In the wake of Donald Trump’s election as U.S. president, Japan is weighing the geopolitical and geo-economic implications of the new economic and security policies that his administration may adopt.
In the wake of Donald Trump’s election as U.S. president, Japan is weighing the geopolitical and geo-economic implications of the new economic and security policies that his administration may adopt. While the alliance with the U.S. has lain at the heart of post-war Japanese foreign and security policy, Trump’s emphasis on “America first” and his reservations with regard to alliance commitments have made Tokyo deeply anxious.
Geo-economics: TPP and beyond
Early signals indicate that the Trump administration is likely to depart from Obama’s pivot or rebalance to Asia. The most important indicator in this regard has been Trump’s description of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – often touted the economic pillar of the pivot – as a “potential disaster” and his declared intent to withdraw from it upon assuming office in January 2017. Japan is hesitant to process the harsh reality of such an impending U.S. decision, continuing to argue that the TPP is not “completely dead”.1 As the second-largest economy in the TPP after the U.S., Japan hurriedly ratified the free trade agreement in an extended session of the Diet, making it the only member country to do so. But Japan is likely to find it extremely difficult to convince other countries to ratify the TPP in its present form. Even Abe himself had earlier acknowledged that a TPP without the US market is “meaningless”.2
Whether TPP fades away or emerges in a new shape remains to be seen. But Japan cannot afford to let go of the TPP easily. Abe in particular considers TPP as an essential mechanism to capitalise on the Asia-Pacific’s growth potential and revive Japanese economic development. He considers TPP as a base for Abenomics and for his trade strategy. World Bank assessments indicate that, with TPP, Japan’s growth rate is likely to increase by an additional 2.7 per cent by 2030,3 with exports rising by USD 23.2 billion annually.4 Consequently, Abe has invested considerable political capital to overcome resistance from the farm lobby to the TPP.
Earlier in November, in an attempt to highlight the advantages of the TPP, the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers pointed out that Washington would have to sacrifice significant economic gains and suffer trade diversion as well as lesser market access in comparison to China if the TPP were to be dropped. Moreover, 35 U.S. industries that export a combined USD 5.3 billion worth of goods to Japan are likely to witness a loss of market in comparison to Chinese contenders due to tariff cuts under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that is being negotiated.5 Jason Furman has argued that in a scenario where the TPP does not fructify and China manages to bring RCEP into effect, the U.S. will be adversely affected. 6
But with Trump seemingly determined to drop the TPP, Japan is being pushed into seriously reconsidering and prioritizing other opportunities including the 16-nation RCEP, and negotiating free trade agreements with other partners such as the European Union and a trilateral China–Japan–South Korea FTA. While Japan is a member of the RCEP, it has certain reservations towards this mega-regional trade deal, which lacks the “gold standards” of the TPP in protecting intellectual property rights and does not insist upon state-owned enterprises following strictly commercial practices. Even more importantly, RCEP excludes the U.S., which provides China – the world’s second largest economy – a greater role in shaping this regional trade arrangement.
As far as the U.S. is concerned, Trump is an advocate of negotiating “fair bilateral trade deals that bring jobs and industry back onto American shores”.7 Trump’s designate as Commerce Secretary, Wilbur Ross, has also categorically stated in a letter to the Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso that his focus would be on strengthening bilateral economic ties. However, drawing from its own experience in the 1980s and 1990s on the size and composition of the trade deficit and issues of market barriers, Tokyo is likely to be cautious when it comes to negotiating a bilateral free-trade agreement with the U.S.
While Japan pushed hard to conclude a broad free trade agreement with the EU by 2016 in the wake of Brexit and Trump’s posture on TPP, negotiations are most likely to continue into early 2017.8 Here, it is important to note that negotiators would also have to overcome a rift concerning tariff issues and operational safety clause. Britain has until now served as Tokyo’s platform for trade and investment in the broader EU single market. With Brexit, Japan faces a new urgency in concluding a free trade agreement with the EU.
Geopolitics in the post-rebalancing era
Japan requires the U.S. alliance more than ever given the evolving regional security dynamics marked by an increasingly defiant North Korea claiming to possess miniaturised nuclear warheads and aggressive Chinese strategic ambitions in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, with the region getting engulfed in history issues and intensified nationalism, Japan is locked in sovereignty disputes with most of its neighbours including, Russia, China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Even as Japan invests energy on regional diplomacy, the Abe administration managing to bridge the trust deficit in Northeast Asia appears to be a remote possibility. With Chinese adventurism in the East China Sea, Russian deployment of the state-of-the-art anti-ship Bastion missile system and the Bal system in Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands, respectively, and a North Korean ballistic missile landing in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, Japan is increasingly looking for reassurance from the U.S. under Article 5 of their security treaty.
While Japan seemingly prefers Republican Presidents,9 this time around it desperately hoped for a Hillary Clinton administration which would have ensured continuity instead of the uncertainties surrounding the U.S.’s Asia policy under a Trump presidency. Clinton was the key architect of the rebalancing strategy. In 2011, she had argued that the security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand constitute the fulcrum of U.S. efforts in the Asia Pacific. In contrast, the Trump campaign had categorically articulated the candidate’s dissatisfaction with Japan on the issue of burden-sharing within the alliance.10 The Trump campaign perceived the alliance with Japan as costly and one-sided despite Tokyo reportedly sharing 48.3 per cent of the costs involved.11 The direct cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan is valued at USD 5.47 billion for fiscal 2016. Japan shelled out USD 1.7 billion for direct sustenance of the base in fiscal 2015. Besides, Japan has decided to devote USD 3.1 billion for the relocation of 4,000 U.S. troops to Guam, accounting for 36 per cent of the estimated cost of USD 8.6 billion.
Trump’s rhetoric during the campaign was very critical of the asymmetrical partnership between the U.S. and Japan. However, campaign rhetoric does not necessarily translate into concrete policy. Candidate Trump and President Trump are unlikely to talk or act in the same manner. Be that as it may, Trump did terrify Japan when he argued that the U.S. should be “prepared to walk”12 and Tokyo consider defending itself against Pyongyang. In addition, Japan’s nuclear sensitivities and crusade against nuclear proliferation received a shock when Trump suggested that a nuclear Japan may not be a bad idea.13 This stand was contrary to the April 2015 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meeting, which articulated the case of “ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional”.14
While Japanese Defence Minister Tomomi Inada stated during Defence Secretary Ashton Carter’s December 2016 visit that the debate should be centred on shared security capabilities rather than financial burdens, uncertainty looms large in the wake of Trump’s election. The debate on burden sharing within the alliance is hardly a new issue. Tokyo has long been pushed by the U.S. to assume a greater role within the alliance instead of being a ‘passive free rider’. For instance, the October 2000 Armitage Report pointed out that “Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defence is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation”.15
The burden sharing issue has been widely debated in the U.S. strategic community since the Cold War years. Japan opted for the Yoshida Doctrine as an effective approach to escape entrapment in the US-Cold War scheme of things. This enabled Japan to focus solely on its economic development and spend minimally on defence while relying on the U.S. security umbrella. However, with the trade wars intensifying with the U.S. and the fear of abandonment gripping the leadership, Japan has over the decades incrementally expanded its role and redefined its security identity with overseas deployment of Self Defence Force (SDF). Now with a fast altering East Asian security setting, Japan has initiated a fresh debate on the scope of Article 9 and taken definitive steps in assuming greater responsibilities with the enactment of the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security. The year 2015 also saw Abe demonstrating willingness to accept greater responsibilities within the framework of the US-Japan security alliance by revising, after 18 years, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation.
Road Ahead
Japan worries that in case the U.S. refrains from playing a major role in the regional architecture building process, China will have an easier path in crafting a Sino-centric order in the Asia-Pacific.16 Such a development is likely to prove to be a monumental challenge for Japan as geopolitical and geo-economic uncertainties intensify regional complexity. With Washington opting for a more inward-looking policy, it will be increasingly problematic for U.S. allies to persuade their security provider of the need to maintain the alliance network in its existing form. While Japan’s decades-old alliance with the U.S. is likely to stand the test of time since it is mutually beneficial, Tokyo certainly will have to deliver more than it is used to in order to convince President Trump that Japan is not a liability but an asset as an ally.
Since the Asia-Pacific region is emerging as the epicentre of economic growth, Trump is likely to remain invested in the region. While the U.S. will continue to work closely with its long term partners in the region, Trump may reorient the nature of the asymmetrical alliance partnerships in Asia. Besides, what shape other important bilateral relations such as the U.S.-China, U.S.-Russia, U.S.-Korean Peninsula and U.S.-ASEAN relations take under President Trump will also determine the U.S.’s overall approach towards this region. As Japan adapts to the new geo-strategic and geo-economic realities in the midst of profound changes unfolding in the global power structure, its strategic choices in turn will play a crucial role in shaping the East Asian security environment.
Political Fallout of the Creation of New Districts in Manipur
Gautam Sen
December 16, 2016
While the creation of seven new smaller districts has led to agitations by the United Naga Council, efficiencies in administrative tasks should be obtainable with district headquarters closer to the respective inhabitants.
Manipur is on the boil on account of the creation of new districts by the Ibobi Singh government. The agitation led by the United Naga Council (UNC) has intensified after seven new districts — Kangpokpi, Tengnoupal, Pherzawl, Noney, Kamjong, Jiribam and Kakching — were carved out formally from the existing nine districts by the state government on December 9, 2016. The respective Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police of these new districts have also been simultaneously appointed. The UNC blockade has been causing economic distress with prices of essential commodities including fuel and drugs increasing substantially. The impact of demonetization and scarcity of currency is also a factor contributing to public distress.
The Manipur High Court expressed displeasure while considering a petition on the matter, and enjoined the state government to ensure smooth flow of essentials to the people by keeping the two arterial highways serving Manipur – National Highways 2 and 53 – open with adequate security escorts. Reports indicate that even with paramilitary escorts, the UNC agitators have managed to stop and interdict the movement of trucks and other vehicles on the highways. In the Imphal Valley area, the predominantly plains people – the Meiteis and other tribals, as well as those in the nearby hinterland, are feeling the brunt of the economic blockade and agitation along the highway routes.
There appears however to be a re-think on the agitational posture adopted by the UNC and its support groups in the hill districts like Tangkul Naga Long, Chandel Naga Peoples` Organisation among others. This is in the aftermath of the High Court intervention as well as due to counter demonstrations opposing the blockade in Imphal. An internal ferment is also evident within the UNC on the future course of the agitation as well as on the need to leverage the support of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Issac-Muivah (NSCN-IM). The NSCN-IM is tacitly supporting the agitation and is also in a dialogue process with Government of India (GoI) on the Naga issue.
While better administrative management of the seven new districts should be feasible, the Manipuri Nagas of the existing hill districts of Tamenglong, Ukhrul, Senapati and Chandel feel that some of the new smaller districts would be under greater political control of the Manipur state administration at Imphal. There is also a foreboding among the Nagas that non-Naga tribes like Kukis would eventually dominate in districts like Kangpokpi — where presently there is a coexistence of Kukis, Nagas and the Meiteis. A major point of objection of the Manipuri Nagas is that the constitutionally-mandated process of prior consultation with the tribal members of the state assembly and hill councils under Article 371 C of the constitution on matters affecting administration in the hill region has been bypassed.
The state of turmoil in Manipur appears to have become a recurrent phenomenon. About a year ago, serious disturbances affecting public order arose after the Manipur Assembly hurriedly passed three controversial bills on August 31, 2015. These related to compulsory registration of non-Manipuris, non-alienation of their land rights, and registration of employees of shops and establishments in the Imphal Valley. These were passed without prior consideration and vetting by the members belonging to the hill constituencies and hill councils. These bills, deemed to be negatively affecting the interests of tribals and violative of the afore-mentioned constitutional provisions, had triggered a huge reaction in the hill districts and Churachanpur. These three bills did not finally get Presidential accent, and perforce had to be reverted back by the Union Home Ministry (MHA) to the state government for reconsideration. As in the case of the creation of seven new districts, the state government`s unilateral and non-consensual action triggered the earlier crisis as well.
In the existing politico-security milieu of north-eastern states — and in particular the India-Myanmar border region which has experienced depredations by the NSCN-Khaplang group, such non-consensual actions by the state executive authorities cannot but be detrimental to India`s security interests. Though the anti-national insurgent Meitei groups drawing support in the Imphal Valley region seem to be lying low currently as a result of counter action by the state police and central paramilitary forces, political unrest is detrimental to the overall security situation in Manipur. The Union government has a residuary responsibility to assist in turning around the present situation. While a direct assumption of executive responsibility by the Union government may not be warranted, a more proactive role of the Governor at New Delhi`s behest, may be justifiably required. The Constitution has adequate scope for this purpose under its Seventh schedule and Article 371 C, without impinging on the autonomy of the state.
The existing situation may nevertheless continue to drift as none of the players on the state`s political scene may like to take steps which may result in an unfavourable political outcome for them in the upcoming assembly elections three months away. The complaint of the hills people — and particularly of the Manipuri Nagas, has been that the Meitei-dominated state governments have not been responsive to their developmental and socio-economic needs. They charge that the outlying hill areas of Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Chandel and to-an-extent Senapati districts have been deliberately neglected. The means and mode of communication were stretched and tenuous. Moreover, adequate funds have not devolved to these districts` hill councils and the line functionaries, as well as project-cum-scheme sanctioning administrative and financial powers have not been transferred to them.
With the creation of new smaller districts and district headquarters closer to the respective inhabitants however, efficiencies in administrative tasks should be obtainable. The non-Meiteis of the far-flung districts would actually benefit more with the latest re-organisation measure. Reports do indicate that hill people and the tribals in Noney and Jiribam have enthusiastically welcomed the creation of their districts. The Ibobi Singh government seems to have worked in a calculated manner to strengthen its political support base in the run-up to the forthcoming state elections and would not be inclined to concede the demands of the UNC. The other political parties participating in the elections may also not contest the administrative reorganization that has been undertaken by the state government.
In the above backdrop, the political contention between the state government and the UNC may not die down conclusively and within a short time period. The UNC may have to work out its political posture to remain relevant among the Manipuri Nagas within the state`s context and realities as indicated above. If the situation does not evolve, there is a danger that some extremists within the UNC fold may resort to activities beyond the purview of law and the constitution to the detriment of India`s overall security interests. Within the canopy of the dialogue in progress with the NSCN-IM on the larger Naga settlement issue, GoI may consider inducing the former to influence the UNC to adopt an accommodative posture towards the Manipur state government.
