The Spectre of ISIS: Trinidad’s Unfolding Jihadi Nightmare
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
August 08, 2016
While there have been no studies on the motivation of Trinidadian Muslims to travel to join ISIS fighters, it is possible that the idea of the Caliphate has fired the imagination of disaffected youth.
"You now have a golden opportunity to do something that many of us here wish we could do right now. You have the ability to terrify the disbelievers in their own homes and make their streets run with their blood."
"...terrorize the disbelievers and make them feel fear everywhere, even in their own bedrooms. Due to their mere disbelief, their blood by default is lawful to spill."
Sending shudders through the population of Trinidad & Tobago, these words were uttered by Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi in the latest issue of Dabiq, the glossy online propaganda magazine of ISIS.1 In an issue dedicated to targeting Christians, at-Trinidadi’s words as part of a vitriol-laced interview were undoubtedly aimed at spreading fear among the island nation’s overwhelmingly non-Muslim population and marks the first time that ISIS has used one of its Trinidadian fighters to exhort his co-religionists in Trinidad to violence against non-Muslims. Suspected of being one Shane Dominic Crawford, and also known as Asadullah, at-Trinidadi’s chilling message came shortly after it was revealed that nine Trinidadian nationals were detained in Turkey trying to infiltrate into Syria to fight alongside ISIS, continuing to demonstrate the significant lure that ISIS has for elements of the Trinidadian Muslim population.2
Trinidad’s Muslim community has not remained immune to the globalisation of the jihadist movement, being susceptible to the lure of the radical doctrines espoused elsewhere. There is no doubt that the internet is one of the most potent recruiting tools for jihadist propaganda and to spread the message of ISIS. But it is difficult to ascertain how many Trinidadians may have been radicalised through the internet, though it is beyond doubt that ISIS has used the internet as one of its primary recruiting tools to attract foreign fighters.3That some recruits from the Caribbean may have been recruited through the internet was hinted at in comments by General John Kelly, head of America’s Southern Command and whose area of responsibility includes the Caribbean.4 In Trinidad, the internet campaign has the additional support of local groups such as the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, and its loose affiliates such as the Jamaat al Islami al Karibi, the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah and the Jamaat al Murabiteen. Al-Muslimeen has openly associated itself with Al-Qaeda and has proclaimed its intention of establishing an Islamic state in Trinidad5
This plethora of ideologically affiliated groups has enabled ISIS to be surprisingly effective in recruiting Trinidadian youth to its cause. Although numbers vary wildly, it is clear that a substantial number of Trinidadians are fighting with ISIS. In 2015, no fewer than 35 have been identified as fighting for ISIS with other family members supporting them actively bringing the total to 896 By 2016, this figure may well be an underestimate as figures discussed in Trinidad’s Parliament have placed the numbers at anywhere between 102 and a staggering 400.7 Trinidadian police intelligence suggests that between 10 and 15 Trinidadians have been killed fighting for ISIS so far, although reliable information is difficult to obtain.8
Trinidadians became “poster boys” for an ISIS recruiting video made in late 2015 which included their children9 Indeed, in the said video, one identifying himself as Abu Zayd al-Muhajir had brought his three children to Syria in the Ar-Raqqah province while another – Abu Khalid, a Christian convert – used the video to proclaim that Muslims in Trinidad were “restricted”. This was echoed by Zayd al-Muhajir and yet another Trinidadian, Abu Abdullah, who went so far as to encourage Muslims in Trinidad to support ISIS and its ambition of creating an Islamic Caliphate. A recurring theme was that Islam in Trinidad is being “restricted” – a statement without basis in fact, but one which has found unusual resonance among elements of the Trinidadian population.
Traditionally, extremist doctrine found most traction with Afro-Trinidadian converts to Islam, exemplified by the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen and its affiliates. This may be a consequence of the strong link between Islam and the 1970s Black Power movement in the United States which found considerable resonance in the Trinidad.10Yasin Abu Bakr, for example, openly courts the urban Afro-Trinidadian youth in his sermons with a mix of Islamic doctrine and Black Power rhetoric, preying upon feelings of discontent among the Afro-Trinidadian urban poor.11It is of interest to note that the rural poor have been less enamoured of this message and few recruits to either ISIS or even the multitude of criminal gangs now operating in Trinidad are from rural areas.
A disturbing trend has been observed wherein more Indo-Trinidadian Muslims, usually moderate and well-integrated into society, are succumbing to such propaganda. From the jihadist viewpoint, the Indo-Trinidadian Muslims, generally better educated and wealthier than the Afro-Trinidadian converts, offer a potentially attractive source of skilled and motivated manpower. Lured by Salafist doctrine, both through social media and through an aggressive campaign in many of Trinidad’s 85 mosques, young Muslims have been targeted for recruitment including through the use of jihad videos to attract potential recruits12 Indeed, a recruiting video featuring a supposed Trinidadian ISIS fighter bearing the name Abu Abdurahman al-Trinidadi sent shockwaves among the majority of Muslims who are appalled, angered and concerned at the apparent attraction that ISIS seems to have for too many Muslim youth13. Yet, it is an unfortunate fact that neither the government nor the mainstream Muslim leadership has been able to either mount a counter-narrative or offer an explanation for the lure of ISIS to Trinidadian Muslims, with the government now belatedly trying to meet Muslim leaders to find an explanation.14
While there have been no studies on the motivation of Trinidadian Muslims to travel to join ISIS fighters, it is possible that the idea of the Caliphate has fired the imagination of disaffected youth. The leader of the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah, Umar Abdullah, who is constantly monitored by an officer of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Special Branch, had identified some characteristics of Trinidadians attracted to ISIS. He noted that those who were recruited by ISIS were arrogant, lacked patience, could not live among non-Muslims, had marital problems and firmly believed they were being marginalised as Muslims15 While publicly disavowing any link to ISIS, the Waajijatul Islaamiyyah still espouses extremist views and its call for an Islamic State in Trinidad remains. The distribution of “jihad videos” among young people has also attracted elements who are attracted to the violence espoused therein.
The latter factor should not be underestimated as the level of brutality shown in ISIS recruiting videos outdoes earlier jihad videos from the 1990s and given the increasing levels of violent crime in Trinidad, it is possible that there are recruits who find the lure of the gun and the power of life and death attractive and revel in the sense of invincibility it gives them. It is of interest to note that of the identified Trinidadian ISIS fighters, many have been linked to violent criminal elements in the past and may see in ISIS a chance at indulging in their violent tendencies while simultaneously justifying it with a “religious” rationale and feeling a sense of purpose in doing so.
It should be noted that these extremist outfits have fanned the flames by perpetuating a myth that Muslims are not allowed to freely practice their faith in Trinidad and are being persecuted. This is being used as a rallying call by Trinidadian ISIS fighters and their sympathisers to attract more recruits16That it is having so much success points to a lack of a cogent counter-narrative. It is also a very telling example of a blatant untruth being told often enough being regarded as the truth by some. It is also interesting that, to date, while condemning ISIS and radicalisation, none of Trinidad’s moderate Islamic groups have publicly stated that Islam is not being discriminated against and that the faith enjoys freedom of practice in the country, which, for all its flaws, has never discriminated against any faith on a collective basis since its independence in 1962. As the reach of ISIS grows ever longer into the country, it remains to be seen whether it will result in any of the type of terrorist attacks that have recently plagued Europe. At-Trinidadi’s exhortations to his co-religionists is an ominous portent of things that may come to pass.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Joint Communique issued by the recent NATO summit, held on July 8-9 in Warsaw, appears to have sown the seeds of a renewed confrontation with Russia.
The Joint Communique issued by the recent NATO summit, held on July 8-9 in Warsaw, appears to have sown the seeds of a renewed confrontation with Russia. It identifies Russia as a key threat to European security, emphasises upon ‘deterrence’ and ‘defence’ through a NATO military build-up along Europe’s eastern arc to counter the Russian threat, and indicates NATO’s intent to strengthen its outreach in the post-Soviet space of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The other vital roadmaps identified by the Joint Communique include Montenegro’s accession as a NATO member, the operationalisation of missile defence systems in Romania and Poland, and the cultivation of a defence partnership with, hitherto neutral, Sweden and Finland.
While these initiatives may reassure Eastern European members about NATO’s commitment to counter the Russian threat, they are also likely to reinforce Russia’s hostile perceptions of this ‘Western’ alliance. It can even be argued that NATO’s blueprint amounts to breaching the Kremlin’s red-lines, which is particularly significant given the adversarial relationship between Russia and the ‘West’ post the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.
Russian and NATO Threat Perceptions
The roots of the ongoing Russia-‘West’ rivalry lies in the inability of the latter to accommodate the former as an equal partner on the global stage. Their historical mutual distrust and fundamental differences over the global strategic balance finally culminated in the Ukrainian standoff. The West’s imposition of economic sanctions and attempts to isolate Russia in the global arena have reinforced Russia’s suspicions about the US-led ‘Western’ strategy to contain it in its own neighbourhood. Against this backdrop, NATO is seen by Russia as a key instrument for pushing this ‘Western’ agenda, which is particularly reflected in the alliance’s expanding footprints eastwards, despite an assurance to the contrary.
Russia’s Historical Anxiety
In this context, one also needs to take into account the historical genesis of the Russian anxiety about military alliances in its neighbourhood. Being a pre-dominantly land power, which moreover did not possess defensible frontiers, Russian empires have had to face the onslaughts of Mongols, Poles, Lithuanians, and Germans.1 This gave rise to its quintessential need for strategic depth, in the form of a geographical buffer, to prevent invasions of Russian territory. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War was an outcome of such thinking. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has not only witnessed its geographical buffer shrink dramatically, but also NATO moving practically to its doorstep. Given the deep sense of betrayal over the alliance’s expansion, Russians have been vigilant of NATO’s capabilities rather than relying upon its assurances that the military build-up is directed against other threats. From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, NATO continues to pose an existential threat to Russia’s security.
At the same time, a similar fear psychosis exists among NATO members about Russia. This is particularly so in the case of the ex-Warsaw Pact countries of Poland and the Baltic states. Given the substantial presence and influence of ethnic Russian minorities in their territories, the pretext advanced by the Kremlin for the Crimean takeover has set alarm bells ringing in these countries. According to a recent RAND report, Russia can overrun their territories within a few hours.2 This has compelled them to seek a more robust NATO military posture towards Russia. However, the fallout is Russia’s belief that NATO has re-discovered its raison d’être. In effect, each side blames the other for escalating tensions.
Brexit and the Dynamics of European Defence
Against the backdrop of an increasingly hostile Russia-NATO relationship, the dynamics of European defence is likely to change on account of ‘Brexit’. This is because NATO’s and the European Union’s (EU) memberships overlap. Britain has been a pillar of NATO, with its defence spending the highest among the EU countries. It has also strongly supported the sanctions against Russia. The ongoing ‘leave’ turmoil and a possible economic slowdown can distract its attention from NATO and its alliance commitments. The key question is which European power can fill the void, given the emerging tendency everywhere to look inwards. Meanwhile, the number of dissenting voices in Europe over the adoption of a hard-line position towards Russia has increased. These include the German Foreign Minister and the French President who have criticised the rationale for NATO’s ‘sabre-rattling’ and the EU’s economic sanctions. At stake is European solidarity and credibility.
Moreover, the EU’s new ‘Foreign and Security Policy’ envisions deeper military cooperation between its members.3 This is seen as an attempt to gain strategic independence from NATO. But will it lead to the revival of the EU-orchestrated Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)? Questions abound since, at present, only a handful of EU members meet NATO’s two per cent of GDP spending on defence threshold. Also, the dynamics of German and French collaboration need to be worked out. Consequently, European defence is likely to be in flux for the foreseeable future even though Russia is perceived as being the biggest threat and challenge to European security.
Is a Military Confrontation Between Russia and NATO in the Offing?
It is likely that Russia will view the Warsaw summit as a major provocation. As a result, the Kremlin can be expected to up the ante. The wheels have already been set in motion since the beginning of the year when signs of a NATO build-up emerged. This has included the re-organisation of Russia’s western military command and an increase in the number of military exercises and bomber flights closer to NATO boundaries. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated that NATO’s initiatives will be met with an ‘adequate response’.
The emerging flashpoints of a Russia-NATO confrontation involve the Baltic and the Black Sea regions. Notably, the Kremlin retains ‘escalation dominance’ in its neighbourhood. This allows it to raise the stakes, knowing fully well that NATO’s success in a localised confrontation are minimal. Russia’s Syrian expedition would also have emboldened it. The tactic appears designed to force the ‘West’ to respect Russia’s core interests.
In this context, the salience of nuclear weapons for Moscow has grown manifold. Nuclear weapons offer the Kremlin parity with NATO at a time when its conventional military capabilities have failed to keep pace with those of the alliance. As a result, the modernisation of both its conventional and nuclear arsenals is likely to be given priority. Given the mutual threat perception, a period of intense arms racing in Europe may be in the offing. Moreover, a hard-line position towards NATO strengthens the Kremlin’s domestic narrative of Russian resilience in the face of adversity. This assumes significance given that parliamentary elections are due in September.
Nevertheless, an armed confrontation looks unlikely. In a Russia-‘West’ standoff, the optics of a strong posture are equally important. They are linked to the nuanced interplay of several events involving Syrian developments, economic sanctions and the Ukrainian crisis. These will, in the future, involve a grand bargain. When that time comes, each party would like to hold an upper hand. As such, there does not appear to be any real appetite for a military confrontation on either side.
A Russian encroachment of the Baltics will likely unite the European fence sitters. A more plausible Russian strategy would be to cultivate the differences among EU members in order to undermine the US-led ‘Western’ alliance. In this light, it is important to note that countries like France, Austria, Italy and Greece have favoured a more reconciliatory approach towards Russia. They have expressed their unhappiness over the American pressure tactics to maintain the current course.
However, the danger of a miscalculation increasingly lurks in the background. The frequent overflights of Russian bombers and ‘mysterious’ appearances of Russian submarines in the NATO periphery have led to tense encounters. The risk of an incident snowballing into a confrontation has grown exponentially in the absence of a regular Russia-NATO dialogue. This can have devastating consequences.
Given the unravelling of Russia’s ties with the ‘West’, it appears that their interactions are likely to be limited to managing risks and cooperating tactically where their interests overlap, including tackling the threat of terrorism. This is unfortunate given the tremendous potential of Russia-‘West’ cooperation on the global stage. Ultimately, in this evolving rivalry, where the ‘West’ appears keen to contain one major power (Russia), it may inadvertently be facilitating the rise of another in the form of China. This does not bode well for either Russia or the ‘West’.
Implications for India
India is neither a member of NATO nor located in Europe or in Europe’s immediate vicinity and, as such, the Russia-NATO confrontation should not ideally affect it. However, the fact remains that the broad contours of this rivalry involve Moscow’s fundamental differences with the US. Therefore, the pull and pressure of this competition is likely to complicate India’s foreign policy practice. While ties with Russia have been a pillar of the country’s foreign policy, India cannot afford to ignore the ‘West’. The key challenge will be to tactfully build relationships with each side on its own merits. More notably, the Russia-China entente, which is a direct outcome of the Russia-‘West’ rivalry, is likely to have more significant implications for India.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Robert Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography (New York: Random House, 2012), p. 159.
2. David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html, Accessed on July 16, 2016.
China’s push for influence among the Caribbean political elite has been replicated with an equally determined effort to court the military and the bureaucratic elite in the region, often deftly stepping in to take advantage of senseless overreactions on the part of the United States.
In June 2013, during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Trinidad and Tobago, the then Prime Minister of the Caribbean nation, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, in a fawning speech, had lauded President Xi’s vision saying, “We see in your China Dream a splendid opportunity for China to become a model for the world.”1 Like a royalty holding court, President Xi thereafter hosted the leaders of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Suriname and Jamaica in Port of Spain, capital of Trinidad and Tobago, where he announced soft loans and investments worth US$ 3 billion as well as grants of up to $8 million for the region.2 President Xi’s visit was an effective and a graphic demonstration of China’s growing influence and outreach in the English-speaking Caribbean region, coming at a time when the United States (US) had been somewhat less forthcoming with financial grants for the region.
