On September 21, 2016, the Union Cabinet approved the enactment of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Bill 2016. The Bill repeals five obsolete British statutes on admiralty jurisdiction in civil matters, namely, (a) Admiralty Court Act, 1840 (b) Admiralty Court Act, 1861, (c) Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, (d) Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891, and (e) the provisions of the Letters Patent, 1865, applicable to the admiralty jurisdiction of the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts.

The process of drafting a suitable legislation to repeal the existing colonial statute was begun by the Director General of Shipping in 1986, and its urgent need was emphasised by the Supreme Court in its landmark judgement in the case of M.V. Elizabeth & others Vs Harwan Investment Trading Pvt. Ltd. JT in 1992. The maritime industry has been highlighting the need to update India's Admiralty Laws so as to be responsive to the needs of the Industry and ensure that maritime disputes are disposed off expeditiously and effectively. This article outlines the arduous journey of this important maritime legislation.

The Admiralty law governs maritime questions and offenses. It is a body of both domestic law governing maritime activities and private international law governing the relationships between private entities that operate vessels on the oceans. It deals with matters including marine commerce, marine navigation, marine salvaging, shipping, sailors, and the transportation of passengers and goods by sea.

Admiralty Courts date to at least the 1360s during the reign of Edward III of England. The Admiralty court’s jurisdiction historically embraced all crimes and offenses involving English ships or crews that were committed at sea or along the English coast outside the borders of any county. Although it originally dealt only with matters of discipline in the English fleet and with cases of piracy and prizes (ships and goods captured at sea), the court progressively acquired some civil jurisdiction over mercantile and shipping disputes. Due to jurisdictional dispute with the civil and the criminal law courts, the Admiralty court progressively concentrated on marine cases involving shipping, collisions, and salvage. The High Court of Admiralty Act 1859 provided the constitutional and jurisdictional clarity on admiralty law and procedures. The Admiralty Court Act, 1861 and the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 established Admiralty courts in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. These colonial statutes, among others, have continued to remain in force by reason of Article 372 of the Constitution of India.

A suit against a foreign ship owned by a foreign company not having a place of residence or business in a coastal state is liable to be proceeded against on the admiralty side of the High Court by an “action in rem” in respect of a cause of action alleged to have arisen by reason of a tort or a breach of obligation arising from the carriage of goods from a port in India to a foreign port. In rem jurisdiction ("power about or against 'the thing'") is a legal term describing the power a court may exercise over property (either real or personal) or a "status" against a person over whom the court does not have in personam jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in rem assumes that property or status is the primary object of the action, rather than personal liabilities not necessarily associated with the property (quasi in rem jurisdiction).

After Independence, Parliament did not exercise powers to make laws with respect to the Admiralty courts. As a result, jurisdictions in respect of admiralty matters remained as defined in the Admiralty Act 1861 and restricted to the High Courts of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. The High Courts of India’s other littoral states, namely, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, do not possess Admiralty jurisdiction, although there have been instances of the High Courts of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa having entertained Admiralty causes apparently on a perfunctory consideration of the various States Reorganisation Acts enacted by Parliament and presumably without the benefit of a full argument. Along with the vexing issue of ambiguity of jurisdiction, existing admiralty statutes required a relook in order to incorporate contemporary maritime practices and the international legal regime.

In 1986, a committee headed by Praveen Singh, the then Director General of Shipping, Mumbai, reviewed the existing maritime laws and admiralty jurisdiction and recommended that a specific admiralty law be enacted. The Committee observed that existing admiralty jurisdiction of courts is by virtue of the Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1891, which vested the jurisdiction only in the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. Whereas the jurisdiction of these courts had, in fact, extended to the whole of British India, after independence this ceased to be the case. The Praveen Singh Committee opined that the present admiralty jurisdiction of courts was outdated and recommended that a comprehensive legislation defining the scope of admiralty jurisdiction be enacted.

