Differing perceptions among the various stakeholders has emerged because the contents of the framework agreement are not in the public domain.
The signing of the historic “Framework Agreement” between the Government of India (GoI) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland Issac-Muivah (NSCN-IM) on 3 August 2015 had brought glimmers of hope amongst the Naga populace. The contents of the framework agreement are, however, not in the public domain, leading to differing perceptions amongst the various stakeholders.
The NSCN-IM has been able to galvanise broad consensus amongst the Naga political and social entities with respect to its ongoing negotiations with the GoI. Prominent Naga social bodies including the Naga Hoho, Naga Student Federation, Naga Mothers Association, Naga Peoples’ Movement for Human Rights and United Naga Council – most of whom were already amenable to the NSCN-IM’s idea of a settlement for the Nagas – have given their consent to the process. There are continuous efforts by the outfit to re-establish its clout and dominance in the claimed areas of Nagalim, including the Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Attempts by the outfit to reshape the existing construct of tribal loyalties in Eastern Nagaland has gathered pace after the defection of self-styled ‘General’, Khole Konyak, of the erstwhile NSCN-Khole-Khitovi (NSCN-KK) to the NSCN-IM, which was followed by a large scale defection of Konyak leaders as well as cadres.
The Nagas of Manipur, in general, are known to be supporting the ongoing peace process despite the prevailing anxiety over the contents of the framework agreement and its possible impact on their status. There is an ongoing awareness campaign on the social media in Manipur wherein the Over Ground Workers (OGWs) of the NSCN-IM have been highlighting the apathy and discriminatory policies of the Manipur government against the tribals. The outfit’s attempts to create divisions among the Aimol tribe, which is mainly based in Chandel district of Manipur, and its continuous engagement with the Lamkang tribe is aimed at the merger of such smaller tribes into the Naga fold. In Assam, especially along the border areas with Manipur and Nagaland, there are attempts by NSCN-IM cadres to intimidate the non-Naga population in Naga-dominated areas which conform to the territorial claims of greater Nagalim.
Developments in the aftermath of the Framework Agreement indicate that the NSCN-IM has been engaged in a focused manner on extending its influence over the entire Naga populace. The organization is making full use of its military strength, financial prowess and strong support bases in Western Nagaland and Manipur. In areas where it is relatively weak, as in Eastern Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, the NSCN-IM is either creating divisions within existing tribal constructs or is exploiting historical linkages with smaller tribes. The outfit’s usage of terms like “shared sovereignty” and “sovereignty lies with the people” is possibly aimed at addressing vulnerabilities generated on account of its changed stance on the issue of Naga independence. Besides raising the slogan of “no integration, no solution”, the NSCN-IM leaders, in an August 18 statement to the press, also hinted at walking out of the ongoing process if the issue of Naga integration is not addressed by New Delhi. This could well be part of the outfit’s pressure tactics in the ongoing negotiations. And in case the talks fail, the presence of sizeable cadres along the Indo-Myanmar border in Ukhrul and in Somra areas of Myanmar could cater for armed contingency scenarios.
Other Naga factions have responded variously to the ongoing peace negotiations between the GOI and NSCN-IM. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland Khaplang (NSCN-K) has rejected any form of engagement with the GoI and is continuing with its acts of violence. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland Khitovi-Neokpao (NSCN-KN) views the ongoing process as an arrangement for the Nagas of Manipur only, and not for the Nagas of Nagaland. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland Reformation (NSCN-R), which had earlier supported the Framework Agreement, is now complaining of delays and emergent complications in the process. Finally, factions of the Naga National Council (NNC), the Manipur-based Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) and the Manipur Naga Peoples’ Front (MNPF) have all expressed their disagreements with the current format of negotiations.
Likewise, some of the prominent Naga civil society organizations including the Eastern Naga Peoples’ Organisation (ENPO), Naga Tribes Council (NTC), Against Corruption and Unabated Taxation (ACAUT), and Zeliangrong Baudi (based in Manipur) have all denounced the framework of the talks. The NSCN-IM’s expanding dominance in Longding, Tirap and Changlang in Arunachal Pradesh has elicited sharp reactions from the local bodies in these districts, which are currently not willing to be part of the proposed arrangement.
The GoI has undertaken significant confidence building measures, and is also trying to rally divergent stakeholders in support of the ongoing process, besides continuation of talks with NSCN-IM. The joint communiqué issued by the GoI and the NSCN-IM on the ongoing peace process, along with the release on bail of Anthony Shimrey, an important NSCN-IM functionary who was arrested on charges of arms smuggling, have generated goodwill and appreciated by the Naga public as well as civil society organizations.
However, there exist several unresolved issues, which could obstruct the ongoing peace process. These include: the issue of integration of contiguous Naga inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh; the demand for a separate Frontier State by the tribes of Eastern Nagaland; addressing the aspirations of the people of South Arunachal Pradesh (areas of Longding, Tirap and Changlang Districts); rising differences amongst the ‘Naga political groups’ whose support is essential for any accord to succeed; and visible cracks in Naga society over the non-inclusion of all stakeholders in the pursuit of an acceptable and comprehensive political solution. It remains to be seen as to how the GOI and NSCN-IM work towards resolving these extant impediments.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Nagaland, National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), Northeast India
Russia’s military intervention in Syria – its first beyond its immediate neighbourhood since the end of the Cold War – highlights the significant transformation that its armed forces have gone through.
Russia’s military intervention in Syria – its first beyond its immediate neighbourhood since the end of the Cold War – highlights the significant transformation that its armed forces have gone through. The mobility and reliability of both men and machines during the operations in Syria stand in sharp contrast to their performance during the 2008 Georgia War, when nearly two decades of neglect had exposed crippling vulnerabilities. The success of this turnaround can be attributed to the USD 300 billion 10-year modernisation programme initiated in 2010, which envisioned structural and functional changes in the armed forces. While its incipient results emerged during the Crimean takeover, it is the Syrian intervention that has provided a real insight into the qualitative shift in capabilities. One can even argue that the Syrian intervention has given a new dimension to Russia’s foreign policy. This assumes significance given Moscow’s attempts to project itself as a pole in international affairs. Against this backdrop, the pertinent questions are: What are the key qualitative and quantitative changes being implemented in the Russian military? And, what role do they play in influencing the Kremlin’s foreign policy?
Military Modernisation and Reforms
The 2010 modernisation programme envisaged structural reforms at three levels – personnel, equipment, and military industrial complex. As such, one of the most vital doctrinal shifts has been the emphasis on mobility and flexible deployments.1 This is in sharp contrast to the mass mobilisation of the Soviet Army, which ruined the element of surprise. The focus, therefore, has been on re-organising divisions into brigades, and promoting inter-services integration. Each military district commander now controls all units in that zone, with the National Cent for Defence (NTSU) in Moscow being the supreme command and control centre.2 The air force, space force and aerospace defence force have been merged into the unified Aerospace Forces (VKS).3 A key priority also involves increasing the Russian military footprint in the Arctic, and strengthening non-conventional and cyber capabilities. Meanwhile, the much maligned conscription (‘kontraktniki’) service has been reduced from two to one year.4 Wages have been increased across the board, and housing and pension disbursement made more robust.5 These have helped attract personnel during a period of acute economic crisis. As a result, professional soldiers have outstripped conscripts for the first time in Russian history.6 Their combat readiness is being frequently tested through snap military exercises.
Moreover, the goal of modernising 70 per cent of all weapons platforms by 2020 has seen the Russian armed forces receive a wide array of both new and upgraded equipment. The most notable include: Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles, Koalitsiya self-propelled guns, Armata tanks, Borei and Yasen class submarines with Bulava missiles, Ratnik body armour, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These systems represent a significant leap of technology. More importantly, the defence industrial complex (OPK) has been earmarked to be the pivot of innovation that will spur the civilian high-technology sector. This assumes importance given the compelling need to diversify the economy.
Limits of the Modernisation Programme
The modernisation plan, which remains a work in progress, will be severely tested by the ongoing economic crisis. The defence ministry’s budget for 2016 was cut by five per cent,7 and the incipient social unrest will further challenge Russia’s ability to consistently spend 4.5 per cent of its GDP on defence, like it did in the preceding two years.8 The Syrian intervention is an additional expenditure as well. Given the fixed outgo in the form of ‘revenue expenditure’, the crisis is likely to affect the development and acquisition of new weapons platforms. Already, the deadlines for a number of flagship projects such as the PAK DA bomber, PAK TA transport aircraft, Barguzin railway ICBMs, hypersonic missiles and aircraft carrier have been pushed back by several years. Other weapons systems have seen a massive cut in their orders. As a result, the innovation in OPK, which was expected to be the fulcrum of rebuilding Russia’s industrial base, is likely to remain atrophied.
Meanwhile, the Syrian intervention has highlighted significant gaps in Russia’s existing technology. These include attack UAVs and targeting pods, and limited number of precision guided munitions.9 The break with Ukraine has also forced Russia to reinvent the wheel of gas turbine technology. Moreover, a number of technological innovations that Russia has introduced in Syria, namely cruise missiles, were actually developed by the ‘West’ in the 1990s. And the majority of its weapons platforms continue to be derivatives of Soviet technology.10 This highlights the significant catching up that Russia will have to do to achieve conventional weapons parity. Consequently, the salience of nuclear weapons for Russia is likely to continue to increase in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, given Russia’s historical resilience in the face of adversity, one cannot rule out the modernisation plan being reprioritised. The idea of Russia to be perceived as a great power by its citizens goes hand in glove with a strong military arsenal. This assumes significance given the asymmetrical confrontation with the ‘West’. As Russia’s Syrian intervention indicates, sophisticated technology is likely to gradually emerge while the available systems are upgraded. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has pointed out that Russian VKS, Navy and armoured units have attained a serviceability of 63, 76 and 94 percent, respectively.11 Overall, Russia’s capabilities appear to have qualitatively and quantitatively improved. As upgraded systems demonstrate their resilience, doctrinal shifts in the realm of mobility and new platforms have helped Russia project power in ways that was difficult to envisage a few years ago.
Dynamics of Military Modernisation and Russia’s Foreign Policy
It can be argued that the Kremlin – particularly after the fall in hydrocarbon prices since 2014 – has punched above its weight on the global stage despite its lack of economic competitiveness and a stagnant military. Therefore, its ability to now project power beyond its immediate neighbourhood has added a new flexibility to Russia’s foreign policy. This assumes significance given Russia’s attempts to project itself as a pillar of global diplomacy. Till now, the ability to influence global events militarily rested primarily with the United States. Russia’s entry into this group alters the existing dynamics. In this context, Russia’s use of the Hamadan airbase in Iran highlights the way it has asserted itself in West Asian geo-politics by creating facts on the ground. But having done so, the resolution of the Syrian conundrum will be a litmus test of its diplomatic skills.
Moreover, the Syrian intervention has had an accompanying benefit to Russia’s defence industry as well. It has not only allowed Russia to test new weapons but also advertise new technology to potential buyers. This can have a positive salience on its arms exports, especially given the Kremlin’s claims about having received a renewed interest in its weapons portfolio.12 While the politico-economic benefits of such transfers are well documented, what is often ignored is the ‘rouble dividend’13 that Russia earns through exports. The additional income can cushion the economic crisis from getting worse.
However, there exist significant limits to Russia’s power projection capabilities beyond its periphery. The escalation dominance that Moscow enjoys in its immediate neighbourhood diminishes exponentially away from it. The economic crisis continues to fester while the technology hurdles remain high. The modernisation plan also appears to be geared more towards the augmentation of defensive capabilities, given Russia’s size and the evolving regional security landscape. This involves an increased NATO presence in the west and the north, the threat of Islamic terrorism from the south, and latent fears of China from the east. It is unlikely that Russia envisions a global expeditionary role in the same vein as the United States. Its focus is more likely to be on Eurasia – the area of its core interests.
Russia’s plan, therefore, appears to be to raise the stakes in order to project its vital role in resolving some regional disputes. This helps dispel the notion that it can be isolated. The U.S. and Turkey have already been compelled to negotiate Syria’s future with Russia. The strong posture allows Russia to bargain for a better outcome in its standoff with the ‘West’. The nuanced interplay of several events involving Syrian developments, NATO military build-up, economic sanctions, and the Ukrainian crisis will involve a grand trade-off in the future. When the time comes, each party would like to hold an upper hand. Similarly, upping the ante strengthens the domestic narrative of a strong Russia resisting ‘Western’ pressure. It helps distract attention from the mounting economic problems within.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Anton Lavrov, “New Russian Military Infrastructure on the Border with Ukraine,” Moscow Defence Brief, No. 5 (49), 2015, at http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/5-2015/item4/article1/, Accessed on August 29, 2016.
8. “Минпромторг рассказал о плане спасения Уралвагонзавода [Ministry of Industry highlights the plan to rescue Uralvagonzavod company],” RBK, August 1, 2016, at http://www.rbc.ru/business/01/08/2016/579b64469a79479dbeccb0a1, Accessed on August 26, 2016. Uralvagonzavod, a manufacturer of state-of-the-art Armata tanks, faces a serious financial crisis. The bailout that it has received from the Russian government is significantly lower than what the company had sought. This is likely to have an impact on its production line for a product that is expected to be the mainstay of Russian forces in the future. Similarly, Almaz-Antey, one of Russia’s biggest weapons producers, has discussed cutting up to 30 percent of its workforce. “"Алмаз-Антей" планирует сократить до 30% работников ради экономии [Almaz-Antey plans to cut up-to 30% of its workers],” Itar-Tass, March 22, 2016, at http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2778301, Accessed on August 29, 2016.
12. “Воздушно-коммерческие силы [Demand of Russian weapons after Syria],” Kommersant, March 28, 2016, at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2932551, Accessed on August 29, 2016.
13. The rouble has depreciated by almost fifty per cent since the Ukrainian crisis. As a result, exports have become more lucrative, since, for each dollar, Russians now earn more roubles than they did two years ago.
Russia, Military Modernisation, Russia-Syria Relations
While the Argentinian military’s desperate state of affairs can be partly blamed on the country’s economic woes, a substantial portion of the blame must fall on the somewhat tense relationship between the military and the civilian government.
In March 2016, President Barack Obama made an official visit to Argentina where he was feted by the recently elected President Mauricio Macri. The visit was not without controversies, coinciding as it did with the 40th anniversary of the March 24, 1976 military coup that plunged Argentina into years of a repressive dictatorship. Another controversy got buried in the furore over the timing of the visit – the fact that the Argentine Air Force did not have a single operational fighter to escort Air Force One.
Following the grounding of its subsonic A-4R Fightinghawks – fewer than half-a-dozen out of 33 surviving airframes being airworthy – and with the 16 Mirage III interceptors being withdrawn without replacement in 2015, Argentina was left with a total of seven operational combat aircraft of dubious value in modern warfare.1 Not willing to entrust the security of Air Force One to Argentinian designed and built FMA IA-58 Pucara turboprop Counter Insurgency aircraft and FMA IA-63 Pampa armed jet trainers – both of which types are subsonic and incapable of even reaching the operational ceiling of Air Force One – the US Air Force deployed four F-16s to escort the Presidential aircraft.2
During the 1982 Falklands War, Argentina was able to deploy several squadrons (perhaps totalling some 120) of reasonably capable combat aircraft – Mirage IIIs, Mirage Vs, IAI Daggers – plus a strike force of A-4 Skyhawks and Super Entendards. The Argentine Navy fielded a carrier battlegroup with a strong escort of modern destroyers and frigates and possessed a submarine force that was treated with wary respect by its adversaries. These forces, in particular the Argentine Air Force and naval aviation wing, inflicted severe casualties on the Royal Navy and earned the respect and admiration of the British. Now, the Argentinian Air Force has been reduced to virtual impotence, the Navy has long lost its carrier and its surface assets are languishing for want of ordnance, and the Army has been reoriented towards UN peacekeeping operations.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Argentine military is in very poor shape, brought upon partly because of the precarious state of the economy – which in 2014 defaulted on its debt for the eighth time.3 Between 2012 and 2013, for example, the Argentine Navy suffered the triple ignominy of having the ARA Libertad seized in Ghana over the issue of Argentina’s debt, the ARA Espora being stranded in South Africa for 73 days after repairs were halted due to unpaid bills and the decommissioned destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad sinking in port.4 In 2012, it was reported that three naval vessels experienced problems due to lack of maintenance and human error.5 By 2014, the situation had not improved and the grounding of the submarine ARA Santa Cruz on June 15 of that year demonstrated that routine maintenance on the submarine’s hull was poor.6 It has been reported that because of acute shortages of ordnance, target practice in the Navy has had to rely on ammunition from the 1950s in certain cases.7 Despite the fact that the submarine force has been refitted, only 19 hours – as opposed to the stipulated 190 – of immersion training has been undertaken by the crews.8
The Air Force is in even worse shape with an acute shortage of airworthy aircraft being compounded by drastically reduced maintenance and operational budgets. In 2015, shortly after the withdrawal of the Mirage III from service, daily orders with effect from 18 August 2015 cut the air force’s working hours to only between 0800 and 1300 hours and imposed rationing on food and electricity. Moreover, it was also revealed that aircraft taken out of service would not undergo maintenance.9 Several efforts to replace the Mirage III fleet – ranging from the procurement of new Gripen fighters to attempts to procure second-hand Mirage F.1s and Kfirs all fell through. In an unusual move, even Chinese FC-1 fighters were considered but to no avail. The Army may be in slightly better shape, having taken delivery of upgraded TAM medium tanks and refurbished Huey helicopters, but seems to be orienting itself towards participation in peacekeeping operations as opposed to conventional combat.10
While this desperate state of affairs can be partly blamed on the country’s economic woes, a substantial portion of the blame must fall on the somewhat tense relationship between the military and the civilian government. In 2006, it was revealed that a naval intelligence unit was conducting surveillance and maintaining dossiers on several union leaders, journalists and politicians, including the then Defence Minister Nilda Garre.11 This scandal ultimately led, in 2012, to then President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner compelling no fewer than 36 high-ranking officers into early retirement.12 In addition, a drug smuggling scandal in 2005 compelled a purge of the Air Force leadership, further lowering the image of the military in the eyes of the public.13 It is therefore not surprising that despite increased rhetoric over the Falklands, neither Cristina Kirchner nor her predecessor (and husband) Nestor Kirchner, were friends of the Argentine military. And, between 2004 and 2013, Argentina’s military expenditure averaged around 0.8 per cent of GDP, placing the military at the bottom of the country’s priorities. Add to this devaluations of the Argentine peso, artificial exchange rates and the fact that between 78 and 90 per cent of defence spending goes towards personnel costs, and the scale of the underfunding of the military becomes evident.14
However, this tension between the Executive and the military has contributed to the virtual decimation of the country’s capability to protect its airspace and even conduct the most basic surveillance of its maritime domain. Argentina’s maritime domain now totals six million square kilometres. To protect this space, the nation can muster only 12 ships of dubious serviceability and a single P-3C Orion – five others being unserviceable, though plans exist to refurbish three of these.15 Much more serious, however, is the feeling of neglect leading to indiscipline in the military, with rifles, ammunition and even TOW anti-tank missiles disappearing from arsenals and Argentina emerging as a major source of weapons for criminal gangs in South America.16
The election of President Macri offers the prospects for a reversal of this pattern of neglect. But there are no easy options. On 1 February 2016, with the grounding of the A-4Rs, the Macri administration placed a high priority request for replacement engines and other spares for the aircraft with the hope of restoring the fleet to some degree of operability.17 However, even if such a step were to come to fruition, it would merely delay the inevitable. Neglect over two decades has meant that the entire military is facing bloc obsolescence and Argentina’s precarious economic state makes a re-capitalization of the armed forces a daunting prospect. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that despite its extreme difficulties, Argentina’s military is blessed with a core of well-trained personnel and its domestic arms industry has been able to produce such products as the TAM tank, the Pucara and Pampa aircraft, and MEKO 140A16 corvettes – a capability which still exists. This combination of trained personnel and domestic arms production capability augurs well for the recovery of Argentina’s military, provided sufficient funds are made available to meet urgent requirements. It is however poignant to see a military that dared to challenge a NATO member in battle now reduced to relative impotence.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A scramble for assets between the years 2013 and 2015 culminated in the procurement of a fleet of vessels that have restored a degree of capability and viability to the TTCG.