MHA may simultaneously use the instrumentality of the state governor for suitable overview and to ensure that the consultative process necessary with the hill councils is mandatorily followed within the existing constitutional framework. A realistic appraisal of Manipur`s political situation as at present and its likely future trajectory seems to indicate that no political dispensation will be able to undo the administrative reorganization carried out without damaging its popular base. The endeavour from the national perspective should therefore be to minimize the disgruntlement and disaffection among the Manipuri Nagas to the maximum extent feasible.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served as Financial Adviser of North Eastern Council and was an Adviser to Nagaland Chief Minister. The views expressed are the author`s own.
A Joint India-Indonesia Intervention on the Rohingya Issue
Gautam Sen
December 15, 2016
Given that both India and Indonesia have a common interest in preserving their respective democratic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious polities, they need to work together to induce Myanmar to control the violence against the Rohingyas.
The problem of Myanmar’s displaced Rohingyas has of late assumed a special dimension in both South-East Asia and in India’s immediate periphery. Festering since 2011, the problem erupted once again in November 2016. After inter-community riots in Myanmar’s western Rakhine province in 2012, a large-scale displacement of approximately one million Rohingyas occurred. The problem has surfaced again after violence broke out in the area on October 9, 2016.
For long, Rohingya Muslims have been at the receiving end of violence unleashed by Burman Buddhists, particularly by the Buddhist extremist group `969` led by the monk Wirathu. The displacement of Rohingyas from Rakhine province, where they have been domiciled for generations, to adjoining countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand has of late assumed a destabilising dimension in Myanmar’s bilateral relations with these countries.
Rohingyas have also emigrated to India. According to authoritative reports including inputs from the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nearly a third of the 36,000 refugees registered with UNHCR in India are Rohingyas (more than 10,000). Some migrated as far back as 2005 (to Jaipur), while others are more recent arrivals housed in temporary make-shift conditions in states such as Assam, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Delhi and even Jammu & Kashmir.
Indonesia’s Vice President, Muhammed Jusuf Kalia, had expressed deep concern with regard to Rohingya migration to his country. Inter-alia, he stated that even though the Rohingya issue is Myanmar’s domestic problem, Indonesia will give suggestions and inputs to help resolve it. And he further added that Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has been sent to Myanmar on November 6, 2016 in order to intercede with the government there on the Rohingya issue.
Although initially the Rohingya refugee problem mainly affected Bangladesh, there were latent apprehensions in some quarters in India that eventually some of these refugees would spill over to this country. Despite the tolerant disposition of the Bangladesh government, conditions in Bangladeshi camps were not really ideal. The temporary settlement of a few thousand Rohingyas in Bangladesh after the ethnic riots in Meikhtila in Rakhine province in 2012 was also becoming a political issue among the country`s political parties to the extent that the Sheikh Hasina government could not afford to be seen as being very accommodative or deploying substantial financial resources on the settlement camps in Chittagong Division. Moreover, Bangladesh, after integrating the Buddhist Chakmas living in that part of the country, did not want a new problem in the form of Rohingyas. Consequently, it has been trying to send the Rohingyas back to Myanmar, albeit without much success. Given all this, it is but natural that some Rohingya refugees would flow into India as well as eastwards to places where they could live in reasonable conditions.
Of late, some of the refugees from these camps as well as a large number affected by the recent ethnic violence in Rakhine have been migrating to Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Thailand and Malaysia have given refuge to some, but have tried to thwart the disembarkation of many especially those who had reached their shores in illegally arranged boats by human trafficking mafias. Indonesia, while trying to maintain some control, has been more accommodative. However, it is not the policy of the Indonesian government to give the Rohingyas citizenship, integrate them within Indonesian society or settle them on a long-term basis. Interestingly, Rohingya refugees have been enthusiastically welcomed by the predominantly Muslim people of Indonesia’s western province of Aceh. This poses a challenge to the Indonesian government in terms of ensuring civic harmony without affecting internal cohesion or the balance among different ethno-religious communities. The various implications of these developments would have undoubtedly weighed with Djakarta when the Indonesian Vice President advised the Myanmar government to resort to politically accommodative measures for resolving the Rohingya issue.
Radicalisation of the Rohingyas is another issue that looms large in the existing scenario. Though not attributable to any hostility of the Rohingya towards India per se, the footprint of some radicalised Rohingyas in setting off the 2013 blasts at the Buddhist pilgrim centre in Bodh Gaya in the backdrop of Burman Buddhist-Rohingya riots in Myanmar was not totally ruled out by authoritative government sources. Therefore, it is in India`s inherent interest to ensure that a further exacerbation of the Rohingya problem is prevented.
Considering that both India and Indonesia have a common interest in preserving their respective democratic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious polities, they need to work together to induce Myanmar to be more assertive and control the violence against the Rohingya minority. Further, it is essential that New Delhi and Djakarta consider joint measures – with consensual support from ASEAN – to prevent the emergence of another source or cause of radical extremism by a persecuted minority in South and Southeast Asia. And they should also adopt a common approach to push for a better outcome with respect to the provision of refugee relief and rehabilitation of the Rohingyas.
The pursuit of such an approach is feasible given India’s multi-faceted relations with ASEAN, of which both Indonesia and Myanmar are members. There is sufficient common ground between New Delhi and Djakarta to ensure the Rohingyas’ eventual repatriation to Myanmar, both on humanitarian grounds and with a view to curb the dangers of radicalisation among a population who are presently facing multi-dimensional socio-economic misery and political apartheid.
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD did not show much consideration or interest on the Rohingya issue in the run-up to the last national elections. Now, with the democratic process instituted, albeit with the military exercising some oversight from the sidelines, the time is ripe to initiate a process for addressing the Rohingya issue. There is a strong case to modify the Myanmarese law of 1982, which has stripped the Rohingyas of not only citizenship but also of their basic rights to livelihood. At least, the following need to be instituted in this regard: work permits in Rakhine province and civic rights like movement for trade and intercourse, possession of property and observance of socio-religious customs, the availing of state-funded health and educational benefits, etc.
The Advisory Commission on the Settlement of Problem in Rakhine State (ACSPRS) set up on August 23, 2016 under the chairmanship of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan by the present Myanmar Government may be an instrument for resolution of the Rakhine-Rohingya problem provided it works impartially and with a modicum of international or at least ASEAN support. India and Indonesia could also act as facilitators in this respect. Notwithstanding the fact that the ACSPRS consists of three international persons of eminence including a Lebanese Muslim, the advisory body may not be able to push for a substantive outcome towards ameliorating the degraded condition of the Rohingyas unless some international pressure is brought to bear on Nay Pyi Taw. India has an inherent interest in acting on the Rohingya issue given its geopolitical and security interests. In the context of the interest evinced by President Widodo in developments in the Indian Ocean littoral, India, both as a littoral Indian Ocean country and as a neighbour with a near-similar political and socio-economic milieu, should forge an avenue of cooperation with Indonesia on the Rohingya issue.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served in senior positions with the Government of India and a State Government.
The Jamaica Defence Force – Balancing Priorities with Resources
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
December 09, 2016
The Jamaican Defence Forces have retained their cutting edge due to a skillful balancing of priorities with resources, the weak economy notwithstanding.
The Jamaica Defence Force is a brigade-sized unit comprising land, sea and air formations and is possibly the largest military establishment within the English-speaking Caribbean. Dating back to 1962, the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) had its roots in the West India Regiment which lasted between 1795 and 1926 and thereafter as the military force of the West Indies Federation which existed between 1958 and 1962. The JDF was formed out of the 1st Battalion of the West India Regiment and was later supplemented by small air and naval components. The JDF enjoys a good reputation within the West Indies, having a high standard of training and discipline and, compared to the military establishments in other West Indian islands, has maintained an organisational stability that has stood it in good stead over the last five decades.
The JDF has primarily been used to reinforce the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), which is the island’s police force, in internal security operations which have been known to degenerate into pitched battles against well-armed criminal gangs. One of the more recent, and certainly most notorious incidents being the 2010 operations against the “Shower Posse” drug gang in an attempt to arrest its leader Christopher “Dudus” Coke. These operations saw the JDF and JCF engaged in urban combat with some 500 armed gang members in which 4 security personnel and 73 civilians lost their lives. The JDF deployed Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and helicopters in support of its operations while the JCF employed weapons up to and including anti-materiel rifles to neutralize gang gun positions. The JDF was also deployed in support of the JCF in 1999 and 2001 to deal with extensive unrest sparked through an explosive combination of economic hardship, violent political agitation, and well-armed criminal gangs.
Beyond its internal security role, the JDF saw service in Grenada between 1983 and 1985 in the aftermath of Operation Urgent Fury as part of the Caribbean Peace Force – along with forces from Barbados and police special service units from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. It has also served in Haiti as part of a joint CARICOM Battalion. The JDF maintains very close ties with the British military and joint exercises are a routine occurrence which has served to preserve a high degree of professionalism in the JDF and its officers are held in high esteem within the Caribbean.
The 3000 strong JDF is overwhelmingly dominated by its land forces element – the Jamaica Regiment – which has 3 infantry battalions (2 light infantry and one reserve) and maintains a sizeable (by regional standards) armoured force of a dozen APCs. The Jamaica Coast Guard has a strength of 241 and the JDF Air Wing is slightly smaller. The organizational structure of the JDF is as follows:
Despite its undoubted professionalism, the JDF suffers from the bane of all military establishments in the English-speaking Caribbean – poor maintenance. Inadequate maintenance and a failure to procure spares in a timely manner has resulted in the demise of the JDF’s Ferret Scout Cars (which now serve as gate guardians), the Air Wing’s AS.355, Bell 212 and UH-1 helicopters as well as its Beech King Air and Cessna 210 aircraft, with its 2 BN-2A Islanders being barely operable. The Jamaica Coast Guard barely puts to sea and while it nominally has 6 patrol boats on strength, is practically without operational assets. Of great concern to the JDF was its inability to keep its ageing force of 14 V-150 APCs serviceable. Given the fact that these vehicles have proven invaluable in protecting JDF personnel during urban operations, their replacement became of great concern. Similarly, the Coast Guard urgently needed to restore capability. To this end a limited reequipment program for the JDF has started.
Lacking serviceable assets, priority was allocated to re-equipping the JDF’s Air Wing which was rebuilt around a force of Bell Helicopters and Canadian Diamond light utility aircraft:
Source: Jamaica Defence Force & World Air Forces Directory 2015
Close on the heels of the procurement of new helicopters and cost-effective fixed-wing aircraft, the Jamaica Regiment began making strenuous efforts to replace its ageing V-150 APCs. Of the 14 originally procured, only 3 remained serviceable by 2009 and, considering their utility during periods of civil unrest, the need for replacement became acute. Eventually, the JDF decided on the procurement of 12 Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles from Thales Australia with the contract being signed in December 2013. Deliveries commenced in 2015 and by January 2016, the full complement of 12 vehicles was received and entered operational service. A less glamourous but more important modernisation program was undertaken with infantry equipment as L1A1 SLRs, and British pattern web-gear and helmets were replaced with US-made M-16 rifles, M249 light machine guns and US pattern helmets and woodland camouflage and web-gear.
The Jamaican Coast Guard was the last to receive attention. In the period 2004-2006, the Coast Guard fleet was rejuvenated with 3 Damen SPa 4207 patrol craft, with two ageing patrol boats, the HMJS Fort Charles and the HMJS Paul Bogle, being refitted by Damen. The rest of the fleet consisted of old US-made Dauntless class patrol boats and a number of interceptor craft and Boston Whaler type vessels. By 2012, the fleet was composed of the following assets:
However, because the JDF failed to procure spares beyond the warranty period, compounded by the country’s poor economic condition, the fleet again fell into disrepair. The HMJS Fort Charles was decommissioned in 2012 and the other vessels were almost completely unserviceable. In 2015, however, Jamaica concluded a peculiar deal with Damen whereby its three Damen SPa 4207s would be decommissioned and returned to Damen in exchange for 2 new SPa 4207s that Damen had in stock. The decommissioning and return of the JDF vessels took place on 8th November 2016 and it is intended, after refurbishment, to offer them for resale. The two replacement vessels to be named (after their predecessors) HMJS Cornwall and HMJS Middlesex are currently undergoing modification and outfitting prior to delivery to the JDF. It should be noted that these vessels have an austere equipment suite and lack advanced surveillance systems or weapons larger than machine guns. However, the SPa 4207 is a cost-effective solution to Jamaica’s maritime patrol needs and, like many other countries in the Western Hemisphere, Jamaica has decided to continue using the type. Once delivered, the Jamaican Coast Guard will be able to monitor the country’s maritime domain.
Compared to the defence forces of Trinidad and Tobago, and the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, the JDF confronts similar security threats in the maritime sphere and from narcotics trafficking. Like Trinidad, it also faces a difficult internal security environment with its forces being deployed to augment a beleaguered police force against well-armed organized gangs. However, the JDF faces these challenges with the additional constraint of having to rely on a weak Jamaican economy to support its requirements. To the credit of the JDF and Jamaica, decisions have been made and resources allocated to keep the force viable in the years to come. Nonetheless, this viability will be contingent on adequate budgetary support being made available for the maintenance and upkeep of JDF assets and it remains to be seen if this will be forthcoming in the future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Brexit, the results of the elections held in Italy and Austria on December 4, 2016, and certain related recent developments in Europe raise questions about the future of the Union.
Brexit, the results of the elections held in Italy and Austria on December 4, 2016, and certain related recent developments in Europe raise questions about the future of the Union. There is mounting popular discontent against the status quo, the Euro, and, in some cases, against the very idea of the European Union (EU) itself. There is a discernible move towards the far right that needs close watching as elections are due next year in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and, perhaps, in Italy and the UK too. Europe might see growing political instability resulting in the unravelling of the Union.
Elections in Italy
In Italy, Matteo Renzi, who at 39 was the youngest to be Prime Minister when he took office in 2014, has repeated the act of political suicide patented by the UK’s David Cameron. Renzi put to referendum a rather complicated set of constitutional amendments. The 65 per cent of the eligible population that voted rejected Renzi’s proposals by a margin of 60 to 40 per cent, despite his threat to resign in the event of the amendments being rejected. Little did he know that his threat to resign will boomerang.
