Significant developments took place regarding Syria in December 2016. The partial cease-fire brokered, or rather, brokered and imposed, by Russia and Turkey, with Iran’s concurrence, on President Basher al Assad and a part of his foes, known as ‘moderates’, might mark a turning point in Syria’s tortuous and painful journey since 2011. Left to himself, Assad would have preferred to carry on with the military operations, heavily and crucially supported by Russia and Iran, and recover more territory. At present, he controls only the western part, which has a high population density and greater wealth than the rest of the country. Even Damascus is not safe as recent attacks on the Russian Embassy have proved. The ‘moderate’ rebels also would have preferred to get more arms and keep fighting.

The Cease-Fire

This is the third cease-fire in less than 12 months following the aborted ones in February and September 2016. Those two were begotten by long negotiations between US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, and were announced with much fanfare. The US was conspicuously absent this time around, marking President Putin’s intention to side-line the outgoing Obama Administration. We might presume that Putin would have kept the President-elect Trump in the loop.

The cease-fire came into force at 2200 hours GMT on December 29 and, despite some violations, it has held so far. There is also an agreement on monitoring the cease-fire for which the guarantors are Russia (for the Syrian government’s observance) and Turkey (for the rebels covered by the cease-fire). Russia and Turkey do not have identical plans for Syria, but they have decided to work together respecting, to the extent possible, each other’s primary goals.

The ‘moderates’ who have signed into the cease-fire were forced to sign up within 48 hours. The support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar has dried up and, in any case, such support in the shape of lethal and non-lethal supplies has to come through Turkey. Obviously, the ‘moderates’ cannot resist Turkey’s pressure.

Apart from the agreements on the cease-fire and on monitoring it, there is a third document on holding talks on a political transition. The ‘moderates’ have signed it and the version they received had a reference to the earlier talks held in Geneva in June 2012 where the approved document contained a provision for a transitional governing council with full executive powers. The interpretation of the ‘moderates’ is that Assad was not part of that council. But, there was no agreement on Assad’s role in Geneva. Nor is there any agreement now. The Assad government signed the document after deleting the reference to the transitional governing council. In short, there is no text agreed to by Assad and his foes.

Reaction of US and its allies

Obviously, by the timing carefully chosen, Putin wanted to administer a parting snub to President Obama who found it difficult to deal with Moscow and took the lead in demonizing his Russian counterpart after the latter annexed the Crimea in 2014. Mark Toner, spokesman for the Department of State, reflected the Obama administration’s frustration when he said, “We hope it will be implemented fully and respected by all parties.” There has not been any comment from London, Paris, or Berlin, probably because the West feels slighted at being excluded from the talks. The Russian Embassy in London did an online poll asking for the reason for the silence of the Foreign Office and half the respondents said that it was ‘jealousy’.

UN Security Council Resolution on the cease-fire

On December 31, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution (2336 of 2016) with slight amendments to the text proposed by Russia. The Council, instead of endorsing, “welcomes and supports the efforts of Russia and Turkey”. The original resolution referred to the political transition talks in Astana from mid-January onwards. The amended one made it clear that the Astana talks will be an important step ‘ahead’ of the resumption of talks under UN auspices in Geneva on 8 February 2017.

It may be recalled that the UN’s Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura was excluded from the talks leading to the cease-fire. One reason for the exclusion might be that Washington would have learnt everything about the negotiations through the UN and might have even derailed the talks from which it was excluded. At the same time, Moscow has expressed the hope that the UN would take part in the Astana talks. Obviously, the UN will not be chairing the talks.

The complications of the cease-fire

It was mentioned earlier that what has been agreed to is a partial cease-fire. There is some lack of clarity as to which parties are included and which excluded. The Russian defence ministry says that seven of the "moderate opposition formations" have signed the agreement: Faylaq al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Thuwwar Ahl al-Sham, Jaysh al-Mujahidin, Jaysh Idlib and Jabhah al-Shamiya. Obviously, these names do not mean much to outside observers, except that they have been, with one or two exceptions, classified as ‘moderates’ by the West and their Arab allies who have been lending support to them. What is known is that Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam are powerful Islamist groups that Russia has previously described as terrorist organizations. Incidentally, a spokesman for Ahrar al-Sham told Reuters news agency that the group had "reservations" and had not signed the deal.