At the Visakhapatnam International Fleet Review 2016, a ship graced the show with her presence – the Brazilian Navy Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) BNAmazonas (P120), commanded by Commander Alessander Felipe Imamura Carneiro. While this ship would have gone largely unnoticed by the naval fraternity, being as it is of sound but unspectacular design and performance, the vessel has a peculiar significance for the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (TTCG) as it was originally built for the latter and was very nearly commissioned as the TTS Port of Spain as part of an order for three OPVs. However, in an abrupt and controversial decision, the order was cancelled in September 2010, following a change in government in May 2010. Combined with poor serviceability of surviving assets, the TTCG was in crisis and this led to a scramble for assets between the years 2013 and 2015, which culminated in the procurement of a fleet of vessels that have restored a degree of capability and viability to the TTCG.
Importance of the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard
The TTCG is the largest naval unit of the English-speaking Caribbean, with over 1400 personnel. Having responsibility for the security of the maritime domain of the Southernmost island of the Caribbean archipelago, it must contend with the trade in illegal narcotics and weapons that emanates from South America. The capability and operational efficacy of the TTCG, therefore, has a direct bearing on the ability to interdict or deter the shipment of such contraband from the South American mainland. In addition, the TTCG is responsible for the security of Trinidad and Tobago’s large off-shore oil and natural gas facilities and has, as the one of only two Caribbean forces capable of conducting long-range humanitarian and disaster relief operations (the other being the Bahamas), assisted other Caribbean nations in post-disaster recovery.
Rise and Fall of the TTCG Surface Fleet
The TTCG began its operational history with two 103-feet Vosper Ltd patrol boats – the TTS Trinity (CG-1) and the TTS Courland Bay (CG-2) – commissioned on 20 February 1965, each 31.4 metres long and displacing 123 tons. These were followed by TTS Chaguaramas (CG-3) and the TTS Buccoo Reef (CG-4), commissioned on 18 March 1972, each 31.5 metres long and displacing 125 tons. CG-1 and CG-2 were decommissioned in 1986 and CG-3 and CG-4 in 1992.
These Vospers were followed on 15 June 1980 by two modified Spica class vessels – TTS Barracuda (CG-5) and TTS Cascadura (CG-6) – each 40.6 metres long and displacing 210 tons. Following a failed attempt at local repair and refurbishment, these vessels were decommissioned after nearly 15 years of inactivity. CG-5 was scrapped. While CG-6 remains ostensibly in commission at Chaguaramas Heliport, it is completely derelict, bereft of sensors, engines, weapons and accommodation.
On 27 August 1982, four Souter Wasp 17 metre class (TTS Plymouth CG27, TTS Caroni CG28,TTS Galeota CG29, TTS Moruga CG30) were commissioned. In addition, the Coast Guard was augmented in the mid-to-late 1980s with vessels from the disbanded Police Marine Branch – one Sword Class patrol craft (TTS Matelot CG 33) and two Wasp 20 metre class (TTS Kairi CG31 & TTS Moriah CG 32) patrol craft. All of these vessels have now been decommissioned.
The years 1986 to 1995 saw the decommissioning of almost all of the TTCG patrol assets and the de facto retirement of CG-5 and CG-6 for want of serviceability as well as the inability of the TTCG to undertake routine maintenance due to severe funding shortfalls. This left the formation incapable of performing its assigned tasks on any sort of credible basis. This period, not surprisingly, saw a significant increase in narcotics and illegal weapons being shipped through Trinidadian waters.
After a number of years with almost no serviceable vessels, the period 1999-2001 saw the TTCG receive a boost with the acquisition of vessels over 20 years old including the ex-Royal Navy Island class OPV, HMS Orkney as the TTS Nelson (CG-20) and four 82 feet Point-class cutters, each displacing some 66 tons, from the United States (TTS Corozal Point CG7, TTS Crown Point CG8, TTS Galera Point CG9 and TTS Bacolet Point CG10). The Point class cutters were nominally on strength until 2009-10 when they were decommissioned, although, in reality, they had been unseaworthy for some years before. Not a single new-build patrol vessel was acquired between 1980 and 2009.
In 2003-2004, the then Government of Patrick Manning began a phased expansion of the formation including the purchase of six new Austal PB30 Fast Patrol Craft (FPC) – CG11 TTS Scarlet Ibis, CG12 TTS Hibiscus, CG13 TTS Humming Bird, CG14 TTS Chaconia, CG 15 TTS Poui and CG16 TTS Teak – commissioned between 2009-2010, and two modified oilrig support vessels – each over 15 years old – armed and re-tasked as Coastal Patrol Vessels (CPVs) – CG-21 TTS Gaspar Grande and CG-22 TTS Chacachare – commissioned on 23 April 2008. In addition, four Midnight Express Interceptors were delivered in 2005 and were extensively deployed in anti-narcotics operations.
The “crown jewels” of this expansion plan were three 90m long OPVs – to be named the Port of Spain, Scarborough and San Fernando – ordered from VT Shipbuilding (later BAE Systems Surface Ships). Easily the most advanced vessels to have been ordered by any coast guard in the English-speaking Caribbean, the OPVs were adequately armed with 25 mm and 30 mm guns and possessed the ability to stage medium-lift helicopters from their flight decks. However, an overly-ambitious integrated fire-control system and some unrealistic expectations from the TTCG in respect of the performance of the 30 mm guns led to significant delays and problems during trials. In September 2010, the Government of then Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar cancelled the contract, overruling advice from the TTCG and the then Minister of National Security, Brigadier (retired) John Sandy.
Compounding the cancellation of the OPVs, archaic bureaucratic procedures together with shortcomings in the engineering and maintenance branches of the TTCG combined to cripple efforts to maintain the fleet’s serviceability. A previous government attempted to circumvent these problems by entering into comprehensive logistics and support arrangements with VT and Austal. However, the former was stillborn because of the cancellation of the OPV contract and the latter never worked as planned because of inherent deficiencies in the TTCG maintenance structure with the result that the vessels had a dismal record in service.
By 2013, the TTCG was in dire straits and an operational audit of its assets revealed the extremely poor state of repair of the surface fleet:
Type
Quantity
Age (years)
Assigned Area of Operation
Status
OPV
TTS Nelson
1
37
Offshore – EEZ and beyond
Unserviceable
CPV
Offshore & Territorial Sea
Unserviceable
Chacachacare
2
19
Gaspar Grande
17
Austal Built FPCs
6
4
Territorial Sea & Inshore
Serviceability is variable.
2 serviceable, 4 unserviceable.
Interceptors
17
2-4
Inshore & Internal Waters
4 serviceable, 13 unserviceable.
Source: Author’s own research
Rebuilding the TTCG Surface Fleet
In January 2014, the Government appointed a professional Naval Assets Acquisition Implementation Team (NAAIT) and tasked it with procuring, inter alia, seven new CPVs and two OPVs (now curiously termed Long-Range Patrol Vessels or LRPVs) within the very short period of two years. For budgetary reasons, the numbers were reduced to four CPVs and one LRPV. The new procurement attracted some international attention and shipyards invited the NAAIT to inspect the yards and the products available. Directed by the Government, the NAAIT visited the Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) shipyard in Ulsan, Republic of Korea, the China State Shipbuilding Company (CSSC) in Guangzhou, COTECMAR at Cartagena, Colombia, and Damen Shipyards Ltd at Gorinchem, Holland.
After deliberating and assessing the vessels and designs on offer, the NAAIT recommended that the four CPVs be acquired from Damen with two additional vessels of a similar design being acquired as “utility vessels” but so armed and equipped that they could augment the four dedicated CPVs in the patrol role, all six vessels being covered by a maintenance and spares support package. The vessels selected were the SPa 5009 CPV and the FCS 5009 utility vessel. The CPVs were fitted with a surveillance system that drew heavily on high-end civilian products. In addition, they were fitted with a remotely controlled 20 mm gun. The FCS 5009 was delivered in standard configuration but with accommodation increased for a larger crew, a manually operated 20 mm gun (from TTCG stocks) and a slightly enhanced surveillance fit. Delivery of the FCS 5009s was completed by mid-2015, while two of the four CPVs have already been delivered.
The LRPV procurement was not so fortunate. NAAIT’s recommendation for a formal Request for Proposals to be sent out to all the shipyards visited by the team was initially approved and then circumvented by the direct intervention of Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar who decided, against advice, to procure a ready-made, unarmed, LRPV from CSSC of China. The latter compared unfavourably with the cancelled OPVs, but the vessel was available and delivery was effected in late 2015, providing a questionable boost to the TTCG fleet. The TTCG made efforts to revive its engineering and maintenance facilities and restore to service inactive vessels. Some success has been achieved in this regard with CG-21 and CG-22 being refitted locally and will soon rejoin the fleet.
When the procurement of these vessels is complete, the TTCG will have no fewer than eight 46-50 metre patrol and utility vessels in service plus a 79 metre LRPV. Of these, the LRPV and six of the eight smaller vessels are new ships and this acquisition is the biggest successful acquisition programme in the history of the TTCG. These assets would give the TTCG the ability to conduct effective surveillance and interdiction operations within its maritime domain. But, the sustainability of these assets is dependent on the TTCG showing the determination to learn from its mistakes and creating a responsive and capable maintenance infrastructure to support its operational assets.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
NSG and China’s Grand Strategic Flip-flops: Some Plausible Explanations
A. Vinod Kumar
August 24, 2016
Given that the NSG may not be able to withhold the India membership question for long, in spite of China’s inconsistent positions, it would be unwise on India’s part to forfeit any advantage it has on the SCS issue.
When India responded cautiously to the international tribunal’s rejection of China’s claim over the South China Sea (SCS), many commentators construed it as India ceding crucial ground on an issue where a tit-for-tat response would have been more appropriate to China’s ‘sabotage’ of India’s admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). For South Block mandarins, a low-key diplomatic reaction to the tribunal’s verdict was an opportunity to not ruffle Beijing’s feathers and keep a window open for engagement with China on the NSG affair. The latter tactic seems to have been effective with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India– ostensibly to prepare for the upcoming G-20 and BRICS summits in Hangzhou and Goa, respectively – opening the space for dialogue on both the NSG and SCS. While Beijing evidently wants to buy New Delhi’s silence on the SCS at these summits, the possibility of a quid pro quo on the NSG was highlighted by the conciliatory voices in the Chinese media.
A commentary in Xinhua noted that India had ‘wrongly’ blamed China for the NSG episode, and that New Delhi should not be “downhearted as the door to the NSG is not tightly closed.”1 This apparent toning down of rhetoric is a far cry from the days when the Chinese official media spewed vitriol on India’s NSG quest, to the extent of warning India against letting “its nuclear ambitions blind itself.”2 Is a quid pro quo possible or tenable for India, especially since the SCS and NSG have emerged as strategic arenas for both powers to grapple with each other in their power balancing quests? The answer may lie in understanding China’s recent grand strategic behaviour, including why it blocked India’s NSG bid.
The ‘hedge’ finally takes-off
When the India-US nuclear deal was announced through a joint statement on 18 July 2005, followed by the NSG waiver of September 2008, the dominant perception was that the US was providing India with this special privilege as a means to counter-balance China. Though factors like India’s burgeoning nuclear energy market and the need to strengthen non-proliferation by including a country with a good record were espoused, that the US simultaneously talked of making India a ‘major power’ underlined the realpolitik that drove the deal. Both the Chinese and Indian strategic communities had then rejected this notion. Nor has India substantially added to any American effort to contain China or the Chinese sphere of influence in the subsequent years.
Things seem to have changed, however, with the advent of new dispensations in Beijing and New Delhi, with Xi Jinping showing signs of aggressive Chinese international posturing and Narendra Modi pursuing a proactive foreign policy agenda. The increasing strategic proximity between the US and India since Modi assumed office – including India’s consent to the logistics and communications agreement,3 firmly placing it in the US strategic ambit – seems to have convinced the Xi regime of India beginning to play a hedging role. Beijing could have seen the redline being crossed when India took the unprecedented step of issuing a joint statement4 with the US on SCS, and also espousing their common strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region – zones where China is beginning to engage in a contest for dominance with these powers. China’s NSG action has a clear message– that the hedging role will come at a cost for India.
A power transition in the works?
Another explanation for China’s behaviour could be linked to its larger strategic outlook – on the roles China wants to assume for itself on the global stage. This may be shaped by two key aspects: (a) Xi Jinping’s perception about the world order and the potential space for Chinese leadership in global affairs; and (b) the strategic imperative of countering the US rebalancing strategy in its periphery and securing its interests in the Asia-Pacific littorals. As the power transition argument goes, when a rising power is dissatisfied with the status quo maintained by a ruling hegemon, it could seek to challenge this condition through contestation, aggression or realignment. China’s evolving economic crisis and America’s Asia Pivot are developments that could undermine Beijing’s prominence as an economic and military power. The need to reverse these conditions, and thereby reduce the US hegemonic grip, might be the rationale for Beijing’s belligerence in its current global postures, be it on the SCS or at the NSG.
The NSG episode, in fact, suitably fits into this dimension as a calculated attempt to challenge US dominance of the non-proliferation regime. The US as the sole hegemon leads a group of guardians (described as a liberal security community, owing to its western domination)5 to lord over the regime and its normative structures. While Russia had figured in this group thanks to the superpower consensus that led to the creation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, China, having termed the guardians as an ‘imperial’ grouping in those formative years, later became a palpably incompatible partner in this framework. Beijing, hence, sees its NSG role as a means to restore its pride of place among the guardians, and also by virtue of being a nuclear weapon state and a leading nuclear energy producer. Well before India’s membership episode, Beijing had expanded the scope of its ‘grand-fathered’ nuclear agreement with Pakistan to newer facilities as a symbolic response to the India-US deal, thus demonstrating that it too could flex muscles within the regime– a posture further reinforced by blocking India. However, it needs to be seen whether these actions will elevate Beijing’s standing in the regime or instead further its image as an irresponsible actor.
Beijing’s dented image
At the core of China’s current problems is its inability to project itself as a responsible global player or one that is peacefully rising on the global scene. Its recent actions –the saboteur role at NSG and sabre rattling over SCS –only aggravate concerns of an authoritarian state seeking to further its hegemonic ambitions. Added to this dimension is China’s own shady record of indulging in or aiding proliferation and the strategic deception it pursues in its international behaviour. From Mao’s terming of nuclear weapons as ‘paper tigers’ and subsequent change of tack to develop a nuclear arsenal, staying out of NPT negotiations calling it an instrument of imperialism and ending up with the current “care about NPT,” 6 and from the activism on the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and subsequent pursuit of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability, examples abound on how words and actions hardly match in China’s grand strategic posturing.
While currently attempting to assume a guardianship role, Beijing’s record of supporting many clandestine nuclear programmes7 had not just invited numerous sanctions from the US,8 but also underlined its own struggle for legitimacy as a nuclear-armed great power. In fact, China was nowhere involved in the initial construction of the non-proliferation regime, and was kept out for long years from the affairs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).9 Though it managed to join the IAEA in 1983 and sign the NPT in 1992, Beijing’s failure to get into groups like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), thanks to its proliferation history, reflects its frustrations on India gaining greater recognition in the system, despite being a non-NPT state.
Is a quid pro quo needed?
Though the reference to NPT and full-scope safeguards is cited to deny membership to India, the unprecedented India-specific waiver of 2008 and the possibility of devising new criteria for non-NPT states refutes any element of sanctity for this framework.10 Relevant to this aspect is the different set of parameters employed to endow the India-specific waiver, which illustrates the scope of flexibility that this grouping has to determine its membership rules.11 However, formulating criteria for non-NPT states with the objective of also including Pakistan will imply that the grouping has diluted its fundamental philosophy of non-proliferation. Such a criterion could also mean that the NSG may not deny a similar claim by even North Korea in the distant future.
Accordingly, it could be argued that the NSG may not be able to withhold the India membership question for long, in spite of China’s inconsistent positions. Given that, it would be unwise on India’s part to forfeit any advantage it has on the SCS issue. Therefore, India should emphasise upon freedom of navigation in the high seas at the forthcoming multilateral summits in order to convey the message that Beijing needs to perfect its behaviour if it seeks a respected global standing.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Furthering the premise of an increasingly severe security environment, Japan’s latest defence white paper has accorded relatively more space to its ‘strong concerns’ over China’s ‘active maritime expansion’ as well as progress in North Korea’s missile development programme.
