Trinidad and Tobago has no air force, yet, has one of the Commonwealth Caribbean’s largest air arms comprising of two separate entities – the Trinidad and Tobago Air Guard and the National Operations Centre Air Division. For a country with decidedly limited numbers of air assets, having two organizations has led to duplication of effort and a faulty procurement process that has ensured no compatibility of either aircraft or avionics.

The Trinidad and Tobago Air Guard

The Trinidad and Tobago Air Guard (TTAG) as an independent service has had a very short life, being formed in 2005 by Cabinet Minute #1936 dated 28th July 2005. However, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF) has had a military aviation component since 1966 when the Air Wing of The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (TTCG) was formed with a single Cessna 337 (serial TTDF-1) which served from 1966 to 1972 when it was replaced with a Cessna 402 Utiliner (serial 201). A brief flirtation with military helicopters began with the formation of the Rotary Wing Flight in 1973 with the first of three Aerospatiale SA-341 G/H Gazelles (serials 9Y-TFN, 9Y-TFO, 9Y-TFU) coming into service. However, by 1976, these were transferred to the Air Division of the Ministry of National Security which morphed into the National Helicopter Services Limited in 1990. It was not until 2011 that the TTAG would get an independent military helicopter fleet. 

Besides the addition of a single Cessna 310 in 1985 (serial 202), the Air Wing of the Coast Guard stagnated for decades with capabilities being severely limited and aircraft being procured second-hand rather than new. The acquisition of an old Cessna 172 in 1991 added little to the Air Wing’s capabilities and it was withdrawn from service in 1994 but spent at least six years occupying space in the Air Wing’s sole hangar propped on tyres. The Cessna 402 was withdrawn from service in 1998 but again remained in the hangar on supports for at least two years. The late 1990s, however, were to bring a fresh lease on life to the outfit. At a time of enhanced counter-narcotics cooperation between the United States and Trinidad, the US used the Air Wing’s base for Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Blackhawk helicopters and in exchange, the United States transferred 2 seized PA-31 Piper Navajos (serials 203 and 204) and 2 Swearingen C-26A Metro aircraft (serials 215 and 216) to the Air Wing, thus infusing the stagnating outfit with new capabilities. The Navajos, after becoming unserviceable (the bane of Trinidadian military equipment) were phased out in 2009-2010 but the C-26As still form the most potent fixed wing assets of the force, renamed the Air Guard in 2005. C-26A serial 216 has been fitted with MR radar and FLIR while 215 appears to serve in the transport role capable of carrying 14 troops as far as Puerto Rico – a useful capability when handling disaster relief operations within the Caribbean. 

The fixed wing assets of the TTAG, therefore, were limited to three serviceable and notionally operational aircraft – 2 C-26A and one Cessna 310. Total flight time in 2008-2009 was over 250 hours in 121 missions – a figure substantially lower than the norm in 2000-2001 when over 350 hours were logged. This figure fell further by 2012 when the Cessna 310 was withdrawn from service without replacement. In addition, the C-26 aircraft began to show their age and equipment problems with the Elta M-2022 radar on board aircraft 216 seriously compromised the efficacy in the vital maritime surveillance role. Acute shortages of spares compound a major serviceability problem that has only been partially alleviated through a somewhat uneasy partnership with the Canadian company, Provincial Aerospace Limited.

The TTAG received its rotary wing assets in the form of four AW-139 (9Y-AG311, 9Y-AG312, 9Y-AG313 and 9Y-AG314) helicopters which were delivered between 2011 and 2012. Costing over USD 200 million, these four helicopters were plagued with a series of problems including structural cracks in their tailbooms and required very delicate handling in air conditioned hangars thus placing a heavy strain on the TTAG’s limited infrastructure. Exacerbating the problem was the fact that the TTAG had no trained helicopter pilots and was forced to employ foreign civilian pilots on contract while building flying hours for local pilots under some very generous contracts which worked to the detriment of the TTAG. The net result is that the helicopters remain severely restricted operationally, five years after induction.