Essentially, Renzi wanted to reform Italy’s rather brittle constitution by giving more powers to the central government in Rome at the expense of provincial governments, apart from reducing the number of elected Senators from 315 to 95 and taking away the powers of the Senate to stand in the way of legislation approved by the House of Representatives. More than a rejection of the proposals as such, the vote was a rejection of Renzi’s performance as Prime Minister in the face of the worsening economic crisis characterised by unsustainable debt and deficit. Italy’s economy in 2016 is 12 per cent smaller than it was in 2008 when the recession started.
While the Euro has recovered, the referendum result has aggravated the crisis in Italy’s banking system burdened with a debt of USD 385 billion. While the EU was able to find money to prop up the failing Greek banks, it is painfully clear that it is beyond the capacity of the EU to prop up Italy. One of the banks in deep trouble is Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the oldest bank in the world, founded in 1472. Renzi wanted to provide funds to the bank, but Germany opposed the move. The bank urgently needs at least USD 5 billion and it is not certain now that private lenders will lend that amount to the bank post the referendum. If the bank falls, other banks also might follow.
Whether Italy’s President Sergio Mattarella decides to ask the ruling party to form a new cabinet, or appoints a cabinet of technocrats, Italy will enter a period of political instability which even a general election in 2017 might not put an end to. The anti-Establishment Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) founded in 2009 succeeded in getting more than 25 per cent of the votes in 2013, making it the second largest party in Parliament. The party is known for its populist, Eurosceptic, anti-globalist and anti-Euro stand, effectively projected by Beppe Grillo, a famous comedian and one of the movement’s co-founders. But there is nothing comic about what is happening to Italy. It is truly tragic.
The Presidential Election in Austria
Norbert Gerwald Hofer of the Freedom Party of Austria, founded by some former Nazis in the 1950s, lost by 6.6 per cent to Alexander Van der Bellan, former head of the Green Party who won 53 per cent of the votes cast. What is significant is that neither of the two established parties, the Austrian People’s Party or the Austrian Socialist Party, who have till now shared power, had a candidate in the final round of voting. Hofer’s party stands a good chance of winning the Parliamentary elections due in October 2018. Opinion surveys show that it might get 35 per cent of the votes if the election were to be held now.
Hofer has asserted that he would ask for a referendum on Austria’s membership of the EU if the European Parliament assumes more powers or if Turkey were to be admitted to the EU. He is against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between EU and US, already rejected by President-elect Trump. Hofer maintains that Islam has no place in EU and he wants to take back South Tyrol, now part of Italy. His motto is ‘Austria First’. He gained 35 per cent of votes in the first round held in April 2016, with his nearest rival Alexander Van der Bellen getting only 21 per cent. However, in the second round, Hofer lost narrowly. With the counting contested, the court ordered a new election in December. The final result shows that the foes of Hofer succeeded in uniting against him. While the post of President is largely ceremonial, it remains to be seen what will happen in the general election due in October 2018.
The Far Right trend in Europe
Support for the European Union has been dwindling elsewhere in Europe, not just in Austria and Italy. To understand the Far Right trend in Europe, we only need look at the anti-Establishment parties gaining strength in other countries: Podemos (Spain), Syriza (Greece, ruling), National Front (France), Freedom Party (The Netherlands), Alternative for Germany, and the UK Independence Party which succeeded in the referendum on Brexit. We cannot predict how well these parties will fare when France, Germany, and the Netherlands go to the polls in 2017. In Germany, Angela Merkel has announced that she would contest for a fourth term, but it is difficult to say whether she will win. In France, Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front, is hopeful of capturing the presidency next year. Whether she gets elected or not, her party should do well in the legislative elections due in June 2017.
Is Capitalism in danger?
A related fall-out of the resurgence of the far-right would be renewed attacks on globalisation. In a recent speech, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England said, "Globalization is associated with low wages, insecure employment, stateless corporations and striking inequalities.”
Carney’s warning is to be taken seriously. As Raghuram Rajan put it, “Democratic capitalism’s greatest problem is not that it will destroy itself economically, as Marx would have it — but that it may lose its political support.” It is obvious that if capitalism fails to deliver the expected benefits to the majority, the political support for it will erode.
In conclusion, Europe is likely to experience serious political turbulence and economic instability in the near future. The dream of ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ inserted in the preamble to the 1957 Treaty of Rome and reaffirmed in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty is as dead as a Dodo. The plans for a common defence and foreign policy are in tatters. Europe has entered uncharted seas and there is an impression that its current leaders are not up to the task of navigating through it.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A careful reading of the report of the deliberations of the UNGA on November 7, 2016 would suggest that nothing has changed at the ground level; only the rhetoric of member states has been amplified.
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) debated Security Council (SC) reform on November 7, 2016. Reports note that many states favoured India’s candidature for permanent membership and demanded that an updated Security Council reflect the far reaching changes the world has witnessed since the formation of the United Nations in 1945.1 This article examines whether the new debate on reforming the Security Council generates any hope for India’s membership in the world body. The first part of the article discusses issues related to UNSC reforms, demands, proposals, challenges, and prospects. The second part focuses on India’s aspiration, scenarios and possible challenges to India’s bid.
UNSC Reforms: Demands and Proposals
During the 71 year history of the UN, Security Council reform has been a much demanded and debated subject. It is widely accepted that the existing membership and functioning of the UNSC reflects the realities of a bygone era. Global politics has changed a lot – as regards its power, structure, rules, and norms since the formation of the UN. The world has witnessed a redistribution of power and emergence of new power centres, along with a transformation from the era of colonialism to that of post-colonial independent states. However, as a global institution to promote international peace and security, the UNSC has not responded to these changes due to many reasons. The only change hitherto has been an increase in the number of non-permanent members in the UNSC from six to ten, that too as far back as 1965.
In 1992, a promising reform move was initiated in the form of General Assembly Resolution 67/62, which highlighted the three major criticisms raised as regards the Council — lack of equitable representation, unresponsiveness towards new political realities and domination of Western states.2 In 1993, General Assembly resolution 48/26 established an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) to discuss SC reform.3 Most reform proposals revolved around the five core issues of “membership categories, the question of the veto held by the five permanent members, regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council, and Council working methods.4 However, even after negotiations for more than two decades, there exists a huge difference of opinion among members on these issues.
The major coalitions for SC reforms include the G-4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan), the L.69 (Group of 42 developing countries), the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) (Group of 12 countries), the African Group (Coalition of 54 African countries) and P5 Countries (Britain, China, France, Russia and United States). G-4 is the leading contender for permanent membership in the Council, as they seek four permanent seats for themselves, and one more seat for the African continent. The coalition demands expansion of both categories of membership — permanent and non-permanent – so as to make the Council more representative of the new realities in the global political landscape.5 The L.69 comprises 42 countries from Africa, Asia, Caribbean, South America and Pacific — and includes three of the four G-4 members (Brazil, India and South Africa). Similar to the G-4, L.69 also argues for reform as a way towards greater accountability, transparency, representation and legitimacy.6
The African Group, comprising 54 states from five regions of the continent, is another prominent advocate of reform. The coalition reflects the Ezulwini Consensus, the official position of the African Union, which demands two permanent seats with veto power for the African continent. In addition to these four constellations, some other coalitions have also proposed reforms in accordance with their own interests and preferences. The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group led by Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea, the Arab Group comprised of members of the Arab League and 10 countries from Africa, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency (ACT), a cross-regional grouping of 27 countries, are the other leading constellations that have proposed reforms consistent with their particular interests and preferences.
Since the adoption of the two GA resolutions related to Security Council reforms in 1992 and 1993, and the inception of the OEWG in 1993, the question of reform has made little progress. The OEWG, which came out with its report in 1995, the formation of a Working Group to Inter-Governmental Negotiation (IGN) in 2009, and the Group of Friends on Security Council Reform have been some of the developments towards Security Council reform hitherto. However, none of these formal and informal efforts were able to bring in either concrete institutional reform or create a broader consensus regarding the issues under debate.
India’s Aspiration: What would it take?
India’s quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC has a long history stretching back to two and a half decades. India was one of the leading countries of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), which initiated a draft resolution of 1992 in the General Assembly on equitable representation in the Council. Since then, several formal and informal negotiations have been held both within and outside the UN to address the issue. These negotiations indicated the necessity and urgency of Council reform.
A careful reading of the report of the deliberations of the UNGA on November 7, 2016 would suggest that nothing has changed at the ground level; only the rhetoric of member states has been amplified. In a repeat of the scenario of past debates, two of the permanent members — the United States and Russia – inflexibly opposed any alteration to the existing veto system. The other two major powers — France and the United Kingdom -- extended their support to reform that would keep alive the competence of the UN. China, as in the past, took an ambiguous position towards the expansion and reform of the Council.7
The debate witnessed a division of opinion among the P5 members, whose unanimous consent is a pre-requisite for any reform, particularly on the question of veto. For instance, Vladimir K. Safronkov, representing the Russian Federation, observed that Council reform was one of the most complex issues on the UN agenda since the approaches of the major players are highly divergent.8 He also noted that any proposal which would “infringe on the rights of current permanent members, including historic right to veto” was unacceptable.9 While Russia continues to back India’s claim for a permanent seat from among the G-4 countries, its strong opposition to changes in veto has generated an apprehension that it is now inclined to support India as a permanent member only without veto power. The US also opposed an expansion or alteration of the veto and demanded the consideration of aspiring members’ contribution to peace and security as a criterion for granting permanent seats in an expanded Council.10 Since the start of the reform initiatives in 1992, the majority of Chinese statements has contained identical phrasings. A sample of such statements includes the following: “Council reform should be carried out on the basis of broad consensus”; “A proposal that was acceptable to the overwhelming majority of Member States had not yet emerged”; and “No artificial deadline should be set”.11
Three among the five permanent members of the Security Council are still against Council reform that would entail a change in their present status. The possibility of changes in the positions of the US and Russia are unlikely since they are in a state of relative decline. Since it is their current status in the Council that provides them pre-eminence on issues related to international peace and security, they are not expected to support any move that reduces their say in global politics. It is unrealistic to think that China would give up its present privileged status in the UN, even as it seeks greater influence and presence in global politics as a rising power. Moreover, reading the text of the November 7 debate makes it clear that additional permanent seats with veto power is at best a distant possibility. The P5 are unlikely to approve the promotion of any states to permanent status due to the fact that such a change would eventually dilute their power. Therefore, for reform-seekers including India, there is nothing to rejoice in the recent UNGA debate.
Given the consistency of the P5’s positions in the past and the minimal progress towards reform during the last two decades, there are three possible scenarios regarding India’s quest for permanent membership in the Security Council.
First, India takes the leadership of reform calls and actively and relentlessly pushes other countries in that direction. Its latent power, remarkable economic growth, rapidly increasing defence capabilities, status as a nuclear weapons power, and contributions to UN peacekeeping all give it the right and privilege to assume such a responsibility. However, looking at India’s engagements with the UN combined with its growing indifference towards multilateralism in the recent past, such a development is unlikely. Beyond the rhetorical statements of leaders and officials, it is still not clear whether a permanent seat in the Council is a priority for India. Many of the policy makers in the country still entertain doubts about the wisdom of India seeking greater space in an institution that has lost its legitimacy. In this situation, it is unrealistic to think that India would take the responsibility of patching the holes of the UN.
The second option is to push for Security Council reform without changing the current status of veto power. Since having a seat without veto is almost similar to not having a place in the Council, the likelihood of such a move from India is even less.
The final possible scenario is for India to accept the fact that, given the current pace and momentum, Security Council reform is never going to happen and to consequently search for alternatives to push the agenda of emerging powers. Given the miserable fate of such alternatives, for example, BRICS and its uncertain future, this option would also be a great gamble. BRICS was formed as a political and economic alternative to the Western-dominated architecture of global governance and to drive an emerging power agenda in such institutions. Nonetheless, no coherent action has been taken by BRICS countries in this regard. Such inaction raises questions about the ability of the emerging powers to either pilot multilateral institutions or push for reforms in the current global governance system.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
3. UN Doc. A/RES/48/26, ‘Through the resolution Assembly recalled its resolution 47/62 and formed an Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects of Security Council expansion’, December 3, 1993, at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r026.htm
4. Press Release of General Assembly Debates on Security Council Reform, n. 1.
5. C.S.R. Murthy, ‘UNSC Reforms: A Perspective’, in Ruchita Beri and Arpita Anant (eds.), United Nations Security Council Reform: Perspectives and Prospects, IDSA Monograph Series, No 38. (2014), p. 18.
6. Statement of Ambassador Menissa Rambally, Permanent Representative of Saint Lucia to the United Nations, on behalf of the L.69 Group on September 14, 2015; Also see her statement on behalf of the L.69 Group on November 7, 2016, n. 1; For more details on L.69 reform proposal, See UN Doc. A/61/L.69/Rev.1, September 14, 2007.
9. Statement of Vladmir Safronkov, Representative of Russian federation to the UN General Assembly on November 7, 2016; Ibid.
10. See the statement of Michele J. Sison, US Deputy Representative to the UN General Assembly on November 7, 2016, Ibid.
11. See Statements of Chinese representatives to UN, Liu Zhenmin at General Assembly meeting on July 20, 2006, at http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/ga10484.doc.htm and Liu Jieyi on November 7, 2016, n. 1.
United Nations, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), India
Impressment Exercise for ‘Civil Hired Transport’ (CHT): Is there a better way to do it in Digital India?
Vinay Kaushal
December 08, 2016
The Army needs to comprehensively review the existing SoP for this exercise, liaise with MORTH and NHAI and jointly develop a software which can generate traffic data reports that would be accurate and useful for its planning purposes.
“Now, Drama Gets Conspiracy Angle, ‘Army out on streets civil war likely” was the title of a report published in the Delhi edition of the Times of India on December 2, 2016. The issue came up for discussion in both Houses of Parliament on the same day. In reply to a point raised by the Leader of Opposition (LOP) in the Rajya Sabha, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence informed1 the House that Army Formations in Eastern Command at local levels are carrying out routine annual data collection exercise on the availability of load carriers at major entry points. He informed the House that this was being done by teams of five to six Army personnel in coordination with local police authorities. It was mentioned that this exercise is carried out to ascertain the availability of vehicles that can be utilized during a national emergency. The exercise involved collecting data in all North Eastern States, including at 18 points in Assam, 13 points in Arunachal Pradesh, 19 in West Bengal, six in Manipur, five in Nagaland, five in Meghalaya, and Tripura and Mizoram. He amplified that this is an exercise carried out every year. He also apprised the House that a similar exercise in Eastern Command was carried out in 2015 at the same locations from 19 to 21 November 2015. Similar exercises have also been carried out in Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar from 26 September to 1 October, 2016 under South Western Command. And such an exercise in Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar was also done under Central Command from 19 to 21 November 2015 at Meerut, Dehradun, Allahabad, Danapur, Lucknow, Raipur, Ranchi, Gaya, Jamshedpur and Roorkee. The Raksha Mantri addressed the political aspects of the question that day in the Lok Sabha. “Army Clears the air, Didi defiant” was the title of a report published in the Delhi edition of the Hindustan Times on 3 December 2016.