Two important developments took place in Japan in August – release of annual defence white paper ‘Defence of Japan 2016’, and the appointment of right-wing leader Tomomi Inada as the new defence minister following the cabinet reshuffle. Looking at these two developments in the backdrop of the July upper house election, which provided impetus to the pro-revision elements1, the latest ballistic missile launch by North Korea, which fell inside Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)2 in the Sea of Japan, and the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on South China Sea appears to have infused a fresh momentum to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s agenda of redefining the Japanese security outlook, a process initiated after he assumed power in late 2012.
Furthering the premise of an increasingly severe security environment around Japan, with “destabilising factors becoming more tangible and acute”,3 the latest defence white paper has accorded relatively more space to Japan’s ‘strong concerns’ over China’s ‘active maritime expansion’ as well as progress in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development programme, compared to the previous white paper.4 It has also articulated the criticality of the Legislation for Peace and Security, which came into effect in March 2016, in enhancing deterrence, reinforcing the Japan-US alliance, security cooperation with other nations within the framework of Proactive Contribution to Peace, policy initiatives and measures aimed at strengthening defence industry and boosting the development of defence technology.
Notably, the 2016 white paper upgraded the Japanese threat perception vis-à-vis China by replacing ‘concern’ with ‘strong concern’5 over what Tokyo regards as China’s ‘heavy-handed’ attitude in the maritime and airspace. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan has consistently critiqued China’s unilateral claims and effort at forcefully changing the status quo. Since September 2012, Japanese foreign ministry has claimed that Chinese ships have been traversing the waters adjoining the Senkaku Islands more frequently. Following the permanent court of arbitration’s recent ruling on the South China Sea, Japan has been emphasising, both individually and within trilateral frameworks such as the Japan-US-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, the significance of safeguarding the rules-based maritime order including in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean.6
In recent weeks, Japan has registered strong protest against the increasing number of Chinese ships entering into the waters around the Senkaku Islands.7 Earlier in June, defence ministry claimed that a Jiangkai I-class frigate and a Dongdiao-class intelligence collection vessel of the Chinese Navy had entered the Japanese contiguous zone on separate occasions. Furthermore, as stated in the white paper, Japan’s Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) had to scramble fighter aircrafts 571 times against Chinese jets.8 In fact, while outlining the Japanese expectations, the 2016 white paper urges Beijing to act responsibly and conform to the international rules.
Regarding the defence of remote islands, Japanese strategy has been to focus on positioning units, intensifying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in peacetime and acquiring maritime and air superiority.9 In January this year, Japan established the ninth Air Wing at its Naha Air Base to further enhance its defence posture in the south-western region. Two F-15 fighter squadrons are now hosted by this base.10 Two months later, in March, a coast observation unit was instituted at Yonaguni, the westernmost inhabited island of the country. Japan further plans to create an Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, equipped with fixed wing patrol aircrafts (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K) in its south-western region. In addition, to facilitate transportation and deployment of units, Japan plans to focus on improving Osumi class transport LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank) and introducing V-22 Ospreys.
Meanwhile, summarising the key aspects of the latest white paper, Japan’s former Defence Minister Gen. Nakatani stated at a press conference held on August 02, just a day before he was replaced by Inada, that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development programme pose “a grave and imminent threat to the security not only of Japan but also of the region surrounding the country and the international community.”11 The 2016 white paper clearly referred to the technological sophistication achieved by North Korea and argued that it is likely to have succeeded in miniaturising its nuclear weapons and building nuclear warheads.
The white paper noted that North Korea has “shown readiness to acquire technologies to make practical use of new intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles and make them more sophisticated, presenting serious concerns for Japan and other relevant countries.”12 Given the situation, Japan is advancing its capabilities to intercept and defend against ballistic missiles. It is also engaged in joint research with the US on developing modified types of SM-3 and PAC-3. As regards SM-3 Block ⅡA, it is in its final stages and is expected to be complete by 2017.
Alliance with the US however remains the ‘cornerstone’ of the Japanese security. The revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, which constitutes the nucleus of the security alliance, has added qualitative depth to the security partnership.13 The 2016 white paper argues that the alliance serves as a ‘public good’ that caters to the goal of the Asia-Pacific stability. Today, the need to shoulder greater responsibility and to sustain the alliance with the US is more pressing for Japan than ever before owing to the geo-political complexity arising from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s push for a new model of great power relations with the US. Meanwhile, in view of the treaty obligation, the fear of possible entrapment in the East China Sea is also very much prevalent among a section of the US strategic community. This is in addition to the budgetary constraints which will shape the future US commitment towards the region.
At the regional level, both China and South Korea have reacted sharply to the Japanese defence white paper. Chinese defence ministry spokesperson has described the white paper as “full of lousy clichés”, “full of malice” and “irresponsible remarks” against China. Expressing “strong dissatisfaction” and “resolute opposition”, the spokesperson alleged that the white paper deliberately “hypes up the East and South China Sea issues” in order to “sow discord” among China’s neighbours. It was categorically stated that “the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is never a problem”. The spokesperson denied that China is “changing the status quo in the South China Sea by relying on its strength”. With regard to contesting claims over parts of the East China Sea, the Chinese spokesperson asserted that Beijing’s military actions are “absolutely based on the indisputable fact that the Diaoyu Dao belongs to China.”14
Over the years, China has claimed that Abe has engineered a China threat theory to validate his militarist drive among the Japanese electorate. Meanwhile, South Korea too has registered a strong protest against Japanese claims over the sovereignty of Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in its annual defence white paper. South Korean defence ministry had summoned the Japanese defence attaché in Seoul and underscored the need for Japan to undertake “corrective measures.”15 It is to be noted that Japan had been laying claim over Dokdo Islands in its annual defence white papers since the Koizumi era. Both China and South Korea have urged Japan to reflect on history and make sincere attempts to build mutual trust and facilitate the strengthening of bilateral relations in the larger interest of peace and stability in the region.
Japan under Prime Minister Abe has certainly witnessed tectonic shifts in its post-war security policy: enabling limited exercise of collective self-defence, escalation in defence expenditure, reorganisation of security structures including establishment of institutions such as the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), gearing up the R&D for achieving technological superiority and promoting security cooperation with other nations.
Japan’s ongoing effort at bolstering its deterrent capabilities is bound to raise anxiety levels in a region that has long suffered from complex historical baggage, intensified nationalism and persistent tension around fiercely contested geopolitical hotspots. As the US expects Japan to assume greater responsibilities, a key challenge before Abe is to define in unambiguous terms the scope and limits of his vision of Japan as a Proactive Contributor to Peace – basically, maintaining the delicate balance between sharing greater burden in ensuring regional security as part of the long-standing alliance with the US, on one hand, and factoring in regional sensitivities as well as its own deeply fractured domestic constituencies, on the other.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
13. The Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation was revised in 2015 further expanding the scope of cooperation after 18 years since the 1997 revision.
ROK is employing an effective combination of gifting equipment combined with joint ventures with local industry, which has the dual effect of increasing exports and forging partnerships with domestic industries in a region where it has hitherto had a very minimal defence relationship.
In August 2016, the first photographs of the BAP Ferre (PM-211) appeared in the livery of the Peruvian Coast Guard. This sound, albeit decidedly unremarkable, ship would not have warranted a second glance even by the relatively modest naval standards of the region but for the fact that it was the latest example of the quiet penetration of the Latin American arms market by South Korea (or more accurately the Republic of Korea – ROK). Unheralded, the ROK has made remarkable inroads: securing contracts from countries in the region for the supply of assault rifles, aircraft, anti-ship missiles and warships, and entering into joint ventures with local shipyards for the design and construction of patrol vessels as well as with Peru’s fledgling aviation industry to assemble basic trainer aircraft. And it has ambitions for further sales in the years to come.
Placing a monetary value on ROK arms exports to the region is difficult as these exports are comprised of three discernible categories:
Outright sale of either weapons or military platforms such as ships and aircraft
Design and Co-production joint-ventures
Transfers of surplus naval vessels
Furthermore, many of these exports were done as part of government-to-government transactions – spearheaded by the ROK’s very active diplomatic missions – which may have involved cooperation in other spheres, thus making estimates of precise values somewhat inaccurate. What is known, however, is that the ROK has exported defence items worth USD 3 billion annually for three consecutive years of either weapons or platforms such as ships or aircraft.1 Between 2011 and 2014, ROK arms exports grew at an average rate of 11.6 per cent per annum. In 2015, however, its arms exports recorded a fall of 3.4 per cent.2 While the majority of these sales valued at over USD 1.6 billion were to countries in Asia (with Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines being major customers), sales of more than USD 1 billion were registered in Europe (notably the K9 self-propelled howitzers to Poland and Turkey and the KT-1 basic trainer aircraft to Turkey), and a sale of assault rifles was made to Nigeria. Latin America accounts for about USD 300 million of the ROK’s arms exports annually, if joint venture investments are taken into account.3
While the sales themselves are of importance, the ROK is using arms exports as a way to build influence and explore avenues of defence cooperation within Latin America and has employed an interesting and effective combination of gifting equipment combined with joint ventures with local industry. This has the dual effect of increasing exports but also forging partnerships with domestic industries in a region where the ROK has hitherto had a very minimal defence relationship.
Military Sales
In 2012 ROK secured a contract to supply SSM-700k Haeseon anti-ship missiles to the Colombian Navy for the latter’s upgraded Almirante Padilla class light-frigates.4 This was significant as it marked the first sale of missiles from a country other than the United States, Russia/ former USSR or one of the European Union member states to the Latin American region. Later that year, the ROK signed a contract to supply 20 KAI KT-1 basic trainer aircraft to the Peruvian Air Force, again marking a major breakthrough for aircraft from hitherto non-traditional sources.5 In both cases, the sales were made through inter-governmental agreements and are indicative of the ROK’s willingness to circumvent the tendering and procurement processes of the respective countries by leveraging its bilateral relations to foster these foreign military sales. It should be noted that the ROK had previously been successful in selling a small quantity of K2 assault rifles to Mexico and a supply tanker (Ciudad Bolivar T-81) to the Venezuelan Navy. The ROK has used its entry into the Peruvian market with the KT-1 to pitch for a sale of its advanced T-50 jet trainer to the Peruvian Air Force, though there has as yet been no progress in this regard.
Joint Ventures for Design and Co-production
The deal to supply the KT-1 basic trainer aircraft to Peru included a provision whereby 16 of the 20 aircraft would be assembled by the Peruvian maintenance, repair and overhaul firm SEMAN. This would represent a quantum leap for Peru’s nascent aviation industry and reflects ROK’s willingness to establish assembly facilities for products within the region. The joint-venture concept was significantly enhanced in the naval sphere through the establishment of two joint-ventures between STX Offshore and Shipbuilding of the ROK and COTECMAR of Colombia and SIMA of Peru respectively. The 2013 deal with SIMA of Peru has a value of USD 82.2 million and is for the construction of five 500 ton patrol boats. Based on the Taeguk class serving in the ROK Coast Guard, and the first in a total of 10, these vessels will significantly bolster the Peruvian Coast Guard while simultaneously boosting SIMA’s shipbuilding capability.6 The first two vessels were commissioned in March 2016, closely adhering to the stipulated contractual timelines.7
COTECMAR and STX have embarked on a much deeper collaboration which has seen a joint design and development effort to develop a 250 ton 46metre patrol boat for the Colombian Navy. The CPV-46 project could total as many as 14 vessels, with two of them being built in the ROK and the rest at the COTECMAR yard in Colombia. Of interest is the fact that STX has given the export rights of the design to COTECMAR. Despite having only commissioned a single locally built vessel (two more having been delivered from the STX yard in Korea), COTECMAR has offered the type for export.8 The willingness of STX to partner with COTECMAR for the design of these vessels is in stark contrast to the practice of European firms such as Damen which have been willing only to allow the assembly of vessels in Colombia but refused to partner in the design process. As COTECMAR has ambitions of becoming a major ship design and ship manufacturing hub in the region, its partnership with STX has stood in good stead while simultaneously enhancing the ROK’s presence in the region.
Transfers of Surplus Military Hardware
The ROK has a long history of transferring surplus naval vessels – usually as they are being decommissioned from its naval service. Over the years, 19 Chamsuri class patrol boats have been transferred to countries such as the Philippines, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Timor and Bangladesh. Despite the fact that the class is now approximately 40 years old, the vessels have given good service and they continue to be offered as free incentives for countries to place orders for Korean vessels –two being offered to Trinidad and Tobago in 2014 free of charge should the country place an order for Korean OPVs. The Korean naval vessels that have been transferred by this route are noted for their excellent state of repair despite their age.
With this precedent, it is not surprising that ROK has made similar offers in Latin America and has found takers in Colombia and Peru. It is perhaps no coincidence that these two countries are the recipients of this largesse given the contracts secured by STX with COTECMAR and SIMA as noted above. The ROK, when undertaking these transfers, is careful to remove weapons systems that may have been imported for the vessels – MM.38 Exocet and Harpoon anti-ship missiles with their associated radars and anti-submarine gear such as Mk.46 torpedoes, depth charges and sonar, restricting the vessels to the patrol role.
To date, two ex-ROK Navy 1200 ton corvettes have been transferred – one each to Colombia and Peru. Colombia took delivery of a Donghae-class corvette (ex RoKS Anyang – PCC-755), which, after its refit, was commissioned into the Colombian Navy as the ARC Narino (CM-55).9 Peru, for its part, availed itself of a Pohang class corvette of the Flight-II subgroup (ex RoKS Geongju PCC-758), which has been commissioned as the BAP Ferre (PM-211) mentioned above.10 There are reports that a second Pohang class vessel is to be transferred to Peru but as yet there is no confirmation of the same.
The combination of approaches adopted by the ROK towards arms sales in Latin America has yielded significant results in a very short period of time. Making effective use of its diplomatic missions, the ROK has played to its military industrial strengths while making careful assessments of the requirements of its potential customers. Its willingness to enter into joint ventures and even design partnerships is uncommon in a region where direct sales are usually the norm. As the ROK deepens its involvement in the region, it remains to be seen whether it is able to make further progress in respect of arms exports to the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Regardless of the concessions Beijing is willing to offer on the NSG and bilateral issues, New Delhi has reason to continue viewing China’s maritime manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean Region with suspicion.
During his visit to New Delhi last week, Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, held wide-ranging talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj. The agenda for discussion is said to have included a number of sticky bilateral issues – China’s perceived opposition to India’s membership of the NSG, Beijing’s opposition to UN sanctions on Jaish-e-Mohammed Chief, Masood Azhar, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Missing from the list of issues, however, was the South China Sea (SCS) – a subject Beijing had apparently debarred from discussion in any context or form.
Oddly, a day after Wang returned to Beijing, the Chinese media hailed India for being “neutral on the South China Sea” – as if the Chinese foreign minister has secured an assurance from India that if the matter ever came up for discussion in an international forum, New Delhi has promised not to take sides. Meanwhile, Indian newspapers pointed out that, despite never mentioning the South China Sea in his official discussions, the Chinese foreign minister did bring up the issue informally with the media. In response to a question by a journalist, Wang had observed solemnly that India needed to decide "where it stood on the matter of the South China Sea" – a clear indication that support on the vexed territorial disputes in Southeast Asia may have been the real purpose of his visit.
Interestingly, in the run up to Wang’s departure for India, The Global Times, a tabloid widely seen as the Chinese government’s mouthpiece, warned New Delhi that its seemingly inimical posture on the South China Sea was potentially damaging for bilateral ties and could create obstacles for Indian businesses in China. "Instead of unnecessary entanglements with China over the South China Sea debate during Wang's visit," an editorial in the newspaper declared, "India must create a good atmosphere for economic cooperation, including the reduction of tariffs…amid the ongoing free trade talks."
Clearly, China remains worried that India could join other countries in raising the controversial issue during the G-20 summit to be held in Hangzhou next month. With the United States certain to rake up the UN tribunal’s rejection of Chinese claims within the "nine-dash line", Beijing is determined to muster support for its own position on the matter. Wang’s India visit was widely seen as part of a Chinese lobbying effort to ensure that New Delhi does not join Washington and its supporters in pushing Beijing on the defensive by bringing up the SCS.
Chinese leaders might claim that by avoiding a mention of the South China Sea during discussions with Wang, Beijing can safely conclude that New Delhi is in agreement with its stand on that matter. The Chinese political leadership must, however, know that while New Delhi respects China’s viewpoint, it chooses to take a principled position on the disputes in the SCS. For three reasons, Southeast Asia and its contested littorals matter to Indian interests.
First, Indian trade and economic linkages in the Pacific are becoming stronger and deeper. Not only are ASEAN and the far-eastern Pacific key target areas of the "Act East" policy, Asia’s Eastern commons are increasingly a vital facilitator of India’s economic development. With growing dependence on the Malacca Strait for the flow of goods and services, economics is increasingly a factor in India’s Pacific policy. China must know that territorial conflicts in the SCS threaten the future trajectory of India’s economic development, creating an unacceptable hindrance for regional trade and commerce.
Secondly, India believes that the disputes in the Southeast Asian littorals are a litmus test for international maritime law. In the aftermath of the Hague Tribunal’s verdict on the South China Sea, New Delhi feels obligated to take a principled stand on the issue of freedom of navigation and commercial access as enshrined in the UNCLOS. Beijing must know that regardless of the guarantees it seeks from India about staying neutral on the SCS, New Delhi cannot be seen to be condoning the aggression of armed Chinese naval ships, aircraft and submarines in the region.
Regardless then of the concessions Beijing is willing to offer India on the NSG and bilateral issues, New Delhi has reason to continue viewing China’s maritime manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with suspicion. For all the geniality on display during Wang’s visit, Beijing still hasn’t explained its rapidly growing undersea presence in littoral South Asia. The flimsy pretext of anti-piracy operations to justify the deployment of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean makes many Indian maritime analysts believe that China is preparing for a larger strategic thrust in the Indian Ocean.
Lastly, Beijing must know that New Delhi recognizes the threat that Chinese aggression poses for the wider Asian commons – in particular the exacerbation of existing power asymmetries. In order to contribute to a fair and equitable regional maritime order, New Delhi will take a stand that restores strategic balance in maritime-Asia.