Now comes the question of exclusion. The announcement by the Syrian Army says that the cease-fire will not cover “the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra terrorist groups (outlawed in Russia) and also the affiliated armed groups.” The last six words require parsing, which can be done only later as the cease-fire proceeds. All that one can say now is that “also” is redundant. As already pointed out, there is no agreed text on the talks for the political transition.

Turkey’s crucial role and its long-term goals

Turkey, the NATO member with the second largest military in the alliance, has moved closer to Moscow and away from Washington. Turkey decided some time back that it could take care of its interest only by working closely with Russia. For his part, Putin was more than willing to promote discord between Ankara and Washington.

Out of the 80,000 and odd rebels in Syria fighting Assad and occasionally among themselves, about 60,000 are covered by this agreement. Turkey has influence over these 60,000 as it has been aiding some of them and permitting foreign donors to send military aid through its territory to the rest. With the drying up of aid from Saudi Arabia (hardly any aid in 2016) and Qatar (hardly any aid for the last six months), Turkey’s clout over the ‘moderates’ has understandably increased.

Turkey has made noises about its wish to see Assad leave the scene, but by now it is clear that Turkey too has accepted that Assad is too well entrenched to be pushed away by it and its allies. In any case, the goal of removing Assad is less important than conducting some military operations in Syria near the border with Turkey. Such operations can be conducted only with Russia’s consent and Erdogan has understood that. These operations have two goals, the more important of which is to prevent the Kurds in Syria from controlling territory that would enable them to work with the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Workers Party) and the YPG (Yekineyen Parastina Gel, People’s Defence Units) in Turkey. This goal is within reach. The other goal is to defeat the IS (Islamic State), especially in the area adjoining to the border. YPG is an ally of the US in the fight against the IS. One has to wait and see how the Trump Administration addresses this disagreement with Turkey.

Will the cease-fire hold?

What are the chances of success for the cease-fire and efforts towards a political settlement combined with a united onslaught on the IS? While it would be foolish to offer a prediction, the cease-fire appears to have, for the time being, a better chance than the two previous ones. It may be recalled that Kerry lacked support from the Pentagon for the September 2016 cease-fire.

However, Assad’s military has already broken the cease-fire in Wadi Barad Valley northwest of Baghdad. It has been reported that the rebels added diesel to the springs in the valley, an important source of water to the four million population in Damascus. Syrian forces along with Hezbollah fighters have gained ground in the fight continuing. All cease-fires are fragile, but the ones in Syria even more so.

What next?

Assuming that over time IS loses all the territory it has in Iraq/Syria, would that mean the dawn of an era of peace and tranquility for Syria? No. The liberation of Mosul, when and if it happens, will beget much tension, and is likely to lead to fighting among the Iraqi Shias, the Iraqi Sunnis, the Iraqi Kurds, and Turkey over territory.

Even after losing territory, IS would be able to carry out terrorist strikes, as it seems to have done at the night club in Istanbul on the New Year night killing more than 35 people. IS is a mind-set that can survive the loss of territory.

Trump has made it clear that his primary interest in Syria is to destroy the IS. He is prepared to work with Russia. Given that, it is likely that the emergence of a Putin-Trump combination would make it easier for the IS to get recruits to fight against the ‘crusaders’?

The Kurds now control much territory in Syria and the Kurds in Iraq have a degree of autonomy. Will the Kurds in Syria agree to anything less than the type of autonomy their Iraqi counterparts enjoy? Will Assad agree to grant such autonomy?