President Xi’s visit to Trinidad was followed by a reciprocal visit by Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar to Beijing in February 2014, when, in a major breakthrough for Chinese arms sales to the region, the controversial purchase of a long-range maritime patrol vessel was agreed upon.3 This was again a demonstration of the growing Chinese influence over the governments of the region, which so far had been firmly under the largely benevolent gaze and geopolitical sway of the US. The decision to buy Chinese patrol vessel also marked the first sale of a non-Western military hardware to the Caribbean nation since the end of the Cold War.4 In fact, acceptance of Chinese aid and investment has since become a norm in the English-speaking Caribbean, where the US has been conspicuous by its absence in respect of doling out large bilateral loans and grants. In quite a contrast, while the private American investment declined post the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese investment in the region grew by more than 500 per cent between 2003 and 2012.5
In the past, China had used financial enticements to lure Caribbean nations away from Taiwan which has a long history of extending financial assistance to the region – of the 23 countries to keep formal diplomatic ties with Taipei, six are in the Caribbean: Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis, and St. Vincent.6 However, China’s intensified outreach to the region seems independent of the “Taiwan factor” and also perfectly timed, as a combination of economic contraction and electoral compulsions have made regional governments desperate for the economic lifeline that the Chinese loans and grants might provide in lieu of having to make cuts in social schemes that are wasteful and of dubious efficacy but politically useful.7 The declining economic fortunes of the region have made governments grateful for the additional investment afforded by China, as the region has for years reeled under the impact of falling commodity prices, crippling government debt and endemic crime and corruption.8
Furthermore, the political compulsion of showcasing visible projects for maximising electoral gains has rendered the region peculiarly susceptible to the allure of Chinese fiscal blandishments. A telling example was Persad-Bissessar’s purchase of the aforementioned Chinese patrol ship, which was selected against technical advice but which had the critical virtue of being deliverable prior to the elections. Trinidad’s previous government, under late Patrick Manning, too had projected the visually impressive Chinese-built National Academy for the Performing Arts (NAPA) as a crowning achievement. Similarly, while the Bahamas pointed to the multi-billion dollar Chinese investment in the Baha Mar resort, Jamaica sought to benefit from the $300 million loan promised by China for the rehabilitation of its roads and bridges.9
However, Chinese financial largesse has not come without its price as China insists on using its own contractors and labourers, bringing few employment benefits to the recipient nation.10 In fact, as early as 2009, Zhao Zhihai, a researcher with the Zhangjiakou Academy of Agricultural Sciences in Heibei Province near Beijing, had suggested before the National People’s Congress that sending Chinese labourers to Africa would create about 100 million more jobs and solve the problem of Chinese unemployment.11 The impact on the chronic unemployment and underemployment plaguing Africa did not seem to attract any attention in his discourse. Furthermore, since Chinese labourers, whether legally or otherwise, have the propensity to stay on in the region, it could cause potential demographic shift among the small population of the islands of the region where even small numbers could have a significant impact.
In addition, the quality of Chinese construction has left something to be desired for as serious structural flaws have resulted in the closure of NAPA for more than a year with substantial costs to be incurred in its repair.12 Trinidad also experienced the ignominy of having to demolish an apartment complex built by China Jiangsu International Corporation as it was deemed unsafe for habitation.13 Even in the Bahamas, the “Chinese Dream” became something of a nightmare as the vaunted Baha Mar resort, reputedly costing $3.5 billion, has failed to open, with China Construction America (CCA) missing deadlines and facing numerous allegations of shoddy workmanship and poor construction quality.14 An added complication is that with China’s Exim Bank having financed the deal, it has become virtually impossible to fire the Chinese contractors for sub-standard work.15 Given the strings attached to the Chinese financing, the benefit that the region seeks to derive from Chinese construction projects is therefore very questionable. Moreover, given the relative negotiating strength of the parties, it is evident that the Caribbean nations lack the means to leverage better contractual terms with the Chinese, the inevitable result being that construction contracts are skewed in favour of the Chinese contractors.
Compared to the US, which has been wary of providing large-scale bilateral financial support due to endemic corruption in the Caribbean nations, the Chinese appear less concerned about such issues, thus further enhancing their prospects among the governing elites of the region where lack of transparency enables potentially shadowy deals between them to flourish.16 In contrast, the US prefers to conduct its economic assistance programmes through such agencies as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), all of whom have some veneer of monitoring the use of funds, in contrast to the Chinese who seem to be unconcerned with issues regarding either the misuse or misappropriation of funds.
What is yet unclear is the motive behind China’s outreach to the English-speaking Caribbean region. As a market, the islands of the Caribbean, with their tiny populations, do not offer much by way of a market for Chinese goods and services. Similarly, the resources of the region, oil and gas in Trinidad and bauxite in Jamaica, are too small and limited to offer much by way of economic incentives for the Chinese.17 China’s significant economic and political engagement in Latin America suggests that it does not look at the Caribbean as a gateway to that region. Rather, it can be cogently argued that the Chinese have been building their economic clout through “chequebook diplomacy” in various regions, and that Caribbean is no exception.
China’s push for influence among the Caribbean political elite has been replicated with an equally determined effort to court the military and the bureaucratic elite in the region, often deftly stepping in to take advantage of senseless overreactions on the part of the US such as the suspension of military aid to Barbados after it refused to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA), which in turn led Barbados to avail itself of China’s offer of military training and assistance.18 The end result is that China’s military training establishments now annually host a substantial number of officers from the region with an attendant increase in influence over their military leadership.
Rather surprisingly, the US does not seem to be perturbed about China’s creeping influence in the Caribbean region. At first glance this might seem to be the case of complacency at work, but a more nuanced assessment indicates that the US still enjoys potentially much greater influence than its current “hands-off” approach suggests. All countries of the English-speaking Caribbean region rely heavily on the US for their economic well-being – whether in the form of tourist arrivals, or, as in the case of Trinidad & Tobago, as a market for gas exports. In addition, the US continues to provide considerable assistance and support in the ongoing fight against drug trafficking as well as in judicial and law-enforcement in the region. Nonetheless, in the absence of financial largesse, the US is no longer seen as a favourite ally by the region’s elite. For now, it is into this fiscal vacuum that China has stepped in, and as expected, quite effectively.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The coup has seriously dented Turkey’s image as a stable, secular, progressive and prosperous country. And Erdogan's witch-hunt has tarnished the country's reputation and credibility. Turkey’s polity and economy will take a long time to recover from the crippling attrition of recent days.
Introduction
It is more than two weeks since the abortive coup on the night of 15-16 July took place in Turkey. Although additional information has become available, it is still not clear who the mastermind behind the failed attempt was. It is, however, possible to piece together the sequence of events with a fair degree of accuracy.
It appears highly unlikely that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in any way associated with the plot. While condemnation of the frail and reclusive Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen by Erdogan and calls for his extradition from the United States where he has been living in self-imposed exile since 1999 have become increasingly louder, well informed Turkish analysts dismiss the charge that Gulen could have been directly involved in the coup attempt. Gulen’s supporters have denied any role and termed the Turkish government’s accusation as “highly irresponsible”.
Gulen has long been an ardent advocate of tolerance, peace and “acceptance of religious and cultural diversity” based on the traditions of Sufism. In a recent op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, Gulen had denounced the Islamic State, called for an end to violent extremism, and advocated equal rights for men and women, and education for Muslims.
Gulen and Erdogan were once friends but split several years ago after allegations of corruption were levelled against senior officials as well as against Erdogan’s son.
The United States has said that it would consider Gulen’s extradition if sufficient evidence of his involvement is presented. It is doubtful whether the volumes of documents presented by Turkey are adequate to satisfy the United States of Gulen's direct complicity. This could further exacerbate hostility between the two countries.
It is increasingly clear that the coup was an attempt by mid-level officers from the army and some from the air force to usurp power. It had apparently become known to them that the government was contemplating a purge shortly in which they would be arrested or dismissed. The coup was an attempt to pre-empt this move and strip Erdogan of his arbitrary power. The coup attempt came a cropper apparently because it was carried out in a hurry without requisite planning to execute it meticulously. It is also likely that Erdogan had an inkling of what was brewing so that the element of surprise that the plotters had banked on was missing.
The failure of the coup was initially perceived as a victory for democracy, as it was foiled by ordinary citizens pouring into the streets of Ankara and Istanbul on the call of President Erdogan, the constitutionally elected leader of the country. However, as unfolding events have revealed, it was anything but that.
Erdogan's Response
The last few days have witnessed one of the most comprehensive purges to occur anywhere in recent memory. Actions thus far have resulted in the seizure of 114 businesses including newspapers, radio and television channels. Arrest warrants for 47 journalists have been issued. 30,000 educationists, 14,000 government officials, and 9,000 from the interior ministry and military have been dismissed. 16,000 people have been detained, with more than 8,000 still under arrest. Deans of all universities have resigned after being ''invited'' by the government to do so. The purge has covered more than 60,000 people in its ambit, many of whom had nothing to do with the coup. Erdogan has taken the coup as a ''gift from God'' and could use this to bludgeon through a new constitution to give himself the powers of an executive President which he has been hankering after for some time.
The post-coup purge smacks of a cultural revolution like the one in China in the 1960s. It appears to be designed to remove those members of the judiciary, academia, thinkers, public officials, military, media, etc., who are perceived to be opposed to Erdogan and to stack up the benches and other instruments of power with Erdogan’s loyalists.
Erdogan has threatened that capital punishment, which was abolished in 2004, could be re-instated to deal with the plotters. This will bring down the curtains on Turkey's bid to become a member of the European Union.
The failed coup will have far-reaching, long-term, implications domestically, regionally and internationally. Domestically, Erdogan's actions have been deeply polarising and can sow huge mistrust among different segments of society. The purge has divided the army down the middle. Erdogan had a unique opportunity to be a statesman to heal the wounds inflicted on the polity in recent years. He has frittered away the moment and further sharpened cleavages amongst people.
The Turkish economy as well as the tourism sector took a big hit in the aftermath of the coup. Even earlier, the economy was reeling earlier under the impact of frequent and powerful terror attacks by ISIS and Kurdish separatists. The coup has multiplied manifold the wariness of investors and business entrepreneurs.
Relations with the West
Erdogan's suspicion that the coup was supported by the United States and Europe has brought Turkey’s relations with the USA, EU and NATO to a new low. As a mark of displeasure, electricity to the Incirlik air-base, where US military assets are housed, was cut off and the US Air Force contingent was grounded for some time. The United States and Europe suspect Erdogan of divided loyalties in the counterterrorism fight.
Erdogan has vehemently attacked the West for not standing by him in defence of democracy in his hour of need and instead expressing concern at the treatment meted out to the coup plotters.
Deteriorating ties are also a blow to NATO and Turkey's fight against terrorism. The decline in the clout of the Turkish Army symbolises its reduced significance as a reliable partner for the West. The Turkish armed forces are the second largest in NATO, next only to those of the USA, have a budget of USD 20 billion and a strength of about half a million officers and men. About 9,000 soldiers have been charged with taking part in the coup attempt.
Conclusion
The failed coup has left Turkey severely bruised and damaged. It has seriously dented Turkey’s image as a stable, secular, progressive and prosperous country. Erdogan's witch-hunt has tarnished the country's reputation and credibility. Turkey’s polity and economy will take a long time to recover from the crippling attrition of recent days.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Message from the Indo-Bangladesh Border: `Banijya Basati Lakkhi’
Gautam Sen
August 02, 2016
While a higher volume of trade through Petrapole should benefit both countries, this new ICP mechanism needs to be suitably leveraged to ensure that the north-east also derives benefits.
On July 21, 2016, the prime ministers of India and Bangladesh jointly inaugurated, through video-conferencing, Asia’s largest Integrated Check-Post (ICP) at Petrapole, 95 km from Kolkata, in North 24-Parganas district of West Bengal, with the West Bengal chief minister too joining on the occasion. This is regarded as a landmark development towards strengthening bilateral trade as well as the border management process.
The Petrapole ICP, encompassing a modern land customs station, with ancillaries spread over nearly 100 acres, will have adequate passenger amenities, facilities for currency exchange and customs clearance, cargo processing and inspection, warehouse and cold storage, quarantine laboratory, etc. for the expeditious clearing of goods and the facilitation of movement of people. It will also ensure comprehensive security oversight on the movement of materials and people. The significance of this development can be appreciated by considering the fact that more than 50 per cent of India-Bangladesh trade is undertaken through this ICP. During 2015-16, trade valued at more than Rs. 15,000 crore was transacted through this point, which is more than all the land ports and customs stations of India, with about 1.5 lakh trucks and 15 lakh people passing through it.
A decisive initiative for a better border management system, including the setting up of ICPs and land-ports with comprehensive functionalities, was taken by the Government of India quite some time ago during the 11th Plan period (2007-2012). This came in the context of consensual acceptance by different governments in New Delhi of the need for promoting a framework for the South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) Programme. Since 2010, international agencies like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have also assisted such initiatives involving India, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal. However, in 2006 itself, the Cabinet Committee on Security had accorded in principle approval for establishing 13 ICPs, with seven in Phase-1 including one at Petrapole at an initially estimated cost of Rs. 172 crore. The land customs station already existing at Petrapole was to be upgraded and subsumed into an ICP. Construction started in 2010. Since 2012, the Government of India has attempted to factor in improvements in the Petrapole ICP project, in the light of the experiences gained with the first ICP operational at Attari on the India-Pakistan border in Punjab and the working of the ICP at Agartala along the Bangladesh border.
The importance of the Petrapole ICP, apart from boosting bilateral trade, lies in the context of improved connectivity and trade and transit between the north-eastern states and the rest of the country through Bangladesh. Consequent on the above-mentioned transit facilities granted to India by the positively disposed present government in Bangladesh, the ICP at the Petrapole-Benapole border point (Benapole is on the Bangladesh side), which isequipped with all the requisite trade enabling facilities, assumes special significance. Being the relevant local authority, the West Bengal Government will be required to both provide adequate municipal services in the adjoining area and ensure appropriate law and order environment in the North 24 Parganas district through which National Highway-35 passes, leading to the Bongaon-Petrapole ICP. Furthermore, a widening of this National Highway to four-lane width in the Kolkata-Bongaon-Petrapole axis and maintaining it properly are a sine qua non for the further growth of India-Bangladesh trade as well as for meeting the developmental needs of the north-eastern region. Quite significantly, during the June 21 inauguration of the Petrapole ICP, the West Bengal chief minister also spoke about the need for opening a police station at the ICP.
There are still some irritants or constraints in India-Bangladesh relations that need to be sorted out. For instance, some media agencies and political outfits – not all necessarily inimical to India – as well as civil society groups in Bangladesh cite the trade imbalance in India’s favour in this regard. The Petrapole ICP, if made optimally functional and suitably scaled up in the near future, in tandem with the expected growth in bilateral commerce, could help suitably boost imports from Bangladesh, including the import of value-added items based on basic input materials sent from India. However, the authorities concerned at the Union and State levels in India need to be suitably conscious of this requirement and monitor the functioning of the umbrella institution of the ICP in the interest of steady growth in bilateral trade so as to bring about a positive perception among Bangladeshis at large. In a recent interview to a Bangladeshi newspaper, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has referred to the increasing growth in India’s imports from Bangladesh vis-à-vis exports to that country. The Petrapole ICP’s performance will have greater salience in this respect.
While the channelling of a higher volume of trade through Petrapole should benefit both countries, this new ICP institution also needs to be suitably leveraged to ensure that the logistically constrained north-eastern region also derives benefits. Towards this objective, India may consider assisting Bangladesh in the development of other cross-over points with facilities similar to the ICPs, from where transiting Indian goods will re-enter Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. If such a cooperative endeavour works out, the prospects of export of raw materials as well as processed items from the north-eastern states to Bangladesh will also increase, apart from facilitating the easier trans-shipment of these items to West Bengal and beyond. In this regard, the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region along with the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of External Affairs, need to conceive and work out a suitable executing and monitoring mechanism.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, while welcoming the Benapole-Petrapole ICP, had aptly observed that `Banijya Basati Lakkhi` or ‘business brings fortune’. The ICP would have achieved the desired end if the benefits were to accrue to all concerned.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who served till recently as an Additional Chief Secretary-level Adviser to the Nagaland Chief Minister/Nagaland Government
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Saudi-Israeli Rendezvous: Does it indicate a Policy Change?
Md. Muddassir Quamar
July 29, 2016
It is early days to speculate on the likely outcome and possible trajectory in Saudi-Israeli engagement, but Eshki’s visit has so far been the clearest indication of Saudi willingness to engage with the Jewish state.