There are, of course, things that New Delhi isn’t in a position to officially communicate to Beijing. For instance, the correlation that Indian maritime analysts discern between aggressive Chinese patrolling in the SCS and its growing deployments in the Indian Ocean Region; or the suspicion in Indian strategic circles that China might use its SCS bases as a springboard for active projection of power in the Indian Ocean.
Beijing might be surprised to learn that many Indian analysts and policymakers view China’s aggressive response to the UN Arbitral Tribunal’s verdict as part of a broader strategy to project power in Asia’s critical littoral spaces. Indian experts, however, recognize that China operates from a position of strength in the SCS, wherein it has physical possession over some critical islands.
What New Delhi really worries about is China’s reclamation and militarisation of features in its possession – particularly the deployment of missiles, fighters and surveillance equipment in its Spratly group of islands, allowing the PLAN effective control over the entire range of maritime operations in the SCS. Indian experts also recognize the important role Beijing’s militia forces play in achieving its regional objectives. India knows well that the main threat to maritime security in Asia isn’t so much the PLA Navy, but China’s irregular forces. Chinese surveillance ships, coast guard vessels and fishing fleets are the real force behind Beijing’s dominance of the littoral spaces.
With the expansion of Chinese maritime activities in the IOR, New Delhi fears a rise in non-grey hull presence in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Already, China’s distant water fishing fleet is now the world’s largest, and is a heavily subsidised maritime commercial entity. While an increase in the presence of such ships doesn’t always pose a security threat, India remains wary of Chinese non-military maritime activity in the Eastern Indian Ocean.
That said, nothing lays bare Indian anxieties as much as the prospect of Chinese naval bases in the IOR. India’s China sceptics are convinced Beijing’s blueprint for maritime operations in the Indian Ocean involves the construction of multiple logistical facilities. China’s 10-year agreement with Djibouti in 2015 for the setting up of a naval replenishment facility in the northern Obock region is widely seen by Indian experts as proof of the PLA Navy’s strategic ambitions in the IOR.
This does not mean that New Delhi is going to team up with the United States in an effort to contain China. On the contrary, Indian policymakers clearly recognize that naval manoeuvres in the SCS emphasising "freedom of navigation" are a risky proposition. While India would like to see all parties act in accordance with the law, New Delhi will not take sides on the territorial disputes. Even so, the possibility that China might eclipse India in its own "backyard" will continue to drive a security response in New Delhi, even as it seeks to strengthen the Indian naval presence in its near and extended waters.
Of course, Indian leaders cannot articulate the full extent of their anxieties over Chinese maritime operations in Asia. Regardless of the concessions on offer to New Delhi, Beijing must know that India will not agree to a compromise deal with China on the South China Sea.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Turkey is going where President Erdogan wants to take it to, as those who do not agree with him are too intimidated to stand in his way.
Turkey is going where President Erdogan wants to take it to, as those who do not agree with him are too intimidated to stand in his way. To figure out Erdogan’s plans, we have to look critically at both what he has done in Turkey after the coup collapsed and his foreign policy moves before and after the failed coup a month ago.
Erdogan invoked the people’s power initially to crush the coup and subsequently to approve the huge purge and other measures to suppress dissent with the aim of concentrating more and power in his hands. Hundreds of thousands of Turks came on the street night after night to show support for Erdogan. His thesis that the followers of Fehtullah Gulen, living in self-chosen exile in the US since 1999, carried out the coup attempt and that Gulen himself masterminded it has been accepted by a majority of Turks. That no convincing proof of Gulen’s involvement has been offered is a different matter.
Erdogan moved fast after the collapse of the coup giving the impression that he had planned it all beforehand. He started a purge, declared a national emergency, shut down dissenting media outlets to intimidate the rest into falling in line, and suspended Turkey’s compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. On July 16 itself, hours after the coup collapsed, 2745 judges were taken into custody. Obviously, the list was there before the coup attempt. Erdogan has done some ‘purging’ in the past from time to time, but this time it has been truly massive even at the cost of making it difficult for the government to function. For example, 21,000 private school teachers and 1500 university deans have been purged, while 1700 schools have been shut altogether. Naturally, the education sector has been gravely disabled. Can the Finance Ministry function normally when 1500 have been sacked? About 300 in the Foreign Office are under investigation including two ambassadors. About 32 diplomats have refused to return to Turkey and have sought refuge in other countries including the two military attaches in Greece who escaped to Italy. There is hardly any part of the government that has escaped the purge which has affected over 80,000 individuals.
What will be the impact of all this on the economy? Will foreign investment be attracted to a country in such turmoil? On July 17, Bloomberg carried a story with the caption “Turkey set for market turmoil as coup turns investors ‘ice-cold’.” Turkey has worked hard to convince the world that the failed coup has not in any way made investment in the country riskier than it was. A paid advertisement was taken out in the Financial Times of London. The rating agency Moody’s announced on July 18 that it was reviewing the current Baa3 grade and that the finding will be announced in mid-October. On July 20, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Turkey from BB+ to BB, drawing attention to ‘polarization of political landscape’ and erosion of ‘institutional checks and balances’. What Turkey’s government does not seem to or does not want to understand is that while the outside world is glad that the coup attempt failed it is concerned about the future of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey.
The 75,000-strong Turkish military, the second largest in NATO, has lost about half of its 360 generals in the purge. Ever since he became Prime Minister in 2002, Erdogan has consistently tried, not without success, to reduce the clout of the military. It was a happy coincidence for him that Turkey’s bid for admission to the European Union (EU) necessitated raising its democratic credentials by reducing the military’s role in politics, especially since it had staged coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. In its 2004 report on Turkey, the EU said, “A number of changes have been introduced over the last year to strengthen civilian control of the military to aligning it (Turkey) with practice in EU member states.” In 2007, the Army Chief, General Yasar Buyukanit, posted a memorandum on the military’s website objecting to the nomination of Erdogan’s candidate, the then Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, for the post of President on the ground that his wife had worn a headscarf and thereby undermined the secular order. Erdogan responded by pointing out that it was none of the military’s business to give an opinion on candidates for the presidency. Gul was elected and the military’s lack of clout was exposed.
The Supreme Military Council met at the Prime Minister’s office on July 28. In the past, the Council always met at the General Staff Head Quarters and the change of venue is significant as an indicator of the primacy of the civilian government. It is also possible that the civilian government deemed the new venue safer. The Council’s recommendations will have to be approved by the President. There is a move to change the composition of the Council by adding more ministers in order to reduce the role of the military. The Army Chief will be deprived of some of his responsibilities.
Predictably, the imposition of emergency, the suspension of the European Convention on Human Rights, the purge, and the suppression of dissent by shutting down media outlets, all in quick succession, alarmed the EU and the US; and they gave vent to their concerns about the erosion of the rule of law, Europe being more vocal than the US. Equally predictably, Turkey reacted with a degree of hostility to that criticism, pointing out that the West did not condemn the coup, its leaders did not personally call Erdogan to show support to the democratically elected government, and that there has been no high level visit after the failed coup.
But the real reason for Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the US is that the latter has not agreed to extradite Gulen. The US is insisting on evidence of Gulen’s involvement and it is doubtful whether Turkey has so far given any evidence that can stand scrutiny. Gulen wrote an article in the New York Times on July 25 titled “I condemn all threats to Turkey’s democracy”. The clear implication is that he condemns the coup and what Erdogan has done in the aftermath. There are signals that the US is willing to be patient and reason with Turkey. A team of US officials is due shortly in Ankara to discuss the matter of Gulen’s extradition. The Turkish media have put out a story that the team will assist Turkey in drafting a memorandum meeting US standards. This story might not be true. US Vice President Biden is due in Turkey on August 24 and the Gulen issue will top the agenda.
Erdogan’s visit to St. Petersburg and meeting with President Putin on August 9 has attracted a good deal of media attention. This was a meeting planned well before the coup attempt. When Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 war plane in November 2015 ‘for violating its air space’, Putin had broken off economic and trade relations inflicting much pain on Turkey. Erdogan’s initial efforts to talk to Putin were rebuffed. After a while, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and a prominent Turkish businessman mediated, and Putin relented after Erdogan apologized in June. Putin who was keen to reconcile with Turkey telephoned Erdogan immediately after the coup collapsed. Erdogan told Putin that the call was ‘psychologically important’. There is a report that Russian intelligence gave Erdogan some advance tip off on the coup.
The economic and trade relations broken by Russia to punish Turkey for shooting down its fighter plane are being restored. Russian tourists have already come back, and being received with champagne and flowers. Some commentators in the West have misinterpreted the resumption of relations primarily as an anti-US move. This interpretation is wrong as this is a resumption of what was there before the shooting down of the plane. The Turkish-Russian differences over Syria remain, but one should not be surprised if Erdogan were to over time get closer to the Russian position on Assad. Russia and Turkey have agreed to cooperate in the war against the Islamic State.
Russia and Turkey are not yet allies, but they might get closer as Turkey’s hopes of gaining entry into the EU fades away. Austria has called on the EU to break off talks with Turkey on its admission. The bone of contention between Turkey and the EU is the latter’s delay in granting visa-free entry to Turkish citizens to the Schengen area in return for Turkey taking back illegal migrants who had entered Greece. The deadline for the deal was June 2016. While Turkey is insisting that the deal be formalised by October, the signals from Brussels indicate that it might not happen any time this year. Most probably, the EU is not going to agree to the visa-free entry of Turks in the near future. Erdogan might threaten to inundate the EU with Syrian refugees and might even carry out the threat unless the EU pays a huge amount of money. Europe is vulnerable to such blackmail.
Iran sent its Foreign Minister to Turkey to show solidarity with Erdogan. The two sides agreed on the need to uphold the territorial integrity of Syria and agreed to talk more on Syria to narrow their differences. The opening to Israel signalled by Turkey before the coup will continue.
The Turkish media have been suitably intimidated and subordinated. The media have now ‘divulged’ that it was some Gulenist group in the Air Force that brought down the Russian plane. This is dis-information. Some columnists have threatened the US that its refusal to extradite Gulen might cost its use of Incirlik. It is difficult to take the threat seriously as the air base was built by the US in the 1950s, the US has stored nuclear weapons there, and the two countries have signed a joint use agreement. Nevertheless, Erdogan has cards to play. In 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution denying the use of the base to US in the War on Iraq. It was Erdogan who talked to his MPs and made them change their stand. Will Erdogan re-enact the same and demand that the US extradite Gulen?
Turkey is seeking more manoeuvring space by reconciling with Russia; the two may work closer in the fight against the Islamic State. Turkey might try to blackmail a vulnerable EU by threatening to inundate it with Syrian refugees. Turkey will play hard ball on Gulen, but short of hard evidence extradition is unlikely. Unless Erdogan takes due care, serious damage can be done to his country’s relations with the US as the latter might reluctantly conclude that Turkey is an unreliable ally. Has the US started looking at alternatives to Incirlik? It has built one and has started building another in Syrian Kurdistan controlled by its Kurdish allies. Russia has announced plans to build an airbase at Khmeimim in Aleppo province to ‘rival Incirlik’. Will Syria, partitioned de facto, if not de jure, have Russian and US airbases?
One wonders whether a phone call from President Obama before Putin’s would have changed the course of history. It might not have, but Obama should have called early knowing Erdogan’s paranoia and that would have made some difference as Erdogan is playing ‘the jilted lover’ with much success. Over time, Erdogan’s pursuit of absolute power and hard-line policy towards the Kurds might boomerang. The EU’s vulnerability should not be exaggerated as it takes 44 per cent of Turkey’s exports. After the general election in Germany around October 2017, Merkel’s successor might be less indulgent towards Erdogan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Erdoğan’s Visit to St. Petersburg: A Measured Russia-Turkey Rapprochement
Rajorshi Roy
August 16, 2016
While a Russia-Turkey rapprochement is driven by their particular national interests, its trajectory and outcome are likely to be shaped by the interplay of several geo-economic and geo-political factors.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to St. Petersburg on August 9 marks a remarkable turnaround in Russia-Turkey ties. The relationship had earlier deteriorated to historical lows after Turkey downed a Sukhoi-24 fighter jet in November 2015, which President Putin termed as a ‘stab in the back’. Nine months later, during their summit meeting in St. Petersburg, the two Presidents highlighted their ‘substantial and constructive’ dialogue on all issues of mutual interest. They also outlined a roadmap for restoring ties to earlier levels.
More symbolically, Erdoğan’s first visit abroad in the aftermath of the failed July coup took place against the backdrop of Turkey’s increasingly strained ties with the ‘West’. This assumes significance due to the ongoing rivalry between Russia and the ‘West’, and Turkey’s pivotal position in NATO. Therefore, given the nature and timing of Erdoğan’s visit, the pertinent questions are: What are the key drivers of the rapprochement? And, what are the limits to Russia-Turkey reconciliation?
Drivers of Russia-Turkey Rapprochement
The key drivers of this incipient rapprochement can broadly be attributed to economic and geo-political factors.
A crucial challenge for both Turkey and Russia is the revival of their economies. The attempted coup would have further dampened the sluggish market sentiments about Turkey. And Russia’s daunting economic crisis continues to fester. Against this backdrop, the restoration of the Russian-Turkish economic linkages become vital. This involves the tourism, agriculture, energy and construction sectors. Russian tourists comprised the second largest group of visitors to Turkey in 2015, while Turkish agricultural products were key substitutes for the banned European commodities in Russia. The Kremlin’s sanctions against Turkey in the wake of the shooting down of the Russian fighter aircraft had resulted in bilateral trade dipping to USD 23.3 billion in 2015 from 31.5 billion during the previous year.1 Russia also remains the biggest supplier of gas to Turkey. Notably, the revival of the Turkish Stream pipeline has significant geo-economic ramifications. It will allow Russia to transport gas to Europe by circumventing Ukraine while making Turkey a key hub of European energy transmission. Similarly, the USD 20 billion Akkuyu nuclear power plant project will boost their economic relationship. This follows the decision to set up a Joint Investment Fund to achieve the target of USD 100 billion of bilateral trade. It is expected that this economic interdependency can become a fulcrum of stronger political engagement.
Turkey’s outreach to Russia is also likely the result of a recalibration of its overall foreign policy objectives. The unravelling of its ‘zero problems with the neighbours’ policy has complicated its core interests in its neighbourhood. Ties with most of its neighbours, including Syria, Iran, Iraq and Israel, remain frayed. The Kurdish issue continues to fester, with Turkey remaining wary of the growing linkages between the Turkish and Syrian Kurds – the latter being supported by Russia and the ‘West’ in the battle against the Islamic State (IS). This can embolden the irredentist aspirations of the Turkish Kurds. Meanwhile, Russia’s emergence as a factor in shaping the key outcomes of the Syrian conflict has severely undermined Turkey’s room for manoeuvre in its ‘near abroad’. The failed coup is likely to further distract Ankara from its Syrian game-plan, with priority being accorded to domestic stability. The recent spate of IS-led terror attacks on Turkish soil underscore this urgency to focus inwards. Moreover, Turkey remains upset at the perceived lack of ‘Western’ support in tackling the attempted coup. Therefore, given the emerging crises on several fronts, Russian support can help Ankara tide over a few problems, particularly its Syrian conundrum. Engagement with Moscow can help Turkey protect its key interests, which include the Kurdish problem. It reduces the risk of a confrontation similar to the SU-24 downing. The reconciliation might also involve Russia using its influence with the Central Asian Republics to push for a crackdown on Gülen schools in the region2.
Interestingly, the timing of the coup and the American refusal to hand over Fethullah Gülen has given credence to Turkish suspicions of a ‘Western’ hand. This can be linked to the compelling need of the US and its West Asian partners to have Turkey on board in keeping the Syrian conflict alive. Ankara remains the most vital conduit to supply logistics to the rebels. A realignment of Turkey’s Syrian policy can result in a decisive victory for the Bashar Assad regime. In this regard, the Iranian Foreign Minister’s recent visit to Ankara highlights the geo-political churnings underway. At stake is the regional balance of power. Perhaps it is a mere coincidence, but barely a few days after Erdogan had apologised to Putin in June 2016 for the SU-24 downing, the perpetrators of the Istanbul airport bombing were identified as Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek citizens.
Russia’s calculus for the rapprochement is likely to be more nuanced. It extends beyond Turkey’s pivotal position in resolving the Syrian crisis. Having raised the stakes in Syria, the resolution of the conflict will be a litmus test of the Kremlin’s claims to be a pole in global diplomacy. As such, engaging the regional stakeholders will be vital. Similarly, finding convergences with Ankara on tackling terrorism is crucial, given Turkey’s links with the IS. Moscow faces the backlash of more than 2,000 Russian citizens having joined the terror organisation. A reconciliation can also cause a setback to the ‘Western’ containment strategy of Russia. As a key NATO ally, Turkey would have been expected to up the ante vis-à-vis Moscow in their overlapping spheres of influence. This includes the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia. Moscow’s recent game-plan appears to be to cultivate the differences among the ‘Western’ partners in order to undermine their unanimous position vis-à-vis Russia. Moreover, it can be argued that the rapprochement with Turkey is part of the Kremlin’s larger strategy of building Eurasian partnerships to reinforce its position on its periphery. A number of recent events point to this calculus: the Kazakh President’s mediation between Moscow and Ankara, the trilateral Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan meeting in Baku, the Russian-Armenian summit talks in Moscow, and the likely quadrilateral Russia-Turkey-Syria-Iran talks in the future. The key themes in these discussions have been on developing economic partnerships, tackling terrorism and improving regional security. Given Turkey’s linkages in these areas, a deeper engagement that can stabilise the region suits Moscow.
Limits to the Reconciliation
The ongoing rapprochement has led to suggestions of Ankara charting a new foreign policy that involves breaking ranks with the ‘West’. However, a deeper analysis reveals a more nuanced interplay of Turkish and Russian strategies. Given its fundamental interests in Syria, it is unlikely that Ankara will completely abandon its Syrian policy. Rather, it may simply adopt a tactical approach to strike deals with Russia on terrorism and the Kurdish issue, while exploring an acceptable political solution to the Syrian crisis. The major stumbling block though remains Assad’s role in a post-conflict setting. Therefore, the way these dynamics unravel will determine the future trajectory of the Turkey-Russia reconciliation. Moreover, the deep sense of betrayal in Russia about the SU-24 incident is likely to continue to shape the normalisation on Kremlin’s terms. Given the interplay of strong presidential personalities, a compromise on Turkey’s core issues without a viable Russian quid pro quo might prove tricky.