In so far as jurisdictional ambiguity of the littoral state is concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of M.V. Elizabeth & others Vs Harwan Investment Trading Pvt. Ltd. JT 1992 decided that the High Courts are superior courts of record with unlimited jurisdiction and inherent and plenary powers to decide on their own jurisdiction for the purpose of redressing grievances according to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, where the statute is silent and judicial intervention is necessary. In this context, the Supreme Court observed that there is no reason to think that the jurisdiction of the High Courts have stood frozen and atrophied on the date of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890. Accordingly, in view of there being no Indian Statute governing the Courts’ jurisdiction in regard to maritime claims, the Supreme Court made the principles of International Conventions on Maritime Laws, applicable in India as part of India’s common law. At the same time, it also directed the early enactment of a suitable legislative measure.

Based on the Supreme Court’s directives, Admiralty jurisdiction was examined by the Law Commission of India in 1992. In its 151st report, the Law Commission pointed out that the admiralty jurisdiction, despite the peculiarities of its origin and growth, is a part of the totality of jurisdiction vested in the High Court as a superior court of record and it is not a distinct and separate jurisdiction. The Commission felt that it is not necessary to limit the jurisdiction only to High Courts whose territories have a coastal belt as was recommended earlier by the Praveen Singh Committee. The Commission, therefore, recommended that the admiralty jurisdiction must be conferred upon all High Courts as part of their original jurisdiction, with a provision empowering the extension of this jurisdiction to other Principal civil Courts in case a necessity should arise in future. The commission submitted a draft bill for enactment by the legislative.

The Ministry of Shipping initiated the process of drafting the Admiralty Bill in accordance with the Law Commission’s recommendations. A draft bill was planned to be introduced in Parliament in 1998. However, it could not be achieved due to the very short duration of the first Vajpayee-led government. Finally, the bill was introduced in Parliament in May 2005. The bill was referred to a Standing Committee which submitted its report in March 2006. The bill was revised and circulated as Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Bill 2009 for consultation. However, due to the dissolution of 14th Lok Sabha, the bill lapsed. The bill went through a further process of revision through inter-ministerial consultation during the 15th Lok Sabha. Due to apprehensions about some provisions of the Admiralty Bill 2009, extensive consultations with shipping and trade associations were undertaken. Finally, 24 years after necessity of a responsive legislation for maritime dispute resolution was voiced, the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Bill 2016 has been approved by the cabinet. Its salient features are as follows:-

The Bill confers admiralty jurisdiction on High Courts located in all coastal states and this jurisdiction extends up to the territorial waters.

The jurisdiction is extendable, by a Central Government notification, up to the exclusive economic zone or any other maritime zone of India or islands constituting part of the territory of India.

It applies to every vessel irrespective of place of residence or domicile of owner.

Inland vessels and vessels under construction are excluded from its application, although the Central Government is empowered to make it applicable to these vessels by a notification if necessary.

It does not apply to warships and naval auxiliary vessels used for non-commercial purposes.

The jurisdiction is for adjudicating on a set of maritime claims listed in the Bill.

In order to ensure security against a maritime claim, a vessel can be arrested in certain circumstances.

The liability in respect of selected maritime claims on a vessel passes on to its new owners by way of maritime lien subject to a stipulated time limit.

In respect of aspects on which provisions are not laid down in the Bill, the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is applicable.

The Government of India has given an impetus for enhancing mercantile trade through its focus on accelerated development of the maritime infrastructure. Along with infrastructure, a holistic review of the enabling legal framework for mercantile trade and maritime practices is also essential. Legislative processes need to be critically reviewed to avoid inordinate delay in the enactment of statutes. The Admiralty Bill 2016 has been in the making for nearly 30 years. This long awaited Admiralty Legislation will finally become an act during the upcoming winter session of Parliament.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

South Asia is the least integrated region in the world, and that is not in line with global trends. This is a major reason constraining India’s economic potential and its re-emergence as a global power. With China now a USD 10 trillion economy, compared to India’s economy of USD two trillion, India is at a defining movement on how the Asian Century will be shaped. The strategic question is whether Asia will have two poles, as it has had throughout history, or will India remain at Asia’s periphery as a regional power? Does connectivity, rather than institutions and rules, now enable integration and economic growth? The related question is whether economic development is the best way of reducing the role of the military in polity.