While one hopes that the issue settles down and does not aggravate further, there is a need to understand the purpose, mechanism and legal provisions of this exercise and also find a better way to do the same in future.
Planning and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
Each military operation is replete with uncertainties. To ensure an efficient response as the operations evolve, every contingency/scenario is thought of and the best response to such situations are thought through, discussed, practiced and the best option selected and a SOP is drawn out. This ensures that in a given situation all members of a team whether individually (a pilot in a fighter cockpit) or collectively as a section, company or a formation need not discuss what to do but instead, without wasting time, respond in a manner which, by repeated practice, becomes a natural response. These SOPs are practiced regularly as part of exercises and have to be continuously reviewed and updated and have to be current to be effective. These contingencies also include logistics challenges during operations. Army formations are spread across the country. In case of a threat they need to be mobilised in the quickest possible time from their peacetime locations to their operational locations (which are known to each formation as per its war plan). There can also be a contingency for movement to some new (not part of the original plan) location based on emerging requirements. No formation is self-contained in transport resources both in the number and type of specialist vehicles to move the fighting units and the support echelons. War and emergency situations require the optimum use of instruments of ‘National Power’ and these include non-defence assets and resources including private commercial assets and equipment. Provision is also made to assess and compensate the individual(s) and entities whenever their assets are used in such contingencies. To be prepared to respond to such demands at the time of operations, Army formations need to have current information on:
The type and number of vehicles of the required class as well as type available in their immediate vicinity.
The volume and density of traffic on the national road networks so to be able to identify the fastest route to reach their destinations.
Impressments for transport
Chapter II of ‘Defence of India Act 1971’ contains ‘Emergency Powers’. Section 3 of the act provides:
(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make such rules as appear to it necessary or expedient for securing the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the rules may provide for, and may empower any authority to make orders providing for, all or any of the following matters, namely:
Under sub subsection (17) & (18) of the above provision are the relevant provisions that address the need of the Army in such a contingency.
(17) Prohibiting or regulating the sailings of vessels from ports, traffic at aerodromes and the movement of aircraft, and traffic on railways, tramways and roads, and reserving and requiring to be adapted, for the use of the Government, all or any accommodation in vessels, aircraft, railways, tramways or road vehicles for the carriage of persons, animals or goods;
(18) The impressment of vessels, aircraft, vehicles and animals, for transport.
The aim of the exercise that has raised controversy was precisely to have a current data bank of vehicles and the volume of traffic so that only fair and reasonable demands are placed by the Army on the civil authorities both in terms of numbers of vehicles to be requisitioned and traffic restriction/closure if any to be made on select sections of the road network in case of a contingency requiring the movement of formations during a declared emergency.
Is this the best way to do this exercise?
The traffic pattern on highways has variations, which are:
Seasonal
Days of the week
Time of day
Religious, social and political events in the vicinity
Holidays and long weekends.
Given the above, the methodology of deploying five to six unarmed combatants at a toll plaza (the number of lanes on an average could vary from eight to 16) on any two to three days in a year and collecting data and then depending upon it would therefore be fraught with a high risk of unpleasant surprise when plans based on that data are to be followed.
The facts, as have been provided during the discussion on the subject, are that the local army formations had interacted with the state police authority while planning the exercise. This suggests that the methodology has not kept up with some changes. The Control of National Highways (Land And Traffic) Act, 2002, effective since January 2003, was promulgated by Parliament to provide for control of land within the National Highways, right of way and traffic moving on the National Highways and also for removal of unauthorised occupation. It authorises the Central Government to appoint one or more officers of the Central Government or the State Government to be known as Highway Administrators. These are for defined lengths of the highway and, by default, Project Directors of the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) are also nominated as Highway Administrators under this act and notified in the gazette. Their task is to exercise powers and discharge functions conferred on them under this Act. Among others, their powers include:
Power to regulate and control the plying of vehicles on the Highway.
To refuse, regulate or divert any proposed or existing access to the Highway.
To temporarily close a Highway or part thereof or to restrict or regulate traffic on such Highway or part thereof, it may do so in the manner as it may deem fit.
Hence for any activity to be done on the Highways or at the Toll plaza, the army formations need to interact and co-ordinate with these officers.
Traffic Data
Actual data on annual, monthly, weekly or daily basis is available at all toll plazas and they (both NHAI and Concessionaire Managed [Public Private Partnership (PPP), Operate maintain and Toll (OMT)] toll plazas report to NHAI HQs on a monthly basis. The data is structured based on user fee (as toll is legally referred to) classification and these would suit (almost tailor made) the Army’s requirement. The table below for rates applicable for one such toll plaza illustrates this:
Type of vehicle
Single Journey
Return Journey
Monthly Pass
Commercial Vehicle registered within the district of plaza
Car/Jeep/Van
100
145
3250
50
LCV
160
235
5255
80
Bus/Truck Two Axle
330
495
11005
165
Three Axle Commercial Vehicle
360
540
12010
180
4 to 6 Axle Commercial Vehicles/Heavy Construction Machinery(HCM)/Earth Moving Equipment(EME)
520
775
17260
260
Seven or more Axle
630
945
21015
315
To avail concessional rates, monthly pass holders and locally registered vehicles have to register with the toll plaza and have to produce documents (including RC). Thus, all relevant details are available with the toll plaza.
Digital Environment
The initiative taken by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MORTH), NHAI, and Concessionaire to introduce Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) has been gathering momentum. They have introduced FASTag for vehicles (a dedicated Epurse for toll) which can be topped up online. Each time the vehicle crosses a toll plaza, the toll would be deducted. In addition to having the registration details, class of the vehicle etc., the tag will also have the owner’s name and mobile number (SMS will automatically be sent each time toll is deducted both indicating the amount and the toll plaza location). There are 346 FASTag enabled Active Toll Plazas and demonetisation is going to be a catalyst for commercial vehicles migrating from cash based tolling to ETC. This will result in faster moving traffic and, for the purpose of issue under discussion, real time information on location of the desired class of vehicles.
Conclusion
The Army needs to comprehensively review the existing SoP for this exercise, liaise with MORTH and NHAI and jointly develop a software which can generate traffic data reports that would be accurate and useful for its planning purposes. A database of Highway Administrators, NHAI Project Directors and their contact details should be created, and kept updated. Details of ‘Way Side Amenities’ and ‘Truck layby’ locations, again available with the Highway Administrators, should be maintained and dovetailed into convoy movement plans so that halts of convoys are planned in a manner that facilitates the movement of normal road traffic. An old management principle, ‘There is always a better way of doing things and the one best way is never achieved” is truer today (in an interdependent world marked by rapid ICT developments) than ever before.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Elections in Kuwait: Will it lead to Political Instability?
Md. Muddassir Quamar
December 06, 2016
The November elections in Kuwait have thrown up some intriguing scenarios. Having won nearly half the seats, if the opposition groups decide to unite under one banner and insist on taking on the government, the possibility of a fresh stalemate in the country cannot be ruled out.
On November 26, parliamentary elections were held in Kuwait and the results have thrown up an interesting scenario with opposition candidates winning nearly half the seats. Notably, many of the sitting members have lost and as many as 30 of the elected members are new and young including a woman. According to the election authority, the turnout was over 65 per cent and a total of 290 candidates including 14 women were in the fray. Kuwait’s unicameral legislature known as Majlis al-Umma or national assembly is one of the most vibrant among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, with the members having right to question the cabinet. The total strength of the Assembly is 65 with 15 appointed ministers who are ex-officio members and 50 directly elected—10 each from five electoral districts.
The previous house was dissolved by the Emir on October 16, citing deteriorating security situation having necessitated a fresh mandate. Analysts, however, believe that the Emir decided to dissolve the house because of persistent questions raised by the members of parliament (MPs) against austerity measures introduced by the cabinet. The Kuwaiti Constitution gives power to the Emir as well as the constitutional court to dissolve the national assembly. Though the term of the house is of four years, there have been seven elections in the last 10 years and three between 2011 and 2013, indicating political challenges facing the tiny oil-rich Emirate. During 2011-13, Kuwait witnessed sporadic protests and heightened political activism amidst regional upheavals, forcing the ruling al-Sabah family to dissolve the national assembly and the opposition groups to boycott the fresh elections.
The campaigns for this election were intense and austerity measures and rising prices were main issues. Opposition groups including Islamists and liberals, who had boycotted the previous election held in July 2013 over the new electoral laws that they alleged favoured the pro-government candidates, participated this time and campaigned vigorously. Downward economic turn due to low oil prices, forcing cut in social security and subsidies, and high youth unemployment, were issues that the opposition groups raised. Analysts have argued that some of the measures taken by the government were not appreciated by the electorate, and the opposition by raising these issues during campaign could connect with the people, leading to their good performance.
Political parties are not allowed in Kuwait but historically likeminded individuals have formed groups and coordinated election campaigns. Islamists, Salafists, liberals, Shias, pro-government individuals backed by dominant tribes such as Ajman, Mutair and Awazem have been the dominant groups. Since the last election was boycotted by the Islamists and liberals, dominant tribe-backed individuals, pro-government Salafists and Shia groups dominated the house. In this election, however, opposition Islamists with links to Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists, liberals and individuals backed by smaller tribes such as Enezi and Jahra have done well. This can create rifts and political instability witnessed earlier might return. Issues such as austerity measures, rising prices, and the issue of citizenship might lead to confrontation between the government and opposition.
There is, however, a larger question that this election has thrown up, that is, whether Kuwait will proceed on the path of political reforms and democratisation. Kuwait has taken significant steps towards reforms since the 1990s, precisely after liberation from Iraq. Kuwaiti MPs are directly elected and can question and discuss policy decisions and the cabinet. The constitutional court has the right to dissolve the parliament and alter decisions taken by the Emir but political reforms and an empowered parliament has largely resulted in political instability. One of the main long-term demands of the opposition is to have an elected government, which has been so far rejected by the monarchy. Analysts believe that the idea of an elected government will not materialise in the current regional climate, because strong political reforms can lead to riddles in the neighbourhood.
There are other political issues especially the status of Bidoon (stateless tribal Bedouins), corruption scandals and tough security measures that have marred previous governments. Security has emerged as a major issue in the past two years as Kuwait has witnessed a number of terrorist attacks. A suicide attack on a Shia mosque killed 27 worshippers on June 26, 2015. There was also an attempt to target the US soldiers in October 2016; an incident that was initially seen as an accident but was later confirmed as a terrorist attack. Crackdown by the security agencies had led to the discovery of many sleeper cells of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), prompting the government to take some extraordinary measures, which were deemed by the opposition as stifling of free speech and dissent. A government proposal to collect DNA samples of all citizens for identification purposes was highly unpopular and has been postponed for now.
In recent years, economic crisis and corruption scandals have often impacted the functioning of the government. On November 15, 2011, during the height of Arab Spring, many MPs along with their supporters had “stormed” the parliament protesting against a scandal involving Prime Minister Nasser al-Sabah who was later removed. After the February 2012 election, an opposition “anti-corruption” bloc had emerged in the national assembly. The judiciary later dissolved the house that led to government introducing new electoral laws, diminishing the possibility of opposition groups forming a bloc in the parliament. Now with austerity measures, cut in social security, rising prices and youth unemployment, and a strong opposition showing in the elections, the oft-seen government paralysis might return.
Kuwait is the only GCC state to have a semblance of democratic elections and a strong parliament. However, in the last one decade, the country has witnessed repeated political stalemate between the parliament and the government. While the opposition groups have been pushing for political reforms, the ruling al-Sabah family has preferred to keep governance in its hand and focus on economic reforms. The November 26 elections have thrown up some intriguing scenarios. Having won nearly half the seats, if the opposition groups decide to unite under one banner and insist on taking on the government, the possibility of a fresh stalemate in the functioning of the government and the national assembly cannot be ruled out.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Trump’s Energy Plan – More Volatility for Oil Geopolitics
Shebonti Ray Dadwal
December 05, 2016
Although President-elect Trump has declared his intention to deregulate the fossil fuel sector in order to make America less energy import dependent, but over time, this will lead to an increase in supplies in an already over-supplied oil (and gas) market and send prices into a further downward spiral.
As the US President-elect Donald Trump forms his team in preparation of his inauguration on January 20, the policy contours of his administration remain a matter of conjecture. Among issues that have elicited substantial debate are climate change, as it is not clear whether the new US administration will remain as invested in clean energy as the current administration. Under President Barack Obama, climate change had been a priority issue. As outlined in the section on climate change in The Economic Record of The Obama Administration, released by the White House in September 2016, the capacity of renewable energy (RE) from non-hydro resources tripled between 2008 and 2015, while the share of US electricity generation from RE increased from under three per cent in 2008 to seven per cent in 2015.1
Now, with Trump poised to take office next month, there are concerns that clean technology and climate change issues, in general, may take a backseat, while oil, natural gas and particularly coal may stage a comeback. Trump has never made his scepticism about climate change policy a secret. During the election campaign, he had (in)famously tweeted, “(climate change) was created by and for the Chinese in order to make US manufacturing non-competitive”. He had also declared that if elected, he would pull America out of the Paris Agreement.
Although Trump has since downplayed much of his contentious campaign rhetoric, scepticism and ambiguity about his likely policy approach on the issue still persists. In an interview with The New York Times on November 23, he did claim to have an “open mind” on climate change issue, that he would study it very carefully, but at the same time also stated that one of the factors that had seen the exodos of 70,000 factories from America was the climate change policy, and that this situation has to be reversed.2 Whether the figures he quoted are based on facts are questionable, but the fact that he has appointed a well-known climate sceptic, Myron Ebell, to lead his Environment Protection Agency (EPA) transition team, and Harold Hamm, an oil man, as a potential Energy Secretary, might be an indication that some dramatic reforms are in the making.