Meanwhile, it is unlikely that a major deviation in Turkey’s ties with the ‘West’ is in the offing. Their partnership remains highly symbiotic. The European Union (EU) is Turkey’s biggest trading partner, while NATO is the pillar of its security. In addition, a significant number of Turks remain oriented towards the ‘West’. For its part, the EU needs Turkey’s support in tackling terrorism and the influx of migrants, while the Turkish army remains the second largest in NATO. Turkey is also a key peg in the West’s containment of Russia. However, given their increasingly strained ties, Turkey can use the Russian card as a bargaining chip with the ‘West’. This stems from Ankara’s strategic value to the ‘West’. Therefore, Turkey might just seek greater ‘Western’ support in carrying out the ongoing purge and extradition of Fethullah Gülen, relaxation of European visa norms, and greater economic and military aid.
Consequently, while a Russia-Turkey rapprochement is driven by their particular national interests, yet its trajectory and outcome are likely to be shaped by the interplay of several geo-economic and geo-political factors. Nevertheless, the on-going Russia-Turkey rapprochement strengthens the maxim that in diplomacy there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies but only permanent interests.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Gülen schools are run by the Gülen movement, whose ideological leader is Fethullah Gülen. Turkey has accused Fethullah Gülen of orchestrating the failed July coup.
Differing perceptions among the various stakeholders has emerged because the contents of the framework agreement are not in the public domain.
The signing of the historic “Framework Agreement” between the Government of India (GoI) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland Issac-Muivah (NSCN-IM) on 3 August 2015 had brought glimmers of hope amongst the Naga populace. The contents of the framework agreement are, however, not in the public domain, leading to differing perceptions amongst the various stakeholders.
The NSCN-IM has been able to galvanise broad consensus amongst the Naga political and social entities with respect to its ongoing negotiations with the GoI. Prominent Naga social bodies including the Naga Hoho, Naga Student Federation, Naga Mothers Association, Naga Peoples’ Movement for Human Rights and United Naga Council – most of whom were already amenable to the NSCN-IM’s idea of a settlement for the Nagas – have given their consent to the process. There are continuous efforts by the outfit to re-establish its clout and dominance in the claimed areas of Nagalim, including the Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Attempts by the outfit to reshape the existing construct of tribal loyalties in Eastern Nagaland has gathered pace after the defection of self-styled ‘General’, Khole Konyak, of the erstwhile NSCN-Khole-Khitovi (NSCN-KK) to the NSCN-IM, which was followed by a large scale defection of Konyak leaders as well as cadres.
The Nagas of Manipur, in general, are known to be supporting the ongoing peace process despite the prevailing anxiety over the contents of the framework agreement and its possible impact on their status. There is an ongoing awareness campaign on the social media in Manipur wherein the Over Ground Workers (OGWs) of the NSCN-IM have been highlighting the apathy and discriminatory policies of the Manipur government against the tribals. The outfit’s attempts to create divisions among the Aimol tribe, which is mainly based in Chandel district of Manipur, and its continuous engagement with the Lamkang tribe is aimed at the merger of such smaller tribes into the Naga fold. In Assam, especially along the border areas with Manipur and Nagaland, there are attempts by NSCN-IM cadres to intimidate the non-Naga population in Naga-dominated areas which conform to the territorial claims of greater Nagalim.
Developments in the aftermath of the Framework Agreement indicate that the NSCN-IM has been engaged in a focused manner on extending its influence over the entire Naga populace. The organization is making full use of its military strength, financial prowess and strong support bases in Western Nagaland and Manipur. In areas where it is relatively weak, as in Eastern Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, the NSCN-IM is either creating divisions within existing tribal constructs or is exploiting historical linkages with smaller tribes. The outfit’s usage of terms like “shared sovereignty” and “sovereignty lies with the people” is possibly aimed at addressing vulnerabilities generated on account of its changed stance on the issue of Naga independence. Besides raising the slogan of “no integration, no solution”, the NSCN-IM leaders, in an August 18 statement to the press, also hinted at walking out of the ongoing process if the issue of Naga integration is not addressed by New Delhi. This could well be part of the outfit’s pressure tactics in the ongoing negotiations. And in case the talks fail, the presence of sizeable cadres along the Indo-Myanmar border in Ukhrul and in Somra areas of Myanmar could cater for armed contingency scenarios.
Other Naga factions have responded variously to the ongoing peace negotiations between the GOI and NSCN-IM. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland Khaplang (NSCN-K) has rejected any form of engagement with the GoI and is continuing with its acts of violence. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland Khitovi-Neokpao (NSCN-KN) views the ongoing process as an arrangement for the Nagas of Manipur only, and not for the Nagas of Nagaland. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland Reformation (NSCN-R), which had earlier supported the Framework Agreement, is now complaining of delays and emergent complications in the process. Finally, factions of the Naga National Council (NNC), the Manipur-based Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) and the Manipur Naga Peoples’ Front (MNPF) have all expressed their disagreements with the current format of negotiations.
Likewise, some of the prominent Naga civil society organizations including the Eastern Naga Peoples’ Organisation (ENPO), Naga Tribes Council (NTC), Against Corruption and Unabated Taxation (ACAUT), and Zeliangrong Baudi (based in Manipur) have all denounced the framework of the talks. The NSCN-IM’s expanding dominance in Longding, Tirap and Changlang in Arunachal Pradesh has elicited sharp reactions from the local bodies in these districts, which are currently not willing to be part of the proposed arrangement.
The GoI has undertaken significant confidence building measures, and is also trying to rally divergent stakeholders in support of the ongoing process, besides continuation of talks with NSCN-IM. The joint communiqué issued by the GoI and the NSCN-IM on the ongoing peace process, along with the release on bail of Anthony Shimrey, an important NSCN-IM functionary who was arrested on charges of arms smuggling, have generated goodwill and appreciated by the Naga public as well as civil society organizations.
However, there exist several unresolved issues, which could obstruct the ongoing peace process. These include: the issue of integration of contiguous Naga inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh; the demand for a separate Frontier State by the tribes of Eastern Nagaland; addressing the aspirations of the people of South Arunachal Pradesh (areas of Longding, Tirap and Changlang Districts); rising differences amongst the ‘Naga political groups’ whose support is essential for any accord to succeed; and visible cracks in Naga society over the non-inclusion of all stakeholders in the pursuit of an acceptable and comprehensive political solution. It remains to be seen as to how the GOI and NSCN-IM work towards resolving these extant impediments.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Russia’s military intervention in Syria – its first beyond its immediate neighbourhood since the end of the Cold War – highlights the significant transformation that its armed forces have gone through.
Russia’s military intervention in Syria – its first beyond its immediate neighbourhood since the end of the Cold War – highlights the significant transformation that its armed forces have gone through. The mobility and reliability of both men and machines during the operations in Syria stand in sharp contrast to their performance during the 2008 Georgia War, when nearly two decades of neglect had exposed crippling vulnerabilities. The success of this turnaround can be attributed to the USD 300 billion 10-year modernisation programme initiated in 2010, which envisioned structural and functional changes in the armed forces. While its incipient results emerged during the Crimean takeover, it is the Syrian intervention that has provided a real insight into the qualitative shift in capabilities. One can even argue that the Syrian intervention has given a new dimension to Russia’s foreign policy. This assumes significance given Moscow’s attempts to project itself as a pole in international affairs. Against this backdrop, the pertinent questions are: What are the key qualitative and quantitative changes being implemented in the Russian military? And, what role do they play in influencing the Kremlin’s foreign policy?
Military Modernisation and Reforms
The 2010 modernisation programme envisaged structural reforms at three levels – personnel, equipment, and military industrial complex. As such, one of the most vital doctrinal shifts has been the emphasis on mobility and flexible deployments.1 This is in sharp contrast to the mass mobilisation of the Soviet Army, which ruined the element of surprise. The focus, therefore, has been on re-organising divisions into brigades, and promoting inter-services integration. Each military district commander now controls all units in that zone, with the National Cent for Defence (NTSU) in Moscow being the supreme command and control centre.2 The air force, space force and aerospace defence force have been merged into the unified Aerospace Forces (VKS).3 A key priority also involves increasing the Russian military footprint in the Arctic, and strengthening non-conventional and cyber capabilities. Meanwhile, the much maligned conscription (‘kontraktniki’) service has been reduced from two to one year.4 Wages have been increased across the board, and housing and pension disbursement made more robust.5 These have helped attract personnel during a period of acute economic crisis. As a result, professional soldiers have outstripped conscripts for the first time in Russian history.6 Their combat readiness is being frequently tested through snap military exercises.
Moreover, the goal of modernising 70 per cent of all weapons platforms by 2020 has seen the Russian armed forces receive a wide array of both new and upgraded equipment. The most notable include: Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles, Koalitsiya self-propelled guns, Armata tanks, Borei and Yasen class submarines with Bulava missiles, Ratnik body armour, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These systems represent a significant leap of technology. More importantly, the defence industrial complex (OPK) has been earmarked to be the pivot of innovation that will spur the civilian high-technology sector. This assumes importance given the compelling need to diversify the economy.
Limits of the Modernisation Programme
The modernisation plan, which remains a work in progress, will be severely tested by the ongoing economic crisis. The defence ministry’s budget for 2016 was cut by five per cent,7 and the incipient social unrest will further challenge Russia’s ability to consistently spend 4.5 per cent of its GDP on defence, like it did in the preceding two years.8 The Syrian intervention is an additional expenditure as well. Given the fixed outgo in the form of ‘revenue expenditure’, the crisis is likely to affect the development and acquisition of new weapons platforms. Already, the deadlines for a number of flagship projects such as the PAK DA bomber, PAK TA transport aircraft, Barguzin railway ICBMs, hypersonic missiles and aircraft carrier have been pushed back by several years. Other weapons systems have seen a massive cut in their orders. As a result, the innovation in OPK, which was expected to be the fulcrum of rebuilding Russia’s industrial base, is likely to remain atrophied.
Meanwhile, the Syrian intervention has highlighted significant gaps in Russia’s existing technology. These include attack UAVs and targeting pods, and limited number of precision guided munitions.9 The break with Ukraine has also forced Russia to reinvent the wheel of gas turbine technology. Moreover, a number of technological innovations that Russia has introduced in Syria, namely cruise missiles, were actually developed by the ‘West’ in the 1990s. And the majority of its weapons platforms continue to be derivatives of Soviet technology.10 This highlights the significant catching up that Russia will have to do to achieve conventional weapons parity. Consequently, the salience of nuclear weapons for Russia is likely to continue to increase in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, given Russia’s historical resilience in the face of adversity, one cannot rule out the modernisation plan being reprioritised. The idea of Russia to be perceived as a great power by its citizens goes hand in glove with a strong military arsenal. This assumes significance given the asymmetrical confrontation with the ‘West’. As Russia’s Syrian intervention indicates, sophisticated technology is likely to gradually emerge while the available systems are upgraded. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has pointed out that Russian VKS, Navy and armoured units have attained a serviceability of 63, 76 and 94 percent, respectively.11 Overall, Russia’s capabilities appear to have qualitatively and quantitatively improved. As upgraded systems demonstrate their resilience, doctrinal shifts in the realm of mobility and new platforms have helped Russia project power in ways that was difficult to envisage a few years ago.
Dynamics of Military Modernisation and Russia’s Foreign Policy
It can be argued that the Kremlin – particularly after the fall in hydrocarbon prices since 2014 – has punched above its weight on the global stage despite its lack of economic competitiveness and a stagnant military. Therefore, its ability to now project power beyond its immediate neighbourhood has added a new flexibility to Russia’s foreign policy. This assumes significance given Russia’s attempts to project itself as a pillar of global diplomacy. Till now, the ability to influence global events militarily rested primarily with the United States. Russia’s entry into this group alters the existing dynamics. In this context, Russia’s use of the Hamadan airbase in Iran highlights the way it has asserted itself in West Asian geo-politics by creating facts on the ground. But having done so, the resolution of the Syrian conundrum will be a litmus test of its diplomatic skills.
Moreover, the Syrian intervention has had an accompanying benefit to Russia’s defence industry as well. It has not only allowed Russia to test new weapons but also advertise new technology to potential buyers. This can have a positive salience on its arms exports, especially given the Kremlin’s claims about having received a renewed interest in its weapons portfolio.12 While the politico-economic benefits of such transfers are well documented, what is often ignored is the ‘rouble dividend’13 that Russia earns through exports. The additional income can cushion the economic crisis from getting worse.
However, there exist significant limits to Russia’s power projection capabilities beyond its periphery. The escalation dominance that Moscow enjoys in its immediate neighbourhood diminishes exponentially away from it. The economic crisis continues to fester while the technology hurdles remain high. The modernisation plan also appears to be geared more towards the augmentation of defensive capabilities, given Russia’s size and the evolving regional security landscape. This involves an increased NATO presence in the west and the north, the threat of Islamic terrorism from the south, and latent fears of China from the east. It is unlikely that Russia envisions a global expeditionary role in the same vein as the United States. Its focus is more likely to be on Eurasia – the area of its core interests.
Russia’s plan, therefore, appears to be to raise the stakes in order to project its vital role in resolving some regional disputes. This helps dispel the notion that it can be isolated. The U.S. and Turkey have already been compelled to negotiate Syria’s future with Russia. The strong posture allows Russia to bargain for a better outcome in its standoff with the ‘West’. The nuanced interplay of several events involving Syrian developments, NATO military build-up, economic sanctions, and the Ukrainian crisis will involve a grand trade-off in the future. When the time comes, each party would like to hold an upper hand. Similarly, upping the ante strengthens the domestic narrative of a strong Russia resisting ‘Western’ pressure. It helps distract attention from the mounting economic problems within.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While the Argentinian military’s desperate state of affairs can be partly blamed on the country’s economic woes, a substantial portion of the blame must fall on the somewhat tense relationship between the military and the civilian government.
In March 2016, President Barack Obama made an official visit to Argentina where he was feted by the recently elected President Mauricio Macri. The visit was not without controversies, coinciding as it did with the 40th anniversary of the March 24, 1976 military coup that plunged Argentina into years of a repressive dictatorship. Another controversy got buried in the furore over the timing of the visit – the fact that the Argentine Air Force did not have a single operational fighter to escort Air Force One.
Following the grounding of its subsonic A-4R Fightinghawks – fewer than half-a-dozen out of 33 surviving airframes being airworthy – and with the 16 Mirage III interceptors being withdrawn without replacement in 2015, Argentina was left with a total of seven operational combat aircraft of dubious value in modern warfare.1 Not willing to entrust the security of Air Force One to Argentinian designed and built FMA IA-58 Pucara turboprop Counter Insurgency aircraft and FMA IA-63 Pampa armed jet trainers – both of which types are subsonic and incapable of even reaching the operational ceiling of Air Force One – the US Air Force deployed four F-16s to escort the Presidential aircraft.2
During the 1982 Falklands War, Argentina was able to deploy several squadrons (perhaps totalling some 120) of reasonably capable combat aircraft – Mirage IIIs, Mirage Vs, IAI Daggers – plus a strike force of A-4 Skyhawks and Super Entendards. The Argentine Navy fielded a carrier battlegroup with a strong escort of modern destroyers and frigates and possessed a submarine force that was treated with wary respect by its adversaries. These forces, in particular the Argentine Air Force and naval aviation wing, inflicted severe casualties on the Royal Navy and earned the respect and admiration of the British. Now, the Argentinian Air Force has been reduced to virtual impotence, the Navy has long lost its carrier and its surface assets are languishing for want of ordnance, and the Army has been reoriented towards UN peacekeeping operations.
It is no exaggeration to say that the Argentine military is in very poor shape, brought upon partly because of the precarious state of the economy – which in 2014 defaulted on its debt for the eighth time.3 Between 2012 and 2013, for example, the Argentine Navy suffered the triple ignominy of having the ARA Libertad seized in Ghana over the issue of Argentina’s debt, the ARA Espora being stranded in South Africa for 73 days after repairs were halted due to unpaid bills and the decommissioned destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad sinking in port.4 In 2012, it was reported that three naval vessels experienced problems due to lack of maintenance and human error.5 By 2014, the situation had not improved and the grounding of the submarine ARA Santa Cruz on June 15 of that year demonstrated that routine maintenance on the submarine’s hull was poor.6 It has been reported that because of acute shortages of ordnance, target practice in the Navy has had to rely on ammunition from the 1950s in certain cases.7 Despite the fact that the submarine force has been refitted, only 19 hours – as opposed to the stipulated 190 – of immersion training has been undertaken by the crews.8
The Air Force is in even worse shape with an acute shortage of airworthy aircraft being compounded by drastically reduced maintenance and operational budgets. In 2015, shortly after the withdrawal of the Mirage III from service, daily orders with effect from 18 August 2015 cut the air force’s working hours to only between 0800 and 1300 hours and imposed rationing on food and electricity. Moreover, it was also revealed that aircraft taken out of service would not undergo maintenance.9 Several efforts to replace the Mirage III fleet – ranging from the procurement of new Gripen fighters to attempts to procure second-hand Mirage F.1s and Kfirs all fell through. In an unusual move, even Chinese FC-1 fighters were considered but to no avail. The Army may be in slightly better shape, having taken delivery of upgraded TAM medium tanks and refurbished Huey helicopters, but seems to be orienting itself towards participation in peacekeeping operations as opposed to conventional combat.10
While this desperate state of affairs can be partly blamed on the country’s economic woes, a substantial portion of the blame must fall on the somewhat tense relationship between the military and the civilian government. In 2006, it was revealed that a naval intelligence unit was conducting surveillance and maintaining dossiers on several union leaders, journalists and politicians, including the then Defence Minister Nilda Garre.11 This scandal ultimately led, in 2012, to then President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner compelling no fewer than 36 high-ranking officers into early retirement.12 In addition, a drug smuggling scandal in 2005 compelled a purge of the Air Force leadership, further lowering the image of the military in the eyes of the public.13 It is therefore not surprising that despite increased rhetoric over the Falklands, neither Cristina Kirchner nor her predecessor (and husband) Nestor Kirchner, were friends of the Argentine military. And, between 2004 and 2013, Argentina’s military expenditure averaged around 0.8 per cent of GDP, placing the military at the bottom of the country’s priorities. Add to this devaluations of the Argentine peso, artificial exchange rates and the fact that between 78 and 90 per cent of defence spending goes towards personnel costs, and the scale of the underfunding of the military becomes evident.14
However, this tension between the Executive and the military has contributed to the virtual decimation of the country’s capability to protect its airspace and even conduct the most basic surveillance of its maritime domain. Argentina’s maritime domain now totals six million square kilometres. To protect this space, the nation can muster only 12 ships of dubious serviceability and a single P-3C Orion – five others being unserviceable, though plans exist to refurbish three of these.15 Much more serious, however, is the feeling of neglect leading to indiscipline in the military, with rifles, ammunition and even TOW anti-tank missiles disappearing from arsenals and Argentina emerging as a major source of weapons for criminal gangs in South America.16
The election of President Macri offers the prospects for a reversal of this pattern of neglect. But there are no easy options. On 1 February 2016, with the grounding of the A-4Rs, the Macri administration placed a high priority request for replacement engines and other spares for the aircraft with the hope of restoring the fleet to some degree of operability.17 However, even if such a step were to come to fruition, it would merely delay the inevitable. Neglect over two decades has meant that the entire military is facing bloc obsolescence and Argentina’s precarious economic state makes a re-capitalization of the armed forces a daunting prospect. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that despite its extreme difficulties, Argentina’s military is blessed with a core of well-trained personnel and its domestic arms industry has been able to produce such products as the TAM tank, the Pucara and Pampa aircraft, and MEKO 140A16 corvettes – a capability which still exists. This combination of trained personnel and domestic arms production capability augurs well for the recovery of Argentina’s military, provided sufficient funds are made available to meet urgent requirements. It is however poignant to see a military that dared to challenge a NATO member in battle now reduced to relative impotence.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A scramble for assets between the years 2013 and 2015 culminated in the procurement of a fleet of vessels that have restored a degree of capability and viability to the TTCG.