The National Operations Centre Air Division

At the time of writing, the NOC Air Division is in a state of flux as its parent entity is seeking a new place in the revamped national security architecture of Trinidad and Tobago. However, between 2010 and 2015, it was a favoured outfit and received lavish budgetary attention, perhaps, in part because of its role in performing VIP transport missions for the then government of Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar. The NOC Air Division inherited assets from a defunct unit called Special Anti-Crime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago (SAUTT), which, at its zenith, operated 4 helicopters - 1 S-76A+, 1 AS.355 and 2 BO-105 CBS-4 - and a Westinghouse Skyship 600. The latter became something of a national joke, with its enormous bulk being easily detected. When handed over to the NOC, the helicopters (apparently purchased second-hand) were used for a multiplicity of tasks. The aircraft were equipped with FLIR turrets on external pylons and Night-Sun searchlights. The S-76 and BO-105s were natural choices for SAUTT as the country has a long history of operating these types through its civilian National Helicopters Services Limited (NHSL).

In two exceedingly controversial decisions, in 2012 and 2015 respectively, the NOC decided to lease a second-hand Eurocopter AS.355F2 at a cost that exceeded the purchase value of a similar used helicopter, the lease contract being decidedly in favour of the helicopter owner rather than the NOC, and thereafter contracted for the purchase of four Bell 429 helicopters and one Bell 412EPI helicopter. This purchase of Bell aircraft made no sense from a logistical standpoint as there is no equipment compatibility between the NOC’s purchases and those of the TTAG and places an additional burden on an already overstretched training system which is not able to meet current requirements.

Duplication of Effort and Shortcomings

For Trinidad and Tobago to operate two separate air arms with no equipment compatibility makes no sense. Furthermore, it can be argued that the procurement of AW139s for the TTAG made little sense given NHSLs successful record with S-76s and BO-105s. Compounding this error, however, was the NOC being allowed to purchase a substantial (by regional standards) fleet of Bell helicopters. This does not augur well for operational sustainability and raises serious questions regarding planning and procurement in respect of helicopter acquisition.

Almost completely neglected in the discourse on military aviation in Trinidad is the long-suffering C-26 fleet. The need for a replacement is acute as the aircraft are currently operating on borrowed time as spares and support for the type becomes ever more difficult to obtain. Furthermore, the maritime surveillance role performed by these aircraft is crucial to the country’s border security and as these aircraft become progressively less serviceable, a huge gap will emerge in Trinidad’s maritime domain awareness.

It is an unfortunate fact, and a damning indictment, that the country’s security bureaucracy wallows in complete ignorance of these matters, making no effort to understand the requirements of the TTAG. This has meant that opportunities to take remedial action to prevent a loss of operational capability have been missed and poor contractual arrangements have rendered existing assets less effective than they otherwise might have been.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

As President Obama approaches the end of his eight-year tenure, it is time to assess his foreign policy. Any reasonable assessment should take into account two considerations. One, Obama inherited from his predecessor, George W. Bush, a toxic legacy. The much bruited about Global War on Terror (GWOT), including the eminently avoidable military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which terminated ‘the unipolar moment’ over-celebrated by Charles Krauthammer following the collapse of the Soviet Union, only globalized terror and made the world more vulnerable to terror and in the process abridged civil liberties in the US and elsewhere. The second consideration is that many IR (International Relations) scholars in the US and some outside still believe that the international system resembles the solar system, with the US occupying the place of the sun and others orbiting around it. They believe that the acts of commission and omission by the US alone provide a complete account of what happens or does not happen in a crisis situation. For instance, the ongoing, seemingly unstoppable, carnage in Syria is Obama’s fault according to some scholars who exaggerate what the US can do to influence the rest of the world.

Keeping these considerations in mind, this article evaluates Obama’s foreign policy on eight major issues likely to shape his legacy.