The One-Road-One-Belt (OROB) initiative for connectivity, with clear strategic advantages for China, contrasts sharply with existing treaty-based integration concepts where the geographical scope, partner countries, strategy, principles and rules are clearly defined at the outset. 34 countries have already signed cooperation agreements with China.

With Asia increasingly the world’s political and economic centre of gravity, the 27th Workshop of China’s Political Bureau, held on October 12, 2015, focused on ‘Global Governance’ seeking a new identity, vision and strategy. The motivation was to re-define the international perception of China as a large developing country, with one-Party rule, split with Taiwan and a regional power. China accounts for 40 per cent of world GDP growth, with the United States contributing only 10 per cent and India 20 per cent. China’s middle class has increased from five million in 2000 to 225 million today. Its outbound direct investment has reached USD 123 billion.

China is now seeking to establish its identity as a world class power; the organization of the Olympics had that aim. It has a vision of major power relations wherein it is an equal of the United States; the China-United States Climate Agreement and Ratification, contributing to global public goods, were announced in China. China’s strategy is to be a major player in global governance; the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is being developed as a multilateral, rather than a Chinese, entity. And, the OROB is consciously not adopting the development-cooperation model based on aid. Instead, it relies on a state strategy implemented by corporate investments and catalysed by the USD 40 billion Silk Road Fund, planned to be increased to 100 billion, to leverage a proposed investment of 1.4 trillion.

China’s ‘grand strategy’ looks both to the West and to the East. The OROB Initiative, seen more as a policy indicator than a set of projects, will link three continents – Asia, Europe and Africa. China is also looking at a free-trade area in the Asia-Pacific, possibly linking up with the United States. In addition, China is going in for tri-lateral agreements with the United States and European Union in Africa and Latin America, where its interests are not directly involved but giving it a global reach and influence beyond its immediate borders – the hallmark of a global power.

The OROB Initiative was accelerated as a strategic response to the military ‘re-balancing’ of the United States to Asia. The drivers are economic – the ‘exceptionalism’ of China’s growth story, which, it believes, serves as a model for others. Capital has been the key driver of China’s growth over the last three decades, with investment in infrastructure peaking at 54 per cent of GDP in 2013. In the period 2001-2007, China’s current account surplus reached 10 per cent of GDP because of booming exports. Foreign exchange reserves increased from USD 300 million to 3.5 trillion during the period 2000-2011. China has cash and deposits in Renminbi equivalent to USD 21 trillion, or two times its GDP, and expects that the massive overseas investment in the OROB will speed-up the internationalization of the Renminbi.

Energy security is another important factor, with pipelines already linking China with the rich gas and oil reserves in Central Asia. Western China also has a restive Uighur minority population, and the most important threat is from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which has taken sanctuary in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas. Lastly, China expects to bridge the socio-economic divide – Western China suffers a 15-fold gap in per capita income with Shanghai.

A regional transport network has begun to be put in place. For some origins and destinations, the door-to-door costs for the rail option is already similar to the ocean option. The logistics rationale is clear; Kashgar is closer to Gwadar than to Shanghai, just as Yunnan, another minority province, is closer to Chittagong than to Shanghai. In 2015, 815 freight trains reached Europe. Iran is excited about being a transit point for a route to Europe via Turkey. A train has just reached Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan.

A new concept of “International Capacity Cooperation” is also being implemented by relocating some manufacturing capacity to OBOR countries. In 2015, China signed memorandums with seventeen OBOR countries for capacity cooperation. This is very different to the current development-cooperation model of capacity building, which is institutional capacity supported by aid rather than local economic activity.

China is determined to push the OBOR initiative as it sees connectivity rather than global rules leading to increased trade, and continuing growth. China plans to have free-trade agreements with 65 countries in the six ‘economic belts’ of the OBOR, accounting for two-thirds of the world population and 30 per cent of GDP and consumption. The areas of cooperation include fibre optics, telecommunication, trade facilitation, monetary policy coordination and arrangements to manage financial risk. Bringing together policy areas that are currently split between the United Nations and Bretton Woods Institutions is a long-standing demand of developing countries.