At the Visakhapatnam International Fleet Review 2016, a ship graced the show with her presence – the Brazilian Navy Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) BN Amazonas (P120), commanded by Commander Alessander Felipe Imamura Carneiro. While this ship would have gone largely unnoticed by the naval fraternity, being as it is of sound but unspectacular design and performance, the vessel has a peculiar significance for the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (TTCG) as it was originally built for the latter and was very nearly commissioned as the TTS Port of Spain as part of an order for three OPVs. However, in an abrupt and controversial decision, the order was cancelled in September 2010, following a change in government in May 2010. Combined with poor serviceability of surviving assets, the TTCG was in crisis and this led to a scramble for assets between the years 2013 and 2015, which culminated in the procurement of a fleet of vessels that have restored a degree of capability and viability to the TTCG.
Importance of the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard
The TTCG is the largest naval unit of the English-speaking Caribbean, with over 1400 personnel. Having responsibility for the security of the maritime domain of the Southernmost island of the Caribbean archipelago, it must contend with the trade in illegal narcotics and weapons that emanates from South America. The capability and operational efficacy of the TTCG, therefore, has a direct bearing on the ability to interdict or deter the shipment of such contraband from the South American mainland. In addition, the TTCG is responsible for the security of Trinidad and Tobago’s large off-shore oil and natural gas facilities and has, as the one of only two Caribbean forces capable of conducting long-range humanitarian and disaster relief operations (the other being the Bahamas), assisted other Caribbean nations in post-disaster recovery.
Rise and Fall of the TTCG Surface Fleet
The TTCG began its operational history with two 103-feet Vosper Ltd patrol boats – the TTS Trinity (CG-1) and the TTS Courland Bay (CG-2) – commissioned on 20 February 1965, each 31.4 metres long and displacing 123 tons. These were followed by TTS Chaguaramas (CG-3) and the TTS Buccoo Reef (CG-4), commissioned on 18 March 1972, each 31.5 metres long and displacing 125 tons. CG-1 and CG-2 were decommissioned in 1986 and CG-3 and CG-4 in 1992.
These Vospers were followed on 15 June 1980 by two modified Spica class vessels – TTS Barracuda (CG-5) and TTS Cascadura (CG-6) – each 40.6 metres long and displacing 210 tons. Following a failed attempt at local repair and refurbishment, these vessels were decommissioned after nearly 15 years of inactivity. CG-5 was scrapped. While CG-6 remains ostensibly in commission at Chaguaramas Heliport, it is completely derelict, bereft of sensors, engines, weapons and accommodation.
On 27 August 1982, four Souter Wasp 17 metre class (TTS Plymouth CG27, TTS Caroni CG28, TTS Galeota CG29, TTS Moruga CG30) were commissioned. In addition, the Coast Guard was augmented in the mid-to-late 1980s with vessels from the disbanded Police Marine Branch – one Sword Class patrol craft (TTS Matelot CG 33) and two Wasp 20 metre class (TTS Kairi CG31 & TTS Moriah CG 32) patrol craft. All of these vessels have now been decommissioned.
The years 1986 to 1995 saw the decommissioning of almost all of the TTCG patrol assets and the de facto retirement of CG-5 and CG-6 for want of serviceability as well as the inability of the TTCG to undertake routine maintenance due to severe funding shortfalls. This left the formation incapable of performing its assigned tasks on any sort of credible basis. This period, not surprisingly, saw a significant increase in narcotics and illegal weapons being shipped through Trinidadian waters.
After a number of years with almost no serviceable vessels, the period 1999-2001 saw the TTCG receive a boost with the acquisition of vessels over 20 years old including the ex-Royal Navy Island class OPV, HMS Orkney as the TTS Nelson (CG-20) and four 82 feet Point-class cutters, each displacing some 66 tons, from the United States (TTS Corozal Point CG7, TTS Crown Point CG8, TTS Galera Point CG9 and TTS Bacolet Point CG10). The Point class cutters were nominally on strength until 2009-10 when they were decommissioned, although, in reality, they had been unseaworthy for some years before. Not a single new-build patrol vessel was acquired between 1980 and 2009.
In 2003-2004, the then Government of Patrick Manning began a phased expansion of the formation including the purchase of six new Austal PB30 Fast Patrol Craft (FPC) – CG11 TTS Scarlet Ibis, CG12 TTS Hibiscus, CG13 TTS Humming Bird, CG14 TTS Chaconia, CG 15 TTS Poui and CG16 TTS Teak – commissioned between 2009-2010, and two modified oilrig support vessels – each over 15 years old – armed and re-tasked as Coastal Patrol Vessels (CPVs) – CG-21 TTS Gaspar Grande and CG-22 TTS Chacachare – commissioned on 23 April 2008. In addition, four Midnight Express Interceptors were delivered in 2005 and were extensively deployed in anti-narcotics operations.
The “crown jewels” of this expansion plan were three 90m long OPVs – to be named the Port of Spain, Scarborough and San Fernando – ordered from VT Shipbuilding (later BAE Systems Surface Ships). Easily the most advanced vessels to have been ordered by any coast guard in the English-speaking Caribbean, the OPVs were adequately armed with 25 mm and 30 mm guns and possessed the ability to stage medium-lift helicopters from their flight decks. However, an overly-ambitious integrated fire-control system and some unrealistic expectations from the TTCG in respect of the performance of the 30 mm guns led to significant delays and problems during trials. In September 2010, the Government of then Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar cancelled the contract, overruling advice from the TTCG and the then Minister of National Security, Brigadier (retired) John Sandy.
Compounding the cancellation of the OPVs, archaic bureaucratic procedures together with shortcomings in the engineering and maintenance branches of the TTCG combined to cripple efforts to maintain the fleet’s serviceability. A previous government attempted to circumvent these problems by entering into comprehensive logistics and support arrangements with VT and Austal. However, the former was stillborn because of the cancellation of the OPV contract and the latter never worked as planned because of inherent deficiencies in the TTCG maintenance structure with the result that the vessels had a dismal record in service.
By 2013, the TTCG was in dire straits and an operational audit of its assets revealed the extremely poor state of repair of the surface fleet:
TTS Nelson
6
4
2 serviceable, 4 unserviceable.
Source: Author’s own research
Rebuilding the TTCG Surface Fleet
In January 2014, the Government appointed a professional Naval Assets Acquisition Implementation Team (NAAIT) and tasked it with procuring, inter alia, seven new CPVs and two OPVs (now curiously termed Long-Range Patrol Vessels or LRPVs) within the very short period of two years. For budgetary reasons, the numbers were reduced to four CPVs and one LRPV. The new procurement attracted some international attention and shipyards invited the NAAIT to inspect the yards and the products available. Directed by the Government, the NAAIT visited the Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) shipyard in Ulsan, Republic of Korea, the China State Shipbuilding Company (CSSC) in Guangzhou, COTECMAR at Cartagena, Colombia, and Damen Shipyards Ltd at Gorinchem, Holland.
After deliberating and assessing the vessels and designs on offer, the NAAIT recommended that the four CPVs be acquired from Damen with two additional vessels of a similar design being acquired as “utility vessels” but so armed and equipped that they could augment the four dedicated CPVs in the patrol role, all six vessels being covered by a maintenance and spares support package. The vessels selected were the SPa 5009 CPV and the FCS 5009 utility vessel. The CPVs were fitted with a surveillance system that drew heavily on high-end civilian products. In addition, they were fitted with a remotely controlled 20 mm gun. The FCS 5009 was delivered in standard configuration but with accommodation increased for a larger crew, a manually operated 20 mm gun (from TTCG stocks) and a slightly enhanced surveillance fit. Delivery of the FCS 5009s was completed by mid-2015, while two of the four CPVs have already been delivered.
The LRPV procurement was not so fortunate. NAAIT’s recommendation for a formal Request for Proposals to be sent out to all the shipyards visited by the team was initially approved and then circumvented by the direct intervention of Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar who decided, against advice, to procure a ready-made, unarmed, LRPV from CSSC of China. The latter compared unfavourably with the cancelled OPVs, but the vessel was available and delivery was effected in late 2015, providing a questionable boost to the TTCG fleet. The TTCG made efforts to revive its engineering and maintenance facilities and restore to service inactive vessels. Some success has been achieved in this regard with CG-21 and CG-22 being refitted locally and will soon rejoin the fleet.
When the procurement of these vessels is complete, the TTCG will have no fewer than eight 46-50 metre patrol and utility vessels in service plus a 79 metre LRPV. Of these, the LRPV and six of the eight smaller vessels are new ships and this acquisition is the biggest successful acquisition programme in the history of the TTCG. These assets would give the TTCG the ability to conduct effective surveillance and interdiction operations within its maritime domain. But, the sustainability of these assets is dependent on the TTCG showing the determination to learn from its mistakes and creating a responsive and capable maintenance infrastructure to support its operational assets.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Given that the NSG may not be able to withhold the India membership question for long, in spite of China’s inconsistent positions, it would be unwise on India’s part to forfeit any advantage it has on the SCS issue.
When India responded cautiously to the international tribunal’s rejection of China’s claim over the South China Sea (SCS), many commentators construed it as India ceding crucial ground on an issue where a tit-for-tat response would have been more appropriate to China’s ‘sabotage’ of India’s admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). For South Block mandarins, a low-key diplomatic reaction to the tribunal’s verdict was an opportunity to not ruffle Beijing’s feathers and keep a window open for engagement with China on the NSG affair. The latter tactic seems to have been effective with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India– ostensibly to prepare for the upcoming G-20 and BRICS summits in Hangzhou and Goa, respectively – opening the space for dialogue on both the NSG and SCS. While Beijing evidently wants to buy New Delhi’s silence on the SCS at these summits, the possibility of a quid pro quo on the NSG was highlighted by the conciliatory voices in the Chinese media.
A commentary in Xinhua noted that India had ‘wrongly’ blamed China for the NSG episode, and that New Delhi should not be “downhearted as the door to the NSG is not tightly closed.”1 This apparent toning down of rhetoric is a far cry from the days when the Chinese official media spewed vitriol on India’s NSG quest, to the extent of warning India against letting “its nuclear ambitions blind itself.”2 Is a quid pro quo possible or tenable for India, especially since the SCS and NSG have emerged as strategic arenas for both powers to grapple with each other in their power balancing quests? The answer may lie in understanding China’s recent grand strategic behaviour, including why it blocked India’s NSG bid.
The ‘hedge’ finally takes-off
When the India-US nuclear deal was announced through a joint statement on 18 July 2005, followed by the NSG waiver of September 2008, the dominant perception was that the US was providing India with this special privilege as a means to counter-balance China. Though factors like India’s burgeoning nuclear energy market and the need to strengthen non-proliferation by including a country with a good record were espoused, that the US simultaneously talked of making India a ‘major power’ underlined the realpolitik that drove the deal. Both the Chinese and Indian strategic communities had then rejected this notion. Nor has India substantially added to any American effort to contain China or the Chinese sphere of influence in the subsequent years.
Things seem to have changed, however, with the advent of new dispensations in Beijing and New Delhi, with Xi Jinping showing signs of aggressive Chinese international posturing and Narendra Modi pursuing a proactive foreign policy agenda. The increasing strategic proximity between the US and India since Modi assumed office – including India’s consent to the logistics and communications agreement,3 firmly placing it in the US strategic ambit – seems to have convinced the Xi regime of India beginning to play a hedging role. Beijing could have seen the redline being crossed when India took the unprecedented step of issuing a joint statement4 with the US on SCS, and also espousing their common strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region – zones where China is beginning to engage in a contest for dominance with these powers. China’s NSG action has a clear message– that the hedging role will come at a cost for India.
A power transition in the works?
Another explanation for China’s behaviour could be linked to its larger strategic outlook – on the roles China wants to assume for itself on the global stage. This may be shaped by two key aspects: (a) Xi Jinping’s perception about the world order and the potential space for Chinese leadership in global affairs; and (b) the strategic imperative of countering the US rebalancing strategy in its periphery and securing its interests in the Asia-Pacific littorals. As the power transition argument goes, when a rising power is dissatisfied with the status quo maintained by a ruling hegemon, it could seek to challenge this condition through contestation, aggression or realignment. China’s evolving economic crisis and America’s Asia Pivot are developments that could undermine Beijing’s prominence as an economic and military power. The need to reverse these conditions, and thereby reduce the US hegemonic grip, might be the rationale for Beijing’s belligerence in its current global postures, be it on the SCS or at the NSG.
The NSG episode, in fact, suitably fits into this dimension as a calculated attempt to challenge US dominance of the non-proliferation regime. The US as the sole hegemon leads a group of guardians (described as a liberal security community, owing to its western domination)5 to lord over the regime and its normative structures. While Russia had figured in this group thanks to the superpower consensus that led to the creation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, China, having termed the guardians as an ‘imperial’ grouping in those formative years, later became a palpably incompatible partner in this framework. Beijing, hence, sees its NSG role as a means to restore its pride of place among the guardians, and also by virtue of being a nuclear weapon state and a leading nuclear energy producer. Well before India’s membership episode, Beijing had expanded the scope of its ‘grand-fathered’ nuclear agreement with Pakistan to newer facilities as a symbolic response to the India-US deal, thus demonstrating that it too could flex muscles within the regime– a posture further reinforced by blocking India. However, it needs to be seen whether these actions will elevate Beijing’s standing in the regime or instead further its image as an irresponsible actor.
Beijing’s dented image
At the core of China’s current problems is its inability to project itself as a responsible global player or one that is peacefully rising on the global scene. Its recent actions –the saboteur role at NSG and sabre rattling over SCS –only aggravate concerns of an authoritarian state seeking to further its hegemonic ambitions. Added to this dimension is China’s own shady record of indulging in or aiding proliferation and the strategic deception it pursues in its international behaviour. From Mao’s terming of nuclear weapons as ‘paper tigers’ and subsequent change of tack to develop a nuclear arsenal, staying out of NPT negotiations calling it an instrument of imperialism and ending up with the current “care about NPT,” 6 and from the activism on the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and subsequent pursuit of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability, examples abound on how words and actions hardly match in China’s grand strategic posturing.
While currently attempting to assume a guardianship role, Beijing’s record of supporting many clandestine nuclear programmes7 had not just invited numerous sanctions from the US,8 but also underlined its own struggle for legitimacy as a nuclear-armed great power. In fact, China was nowhere involved in the initial construction of the non-proliferation regime, and was kept out for long years from the affairs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).9 Though it managed to join the IAEA in 1983 and sign the NPT in 1992, Beijing’s failure to get into groups like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), thanks to its proliferation history, reflects its frustrations on India gaining greater recognition in the system, despite being a non-NPT state.
Is a quid pro quo needed?
Though the reference to NPT and full-scope safeguards is cited to deny membership to India, the unprecedented India-specific waiver of 2008 and the possibility of devising new criteria for non-NPT states refutes any element of sanctity for this framework.10 Relevant to this aspect is the different set of parameters employed to endow the India-specific waiver, which illustrates the scope of flexibility that this grouping has to determine its membership rules.11 However, formulating criteria for non-NPT states with the objective of also including Pakistan will imply that the grouping has diluted its fundamental philosophy of non-proliferation. Such a criterion could also mean that the NSG may not deny a similar claim by even North Korea in the distant future.
Accordingly, it could be argued that the NSG may not be able to withhold the India membership question for long, in spite of China’s inconsistent positions. Given that, it would be unwise on India’s part to forfeit any advantage it has on the SCS issue. Therefore, India should emphasise upon freedom of navigation in the high seas at the forthcoming multilateral summits in order to convey the message that Beijing needs to perfect its behaviour if it seeks a respected global standing.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Furthering the premise of an increasingly severe security environment, Japan’s latest defence white paper has accorded relatively more space to its ‘strong concerns’ over China’s ‘active maritime expansion’ as well as progress in North Korea’s missile development programme.
Two important developments took place in Japan in August – release of annual defence white paper ‘Defence of Japan 2016’, and the appointment of right-wing leader Tomomi Inada as the new defence minister following the cabinet reshuffle. Looking at these two developments in the backdrop of the July upper house election, which provided impetus to the pro-revision elements1 , the latest ballistic missile launch by North Korea, which fell inside Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)2 in the Sea of Japan, and the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on South China Sea appears to have infused a fresh momentum to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s agenda of redefining the Japanese security outlook, a process initiated after he assumed power in late 2012.
