The construction of border fence by Myanmar has led to resentment among the people on both sides of the Indo-Myanmar border. The affected people mainly are Konyak, Khiamniungan and Yimchunger Nagas who inhabit the areas of Eastern Nagaland in India and the Naga Self Administered Zone (NSAZ) in Myanmar. The formation of Myanmar as a separate State in 1935 and decolonisation of the sub-continent in 1947 divided ethnic communities living along the Indo-Myanmar border. These communities, particularly Nagas, found the newly created boundary to be inconsistent with the traditional limits of the region they inhabited. And they felt a deep sense of insecurity because they became relegated to the status of ethnic minorities on both sides of the border. To address their concerns and enable greater interaction among them, the Indian and Myanmarese governments established the Free Movement Regime (FMR), which allowed Nagas to travel 16 kilometres across the border on either side without any visa requirements.

The people living in the Eastern districts of Nagaland and in the areas of NSAZ in Myanmar have close family ties and engage in cultural and economic exchanges. In some instances, the imaginary border line cuts across houses, land and villages. People, especially those living on the Indian side, own land holdings including cultivated lands and forested areas across the border and are completely dependent on such areas for their livelihood. From the Myanmar side, a lot of villagers come to the Indian side to buy basic essentials. Taking advantage of the FMR, a sizeable number of students from NSAZ also study in schools on the Indian side of the border.

The four border districts of Eastern Nagaland – Mon, Tuensang, Kiphire and Longleng – are extremely remote and backward mainly due to lack of development and neglect by successive state governments. Mon district and corresponding areas across the border are mainly inhabited by the members of the Konyak tribe. Konyaks have the maximum representation in the population of Nagaland and also have substantial numbers within NSAZ. About three fourths of the total population of Khiamniungan tribals reside in NSAZ with the remainder being present in Tuensang district. The Yimchungers straddle the border areas with a sizeable presence in the Kiphire and Tuensang districts of Nagaland.

The ongoing activity of fence construction by Myanmar, which the locals perceive as being carried out with the concurrence of Indian authorities, has triggered apprehensions among the people living on either side of the border. They contend that the border fence would deprive them of the produce from their land and forest resources, which spread out on both sides of the border. From the security perspective, possible anti-establishment sentiments that could flow from such apprehensions, if unaddressed, could reinvigorate the presently weakening Naga insurgency in the region. An aggravation of this issue at a time when peace talks between the central government and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) are being held in a congenial atmosphere may fuel discontent.

It is pertinent to note that the region presents serious security challenges. The FMR has been misused by locals to smuggle contraband in their head loads, which are not subject to inspection. Militant groups have been using the porous border for moving cadres and war-like stores. Along with other active Indian insurgent groups, the NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K), which had unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire with the Government of India (GoI) in 2015, maintains its camps and training bases in NSAZ. All these groups have benefited from the open border in terms of carrying out illegal activities including launching strikes against Indian security forces and returning to their safe havens in Myanmar. China has also been reportedly aiding some of these groups. Indian insurgent groups in the region are also known to collaborate with Myanmarese insurgent groups like the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Kachin Independent Army (KIA), among others.

Policing such a large area marked by harsh terrain and dense forest is difficult. The attempt to create physical infrastructure to secure the border in the midst of the prevailing public resentment presents a real challenge. Suitable measures aimed at addressing the people’s concern on the Indian side as well as on the other side in collaboration with Myanmarese authorities therefore need to be initiated in order to establish trust and confidence amongst the affected populace. Tripartite talks involving the local stakeholders (through the concerned state government), the Myanmarese government and the GoI could be organised to address extant concerns. Socio-economic initiatives on either side of the border aimed at benefitting the local inhabitants by alleviating poverty and bringing greater development in the region could be worked out. A mutually acceptable arrangement addressing the security concerns of both the countries with minimum discomfort to the local inhabitants would be prudent.

The GoI on its part could provide an assurance that no construction of border fence will be undertaken on the Indian side without taking the affected population into confidence. This is pertinent given that in March 2003 the GoI, in consultation with its Myanmarese counterpart, had attempted to erect a fence along the India-Myanmar border in Manipur. However, the work had to be stopped due to protests by local communities. It is therefore essential that the pros and cons on the requirement of border fencing in this region need to be deliberated upon in order to weigh the impact of action taken vis-a vis corresponding benefits accrued in the context of regional security and India’s ‘Act East’ policy initiatives.