Reconciliation with Cuba

Economic sanctions were imposed on Cuba first in 1960 when Fidel Castro, who overthrew the US-supported dictator Batista, started asserting Cuba’s right over its economic resources by nationalising the properties of US companies. Under Batista, the US Ambassador was even more powerful than the Cuban President. In 1960, the CIA sent 1,500 Cuban exiles to dislodge Castro, a disastrous failure known as the Bay of Pigs. Yet, the US persisted by replacing pigs with mongooses, with Operation Mongoose including assassination attempts on Castro. Castro, in turn, sought missiles from the USSR which led to the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when the world got very close to a nuclear war. In all fairness, the US should have ended the sanctions when the crisis was resolved. It is to Obama’s credit that he exerted his utmost and accomplished a reconciliation with Cuba in 2015. Sanctions have, however, not been fully lifted yet, as the Republicans control Congress.
Score: 9 out of 10.

The Iran Deal

In December 2007, US intelligence concluded “with a high level of confidence” that Iran had halted its nuclear weapon programme in 2003, and “with a moderate degree of confidence” that the programme remained “frozen in 2007.” Instead of engaging with Iran, President Bush continued with confrontation, and used the US clout with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council to impose asphyxiating sanctions. Resenting the sanctions, Iran started a uranium enrichment programme that could have given it enough fissile material for bombs. A disinformation campaign made sure that hardly any attention was paid to the fact the enrichment stopped at the industrial level, far below what is required to make a bomb. In other words, Iran was punished not for what it was doing but for what its foes alleged it might do in the future.

Obama, in contrast, demonstrated a singular tenacity of purpose and superb diplomatic skill in engaging with Iran and signing a deal in July 2015. He withstood pressure from Saudi Arabia and Israel, and prevented the latter from starting a dangerous war by bombing Iran’s nuclear sites. As Congress is standing in the way, some US sanctions remain.
Score: 8.5 out of 10.

Moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free and more peaceful world

Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize less than nine months after assuming office and without having done anything in particular to merit it. But he did promise to respect multilateralism and to restrict the use of the US military as the first option when confronted with a crisis. In a famous address in Prague in 2009, Obama said, “To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy… begin the work of reducing our arsenal.” A new START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with Russia was signed in Prague in 2010 setting the following aggregate limits:

• 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments;
• 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each such heavy bomber is counted as one warhead toward this limit);
• 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

The treaty marked progress towards a limited reduction of nuclear weapons, but it obviously does not take us to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. But the fault is not Obama’s. States holding nuclear weapons are not willing to give up their weapons. However, under pressure from hardliners in the Pentagon and Congress, Obama did approve a modernisation project for more accurate weapons with lesser yield (B 61 Mod12). The project might cost up to USD one trillion over three decades. Obviously, Russia and China will respond and Obama has inaugurated a new arms race. His refusal to send troops to Syria and arms to Ukraine is sensible as will be explained below.
Score: 8 out of 10.

The Arab Spring

When Tunisia’s Ben Ali fell from power in January 2011 and Egypt’s Mubarak the next month, Obama sent out signals supporting the aspirations of the people to move towards democracy. But on Libya, Obama let France and Britain persuade him to make a ‘humanitarian military intervention’. Russia and China agreed to a loosely worded Security Council resolution enabling NATO to effect regime change in a crude manner and the result is Libya in a ‘state of nature’ with a war of ‘all against all’ as Thomas Hobbes would have put it. Obama has publicly admitted that it was a mistake, but the harm done to Libya is enormous and he could have prevented it by exercising better judgment.

In Syria, Obama has been without a clear policy. In August 2011, he publicly asked President Assad to leave office. But the US has been reluctant to give effective weapons such as Stinger missiles (man-portable air defence system) to the rebels supported by it because of worries about foes getting hold of them. In 2013, Obama drew a ‘red line’ over the use of chemical weapons and the Pentagon got ready to carry out bombing after Assad reportedly used such weapons. But subsequently Obama reversed his decision, thus inflicting a degree of damage on his credibility as leader. And after spending USD 500 million to train 5,000 so-called moderate rebels fighting against Assad, the US managed to train only a handful. Russia stepped in by starting a bombing campaign and as of now, Russia has the military and diplomatic advantage.