China recognizes that India had these ideas earlier but did not have the resources to execute them. The principal Indian idea was that of an International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC), initiated in September 2000, to bring together India, Iran and Russia in an effort to create multi-modal links (ship-rail-road) from India to Europe, via the Gulf, Central Asia and Russia. Another multi-modal transport agreement, the Ashkhabad Agreement, which brings together India, Oman, Iran and the Central Asian republics was initiated in April 2011, and linked closely to the INSTC projects. Only one Indian connectivity project, the trade and transit corridor from Chabahar in Iran to Afghanistan is off the ground; but the Indian investment of USD 500 million for port development is miniscule compared to the OROB.

In three years, China has achieved considerable success with OROB. The lending of the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Cexim) has become closely aligned with its OBOR strategy, in the fields of industry, infrastructure, energy, trade finance and financial services. Some of the largest recent Chinese lending include: a USD three billion loan to the governments of Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand and Laos, to be used for infrastructure projects and trade finance purposes; a 2.2 billion Cexim facility extended to the Kenya Railways Corporation for a new rail link between the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa and the Kenyan capital of Nairobi; and two facilities to companies in Indonesia for power plants, one totalling 1.5 billion and another worth 1.2 billion.

An interesting development with regard to OBOR is that projects have attracted overseas capital. For example, in October 2014, Oman’s State General Reserve Fund signed an agreement to take an equity stake in a port being constructed in Tanzania by the China Merchant Group (CMG) as well as the railway network leading to it. The agreement specified that USD 500 million would be designated for port financing for 2013 (via Cexim), for interest-free or low-interest loans to get the project started.
China is aware that it is investing in a risky environment and that the OROB initiative may not be commercially rewarding. China has a three-fold solution to these problems. First, it invites governments to organize summits to identify issues and seek common understandings, cooperation memorandum and people-to–people contact as the basis for regional cooperation.

Second, China is also organizing technical workshops of the concerned countries to facilitate investments and is partnering with multilateral institutions in this effort to give greater legitimacy. It is entering into areas the United Nations and bilaterals have ignored but have been considered important by developing countries. For example, a workshop to harmonize intellectual property rights legislation was organized in Beijing in July, jointly with the World Intellectual Property Organization.

Third, China is using money to resolve security issues, like paying Pakistan for an army division dedicated to the protection of Gwadar and is actively considering setting up a private security agency, borrowing ideas from something the United States has done for decades, but paid for by the companies rather than the government. Currently, China has no intention of directly improving the military capacity of these countries or getting involved in regional disputes, as its military strategy is focused on Taiwan and the Pacific.

The OROB initiative has moved beyond the discussion stage to being politically and economically accepted widely. In April 2016, an agreement was signed with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), treating implementation of the OROB initiative as promoting regional cooperation. This is in part an answer to India’s concerns that connectivity should be built through consultative processes and not unilateral decisions.

Perceptions of what OBOR is really about – and how far it is feasible – diverge widely like the fable of the blind men and the elephant. Europe is assessing whether it will be a financial bonanza, the United States has been caught slow footed with its focus on seeking support for security from China, and India remains ambivalent.

India’s concerns centre on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), finalized in April 2015 on the basis of 51 agreements, for a series of highway, railway and energy projects linked to the newly developed port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, all of which taken together will be valued at USD 46 billion. These projects will generate 700,000 jobs in Pakistan and, when completed, add 2 to 2.5 per cent to the country’s GDP. By focusing on the strategic implications, India is ignoring China’s supplementary interest – that such investments in the backward regions of Pakistan also address China’s, and India’s, concerns relating to security problems whose roots are in Pakistan.

During Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013, China and India jointly proposed the building of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) at a total cost of USD 22 billion, and agreed to do a joint study – this is a part of OROB. At the BRICS Summit, to be held in Goa in October 2016, India has invited the seven-member BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) group, comprising Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka from South Asia and Myanmar and Thailand from ASEAN. It dates back to 1997, with a study on infrastructure as an important activity, and the discussion will inevitably turn to connectivity. Linking BIMSTEC and BCIM will be a strategic response to a strategic issue.