In case national security concerns dictate the necessity of constructing a fence along the India-Myanmar border, options such as selective fencing, better use of technology, and regulated flow of cross-border movement, among other initiatives, can be examined. It is however essential to take into confidence the affected populace and the local stakeholders prior to the finalisation and implementation of such plans. Regulated borders with greater emphasis on developing people-to-people contact and cross-border trade initiatives are likely to yield greater security benefits as against a closed border that may lead to a disturbed security environment amidst popular discontent.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

The new President of the United States of America (USA), Donald Trump, seems to be intent on fulfilling his campaign pledge to erect a wall along his country’s border with Mexico to stall further illegal immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries. On January 25, 2017, Trump signed an executive order for constructing a wall along the US - Mexico border stretching 3100 kms. Trump also demanded that Mexico bear the cost of the proposed wall. These announcements have not only caused deep consternation in Mexico, but also drawn opprobrium from Latin American leaders. An immediate casualty has been the cancellation of the first working-level visit of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto to the US after President Trump assumed office.

The Mexican president has rejected outright, the demand for his country to pay for the construction of the wall, which obviously is not in Mexico’s interest. In the context of these developments, a scheduled meeting between the Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Videgara and the new US Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly, on border management and immigration matters, has also been called off.

The Trump Administration is reported to be considering a set of punitive measures against Mexico if the latter does not agree to defray the construction cost of the wall. President Trump has issued an executive order directing all executive branches to identify all bilateral and multilateral development aid, economic assistance, humanitarian aid and military aid to Mexico over the past five years. This is obviously to identify the areas where Mexico’s dependence on the US is considerable, and pressure on Mexico could be effectively applied to accede to the US demands and cooperate towards construction of the border wall.

Trump also mentioned on January 26 that a 20 per cent tariff may be imposed on Mexican goods exported to the US to raise resources for building the wall. A 35 per cent border adjustment tax, in the garb of a border tax reform policy, on cross-border movement of goods has also been hinted at by the Republican congressional sources. It appears that there has been a repercussion to Trump’s threat. Ford has just cancelled a $1.6 billion automobile plant investment in Mexico. Earlier, Ford had planned to shift its Ford Focus small car plant from Michigan to Mexico which had drawn the ire of Trump. Similar pressure is building up on General Motors.

Tariff measures of the type aimed at Mexico, are likely to affect other western hemispheric countries also. Trump also proposes to tax remittances of Mexicans, and the US citizens of Mexican origin, to Mexico. Mexico’s economy minister has retorted that his government would respond immediately to any coercive trade action by the US administration. The Mexican Government has also indicated that it would not tolerate actions planned by the new US administration on the border wall and punitive taxation on the Mexican goods, as they impinge on Mexican dignity and pride.

Former US President George Bush had signed the Secure Fence Act in 2000 after congressional approval. The Act had approved construction of a fence along the US-Mexico border for approximately 700 of the total 1900 mile long border. As per the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), 652 miles of border fence-cum-wall has since been erected. The fence and other barriers that cover the 652 miles of the sanctioned border project, is actually a collection of walls, fence and other obstacles. The existing border wall is effective and strongest in places where large populations are concentrated e.g. San Diego, California on the US side, and Tijuana on the Mexican side. In some places, the wall passes through barren territory, and in many parts its condition is such that people can walk through. There are also portions of the border where the terrain conditions are difficult and it is extremely difficult to cross. The fence-cum-wall has been erected at a cost of US$ seven billion, and is not exactly impenetrable. This indicates the substantial effort and resources which will have to be deployed to cover the entire length of the border in an effective manner.

Though Trump has claimed that the erection of the wall would cost US$ eight billion, a realistic assessment is that it will be much more. Authoritative sources (like Bernstein Research Group), and the expenditure trend on the approximately 652 miles of wall-cum-fence constructed, indicate that actual cost of the entire border wall project will be in the range of US$ 15 - 25 billion. If the above-mentioned details are taken into account, the effort and expenditure on the border wall will be substantial, apart from the political and socio-economic fallout on American citizens in its southern border states like California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, as well as on its relations with Mexico. Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona has expressed deep concern on the proposed border wall and its serious implications on trade relations with Mexico, and also consequent economic consequences on his state of Arizona and the country as a whole. Republican Senator Lindsay Graham of South Carolina, has tersely observed that ‘border security yes, but tariffs no’.