Whatever be the fate of the US’ climate change policy, there is, however, a general consensus that the fossil fuel industry will benefit under the new administration. During his campaign, Trump had promised that the US would “become and stay independent of any need to import energy from the OPEC cartel or any nations hostile to our interests”, and that allowing companies to drill into untapped natural gas and oil reserves beneath the US land and coastal waters would be a massive economic boon, creating millions of jobs and billions of dollars in revenue.3
The question now is, whether the revamped fossil fuel-centric energy policy deliver the expected results? And, more importantly, what impact will it have for the global oil market?
First, although Trump has declared his intention to deregulate the fossil fuel sector in order to make America less energy import dependent, which may bring cheer to production companies in the short term, but over time, this will lead to an increase in supplies in an already over-supplied oil (and gas) market and send prices into a further downward spiral. While production efficiency technology has seen shale oil hold its own at $45-50/barrel, any fall in price levels will once again impact the output. At the same time, it will also impact the RE sector. While it may not stop the momentum in the growth of green technology, it may slow it down as a result of drop in investment for the sector.
Much of Trump’s attempt at reviving the domestic fossil fuel sector will however depend on how the international oil market reacts. On November 30, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) finally arrived at a consensus on market intervention and agreed to cut production by1.2 million barrels a day for six months, starting January 2017, causing Brent crude prices to jump by almost nine per cent overnight to over $50/barrel. Russia too has agreed to cut production by 300,000 barrels a day. But given that higher oil price will benefit the US shale drillers and will lead to more supply in an already over-supplied market, the issue is how OPEC members reached such a consensus.
Following Trump’s election, the US dollar has surged, causing oil prices to weaken further. Again, with Trump promising to end the US dependence on OPEC and removing regulatory hurdles to the US oil production, prices would have been poised to drop even further. Neither did months of low oil prices have had the desired impact on big shale production. For OPEC producers, it could well be a do-or-die situation. Hence, after Riyadh, which ran $100 billion in deficit in 2015, acquiesced to Iran’s demand to agree to its freezing production after reaching pre-sanctions levels, as well as output concessions for Libya and Nigeria, the deal was made. OPEC is also hopeful that the winter demand will pick up and reduce the oil inventories, which had piled up, due to over-supply and falling demand.
Nevertheless, there is scepticism regarding OPEC’s ability to abide by production quotas, as well as Russia honouring its promise on output cuts. Furthermore, as shale production recovers, it may not be long before market once again witnesses increased liquidity. But for the six months starting January 2017, if OPEC production is reduced, it may shore up prices for the short term.
For large fossil fuel consuming countries like India, the prospects of an increase in prices – or volatility -- is not welcome, even if short-lived. Already, some Asian countries are looking for ways to diversify their imports away from OPEC sources, and they may well begin looking up to the US for supplies, to the detriment of traditional West Asian suppliers. Moreover, if Trump carries through with his election promise of re-imposing sanctions on Iran, it may lead to a further tightening of the oil market. This could be a double whammy for India, which recently saw Iran overtaking Saudi Arabia as its largest oil source as Tehran offered discounted prices. If the US goes ahead and imposes additional sanctions against Iran, it may not only impact India’s oil imports from Iran but also its investments in Chabahar, which has only recently started moving forward.
As of now, therefore, the picture is far from clear. The assumptions about the new US administration’s energy and climate policy are largely based on Trump’s campaign rhetoric, many of which have since been rescinded. Some analysts believe that his priorities may shift once he takes office. What seems almost certain, however, is that the hydrocarbon sector will be a priority for the new US administration, even if the US does not exit the Paris climate deal. This could be a game changer for the beleaguered international oil market and the West Asian politics, which in turn will have a cascading impact on global geopolitics in general.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
It is Terrorism by Daish, Not Jihad by Islamic State
Reshmi Kazi
December 05, 2016
Terrorists pursuing an atavistic agenda through the brutal killing of common people are not performing jihad. They only seek to legitimize their vile acts in the name of Islam.
The November 2016 announcement by the Union Government to henceforth change the nomenclature of the “Islamic State” (IS) to “Daish” in all its official communications concerning the global terrorist organisation is an appropriate move.1 Banned in 2015 under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act,2 the terror outfit has until now been referred to in official records by its various existing nomenclatures including Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Caliphate and Daish. Reportedly, the Union Home Ministry is likely to send instructions to the effect that only the name 'Daish' is to be used in all official communications while referring to the group. Measures are under consideration for circulating an advisory on these lines to all state governments. The rationale behind this step is that the nomenclature ‘Islamic State’ tantamounts to acknowledging the existence of the terrorist organization as a legitimate state. The initiative to reconsider the nomenclature is a prudent decision that would not only help in delegitimizing the IS ideology for potential Indian recruits but also prevent or at least lessen the number of potential recruits from India.
The goal of the Daish is to establish a state that does not recognize any international boundaries. In July 2014, the group proclaimed its ambition to establish a Caliphate across Asia, Africa and Europe. It released a map identifying several countries in the Middle East, North Africa and large areas of South Asia including India as potential territories of such an entity. As part of its strategy, the Daish has established terrorist modules to lure recruits. Recruits from the US, Canada, Europe, South Africa, Middle East, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia have surged the group’s ranks in recent years.
Delegitimizing the IS
In spite of the heavy losses in terms of territory and recruits in recent months, the Daish’s influence remains far from diminished. In India, the National Investigation Agency, entrusted with the job of investigating several cases relating to people joining the Daish, has successfully busted several terror modules operating including in Kerala and Tamil Nadu.3 However, it still remains necessary to maintain vigilance and craft a strategy that reduces the group’s attractiveness and influence. One possible way of doing this is to strip the Daish of its self-proclaimed esteem that it is the sole representative of Muslims worldwide. Investigations have revealed that the group’s handlers of Indian origin are actively “seeking to establish Caliphate in India with allegiance to the ISIS/ISIL” and “recruit Muslim youths to work for the ISIS.”4 During investigations, the accused have provided detailed accounts of how they “had used numerous social networking platforms for waging jihad by violent means to attract the attention of likeminded persons and motivate vulnerable youngsters to commit terrorist acts to strike terror in the minds of the people by joining a banned international terrorist organisation, ISIS, with an intent to threaten the Unity, Integrity, Security and Sovereignty of India.”5 The IS is using its propaganda tool to convince its targets that it is the sole successor of the original seventh-century Islamic State. By that “virtue”, it seeks to bring back a version of the Sharia law (far more radical than the prevalent Islamic legal code) and calls upon Muslims around the world to swear their loyalty to the group. For instance, Md. Ataullah Rehman, @ Ghouse, aged 32, a resident of Hyderabad arrested for his key role in the Hyderabad conspiracy case of July 2016, revealed his involvement in radicalising the group members and administering to them the Bayáh – oath of allegiance to the Khalifa-Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi.6 Recruits are also put through a “detailed course in Shariya followed by combat training.”7 Given all this, it is necessary to tear of the veil of virtue that the IS has covered itself with.
Daish was initially named as ISIL or ISIS, referring to the Levant and Syria as the region over which its territory spread from southern Turkey through Syria to Egypt. Reportedly, in June 2014, with territories under its control expanding, the ISIS/ISIL renamed itself as the Islamic State, portending its ambitions to establish a Caliphate that extends beyond the Middle East and proclaiming its desire to represent all Muslims worldwide. The IS released maps marking territories extending from Spain to China including North Africa to be seized by 2020 as part of a successful propaganda campaign.8
In order to curb this ominous development, there has been a global effort on for some time now to coin a fourth name for the group, namely, Daish.9 While military operations are already in full swing against the group in Iraq and Syria, the additional step of a changed nomenclature to de-legitimize it is an important initiative to counter the group’s propaganda and restrain it spread. The IS considers the nomenclature “Daish” as insulting and thus abhors it.10 The reasons for this is evident from the fact that the word Daish is an acronym of al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham, which, transliterated in Arabic, stands for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Phonetically, the word Daish sounds more like Daes, which in Arabic implies “a group of hypocrites who impose their will on others.” It also refers to people who propagate disharmony and chaos. Such a group is dogmatic and seeks to impose its will by subjugating all “nonconformists”. This is precisely the agenda of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and IS that seek to impose their will upon their targets through “coercion, provocation, attrition, intimidation, spoiling, and outbidding.”11 The IS thus hates the nomenclature of Daish given these negative connotations that significantly impair its self-proclaimed prerogative of re-establishing the Caliphate and be the sole representative of all Muslims. Given, however, the offensive connotation associated with the use of the word “Daish”, it provides an excellent step to defame the terrorist group not only in India but also worldwide. It also signifies India’s commitment to extend its support to strengthen global forces in the fight against the Daish.
Here, it is worth noting that many leaders and countries are seeking to delegitimise the IS by beginning to refer to it as Daish. In December 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron while addressing the British Parliament emphasized that it was “important” to refer to ISIL, ISIS or IS as ‘Daesh’. Following his announcement, a British government Twitter handle “UK Against ISIL” was changed to “UK Against Daesh”. A month earlier, President Francois Hollande termed the Paris attacks as “an act of war… by Daesh against France”. In January 2015, former Australian Premier Tony Abbott announced that Daesh would be the designated name for IS. At the G20 Summit in Turkey just after the Paris attacks, President Barack Obama condemned the activities of Daesh. In an August 2016 press conference, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau described Canada’s mission in Iraq as part of the “coalition against Daesh.”
The Indian government’s decision to refer to the IS as Daish needs to be viewed as a part of this larger trend. Alongside the decision on the nomenclature to be used for describing the IS, the government must also take steps to convey the message that there is nothing virtuous about the dreaded terror outfit and that its objective is to spread instability in the country. And to counter the Daish propaganda, the authorities should take necessary measures to educate the vulnerable demographic about the Daish being a dangerous terror group that seeks to impose an insidious influence upon innocent minds. Further, in the struggle against the Daish, the government should seek the active support of all responsible segments like Muslim political leaders and religious leaders. Particularly important in this regard is local religious leaders holding regular sermons to educate the youth that the actions of the Daish are against the basic tenets of Islam12 and that there is nothing Koranic about its ideology. The Daish’s actions of beheadings, mindless killings, torture, and slavery are against civilization. In this regard, it is worth nothing that, in September 2015, the Islamic seminary of Sunni Muslims, Darul Uloom, issued a fatwa against the Daish calling its activities as “anti-Islam”.13 This important ideological step condemned the killing of any innocent person and exhorted Indian Muslim youth not to get influenced by the deceitful propaganda of the Daish.
At a broader conceptual level, in the struggle against international terrorism and radicalization, terms like jihad and jihadists with reference to terrorists needs to be discontinued. The current discourse on international terrorism uses these concepts interchangeably with terrorists and terrorism. However, terrorists pursuing an atavistic agenda based upon a lethal modus operandi that involves the brutal killing of common people are not performing jihad. They only seek to legitimize their vile acts in the name of Islam and make it appealing to people. Terrorists must not be conferred the nomenclature jihadists, which only bestows upon them a legitimacy that they do not deserve.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. “Banned Organisations” List Of Banned Terrorist Organisations Under Section 35 Of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) ACT, 1967 (As on 30-03-2015), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, at http://mha.nic.in/bo (Accessed on December 1, 2016).
3. Press Release, “Six Persons Of An Isis Inspired Module Arrested In Kerala For Conspiring To Commit Terrorist Acts,” National Investigation Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, October 2, 2016, at
http://www.nia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/PressReleaseNew/350_1_PressRe..., p.1 (Accessed on December 1, 2016); Press Release, “One foreign terrorist fighter, arrested for associating with ISIS terrorist conspiracy Case no. RC-05/2016/NIA/KOC (ISIS Omar Al Hindi Module),” National Investigation Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, October 6, 2016, at
4. Press Release, “Supplementary Charge-sheet filed in ISIS Case RC-14/15/NIA/DLI,” National Investigation Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India July 19, 2016, at
5. Press Release, “NIA files chargesheet against 4 for involvement in an ISIS terrorist conspiracy module,” National Investigation Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India July 18, 2016, at
6. Press Release, “2 More Arrested for Involvement in the Hyderabad Terrorist Conspiracy Case (RC-01/2016/NIA/HYD),” National Investigation Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India July 12, 2016, at
7. Press Release, “One foreign terrorist fighter, arrested for associating with ISIS terrorist conspiracy Case no. RC-05/2016/NIA/KOC (ISIS Omar Al Hindi Module),” National Investigation Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, October 6, 2016, at
In the wake of Donald Trump’s election as U.S. president, Japan is weighing the geopolitical and geo-economic implications of the new economic and security policies that his administration may adopt.
In the wake of Donald Trump’s election as U.S. president, Japan is weighing the geopolitical and geo-economic implications of the new economic and security policies that his administration may adopt. While the alliance with the U.S. has lain at the heart of post-war Japanese foreign and security policy, Trump’s emphasis on “America first” and his reservations with regard to alliance commitments have made Tokyo deeply anxious.
Geo-economics: TPP and beyond
Early signals indicate that the Trump administration is likely to depart from Obama’s pivot or rebalance to Asia. The most important indicator in this regard has been Trump’s description of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – often touted the economic pillar of the pivot – as a “potential disaster” and his declared intent to withdraw from it upon assuming office in January 2017. Japan is hesitant to process the harsh reality of such an impending U.S. decision, continuing to argue that the TPP is not “completely dead”.1 As the second-largest economy in the TPP after the U.S., Japan hurriedly ratified the free trade agreement in an extended session of the Diet, making it the only member country to do so. But Japan is likely to find it extremely difficult to convince other countries to ratify the TPP in its present form. Even Abe himself had earlier acknowledged that a TPP without the US market is “meaningless”.2
Whether TPP fades away or emerges in a new shape remains to be seen. But Japan cannot afford to let go of the TPP easily. Abe in particular considers TPP as an essential mechanism to capitalise on the Asia-Pacific’s growth potential and revive Japanese economic development. He considers TPP as a base for Abenomics and for his trade strategy. World Bank assessments indicate that, with TPP, Japan’s growth rate is likely to increase by an additional 2.7 per cent by 2030,3 with exports rising by USD 23.2 billion annually.4 Consequently, Abe has invested considerable political capital to overcome resistance from the farm lobby to the TPP.