The July 22 visit of a Saudi delegation led by retired Major General Anwar Eshki, head of the Jeddah-based Middle East Center for Strategic and Legal Studies, to Israel to meet Ambassador Dore Gold, the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, has raised many eyebrows. This is the first time that a Saudi delegation visited Israel. Though not an official visit, Eshki’s is a highly symbolic one. Reportedly, the Saudi delegation also met Yaov Mordechai, the coordinator of Israeli government activities in the ‘occupied territories’, as well as a number of opposition Members of the Knesset including Meretz MKs Esawi Freig and Michal Rozin and Zionist Union MKs Ksenia Svetlova and Omer Bar-Lav, in order to encourage discussions in Israel on the Arab Peace Initiative.
This is not the first time that Eshki and Gold were meeting. Earlier, on June 4, the two held discussions on opportunities and challenges in the Middle East at an event organised by the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. And, in June 2015, they had met in public and since then have reportedly held several private meetings.
Eshki has not been the only prominent Saudi to hold meetings with an Israeli leader. In May 2016, the former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal and Israel’s former national security advisor Major General Yaakov Amidror had held a debate on security and peace in the Middle East at the Washington Institute. In fact, Turki al-Faisal has in recent years publicly met a number of Israeli leaders including former Members of the Knesset Dan Meridor and Meir Sheetrit, former IDF intelligence chief Amos Yaldin and even the Yesh Atid leader and former finance minister Yair Lapid. Turki has been one of the most prominent advocates of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, arguing that it is the only approach towards peace and the formation of a Palestinian state.1
The various publicised contacts between Saudi and Israeli leaders are a result of the changing geopolitics in the Middle East brought about by a change in the US approach towards Iran. A publicized visit of a Saudi delegation to Israel is indicative of the changing Saudi stance towards Israel. Firstly, it shows a willingness to engage with Israel, a country with which the Kingdom has no diplomatic relations. While speculations about secret Saudi-Israeli counter-terrorism and intelligence exchanges cannot be confirmed, it would be naïve to believe that the two countries have no contacts, especially given their mutuality of interest vis-à-vis Iran and defeating terror. There is no doubt that concerns in both Israel and Saudi Arabia about Iran’s ambitions and growing influence in the Middle East have brought these two adversaries of Iran closer.
Secondly, although the Palestinian issue is highly important as is evident from Eshki’s statement during his visit – “There will be no peace with the Arab countries before there is peace with the Palestinians...If the conflict is resolved, the countries that exploit the Palestinian issue, namely Iran, will no longer be able to capitalize on it.”2 – his public, even if unofficial, visit shows that Saudi Arabia is willing to take the risk of provoking domestic and Arab public anger by engaging with Israel. Saudi media did not highlight the visit, but, of late, there have been articulations about the need to engage with Israel to find a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to take the initiative from Iran as the benefactor of the Palestinian people. These views and moves have been impelled by the reduced US engagement in the region and the conclusion of a nuclear deal with Iran, which Saudi Arabia views as an American move to recognize Iran as a dominant regional player. Given the necessity of taking care of its own security under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia has begun to engage with all the players in the region including Israel. Though Eshki denied any knowledge about Saudi-Israeli counter-terrorism cooperation, such a possibility cannot be ruled out. One of the most potent threats to the Kingdom emanates from the Islamic State. Having some secret understanding with Israel, especially the sharing of intelligence and counter-terror experience, can be a major tool to deal with this threat.
The third important aspect of the meeting can be gleaned from the discussions reportedly held during Eshki’s visit. Israeli media reports suggest that the discussion largely remained confined to reviving talks on the Saudi proposed Arab Peace Initiative, with Eshki articulating the need for Israel to work towards resolving the conflict. On being asked whether he sees Israel as the cause of terrorism in the region, Eshki said: “The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the source of terrorism, but it does create fertile ground for acts of terrorism in the region.”3 The efforts to revive the Arab Peace Initiative gains importance in the light of the recent statement by Benjamin Netanyahu that the initiative has some “positive elements that can help revive constructive negotiations with Palestinians.”4 On an earlier occasion in 2015, he had remarked that Israel is willing to discuss the Arab initiative if it is revised.5 Nonetheless, these are early days to discern the trend of things to come. It can lead to some secret discussions but may get derailed due to adverse public opinion in both countries.
Though the reaction to Eshki’s visit within Saudi Arabia or in other parts of the region remains muted, there has been some criticism. For example, BDS Gulf issued a statement on July 24 denouncing the visit of the Eshki-led delegation. The statement read: “The Arab people, including in the Gulf, have always supported the people of Palestine against colonial and Zionist occupation and have opposed any violation of this support by their governments.”6 It urged people in the Gulf region to oppose any efforts at reconciliation with Israel. It added that if, as denied by Saudi Arabia of any official status to the visit, then action should be taken against those who visited Israel. Such statements are, however, unlikely to deter the Saudis as they see Israel as a possible partner in countering Iran’s growing clout in the region.
It is early days to speculate on the likely outcome and possible trajectory in Saudi-Israeli engagement, but Eshki’s visit has so far been the clearest indication of Saudi willingness to engage with the Jewish state. These are interesting times in the Middle East and things can derail with one small flare up. But if media reports and speculations of clandestine Saudi-Israeli engagements are to be believed, important turns could occur including the revival of the Arab Peace Initiative and cooperation to counter common threat perceptions.
Md. Muddassir Quamar is a researcher with the Middle East Institute, New Delhi. He recently submitted his PhD thesis on social reforms in Saudi Arabia at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Elections in PoK and Protests in Kashmir Valley: The Linkage
Prabha Rao
July 28, 2016
The political reality in PoK is that ‘azadi’ is a chimera, and substantive control of the area is shared between terrorist organisations such as the LeT and HM and the political elite of Islamabad. However, a narrative has been fed in the Kashmir Valley that Pakistan is a more favourable option than India.
Burhan Wani’s death on July 8 occurred just before the elections in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Expectedly, election rhetoric from all concerned political parties, including the ruling Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN), and the opposition, Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), and others, contained passionate eulogies for the ‘martyr’ Burhan Wani, and reruns of the usual Pakistani litany of Indian atrocities and human rights violations in Jammu & Kashmir. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif chaired a cabinet meeting on July 15 in which he declared Pakistan’s unstinting support for the Kashmiris’ “just struggle for self-determination.”1 Interestingly, he announced Islamabad’s intention to observe July 19 as a “Black Day”, which was swiftly postponed to July 21, to coincide with elections in PoK. In a campaign speech in Islamabad, he asserted that Pakistan was and will continue to be a stakeholder in Kashmir, which could not be considered India’s internal matter. Nawaz Sharif was echoed by the Pakistani establishment. Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhary requested the Islamabad-based Ambassadors of the member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir, which comprises Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Niger, to raise their voice against “the blatant human rights violations” of Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley.2 Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaz Aziz stated on July 25, in reply to Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s statement that Burhan Wani was considered to be a terrorist by India, thus: “Let us not forget, that not long ago the British labelled Indian freedom fighters as traitors and terrorists because at that time India was considered an integral part of the British Empire.”3 While the intention to rile India, especially in international fora, is always an objective with Pakistan, the political mileage that Nawaz Sharif and the PMLN has extracted from this situation in the past two weeks needs to be evaluated and factored.
PMLN swept the polls in PoK, winning 31 of the 41 seats. In his victory speech in Muzaffarabad on July 22, Nawaz Sharif grandiloquently stated that “We await the day of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan.”4 And he added that he was as much a Kashmiri as a Pakistani and promised to work extensively for establishing schools and universities in Azad Kashmir. Sharif, who was under a cloud due to his family connections with shell, front, companies allegedly involved in money laundering, which had been disclosed in the Panama Papers, and under threat from a section of the armed forces and public obliquely supporting Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif, took the opportunity to proclaim his political relevance and resilience. He and his party adroitly used the media hype generated by the current crisis in Kashmir to portray himself as an indefatigable activist for Kashmiri rights. Consequently, the PPP, which had formed the government in PoK in 2011, managed to get only two seats, with the Muslim Congress getting three seats, the PTI one, the Jammu Kashmir Peoples’ Party (JKPP) one, and another being won by an independent who has affiliated himself with the PML-N.5 Chairman of the PPP, Bilawal Bhutto, had made visits to all the districts of PoK, along with the outgoing Prime Minister of PoK, Choudhary Abdul Majed, but the anti-incumbency factor kicked in to his disadvantage. The dominance of national parties in PoK, as against the hold of regional political parties in the Kashmir Valley in India, has been touted as evidence of the integration of Kashmiris within the Pakistani state.
The Muslim Congress, the oldest party in PoK, has been steadily losing ground. The PML¬-N encouraged factional rifts within the Muslim Conference, which caused a vertical split in the party. As a result of this split, the former PoK Prime Minister Raja Farooq Haider established a PML-N chapter in PoK. This move divided the vote bank and severely weakened the Muslim Conference. The remains of the party, led by another ex-Prime Minister, Sardar Atteque Ahamad, had formed a coalition with Imran Khan’s PTI, which latter had also fielded a former PoK Prime Minister, Barrister Sultan Mehmood.6 The significant lack of public response to the PTI, which resulted in a loss even for Barrister Sultan Mehmood, is symptomatic of the party’s and Imran Khan’s waning popularity, which is also evident in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Also, the PPP’s substantial downslide is indicative of its fast diminishing role as an opposition. The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), which had managed to get two nominees elected in the previous elections, drew a blank in the latest round. This is significant as the number of Kashmiri voters residing in Pakistan is 438,884, mainly in Karachi.7 MQM’s defeat here reveals not only its declining fortunes but also its inability to control the street in Karachi.
It is noteworthy that in the run up to the elections, media bans on the Lashkar-e Taiba/Jama’at ud Dawa were quietly kept in abeyance. JuD Emir, Hafiz Saeed, who has been listed as a terrorist by the UN Security Council’s Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee and has an Interpol Red Corner Notice against him, was permitted to organise a ‘Kashmir Caravan,’ comprising several trucks and buses from Lahore to Islamabad. The ‘Caravan’ passed through the towns of Gujranwala, Jhelum and Gujrat, and organised major rallies that were well attended by federal ministers and religious leaders, garnering a fair amount of coverage in print and airspace. Islamabad’s, and Nawaz Sharif’s, high degree of tolerance for extremist invective can be gauged from Hafiz Sayeed’s claim on July 22 that he had received a call from Asiya Andrabi, the founder of the Dukhtaran-e-Millat, begging for his help to resolve the “crisis” on the Indian side of Kashmir. With his characteristic dramatic flourishes, Saeed told the cheering mob “I am telling my sister Asiya – my sister, we are coming. This act of violence will come to end and nobody can stop Kashmir from becoming independent.” Saeed further emphasised that he had received a call from Hizbul Mujahideen militant Burhan Wani in early July, when the latter reportedly told him over phone that it was his desire to talk to the JuD emir, and that then he could face martyrdom! Hafiz Saeed’s statements make it evident that Burhan Wani was in touch with hard-core terrorist elements like the LeT and had established contacts across the border, diminishing his chocolate-box, romantic, image of an idealistic separatist. Hafiz Syed used these rallies to reiterate his and Pakistan’s support for Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s four-point formula on Kashmir and to call for withdrawal of security forces from the Valley8
Earlier, Nawaz Sharif had held a meeting with the Pakistan Parliament Special Committee Chairman and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal (JUI-F) President Maulana Fazlur Rehman in Lahore, during which Rehman apprised him about his recent talks with separatist leaders over "human rights violations" by the Indian military and paramilitary forces in Jammu and Kashmir. According to Rehman, the separatist leadership in Kashmir was looking towards Pakistan for guidance and succour.5 Like Hafiz Saeed, and other Pakistani leaders, Rehman urged immediate implementation of Syed Geelani’s four point formula on Kashmir.9
The Pakistani leadership, both mainstream and extremist, takes recourse to recommending Geelani’s proposals as they are aware that there will be no meeting point with New Delhi on this issue, and, despite no forward movement in actually ameliorating the situation, Islamabad is able to generate sound bites for the Kashmiri and international consumption. The leader of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, Syed Ali Geelani, has written a letter on July 18 to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its permanent members – US, UK, China, France and Russia – as well as to the EU, OIC, SAARC countries and ASEAN, apart from separate missives to the heads of Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, China and Iran outlining his proposal. The proposal, which was a near verbatim rehash of previous demands, proposed that the “controversial status of the Indian-held Kashmir and Kashmiris’ self-determination right should be accepted,” Indian troops from heavily populated areas should be withdrawn, AFSPA and other draconian laws repealed, and political prisoners released. He further demanded that the UN and all international human rights and humanitarian organisations should be allowed to enter and work in the region.10 Geelani, while proactively using the issue of Burhan Wani’s death to whip up anti-India sentiments, has earlier tried to underplay the role that Wani and his band of boys had in instigating and mobilising the youth in Kashmir. He has asserted that his Tehreek-e-Hurriyat was the most representative party in Kashmir, with a clear stand on the freedom struggle of Kashmir. On gauging the reach of the social media-led Hizbul Mujahidin (HM) campaign, Syed Ali Geelani issued special directions to the central as well as district officials of his party to use the first fifteen days of April for a concerted recruitment drive to induct more people, especially youth into the cadre.11
Factors which are being conveniently kept out of the Hurriyat/other separatists’ narrative are the inflexible laws Pakistan has regarding PoK. Pakistan brought out the AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974, which continues to be interim till date. Under Section 4(7) (2) of this Act, “No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to, the ideology of the State’s accession to Pakistan.” Even the oath of PoK’s Prime Minister reads: “As Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, I will be loyal to the country (Pakistan) and the cause of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan.” Political activists who denounce this constitutional gag attract hostile attention and often face prosecution. Using the interim constitution, the political parties of Pakistan extended their reach into PoK, with their baggage of political enmity, and tribal leaders – from Suddhan, Gujjar, Jat and Rajput clans –have been cultivated by them as representative satraps. The Kashmir Council, which was set up as a nodal body under this act, is headed by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, who is termed the chief executive and is more powerful than the legislative assembly, or the Prime Minister (equivalent to a Chief Minister) of PoK. The Chief Secretary reports directly to Islamabad, and political power in Muzaffarabad is illusory.12
Some debates on India’s national television, and in some print media outlets, have focussed on the various shortcomings of the security forces, the advisability of using pellets, the possible use of excess force and concurrent human rights violations in Kashmir. The stark images of injured children need to be seen, not just against the backdrop of khaki, but keeping in view the cynical manipulations of Pakistan. The political reality in PoK is that ‘azadi’ is a chimera, and substantive control of the area is shared between terrorist organisations such as the LeT and HM and the political elite of Islamabad. However, a narrative has been fed in the Kashmir Valley that Pakistan is a more favourable option than India. The victim of this mendacious narrative has been the average Kashmiri.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
On July 27, 1990, Trinidad experienced its own day of infamy when the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen staged an armed insurrection and held hostage the then Prime Minister, most of his cabinet and several opposition MPs, plus the staff of the television and radio networks.
On Friday, July 27, 1990, Trinidad experienced its own day of infamy when a radical Afro-Trinidadian Islamist group, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, led by Imam Yasin Abu Bakr, an Afro-Trinidadian convert to Islam previously known as Lennox Philip and a former policeman, staged an armed insurrection with 113 of his followers, and held hostage for six days the then Prime Minister, Arthur N.R. Robinson, most of his cabinet and several opposition Members of Parliament, plus the staff of the Government-owned television and radio networks.1 The Parliament building and the television and radio studios occupied by the armed insurgents were severely damaged during the standoff that ensued. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service collapsed within the first hour of the insurrection, after its headquarters was destroyed by a car bomb. The capital city, Port of Spain, was abandoned, and the military took hours to assemble a viable fighting force. To this day, it has remained, fortunately, the single biggest violent incident in the history of Trinidad and Tobago.
Trinidad and Tobago lies at the southernmost point of the Caribbean Archipelago and lies 11 kilometres off the coast of north-east Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago is an industrialised society, with a high literacy rate and large petrochemical, petroleum and natural gas sectors2 While there is income disparity and some level of deprivation, the country has a very high human development index3
Demographically, the country has a stable population of just over 1.3 million, with 35.4 per cent of the population being of Indian origin, 34.2 per cent being of African descent and 22.8 per cent being of mixed parentage4 In terms of religion, 57 per cent of the population identifies itself as Christian, 18 per cent as Hindu and 13 per cent as having no religion. Adherents to the Islamic faith comprise only 5 per cent of the population5 It should be noted that two distinct groups of Muslims exist in Trinidad – those of Indian origin and a more recent group of Afro-Trinidadian converts. While the former have traditionally been well-integrated moderates, the latter, influenced from the Middle East, are far more radical. All religious and racial groups are integrated into the wider national community without compromising their individual identities with complete freedom of religion being enshrined in law and effected in practice.