However, Obama acted with wise restraint by not sending troops to Syria as it could have been a new ‘Vietnam’ or ‘Iraq’. In any case, he did not have that option as the US had become war weary after Bush’s misadventures. But, Obama need not have drawn a ‘red line’ if he was not ready to use his military power to take consequential action. Inconsequential words are best avoided. Obama could have prevented the ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) from taking Mosul in June 2014, but he unwisely used the situation only to put pressure on Prime Minister Al Maliki to resign. Earlier, Obama had misjudged the ISIL and called it a “J V team” (junior varsity team) of not much consequence.
Score: 5.5 out of 10.

Relations with Russia

The new START (referred to earlier) followed a decision by the newly elected Obama to ‘reset’ the rather frosty relations that had developed with Russia during the Bush years. The reset ran into problems from time to time, but it worked until the onset of the crisis in Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis was practically the creation of the US, which supported a popular agitation started in November 2013 to unseat the elected president Victor Yanukovych, who later fled to Russia in February 2014. Putin had reason to conclude that the new government would move rapidly towards joining NATO as well as EU and make it difficult for Russia to maintain its hold on the naval base in the Crimea established as far back as 1783. As a majority of the people in the eastern part of Ukraine are of Russian stock, a separatist movement arose supported by Putin. In March 2014, Putin staged a referendum after annexing the Crimea. Of course, what Putin did was illegal. But, keeping in mind his national security imperative, Putin had few options.

Obama personalized bilateral relations and nursed a personal hatred towards Putin, publicly demonstrated at a lunch given by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon at the 70th anniversary of the founding of the UN. Putin smiled as he raised his glass while Obama looked stern. As we all know, anger does not lead to good policy. Obama’s reset has boomeranged and relations with Russia can improve only under a new president. But, Obama wisely chose not to send weapons or troops to Ukraine.
Score: 4 out of 10.

Relations with China

Obama has more or less accepted the inevitability of the rise of China as the only power that can pose a challenge to the US. He also realises that the US and Chinese economies are virtually Siamese twins. In this context the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ to Asia announced in 2011 entailed plans to divert some of the military resources available with the winding down of the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan to ‘Asia’. The main purpose of the ‘rebalance’ was to reassure allies that the US intends to remain in the area and will be able to render them protection, if needed, against an assertive China.

Five years after the announcement, it is doubtful whether the allies feel confident that they can count on the US if China moves from assertiveness to aggression. The ASEAN has repeatedly failed to take a stand against China in support of Vietnam in the matter of the South China Sea. China has rejected the verdict of an international tribunal against its claims and has not stopped creating ‘facts on the ground’. The pivot appears weak for now.
Score: 4 out of 10.

The Palestine Question

Despite numerous shuttles by Secretary of State John Kerry, there has been no progress. By taking on Prime Minister Netanyahu on the question of settlements in his first term, Obama made an avoidable mistake.
Score: 4 out of 10

Relations with India

Obama succeeded in bringing India into a closer defence cooperation relationship marked by the signing of LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) in August 2016. Critics have unfairly faulted him for not getting India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). A comparison with what Bush did in 2008 in getting an NSG waiver for the Indo-US nuclear agreement does not hold as China’s clout has grown considerably in the intervening years. Closer defence cooperation with India is part of the ‘pivot’.
Score: 7 out of 10.

Overall score: 62.5 per cent.

Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) had said that world history is the world’s court of justice. History will rate Obama, the 44th President of the United States, among the top ten of the holders of that high office.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Dilma Rouseff, the democratically elected, leftist, first lady president of Latin America, has been finally impeached on 31 August 2016 and removed from Brazil’s presidency. As can be expected, there have been outbursts of contrasting public expressions, of dismay and support, for the decisive decision of Brazil`s Senate – with 61 votes against and 20 for – to impeach her. The lower house of Brazil`s parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, had already recommended, and the Senate vetted, the initiation of Rouseff`s impeachment process on 12 May this year. While seven Latin American countries, viz., Venezuela, El Salvador, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Cuba, had expressed their disapproval-cum-apprehension when Rouseff was suspended from the presidency for 180 days consequent on the Senate decision, three of these – Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia – have not only condemned outright the final impeachment of Rouseff as a constitutional coup but have also withdrawn their ambassadors from Brasilia. This diplomatic remonstration has, in turn, invited a sharp reciprocal response from the incumbent Brazilian Government of interim President, Michel Temer, who is likely to be confirmed in that position for the remainder of Rouseff`s term ending in 2018, though he will be unelected to the post.