The reaction to Trump’s utterances and avowed policies on the border wall and tariff has attracted strong criticism from the Latin American governments. In the January 2017 summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) at Punta Cana in Dominican Republic, attended by ten heads of state and 33 foreign ministers, the consensus was that the Trump administration`s action was outrageous, and the CELAC group of countries have to respond to the new aggressive policy of prosecuting migrants. President Danilo Medina of Dominican Republic – the host country - and Rafael Correa of Ecuador took the lead in consolidating the CELAC countries’ position against Trump’s policy on the Mexican border wall – which they termed as a ‘wall of infamy’ , his anti-immigration plan and threat of escalated tariff.

Though the stance taken by Trump is not totally unexpected in the backdrop of his pre and post election utterances, it is surprising that he is rushing through his controversial policies soon after taking office. Actions which the US president has proposed before completing a month in office and even before delivering his first State of the Union Address, appear to indicate that he intends to take a posture of resoluteness on controversial issues, such as the US-Mexico border management and trade, in order to consolidate his domestic constituency. This forebodes political turbulence within the US, apart from introducing many imponderables in western hemispheric economic relations, and also undermining the existing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which has served this hemispheric community reasonably well since its formation in 1994. It is also surprising that Trump, who is known to view developments and decide on policies in transactional terms, appears short-sighted and unwilling to view the implications of his policies on his country`s economy and international influence in a long-term perspective.

Mexico is the third largest import source and trade partner of the US. Mexico is also the second largest export market, and the third largest agricultural export market of the US. The Mexico-US trade is more than US$ 583 billion (US imports: $316 billion + exports $267 billion: as per 2015 US Trade Representative Office data), and the US foreign direct investment in Mexico is more than US$ 107 billion. It is not clear whether Trump has weighed the impact of a higher tariff barrier on Mexican exports to the US, and the consequent impact on the US consumers. There would also be supply chain problems because of the cost impact on the US intermediate components that are exported to Mexico, value-added there and re-exported to US, which would be affected by the proposed escalation in tariff.

Any constriction in Mexican exports and supply-chain problems, would have a huge negative impact on the US industry and its labour market. The US industrial goods sector, automobile market and even its agriculture, would be affected. Interestingly, the US upper middle country, mid-west and the southern states – the ‘rust belt’ which had voted overwhelmingly for Trump in the last presidential elections, would be impacted the most. This is because, Mexico would definitely retaliate by imposing countervailing tariffs on the US exports, particularly those which are leviable on goods to be imported and exported after value addition in Mexico. Mexico is also likely to raise tariffs on agricultural imports from the US of corn, dairy products, pork and beef estimated at more than $18 billion, which in turn will affect consumption in Mexico and the US farming community. Mexico is also likely to resort to fiscal measures to restrict profit plough-back from the US investments.

Trump has indicated on many an occasion that the US economy and jobs are his primary concern. The slew of actions which he is contemplating is unlikely to benefit either. A cost-benefit analysis seems to indicate that negative international repercussions and even domestic political fallout, would decidedly outweigh the economic gains which are difficult to assess at this stage.

The author is a commentator on international affairs and a retired IDAS officer who has held senior positions in the Government of India and in a State Government.

The views expressed are the author`s own.

With the presentation of the annual budget for the next fiscal being just a few days away, there is no point in second guessing the size of the defence appropriation. Even so, it would be pretty safe to rule out any extraordinary hike in the allocation.

In last year’s medium term fiscal policy statement, the finance minister had mentioned that total defence expenditure, including the capital component, is estimated to be about 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2017-18 and 2018-19. Unless there is a huge spurt in GDP and reduced pressure from competing sectors allows sufficient elbow-room to the finance ministry, the defence budget is likely to grow by about 11 to 12 per cent over the Revised Estimate (RE) for the current fiscal, in keeping with the trend.

In that likely event, the same old issues that dominate the discourse on India’s defence budget are bound to resurface. Among them is the unrealistic demand that the defence budget be pegged at three per cent of GDP. Other issues include the idea of creating a non-lapsable pool of funds to conserve unutilised funds (especially under the revenue segment of the budget) which otherwise lapse at the end of the financial year in accordance with the government’s system of accounting. Further, the demand for ‘integration’ of the services headquarters with the ministry is bound to resurface with greater vigour. This is seen as a bulwark against the wily bureaucracy, which was recently uncharitably described as ‘feckless’ by a former naval chief.