Assad is vulnerable as he is crucially dependent on the military support of Moscow and Tehran. But he is safe so long as these two capitals support him. The key question is whether some time in 2017 Putin would agree with Trump to withdraw the life-support from Assad as part of a larger deal involving Syria and more? If that were to happen, Trump can boast that by making a deal he did what Obama who had publicly asked Assad to step down as early as August 2011 failed to do.

Teheran’s support for Assad is stronger than that of Moscow’s. But, even for Iran, retaining Assad is not the primary interest. It wants a corridor to Lebanon to send aid to the Hezbollah and it wants to have that corridor through an area with a Shia majority population. If Iran were to gain such a corridor, it might agree to a grand bargain that includes the removal of Assad.

In short, there are many imponderables as of now, and it cannot be definitively said that the present cease-fire will necessarily take Syria to a peaceful destiny. But, the cease-fire would reduce the killing and as such should be welcomed by all. All told, Putin has demonstrated imaginative diplomacy by the timing of the cease-fire, by bringing in Turkey, by keeping the US and its allies out at this stage, and preparing for a grand bargain with Trump. By not expelling US diplomats in retaliation to Obama’s expulsion of 35 Russian diplomats, Putin has earned the good will of Trump.

2017 might turn out better for Syria than 2016, partly because Washington might adopt a more consistent policy on Syria and is likely to stop demonizing Putin and start working with him, and partly because the ‘moderates’, ‘softened up’ by the recent military successes of Assad, may prove to be less adamant.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

As the year 2016 drew to a raucous close, memories of the Pathankot strike by militants on January 2, 2016 sound like an echo from the distant past. So much has happened since then but several critical issues related to defence, at best, continue to be “work-in-progress” at the end of the year.

Apart from the deterioration in relations with Pakistan, growing pomposity of China, a perceptible shift in Russia’s stance vis-a-vis India, and other developments in the region and beyond, there are at least three broad areas in which the pot only kept brewing during the past year.

The first of these is in the area of higher defence management in which the primary focus remained on issues like appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and integration of the Services Headquarters (SHQs) with the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

Appointment of the CDS is perceived by many as the panacea for all sorts of problems besetting the defence establishment in India. Contrary to the expectation of CDS becoming a reality in 2016, the sluggish pace at which this issue moved during the year only ended up reinforcing the perception that the government is either unable or unwilling, or at best lacks a sense of urgency, to take the step.

These perceptions prevented a dispassionate public discourse on how this step, if and when taken, will actually pan out. It is important to think it through because the experience of setting up of Headquarters of Integrated Defence Staff shows that mere creation of an institution is no guarantee that the objectives for which it is set up will be achieved. This also applies to the idea of integrating SHQs with MoD.

The second important area in which there was no turnaround is the area of civil-military relations (CMR). Even at the risk of opening the Pandora’s Box, the point must be made that a lot of this has to do with perception rather than reality but then there is no denying that perceptions have always mattered in inter-personal relationships.

If anything, recommendations of the Seventh Pay Commission have queered the pitch further. Implementation of the recommendations posed a major challenge which continues to dog the establishment as the year drew to a close.

The government’s decision on implementation of one-rank-one-pension might have quelled growing unrest in the ranks of the retired but it would be naive to believe that it has made a dent on the negative perceptions about the civilian bureaucracy.

Two recent developments have exacerbated the problem. The action taken against the former Chief of Air Staff (COAS) has drawn sharp reactions. The unprecedented arrest of a former chief is largely being seen as inexplicable, if not unwarranted.

While the point at issue, on which the courts will have to rule, is the personal culpability of the former chief, negative perceptions are bound to grow if immediate action is not taken against politicians and/or bureaucrats allegedly involved in the scam. A strong indication on action in this regard was given by the Defence Minister when he spoke on the subject in parliament in May of last year.

The latest issue to stir the embers is the selection of the next Chief of Army Staff where the government deviated from the generally followed principle of seniority in appointment to the highest posts in the military establishment. This was met with much opprobrium, more so because it was evidently not taken into account while announcing the surprise move that any supersession in promotion, especially at the highest levels, is demeaning to those who get superseded.