Furthering the premise of an increasingly severe security environment around Japan, with “destabilising factors becoming more tangible and acute”,3 the latest defence white paper has accorded relatively more space to Japan’s ‘strong concerns’ over China’s ‘active maritime expansion’ as well as progress in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development programme, compared to the previous white paper.4 It has also articulated the criticality of the Legislation for Peace and Security, which came into effect in March 2016, in enhancing deterrence, reinforcing the Japan-US alliance, security cooperation with other nations within the framework of Proactive Contribution to Peace, policy initiatives and measures aimed at strengthening defence industry and boosting the development of defence technology.
Notably, the 2016 white paper upgraded the Japanese threat perception vis-à-vis China by replacing ‘concern’ with ‘strong concern’5 over what Tokyo regards as China’s ‘heavy-handed’ attitude in the maritime and airspace. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan has consistently critiqued China’s unilateral claims and effort at forcefully changing the status quo. Since September 2012, Japanese foreign ministry has claimed that Chinese ships have been traversing the waters adjoining the Senkaku Islands more frequently. Following the permanent court of arbitration’s recent ruling on the South China Sea, Japan has been emphasising, both individually and within trilateral frameworks such as the Japan-US-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, the significance of safeguarding the rules-based maritime order including in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean.6
In recent weeks, Japan has registered strong protest against the increasing number of Chinese ships entering into the waters around the Senkaku Islands.7 Earlier in June, defence ministry claimed that a Jiangkai I-class frigate and a Dongdiao-class intelligence collection vessel of the Chinese Navy had entered the Japanese contiguous zone on separate occasions. Furthermore, as stated in the white paper, Japan’s Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) had to scramble fighter aircrafts 571 times against Chinese jets.8 In fact, while outlining the Japanese expectations, the 2016 white paper urges Beijing to act responsibly and conform to the international rules.
Regarding the defence of remote islands, Japanese strategy has been to focus on positioning units, intensifying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in peacetime and acquiring maritime and air superiority.9 In January this year, Japan established the ninth Air Wing at its Naha Air Base to further enhance its defence posture in the south-western region. Two F-15 fighter squadrons are now hosted by this base.10 Two months later, in March, a coast observation unit was instituted at Yonaguni, the westernmost inhabited island of the country. Japan further plans to create an Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, equipped with fixed wing patrol aircrafts (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K) in its south-western region. In addition, to facilitate transportation and deployment of units, Japan plans to focus on improving Osumi class transport LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank) and introducing V-22 Ospreys.
Meanwhile, summarising the key aspects of the latest white paper, Japan’s former Defence Minister Gen. Nakatani stated at a press conference held on August 02, just a day before he was replaced by Inada, that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development programme pose “a grave and imminent threat to the security not only of Japan but also of the region surrounding the country and the international community.”11 The 2016 white paper clearly referred to the technological sophistication achieved by North Korea and argued that it is likely to have succeeded in miniaturising its nuclear weapons and building nuclear warheads.
The white paper noted that North Korea has “shown readiness to acquire technologies to make practical use of new intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles and make them more sophisticated, presenting serious concerns for Japan and other relevant countries.”12 Given the situation, Japan is advancing its capabilities to intercept and defend against ballistic missiles. It is also engaged in joint research with the US on developing modified types of SM-3 and PAC-3. As regards SM-3 Block ⅡA, it is in its final stages and is expected to be complete by 2017.
Alliance with the US however remains the ‘cornerstone’ of the Japanese security. The revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, which constitutes the nucleus of the security alliance, has added qualitative depth to the security partnership.13 The 2016 white paper argues that the alliance serves as a ‘public good’ that caters to the goal of the Asia-Pacific stability. Today, the need to shoulder greater responsibility and to sustain the alliance with the US is more pressing for Japan than ever before owing to the geo-political complexity arising from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s push for a new model of great power relations with the US. Meanwhile, in view of the treaty obligation, the fear of possible entrapment in the East China Sea is also very much prevalent among a section of the US strategic community. This is in addition to the budgetary constraints which will shape the future US commitment towards the region.
At the regional level, both China and South Korea have reacted sharply to the Japanese defence white paper. Chinese defence ministry spokesperson has described the white paper as “full of lousy clichés”, “full of malice” and “irresponsible remarks” against China. Expressing “strong dissatisfaction” and “resolute opposition”, the spokesperson alleged that the white paper deliberately “hypes up the East and South China Sea issues” in order to “sow discord” among China’s neighbours. It was categorically stated that “the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is never a problem”. The spokesperson denied that China is “changing the status quo in the South China Sea by relying on its strength”. With regard to contesting claims over parts of the East China Sea, the Chinese spokesperson asserted that Beijing’s military actions are “absolutely based on the indisputable fact that the Diaoyu Dao belongs to China.”14
Over the years, China has claimed that Abe has engineered a China threat theory to validate his militarist drive among the Japanese electorate. Meanwhile, South Korea too has registered a strong protest against Japanese claims over the sovereignty of Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in its annual defence white paper. South Korean defence ministry had summoned the Japanese defence attaché in Seoul and underscored the need for Japan to undertake “corrective measures.”15 It is to be noted that Japan had been laying claim over Dokdo Islands in its annual defence white papers since the Koizumi era. Both China and South Korea have urged Japan to reflect on history and make sincere attempts to build mutual trust and facilitate the strengthening of bilateral relations in the larger interest of peace and stability in the region.
Japan under Prime Minister Abe has certainly witnessed tectonic shifts in its post-war security policy: enabling limited exercise of collective self-defence, escalation in defence expenditure, reorganisation of security structures including establishment of institutions such as the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), gearing up the R&D for achieving technological superiority and promoting security cooperation with other nations.
Japan’s ongoing effort at bolstering its deterrent capabilities is bound to raise anxiety levels in a region that has long suffered from complex historical baggage, intensified nationalism and persistent tension around fiercely contested geopolitical hotspots. As the US expects Japan to assume greater responsibilities, a key challenge before Abe is to define in unambiguous terms the scope and limits of his vision of Japan as a Proactive Contributor to Peace – basically, maintaining the delicate balance between sharing greater burden in ensuring regional security as part of the long-standing alliance with the US, on one hand, and factoring in regional sensitivities as well as its own deeply fractured domestic constituencies, on the other.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
ROK is employing an effective combination of gifting equipment combined with joint ventures with local industry, which has the dual effect of increasing exports and forging partnerships with domestic industries in a region where it has hitherto had a very minimal defence relationship.
In August 2016, the first photographs of the BAP Ferre (PM-211) appeared in the livery of the Peruvian Coast Guard. This sound, albeit decidedly unremarkable, ship would not have warranted a second glance even by the relatively modest naval standards of the region but for the fact that it was the latest example of the quiet penetration of the Latin American arms market by South Korea (or more accurately the Republic of Korea – ROK). Unheralded, the ROK has made remarkable inroads: securing contracts from countries in the region for the supply of assault rifles, aircraft, anti-ship missiles and warships, and entering into joint ventures with local shipyards for the design and construction of patrol vessels as well as with Peru’s fledgling aviation industry to assemble basic trainer aircraft. And it has ambitions for further sales in the years to come.
Placing a monetary value on ROK arms exports to the region is difficult as these exports are comprised of three discernible categories:
Furthermore, many of these exports were done as part of government-to-government transactions – spearheaded by the ROK’s very active diplomatic missions – which may have involved cooperation in other spheres, thus making estimates of precise values somewhat inaccurate. What is known, however, is that the ROK has exported defence items worth USD 3 billion annually for three consecutive years of either weapons or platforms such as ships or aircraft.1 Between 2011 and 2014, ROK arms exports grew at an average rate of 11.6 per cent per annum. In 2015, however, its arms exports recorded a fall of 3.4 per cent.2 While the majority of these sales valued at over USD 1.6 billion were to countries in Asia (with Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines being major customers), sales of more than USD 1 billion were registered in Europe (notably the K9 self-propelled howitzers to Poland and Turkey and the KT-1 basic trainer aircraft to Turkey), and a sale of assault rifles was made to Nigeria. Latin America accounts for about USD 300 million of the ROK’s arms exports annually, if joint venture investments are taken into account.3
While the sales themselves are of importance, the ROK is using arms exports as a way to build influence and explore avenues of defence cooperation within Latin America and has employed an interesting and effective combination of gifting equipment combined with joint ventures with local industry. This has the dual effect of increasing exports but also forging partnerships with domestic industries in a region where the ROK has hitherto had a very minimal defence relationship.
Military Sales
In 2012 ROK secured a contract to supply SSM-700k Haeseon anti-ship missiles to the Colombian Navy for the latter’s upgraded Almirante Padilla class light-frigates.4 This was significant as it marked the first sale of missiles from a country other than the United States, Russia/ former USSR or one of the European Union member states to the Latin American region. Later that year, the ROK signed a contract to supply 20 KAI KT-1 basic trainer aircraft to the Peruvian Air Force, again marking a major breakthrough for aircraft from hitherto non-traditional sources.5 In both cases, the sales were made through inter-governmental agreements and are indicative of the ROK’s willingness to circumvent the tendering and procurement processes of the respective countries by leveraging its bilateral relations to foster these foreign military sales. It should be noted that the ROK had previously been successful in selling a small quantity of K2 assault rifles to Mexico and a supply tanker (Ciudad Bolivar T-81) to the Venezuelan Navy. The ROK has used its entry into the Peruvian market with the KT-1 to pitch for a sale of its advanced T-50 jet trainer to the Peruvian Air Force, though there has as yet been no progress in this regard.
Joint Ventures for Design and Co-production
The deal to supply the KT-1 basic trainer aircraft to Peru included a provision whereby 16 of the 20 aircraft would be assembled by the Peruvian maintenance, repair and overhaul firm SEMAN. This would represent a quantum leap for Peru’s nascent aviation industry and reflects ROK’s willingness to establish assembly facilities for products within the region. The joint-venture concept was significantly enhanced in the naval sphere through the establishment of two joint-ventures between STX Offshore and Shipbuilding of the ROK and COTECMAR of Colombia and SIMA of Peru respectively. The 2013 deal with SIMA of Peru has a value of USD 82.2 million and is for the construction of five 500 ton patrol boats. Based on the Taeguk class serving in the ROK Coast Guard, and the first in a total of 10, these vessels will significantly bolster the Peruvian Coast Guard while simultaneously boosting SIMA’s shipbuilding capability.6 The first two vessels were commissioned in March 2016, closely adhering to the stipulated contractual timelines.7
COTECMAR and STX have embarked on a much deeper collaboration which has seen a joint design and development effort to develop a 250 ton 46metre patrol boat for the Colombian Navy. The CPV-46 project could total as many as 14 vessels, with two of them being built in the ROK and the rest at the COTECMAR yard in Colombia. Of interest is the fact that STX has given the export rights of the design to COTECMAR. Despite having only commissioned a single locally built vessel (two more having been delivered from the STX yard in Korea), COTECMAR has offered the type for export.8 The willingness of STX to partner with COTECMAR for the design of these vessels is in stark contrast to the practice of European firms such as Damen which have been willing only to allow the assembly of vessels in Colombia but refused to partner in the design process. As COTECMAR has ambitions of becoming a major ship design and ship manufacturing hub in the region, its partnership with STX has stood in good stead while simultaneously enhancing the ROK’s presence in the region.
Transfers of Surplus Military Hardware
The ROK has a long history of transferring surplus naval vessels – usually as they are being decommissioned from its naval service. Over the years, 19 Chamsuri class patrol boats have been transferred to countries such as the Philippines, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Timor and Bangladesh. Despite the fact that the class is now approximately 40 years old, the vessels have given good service and they continue to be offered as free incentives for countries to place orders for Korean vessels –two being offered to Trinidad and Tobago in 2014 free of charge should the country place an order for Korean OPVs. The Korean naval vessels that have been transferred by this route are noted for their excellent state of repair despite their age.
With this precedent, it is not surprising that ROK has made similar offers in Latin America and has found takers in Colombia and Peru. It is perhaps no coincidence that these two countries are the recipients of this largesse given the contracts secured by STX with COTECMAR and SIMA as noted above. The ROK, when undertaking these transfers, is careful to remove weapons systems that may have been imported for the vessels – MM.38 Exocet and Harpoon anti-ship missiles with their associated radars and anti-submarine gear such as Mk.46 torpedoes, depth charges and sonar, restricting the vessels to the patrol role.
To date, two ex-ROK Navy 1200 ton corvettes have been transferred – one each to Colombia and Peru. Colombia took delivery of a Donghae-class corvette (ex RoKS Anyang – PCC-755), which, after its refit, was commissioned into the Colombian Navy as the ARC Narino (CM-55).9 Peru, for its part, availed itself of a Pohang class corvette of the Flight-II subgroup (ex RoKS Geongju PCC-758), which has been commissioned as the BAP Ferre (PM-211) mentioned above.10 There are reports that a second Pohang class vessel is to be transferred to Peru but as yet there is no confirmation of the same.
The combination of approaches adopted by the ROK towards arms sales in Latin America has yielded significant results in a very short period of time. Making effective use of its diplomatic missions, the ROK has played to its military industrial strengths while making careful assessments of the requirements of its potential customers. Its willingness to enter into joint ventures and even design partnerships is uncommon in a region where direct sales are usually the norm. As the ROK deepens its involvement in the region, it remains to be seen whether it is able to make further progress in respect of arms exports to the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Regardless of the concessions Beijing is willing to offer on the NSG and bilateral issues, New Delhi has reason to continue viewing China’s maritime manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean Region with suspicion.
During his visit to New Delhi last week, Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister, held wide-ranging talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj. The agenda for discussion is said to have included a number of sticky bilateral issues – China’s perceived opposition to India’s membership of the NSG, Beijing’s opposition to UN sanctions on Jaish-e-Mohammed Chief, Masood Azhar, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Missing from the list of issues, however, was the South China Sea (SCS) – a subject Beijing had apparently debarred from discussion in any context or form.
Oddly, a day after Wang returned to Beijing, the Chinese media hailed India for being “neutral on the South China Sea” – as if the Chinese foreign minister has secured an assurance from India that if the matter ever came up for discussion in an international forum, New Delhi has promised not to take sides. Meanwhile, Indian newspapers pointed out that, despite never mentioning the South China Sea in his official discussions, the Chinese foreign minister did bring up the issue informally with the media. In response to a question by a journalist, Wang had observed solemnly that India needed to decide "where it stood on the matter of the South China Sea" – a clear indication that support on the vexed territorial disputes in Southeast Asia may have been the real purpose of his visit.
Interestingly, in the run up to Wang’s departure for India, The Global Times, a tabloid widely seen as the Chinese government’s mouthpiece, warned New Delhi that its seemingly inimical posture on the South China Sea was potentially damaging for bilateral ties and could create obstacles for Indian businesses in China. "Instead of unnecessary entanglements with China over the South China Sea debate during Wang's visit," an editorial in the newspaper declared, "India must create a good atmosphere for economic cooperation, including the reduction of tariffs…amid the ongoing free trade talks."
Clearly, China remains worried that India could join other countries in raising the controversial issue during the G-20 summit to be held in Hangzhou next month. With the United States certain to rake up the UN tribunal’s rejection of Chinese claims within the "nine-dash line", Beijing is determined to muster support for its own position on the matter. Wang’s India visit was widely seen as part of a Chinese lobbying effort to ensure that New Delhi does not join Washington and its supporters in pushing Beijing on the defensive by bringing up the SCS.
Chinese leaders might claim that by avoiding a mention of the South China Sea during discussions with Wang, Beijing can safely conclude that New Delhi is in agreement with its stand on that matter. The Chinese political leadership must, however, know that while New Delhi respects China’s viewpoint, it chooses to take a principled position on the disputes in the SCS. For three reasons, Southeast Asia and its contested littorals matter to Indian interests.
First, Indian trade and economic linkages in the Pacific are becoming stronger and deeper. Not only are ASEAN and the far-eastern Pacific key target areas of the "Act East" policy, Asia’s Eastern commons are increasingly a vital facilitator of India’s economic development. With growing dependence on the Malacca Strait for the flow of goods and services, economics is increasingly a factor in India’s Pacific policy. China must know that territorial conflicts in the SCS threaten the future trajectory of India’s economic development, creating an unacceptable hindrance for regional trade and commerce.
Secondly, India believes that the disputes in the Southeast Asian littorals are a litmus test for international maritime law. In the aftermath of the Hague Tribunal’s verdict on the South China Sea, New Delhi feels obligated to take a principled stand on the issue of freedom of navigation and commercial access as enshrined in the UNCLOS. Beijing must know that regardless of the guarantees it seeks from India about staying neutral on the SCS, New Delhi cannot be seen to be condoning the aggression of armed Chinese naval ships, aircraft and submarines in the region.
Regardless then of the concessions Beijing is willing to offer India on the NSG and bilateral issues, New Delhi has reason to continue viewing China’s maritime manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) with suspicion. For all the geniality on display during Wang’s visit, Beijing still hasn’t explained its rapidly growing undersea presence in littoral South Asia. The flimsy pretext of anti-piracy operations to justify the deployment of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean makes many Indian maritime analysts believe that China is preparing for a larger strategic thrust in the Indian Ocean.
Lastly, Beijing must know that New Delhi recognizes the threat that Chinese aggression poses for the wider Asian commons – in particular the exacerbation of existing power asymmetries. In order to contribute to a fair and equitable regional maritime order, New Delhi will take a stand that restores strategic balance in maritime-Asia.
There are, of course, things that New Delhi isn’t in a position to officially communicate to Beijing. For instance, the correlation that Indian maritime analysts discern between aggressive Chinese patrolling in the SCS and its growing deployments in the Indian Ocean Region; or the suspicion in Indian strategic circles that China might use its SCS bases as a springboard for active projection of power in the Indian Ocean.
Beijing might be surprised to learn that many Indian analysts and policymakers view China’s aggressive response to the UN Arbitral Tribunal’s verdict as part of a broader strategy to project power in Asia’s critical littoral spaces. Indian experts, however, recognize that China operates from a position of strength in the SCS, wherein it has physical possession over some critical islands.
What New Delhi really worries about is China’s reclamation and militarisation of features in its possession – particularly the deployment of missiles, fighters and surveillance equipment in its Spratly group of islands, allowing the PLAN effective control over the entire range of maritime operations in the SCS. Indian experts also recognize the important role Beijing’s militia forces play in achieving its regional objectives. India knows well that the main threat to maritime security in Asia isn’t so much the PLA Navy, but China’s irregular forces. Chinese surveillance ships, coast guard vessels and fishing fleets are the real force behind Beijing’s dominance of the littoral spaces.