In 1990, however, the country was in the throes of a deep recession with the economy contracting at an alarming rate. Public servants experienced reductions in salaries and the government of Prime Minister Robinson, which had suffered an acrimonious split in 1988, was fast losing both support and credibility. Robinson’s own arrogance and his increasing alienation of the Indo-Trinidadian population contributed to an atmosphere of political and economic unease, bordering at times on despair. Into this inherently volatile situation, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen entered the fray.
Formed in the mid-1980s, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen began as a quasi-criminal outfit, initially portraying itself as a vigilante group behind a mask of indignation over the growing narcotics trade that was becoming rampant in the country. The Jamaat-al-Muslimeen grew rapidly in influence and emerged as a challenge to the State in the depressed areas of Port-of-Spain and its environs, obtaining funding and training from, and in, Libya and civilian pattern weapons from the United States through an elaborate smuggling network. In addition, it began forging alliances with and seeking recruits from other radical elements in various mosques. Libyan funding was routed through Muammar al-Qaddafi’s World Islamic Call Society (WICS).6
For several years leading up to the insurrection, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen was involved in an intense land dispute which began to escalate. In spite of its assertion that the insurrection was spontaneous, it has been revealed that discussions about assassinating Prime Minister Robinson were held in 1989 and, by October of that year, the physical infrastructure needed for the insurrection was in place. In an example of catastrophic intelligence failure, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen was under surveillance by the police, including the elite Special Branch, and the military. It was, however, able to plan, gather arms and ammunition, assemble and coordinate the insurrection without interference from any of these agencies.7
The insurrection left 24 persons dead and 231 wounded, 133 of them in an orgy of looting and arson that followed, leading to losses amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.8 Popular support for the insurrection was minimal but a total breakdown in law enforcement led to chaos, exploited by looters for personal gain. The absence of any police presence in Port of Spain ensured that the looters had free reign of the city’s business districts. The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF), facing its first major challenge, was hard-pressed to move its two understrength battalions into position with any degree of rapidity.
Despite taking hours to deploy into Port of Spain, and despite the fact that its main bases were not far away, they benefited from the somewhat amateurish execution of the insurrection as Bakr and his followers allowed themselves to be besieged in three locations – Parliament as well as the radio and TV stations. Without a means of escape and lacking food, they were forced to surrender in exchange for an amnesty.
While the insurrection ended with the surrender of Bakr and his followers, they were acquitted of charges brought against them in the Trinidadian courts, which upheld the amnesty granted to secure the lives of the hostages, despite the State making the argument that the amnesty was granted under duress. This has emboldened the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, and Bakr and his adherents have continued to occupy an important position of influence and prominence in the local Islamic community and the local criminal community.
Despite an expensive and controversial commission of enquiry being held, the complete failure to detect preparations for the insurrection remains baffling. However, Bakr did have extensive contacts in the military and police, which may have been a factor.9 Furthermore, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen managed to infiltrate Trinidad’s Customs and Excise service and thus bring in quantities of arms and ammunition, showing the susceptibility of agencies to relatively easy subversion. The outfit also allegedly sought to forge links with political parties, links that seemed to become evident in the years after the insurrection, with politicians clamouring for support from them as early as the 1991 Parliamentary elections, and which said links continue to come to the fore on occasion when elections are near.10 This has led to the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen being much sought after as electoral “muscle” by politicians of all hues.11 Bakr has described himself as a “kingmaker” in Trinidad’s political scene, but his influence and value have seemingly waned over the last decade.12
To this day, Bakr and members of the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen are frequently charged with crimes ranging from extortion to murder, but a dysfunctional criminal justice system has ensured that Bakr has never been convicted and his henchmen rarely face sanctions for their actions.13 Despite weapons being seized from their compound in 2005, the ten Jamaat-al Muslimeen detained for questioning were released without charge.14 This has given the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen much confidence and credibility among the denizens of the Trinidadian underworld. Moreover, their seeming impunity has led to a sense of disenchantment with the security establishment and the criminal justice system and, as such, actionable human intelligence continues to be problematic. Confidence in judicial system was further shaken when the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen was able to reacquire two of ten properties seized for auction at a small fraction of the market value.15 This apparent impunity has led to strong suspicions that the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen has extensive connections within the political establishment across party lines and continues to subvert the security and intelligence agencies.16 Given the almost endemic corruption within the police service and the political establishment (transcending political parties), it is not implausible that such suspicions have merit.17
The 1990 insurrection and its unfolding aftermath illustrates the muddled and, at times, contradictory Trinidadian response to terrorism. From underestimating the threat to botching the response to failing to adequately punish the insurrectionists, the lack of sufficiently severe consequences for their actions has not only emboldened the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen but has also now spawned a series of other similar groups, among them, the Jamaat al Islami al Karibi, the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah (The Islamic Front) and the Jamaat al Murabiteen, each drawing its leadership from former members of the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen.18
The power wielded by these groups helps create fertile ground for recruitment into potential jihadist groups. As such, the membership of these groups keeps expanding with recruits falling prey to the potent mix of propaganda and the lure of perceived empowerment offered by these groups.19 Radicalization has now assumed a new dimension with the message of ISIS being disseminated through social media and the internet as well as through more direct attempts at recruitment through proxies and allied groups. In this new dynamic, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen and its affiliates, spin-offs and ideological associates with their network among Trinidad’s cities, mosques and economically less advantaged urban neighbourhoods, are ideally placed to act as de facto fronts for ISIS or other jihadi recruiting efforts in Trinidad.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. It should be noted that the insurrectionists were not provisioned to sustain a siege of this duration.
6. S. Ryan, The Muslimeen Grab for Power: Race, Religion, and Revolution in Trinidad and Tobago (Port of Spain: Imprint Caribbean Ltd., 1991), pp. 252–66.
Application of AFSPA and DAA provisions to the eastern districts of Nagaland and to districts or select areas bordering Arunachal Pradesh and the Myanmar frontier would have sent an appropriate message to shore up public confidence for an overall settlement of the Naga issue.
Through a Union Home Ministry Notification of June 30, 2016, the Government of India has extended the coverage of the Disturbed Areas Act (DAA) to the entire State of Nagaland by six more months until December 31 this year, within the enabling provisions of Section 3 of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The areas, which today constitute Nagaland State, have effectively been under the purview of AFSPA since May 1958.
AFSPA and the consequent DAA provisions have continued to remain promulgated in Nagaland State even after the last substantive ceasefire agreement between the Union Government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Issac-Muivah) (NSCN-IM) went into effect on August 1, 1997. The other major insurgent group – National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Khaplang) (NSCN–K) – was brought within the fold of a ceasefire accord in 2001. However, if the incident ofJune 4, 2015 – resulting in a major ambush on the Army in Chandel district of Manipur on May 27, 2015 – is any indicator, the NSCN (K) has been re-grouping, bolstering its combat potential with illicit arms supplies including through indirect channelling of some contents from China, and continues to operate from Myanmar towards maintaining its insurrectionist activities in Nagaland. The NSCN(K) was keen to nullify the ceasefire and, in fact, unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire on March 27, 2015. In this backdrop, and keeping in view the recent Framework Naga Peace Accord concluded by the Union Government with NSCN(IM) on August 3 last year (though a comprehensive agreement is yet to be consummated), the latest decision concerning the extension of the DAA needs a critical appraisal.
Former Union Home Secretary G.K. Pillai had observed in November 2012 (in an IDSA compendium on the AFSPA) that a State like Nagaland continues to be designated as disturbed despite the fact that hostilities have remained suspended (at that time) for more than a decade and no security personnel killed during that period. He thereby implied that though the State has remained largely peaceful (with the ceasefire with the major insurgent groups holding and elected civil administrations in place in the State), AFSPA and the DAA have not been critically reviewed.
In contrast, in Tripura, the Left-Front Communist Party-controlled State Government has withdrawn AFSPA from the entire State which was once bedevilled by serious home-grown, but externally supported, insurgent outfits. There is however, a difference in the political and administrative situation prevailing in the two States. While in Tripura there has been stable governments with effective grass-root public delivery systems in place as well as substantive functional autonomy in the spheres of governance affecting the State’s tribal people, the situation in Nagaland is different in various aspects. Nagaland, at present, is in an obfuscated political milieu despite the Accord of August 2015. A series of defections (from Congress – the main Opposition Party – as well as from the BJP) to the ruling Naga Peoples’ Front (NPF) has taken place in the Nagaland State Assembly over the past one and a half years. The Congress Party, a major player in Nagaland politics since the creation of the State, appears to be virtually eclipsed for the present. Factionalism prevails within the NPF. The present lone Lok Sabha member of Nagaland and former three-time Chief Minister has been expelled from the NPF. Further, the State administration is facing administrative and financial constraints and is, above all, unable to politically steer the State and reinforce the Union Government’s efforts to assimilate and unify the various insurgent groups as well as civil society organizations towards a consummation of the peace process. Notwithstanding the political hiatus, the security situation in the State is broadly under control.
In the above-mentioned environment, while a complete roll-back of AFSPA and restriction in the ambit of DAA may not have been warranted, a selective application of these statutory provisions would have been more purposeful. Application of the provisions to, say, the eastern districts of Nagaland, districts or select areas bordering Arunachal Pradesh and the Myanmar frontier, would have sent an appropriate message to shore up public confidence for an overall settlement of the Naga issue, and against those harbouring inimical intentions vis-à-vis the Union Government’s peace initiative. It is undeniable that AFSPA and DAA still create a certain unfavourable impact on the North-Easterners’ psyche, particularly in States and regions affected by disturbances of various types and insurgency. It is time for the Central authorities to decisively push the political process for a Naga settlement as far and extensively as possible, instead of depending on traditional institutions and local government leaders.
Prima facie, the continuation of AFSPA and DAA in Nagaland may imply the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of normal institutions of civil and police administration as well as of the deployed Central forces like Assam Rifles, Central Reserve Police Force and the Army. Despite the internal political fluidity and, to an extent, uncertain political environment in the State, the overall conditions may not be deemed so fragile or beyond the control of the central and state machinery without the above-referred statutory provisions. Viewed from such a perspective, perhaps, a more nuanced approach on the extension of the DAA may have been more appropriate.
Furthermore, with a newly-elected Myanmar Government led by Htin Kyaw of the National League for Democracy in power since March 2016, and in the context of a political accommodation being attempted in that country with various ethnic groups (an Accord has already been reached between the Myanmar Government and seven insurgent groups operating near the Thailand border and in western areas adjacent to India), there is scope to work with a friendly government at Nay Pyi Taw to goad the Myanmarese Nagas and the NSCN(K) (its leader, Khaplang, is a citizen of Myanmar) to restrict their political activities within that country. The Union Government may therefore use the instrumentality of AFSPA and DAA to create a security overhang in the Nagaland and Manipur districts in or near the areas of NSCN(K) influence, thus containing the latter’s activities from the security angle. Such an approach would have been more politically appropriate and likely to lead to better outcomes.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served as Adviser to the North Eastern Council and was till recently a senior Additional Chief Secretary-level Adviser of the Government of Nagaland.
The Inter-State Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, is the best constitutional forum at the disposal of the Union Government to deal with challenges relating to internal security.
Chairing the 11th meeting of the Inter-State Council (ISC) on July 13, Prime Minister Narendra Modi noted that “[t]he nation can only progress if the State and the Centre work shoulder to shoulder.” And with reference to internal security, he observed that it was not possible to strengthen it if intelligence exchange was not improved. He, therefore, requested States to focus on intelligence-sharing in order to help the country stay “alert” to, and “updated” on, internal security challenges.1 The meeting, held for the first time after 2006, had internal security as one of its main agendas.
The ISC has met ten times so far. Its first seven meetings mainly discussed the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission, which had been established in June 1983 to review the working of the existing arrangements between the Union and the States. In the eighth meeting, the emphasis was on optimal utilization of the ISC to sort out, and reach consensus on, emerging issues of national importance, especially in socio-economic sectors, so as to facilitate cooperation between the States and the Centre, leading to concrete implementation. At the ISC’s ninth meeting in June 2005, the emphasis was on good governance, while the tenth meeting held in December 2006 focused on implementation of SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.2
The ISC is a recommendatory body with the following duties:3
Investigating and discussing such subjects, in which some or all of the States or the Union and one or more of the States have a common interest.
Making recommendations upon any such subject and in particular recommendations for the better coordination of policy and action with respect to that subject.
Deliberating upon such other matters of general interest to the States as may be referred by the Chairman to the Council.
Internal Security is thus only one of the aspects that the wide scope and mandate of the ISC covers. Consequently, internal security has often not been given due consideration as far as the proceedings of the ISC are concerned.
Over the last few decades, the dividing line between internal and external security has blurred considerably, with the respective facets of the two aspects of security often enmeshed. ‘Law and Order’, which is a subject in the State list, can no longer be exclusively left to the States. Evolving and deepening nexus between crime and terrorism/insurgency bears testimony to the fact that ‘law and order’ issues have wider pan-Indian ramifications with obvious connections to external security, given India’s inimical neighbourhood. Also, insurgents often do not recognise state boundaries and have exploited to their advantage the lack of synergy amongst the States and between the States and the Centre. A case in point is the current version of Left Wing Extremism, which thrives in the central eastern tribal belt by exploiting the gaps along inter-state boundaries.
Internal threats to national security have assumed centre-stage in the debates on Indian security. It has been argued that internal threats are as serious as external threats, if not greater. They have a pan-Indian presence and, therefore, tackling them is a common concern for the Centre and the States.
In view of the above, coordination and unity of purpose between the Centre and the States as well as amongst the States has often been acknowledged and deliberated upon. Several initiatives have also been taken towards creating mechanisms to forge cohesion, although these have not yielded substantial success. The basic challenge has been the lack of trust between the Centre and the States. There is an undeniable requirement for a platform that provides a forum for continuous exchange between the Centre and the State.
In this regard, the ISC, chaired by the Prime Minister, is the best constitutional forum at the disposal of the Union Government. This platform needs to be utilised optimally for enhancing cohesion and ironing out the differences between the Centre and the States. The latest meeting of the ISC, held after a gap of ten years, certainly raises questions about the commitment towards the overall well being of the national fabric. The ISC, a forum that facilitates cooperative federalism, is an ideal setting to deliberate on the interests of the people, address their problems and take collective and concrete decisions.
Considering the all pervasive and grave threats to national security, it is important that the Centre takes the most urgent steps for finalising the National Security Policy (NSP) and the machinery for its administration, in consultation with the States, in a non-partisan way. After the NSP is finalised, the Centre will have to undertake, in collaboration with the States, a country-wide review of the existing security management apparatus and draw up a plan for restructuring and revamping it within a stipulated timeframe. While playing their part in such an exercise, the States would need to accept the important role they are required to play in the National Security Management apparatus and demonstrate their unconditional commitment to working closely with each other and with the Centre.4
For nearly two decades, there have been repeated pronouncements that the Centre is promulgating a law for dealing with identified federal offences and establishing a central agency which would have the authority to take cognisance of, and investigate, crimes that have serious inter-state and nationwide ramifications for national security. The proposal of setting up a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), for instance, has continued to be debated for the past several years. A number of States, which have been opposed to the establishment of a NCTC in its proposed form, have suggested that the proposed framework of this body should be entirely revised in consultation with all the States. Some other states have urged that a NCTC should not be established through an executive order, but instead through an Act of Parliament.
Terrorism and other federal offences cannot be dealt with by the existing security management apparatus. It is necessary that the Prime Minister undertakes urgent discussions with the Chief Ministers to resolve all doubts and issues raised by the States. The ISC, with the Prime Minister at its helm, could prove to be a game changer in this regard. In the same stead, it would be useful for the Central Government to consider inducting representatives of the States in the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and in the National Security Council (NSC), even if on a rotational basis. Similarly, a NCTC should also be established by going beyond party lines.5
Some of the doubts voiced by the States about the management of security-related issues arise from the style of functioning of the institutions that are exclusively controlled by the Centre. A via media has to be struck in the form of an organisation that is jointly managed by the Centre and the States. An excellent example in this regard is the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) established by the United States after 9/11. The JTTF, located in various cities across the US, includes representatives from the federal, state and municipal enforcement agencies and perform several important roles including the clearing of all terrorism-related information.6
Over time, functioning through joint institutions will enable the States to gain a well-informed perspective about the complex and sensitive issues concerning national security management and, in the process, also defuse their perennial complaints about the Centre’s interference with the powers of the States while undertaking internal security management. And above all, an atmosphere of mutual trust can be established through deliberations in the ISC. The aforesaid aspect assumes paramount importance in the light of the activities and reach of insurgents and terrorists who recognise no boundaries.