The third area in which there were mixed developments is the area of force modernisation. The year started on a somewhat disappointing note because, contrary to expectations, there was not much of a hike in defence allocation in the Union budget.

Based on the recommendations of a committee of experts, set up belatedly by the government in 2015, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) came out with a revised Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), albeit in two instalments. The latest iteration does contain some interesting new provisions but it will take a couple of years, if not more, before the impact of the new provisions manifests itself.

Many issues related to the defence acquisitions and promotion of the domestic defence industry remained ‘under consideration’ of the ministry or various committees set up by it. These include restructuring of the defence procurement organisation and, more importantly, adoption of the strategic partnership model.

As in previous years, since the ‘Make’ procedure was introduced in 2005 by MoD to promote indigenous design and development, no contract was signed for any ‘Make’ project during the year.

Lastly, the old bugbear of inordinate delays in concluding acquisition contracts continued to hold sway throughout the year, notwithstanding signing of a few big ticket contracts, mostly with US companies. Decision-making has been the bane of all defence acquisitions in the past. The developments in 2016 did little to dispel this impression.

Having crossed the half way mark of its five-year tenure, all this should be a matter of some concern to the government. With each passing year, the possibility of reforms in the management of defence keeps becoming more distant. Or, so it appears. It is now over to 2017.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

I was not “officially invited” to be an observer for the recently-held presidential elections in Uzbekistan. On the contrary, I was a tourist during the last few days of campaigning and left Uzbekistan on the same evening of the voting day. My itinerary took me to all major parts of the country – from Andijan in the East to Kiva in the West and Muynaq in the North West. I also stayed in Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent during my two-week long travel in the country.

At the outset, I must admit to being impressed by many aspects of Uzbek life – culture, politics, ethics, social life, etc. President Karimov had died about two months before my fellow travellers and I set foot on Uzbek soil. We were disturbed by Western media accounts that the transition of power would not be easy. The little news that trickled out during the funeral of Karimov including reports that Samarkand airport was shut down added to our concerns.

We expressed these to the tour organisers who reassured us thus: “Nothing has changed in the country. Karimov was a respected leader and many feel sorry that he is no more. But we do have a constitution and everything will go by it. The election commission will declare and conduct the elections and the new president will take over. The news about Samarkand airport being shut down is correct but what was deleted explicitly was that it was to facilitate the air traffic bringing in the delegations attending the funeral." They also assured us that our safety was their concern too and that we need not worry about it and should not cancel our trip.

Being election time, we expected to see the stereotypical boards and hoardings of all candidates in the places we visited. That was not to be; there was nothing on the streets. We were told that all the candidates were to visit all parts of the country and meet people behind closed doors and convince them to vote for them. Processions, sloganeering, 'shobha-yatras', etc. were not allowed. The state owned television provided coverage to the campaigning of all the candidates.

I asked our guide whether I can talk to people and ask them about the elections. "By all means! Do tell me if you want any translation," was the answer.

"But will they give me the real answer? Or will they be afraid of talking the truth?" I asked. 

The answer was: "Try it! You will know whether the answer is real or under threat."

I did ask the taxi driver and he said that he was surely going to vote, which he had not done in the past 20 years or four elections. That went to show that even in previous elections voting was not an obligation or not voting a curse by any means. I asked the same questions to a vendor on the street. Her answer was: “Well, all are good candidates. But Mirziyoyev is my choice. He is around for long and knows the problems very well." While raising the same questions with a third person, I also asked as to who the number two choice was, given that Mirziyoyev seemed to be far ahead of all. "Nariman Umarov," was the answer. So there was somebody next to him in popularity. 

We did find that everybody we talked to in every region was interested in the election. I was wondering whether there are regions in which somebody other than Mirziyoyev would be giving a tough fight and could come close. But the country seemed unanimous on electing Mirziyoyev. When almost all talked in favour of Mirziyoyev, I asked one person in a hotel whether he had heard of anybody who would not vote for Mirziyoyev. "Oh yes, there are! Not many though!," was the response.

