.9 This coincided with a decision of the Venezuelan government in 2005 to suspend cooperation with the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) due to unfortunate political differences between the Chavez administration and the US Government.10
This led to an upsurge in cocaine trafficking out of Venezuela where corrupt law enforcement and military personnel, porous borders with Colombia and apparent government indifference have contributed to this trend. In the case of Brazil, the combination of porous borders with three major cocaine producing countries (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru) and a poorly patrolled coastline are combined with a thriving legitimate trade with West Africa thus facilitating the smuggling of cocaine by subterfuge, corruption or coercion of legal traders.11 South Africa has emerged as one of several preferred transshipment points for cocaine emanating from Brazil, taking its place alongside such nations as Angola, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.12 It should be noted that South Africa has also become a preferred route for Afghan heroin.13 Almost completely unmonitored airspace renders air transport particularly attractive for smugglers.
Having taken this decision, are the Latin American military establishments in a position o provide the requisite quality of evidence to ensure that unfortunate mistakes do not recur? The answer must be a qualified “no”. While decades of fighting the narcotics trade have created strong local intelligence networks, these are by no means foolproof and radar surveillance remains problematic. Even the advanced SIVAM radar network deployed by Brazil to provide surveillance over the Amazon region, has several exploitable gaps.14 Several air forces in the region are also incapable of conducting even basic intercept operations owing to a lack of suitable aircraft – Paraguay being a prime example. Combined with the inherent defects of the law enforcement and military forces of the region, it is therefore doubtful that any air force in the region could be certain of the mala fide contents of any aircraft.
Shoot-Downs of Suspected Narcotics Trafficking Aircraft 1983-2013
Source: Air Combat Information Group
Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, there have been multiple downings of suspected narcotics transport aircraft as shown in the table above. Aircraft such as the AT-27 Tucano and the A-37 Dragonfly have seen extensive service in an interceptor role where their excellent low speed performance has enabled them to engage aircraft that could create problems for faster interceptor aircraft. The problem with faster aircraft was graphically demonstrated on 17th September 2015 when a Venezuelan Su-30MKV crashed while trying to engage a slow flying suspected narcotics aircraft near the Colombian border, killing both crewmen.15
It seems, however, that despite the evident shortcomings and limitations of this strategy, Latin American air forces seem to be intent on pursuing this course of action. Whether they actually believe that this interception policy will have a tangible impact on the narcotics trade or this is merely a ploy for domestic political consumption is a matter of debate. Whatever the reason for the decision, one can expect a sharp rise in both interceptions and the potential of more unfortunate accidents.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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