President Xi Jinping has staked so much personal and political capital on OROB that it has become a key test of his leadership, and will be made to succeed. China is keen to have India on board and both recognize that working together is necessary for achieving the ‘Asian Century’. India should seek to ‘redefine’ OROB to add a strong component for a ‘Digital Asia’, as that is where our comparative advantage lies, and for Asian connectivity to have two nodes, in China and in India, as has been the case throughout history.

It is rumoured that the OROB was a purely political initiative that did not emerge from the foreign policy establishment. It is now up to Prime Minister Modi to make a similar strategic leap with respect to Kashmir; the road to Islamabad is now through Beijing and not Washington.

The author is a former Diplomat and currently Visiting Professor, Tsinghua University, Beijing. The article is based on a discussion at the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy held on September 13 titled “After Hangzhou: Next steps in International Cooperation” which had a panel on ‘The Belt and road Initiative’.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Who won the just concluded parliamentary election in Jordan? The answer depends on how one frames ‘victory'? The outcome of the 18th parliamentary election held on September 20 reflects the complexity of the Jordanian society and its multiple identities, namely, the tribal groups which form the backbone of the Hashemite power, a sizeable Palestinian population, presence of powerful Islamist forces, various religious and ethnic minorities, and a larger refugee population. It is this diversity which makes electoral process a complex but dynamic affair.

The most significant outcome of this election has been the participation of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the officially-banned Muslim Brotherhood. Due to disagreements over electoral laws and one-person-one-vote system that favoured the tribes and pro-monarchy independents, the IAF had refused to take part in previous elections held in 2010 and 2013. As a well-organised party with grassroots support, its participation is considered essential for the legitimacy of the electoral process and seen in that context, the just concluded elections can be declared as a success.

At the same time, the performance of the IAF-led National Alliance for Reform was less than spectacular. As against the pre-election estimate of 25 seats, the block could win only 15 seats in the 130-member house, including ten secured by the IAF. Eight political parties won 20 seats; they are Zamzam (five), National Current (four), Islamic Centrist Part (five) and Justice and Reform Party (two). The Ba’ath, Communists, National Union and Al Awn lists have won one seat each. The rest of close to 100 seats were won either by local lists or were reserved for women and minorities. Under such circumstances, government formation would be a herculean task and will have to include many one-seat parties, blocs, and individuals.

The Hashemites have been accommodative of the tribal population through gerrymandering and this time the allocation of electoral districts took care of this issue. The 130 seats were divided among the 23 electoral districts in the 12 Governorates, with the tribal areas getting more than adequate representation.

Under popular pressures, especially from the IAF, the erstwhile one-person-one-vote system which favoured the tribal population was abandoned in favour of proportional representation. At the same time, Jordan is still struggling to determine the optimum size of the parliament whose strength once stood at 80, and was raised to 150, and now stands at 130.

Women are the significant gainers of this election. While 15 seats are reserved for them, they had won 20 seats, that is, five seats outside their quota. Out of the 1,252 candidates who took part in the elections, as many as 252 were women, the highest number ever in Jordan’s electoral history.

This was the second election since the outbreak of the Arab Spring protests in the Middle East in late 2010 and has seen some new initiatives. Besides the proportional representation, the elections were conducted by the Independent Election Commission. For quiet sometime King Abdullah had been indicating that the future Jordanian Government would be headed by an ‘elected’ and not a nominated prime minister. In many ways, this election is a test of his commitment to electoral reforms.

Since the outbreak of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, Islamists parties have won various elections in the Arab world. Jordan could have gone the same way but for its electoral system of gerrymandering and affirmative action in favour of women and minorities. Partly to consolidate the position of the palace, the electoral system has always been tilted in favour of the minority population. Out of the 130 seats, nine seats are reserved for Christians, three for Circassians and Chechens, nine seats for Bedouins and 15 seats for women. To further women empowerment, three of the 15 seats reserved for women are earmarked for Bedouins. The affirmative action in favour of the minorities does not reflect their demographic conditions; for example, Christians account for about three per cent of the population but are given nine out of 130 seats.