On the day of voting, in our hotel in Tashkent, we met a Pakistani election observer. He was being interviewed in the lobby just behind us by Uzbek TV. We exchanged niceties and then he said, "Kya country hai yaar? Aur unaki yeh election! Kamaal kee baat hai! Apane idhar to abtak 20 -25 bande ya toa maare jaate yaa marvaa jaate." [What a country! And what an election! It is amazing! If it had been our country, 20 to 25 people would have died or been killed.] He spoke a million words. 

We then asked our tour guide to take us to a voting station. I assumed that he would take us to the area and show us from a distance since we were not official observers. He asked the driver to park the vehicle near a small building and took us inside. He went in and came out with a person in his 50's who welcomed us in fluent English. He said he was happy to note that we were taking interest in the democratic process of his country. On the first table four to five persons were seated, among them two to three ladies in violet dress who seemed to be on election duty. The men were in western suits. He took us to the table and said the voters would come here and show their identity which is their passport. The number would be recorded and they would be handed over the voting paper in the language of their choice – Uzbek or Russian. He showed us the voting papers in both languages. “Take as many pictures as you want – no restrictions,” he added. The ballot was all in written script. No symbols! Next to the name of each candidate was a brief CV of two or three lines detailing his date of birth, his party and highlights from the manifesto. The choice was to be marked with a '+' sign and not 'x' in the appropriate box. An 'x' vote would be invalid unless there was a tie.

The voting booth was a good metre high with glass on one side, so that one can see that the voting papers are not tampered with. To further ensure this, representatives of each political party were present. We could meet all four. "Can I talk with them?," I asked. The answer was, "by all means!” However, only one of them knew English. A bank employee, he said he was a supporter of Mirziyoyev's party. He had followed the instructions of the party during the campaigning.

“Did you go from house to house to tell people about your party and what it stood for?,” I asked him.

"Occasionally, but not required," he replied.

I then peppered him with further questions:

"How confident are the others about their candidate winning?"

"Oh sure they are quite optimistic and expect good response. They have worked hard too over the past two months."

“How confident are you about your candidate?”

“We are certainly winning!"

“What margin?”

"Good margin."

“Can you quantify?”

"More than 50 per cent." 

The election officer then took us to the room just behind the voting booths. A well-equipped crèche equipped with toys and activities, attended by a lady with a couple of kids, welcomed us. If a mother comes to vote with her child, she could leave the child there. Next to it was a medical facility with a nurse and emergency medicines. The Election officer quipped, "Fortunately, we did not have any casualty."

On the way out, he showed us what we missed while coming in. The list of all voters who were to come to that centre was displayed prominently. In the appendage, there were a few names of those who had registered themselves for voting outside their area or town. The total number enrolled was about 4000 voters.

“How much was the response since morning?,” I asked him.

"This is the fifth election I am participating in and, believe me, I have not seen so much enthusiasm ever in the past."

“Will the counting be done there itself?,” I then asked.

"Yes, immediately after the voting is officially over. But we have to inform the figures to the nearby main counting centre. We cannot declare the result here," he replied.

We left for the airport, reached home and were curious to know the outcome. It did come the next day and was as expected. Whatever may be the impressions of the world media, in my view, Uzbekistan has taken a firm step in the world of democracy.

The author is a retired Professor of Organic Chemistry from the University of Pune. He was travelling in Uzbekistan during the elections and these are his personal observations.

The security situation in Manipur is increasingly becoming alarming. Besides rising violence, the state has witnessed a spate of shutdowns and blockades in support of various demands by civil society organisations. The December 9 announcement by the state government on the creation of seven new districts has added fuel to ethnic resentments. The security situation is volatile with inter-tribal differences and distrust becoming more pronounced than ever before. Manipur is also gearing up for Assembly elections in early 2017.