In the current circumstances, a seemingly ‘law and order’ issue has the potential to cascade into a serious national security threat. As a general practice, instead of progressively improving the capability of their police and security maintenance apparatus for effectively dealing with disturbances, the States have been perennially seeking assistance from the Centre. The Centre too has been adopting a mathematical ‘battalion approach’ by pumping in troops without associating itself with the root cause of the challenge. Countering such threats by the governments at all levels cannot be done in silos. Ownership shall have to be taken up by the Centre and States and regular ISC meetings could provide the necessary impetus for the executive to act, as warranted.
Colonel Shashank Ranjan is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While there have been no studies on the motivation of Trinidadian Muslims to travel to join ISIS fighters, it is possible that the idea of the Caliphate has fired the imagination of disaffected youth.
Sending shudders through the population of Trinidad & Tobago, these words were uttered by Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi in the latest issue of Dabiq, the glossy online propaganda magazine of ISIS.1 In an issue dedicated to targeting Christians, at-Trinidadi’s words as part of a vitriol-laced interview were undoubtedly aimed at spreading fear among the island nation’s overwhelmingly non-Muslim population and marks the first time that ISIS has used one of its Trinidadian fighters to exhort his co-religionists in Trinidad to violence against non-Muslims. Suspected of being one Shane Dominic Crawford, and also known as Asadullah, at-Trinidadi’s chilling message came shortly after it was revealed that nine Trinidadian nationals were detained in Turkey trying to infiltrate into Syria to fight alongside ISIS, continuing to demonstrate the significant lure that ISIS has for elements of the Trinidadian Muslim population.2
Trinidad’s Muslim community has not remained immune to the globalisation of the jihadist movement, being susceptible to the lure of the radical doctrines espoused elsewhere. There is no doubt that the internet is one of the most potent recruiting tools for jihadist propaganda and to spread the message of ISIS. But it is difficult to ascertain how many Trinidadians may have been radicalised through the internet, though it is beyond doubt that ISIS has used the internet as one of its primary recruiting tools to attract foreign fighters.3That some recruits from the Caribbean may have been recruited through the internet was hinted at in comments by General John Kelly, head of America’s Southern Command and whose area of responsibility includes the Caribbean.4 In Trinidad, the internet campaign has the additional support of local groups such as the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, and its loose affiliates such as the Jamaat al Islami al Karibi, the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah and the Jamaat al Murabiteen. Al-Muslimeen has openly associated itself with Al-Qaeda and has proclaimed its intention of establishing an Islamic state in Trinidad5
This plethora of ideologically affiliated groups has enabled ISIS to be surprisingly effective in recruiting Trinidadian youth to its cause. Although numbers vary wildly, it is clear that a substantial number of Trinidadians are fighting with ISIS. In 2015, no fewer than 35 have been identified as fighting for ISIS with other family members supporting them actively bringing the total to 896 By 2016, this figure may well be an underestimate as figures discussed in Trinidad’s Parliament have placed the numbers at anywhere between 102 and a staggering 400.7 Trinidadian police intelligence suggests that between 10 and 15 Trinidadians have been killed fighting for ISIS so far, although reliable information is difficult to obtain.8
Trinidadians became “poster boys” for an ISIS recruiting video made in late 2015 which included their children9 Indeed, in the said video, one identifying himself as Abu Zayd al-Muhajir had brought his three children to Syria in the Ar-Raqqah province while another – Abu Khalid, a Christian convert – used the video to proclaim that Muslims in Trinidad were “restricted”. This was echoed by Zayd al-Muhajir and yet another Trinidadian, Abu Abdullah, who went so far as to encourage Muslims in Trinidad to support ISIS and its ambition of creating an Islamic Caliphate. A recurring theme was that Islam in Trinidad is being “restricted” – a statement without basis in fact, but one which has found unusual resonance among elements of the Trinidadian population.
Traditionally, extremist doctrine found most traction with Afro-Trinidadian converts to Islam, exemplified by the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen and its affiliates. This may be a consequence of the strong link between Islam and the 1970s Black Power movement in the United States which found considerable resonance in the Trinidad.10Yasin Abu Bakr, for example, openly courts the urban Afro-Trinidadian youth in his sermons with a mix of Islamic doctrine and Black Power rhetoric, preying upon feelings of discontent among the Afro-Trinidadian urban poor.11It is of interest to note that the rural poor have been less enamoured of this message and few recruits to either ISIS or even the multitude of criminal gangs now operating in Trinidad are from rural areas.
A disturbing trend has been observed wherein more Indo-Trinidadian Muslims, usually moderate and well-integrated into society, are succumbing to such propaganda. From the jihadist viewpoint, the Indo-Trinidadian Muslims, generally better educated and wealthier than the Afro-Trinidadian converts, offer a potentially attractive source of skilled and motivated manpower. Lured by Salafist doctrine, both through social media and through an aggressive campaign in many of Trinidad’s 85 mosques, young Muslims have been targeted for recruitment including through the use of jihad videos to attract potential recruits12 Indeed, a recruiting video featuring a supposed Trinidadian ISIS fighter bearing the name Abu Abdurahman al-Trinidadi sent shockwaves among the majority of Muslims who are appalled, angered and concerned at the apparent attraction that ISIS seems to have for too many Muslim youth13. Yet, it is an unfortunate fact that neither the government nor the mainstream Muslim leadership has been able to either mount a counter-narrative or offer an explanation for the lure of ISIS to Trinidadian Muslims, with the government now belatedly trying to meet Muslim leaders to find an explanation.14
While there have been no studies on the motivation of Trinidadian Muslims to travel to join ISIS fighters, it is possible that the idea of the Caliphate has fired the imagination of disaffected youth. The leader of the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah, Umar Abdullah, who is constantly monitored by an officer of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Special Branch, had identified some characteristics of Trinidadians attracted to ISIS. He noted that those who were recruited by ISIS were arrogant, lacked patience, could not live among non-Muslims, had marital problems and firmly believed they were being marginalised as Muslims15 While publicly disavowing any link to ISIS, the Waajijatul Islaamiyyah still espouses extremist views and its call for an Islamic State in Trinidad remains. The distribution of “jihad videos” among young people has also attracted elements who are attracted to the violence espoused therein.
The latter factor should not be underestimated as the level of brutality shown in ISIS recruiting videos outdoes earlier jihad videos from the 1990s and given the increasing levels of violent crime in Trinidad, it is possible that there are recruits who find the lure of the gun and the power of life and death attractive and revel in the sense of invincibility it gives them. It is of interest to note that of the identified Trinidadian ISIS fighters, many have been linked to violent criminal elements in the past and may see in ISIS a chance at indulging in their violent tendencies while simultaneously justifying it with a “religious” rationale and feeling a sense of purpose in doing so.
It should be noted that these extremist outfits have fanned the flames by perpetuating a myth that Muslims are not allowed to freely practice their faith in Trinidad and are being persecuted. This is being used as a rallying call by Trinidadian ISIS fighters and their sympathisers to attract more recruits16That it is having so much success points to a lack of a cogent counter-narrative. It is also a very telling example of a blatant untruth being told often enough being regarded as the truth by some. It is also interesting that, to date, while condemning ISIS and radicalisation, none of Trinidad’s moderate Islamic groups have publicly stated that Islam is not being discriminated against and that the faith enjoys freedom of practice in the country, which, for all its flaws, has never discriminated against any faith on a collective basis since its independence in 1962. As the reach of ISIS grows ever longer into the country, it remains to be seen whether it will result in any of the type of terrorist attacks that have recently plagued Europe. At-Trinidadi’s exhortations to his co-religionists is an ominous portent of things that may come to pass.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Joint Communique issued by the recent NATO summit, held on July 8-9 in Warsaw, appears to have sown the seeds of a renewed confrontation with Russia.
The Joint Communique issued by the recent NATO summit, held on July 8-9 in Warsaw, appears to have sown the seeds of a renewed confrontation with Russia. It identifies Russia as a key threat to European security, emphasises upon ‘deterrence’ and ‘defence’ through a NATO military build-up along Europe’s eastern arc to counter the Russian threat, and indicates NATO’s intent to strengthen its outreach in the post-Soviet space of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The other vital roadmaps identified by the Joint Communique include Montenegro’s accession as a NATO member, the operationalisation of missile defence systems in Romania and Poland, and the cultivation of a defence partnership with, hitherto neutral, Sweden and Finland.
While these initiatives may reassure Eastern European members about NATO’s commitment to counter the Russian threat, they are also likely to reinforce Russia’s hostile perceptions of this ‘Western’ alliance. It can even be argued that NATO’s blueprint amounts to breaching the Kremlin’s red-lines, which is particularly significant given the adversarial relationship between Russia and the ‘West’ post the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.
Russian and NATO Threat Perceptions
The roots of the ongoing Russia-‘West’ rivalry lies in the inability of the latter to accommodate the former as an equal partner on the global stage. Their historical mutual distrust and fundamental differences over the global strategic balance finally culminated in the Ukrainian standoff. The West’s imposition of economic sanctions and attempts to isolate Russia in the global arena have reinforced Russia’s suspicions about the US-led ‘Western’ strategy to contain it in its own neighbourhood. Against this backdrop, NATO is seen by Russia as a key instrument for pushing this ‘Western’ agenda, which is particularly reflected in the alliance’s expanding footprints eastwards, despite an assurance to the contrary.
Russia’s Historical Anxiety
In this context, one also needs to take into account the historical genesis of the Russian anxiety about military alliances in its neighbourhood. Being a pre-dominantly land power, which moreover did not possess defensible frontiers, Russian empires have had to face the onslaughts of Mongols, Poles, Lithuanians, and Germans.1 This gave rise to its quintessential need for strategic depth, in the form of a geographical buffer, to prevent invasions of Russian territory. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War was an outcome of such thinking. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has not only witnessed its geographical buffer shrink dramatically, but also NATO moving practically to its doorstep. Given the deep sense of betrayal over the alliance’s expansion, Russians have been vigilant of NATO’s capabilities rather than relying upon its assurances that the military build-up is directed against other threats. From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, NATO continues to pose an existential threat to Russia’s security.
At the same time, a similar fear psychosis exists among NATO members about Russia. This is particularly so in the case of the ex-Warsaw Pact countries of Poland and the Baltic states. Given the substantial presence and influence of ethnic Russian minorities in their territories, the pretext advanced by the Kremlin for the Crimean takeover has set alarm bells ringing in these countries. According to a recent RAND report, Russia can overrun their territories within a few hours.2 This has compelled them to seek a more robust NATO military posture towards Russia. However, the fallout is Russia’s belief that NATO has re-discovered its raison d’être. In effect, each side blames the other for escalating tensions.
Brexit and the Dynamics of European Defence
Against the backdrop of an increasingly hostile Russia-NATO relationship, the dynamics of European defence is likely to change on account of ‘Brexit’. This is because NATO’s and the European Union’s (EU) memberships overlap. Britain has been a pillar of NATO, with its defence spending the highest among the EU countries. It has also strongly supported the sanctions against Russia. The ongoing ‘leave’ turmoil and a possible economic slowdown can distract its attention from NATO and its alliance commitments. The key question is which European power can fill the void, given the emerging tendency everywhere to look inwards. Meanwhile, the number of dissenting voices in Europe over the adoption of a hard-line position towards Russia has increased. These include the German Foreign Minister and the French President who have criticised the rationale for NATO’s ‘sabre-rattling’ and the EU’s economic sanctions. At stake is European solidarity and credibility.
Moreover, the EU’s new ‘Foreign and Security Policy’ envisions deeper military cooperation between its members.3 This is seen as an attempt to gain strategic independence from NATO. But will it lead to the revival of the EU-orchestrated Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)? Questions abound since, at present, only a handful of EU members meet NATO’s two per cent of GDP spending on defence threshold. Also, the dynamics of German and French collaboration need to be worked out. Consequently, European defence is likely to be in flux for the foreseeable future even though Russia is perceived as being the biggest threat and challenge to European security.
Is a Military Confrontation Between Russia and NATO in the Offing?
It is likely that Russia will view the Warsaw summit as a major provocation. As a result, the Kremlin can be expected to up the ante. The wheels have already been set in motion since the beginning of the year when signs of a NATO build-up emerged. This has included the re-organisation of Russia’s western military command and an increase in the number of military exercises and bomber flights closer to NATO boundaries. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated that NATO’s initiatives will be met with an ‘adequate response’.
The emerging flashpoints of a Russia-NATO confrontation involve the Baltic and the Black Sea regions. Notably, the Kremlin retains ‘escalation dominance’ in its neighbourhood. This allows it to raise the stakes, knowing fully well that NATO’s success in a localised confrontation are minimal. Russia’s Syrian expedition would also have emboldened it. The tactic appears designed to force the ‘West’ to respect Russia’s core interests.
In this context, the salience of nuclear weapons for Moscow has grown manifold. Nuclear weapons offer the Kremlin parity with NATO at a time when its conventional military capabilities have failed to keep pace with those of the alliance. As a result, the modernisation of both its conventional and nuclear arsenals is likely to be given priority. Given the mutual threat perception, a period of intense arms racing in Europe may be in the offing. Moreover, a hard-line position towards NATO strengthens the Kremlin’s domestic narrative of Russian resilience in the face of adversity. This assumes significance given that parliamentary elections are due in September.
Nevertheless, an armed confrontation looks unlikely. In a Russia-‘West’ standoff, the optics of a strong posture are equally important. They are linked to the nuanced interplay of several events involving Syrian developments, economic sanctions and the Ukrainian crisis. These will, in the future, involve a grand bargain. When that time comes, each party would like to hold an upper hand. As such, there does not appear to be any real appetite for a military confrontation on either side.
A Russian encroachment of the Baltics will likely unite the European fence sitters. A more plausible Russian strategy would be to cultivate the differences among EU members in order to undermine the US-led ‘Western’ alliance. In this light, it is important to note that countries like France, Austria, Italy and Greece have favoured a more reconciliatory approach towards Russia. They have expressed their unhappiness over the American pressure tactics to maintain the current course.
However, the danger of a miscalculation increasingly lurks in the background. The frequent overflights of Russian bombers and ‘mysterious’ appearances of Russian submarines in the NATO periphery have led to tense encounters. The risk of an incident snowballing into a confrontation has grown exponentially in the absence of a regular Russia-NATO dialogue. This can have devastating consequences.
Given the unravelling of Russia’s ties with the ‘West’, it appears that their interactions are likely to be limited to managing risks and cooperating tactically where their interests overlap, including tackling the threat of terrorism. This is unfortunate given the tremendous potential of Russia-‘West’ cooperation on the global stage. Ultimately, in this evolving rivalry, where the ‘West’ appears keen to contain one major power (Russia), it may inadvertently be facilitating the rise of another in the form of China. This does not bode well for either Russia or the ‘West’.
Implications for India
India is neither a member of NATO nor located in Europe or in Europe’s immediate vicinity and, as such, the Russia-NATO confrontation should not ideally affect it. However, the fact remains that the broad contours of this rivalry involve Moscow’s fundamental differences with the US. Therefore, the pull and pressure of this competition is likely to complicate India’s foreign policy practice. While ties with Russia have been a pillar of the country’s foreign policy, India cannot afford to ignore the ‘West’. The key challenge will be to tactfully build relationships with each side on its own merits. More notably, the Russia-China entente, which is a direct outcome of the Russia-‘West’ rivalry, is likely to have more significant implications for India.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
China’s push for influence among the Caribbean political elite has been replicated with an equally determined effort to court the military and the bureaucratic elite in the region, often deftly stepping in to take advantage of senseless overreactions on the part of the United States.
In June 2013, during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Trinidad and Tobago, the then Prime Minister of the Caribbean nation, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, in a fawning speech, had lauded President Xi’s vision saying, “We see in your China Dream a splendid opportunity for China to become a model for the world.”1 Like a royalty holding court, President Xi thereafter hosted the leaders of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Suriname and Jamaica in Port of Spain, capital of Trinidad and Tobago, where he announced soft loans and investments worth US$ 3 billion as well as grants of up to $8 million for the region.2 President Xi’s visit was an effective and a graphic demonstration of China’s growing influence and outreach in the English-speaking Caribbean region, coming at a time when the United States (US) had been somewhat less forthcoming with financial grants for the region.