Though the IAF is the largest bloc in the new parliament, its ability to play a key role in the government formation depends upon the level of support it receives from various like-minded blocs and individuals. Partly with this in mind, the IAF had fielded Christians and women on its list and one from each group had won their seats.

International monitors who observed the elections declared it to be free and fair and it passed off without violence. At the same time, the voter apathy was palpable. Partly to encourage young voters, the voting age was reduced from 18 to 17 and out of the 4.1 million eligible voters only 1.5 million or 37 per cent cast their ballot. The apathy appears to be widespread and more pronounced among the youth. Observers identify continuing economic crisis and growing unemployment as principle reasons. At the same time, the victory of a number of local lists indicates that the Jordanians remain more preoccupied with issues of local governance than larger issues facing the country such as the threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), growing influx of Syrian refugees, and sustaining peace with Israel.

Manjari Singh is a doctoral candidate and Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF) Fellow at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

On 9 September 2016, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) defied international pressure and conducted its fifth nuclear test. Criticising the test, the Government of India described it as a “matter of grave concern”.1 India not only urged DPRK to “refrain from such tests,” which gravely affect regional peace and stability, but also noted that the test violated Pyongyang’s international obligations and contradicts the denuclearization effort in the Korean peninsula. The Indian statement also expressed concern over the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies that have a bearing on “India’s national security”,2 alluding to the cooperation between DPRK and Pakistan in nuclear and missile technologies, possibly with China’s backing.

DPRK’s nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan is an established fact. Security relations between the two countries go back to the 1970s, when Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited DPRK in 1976. In the 1990s, Pakistan purchased long-range missiles from DPRK and, in return, helped the latter with nuclear enrichment technologies and dual use items. Pakistan’s assistance for DPRK’s uranium enrichment programme was a globally reported matter a few years ago when the A.Q. Khan scandal broke. India, on its part, has repeatedly expressed concern over DPRK-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation. For instance, while responding to the DPRK’s nuclear test in January 2016, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) also observed that the “proliferation links between North-East Asia and India’s neighbourhood are well known.”3

Yet, this Indian concern has received little attention from the US, Japan and South Korea, the three countries that are most immediately concerned by the DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests. From time to time, the US and South Korea have exerted pressure on DPRK to give up its nuclear programme through various means, mainly through UN sanctions, but such pressure has clearly not been effective. The regime of Kim Jong-Un seems to have an unswerving approach of defying these sanctions and carrying forward its nuclear and missile programmes. Besides, China’s soft approach on this issue does not serve as a deterrent for DPRK. What remains problematic, however, especially from the Indian point of view, is that the international community worries a great deal about DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes without actually acknowledging the expertise network that Pyongyang currently maintains with Islamabad and which may emerge as a bigger problem in future.

DPRK’s fifth nuclear test significantly advances its nuclear weapons capability, which is a source of strength for the Kim Jong-Un regime. As widely reported, the fifth nuclear test is the “biggest ever” test carried out by DPRK. Moreover, by conducting this test, DPRK claims that it has developed the expertise to mate nuclear warheads with strategic ballistic missiles.4 Debates continue among experts, however, over DPRK’s capability in this regard. What must worry the international community though is DPRK’s sustained and determined effort in this direction.

Much to India’s concern, these repeated tests have helped DPRK develop expertise in the use of plutonium, which enables the miniaturisation of the warhead for fitting into a missile system.5 Given the history of DPRK’s cooperation with Pakistan, apprehensions abound about Pyongyang sharing this expertise with Islamabad. Such cooperation will boost Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability, primarily its ability to miniaturise nuclear warheads. That, in turn, will enhance Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons programme and enable it to employ short- and medium-range missiles mated with nuclear warheads for battlefield purposes.