With the expansion of Chinese maritime activities in the IOR, New Delhi fears a rise in non-grey hull presence in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Already, China’s distant water fishing fleet is now the world’s largest, and is a heavily subsidised maritime commercial entity. While an increase in the presence of such ships doesn’t always pose a security threat, India remains wary of Chinese non-military maritime activity in the Eastern Indian Ocean.
That said, nothing lays bare Indian anxieties as much as the prospect of Chinese naval bases in the IOR. India’s China sceptics are convinced Beijing’s blueprint for maritime operations in the Indian Ocean involves the construction of multiple logistical facilities. China’s 10-year agreement with Djibouti in 2015 for the setting up of a naval replenishment facility in the northern Obock region is widely seen by Indian experts as proof of the PLA Navy’s strategic ambitions in the IOR.
This does not mean that New Delhi is going to team up with the United States in an effort to contain China. On the contrary, Indian policymakers clearly recognize that naval manoeuvres in the SCS emphasising "freedom of navigation" are a risky proposition. While India would like to see all parties act in accordance with the law, New Delhi will not take sides on the territorial disputes. Even so, the possibility that China might eclipse India in its own "backyard" will continue to drive a security response in New Delhi, even as it seeks to strengthen the Indian naval presence in its near and extended waters.
Of course, Indian leaders cannot articulate the full extent of their anxieties over Chinese maritime operations in Asia. Regardless of the concessions on offer to New Delhi, Beijing must know that India will not agree to a compromise deal with China on the South China Sea.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Turkey is going where President Erdogan wants to take it to, as those who do not agree with him are too intimidated to stand in his way.
Turkey is going where President Erdogan wants to take it to, as those who do not agree with him are too intimidated to stand in his way. To figure out Erdogan’s plans, we have to look critically at both what he has done in Turkey after the coup collapsed and his foreign policy moves before and after the failed coup a month ago.
Erdogan invoked the people’s power initially to crush the coup and subsequently to approve the huge purge and other measures to suppress dissent with the aim of concentrating more and power in his hands. Hundreds of thousands of Turks came on the street night after night to show support for Erdogan. His thesis that the followers of Fehtullah Gulen, living in self-chosen exile in the US since 1999, carried out the coup attempt and that Gulen himself masterminded it has been accepted by a majority of Turks. That no convincing proof of Gulen’s involvement has been offered is a different matter.
Erdogan moved fast after the collapse of the coup giving the impression that he had planned it all beforehand. He started a purge, declared a national emergency, shut down dissenting media outlets to intimidate the rest into falling in line, and suspended Turkey’s compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. On July 16 itself, hours after the coup collapsed, 2745 judges were taken into custody. Obviously, the list was there before the coup attempt. Erdogan has done some ‘purging’ in the past from time to time, but this time it has been truly massive even at the cost of making it difficult for the government to function. For example, 21,000 private school teachers and 1500 university deans have been purged, while 1700 schools have been shut altogether. Naturally, the education sector has been gravely disabled. Can the Finance Ministry function normally when 1500 have been sacked? About 300 in the Foreign Office are under investigation including two ambassadors. About 32 diplomats have refused to return to Turkey and have sought refuge in other countries including the two military attaches in Greece who escaped to Italy. There is hardly any part of the government that has escaped the purge which has affected over 80,000 individuals.
What will be the impact of all this on the economy? Will foreign investment be attracted to a country in such turmoil? On July 17, Bloomberg carried a story with the caption “Turkey set for market turmoil as coup turns investors ‘ice-cold’.” Turkey has worked hard to convince the world that the failed coup has not in any way made investment in the country riskier than it was. A paid advertisement was taken out in the Financial Times of London. The rating agency Moody’s announced on July 18 that it was reviewing the current Baa3 grade and that the finding will be announced in mid-October. On July 20, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Turkey from BB+ to BB, drawing attention to ‘polarization of political landscape’ and erosion of ‘institutional checks and balances’. What Turkey’s government does not seem to or does not want to understand is that while the outside world is glad that the coup attempt failed it is concerned about the future of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey.
The 75,000-strong Turkish military, the second largest in NATO, has lost about half of its 360 generals in the purge. Ever since he became Prime Minister in 2002, Erdogan has consistently tried, not without success, to reduce the clout of the military. It was a happy coincidence for him that Turkey’s bid for admission to the European Union (EU) necessitated raising its democratic credentials by reducing the military’s role in politics, especially since it had staged coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. In its 2004 report on Turkey, the EU said, “A number of changes have been introduced over the last year to strengthen civilian control of the military to aligning it (Turkey) with practice in EU member states.” In 2007, the Army Chief, General Yasar Buyukanit, posted a memorandum on the military’s website objecting to the nomination of Erdogan’s candidate, the then Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, for the post of President on the ground that his wife had worn a headscarf and thereby undermined the secular order. Erdogan responded by pointing out that it was none of the military’s business to give an opinion on candidates for the presidency. Gul was elected and the military’s lack of clout was exposed.
The Supreme Military Council met at the Prime Minister’s office on July 28. In the past, the Council always met at the General Staff Head Quarters and the change of venue is significant as an indicator of the primacy of the civilian government. It is also possible that the civilian government deemed the new venue safer. The Council’s recommendations will have to be approved by the President. There is a move to change the composition of the Council by adding more ministers in order to reduce the role of the military. The Army Chief will be deprived of some of his responsibilities.
Predictably, the imposition of emergency, the suspension of the European Convention on Human Rights, the purge, and the suppression of dissent by shutting down media outlets, all in quick succession, alarmed the EU and the US; and they gave vent to their concerns about the erosion of the rule of law, Europe being more vocal than the US. Equally predictably, Turkey reacted with a degree of hostility to that criticism, pointing out that the West did not condemn the coup, its leaders did not personally call Erdogan to show support to the democratically elected government, and that there has been no high level visit after the failed coup.
But the real reason for Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the US is that the latter has not agreed to extradite Gulen. The US is insisting on evidence of Gulen’s involvement and it is doubtful whether Turkey has so far given any evidence that can stand scrutiny. Gulen wrote an article in the New York Times on July 25 titled “I condemn all threats to Turkey’s democracy”. The clear implication is that he condemns the coup and what Erdogan has done in the aftermath. There are signals that the US is willing to be patient and reason with Turkey. A team of US officials is due shortly in Ankara to discuss the matter of Gulen’s extradition. The Turkish media have put out a story that the team will assist Turkey in drafting a memorandum meeting US standards. This story might not be true. US Vice President Biden is due in Turkey on August 24 and the Gulen issue will top the agenda.
Erdogan’s visit to St. Petersburg and meeting with President Putin on August 9 has attracted a good deal of media attention. This was a meeting planned well before the coup attempt. When Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 war plane in November 2015 ‘for violating its air space’, Putin had broken off economic and trade relations inflicting much pain on Turkey. Erdogan’s initial efforts to talk to Putin were rebuffed. After a while, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and a prominent Turkish businessman mediated, and Putin relented after Erdogan apologized in June. Putin who was keen to reconcile with Turkey telephoned Erdogan immediately after the coup collapsed. Erdogan told Putin that the call was ‘psychologically important’. There is a report that Russian intelligence gave Erdogan some advance tip off on the coup.
The economic and trade relations broken by Russia to punish Turkey for shooting down its fighter plane are being restored. Russian tourists have already come back, and being received with champagne and flowers. Some commentators in the West have misinterpreted the resumption of relations primarily as an anti-US move. This interpretation is wrong as this is a resumption of what was there before the shooting down of the plane. The Turkish-Russian differences over Syria remain, but one should not be surprised if Erdogan were to over time get closer to the Russian position on Assad. Russia and Turkey have agreed to cooperate in the war against the Islamic State.
Russia and Turkey are not yet allies, but they might get closer as Turkey’s hopes of gaining entry into the EU fades away. Austria has called on the EU to break off talks with Turkey on its admission. The bone of contention between Turkey and the EU is the latter’s delay in granting visa-free entry to Turkish citizens to the Schengen area in return for Turkey taking back illegal migrants who had entered Greece. The deadline for the deal was June 2016. While Turkey is insisting that the deal be formalised by October, the signals from Brussels indicate that it might not happen any time this year. Most probably, the EU is not going to agree to the visa-free entry of Turks in the near future. Erdogan might threaten to inundate the EU with Syrian refugees and might even carry out the threat unless the EU pays a huge amount of money. Europe is vulnerable to such blackmail.
Iran sent its Foreign Minister to Turkey to show solidarity with Erdogan. The two sides agreed on the need to uphold the territorial integrity of Syria and agreed to talk more on Syria to narrow their differences. The opening to Israel signalled by Turkey before the coup will continue.
The Turkish media have been suitably intimidated and subordinated. The media have now ‘divulged’ that it was some Gulenist group in the Air Force that brought down the Russian plane. This is dis-information. Some columnists have threatened the US that its refusal to extradite Gulen might cost its use of Incirlik. It is difficult to take the threat seriously as the air base was built by the US in the 1950s, the US has stored nuclear weapons there, and the two countries have signed a joint use agreement. Nevertheless, Erdogan has cards to play. In 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution denying the use of the base to US in the War on Iraq. It was Erdogan who talked to his MPs and made them change their stand. Will Erdogan re-enact the same and demand that the US extradite Gulen?
Turkey is seeking more manoeuvring space by reconciling with Russia; the two may work closer in the fight against the Islamic State. Turkey might try to blackmail a vulnerable EU by threatening to inundate it with Syrian refugees. Turkey will play hard ball on Gulen, but short of hard evidence extradition is unlikely. Unless Erdogan takes due care, serious damage can be done to his country’s relations with the US as the latter might reluctantly conclude that Turkey is an unreliable ally. Has the US started looking at alternatives to Incirlik? It has built one and has started building another in Syrian Kurdistan controlled by its Kurdish allies. Russia has announced plans to build an airbase at Khmeimim in Aleppo province to ‘rival Incirlik’. Will Syria, partitioned de facto, if not de jure, have Russian and US airbases?
One wonders whether a phone call from President Obama before Putin’s would have changed the course of history. It might not have, but Obama should have called early knowing Erdogan’s paranoia and that would have made some difference as Erdogan is playing ‘the jilted lover’ with much success. Over time, Erdogan’s pursuit of absolute power and hard-line policy towards the Kurds might boomerang. The EU’s vulnerability should not be exaggerated as it takes 44 per cent of Turkey’s exports. After the general election in Germany around October 2017, Merkel’s successor might be less indulgent towards Erdogan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
While a Russia-Turkey rapprochement is driven by their particular national interests, its trajectory and outcome are likely to be shaped by the interplay of several geo-economic and geo-political factors.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to St. Petersburg on August 9 marks a remarkable turnaround in Russia-Turkey ties. The relationship had earlier deteriorated to historical lows after Turkey downed a Sukhoi-24 fighter jet in November 2015, which President Putin termed as a ‘stab in the back’. Nine months later, during their summit meeting in St. Petersburg, the two Presidents highlighted their ‘substantial and constructive’ dialogue on all issues of mutual interest. They also outlined a roadmap for restoring ties to earlier levels.
More symbolically, Erdoğan’s first visit abroad in the aftermath of the failed July coup took place against the backdrop of Turkey’s increasingly strained ties with the ‘West’. This assumes significance due to the ongoing rivalry between Russia and the ‘West’, and Turkey’s pivotal position in NATO. Therefore, given the nature and timing of Erdoğan’s visit, the pertinent questions are: What are the key drivers of the rapprochement? And, what are the limits to Russia-Turkey reconciliation?
Drivers of Russia-Turkey Rapprochement
The key drivers of this incipient rapprochement can broadly be attributed to economic and geo-political factors.
A crucial challenge for both Turkey and Russia is the revival of their economies. The attempted coup would have further dampened the sluggish market sentiments about Turkey. And Russia’s daunting economic crisis continues to fester. Against this backdrop, the restoration of the Russian-Turkish economic linkages become vital. This involves the tourism, agriculture, energy and construction sectors. Russian tourists comprised the second largest group of visitors to Turkey in 2015, while Turkish agricultural products were key substitutes for the banned European commodities in Russia. The Kremlin’s sanctions against Turkey in the wake of the shooting down of the Russian fighter aircraft had resulted in bilateral trade dipping to USD 23.3 billion in 2015 from 31.5 billion during the previous year.1 Russia also remains the biggest supplier of gas to Turkey. Notably, the revival of the Turkish Stream pipeline has significant geo-economic ramifications. It will allow Russia to transport gas to Europe by circumventing Ukraine while making Turkey a key hub of European energy transmission. Similarly, the USD 20 billion Akkuyu nuclear power plant project will boost their economic relationship. This follows the decision to set up a Joint Investment Fund to achieve the target of USD 100 billion of bilateral trade. It is expected that this economic interdependency can become a fulcrum of stronger political engagement.
Turkey’s outreach to Russia is also likely the result of a recalibration of its overall foreign policy objectives. The unravelling of its ‘zero problems with the neighbours’ policy has complicated its core interests in its neighbourhood. Ties with most of its neighbours, including Syria, Iran, Iraq and Israel, remain frayed. The Kurdish issue continues to fester, with Turkey remaining wary of the growing linkages between the Turkish and Syrian Kurds – the latter being supported by Russia and the ‘West’ in the battle against the Islamic State (IS). This can embolden the irredentist aspirations of the Turkish Kurds. Meanwhile, Russia’s emergence as a factor in shaping the key outcomes of the Syrian conflict has severely undermined Turkey’s room for manoeuvre in its ‘near abroad’. The failed coup is likely to further distract Ankara from its Syrian game-plan, with priority being accorded to domestic stability. The recent spate of IS-led terror attacks on Turkish soil underscore this urgency to focus inwards. Moreover, Turkey remains upset at the perceived lack of ‘Western’ support in tackling the attempted coup. Therefore, given the emerging crises on several fronts, Russian support can help Ankara tide over a few problems, particularly its Syrian conundrum. Engagement with Moscow can help Turkey protect its key interests, which include the Kurdish problem. It reduces the risk of a confrontation similar to the SU-24 downing. The reconciliation might also involve Russia using its influence with the Central Asian Republics to push for a crackdown on Gülen schools in the region2.
Interestingly, the timing of the coup and the American refusal to hand over Fethullah Gülen has given credence to Turkish suspicions of a ‘Western’ hand. This can be linked to the compelling need of the US and its West Asian partners to have Turkey on board in keeping the Syrian conflict alive. Ankara remains the most vital conduit to supply logistics to the rebels. A realignment of Turkey’s Syrian policy can result in a decisive victory for the Bashar Assad regime. In this regard, the Iranian Foreign Minister’s recent visit to Ankara highlights the geo-political churnings underway. At stake is the regional balance of power. Perhaps it is a mere coincidence, but barely a few days after Erdogan had apologised to Putin in June 2016 for the SU-24 downing, the perpetrators of the Istanbul airport bombing were identified as Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek citizens.
Russia’s calculus for the rapprochement is likely to be more nuanced. It extends beyond Turkey’s pivotal position in resolving the Syrian crisis. Having raised the stakes in Syria, the resolution of the conflict will be a litmus test of the Kremlin’s claims to be a pole in global diplomacy. As such, engaging the regional stakeholders will be vital. Similarly, finding convergences with Ankara on tackling terrorism is crucial, given Turkey’s links with the IS. Moscow faces the backlash of more than 2,000 Russian citizens having joined the terror organisation. A reconciliation can also cause a setback to the ‘Western’ containment strategy of Russia. As a key NATO ally, Turkey would have been expected to up the ante vis-à-vis Moscow in their overlapping spheres of influence. This includes the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia. Moscow’s recent game-plan appears to be to cultivate the differences among the ‘Western’ partners in order to undermine their unanimous position vis-à-vis Russia. Moreover, it can be argued that the rapprochement with Turkey is part of the Kremlin’s larger strategy of building Eurasian partnerships to reinforce its position on its periphery. A number of recent events point to this calculus: the Kazakh President’s mediation between Moscow and Ankara, the trilateral Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan meeting in Baku, the Russian-Armenian summit talks in Moscow, and the likely quadrilateral Russia-Turkey-Syria-Iran talks in the future. The key themes in these discussions have been on developing economic partnerships, tackling terrorism and improving regional security. Given Turkey’s linkages in these areas, a deeper engagement that can stabilise the region suits Moscow.
Limits to the Reconciliation
The ongoing rapprochement has led to suggestions of Ankara charting a new foreign policy that involves breaking ranks with the ‘West’. However, a deeper analysis reveals a more nuanced interplay of Turkish and Russian strategies. Given its fundamental interests in Syria, it is unlikely that Ankara will completely abandon its Syrian policy. Rather, it may simply adopt a tactical approach to strike deals with Russia on terrorism and the Kurdish issue, while exploring an acceptable political solution to the Syrian crisis. The major stumbling block though remains Assad’s role in a post-conflict setting. Therefore, the way these dynamics unravel will determine the future trajectory of the Turkey-Russia reconciliation. Moreover, the deep sense of betrayal in Russia about the SU-24 incident is likely to continue to shape the normalisation on Kremlin’s terms. Given the interplay of strong presidential personalities, a compromise on Turkey’s core issues without a viable Russian quid pro quo might prove tricky.
Meanwhile, it is unlikely that a major deviation in Turkey’s ties with the ‘West’ is in the offing. Their partnership remains highly symbiotic. The European Union (EU) is Turkey’s biggest trading partner, while NATO is the pillar of its security. In addition, a significant number of Turks remain oriented towards the ‘West’. For its part, the EU needs Turkey’s support in tackling terrorism and the influx of migrants, while the Turkish army remains the second largest in NATO. Turkey is also a key peg in the West’s containment of Russia. However, given their increasingly strained ties, Turkey can use the Russian card as a bargaining chip with the ‘West’. This stems from Ankara’s strategic value to the ‘West’. Therefore, Turkey might just seek greater ‘Western’ support in carrying out the ongoing purge and extradition of Fethullah Gülen, relaxation of European visa norms, and greater economic and military aid.
Consequently, while a Russia-Turkey rapprochement is driven by their particular national interests, yet its trajectory and outcome are likely to be shaped by the interplay of several geo-economic and geo-political factors. Nevertheless, the on-going Russia-Turkey rapprochement strengthens the maxim that in diplomacy there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies but only permanent interests.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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