President Xi’s visit to Trinidad was followed by a reciprocal visit by Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar to Beijing in February 2014, when, in a major breakthrough for Chinese arms sales to the region, the controversial purchase of a long-range maritime patrol vessel was agreed upon.3 This was again a demonstration of the growing Chinese influence over the governments of the region, which so far had been firmly under the largely benevolent gaze and geopolitical sway of the US. The decision to buy Chinese patrol vessel also marked the first sale of a non-Western military hardware to the Caribbean nation since the end of the Cold War.4 In fact, acceptance of Chinese aid and investment has since become a norm in the English-speaking Caribbean, where the US has been conspicuous by its absence in respect of doling out large bilateral loans and grants. In quite a contrast, while the private American investment declined post the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese investment in the region grew by more than 500 per cent between 2003 and 2012.5
In the past, China had used financial enticements to lure Caribbean nations away from Taiwan which has a long history of extending financial assistance to the region – of the 23 countries to keep formal diplomatic ties with Taipei, six are in the Caribbean: Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis, and St. Vincent.6 However, China’s intensified outreach to the region seems independent of the “Taiwan factor” and also perfectly timed, as a combination of economic contraction and electoral compulsions have made regional governments desperate for the economic lifeline that the Chinese loans and grants might provide in lieu of having to make cuts in social schemes that are wasteful and of dubious efficacy but politically useful.7 The declining economic fortunes of the region have made governments grateful for the additional investment afforded by China, as the region has for years reeled under the impact of falling commodity prices, crippling government debt and endemic crime and corruption.8
Furthermore, the political compulsion of showcasing visible projects for maximising electoral gains has rendered the region peculiarly susceptible to the allure of Chinese fiscal blandishments. A telling example was Persad-Bissessar’s purchase of the aforementioned Chinese patrol ship, which was selected against technical advice but which had the critical virtue of being deliverable prior to the elections. Trinidad’s previous government, under late Patrick Manning, too had projected the visually impressive Chinese-built National Academy for the Performing Arts (NAPA) as a crowning achievement. Similarly, while the Bahamas pointed to the multi-billion dollar Chinese investment in the Baha Mar resort, Jamaica sought to benefit from the $300 million loan promised by China for the rehabilitation of its roads and bridges.9
However, Chinese financial largesse has not come without its price as China insists on using its own contractors and labourers, bringing few employment benefits to the recipient nation.10 In fact, as early as 2009, Zhao Zhihai, a researcher with the Zhangjiakou Academy of Agricultural Sciences in Heibei Province near Beijing, had suggested before the National People’s Congress that sending Chinese labourers to Africa would create about 100 million more jobs and solve the problem of Chinese unemployment.11 The impact on the chronic unemployment and underemployment plaguing Africa did not seem to attract any attention in his discourse. Furthermore, since Chinese labourers, whether legally or otherwise, have the propensity to stay on in the region, it could cause potential demographic shift among the small population of the islands of the region where even small numbers could have a significant impact.
In addition, the quality of Chinese construction has left something to be desired for as serious structural flaws have resulted in the closure of NAPA for more than a year with substantial costs to be incurred in its repair.12 Trinidad also experienced the ignominy of having to demolish an apartment complex built by China Jiangsu International Corporation as it was deemed unsafe for habitation.13 Even in the Bahamas, the “Chinese Dream” became something of a nightmare as the vaunted Baha Mar resort, reputedly costing $3.5 billion, has failed to open, with China Construction America (CCA) missing deadlines and facing numerous allegations of shoddy workmanship and poor construction quality.14 An added complication is that with China’s Exim Bank having financed the deal, it has become virtually impossible to fire the Chinese contractors for sub-standard work.15 Given the strings attached to the Chinese financing, the benefit that the region seeks to derive from Chinese construction projects is therefore very questionable. Moreover, given the relative negotiating strength of the parties, it is evident that the Caribbean nations lack the means to leverage better contractual terms with the Chinese, the inevitable result being that construction contracts are skewed in favour of the Chinese contractors.
Compared to the US, which has been wary of providing large-scale bilateral financial support due to endemic corruption in the Caribbean nations, the Chinese appear less concerned about such issues, thus further enhancing their prospects among the governing elites of the region where lack of transparency enables potentially shadowy deals between them to flourish.16 In contrast, the US prefers to conduct its economic assistance programmes through such agencies as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), all of whom have some veneer of monitoring the use of funds, in contrast to the Chinese who seem to be unconcerned with issues regarding either the misuse or misappropriation of funds.
What is yet unclear is the motive behind China’s outreach to the English-speaking Caribbean region. As a market, the islands of the Caribbean, with their tiny populations, do not offer much by way of a market for Chinese goods and services. Similarly, the resources of the region, oil and gas in Trinidad and bauxite in Jamaica, are too small and limited to offer much by way of economic incentives for the Chinese.17 China’s significant economic and political engagement in Latin America suggests that it does not look at the Caribbean as a gateway to that region. Rather, it can be cogently argued that the Chinese have been building their economic clout through “chequebook diplomacy” in various regions, and that Caribbean is no exception.
China’s push for influence among the Caribbean political elite has been replicated with an equally determined effort to court the military and the bureaucratic elite in the region, often deftly stepping in to take advantage of senseless overreactions on the part of the US such as the suspension of military aid to Barbados after it refused to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA), which in turn led Barbados to avail itself of China’s offer of military training and assistance.18 The end result is that China’s military training establishments now annually host a substantial number of officers from the region with an attendant increase in influence over their military leadership.
Rather surprisingly, the US does not seem to be perturbed about China’s creeping influence in the Caribbean region. At first glance this might seem to be the case of complacency at work, but a more nuanced assessment indicates that the US still enjoys potentially much greater influence than its current “hands-off” approach suggests. All countries of the English-speaking Caribbean region rely heavily on the US for their economic well-being – whether in the form of tourist arrivals, or, as in the case of Trinidad & Tobago, as a market for gas exports. In addition, the US continues to provide considerable assistance and support in the ongoing fight against drug trafficking as well as in judicial and law-enforcement in the region. Nonetheless, in the absence of financial largesse, the US is no longer seen as a favourite ally by the region’s elite. For now, it is into this fiscal vacuum that China has stepped in, and as expected, quite effectively.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The coup has seriously dented Turkey’s image as a stable, secular, progressive and prosperous country. And Erdogan's witch-hunt has tarnished the country's reputation and credibility. Turkey’s polity and economy will take a long time to recover from the crippling attrition of recent days.
Introduction
It is more than two weeks since the abortive coup on the night of 15-16 July took place in Turkey. Although additional information has become available, it is still not clear who the mastermind behind the failed attempt was. It is, however, possible to piece together the sequence of events with a fair degree of accuracy.
It appears highly unlikely that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in any way associated with the plot. While condemnation of the frail and reclusive Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen by Erdogan and calls for his extradition from the United States where he has been living in self-imposed exile since 1999 have become increasingly louder, well informed Turkish analysts dismiss the charge that Gulen could have been directly involved in the coup attempt. Gulen’s supporters have denied any role and termed the Turkish government’s accusation as “highly irresponsible”.
Gulen has long been an ardent advocate of tolerance, peace and “acceptance of religious and cultural diversity” based on the traditions of Sufism. In a recent op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, Gulen had denounced the Islamic State, called for an end to violent extremism, and advocated equal rights for men and women, and education for Muslims.
Gulen and Erdogan were once friends but split several years ago after allegations of corruption were levelled against senior officials as well as against Erdogan’s son.
The United States has said that it would consider Gulen’s extradition if sufficient evidence of his involvement is presented. It is doubtful whether the volumes of documents presented by Turkey are adequate to satisfy the United States of Gulen's direct complicity. This could further exacerbate hostility between the two countries.
It is increasingly clear that the coup was an attempt by mid-level officers from the army and some from the air force to usurp power. It had apparently become known to them that the government was contemplating a purge shortly in which they would be arrested or dismissed. The coup was an attempt to pre-empt this move and strip Erdogan of his arbitrary power. The coup attempt came a cropper apparently because it was carried out in a hurry without requisite planning to execute it meticulously. It is also likely that Erdogan had an inkling of what was brewing so that the element of surprise that the plotters had banked on was missing.
The failure of the coup was initially perceived as a victory for democracy, as it was foiled by ordinary citizens pouring into the streets of Ankara and Istanbul on the call of President Erdogan, the constitutionally elected leader of the country. However, as unfolding events have revealed, it was anything but that.
Erdogan's Response
The last few days have witnessed one of the most comprehensive purges to occur anywhere in recent memory. Actions thus far have resulted in the seizure of 114 businesses including newspapers, radio and television channels. Arrest warrants for 47 journalists have been issued. 30,000 educationists, 14,000 government officials, and 9,000 from the interior ministry and military have been dismissed. 16,000 people have been detained, with more than 8,000 still under arrest. Deans of all universities have resigned after being ''invited'' by the government to do so. The purge has covered more than 60,000 people in its ambit, many of whom had nothing to do with the coup. Erdogan has taken the coup as a ''gift from God'' and could use this to bludgeon through a new constitution to give himself the powers of an executive President which he has been hankering after for some time.
The post-coup purge smacks of a cultural revolution like the one in China in the 1960s. It appears to be designed to remove those members of the judiciary, academia, thinkers, public officials, military, media, etc., who are perceived to be opposed to Erdogan and to stack up the benches and other instruments of power with Erdogan’s loyalists.
Erdogan has threatened that capital punishment, which was abolished in 2004, could be re-instated to deal with the plotters. This will bring down the curtains on Turkey's bid to become a member of the European Union.
The failed coup will have far-reaching, long-term, implications domestically, regionally and internationally. Domestically, Erdogan's actions have been deeply polarising and can sow huge mistrust among different segments of society. The purge has divided the army down the middle. Erdogan had a unique opportunity to be a statesman to heal the wounds inflicted on the polity in recent years. He has frittered away the moment and further sharpened cleavages amongst people.
The Turkish economy as well as the tourism sector took a big hit in the aftermath of the coup. Even earlier, the economy was reeling earlier under the impact of frequent and powerful terror attacks by ISIS and Kurdish separatists. The coup has multiplied manifold the wariness of investors and business entrepreneurs.
Relations with the West
Erdogan's suspicion that the coup was supported by the United States and Europe has brought Turkey’s relations with the USA, EU and NATO to a new low. As a mark of displeasure, electricity to the Incirlik air-base, where US military assets are housed, was cut off and the US Air Force contingent was grounded for some time. The United States and Europe suspect Erdogan of divided loyalties in the counterterrorism fight.
Erdogan has vehemently attacked the West for not standing by him in defence of democracy in his hour of need and instead expressing concern at the treatment meted out to the coup plotters.
Deteriorating ties are also a blow to NATO and Turkey's fight against terrorism. The decline in the clout of the Turkish Army symbolises its reduced significance as a reliable partner for the West. The Turkish armed forces are the second largest in NATO, next only to those of the USA, have a budget of USD 20 billion and a strength of about half a million officers and men. About 9,000 soldiers have been charged with taking part in the coup attempt.
Conclusion
The failed coup has left Turkey severely bruised and damaged. It has seriously dented Turkey’s image as a stable, secular, progressive and prosperous country. Erdogan's witch-hunt has tarnished the country's reputation and credibility. Turkey’s polity and economy will take a long time to recover from the crippling attrition of recent days.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While a higher volume of trade through Petrapole should benefit both countries, this new ICP mechanism needs to be suitably leveraged to ensure that the north-east also derives benefits.
On July 21, 2016, the prime ministers of India and Bangladesh jointly inaugurated, through video-conferencing, Asia’s largest Integrated Check-Post (ICP) at Petrapole, 95 km from Kolkata, in North 24-Parganas district of West Bengal, with the West Bengal chief minister too joining on the occasion. This is regarded as a landmark development towards strengthening bilateral trade as well as the border management process.
The Petrapole ICP, encompassing a modern land customs station, with ancillaries spread over nearly 100 acres, will have adequate passenger amenities, facilities for currency exchange and customs clearance, cargo processing and inspection, warehouse and cold storage, quarantine laboratory, etc. for the expeditious clearing of goods and the facilitation of movement of people. It will also ensure comprehensive security oversight on the movement of materials and people. The significance of this development can be appreciated by considering the fact that more than 50 per cent of India-Bangladesh trade is undertaken through this ICP. During 2015-16, trade valued at more than Rs. 15,000 crore was transacted through this point, which is more than all the land ports and customs stations of India, with about 1.5 lakh trucks and 15 lakh people passing through it.
A decisive initiative for a better border management system, including the setting up of ICPs and land-ports with comprehensive functionalities, was taken by the Government of India quite some time ago during the 11th Plan period (2007-2012). This came in the context of consensual acceptance by different governments in New Delhi of the need for promoting a framework for the South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) Programme. Since 2010, international agencies like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have also assisted such initiatives involving India, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal. However, in 2006 itself, the Cabinet Committee on Security had accorded in principle approval for establishing 13 ICPs, with seven in Phase-1 including one at Petrapole at an initially estimated cost of Rs. 172 crore. The land customs station already existing at Petrapole was to be upgraded and subsumed into an ICP. Construction started in 2010. Since 2012, the Government of India has attempted to factor in improvements in the Petrapole ICP project, in the light of the experiences gained with the first ICP operational at Attari on the India-Pakistan border in Punjab and the working of the ICP at Agartala along the Bangladesh border.
The importance of the Petrapole ICP, apart from boosting bilateral trade, lies in the context of improved connectivity and trade and transit between the north-eastern states and the rest of the country through Bangladesh. Consequent on the above-mentioned transit facilities granted to India by the positively disposed present government in Bangladesh, the ICP at the Petrapole-Benapole border point (Benapole is on the Bangladesh side), which isequipped with all the requisite trade enabling facilities, assumes special significance. Being the relevant local authority, the West Bengal Government will be required to both provide adequate municipal services in the adjoining area and ensure appropriate law and order environment in the North 24 Parganas district through which National Highway-35 passes, leading to the Bongaon-Petrapole ICP. Furthermore, a widening of this National Highway to four-lane width in the Kolkata-Bongaon-Petrapole axis and maintaining it properly are a sine qua non for the further growth of India-Bangladesh trade as well as for meeting the developmental needs of the north-eastern region. Quite significantly, during the June 21 inauguration of the Petrapole ICP, the West Bengal chief minister also spoke about the need for opening a police station at the ICP.
There are still some irritants or constraints in India-Bangladesh relations that need to be sorted out. For instance, some media agencies and political outfits – not all necessarily inimical to India – as well as civil society groups in Bangladesh cite the trade imbalance in India’s favour in this regard. The Petrapole ICP, if made optimally functional and suitably scaled up in the near future, in tandem with the expected growth in bilateral commerce, could help suitably boost imports from Bangladesh, including the import of value-added items based on basic input materials sent from India. However, the authorities concerned at the Union and State levels in India need to be suitably conscious of this requirement and monitor the functioning of the umbrella institution of the ICP in the interest of steady growth in bilateral trade so as to bring about a positive perception among Bangladeshis at large. In a recent interview to a Bangladeshi newspaper, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has referred to the increasing growth in India’s imports from Bangladesh vis-à-vis exports to that country. The Petrapole ICP’s performance will have greater salience in this respect.
While the channelling of a higher volume of trade through Petrapole should benefit both countries, this new ICP institution also needs to be suitably leveraged to ensure that the logistically constrained north-eastern region also derives benefits. Towards this objective, India may consider assisting Bangladesh in the development of other cross-over points with facilities similar to the ICPs, from where transiting Indian goods will re-enter Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. If such a cooperative endeavour works out, the prospects of export of raw materials as well as processed items from the north-eastern states to Bangladesh will also increase, apart from facilitating the easier trans-shipment of these items to West Bengal and beyond. In this regard, the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region along with the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of External Affairs, need to conceive and work out a suitable executing and monitoring mechanism.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, while welcoming the Benapole-Petrapole ICP, had aptly observed that `Banijya Basati Lakkhi` or ‘business brings fortune’. The ICP would have achieved the desired end if the benefits were to accrue to all concerned.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who served till recently as an Additional Chief Secretary-level Adviser to the Nagaland Chief Minister/Nagaland Government
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
It is early days to speculate on the likely outcome and possible trajectory in Saudi-Israeli engagement, but Eshki’s visit has so far been the clearest indication of Saudi willingness to engage with the Jewish state.
The July 22 visit of a Saudi delegation led by retired Major General Anwar Eshki, head of the Jeddah-based Middle East Center for Strategic and Legal Studies, to Israel to meet Ambassador Dore Gold, the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, has raised many eyebrows. This is the first time that a Saudi delegation visited Israel. Though not an official visit, Eshki’s is a highly symbolic one. Reportedly, the Saudi delegation also met Yaov Mordechai, the coordinator of Israeli government activities in the ‘occupied territories’, as well as a number of opposition Members of the Knesset including Meretz MKs Esawi Freig and Michal Rozin and Zionist Union MKs Ksenia Svetlova and Omer Bar-Lav, in order to encourage discussions in Israel on the Arab Peace Initiative.