India is of the view that Pakistan failed to conduct a plutonium device test in 1998. Since then, Pakistan has been continuously trying to develop weapons-grade plutonium devices so that nuclear warheads can be miniaturised. This deficiency in Pakistan’s nuclear capability may be filled by DPRK’s assistance. Even though Pakistan has received significant Chinese assistance for its nuclear programme, particularly in terms of designing and supplying the Khushab heavy water reactor and the Chasma nuclear reactor complex which houses the plutonium reprocessing facility, it is not yet fully established whether such Chinese assistance has helped Pakistan acquire the capability to develop plutonium-based miniaturised nuclear warheads. Also, the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is a worrying factor for India, given the plethora of extremist groups operating inside that country, some of which moreover have carried out significant attacks against key military installations with impunity.

Of even greater concern is China, a P-5 member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which shows no concern about the nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and DPRK. Instead, China strongly backs Pakistan’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This amply indicates that China endorses Pakistan-DPRK nuclear cooperation. In fact, China’s approach towards the DPRK has always been complex and highly nuanced. Like most major and important regional powers, China has condemned DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests. But it differs with them on how to handle the issue including the implementation of UN sanctions. Despite the growing international pressure on DPRK, Beijing has constantly backed Kim Jong-Un’s regime by supplying food and other assistance. Notably, China continues to be the biggest trading partner of DPRK. In some ways, Beijing’s ‘special’ relations with Pyongyang have encouraged the regime in DPRK to further pursue its nuclear and missile programmes.

Given all this, the international community needs to take a fresh look not only at DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes but also at the Pakistan-DPRK nuclear cooperation which has a subtle Chinese endorsement. India’s concern on DPRK’s nuclear connection therefore needs fresh contemplation. India has so far severely and repeatedly condemned DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests. This has not, however, served New Delhi’s purpose. India has to do a lot more to make its concerns count. Expressing “deep concern” over DPRK’s rocket launch on 8 February 2016, the Government of India called on Pyongyang to refrain from such launches that affect regional peace and stability.6 Similarly, India condemned DPRK’s 6 January 2016 self-declared thermonuclear test.

Despite such stern condemnations, scepticism has recently been expressed in the media about India’s adherence to UN sanctions on DPRK. It has been contended that India is allowing science students from DPRK to study in Dehradun, ostensibly in violation of the norms of UN sanctions.7 Terming such reports as “baseless”, the MEA has asserted that “India is fully aware of its obligations under the UN Charter and has been exemplary in its implementation of UN sanctions including those related to DPRK.”8 New Delhi has also clarified that the enrolment of North Korean students in Dehradun was with the prior knowledge of UN representatives. Finally, the MEA also pointed out that India is a “victim of proliferation in its extended neighbourhood” and it is therefore incorrect to suggest that India supports in anyway a violation of UN sanctions on DPRK.9

Overall, India’s stance on DPRK’s tests rests on three broad premises. One, DPRK tests violate its international obligations. Two, such tests affect regional peace and stability, and thus India’s security as well. And, three, DPRK must refrain from further tests. A response of this nature is, however, customary. Neither does it create the required diplomatic space to discuss with the major powers the possible effects of DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes in India’s immediate neighbourhood nor does it create a condition for exerting pressure to prevent further DPRK-Pakistan nuclear cooperation.

How should India then approach the issue? First, India needs to strengthen DPRK-specific bilateral dialogues with the US, Japan and South Korea, countries that are most concerned about Pyongyang’s repeated tests. New Delhi’s approach has not been effective in this respect. India has a “global partnership” with the US, but DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests have not really figured in India-US bilateral dialogues even though nuclear issues have been the dominant aspect of most of their bilateral talks in recent years. Having an exclusive discussion on DPRK’s nuclear tests will be in the interests of both countries since they are both affected by the former’s provocative nuclear behaviour. India must therefore develop a more nuanced understanding with the US on DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests since both adhere to the goal of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime.10 This will help India highlight its concerns more intently.

Similarly, with Japan, India should not only have a shared understanding but also carry out a specific dialogue on the consequences of DPRK’s tests. Both India and Japan have expressed concerns over the “uranium enrichment activities” of DPRK but only periphrastically. More needs to be done to concretise these concerns in terms of sharing information and forging bilateral discussions. This will help India raise its concerns about DPRK-Pakistan nuclear cooperation more purposely. Besides, it will also encourage India and Japan to forge ahead in bilateral talks on a civil nuclear agreement, an issue which has not progressed much between them.