Earlier in November, in an attempt to highlight the advantages of the TPP, the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers pointed out that Washington would have to sacrifice significant economic gains and suffer trade diversion as well as lesser market access in comparison to China if the TPP were to be dropped. Moreover, 35 U.S. industries that export a combined USD 5.3 billion worth of goods to Japan are likely to witness a loss of market in comparison to Chinese contenders due to tariff cuts under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that is being negotiated.5 Jason Furman has argued that in a scenario where the TPP does not fructify and China manages to bring RCEP into effect, the U.S. will be adversely affected. 6
But with Trump seemingly determined to drop the TPP, Japan is being pushed into seriously reconsidering and prioritizing other opportunities including the 16-nation RCEP, and negotiating free trade agreements with other partners such as the European Union and a trilateral China–Japan–South Korea FTA. While Japan is a member of the RCEP, it has certain reservations towards this mega-regional trade deal, which lacks the “gold standards” of the TPP in protecting intellectual property rights and does not insist upon state-owned enterprises following strictly commercial practices. Even more importantly, RCEP excludes the U.S., which provides China – the world’s second largest economy – a greater role in shaping this regional trade arrangement.
As far as the U.S. is concerned, Trump is an advocate of negotiating “fair bilateral trade deals that bring jobs and industry back onto American shores”.7 Trump’s designate as Commerce Secretary, Wilbur Ross, has also categorically stated in a letter to the Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso that his focus would be on strengthening bilateral economic ties. However, drawing from its own experience in the 1980s and 1990s on the size and composition of the trade deficit and issues of market barriers, Tokyo is likely to be cautious when it comes to negotiating a bilateral free-trade agreement with the U.S.
While Japan pushed hard to conclude a broad free trade agreement with the EU by 2016 in the wake of Brexit and Trump’s posture on TPP, negotiations are most likely to continue into early 2017.8 Here, it is important to note that negotiators would also have to overcome a rift concerning tariff issues and operational safety clause. Britain has until now served as Tokyo’s platform for trade and investment in the broader EU single market. With Brexit, Japan faces a new urgency in concluding a free trade agreement with the EU.
Geopolitics in the post-rebalancing era
Japan requires the U.S. alliance more than ever given the evolving regional security dynamics marked by an increasingly defiant North Korea claiming to possess miniaturised nuclear warheads and aggressive Chinese strategic ambitions in the East and South China Seas. Moreover, with the region getting engulfed in history issues and intensified nationalism, Japan is locked in sovereignty disputes with most of its neighbours including, Russia, China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Even as Japan invests energy on regional diplomacy, the Abe administration managing to bridge the trust deficit in Northeast Asia appears to be a remote possibility. With Chinese adventurism in the East China Sea, Russian deployment of the state-of-the-art anti-ship Bastion missile system and the Bal system in Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands, respectively, and a North Korean ballistic missile landing in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, Japan is increasingly looking for reassurance from the U.S. under Article 5 of their security treaty.
While Japan seemingly prefers Republican Presidents,9 this time around it desperately hoped for a Hillary Clinton administration which would have ensured continuity instead of the uncertainties surrounding the U.S.’s Asia policy under a Trump presidency. Clinton was the key architect of the rebalancing strategy. In 2011, she had argued that the security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand constitute the fulcrum of U.S. efforts in the Asia Pacific. In contrast, the Trump campaign had categorically articulated the candidate’s dissatisfaction with Japan on the issue of burden-sharing within the alliance.10 The Trump campaign perceived the alliance with Japan as costly and one-sided despite Tokyo reportedly sharing 48.3 per cent of the costs involved.11 The direct cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan is valued at USD 5.47 billion for fiscal 2016. Japan shelled out USD 1.7 billion for direct sustenance of the base in fiscal 2015. Besides, Japan has decided to devote USD 3.1 billion for the relocation of 4,000 U.S. troops to Guam, accounting for 36 per cent of the estimated cost of USD 8.6 billion.
Trump’s rhetoric during the campaign was very critical of the asymmetrical partnership between the U.S. and Japan. However, campaign rhetoric does not necessarily translate into concrete policy. Candidate Trump and President Trump are unlikely to talk or act in the same manner. Be that as it may, Trump did terrify Japan when he argued that the U.S. should be “prepared to walk”12 and Tokyo consider defending itself against Pyongyang. In addition, Japan’s nuclear sensitivities and crusade against nuclear proliferation received a shock when Trump suggested that a nuclear Japan may not be a bad idea.13 This stand was contrary to the April 2015 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meeting, which articulated the case of “ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional”.14
While Japanese Defence Minister Tomomi Inada stated during Defence Secretary Ashton Carter’s December 2016 visit that the debate should be centred on shared security capabilities rather than financial burdens, uncertainty looms large in the wake of Trump’s election. The debate on burden sharing within the alliance is hardly a new issue. Tokyo has long been pushed by the U.S. to assume a greater role within the alliance instead of being a ‘passive free rider’. For instance, the October 2000 Armitage Report pointed out that “Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defence is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation”.15
The burden sharing issue has been widely debated in the U.S. strategic community since the Cold War years. Japan opted for the Yoshida Doctrine as an effective approach to escape entrapment in the US-Cold War scheme of things. This enabled Japan to focus solely on its economic development and spend minimally on defence while relying on the U.S. security umbrella. However, with the trade wars intensifying with the U.S. and the fear of abandonment gripping the leadership, Japan has over the decades incrementally expanded its role and redefined its security identity with overseas deployment of Self Defence Force (SDF). Now with a fast altering East Asian security setting, Japan has initiated a fresh debate on the scope of Article 9 and taken definitive steps in assuming greater responsibilities with the enactment of the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security. The year 2015 also saw Abe demonstrating willingness to accept greater responsibilities within the framework of the US-Japan security alliance by revising, after 18 years, the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation.
Road Ahead
Japan worries that in case the U.S. refrains from playing a major role in the regional architecture building process, China will have an easier path in crafting a Sino-centric order in the Asia-Pacific.16 Such a development is likely to prove to be a monumental challenge for Japan as geopolitical and geo-economic uncertainties intensify regional complexity. With Washington opting for a more inward-looking policy, it will be increasingly problematic for U.S. allies to persuade their security provider of the need to maintain the alliance network in its existing form. While Japan’s decades-old alliance with the U.S. is likely to stand the test of time since it is mutually beneficial, Tokyo certainly will have to deliver more than it is used to in order to convince President Trump that Japan is not a liability but an asset as an ally.
Since the Asia-Pacific region is emerging as the epicentre of economic growth, Trump is likely to remain invested in the region. While the U.S. will continue to work closely with its long term partners in the region, Trump may reorient the nature of the asymmetrical alliance partnerships in Asia. Besides, what shape other important bilateral relations such as the U.S.-China, U.S.-Russia, U.S.-Korean Peninsula and U.S.-ASEAN relations take under President Trump will also determine the U.S.’s overall approach towards this region. As Japan adapts to the new geo-strategic and geo-economic realities in the midst of profound changes unfolding in the global power structure, its strategic choices in turn will play a crucial role in shaping the East Asian security environment.
While the creation of seven new smaller districts has led to agitations by the United Naga Council, efficiencies in administrative tasks should be obtainable with district headquarters closer to the respective inhabitants.
Manipur is on the boil on account of the creation of new districts by the Ibobi Singh government. The agitation led by the United Naga Council (UNC) has intensified after seven new districts — Kangpokpi, Tengnoupal, Pherzawl, Noney, Kamjong, Jiribam and Kakching — were carved out formally from the existing nine districts by the state government on December 9, 2016. The respective Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police of these new districts have also been simultaneously appointed. The UNC blockade has been causing economic distress with prices of essential commodities including fuel and drugs increasing substantially. The impact of demonetization and scarcity of currency is also a factor contributing to public distress.
The Manipur High Court expressed displeasure while considering a petition on the matter, and enjoined the state government to ensure smooth flow of essentials to the people by keeping the two arterial highways serving Manipur – National Highways 2 and 53 – open with adequate security escorts. Reports indicate that even with paramilitary escorts, the UNC agitators have managed to stop and interdict the movement of trucks and other vehicles on the highways. In the Imphal Valley area, the predominantly plains people – the Meiteis and other tribals, as well as those in the nearby hinterland, are feeling the brunt of the economic blockade and agitation along the highway routes.
There appears however to be a re-think on the agitational posture adopted by the UNC and its support groups in the hill districts like Tangkul Naga Long, Chandel Naga Peoples` Organisation among others. This is in the aftermath of the High Court intervention as well as due to counter demonstrations opposing the blockade in Imphal. An internal ferment is also evident within the UNC on the future course of the agitation as well as on the need to leverage the support of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Issac-Muivah (NSCN-IM). The NSCN-IM is tacitly supporting the agitation and is also in a dialogue process with Government of India (GoI) on the Naga issue.
While better administrative management of the seven new districts should be feasible, the Manipuri Nagas of the existing hill districts of Tamenglong, Ukhrul, Senapati and Chandel feel that some of the new smaller districts would be under greater political control of the Manipur state administration at Imphal. There is also a foreboding among the Nagas that non-Naga tribes like Kukis would eventually dominate in districts like Kangpokpi — where presently there is a coexistence of Kukis, Nagas and the Meiteis. A major point of objection of the Manipuri Nagas is that the constitutionally-mandated process of prior consultation with the tribal members of the state assembly and hill councils under Article 371 C of the constitution on matters affecting administration in the hill region has been bypassed.
The state of turmoil in Manipur appears to have become a recurrent phenomenon. About a year ago, serious disturbances affecting public order arose after the Manipur Assembly hurriedly passed three controversial bills on August 31, 2015. These related to compulsory registration of non-Manipuris, non-alienation of their land rights, and registration of employees of shops and establishments in the Imphal Valley. These were passed without prior consideration and vetting by the members belonging to the hill constituencies and hill councils. These bills, deemed to be negatively affecting the interests of tribals and violative of the afore-mentioned constitutional provisions, had triggered a huge reaction in the hill districts and Churachanpur. These three bills did not finally get Presidential accent, and perforce had to be reverted back by the Union Home Ministry (MHA) to the state government for reconsideration. As in the case of the creation of seven new districts, the state government`s unilateral and non-consensual action triggered the earlier crisis as well.
In the existing politico-security milieu of north-eastern states — and in particular the India-Myanmar border region which has experienced depredations by the NSCN-Khaplang group, such non-consensual actions by the state executive authorities cannot but be detrimental to India`s security interests. Though the anti-national insurgent Meitei groups drawing support in the Imphal Valley region seem to be lying low currently as a result of counter action by the state police and central paramilitary forces, political unrest is detrimental to the overall security situation in Manipur. The Union government has a residuary responsibility to assist in turning around the present situation. While a direct assumption of executive responsibility by the Union government may not be warranted, a more proactive role of the Governor at New Delhi`s behest, may be justifiably required. The Constitution has adequate scope for this purpose under its Seventh schedule and Article 371 C, without impinging on the autonomy of the state.
The existing situation may nevertheless continue to drift as none of the players on the state`s political scene may like to take steps which may result in an unfavourable political outcome for them in the upcoming assembly elections three months away. The complaint of the hills people — and particularly of the Manipuri Nagas, has been that the Meitei-dominated state governments have not been responsive to their developmental and socio-economic needs. They charge that the outlying hill areas of Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Chandel and to-an-extent Senapati districts have been deliberately neglected. The means and mode of communication were stretched and tenuous. Moreover, adequate funds have not devolved to these districts` hill councils and the line functionaries, as well as project-cum-scheme sanctioning administrative and financial powers have not been transferred to them.
With the creation of new smaller districts and district headquarters closer to the respective inhabitants however, efficiencies in administrative tasks should be obtainable. The non-Meiteis of the far-flung districts would actually benefit more with the latest re-organisation measure. Reports do indicate that hill people and the tribals in Noney and Jiribam have enthusiastically welcomed the creation of their districts. The Ibobi Singh government seems to have worked in a calculated manner to strengthen its political support base in the run-up to the forthcoming state elections and would not be inclined to concede the demands of the UNC. The other political parties participating in the elections may also not contest the administrative reorganization that has been undertaken by the state government.
In the above backdrop, the political contention between the state government and the UNC may not die down conclusively and within a short time period. The UNC may have to work out its political posture to remain relevant among the Manipuri Nagas within the state`s context and realities as indicated above. If the situation does not evolve, there is a danger that some extremists within the UNC fold may resort to activities beyond the purview of law and the constitution to the detriment of India`s overall security interests. Within the canopy of the dialogue in progress with the NSCN-IM on the larger Naga settlement issue, GoI may consider inducing the former to influence the UNC to adopt an accommodative posture towards the Manipur state government.
MHA may simultaneously use the instrumentality of the state governor for suitable overview and to ensure that the consultative process necessary with the hill councils is mandatorily followed within the existing constitutional framework. A realistic appraisal of Manipur`s political situation as at present and its likely future trajectory seems to indicate that no political dispensation will be able to undo the administrative reorganization carried out without damaging its popular base. The endeavour from the national perspective should therefore be to minimize the disgruntlement and disaffection among the Manipuri Nagas to the maximum extent feasible.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served as Financial Adviser of North Eastern Council and was an Adviser to Nagaland Chief Minister. The views expressed are the author`s own.
Given that both India and Indonesia have a common interest in preserving their respective democratic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious polities, they need to work together to induce Myanmar to control the violence against the Rohingyas.
The problem of Myanmar’s displaced Rohingyas has of late assumed a special dimension in both South-East Asia and in India’s immediate periphery. Festering since 2011, the problem erupted once again in November 2016. After inter-community riots in Myanmar’s western Rakhine province in 2012, a large-scale displacement of approximately one million Rohingyas occurred. The problem has surfaced again after violence broke out in the area on October 9, 2016.
For long, Rohingya Muslims have been at the receiving end of violence unleashed by Burman Buddhists, particularly by the Buddhist extremist group `969` led by the monk Wirathu. The displacement of Rohingyas from Rakhine province, where they have been domiciled for generations, to adjoining countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand has of late assumed a destabilising dimension in Myanmar’s bilateral relations with these countries.
Rohingyas have also emigrated to India. According to authoritative reports including inputs from the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nearly a third of the 36,000 refugees registered with UNHCR in India are Rohingyas (more than 10,000). Some migrated as far back as 2005 (to Jaipur), while others are more recent arrivals housed in temporary make-shift conditions in states such as Assam, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Delhi and even Jammu & Kashmir.
Indonesia’s Vice President, Muhammed Jusuf Kalia, had expressed deep concern with regard to Rohingya migration to his country. Inter-alia, he stated that even though the Rohingya issue is Myanmar’s domestic problem, Indonesia will give suggestions and inputs to help resolve it. And he further added that Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has been sent to Myanmar on November 6, 2016 in order to intercede with the government there on the Rohingya issue.