It may be worthwhile to explore how Rouseff’s impeachment impacts Latin American politics, particularly the left-oriented regimes, at least in the immediate future. This is because some of the governments in the Western hemisphere with political proclivities similar to that of the erstwhile Workers’ Party Government of Dilma Rouseff, though installed in power through a democratic process, are presently facing strong internal opposition. These governments, because of their socio-economic policies, are being buffeted by the rightist and conservative forces attempting to reverse them, and extra-constitutional means are being used by both the governments in power and their opponents to retain and acquire power, respectively.

The salience of the impact of the Rouseff-related developments lie in the fact that there is a degree of similarity in the economic policies of the erstwhile Rouseff Government and its counterparts in some of the other Latin American countries like Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia that have been affected by the so-called `pink tide`. It will be interesting to watch whether the labour-friendly, socially inclusive and egalitarian policies in these countries can be sustained even after their originators like former Brazilian presidents Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rouseff have been removed from positions of power, or can be maintained only by forcefully entrenching the incumbent political leadership associated with such policies through extra-constitutional means and constricting the space for the political opposition as being attempted in countries like Venezuela. Temer, Brazil’s interim President, has quickly reversed many of Rouseff`s progressive policies: capping expenditure on healthcare and education while increasing the salaries of government officials, winding up the Ministry on Women Affairs, Racial Equality and Human Rights and symbolically appointing a former police officer as Minister of Justice. In contrast, some of the other regimes in the region cited above are showing greater political will to retain their progressive policies even at the cost of deepening societal divisions and undermining political institutions.

Rouseff has appealed to Brazil’s Supreme Court against her impeachment, but relief appears unlikely considering that the impeachment proceedings were carried out by Senate under the supervision of the Supreme Court Chief Justice. A significant aspect of the Senate verdict is that, though Rouseff has been removed from her present constitutional position as President, she has been allowed to hold public office including in the bureaucracy in future. This decision, as part of the impeachment verdict, is reported to be the outcome of a behind-the-scenes political compromise among Brazil’s political parties, particularly between Rouseff`s Workers’ Party and Temer’s Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB) as well as a few Senators and political leaders including some from PMDB against whom some corruption charges are looming. This compromise will enable Rouseff to remain active and relevant in politics for some more time. Other Latin American countries may draw the lesson from the impeachment verdict to the extent that, while jostling for political power there could be a way to give space to political opponents without aborting a democratic or a pseudo-democratic process altogether.

The left-oriented political forces or the `pink tide` proponents have received some setbacks in the past few years. After the demise of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez in 2013, the successor government headed by Nicolas Maduro, though managing to retain power through an election process criticized by his opponents to have been partially rigged, does not seem to be doing well so far as administration of the economy and governance in general are concerned. There has been widespread public mobilisation against the Maduro Government and the latter, in turn, has imposed restrictions on public protests notwithstanding the anti-Maduro forces drawing political support from a few Latin American countries. In neighbouring Argentina, the leftist President Christina Kitchener has been replaced by a conservative, Mauricio Macri, through a democratic process. And Peru`s leftist President Ollanta Humala has been replaced by a right-of-centre politician, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski.