The civilian bureaucracy, especially the bad boys of the finance division, are seen as the biggest hurdle in the swift processing of capital acquisition proposals and as responsible for derailing other demands, including one-rank-one-pension. Such a characterisation is grotesque, not least because it betrays a lack of dispassionate understanding of what ails the system and the tendency to discredit institutions.

Concerns will also be expressed about inefficient procurement procedures, inefficiency of the DRDO, Defence PSUs and ordnance factories, delay in introducing the strategic partnership model, the discriminatory treatment meted out to the private sector, and, above all, delay in appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff.

These issues, some of which are undoubtedly relevant, have gained greater legitimacy because of the Standing Committee on Defence joining the chorus. The counter-narrative is routinely ignored, if not deliberately suppressed.

Take, for example, the question of pegging the defence budget at three per cent of GDP. The defence and finance ministries have been of the view that the ‘co-relation of defence expenditure with GDP is just an indexation and has no bearing on defence preparedness’ or ‘to safeguard the interest of the country’. Even on practical considerations, the past trend and the various demands on finances, it is highly optimistic to expect that to happen. But these views were summarily rejected by the Standing Committee – and continue to be rejected by others – without pointing out why they are flawed and, more to the point, suggesting how this objective could be achieved.

Or, take, for example, the question of creating a non-lapsable pool of funds to conserve the unutilised allocation. The popular narrative is that this will solve many a problem but that it is not being accepted because the archaic ‘rules of business’ framed during the British Raj do not permit it. Nothing could be farther from the truth. First of all, unutilised balances are not held in cash. Even if a non-lapsable fund were to be created for rolling over these balances, the government will have to raise matching resources in the year in which these funds would be utilised. And, in any case, such an appropriation will require parliamentary approval.

All this can be found in various reports of the Standing Committee, along with what could be a startling revelation for some that, while the ministry of finance had agreed to the setting up of such a fund, ‘the Ministry of Defence, for reasons best known to them, asked us (the finance ministry) not to set it up’. This was more than a decade ago.

It makes little sense to borrow money only to hoard it, especially against the backdrop of repeated under-utilisation. More to the point, there are no ‘rules of business’ which come in the way. After all, we do have a non-lapsable pool of funds for the North Eastern Region. Yet, the narrative persists.

There is little discussion on how the integration of the service headquarters will pan out and what it will achieve. In fact, the underlying assumption in all this is that everything will fall into place once the civilian bureaucracy is replaced by the military bureaucracy since this will replace the perceived malady of ‘bureaucratic’ control of the armed forces with ‘political’ control.

For one thing, there is large scale delegation of administrative and financial powers down the line to the services, which undoubtedly need to be enhanced. Consequently, there is little interference in the day-to-day functioning of the armed forces by the MoD. There is little, if any, control that the MoD exercises especially in budgetary matters. It does not even have the time and the wherewithal to scrutinise the requirement of funds projected by the services and other departments.

That the armed forces do not get as much as they ask for is not because of the inability of the civilian bureaucracy to effectively plead the case before the finance ministry in the run up to the budget formulation, as many believe. It will be surprising if any ministry or department of the government gets whatever it asks for. Allocations depend on the ability of the government to raise enough resources and not bureaucratic machinations.

The post of Chief of Defence Staff, or permanent chief of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, is seen as a panacea for various ills besetting the defence establishment. He – and hopefully a she someday – might just be able to bring about greater jointness in planning and prioritisation of procurement, among other things, but cannot solve the real or perceived problem related to budgetary allocation.

With all the complexities of the procurement procedures, the MoD has been able to spend more than Rs. 5 lakh crore since 2002-03 on capital acquisitions, although around Rs. 50,000 crore was also under-spent during this period. This is not a small sum, but the point is whether the underutilisation is primarily, or largely, on account of procedural complexities.

It will be astonishing indeed if, after several revisions of the procurement procedure based on feedback from a cross-section of stakeholders, that the procurement procedure continues to be needlessly complex or even archaic. It is significant that the committee of experts set up by the government in 2015 did not recommend any drastic change in the basic architecture of the procurement procedure. There is always room for improvement though.