Although initially the Rohingya refugee problem mainly affected Bangladesh, there were latent apprehensions in some quarters in India that eventually some of these refugees would spill over to this country. Despite the tolerant disposition of the Bangladesh government, conditions in Bangladeshi camps were not really ideal. The temporary settlement of a few thousand Rohingyas in Bangladesh after the ethnic riots in Meikhtila in Rakhine province in 2012 was also becoming a political issue among the country`s political parties to the extent that the Sheikh Hasina government could not afford to be seen as being very accommodative or deploying substantial financial resources on the settlement camps in Chittagong Division. Moreover, Bangladesh, after integrating the Buddhist Chakmas living in that part of the country, did not want a new problem in the form of Rohingyas. Consequently, it has been trying to send the Rohingyas back to Myanmar, albeit without much success. Given all this, it is but natural that some Rohingya refugees would flow into India as well as eastwards to places where they could live in reasonable conditions.
Of late, some of the refugees from these camps as well as a large number affected by the recent ethnic violence in Rakhine have been migrating to Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Thailand and Malaysia have given refuge to some, but have tried to thwart the disembarkation of many especially those who had reached their shores in illegally arranged boats by human trafficking mafias. Indonesia, while trying to maintain some control, has been more accommodative. However, it is not the policy of the Indonesian government to give the Rohingyas citizenship, integrate them within Indonesian society or settle them on a long-term basis. Interestingly, Rohingya refugees have been enthusiastically welcomed by the predominantly Muslim people of Indonesia’s western province of Aceh. This poses a challenge to the Indonesian government in terms of ensuring civic harmony without affecting internal cohesion or the balance among different ethno-religious communities. The various implications of these developments would have undoubtedly weighed with Djakarta when the Indonesian Vice President advised the Myanmar government to resort to politically accommodative measures for resolving the Rohingya issue.
Radicalisation of the Rohingyas is another issue that looms large in the existing scenario. Though not attributable to any hostility of the Rohingya towards India per se, the footprint of some radicalised Rohingyas in setting off the 2013 blasts at the Buddhist pilgrim centre in Bodh Gaya in the backdrop of Burman Buddhist-Rohingya riots in Myanmar was not totally ruled out by authoritative government sources. Therefore, it is in India`s inherent interest to ensure that a further exacerbation of the Rohingya problem is prevented.
Considering that both India and Indonesia have a common interest in preserving their respective democratic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious polities, they need to work together to induce Myanmar to be more assertive and control the violence against the Rohingya minority. Further, it is essential that New Delhi and Djakarta consider joint measures – with consensual support from ASEAN – to prevent the emergence of another source or cause of radical extremism by a persecuted minority in South and Southeast Asia. And they should also adopt a common approach to push for a better outcome with respect to the provision of refugee relief and rehabilitation of the Rohingyas.
The pursuit of such an approach is feasible given India’s multi-faceted relations with ASEAN, of which both Indonesia and Myanmar are members. There is sufficient common ground between New Delhi and Djakarta to ensure the Rohingyas’ eventual repatriation to Myanmar, both on humanitarian grounds and with a view to curb the dangers of radicalisation among a population who are presently facing multi-dimensional socio-economic misery and political apartheid.
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD did not show much consideration or interest on the Rohingya issue in the run-up to the last national elections. Now, with the democratic process instituted, albeit with the military exercising some oversight from the sidelines, the time is ripe to initiate a process for addressing the Rohingya issue. There is a strong case to modify the Myanmarese law of 1982, which has stripped the Rohingyas of not only citizenship but also of their basic rights to livelihood. At least, the following need to be instituted in this regard: work permits in Rakhine province and civic rights like movement for trade and intercourse, possession of property and observance of socio-religious customs, the availing of state-funded health and educational benefits, etc.
The Advisory Commission on the Settlement of Problem in Rakhine State (ACSPRS) set up on August 23, 2016 under the chairmanship of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan by the present Myanmar Government may be an instrument for resolution of the Rakhine-Rohingya problem provided it works impartially and with a modicum of international or at least ASEAN support. India and Indonesia could also act as facilitators in this respect. Notwithstanding the fact that the ACSPRS consists of three international persons of eminence including a Lebanese Muslim, the advisory body may not be able to push for a substantive outcome towards ameliorating the degraded condition of the Rohingyas unless some international pressure is brought to bear on Nay Pyi Taw. India has an inherent interest in acting on the Rohingya issue given its geopolitical and security interests. In the context of the interest evinced by President Widodo in developments in the Indian Ocean littoral, India, both as a littoral Indian Ocean country and as a neighbour with a near-similar political and socio-economic milieu, should forge an avenue of cooperation with Indonesia on the Rohingya issue.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served in senior positions with the Government of India and a State Government.
The views expressed are the author`s own.
The Jamaican Defence Forces have retained their cutting edge due to a skillful balancing of priorities with resources, the weak economy notwithstanding.
The Jamaica Defence Force is a brigade-sized unit comprising land, sea and air formations and is possibly the largest military establishment within the English-speaking Caribbean. Dating back to 1962, the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) had its roots in the West India Regiment which lasted between 1795 and 1926 and thereafter as the military force of the West Indies Federation which existed between 1958 and 1962. The JDF was formed out of the 1st Battalion of the West India Regiment and was later supplemented by small air and naval components. The JDF enjoys a good reputation within the West Indies, having a high standard of training and discipline and, compared to the military establishments in other West Indian islands, has maintained an organisational stability that has stood it in good stead over the last five decades.
The JDF has primarily been used to reinforce the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), which is the island’s police force, in internal security operations which have been known to degenerate into pitched battles against well-armed criminal gangs. One of the more recent, and certainly most notorious incidents being the 2010 operations against the “Shower Posse” drug gang in an attempt to arrest its leader Christopher “Dudus” Coke. These operations saw the JDF and JCF engaged in urban combat with some 500 armed gang members in which 4 security personnel and 73 civilians lost their lives. The JDF deployed Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and helicopters in support of its operations while the JCF employed weapons up to and including anti-materiel rifles to neutralize gang gun positions. The JDF was also deployed in support of the JCF in 1999 and 2001 to deal with extensive unrest sparked through an explosive combination of economic hardship, violent political agitation, and well-armed criminal gangs.
Beyond its internal security role, the JDF saw service in Grenada between 1983 and 1985 in the aftermath of Operation Urgent Fury as part of the Caribbean Peace Force – along with forces from Barbados and police special service units from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. It has also served in Haiti as part of a joint CARICOM Battalion. The JDF maintains very close ties with the British military and joint exercises are a routine occurrence which has served to preserve a high degree of professionalism in the JDF and its officers are held in high esteem within the Caribbean.
The 3000 strong JDF is overwhelmingly dominated by its land forces element – the Jamaica Regiment – which has 3 infantry battalions (2 light infantry and one reserve) and maintains a sizeable (by regional standards) armoured force of a dozen APCs. The Jamaica Coast Guard has a strength of 241 and the JDF Air Wing is slightly smaller. The organizational structure of the JDF is as follows:
Despite its undoubted professionalism, the JDF suffers from the bane of all military establishments in the English-speaking Caribbean – poor maintenance. Inadequate maintenance and a failure to procure spares in a timely manner has resulted in the demise of the JDF’s Ferret Scout Cars (which now serve as gate guardians), the Air Wing’s AS.355, Bell 212 and UH-1 helicopters as well as its Beech King Air and Cessna 210 aircraft, with its 2 BN-2A Islanders being barely operable. The Jamaica Coast Guard barely puts to sea and while it nominally has 6 patrol boats on strength, is practically without operational assets. Of great concern to the JDF was its inability to keep its ageing force of 14 V-150 APCs serviceable. Given the fact that these vehicles have proven invaluable in protecting JDF personnel during urban operations, their replacement became of great concern. Similarly, the Coast Guard urgently needed to restore capability. To this end a limited reequipment program for the JDF has started.
Lacking serviceable assets, priority was allocated to re-equipping the JDF’s Air Wing which was rebuilt around a force of Bell Helicopters and Canadian Diamond light utility aircraft:
Aircraft
Type
Variant
In service
Helicopters
Bell 206
United States
Utility
2
Bell 407
United States
Utility
3
Bell 412
United States
Utility/ Search And Rescue
2
Training/ Utility aircraft
Diamond DA40
Canada
Basic Trainer and Utility
DA40FP
2
Diamond DA42
Canada
Basic Trainer and Utility
DA42ng
2
Source: Jamaica Defence Force & World Air Forces Directory 2015
Close on the heels of the procurement of new helicopters and cost-effective fixed-wing aircraft, the Jamaica Regiment began making strenuous efforts to replace its ageing V-150 APCs. Of the 14 originally procured, only 3 remained serviceable by 2009 and, considering their utility during periods of civil unrest, the need for replacement became acute. Eventually, the JDF decided on the procurement of 12 Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles from Thales Australia with the contract being signed in December 2013. Deliveries commenced in 2015 and by January 2016, the full complement of 12 vehicles was received and entered operational service. A less glamourous but more important modernisation program was undertaken with infantry equipment as L1A1 SLRs, and British pattern web-gear and helmets were replaced with US-made M-16 rifles, M249 light machine guns and US pattern helmets and woodland camouflage and web-gear.
The Jamaican Coast Guard was the last to receive attention. In the period 2004-2006, the Coast Guard fleet was rejuvenated with 3 Damen SPa 4207 patrol craft, with two ageing patrol boats, the HMJS Fort Charles and the HMJS Paul Bogle, being refitted by Damen. The rest of the fleet consisted of old US-made Dauntless class patrol boats and a number of interceptor craft and Boston Whaler type vessels. By 2012, the fleet was composed of the following assets:
Name of Ship
Length
Builder
Delivery
HMJS Cornwall
42.8 m
Damen Group
2006
HMJS Middlesex
42.8 m
Damen Group
2006
HMJS Surrey
42.8 m
Damen Group
2007
HMJS Fort Charles (P 7)
35.3 m
Swiftships
1974
HMJS Paul Bogle (P 8)
32.3 m
Lantana Boatyard
1985
Source: Jamaica Defence Force Website
However, because the JDF failed to procure spares beyond the warranty period, compounded by the country’s poor economic condition, the fleet again fell into disrepair. The HMJS Fort Charles was decommissioned in 2012 and the other vessels were almost completely unserviceable. In 2015, however, Jamaica concluded a peculiar deal with Damen whereby its three Damen SPa 4207s would be decommissioned and returned to Damen in exchange for 2 new SPa 4207s that Damen had in stock. The decommissioning and return of the JDF vessels took place on 8th November 2016 and it is intended, after refurbishment, to offer them for resale. The two replacement vessels to be named (after their predecessors) HMJS Cornwall and HMJS Middlesex are currently undergoing modification and outfitting prior to delivery to the JDF. It should be noted that these vessels have an austere equipment suite and lack advanced surveillance systems or weapons larger than machine guns. However, the SPa 4207 is a cost-effective solution to Jamaica’s maritime patrol needs and, like many other countries in the Western Hemisphere, Jamaica has decided to continue using the type. Once delivered, the Jamaican Coast Guard will be able to monitor the country’s maritime domain.
Compared to the defence forces of Trinidad and Tobago, and the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, the JDF confronts similar security threats in the maritime sphere and from narcotics trafficking. Like Trinidad, it also faces a difficult internal security environment with its forces being deployed to augment a beleaguered police force against well-armed organized gangs. However, the JDF faces these challenges with the additional constraint of having to rely on a weak Jamaican economy to support its requirements. To the credit of the JDF and Jamaica, decisions have been made and resources allocated to keep the force viable in the years to come. Nonetheless, this viability will be contingent on adequate budgetary support being made available for the maintenance and upkeep of JDF assets and it remains to be seen if this will be forthcoming in the future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Brexit, the results of the elections held in Italy and Austria on December 4, 2016, and certain related recent developments in Europe raise questions about the future of the Union.
Brexit, the results of the elections held in Italy and Austria on December 4, 2016, and certain related recent developments in Europe raise questions about the future of the Union. There is mounting popular discontent against the status quo, the Euro, and, in some cases, against the very idea of the European Union (EU) itself. There is a discernible move towards the far right that needs close watching as elections are due next year in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and, perhaps, in Italy and the UK too. Europe might see growing political instability resulting in the unravelling of the Union.
Elections in Italy
In Italy, Matteo Renzi, who at 39 was the youngest to be Prime Minister when he took office in 2014, has repeated the act of political suicide patented by the UK’s David Cameron. Renzi put to referendum a rather complicated set of constitutional amendments. The 65 per cent of the eligible population that voted rejected Renzi’s proposals by a margin of 60 to 40 per cent, despite his threat to resign in the event of the amendments being rejected. Little did he know that his threat to resign will boomerang.
Essentially, Renzi wanted to reform Italy’s rather brittle constitution by giving more powers to the central government in Rome at the expense of provincial governments, apart from reducing the number of elected Senators from 315 to 95 and taking away the powers of the Senate to stand in the way of legislation approved by the House of Representatives. More than a rejection of the proposals as such, the vote was a rejection of Renzi’s performance as Prime Minister in the face of the worsening economic crisis characterised by unsustainable debt and deficit. Italy’s economy in 2016 is 12 per cent smaller than it was in 2008 when the recession started.
While the Euro has recovered, the referendum result has aggravated the crisis in Italy’s banking system burdened with a debt of USD 385 billion. While the EU was able to find money to prop up the failing Greek banks, it is painfully clear that it is beyond the capacity of the EU to prop up Italy. One of the banks in deep trouble is Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the oldest bank in the world, founded in 1472. Renzi wanted to provide funds to the bank, but Germany opposed the move. The bank urgently needs at least USD 5 billion and it is not certain now that private lenders will lend that amount to the bank post the referendum. If the bank falls, other banks also might follow.
Whether Italy’s President Sergio Mattarella decides to ask the ruling party to form a new cabinet, or appoints a cabinet of technocrats, Italy will enter a period of political instability which even a general election in 2017 might not put an end to. The anti-Establishment Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) founded in 2009 succeeded in getting more than 25 per cent of the votes in 2013, making it the second largest party in Parliament. The party is known for its populist, Eurosceptic, anti-globalist and anti-Euro stand, effectively projected by Beppe Grillo, a famous comedian and one of the movement’s co-founders. But there is nothing comic about what is happening to Italy. It is truly tragic.
The Presidential Election in Austria
Norbert Gerwald Hofer of the Freedom Party of Austria, founded by some former Nazis in the 1950s, lost by 6.6 per cent to Alexander Van der Bellan, former head of the Green Party who won 53 per cent of the votes cast. What is significant is that neither of the two established parties, the Austrian People’s Party or the Austrian Socialist Party, who have till now shared power, had a candidate in the final round of voting. Hofer’s party stands a good chance of winning the Parliamentary elections due in October 2018. Opinion surveys show that it might get 35 per cent of the votes if the election were to be held now.