The impeachment verdict against Rouseff and the manner in which the former Brazilian President has dealt with the process leading to her impeachment are noteworthy. A senior Brazilian politician, Fernando de Mello, who was forced out of the presidency in 1992 and later became a Senator and now voted for Rouseff’s impeachment, has, however, expressed doubts about the legal basis for her dismissal. A widespread view in Brazil is that Rouseff’s budget manipulations – one of the prime charges against her being that she made up for her government’s budgetary shortfalls by drawing upon funds from public sector banks – cannot be considered as a ‘crime of responsibility’. Many Brazilians are of the view that, while Rouseff may be held responsible for improper macro-management of the economy, she was not a direct beneficiary of corruption-related political activities such as illegitimately drawing upon funds from the country`s petroleum entity `Petrobras`, etc. Many also give her credit for not restraining the judicial investigation of the `Car Wash` or `Lava Jato` scandal, which involved mis-utilisation of position and authority by politicians and bureaucrats towards obtaining commissions on state-entities’ contracts for political and personal benefit, notwithstanding the likely damaging fallout on her governing Workers Party. While there has been a strong political context to the impeachment process, Rouseff has shown her determination to contest her trial constitutionally and through the due process of law. In contrast, in many of the other Latin American countries, the political contestation seems to be occurring outside of a mutually accepted legal or constitutional framework.

If Roussef’s political revival occurs, if not within a few months but in a time-span of one or two years or at least by the time the next presidential elections are held in 2018, it will have an impact throughout Latin America given Brazil’s geopolitical status and socio-economic resources, even if its economy were not to be restored to a high growth path. The way political developments are playing out in Brazil, i.e., with a door left open for Rouseff to reclaim her political space by virtue of not being embargoed from political and legislative opportunities, an outcome as visualized above seems possible. In such an eventuality, the coalescing of like-minded left-oriented political forces on a transnational basis in the Latin American context may be more effectively facilitated. Such a development may help reinforce the efforts of the middle income Third World countries – the group to which most Latin American countries belong – towards promoting a more egalitarian and participative international order. But a prerequisite for such a scenario to evolve is that the Latin American regimes of leftist or socialist hue and forces supporting them should first survive and be able to retain their respective political constituencies and support bases. It is doubtful whether this can be achieved through peaceful means if the manner of the present contestations is any indicator.

The author is a retired IDAS officer, who served till recently as an Additional Chief Secretary-level Adviser on developmental and finance issues to a State Government.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

India heaved a sigh of relief after Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ assumed charge as Nepal’s Prime Minister earlier this month. New Delhi had got tired of and frustrated with the predecessor KP Sharma Oli regime, which appeared determined to undo the new warmth that had crept into the India-Nepal bilateral after Narendra Modi became Prime Minister in May 2014. Modi was quick to congratulate Prachanda and invite him to India.

Note the contrast: When Prachanda had become Prime Minister for the first time in mid-2008, India had viewed the development with some alarm. After all, the Maoist leader didn’t exactly have a track record of being India-friendly. New Delhi’s worst fears were soon realised. Ironically, India had played a crucial role in clearing the way for Prachanda’s elevation, by persuading the monarchy to walk into the sunset; nudging the dominant Nepali Congress to do business with the Maoist leader; and convincing the Prachanda-led Maoists to give up arms and join the political mainstream. New Delhi had not reckoned, though, with the prospect of Prachanda forming a Government.

This change in attitude from 2008 to 2016 speaks volumes about how and where India-Nepal relations have progressed. There are indicators that the new Prime Minister will make his first official visit to India — as per a long-standing convention. It could be in September or October. New Delhi will view this positively, given that Prachanda had chosen China over India for his first official visit when he became Prime Minister in 2008.

The first few steps that the new Nepalese Prime Minister takes will set the tenor for the development of the relationship between New Delhi and Kathmandu. Prachanda has demonstrated some indication of change in style. He has admitted, “Last time I was inexperienced in the ways of competitive democracy. We (the Maoists) still had a mind-set from the insurgency years.”

Admittedly, there is nothing in the statement which alludes to ties with India. But an admittance of error can be interpreted as one encompassing his attitude in general, including towards New Delhi. Moreover, given that Prachanda’s Government is dependent on the Nepali Congress and a clutch of Madhesi parties that have grouped under the umbrella of what is called the United Democratic Madhesi Front — both of which are on robust terms with India — the new Prime Minister is unlikely to adopt the confrontationist posture he did eight years ago.