This is not the first time that Eshki and Gold were meeting. Earlier, on June 4, the two held discussions on opportunities and challenges in the Middle East at an event organised by the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. And, in June 2015, they had met in public and since then have reportedly held several private meetings.
Eshki has not been the only prominent Saudi to hold meetings with an Israeli leader. In May 2016, the former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal and Israel’s former national security advisor Major General Yaakov Amidror had held a debate on security and peace in the Middle East at the Washington Institute. In fact, Turki al-Faisal has in recent years publicly met a number of Israeli leaders including former Members of the Knesset Dan Meridor and Meir Sheetrit, former IDF intelligence chief Amos Yaldin and even the Yesh Atid leader and former finance minister Yair Lapid. Turki has been one of the most prominent advocates of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, arguing that it is the only approach towards peace and the formation of a Palestinian state.1
The various publicised contacts between Saudi and Israeli leaders are a result of the changing geopolitics in the Middle East brought about by a change in the US approach towards Iran. A publicized visit of a Saudi delegation to Israel is indicative of the changing Saudi stance towards Israel. Firstly, it shows a willingness to engage with Israel, a country with which the Kingdom has no diplomatic relations. While speculations about secret Saudi-Israeli counter-terrorism and intelligence exchanges cannot be confirmed, it would be naïve to believe that the two countries have no contacts, especially given their mutuality of interest vis-à-vis Iran and defeating terror. There is no doubt that concerns in both Israel and Saudi Arabia about Iran’s ambitions and growing influence in the Middle East have brought these two adversaries of Iran closer.
Secondly, although the Palestinian issue is highly important as is evident from Eshki’s statement during his visit – “There will be no peace with the Arab countries before there is peace with the Palestinians...If the conflict is resolved, the countries that exploit the Palestinian issue, namely Iran, will no longer be able to capitalize on it.”2 – his public, even if unofficial, visit shows that Saudi Arabia is willing to take the risk of provoking domestic and Arab public anger by engaging with Israel. Saudi media did not highlight the visit, but, of late, there have been articulations about the need to engage with Israel to find a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to take the initiative from Iran as the benefactor of the Palestinian people. These views and moves have been impelled by the reduced US engagement in the region and the conclusion of a nuclear deal with Iran, which Saudi Arabia views as an American move to recognize Iran as a dominant regional player. Given the necessity of taking care of its own security under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia has begun to engage with all the players in the region including Israel. Though Eshki denied any knowledge about Saudi-Israeli counter-terrorism cooperation, such a possibility cannot be ruled out. One of the most potent threats to the Kingdom emanates from the Islamic State. Having some secret understanding with Israel, especially the sharing of intelligence and counter-terror experience, can be a major tool to deal with this threat.
The third important aspect of the meeting can be gleaned from the discussions reportedly held during Eshki’s visit. Israeli media reports suggest that the discussion largely remained confined to reviving talks on the Saudi proposed Arab Peace Initiative, with Eshki articulating the need for Israel to work towards resolving the conflict. On being asked whether he sees Israel as the cause of terrorism in the region, Eshki said: “The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the source of terrorism, but it does create fertile ground for acts of terrorism in the region.”3 The efforts to revive the Arab Peace Initiative gains importance in the light of the recent statement by Benjamin Netanyahu that the initiative has some “positive elements that can help revive constructive negotiations with Palestinians.”4 On an earlier occasion in 2015, he had remarked that Israel is willing to discuss the Arab initiative if it is revised.5 Nonetheless, these are early days to discern the trend of things to come. It can lead to some secret discussions but may get derailed due to adverse public opinion in both countries.
Though the reaction to Eshki’s visit within Saudi Arabia or in other parts of the region remains muted, there has been some criticism. For example, BDS Gulf issued a statement on July 24 denouncing the visit of the Eshki-led delegation. The statement read: “The Arab people, including in the Gulf, have always supported the people of Palestine against colonial and Zionist occupation and have opposed any violation of this support by their governments.”6 It urged people in the Gulf region to oppose any efforts at reconciliation with Israel. It added that if, as denied by Saudi Arabia of any official status to the visit, then action should be taken against those who visited Israel. Such statements are, however, unlikely to deter the Saudis as they see Israel as a possible partner in countering Iran’s growing clout in the region.
It is early days to speculate on the likely outcome and possible trajectory in Saudi-Israeli engagement, but Eshki’s visit has so far been the clearest indication of Saudi willingness to engage with the Jewish state. These are interesting times in the Middle East and things can derail with one small flare up. But if media reports and speculations of clandestine Saudi-Israeli engagements are to be believed, important turns could occur including the revival of the Arab Peace Initiative and cooperation to counter common threat perceptions.
Md. Muddassir Quamar is a researcher with the Middle East Institute, New Delhi. He recently submitted his PhD thesis on social reforms in Saudi Arabia at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The political reality in PoK is that ‘azadi’ is a chimera, and substantive control of the area is shared between terrorist organisations such as the LeT and HM and the political elite of Islamabad. However, a narrative has been fed in the Kashmir Valley that Pakistan is a more favourable option than India.
Burhan Wani’s death on July 8 occurred just before the elections in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Expectedly, election rhetoric from all concerned political parties, including the ruling Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN), and the opposition, Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), and others, contained passionate eulogies for the ‘martyr’ Burhan Wani, and reruns of the usual Pakistani litany of Indian atrocities and human rights violations in Jammu & Kashmir. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif chaired a cabinet meeting on July 15 in which he declared Pakistan’s unstinting support for the Kashmiris’ “just struggle for self-determination.”1 Interestingly, he announced Islamabad’s intention to observe July 19 as a “Black Day”, which was swiftly postponed to July 21, to coincide with elections in PoK. In a campaign speech in Islamabad, he asserted that Pakistan was and will continue to be a stakeholder in Kashmir, which could not be considered India’s internal matter. Nawaz Sharif was echoed by the Pakistani establishment. Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhary requested the Islamabad-based Ambassadors of the member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir, which comprises Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Niger, to raise their voice against “the blatant human rights violations” of Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley.2 Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaz Aziz stated on July 25, in reply to Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s statement that Burhan Wani was considered to be a terrorist by India, thus: “Let us not forget, that not long ago the British labelled Indian freedom fighters as traitors and terrorists because at that time India was considered an integral part of the British Empire.”3 While the intention to rile India, especially in international fora, is always an objective with Pakistan, the political mileage that Nawaz Sharif and the PMLN has extracted from this situation in the past two weeks needs to be evaluated and factored.
PMLN swept the polls in PoK, winning 31 of the 41 seats. In his victory speech in Muzaffarabad on July 22, Nawaz Sharif grandiloquently stated that “We await the day of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan.”4 And he added that he was as much a Kashmiri as a Pakistani and promised to work extensively for establishing schools and universities in Azad Kashmir. Sharif, who was under a cloud due to his family connections with shell, front, companies allegedly involved in money laundering, which had been disclosed in the Panama Papers, and under threat from a section of the armed forces and public obliquely supporting Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif, took the opportunity to proclaim his political relevance and resilience. He and his party adroitly used the media hype generated by the current crisis in Kashmir to portray himself as an indefatigable activist for Kashmiri rights. Consequently, the PPP, which had formed the government in PoK in 2011, managed to get only two seats, with the Muslim Congress getting three seats, the PTI one, the Jammu Kashmir Peoples’ Party (JKPP) one, and another being won by an independent who has affiliated himself with the PML-N.5 Chairman of the PPP, Bilawal Bhutto, had made visits to all the districts of PoK, along with the outgoing Prime Minister of PoK, Choudhary Abdul Majed, but the anti-incumbency factor kicked in to his disadvantage. The dominance of national parties in PoK, as against the hold of regional political parties in the Kashmir Valley in India, has been touted as evidence of the integration of Kashmiris within the Pakistani state.
The Muslim Congress, the oldest party in PoK, has been steadily losing ground. The PML¬-N encouraged factional rifts within the Muslim Conference, which caused a vertical split in the party. As a result of this split, the former PoK Prime Minister Raja Farooq Haider established a PML-N chapter in PoK. This move divided the vote bank and severely weakened the Muslim Conference. The remains of the party, led by another ex-Prime Minister, Sardar Atteque Ahamad, had formed a coalition with Imran Khan’s PTI, which latter had also fielded a former PoK Prime Minister, Barrister Sultan Mehmood.6 The significant lack of public response to the PTI, which resulted in a loss even for Barrister Sultan Mehmood, is symptomatic of the party’s and Imran Khan’s waning popularity, which is also evident in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Also, the PPP’s substantial downslide is indicative of its fast diminishing role as an opposition. The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), which had managed to get two nominees elected in the previous elections, drew a blank in the latest round. This is significant as the number of Kashmiri voters residing in Pakistan is 438,884, mainly in Karachi.7 MQM’s defeat here reveals not only its declining fortunes but also its inability to control the street in Karachi.
It is noteworthy that in the run up to the elections, media bans on the Lashkar-e Taiba/Jama’at ud Dawa were quietly kept in abeyance. JuD Emir, Hafiz Saeed, who has been listed as a terrorist by the UN Security Council’s Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee and has an Interpol Red Corner Notice against him, was permitted to organise a ‘Kashmir Caravan,’ comprising several trucks and buses from Lahore to Islamabad. The ‘Caravan’ passed through the towns of Gujranwala, Jhelum and Gujrat, and organised major rallies that were well attended by federal ministers and religious leaders, garnering a fair amount of coverage in print and airspace. Islamabad’s, and Nawaz Sharif’s, high degree of tolerance for extremist invective can be gauged from Hafiz Sayeed’s claim on July 22 that he had received a call from Asiya Andrabi, the founder of the Dukhtaran-e-Millat, begging for his help to resolve the “crisis” on the Indian side of Kashmir. With his characteristic dramatic flourishes, Saeed told the cheering mob “I am telling my sister Asiya – my sister, we are coming. This act of violence will come to end and nobody can stop Kashmir from becoming independent.” Saeed further emphasised that he had received a call from Hizbul Mujahideen militant Burhan Wani in early July, when the latter reportedly told him over phone that it was his desire to talk to the JuD emir, and that then he could face martyrdom! Hafiz Saeed’s statements make it evident that Burhan Wani was in touch with hard-core terrorist elements like the LeT and had established contacts across the border, diminishing his chocolate-box, romantic, image of an idealistic separatist. Hafiz Syed used these rallies to reiterate his and Pakistan’s support for Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s four-point formula on Kashmir and to call for withdrawal of security forces from the Valley8
Earlier, Nawaz Sharif had held a meeting with the Pakistan Parliament Special Committee Chairman and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal (JUI-F) President Maulana Fazlur Rehman in Lahore, during which Rehman apprised him about his recent talks with separatist leaders over "human rights violations" by the Indian military and paramilitary forces in Jammu and Kashmir. According to Rehman, the separatist leadership in Kashmir was looking towards Pakistan for guidance and succour.5 Like Hafiz Saeed, and other Pakistani leaders, Rehman urged immediate implementation of Syed Geelani’s four point formula on Kashmir.9
The Pakistani leadership, both mainstream and extremist, takes recourse to recommending Geelani’s proposals as they are aware that there will be no meeting point with New Delhi on this issue, and, despite no forward movement in actually ameliorating the situation, Islamabad is able to generate sound bites for the Kashmiri and international consumption. The leader of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, Syed Ali Geelani, has written a letter on July 18 to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its permanent members – US, UK, China, France and Russia – as well as to the EU, OIC, SAARC countries and ASEAN, apart from separate missives to the heads of Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, China and Iran outlining his proposal. The proposal, which was a near verbatim rehash of previous demands, proposed that the “controversial status of the Indian-held Kashmir and Kashmiris’ self-determination right should be accepted,” Indian troops from heavily populated areas should be withdrawn, AFSPA and other draconian laws repealed, and political prisoners released. He further demanded that the UN and all international human rights and humanitarian organisations should be allowed to enter and work in the region.10 Geelani, while proactively using the issue of Burhan Wani’s death to whip up anti-India sentiments, has earlier tried to underplay the role that Wani and his band of boys had in instigating and mobilising the youth in Kashmir. He has asserted that his Tehreek-e-Hurriyat was the most representative party in Kashmir, with a clear stand on the freedom struggle of Kashmir. On gauging the reach of the social media-led Hizbul Mujahidin (HM) campaign, Syed Ali Geelani issued special directions to the central as well as district officials of his party to use the first fifteen days of April for a concerted recruitment drive to induct more people, especially youth into the cadre.11
Factors which are being conveniently kept out of the Hurriyat/other separatists’ narrative are the inflexible laws Pakistan has regarding PoK. Pakistan brought out the AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974, which continues to be interim till date. Under Section 4(7) (2) of this Act, “No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to, the ideology of the State’s accession to Pakistan.” Even the oath of PoK’s Prime Minister reads: “As Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, I will be loyal to the country (Pakistan) and the cause of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan.” Political activists who denounce this constitutional gag attract hostile attention and often face prosecution. Using the interim constitution, the political parties of Pakistan extended their reach into PoK, with their baggage of political enmity, and tribal leaders – from Suddhan, Gujjar, Jat and Rajput clans –have been cultivated by them as representative satraps. The Kashmir Council, which was set up as a nodal body under this act, is headed by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, who is termed the chief executive and is more powerful than the legislative assembly, or the Prime Minister (equivalent to a Chief Minister) of PoK. The Chief Secretary reports directly to Islamabad, and political power in Muzaffarabad is illusory.12
Some debates on India’s national television, and in some print media outlets, have focussed on the various shortcomings of the security forces, the advisability of using pellets, the possible use of excess force and concurrent human rights violations in Kashmir. The stark images of injured children need to be seen, not just against the backdrop of khaki, but keeping in view the cynical manipulations of Pakistan. The political reality in PoK is that ‘azadi’ is a chimera, and substantive control of the area is shared between terrorist organisations such as the LeT and HM and the political elite of Islamabad. However, a narrative has been fed in the Kashmir Valley that Pakistan is a more favourable option than India. The victim of this mendacious narrative has been the average Kashmiri.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
On July 27, 1990, Trinidad experienced its own day of infamy when the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen staged an armed insurrection and held hostage the then Prime Minister, most of his cabinet and several opposition MPs, plus the staff of the television and radio networks.
On Friday, July 27, 1990, Trinidad experienced its own day of infamy when a radical Afro-Trinidadian Islamist group, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, led by Imam Yasin Abu Bakr, an Afro-Trinidadian convert to Islam previously known as Lennox Philip and a former policeman, staged an armed insurrection with 113 of his followers, and held hostage for six days the then Prime Minister, Arthur N.R. Robinson, most of his cabinet and several opposition Members of Parliament, plus the staff of the Government-owned television and radio networks.1 The Parliament building and the television and radio studios occupied by the armed insurgents were severely damaged during the standoff that ensued. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service collapsed within the first hour of the insurrection, after its headquarters was destroyed by a car bomb. The capital city, Port of Spain, was abandoned, and the military took hours to assemble a viable fighting force. To this day, it has remained, fortunately, the single biggest violent incident in the history of Trinidad and Tobago.
Trinidad and Tobago lies at the southernmost point of the Caribbean Archipelago and lies 11 kilometres off the coast of north-east Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago is an industrialised society, with a high literacy rate and large petrochemical, petroleum and natural gas sectors2 While there is income disparity and some level of deprivation, the country has a very high human development index3
Demographically, the country has a stable population of just over 1.3 million, with 35.4 per cent of the population being of Indian origin, 34.2 per cent being of African descent and 22.8 per cent being of mixed parentage4 In terms of religion, 57 per cent of the population identifies itself as Christian, 18 per cent as Hindu and 13 per cent as having no religion. Adherents to the Islamic faith comprise only 5 per cent of the population5 It should be noted that two distinct groups of Muslims exist in Trinidad – those of Indian origin and a more recent group of Afro-Trinidadian converts. While the former have traditionally been well-integrated moderates, the latter, influenced from the Middle East, are far more radical. All religious and racial groups are integrated into the wider national community without compromising their individual identities with complete freedom of religion being enshrined in law and effected in practice.