There is a need to go beyond these stale issues and have a more meaningful and dispassionate discussion on how to make the best use of the allocations made for defence. It also calls for taking steps that do not require widespread systemic changes, as these have a tendency to get mired in conflicting views. There is a need to respect institutions and individuals and not to carry out a campaign of vilification.

How about starting with instituting a system of outcome-oriented monitoring of important segments of the defence budget, the allocation for capital acquisition being one of them? Even the Standing Committee had recommended this last year. It will not take much effort to do so. It is also more likely to show results than a theoretical debate on micro-financial aspects of the defence budget. After all, in the words of Lao Tzu, the journey of a thousand miles has to begin with a single step.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cuban armed forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias - FAR) were easily the most powerful in Latin America. Numbering over 200,000 active personnel, the FAR possessed several hundred advanced combat aircraft (MiG-21s, MiG-23-MF/-ML/-BN) and MiG-29s, along with a modern and well-equipped air defence network. The army possessed large quantities of artillery and over a thousand T-55 and T-62 main battle-tanks (MBTs), while the navy fielded three submarines, three frigates, 13 missile boats and 48 patrol craft.

Some 25 years after the demise of its ally, benefactor and largest market for its principal export (sugar), the FAR is but a shadow of its former self with equipment either unserviceable or in storage and personnel strength slashed to some 65,000. From a force potentially capable of fighting determinedly against an American invasion, the FAR has now become a force of limited conventional military capability, more useful for internal security operations than for prosecuting any military conflict.

None of this should be unexpected as the FAR was always an unsustainably large force which, while seeing extensive combat in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, was largely an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. With the risk of an American invasion neutralized by friendship with the Soviet Union, the FAR was expanded to the point of extreme excess – being incapable of defending against a US invasion unaided yet vastly superior to any of its neighbours. Once support from the Soviet Union ended, the decline of the FAR was inevitable. All three formations – the army, the air force and the navy – achieved great strength in both equipment and personnel by the late 1980s but their fall was rapid.

The Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Rebelde - ER) had modest beginnings. With a 1959 strength of 25,000 (supported by a Revolutionary Militia of 250,000), the ER initially used an eclectic mix of European and American equipment supplied to the Batista regime, including Sherman and Stuart tanks along with M116 75mm pack howitzers and Schneider 75mm field and mountain guns. Infantry units were almost entirely equipped with American small arms with support weapons, such as mortars and machine guns coming from Europe as well as the United States. There was no immediate shift to the Soviet bloc as the first arms orders placed by the Castro regime were for 24,000 FN-FAL rifles, 15 British Comet tanks and Oto Melara Model 56 105mm howitzers.

This changed in 1960 when the first influx of Czechoslovak and Soviet arms began entering service. The expansion of the ER was rapid and by 1975, it reached its peak strength of 200,000 divided into three regional armies with three armoured and 15 infantry divisions. Though the ER fell to some 130,000 by the mid-to-late 1980s, it now possessed some 800 T-54/-55 and 380 T-62 tanks plus well over 500 armoured personnel carriers of the BTR and BMP families with 1400 pieces of artillery. Over 30,000 Cuban troops played a pivotal role in Angola supporting the MPLA against UNITA and the apartheid regime of South Africa.

The Cuban Air Force – now termed the Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Force (Defensa Anti-Aérea Y FuerzaAéreaRevolucionaria - DAAFAR) experienced even more spectacular growth. Even at the time of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the air force was still equipped with ageing relics from the Batista era with T-33 trainers being the most advanced equipment and eight Sea Fury piston engine fighters and a similar number of B-26 bombers forming the bulk of the combat force.

The expansion of the DAAFAR was dramatic and by the mid-to-late 1980s, it had taken delivery of no fewer than 118 MiG-21s and 89 MiG-23s of all variants augmented by eight MiG-29s and a large force of light transport aircraft, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters – easily the most powerful air force in the region. Though possessed of no bombers, the threat of DAAFAR MiG-23BNs was deemed serious enough for the United States to sanction the supply of 24 F-16As to Venezuela to protect their oil-fields. DAAFAR was also responsible for operating the most extensive surface-to-air missile (SAM) network in Latin America with SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 medium range SAMs being augmented by mobile SA-13 and SA-8 systems and well over 1000 towed and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. The DAAFAR also saw extensive service in Africa with operations in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique.