The India-Nepal relationship has often swung from one extreme to the other. In the last two years alone, this tendency has been in full play, and with unfortunate results for both countries. New Delhi and Prime Minister Modi were the toast of the Nepalese leadership cutting across party lines, and of the people of Nepal, following the Indian Prime Minister’s hugely successful visit to that country and his address to Parliament in August 2014. He struck a chord when he told the gathering of law-makers, “We have not come here to interfere with your internal matters, but we want to help you develop.” In light of the then ongoing work in framing a new Constitution of Ne-pal that would address the concerns of all communities of the nation, Modi advised, “Those involved in writing the Constitution should have a heart like that of a rishi (sage) and they should think far ahead.”

Modi had also, during the course of his interactions, remarked that India was prepared to accept a revised version of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in 1950. He said that Kathmandu had only to bring forth the amendments and New Delhi would sign on the dotted line, since it implicitly trusted Nepal. The New Delhi-Kathmandu bond grew stronger after India rushed in expertise and relief material within hours after a massive earthquake hit Nepal in April-May 2015, and promised any additional assistance that Nepal would ask for.

Problems began after the Constitution, shepherded by the then Nepali Congress Government led by Sushil Koirala and backed by certain opposition parties, was adopted by Parliament on the strength of numbers in the House. It had followed a so-called 16-point agreement between the Government and the opposition, which had laid down the roadmap for the new Constitution. It was instantly condemned by various Madhesi parties and Janjatis because they felt short-changed by the provisions of the Constitution. Modi’s earlier advice that a consensus-driven rather than a numbers-determined approach should finalise the Constitution had been ignored. Koirala quit as part of an earlier arrangement, but failed to get renominated as prime minister, losing out to Oli and his Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist).

India had got a whiff of the situation getting bad even as the countdown to the new Constitution began and the Madhesi leaders upped the ante. Trouble was in the air. Foreign Secretary Jaishankar was rushed to Kathmandu as Prime Minister Modi’s special envoy, to persuade the leadership there to defer the adoption of the Constitution, make appropriate amendments to it, get the Madhesis and others on board, and thereafter proceed. But it was too late. Moreover, Kathmandu viewed this intervention with hostility — a brazen attempt by India to meddle in Nepal’s internal matters. Adding to the sentiment were reports that Jaishankar had come armed with a set of seven amendments New Delhi wanted to see in the Constitution. The fire-fighting visit failed, and Nepal adopted the flawed Constitution in September 2015.

The India-Nepal relationship plummeted to a further low in the wake of the disruption in the movement of goods caused by the Madhesi agitation. New Delhi and Modi suddenly became villains in the corridors of power in Kathmandu. Oli and some of his senior leaders added fuel to the fire by blaming India for the ‘blockade’ and the resulting misery it had brought on the common citizens of Nepal. This, no doubt, served the then Prime Minister’s political agenda. In the end, Oli lost the trust of both India and the larger political system of his own country, and quit.

This backdrop is necessary to understand the challenges that both Kathmandu and New Delhi face in recasting the bilateral relationship. What is most needed is the restoration of mutual trust. Here, the China factor can be a deterrent, but it should not. New Delhi realises that it would not only be futile but also non-pragmatic to expect Nepal not to deepen ties with Beijing. However, Kathmandu must ensure that it does not engage with China in a way that can harm India’s strategic interests in the region.

Finally, the Prachanda regime’s success in bringing India-Nepal ties back on track will greatly depend on his domestic performance; that is where the goodwill which can give him political heft lies. He has to move swiftly to amend the Constitution; live up to the promises made during the second People’s Movement (Jan Andolan); and get his country out of the financial morass the earthquake landed it in. According to some estimates, the economic damage the natural disaster caused has been to the tune of USD 10 billion — half the country’s GDP. Nepal is already reeling under heavy external debt (almost USD 3.5 billion to the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank put together). Prachanda has his work cut out.

The writer is a senior political commentator and public affairs analyst.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.