The United Naga Council (UNC) — an umbrella organisation of Naga civil society organisations — has stood in resolute opposition to the demand of Kuki and Meitei groups for district status for Sadar Hills and Jiribam sub-divisions. In an attempt to compel the state government not to grant such status, on November 1, 2016, the UNC had imposed an indefinite blockade on the two national highways that serve as the lifeline to the state. Yet, the state government decided to go ahead and create seven new districts on December 9. In addition to the contentious Jiribam and Kangkpoi (conforming to the boundaries of the proposed Sadar Hills District) districts, the Ibobi Singh government also announced the creation of five other new districts – Kamjong, Tengnoupal, Noney, Pherzawl and Kakching.

The Manipur government believes that the creation of new districts would facilitate better administration and more equitable development. The newly created Jiribam district (Jiribam and Borobekra sub-divisions), which is also known as the western gateway to the state, was earlier a valley sub-division under Imphal East district. But it was located at a distance at about 220 kms from the district headquarters in the Imphal valley. In view of administrative inconvenience caused by such a geographical separation, the people of Jiribam had been demanding full-fledged district status for their sub-division. But Nagas residing in the neighbouring district of Tamenglong have been opposing this demand because of the apprehension that a separate Jiribam district may result in some of the Zeliangrong (Naga) tribal villages coming under the administrative jurisdiction of Jiribam, which has a Meitei (non-tribal) majority population. Moreover, an ongoing border dispute between Tamenglong and Jiribam is yet to be resolved. In sum, the Nagas see in the creation of Jiribam the possibility of some Naga villages falling under the jurisdiction of the majority Meiteis which would have the effect of subverting the idea of Nagalim, whereas the Meiteis view it as an administrative necessity.

Similarly, there has been a demand since 2011 for upgrading the Phungyar assembly constituency in Ukhrul into a full-fledged district. This has been a collective aspiration of the people of four sub-divisions (Phungyar, Kasom Khullen, Kamjong and Sahamphung) who had formed a District Demand Committee to seek greater infrastructural development and better means of communication for addressing socio-economic issues and improving the living standards of the people. In February 2011, the Committee had submitted a memorandum to Chief Minister Ibobi Singh who gave a positive response. But, given the fact that Ukhrul District as a whole was a Naga-majority region and its bifurcation could derail the demand for an alternative arrangement of governance for the Nagas, the UNC had objected to the Committee’s demand and even called upon it to withdraw the representation submitted to the government. On April 15, 2011, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak and Muivah [NSCN (IM)] even made an unsuccessful attempt on the life of one of the early advocates of this demand, the late Wungnaosang Keishing, Member of the Legislative Assembly from Phungyar. The demand for a separate district did not resurface thereafter. However, it has now been fulfilled by the Manipur government in the form of the creation of Kamjong District (Phungyar, Kasom Khullen, Kamjong and Sahamphung sub-divisions). Such a division of the traditional Naga bastion of Ukhrul may lead to social as well as political divisions amongst the Nagas (as the newly formed district has a mix of Nagas and Kukis), and is likely to invite stiff opposition from organisations fighting for a unified Naga territory.

The demand for a separate district of Tengnoupal (Machi, Moreh and Tengnoupal sub-divisions) was initiated in 2006 by the Tengnoupal District Demand Committee (essentially represented by Kuki organisations of Chandel district). Their grounds for the demand were administrative inconvenience and the existing embargo on the opening of business and purchase of land in Chandel district headquarters except for those residing in the district headquarters. The creation of Tengnoupal district may intensify Kuki domination, which is likely to undermine the quest of the UNC and NSCN (IM) for a contiguous Naga dominated territory in East Manipur.