In 1990, however, the country was in the throes of a deep recession with the economy contracting at an alarming rate. Public servants experienced reductions in salaries and the government of Prime Minister Robinson, which had suffered an acrimonious split in 1988, was fast losing both support and credibility. Robinson’s own arrogance and his increasing alienation of the Indo-Trinidadian population contributed to an atmosphere of political and economic unease, bordering at times on despair. Into this inherently volatile situation, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen entered the fray.
Formed in the mid-1980s, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen began as a quasi-criminal outfit, initially portraying itself as a vigilante group behind a mask of indignation over the growing narcotics trade that was becoming rampant in the country. The Jamaat-al-Muslimeen grew rapidly in influence and emerged as a challenge to the State in the depressed areas of Port-of-Spain and its environs, obtaining funding and training from, and in, Libya and civilian pattern weapons from the United States through an elaborate smuggling network. In addition, it began forging alliances with and seeking recruits from other radical elements in various mosques. Libyan funding was routed through Muammar al-Qaddafi’s World Islamic Call Society (WICS).6
For several years leading up to the insurrection, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen was involved in an intense land dispute which began to escalate. In spite of its assertion that the insurrection was spontaneous, it has been revealed that discussions about assassinating Prime Minister Robinson were held in 1989 and, by October of that year, the physical infrastructure needed for the insurrection was in place. In an example of catastrophic intelligence failure, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen was under surveillance by the police, including the elite Special Branch, and the military. It was, however, able to plan, gather arms and ammunition, assemble and coordinate the insurrection without interference from any of these agencies.7
The insurrection left 24 persons dead and 231 wounded, 133 of them in an orgy of looting and arson that followed, leading to losses amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.8 Popular support for the insurrection was minimal but a total breakdown in law enforcement led to chaos, exploited by looters for personal gain. The absence of any police presence in Port of Spain ensured that the looters had free reign of the city’s business districts. The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF), facing its first major challenge, was hard-pressed to move its two understrength battalions into position with any degree of rapidity.
Despite taking hours to deploy into Port of Spain, and despite the fact that its main bases were not far away, they benefited from the somewhat amateurish execution of the insurrection as Bakr and his followers allowed themselves to be besieged in three locations – Parliament as well as the radio and TV stations. Without a means of escape and lacking food, they were forced to surrender in exchange for an amnesty.
While the insurrection ended with the surrender of Bakr and his followers, they were acquitted of charges brought against them in the Trinidadian courts, which upheld the amnesty granted to secure the lives of the hostages, despite the State making the argument that the amnesty was granted under duress. This has emboldened the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, and Bakr and his adherents have continued to occupy an important position of influence and prominence in the local Islamic community and the local criminal community.
Despite an expensive and controversial commission of enquiry being held, the complete failure to detect preparations for the insurrection remains baffling. However, Bakr did have extensive contacts in the military and police, which may have been a factor.9 Furthermore, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen managed to infiltrate Trinidad’s Customs and Excise service and thus bring in quantities of arms and ammunition, showing the susceptibility of agencies to relatively easy subversion. The outfit also allegedly sought to forge links with political parties, links that seemed to become evident in the years after the insurrection, with politicians clamouring for support from them as early as the 1991 Parliamentary elections, and which said links continue to come to the fore on occasion when elections are near.10 This has led to the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen being much sought after as electoral “muscle” by politicians of all hues.11 Bakr has described himself as a “kingmaker” in Trinidad’s political scene, but his influence and value have seemingly waned over the last decade.12
To this day, Bakr and members of the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen are frequently charged with crimes ranging from extortion to murder, but a dysfunctional criminal justice system has ensured that Bakr has never been convicted and his henchmen rarely face sanctions for their actions.13 Despite weapons being seized from their compound in 2005, the ten Jamaat-al Muslimeen detained for questioning were released without charge.14 This has given the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen much confidence and credibility among the denizens of the Trinidadian underworld. Moreover, their seeming impunity has led to a sense of disenchantment with the security establishment and the criminal justice system and, as such, actionable human intelligence continues to be problematic. Confidence in judicial system was further shaken when the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen was able to reacquire two of ten properties seized for auction at a small fraction of the market value.15 This apparent impunity has led to strong suspicions that the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen has extensive connections within the political establishment across party lines and continues to subvert the security and intelligence agencies.16 Given the almost endemic corruption within the police service and the political establishment (transcending political parties), it is not implausible that such suspicions have merit.17
The 1990 insurrection and its unfolding aftermath illustrates the muddled and, at times, contradictory Trinidadian response to terrorism. From underestimating the threat to botching the response to failing to adequately punish the insurrectionists, the lack of sufficiently severe consequences for their actions has not only emboldened the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen but has also now spawned a series of other similar groups, among them, the Jamaat al Islami al Karibi, the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah (The Islamic Front) and the Jamaat al Murabiteen, each drawing its leadership from former members of the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen.18
The power wielded by these groups helps create fertile ground for recruitment into potential jihadist groups. As such, the membership of these groups keeps expanding with recruits falling prey to the potent mix of propaganda and the lure of perceived empowerment offered by these groups.19 Radicalization has now assumed a new dimension with the message of ISIS being disseminated through social media and the internet as well as through more direct attempts at recruitment through proxies and allied groups. In this new dynamic, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen and its affiliates, spin-offs and ideological associates with their network among Trinidad’s cities, mosques and economically less advantaged urban neighbourhoods, are ideally placed to act as de facto fronts for ISIS or other jihadi recruiting efforts in Trinidad.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Application of AFSPA and DAA provisions to the eastern districts of Nagaland and to districts or select areas bordering Arunachal Pradesh and the Myanmar frontier would have sent an appropriate message to shore up public confidence for an overall settlement of the Naga issue.
Through a Union Home Ministry Notification of June 30, 2016, the Government of India has extended the coverage of the Disturbed Areas Act (DAA) to the entire State of Nagaland by six more months until December 31 this year, within the enabling provisions of Section 3 of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The areas, which today constitute Nagaland State, have effectively been under the purview of AFSPA since May 1958.
AFSPA and the consequent DAA provisions have continued to remain promulgated in Nagaland State even after the last substantive ceasefire agreement between the Union Government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Issac-Muivah) (NSCN-IM) went into effect on August 1, 1997. The other major insurgent group – National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Khaplang) (NSCN–K) – was brought within the fold of a ceasefire accord in 2001. However, if the incident ofJune 4, 2015 – resulting in a major ambush on the Army in Chandel district of Manipur on May 27, 2015 – is any indicator, the NSCN (K) has been re-grouping, bolstering its combat potential with illicit arms supplies including through indirect channelling of some contents from China, and continues to operate from Myanmar towards maintaining its insurrectionist activities in Nagaland. The NSCN(K) was keen to nullify the ceasefire and, in fact, unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire on March 27, 2015. In this backdrop, and keeping in view the recent Framework Naga Peace Accord concluded by the Union Government with NSCN(IM) on August 3 last year (though a comprehensive agreement is yet to be consummated), the latest decision concerning the extension of the DAA needs a critical appraisal.
Former Union Home Secretary G.K. Pillai had observed in November 2012 (in an IDSA compendium on the AFSPA) that a State like Nagaland continues to be designated as disturbed despite the fact that hostilities have remained suspended (at that time) for more than a decade and no security personnel killed during that period. He thereby implied that though the State has remained largely peaceful (with the ceasefire with the major insurgent groups holding and elected civil administrations in place in the State), AFSPA and the DAA have not been critically reviewed.
In contrast, in Tripura, the Left-Front Communist Party-controlled State Government has withdrawn AFSPA from the entire State which was once bedevilled by serious home-grown, but externally supported, insurgent outfits. There is however, a difference in the political and administrative situation prevailing in the two States. While in Tripura there has been stable governments with effective grass-root public delivery systems in place as well as substantive functional autonomy in the spheres of governance affecting the State’s tribal people, the situation in Nagaland is different in various aspects. Nagaland, at present, is in an obfuscated political milieu despite the Accord of August 2015. A series of defections (from Congress – the main Opposition Party – as well as from the BJP) to the ruling Naga Peoples’ Front (NPF) has taken place in the Nagaland State Assembly over the past one and a half years. The Congress Party, a major player in Nagaland politics since the creation of the State, appears to be virtually eclipsed for the present. Factionalism prevails within the NPF. The present lone Lok Sabha member of Nagaland and former three-time Chief Minister has been expelled from the NPF. Further, the State administration is facing administrative and financial constraints and is, above all, unable to politically steer the State and reinforce the Union Government’s efforts to assimilate and unify the various insurgent groups as well as civil society organizations towards a consummation of the peace process. Notwithstanding the political hiatus, the security situation in the State is broadly under control.
In the above-mentioned environment, while a complete roll-back of AFSPA and restriction in the ambit of DAA may not have been warranted, a selective application of these statutory provisions would have been more purposeful. Application of the provisions to, say, the eastern districts of Nagaland, districts or select areas bordering Arunachal Pradesh and the Myanmar frontier, would have sent an appropriate message to shore up public confidence for an overall settlement of the Naga issue, and against those harbouring inimical intentions vis-à-vis the Union Government’s peace initiative. It is undeniable that AFSPA and DAA still create a certain unfavourable impact on the North-Easterners’ psyche, particularly in States and regions affected by disturbances of various types and insurgency. It is time for the Central authorities to decisively push the political process for a Naga settlement as far and extensively as possible, instead of depending on traditional institutions and local government leaders.
Prima facie, the continuation of AFSPA and DAA in Nagaland may imply the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of normal institutions of civil and police administration as well as of the deployed Central forces like Assam Rifles, Central Reserve Police Force and the Army. Despite the internal political fluidity and, to an extent, uncertain political environment in the State, the overall conditions may not be deemed so fragile or beyond the control of the central and state machinery without the above-referred statutory provisions. Viewed from such a perspective, perhaps, a more nuanced approach on the extension of the DAA may have been more appropriate.
Furthermore, with a newly-elected Myanmar Government led by Htin Kyaw of the National League for Democracy in power since March 2016, and in the context of a political accommodation being attempted in that country with various ethnic groups (an Accord has already been reached between the Myanmar Government and seven insurgent groups operating near the Thailand border and in western areas adjacent to India), there is scope to work with a friendly government at Nay Pyi Taw to goad the Myanmarese Nagas and the NSCN(K) (its leader, Khaplang, is a citizen of Myanmar) to restrict their political activities within that country. The Union Government may therefore use the instrumentality of AFSPA and DAA to create a security overhang in the Nagaland and Manipur districts in or near the areas of NSCN(K) influence, thus containing the latter’s activities from the security angle. Such an approach would have been more politically appropriate and likely to lead to better outcomes.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served as Adviser to the North Eastern Council and was till recently a senior Additional Chief Secretary-level Adviser of the Government of Nagaland.
The views expressed are the author`s own.
The Inter-State Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, is the best constitutional forum at the disposal of the Union Government to deal with challenges relating to internal security.
Chairing the 11th meeting of the Inter-State Council (ISC) on July 13, Prime Minister Narendra Modi noted that “[t]he nation can only progress if the State and the Centre work shoulder to shoulder.” And with reference to internal security, he observed that it was not possible to strengthen it if intelligence exchange was not improved. He, therefore, requested States to focus on intelligence-sharing in order to help the country stay “alert” to, and “updated” on, internal security challenges.1 The meeting, held for the first time after 2006, had internal security as one of its main agendas.
The ISC has met ten times so far. Its first seven meetings mainly discussed the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission, which had been established in June 1983 to review the working of the existing arrangements between the Union and the States. In the eighth meeting, the emphasis was on optimal utilization of the ISC to sort out, and reach consensus on, emerging issues of national importance, especially in socio-economic sectors, so as to facilitate cooperation between the States and the Centre, leading to concrete implementation. At the ISC’s ninth meeting in June 2005, the emphasis was on good governance, while the tenth meeting held in December 2006 focused on implementation of SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.2
The ISC is a recommendatory body with the following duties:3
Internal Security is thus only one of the aspects that the wide scope and mandate of the ISC covers. Consequently, internal security has often not been given due consideration as far as the proceedings of the ISC are concerned.
Over the last few decades, the dividing line between internal and external security has blurred considerably, with the respective facets of the two aspects of security often enmeshed. ‘Law and Order’, which is a subject in the State list, can no longer be exclusively left to the States. Evolving and deepening nexus between crime and terrorism/insurgency bears testimony to the fact that ‘law and order’ issues have wider pan-Indian ramifications with obvious connections to external security, given India’s inimical neighbourhood. Also, insurgents often do not recognise state boundaries and have exploited to their advantage the lack of synergy amongst the States and between the States and the Centre. A case in point is the current version of Left Wing Extremism, which thrives in the central eastern tribal belt by exploiting the gaps along inter-state boundaries.
Internal threats to national security have assumed centre-stage in the debates on Indian security. It has been argued that internal threats are as serious as external threats, if not greater. They have a pan-Indian presence and, therefore, tackling them is a common concern for the Centre and the States.
In view of the above, coordination and unity of purpose between the Centre and the States as well as amongst the States has often been acknowledged and deliberated upon. Several initiatives have also been taken towards creating mechanisms to forge cohesion, although these have not yielded substantial success. The basic challenge has been the lack of trust between the Centre and the States. There is an undeniable requirement for a platform that provides a forum for continuous exchange between the Centre and the State.
In this regard, the ISC, chaired by the Prime Minister, is the best constitutional forum at the disposal of the Union Government. This platform needs to be utilised optimally for enhancing cohesion and ironing out the differences between the Centre and the States. The latest meeting of the ISC, held after a gap of ten years, certainly raises questions about the commitment towards the overall well being of the national fabric. The ISC, a forum that facilitates cooperative federalism, is an ideal setting to deliberate on the interests of the people, address their problems and take collective and concrete decisions.
Considering the all pervasive and grave threats to national security, it is important that the Centre takes the most urgent steps for finalising the National Security Policy (NSP) and the machinery for its administration, in consultation with the States, in a non-partisan way. After the NSP is finalised, the Centre will have to undertake, in collaboration with the States, a country-wide review of the existing security management apparatus and draw up a plan for restructuring and revamping it within a stipulated timeframe. While playing their part in such an exercise, the States would need to accept the important role they are required to play in the National Security Management apparatus and demonstrate their unconditional commitment to working closely with each other and with the Centre.4
For nearly two decades, there have been repeated pronouncements that the Centre is promulgating a law for dealing with identified federal offences and establishing a central agency which would have the authority to take cognisance of, and investigate, crimes that have serious inter-state and nationwide ramifications for national security. The proposal of setting up a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), for instance, has continued to be debated for the past several years. A number of States, which have been opposed to the establishment of a NCTC in its proposed form, have suggested that the proposed framework of this body should be entirely revised in consultation with all the States. Some other states have urged that a NCTC should not be established through an executive order, but instead through an Act of Parliament.
Terrorism and other federal offences cannot be dealt with by the existing security management apparatus. It is necessary that the Prime Minister undertakes urgent discussions with the Chief Ministers to resolve all doubts and issues raised by the States. The ISC, with the Prime Minister at its helm, could prove to be a game changer in this regard. In the same stead, it would be useful for the Central Government to consider inducting representatives of the States in the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and in the National Security Council (NSC), even if on a rotational basis. Similarly, a NCTC should also be established by going beyond party lines.5
Some of the doubts voiced by the States about the management of security-related issues arise from the style of functioning of the institutions that are exclusively controlled by the Centre. A via media has to be struck in the form of an organisation that is jointly managed by the Centre and the States. An excellent example in this regard is the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) established by the United States after 9/11. The JTTF, located in various cities across the US, includes representatives from the federal, state and municipal enforcement agencies and perform several important roles including the clearing of all terrorism-related information.6
Over time, functioning through joint institutions will enable the States to gain a well-informed perspective about the complex and sensitive issues concerning national security management and, in the process, also defuse their perennial complaints about the Centre’s interference with the powers of the States while undertaking internal security management. And above all, an atmosphere of mutual trust can be established through deliberations in the ISC. The aforesaid aspect assumes paramount importance in the light of the activities and reach of insurgents and terrorists who recognise no boundaries.
In the current circumstances, a seemingly ‘law and order’ issue has the potential to cascade into a serious national security threat. As a general practice, instead of progressively improving the capability of their police and security maintenance apparatus for effectively dealing with disturbances, the States have been perennially seeking assistance from the Centre. The Centre too has been adopting a mathematical ‘battalion approach’ by pumping in troops without associating itself with the root cause of the challenge. Countering such threats by the governments at all levels cannot be done in silos. Ownership shall have to be taken up by the Centre and States and regular ISC meetings could provide the necessary impetus for the executive to act, as warranted.
Colonel Shashank Ranjan is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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