In contrast to the ER and DAAFAR, the Cuban Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria - MGR) was far less favoured. The Batista-era Navy of three Tacoma class frigates, two PCE class corvettes, four SC-class submarine chasers and three torpedo boats was replaced by a coastal defence force centered around 18 OSA class missile boats and an assortment of torpedo craft and submarine chasers augmented by a fleet of 40 Zhuk class patrol boats. To these were added a limited blue-water capability in the form of three Foxtrot class submarines and three Koni class light frigates. Compared to the ER and DAAFAR, the MGR trailed behind the capabilities of larger Latin American navies, though it was by far the most powerful naval force in the Caribbean.

Since then, the decline of the FAR’s capabilities has been dramatic. Budgetary allocations inevitably fell as the Cuban economy underwent a period of extreme adjustment in the 1990s. No major new equipment has been inducted into any branch of the FAR and manpower has been slashed. The ER now comprises some 45,000 personnel including 39,000 conscripts and active reservists doing 45 day of service annually. However, compared to the DAAFAR and MGR, the ER has been able to keep much of its equipment to a reasonable degree of serviceability – partly by relegating a large portion of it to storage. Only 50 MBT’s are operational at any given time, augmented by wheeled AFVs.

It has also shown a remarkable degree of innovation in adapting weapons systems to platforms, typified by the fitting of T-55 and BMP-1 turrets to BTR-60 chassis, fitting 122mm D-30 Howitzers to BMP-1 chassis and to trucks and adapting RBU-6000 rockets to being fired from a truck flatbed. This ingenuity, however, is no substitute for more modern equipment although the ER remains formidable by regional standards. It has been suggested that the ER is no longer capable of mounting operations above battalion level. However, this may be an underestimation of the ER’s institutional experience and while division level operations are unlikely, brigade-sized operations are probably feasible.

The DAAFAR has been reduced to approximately 30 combat aircraft – four MiG-29s, six MiG-21s and nearly 20 MiG-23s being operational at any given time. These are augmented by about five operational L-39 trainers which can be armed for light strike and air defence duties. Aircraft are rarely seen with ordnance though in 1996, MiG-29s used R-60 air-to-air missiles to destroy Cessna light aircraft belonging to the Florida-based, Cuban-exile run organization ‘Brothers to the Rescue’. It is believed that flying hours are restricted although it is clear that some degree of competence is retained by a nucleus of pilots. Cuba retains its SAM network although it is unclear if an overhaul of the missiles has been undertaken. The DAAFAR’s helicopter and transport fleets have been reduced massively with only 24 helicopters and two transport aircraft being operational at any given time. It should be noted that a large number of combat aircraft are in storage and some may be capable of being restored to service.

The decline of the MGR mirrors that of the DAAFAR. The Koni class light frigates were scrapped with two being sunk as reefs to serve as dive attraction for tourists. The submarines were decommissioned as were most of the patrol, missile and torpedo boats. A single Pauk-class corvette remains in service alongside eight minesweepers and six OSA class missile boats which have had their missiles removed and used on land-based launchers. About a dozen Zhuk class vessels remain operational along with two larger Stenka class patrol vessels.

Cuban ingenuity came to the fore in the MGR’s efforts to restore a veneer of ocean-going capability when two 1970s vintage trawlers were converted into patrol vessels with helicopter platforms. Equipped with P-15 missile launchers from the OSA class vessels and an assortment of gun turrets scavenged from decommissioned ships and even land-based platforms (the main guns being a ZSU-57-2 turret with twin manually operated 57mm guns), these two vessels form the Rio Damuji class and lack any form of modern sensors for either surveillance or fire-control. Nonetheless, the two ships of this class provide the MGR with a useful off-shore patrol force, capable of intimidating Caribbean neighbours while being of negligible combat potential.

The FAR, like Cuba itself, was overly dependent on Soviet support and lacked the means to finance either its maintenance or modernization requirements. While Cuba no longer faces an existential threat from the United States, it still retains combat capabilities far in excess of any of its Caribbean neighbours. It is of interest that while the FAR has been depleted in terms of capability and personnel, Cuba’s National Revolutionary Police Force (Policía Nacional Revolucionaria - PNR), Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales - MTT), and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución - CDR) remain powerful and adequately funded, serving as instruments of state control and power. It would appear that the Cuban government is content to preserve modest military capabilities while ensuring that its internal security apparatus is intact.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.