Newly created Noney district (Nungba, Noney, Khoupum and Haochong sub-divisions) is the southern region of the erstwhile Tamenglong District. The demand for a separate district was initiated by the Tongjei Maril District Demand Committee, citing the remoteness of the region as well as its historical importance. The region’s remoteness is evidenced by the fact that all essential commodities were traditionally brought in from Silchar by the villagers on foot through a narrow conduit along the Tongjei Maril stretch (an area of 952 sq km encompassing Tamenglong district’s Lower Lukhambi to the north, Churachandpur district’s Tuangtu and Tuiphai to the south, Senapati district’s New Keithelmanbi and Chini-Inkhol to the east and Imphal East’s Gularthol and Tousem subdivision’s Kaiphundai to the west). And the historical importance of the region lies in the fact that the Zeliangrong people carried the palanquin of King Charairongba in 1704 AD when he went on his pilgrimage through Tongjei Marin and onto Silchar. Despite its historical importance the area was ignored by successive state governments, leading to a development deficit. Yet, the Naga socio-political bodies under the aegis of the UNC are opposed to the grant of district status to the region because it causes the further administrative breakup of the Naga areas in Manipur.

Since the 1970s, there has been a demand for a separate revenue district in the form of the upgradation of Sadar Hills by Kuki Civil Society Organisations. This has been in addition to the demand by Kuki militant organisations for a Kuki homeland, comprising areas from Senapati, Tamenglong, Ukhrul, Churachandpur and Chandel districts. While an Autonomous District Council has been functioning in the region since February 1972, the Nagas have been objecting to both the Kuki demands on the pretext that it would result in the alienation of Nagas from their land. But the Manipur government has granted the popular Kuki demand by formally naming the new district as Kangpokpi, comprising of Kangpokpi, Champhai, Saitu Gamphazol, Kangchup Geljang, Saikul, Lungtin, Island and Bungte Chiru sub-divisions.

The carving out of a separate Pherzawl district (Pherzawl, Thanlon, Parbung, Tipaimikh and Vangai Range sub-divisions) from the erstwhile Churachandpur district has primarily been driven by the need to increase the region’s development prospects as well as improve the administrative convenience for the people. The region lies approximately 220 kms from the existing district headquarters of Churachandpur. Due to the difficult terrain and poor connectivity, the region has more or less remained out of reach of the district administration and is comparatively less developed than other parts of the state. Given that Kuki and Hmar tribes constitute Pherzawl’s majority population, the creation of this new district may not result in any major controversy.

Similarly, the newly created district of Kakching may also not result in controversy. Covering only an area of 190 sq km and composed of a mere 37 villages, Kakching has been carved out of the erstwhile Thoubal district. The Lois, who fall under the category of Scheduled Castes among the Meiteis, are the majority population in the district. Despite their right to vote, the Lois have been barred from contesting elections in the ‘non-Tribal’ district of Thoubal. The creation of Kakching will enhance the political power and representation of the Lois, which, in turn, is likely to speed up socio-economic development.

Though the Manipur government’s decision to create seven new districts has come in the wake of demands from the local people as well as for improving administrative efficiency, it has drawn mixed reactions within the state. The notification has been largely welcomed by the Kukis and Meiteis in Kangpokpi, Kamjong and Pherzawl districts as well as by the Naga chiefs of villages under Kamjong district who had been craving for development and socio-economic needs. However, there has been fierce opposition from Naga bodies under the aegis of the UNC, which contend that Naga villages have been merged with non-Naga areas to form the new districts in an attempt to divide the Naga people, and that the state government did not consult the Hill Area Committees formed to protect the rights of the hill people before taking the decision. Most importantly, the Nagas fear that the new districts jeopardise the prospects of building greater Naga unity and territorial integration. As a result, there has been a spurt in violence including acts of vandalism by Naga and Meitei groups in response to the prevailing situation in the state.

It appears that the Manipur government’s move to create new districts was aimed at reviving the ruling party’s fading popularity and credibility especially amongst Kukis and Meiteis as well as to woo small segments of Nagas. The creation of the new districts has had contrasting consequences. On the one hand, it has met the popular aspirations of the Kuki and Meitei populations. But, on the other, it poses a direct challenge to the endeavours of the UNC-led Naga bodies to establish Naga territorial contiguity and an alternate arrangement of governance for the Nagas in Manipur. These twin, but contrasting consequences, are amplifying the existing divisions amongst various ethnic groups, and may even threaten the ongoing Naga peace process.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.