In addition, DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests must also become an important point of India’s discussions with South Korea. Both India and South Korea have often discussed and expressed mutual concerns over the deteriorating security situation in the Korean peninsula. But this discussion has been generic in nature and lacks concreteness. New Delhi and Seoul decided to establish a 2+2 dialogue mechanism on 18 May 2015 during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Seoul, but no substantial progress has taken place to push ahead this dialogue mechanism.11 DPRK’s tests as well as matters concerning the network of nuclear relations between Pyongyang and Islamabad must be priorities in these discussions. Further, establishing a stronger intelligence sharing mechanism relating to the Korean peninsula will be in the interests of India and South Korea.

Apart from strengthening bilateral dialogues with countries that are most concerned about DPRK’s continuing nuclear and missile tests, India concurrently needs to consider how it can effectively raise the matter in regional forums. Identifying appropriate regional mechanisms, partaking in it and forming a dialogue mechanism will help India highlight its concerns regionally. One such mechanism is the North-East Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). The Park Geun-hye administration in South Korea initiated the NAPCI process to foster peace and cooperation within an ambit of “infrastructure of trust” in North-East Asia. India should try and become a part of this process, and it must pursue its participation in this process with South Korea. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Park have agreed to “find complementarities” between India’s Act East policy and South Korea’s NAPCI initiative. India is not part of the NAPCI, while countries such as United States, China, Japan, Russia and Mongolia are part of this process.

Besides, India must also establish special communications with members of the Six-Party Talks – South Korea, North Korea, US, China, Japan and Russia. Although the Six-Party Talks process has become irrelevant at present, there is hope that it might be revived at some stage. Moreover, having a dialogue with members of the Six-Party Talks will serve India’s interest since all these countries, with the exception of DPRK, have a ‘strategic partnership’ with India. Also, given China’s special relations with Pakistan and lately Russia’s growing relations with Pakistan, India may find it apposite to raise its longstanding concerns at this forum.

Finally, India needs to adopt a savvier approach towards DPRK. Its policy towards DPRK has so far been measured and it has maintained a balance between ‘two Koreas’. Even as India has developed a relationship with South Korea that is ‘strategic and special’, it has also managed to maintain a good understanding with DPRK. Taking advantage of this understanding, India must initiate a pointed discussion with Pyongyang on its concerns about DPRK-Pakistan nuclear cooperation with a view to arriving at a mutual accommodation of each other’s concerns and expectations.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Statement on DPRK, Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, 9 September 2016 (accessed on 17 September 2016).
• 2. Ibid
• 3. Official Spokesperson’s response to a question on reports of a nuclear test by DPRK, Embassy of India, Seoul, 6 January 2016 (accessed on 17 September 2016).
• 4. Choi Kyong-ae and Kim Soo-yeon, “(4th LD) N.Korea conducts 5th nuclear test”, Yonhap News Agency, September 9, 2016 (accessed on September 22, 2016).
• 5. Pranab Dhal Samanta, “North Korean nuclear test and Pakistan in border, a lethal cocktail for India”, Economic Times, 13 September 2016 (accessed on 16 September 2016).
• 6. Statement on the DPRK Rocket Launch, Press Release, Embassy of India, Seoul, 8 February 2016 (accessed on 17 September 2016).
• 7. Nilanjana Bhowmick, “India’s embarrassing North Korean connection”, Al Jazeera, 21 June 2016 (accessed on 16 September 2016).
• 8. Official Spokesperson’s response to a question on an article in Al Jazeera on India and DPRK, Media Centre, Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, 23 June 2016 (accessed on 18 September 2016).
• 9. Ibid.
• 10. Strengthening the global non-proliferation initiatives has been a matter of discussion between India and the US at the bilateral level. See, Joint Statement: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21stCentury, June 7, 2016 (accessed on September 24, 2016).
• 11. India-Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 18 May 2016 (accessed on 16 September 2016).