Hofer has asserted that he would ask for a referendum on Austria’s membership of the EU if the European Parliament assumes more powers or if Turkey were to be admitted to the EU. He is against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between EU and US, already rejected by President-elect Trump. Hofer maintains that Islam has no place in EU and he wants to take back South Tyrol, now part of Italy. His motto is ‘Austria First’. He gained 35 per cent of votes in the first round held in April 2016, with his nearest rival Alexander Van der Bellen getting only 21 per cent. However, in the second round, Hofer lost narrowly. With the counting contested, the court ordered a new election in December. The final result shows that the foes of Hofer succeeded in uniting against him. While the post of President is largely ceremonial, it remains to be seen what will happen in the general election due in October 2018.
The Far Right trend in Europe
Support for the European Union has been dwindling elsewhere in Europe, not just in Austria and Italy. To understand the Far Right trend in Europe, we only need look at the anti-Establishment parties gaining strength in other countries: Podemos (Spain), Syriza (Greece, ruling), National Front (France), Freedom Party (The Netherlands), Alternative for Germany, and the UK Independence Party which succeeded in the referendum on Brexit. We cannot predict how well these parties will fare when France, Germany, and the Netherlands go to the polls in 2017. In Germany, Angela Merkel has announced that she would contest for a fourth term, but it is difficult to say whether she will win. In France, Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front, is hopeful of capturing the presidency next year. Whether she gets elected or not, her party should do well in the legislative elections due in June 2017.
Is Capitalism in danger?
A related fall-out of the resurgence of the far-right would be renewed attacks on globalisation. In a recent speech, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England said, "Globalization is associated with low wages, insecure employment, stateless corporations and striking inequalities.”
Carney’s warning is to be taken seriously. As Raghuram Rajan put it, “Democratic capitalism’s greatest problem is not that it will destroy itself economically, as Marx would have it — but that it may lose its political support.” It is obvious that if capitalism fails to deliver the expected benefits to the majority, the political support for it will erode.
In conclusion, Europe is likely to experience serious political turbulence and economic instability in the near future. The dream of ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ inserted in the preamble to the 1957 Treaty of Rome and reaffirmed in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty is as dead as a Dodo. The plans for a common defence and foreign policy are in tatters. Europe has entered uncharted seas and there is an impression that its current leaders are not up to the task of navigating through it.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A careful reading of the report of the deliberations of the UNGA on November 7, 2016 would suggest that nothing has changed at the ground level; only the rhetoric of member states has been amplified.
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) debated Security Council (SC) reform on November 7, 2016. Reports note that many states favoured India’s candidature for permanent membership and demanded that an updated Security Council reflect the far reaching changes the world has witnessed since the formation of the United Nations in 1945.1 This article examines whether the new debate on reforming the Security Council generates any hope for India’s membership in the world body. The first part of the article discusses issues related to UNSC reforms, demands, proposals, challenges, and prospects. The second part focuses on India’s aspiration, scenarios and possible challenges to India’s bid.
UNSC Reforms: Demands and Proposals
During the 71 year history of the UN, Security Council reform has been a much demanded and debated subject. It is widely accepted that the existing membership and functioning of the UNSC reflects the realities of a bygone era. Global politics has changed a lot – as regards its power, structure, rules, and norms since the formation of the UN. The world has witnessed a redistribution of power and emergence of new power centres, along with a transformation from the era of colonialism to that of post-colonial independent states. However, as a global institution to promote international peace and security, the UNSC has not responded to these changes due to many reasons. The only change hitherto has been an increase in the number of non-permanent members in the UNSC from six to ten, that too as far back as 1965.
In 1992, a promising reform move was initiated in the form of General Assembly Resolution 67/62, which highlighted the three major criticisms raised as regards the Council — lack of equitable representation, unresponsiveness towards new political realities and domination of Western states.2 In 1993, General Assembly resolution 48/26 established an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) to discuss SC reform.3 Most reform proposals revolved around the five core issues of “membership categories, the question of the veto held by the five permanent members, regional representation, the size of an enlarged Council, and Council working methods.4 However, even after negotiations for more than two decades, there exists a huge difference of opinion among members on these issues.
The major coalitions for SC reforms include the G-4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan), the L.69 (Group of 42 developing countries), the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) (Group of 12 countries), the African Group (Coalition of 54 African countries) and P5 Countries (Britain, China, France, Russia and United States). G-4 is the leading contender for permanent membership in the Council, as they seek four permanent seats for themselves, and one more seat for the African continent. The coalition demands expansion of both categories of membership — permanent and non-permanent – so as to make the Council more representative of the new realities in the global political landscape.5 The L.69 comprises 42 countries from Africa, Asia, Caribbean, South America and Pacific — and includes three of the four G-4 members (Brazil, India and South Africa). Similar to the G-4, L.69 also argues for reform as a way towards greater accountability, transparency, representation and legitimacy.6
The African Group, comprising 54 states from five regions of the continent, is another prominent advocate of reform. The coalition reflects the Ezulwini Consensus, the official position of the African Union, which demands two permanent seats with veto power for the African continent. In addition to these four constellations, some other coalitions have also proposed reforms in accordance with their own interests and preferences. The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group led by Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea, the Arab Group comprised of members of the Arab League and 10 countries from Africa, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency (ACT), a cross-regional grouping of 27 countries, are the other leading constellations that have proposed reforms consistent with their particular interests and preferences.
Since the adoption of the two GA resolutions related to Security Council reforms in 1992 and 1993, and the inception of the OEWG in 1993, the question of reform has made little progress. The OEWG, which came out with its report in 1995, the formation of a Working Group to Inter-Governmental Negotiation (IGN) in 2009, and the Group of Friends on Security Council Reform have been some of the developments towards Security Council reform hitherto. However, none of these formal and informal efforts were able to bring in either concrete institutional reform or create a broader consensus regarding the issues under debate.
India’s Aspiration: What would it take?
India’s quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC has a long history stretching back to two and a half decades. India was one of the leading countries of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), which initiated a draft resolution of 1992 in the General Assembly on equitable representation in the Council. Since then, several formal and informal negotiations have been held both within and outside the UN to address the issue. These negotiations indicated the necessity and urgency of Council reform.
A careful reading of the report of the deliberations of the UNGA on November 7, 2016 would suggest that nothing has changed at the ground level; only the rhetoric of member states has been amplified. In a repeat of the scenario of past debates, two of the permanent members — the United States and Russia – inflexibly opposed any alteration to the existing veto system. The other two major powers — France and the United Kingdom -- extended their support to reform that would keep alive the competence of the UN. China, as in the past, took an ambiguous position towards the expansion and reform of the Council.7
The debate witnessed a division of opinion among the P5 members, whose unanimous consent is a pre-requisite for any reform, particularly on the question of veto. For instance, Vladimir K. Safronkov, representing the Russian Federation, observed that Council reform was one of the most complex issues on the UN agenda since the approaches of the major players are highly divergent.8 He also noted that any proposal which would “infringe on the rights of current permanent members, including historic right to veto” was unacceptable.9 While Russia continues to back India’s claim for a permanent seat from among the G-4 countries, its strong opposition to changes in veto has generated an apprehension that it is now inclined to support India as a permanent member only without veto power. The US also opposed an expansion or alteration of the veto and demanded the consideration of aspiring members’ contribution to peace and security as a criterion for granting permanent seats in an expanded Council.10 Since the start of the reform initiatives in 1992, the majority of Chinese statements has contained identical phrasings. A sample of such statements includes the following: “Council reform should be carried out on the basis of broad consensus”; “A proposal that was acceptable to the overwhelming majority of Member States had not yet emerged”; and “No artificial deadline should be set”.11
Three among the five permanent members of the Security Council are still against Council reform that would entail a change in their present status. The possibility of changes in the positions of the US and Russia are unlikely since they are in a state of relative decline. Since it is their current status in the Council that provides them pre-eminence on issues related to international peace and security, they are not expected to support any move that reduces their say in global politics. It is unrealistic to think that China would give up its present privileged status in the UN, even as it seeks greater influence and presence in global politics as a rising power. Moreover, reading the text of the November 7 debate makes it clear that additional permanent seats with veto power is at best a distant possibility. The P5 are unlikely to approve the promotion of any states to permanent status due to the fact that such a change would eventually dilute their power. Therefore, for reform-seekers including India, there is nothing to rejoice in the recent UNGA debate.
Given the consistency of the P5’s positions in the past and the minimal progress towards reform during the last two decades, there are three possible scenarios regarding India’s quest for permanent membership in the Security Council.
First, India takes the leadership of reform calls and actively and relentlessly pushes other countries in that direction. Its latent power, remarkable economic growth, rapidly increasing defence capabilities, status as a nuclear weapons power, and contributions to UN peacekeeping all give it the right and privilege to assume such a responsibility. However, looking at India’s engagements with the UN combined with its growing indifference towards multilateralism in the recent past, such a development is unlikely. Beyond the rhetorical statements of leaders and officials, it is still not clear whether a permanent seat in the Council is a priority for India. Many of the policy makers in the country still entertain doubts about the wisdom of India seeking greater space in an institution that has lost its legitimacy. In this situation, it is unrealistic to think that India would take the responsibility of patching the holes of the UN.
The second option is to push for Security Council reform without changing the current status of veto power. Since having a seat without veto is almost similar to not having a place in the Council, the likelihood of such a move from India is even less.
The final possible scenario is for India to accept the fact that, given the current pace and momentum, Security Council reform is never going to happen and to consequently search for alternatives to push the agenda of emerging powers. Given the miserable fate of such alternatives, for example, BRICS and its uncertain future, this option would also be a great gamble. BRICS was formed as a political and economic alternative to the Western-dominated architecture of global governance and to drive an emerging power agenda in such institutions. Nonetheless, no coherent action has been taken by BRICS countries in this regard. Such inaction raises questions about the ability of the emerging powers to either pilot multilateral institutions or push for reforms in the current global governance system.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Army needs to comprehensively review the existing SoP for this exercise, liaise with MORTH and NHAI and jointly develop a software which can generate traffic data reports that would be accurate and useful for its planning purposes.
“Now, Drama Gets Conspiracy Angle, ‘Army out on streets civil war likely” was the title of a report published in the Delhi edition of the Times of India on December 2, 2016. The issue came up for discussion in both Houses of Parliament on the same day. In reply to a point raised by the Leader of Opposition (LOP) in the Rajya Sabha, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence informed1 the House that Army Formations in Eastern Command at local levels are carrying out routine annual data collection exercise on the availability of load carriers at major entry points. He informed the House that this was being done by teams of five to six Army personnel in coordination with local police authorities. It was mentioned that this exercise is carried out to ascertain the availability of vehicles that can be utilized during a national emergency. The exercise involved collecting data in all North Eastern States, including at 18 points in Assam, 13 points in Arunachal Pradesh, 19 in West Bengal, six in Manipur, five in Nagaland, five in Meghalaya, and Tripura and Mizoram. He amplified that this is an exercise carried out every year. He also apprised the House that a similar exercise in Eastern Command was carried out in 2015 at the same locations from 19 to 21 November 2015. Similar exercises have also been carried out in Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar from 26 September to 1 October, 2016 under South Western Command. And such an exercise in Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar was also done under Central Command from 19 to 21 November 2015 at Meerut, Dehradun, Allahabad, Danapur, Lucknow, Raipur, Ranchi, Gaya, Jamshedpur and Roorkee. The Raksha Mantri addressed the political aspects of the question that day in the Lok Sabha. “Army Clears the air, Didi defiant” was the title of a report published in the Delhi edition of the Hindustan Times on 3 December 2016.
While one hopes that the issue settles down and does not aggravate further, there is a need to understand the purpose, mechanism and legal provisions of this exercise and also find a better way to do the same in future.
Planning and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
Each military operation is replete with uncertainties. To ensure an efficient response as the operations evolve, every contingency/scenario is thought of and the best response to such situations are thought through, discussed, practiced and the best option selected and a SOP is drawn out. This ensures that in a given situation all members of a team whether individually (a pilot in a fighter cockpit) or collectively as a section, company or a formation need not discuss what to do but instead, without wasting time, respond in a manner which, by repeated practice, becomes a natural response. These SOPs are practiced regularly as part of exercises and have to be continuously reviewed and updated and have to be current to be effective. These contingencies also include logistics challenges during operations. Army formations are spread across the country. In case of a threat they need to be mobilised in the quickest possible time from their peacetime locations to their operational locations (which are known to each formation as per its war plan). There can also be a contingency for movement to some new (not part of the original plan) location based on emerging requirements. No formation is self-contained in transport resources both in the number and type of specialist vehicles to move the fighting units and the support echelons. War and emergency situations require the optimum use of instruments of ‘National Power’ and these include non-defence assets and resources including private commercial assets and equipment. Provision is also made to assess and compensate the individual(s) and entities whenever their assets are used in such contingencies. To be prepared to respond to such demands at the time of operations, Army formations need to have current information on:
Impressments for transport
Chapter II of ‘Defence of India Act 1971’ contains ‘Emergency Powers’. Section 3 of the act provides:
Under sub subsection (17) & (18) of the above provision are the relevant provisions that address the need of the Army in such a contingency.
The aim of the exercise that has raised controversy was precisely to have a current data bank of vehicles and the volume of traffic so that only fair and reasonable demands are placed by the Army on the civil authorities both in terms of numbers of vehicles to be requisitioned and traffic restriction/closure if any to be made on select sections of the road network in case of a contingency requiring the movement of formations during a declared emergency.
Is this the best way to do this exercise?
The traffic pattern on highways has variations, which are:
Given the above, the methodology of deploying five to six unarmed combatants at a toll plaza (the number of lanes on an average could vary from eight to 16) on any two to three days in a year and collecting data and then depending upon it would therefore be fraught with a high risk of unpleasant surprise when plans based on that data are to be followed.
The facts, as have been provided during the discussion on the subject, are that the local army formations had interacted with the state police authority while planning the exercise. This suggests that the methodology has not kept up with some changes. The Control of National Highways (Land And Traffic) Act, 2002, effective since January 2003, was promulgated by Parliament to provide for control of land within the National Highways, right of way and traffic moving on the National Highways and also for removal of unauthorised occupation. It authorises the Central Government to appoint one or more officers of the Central Government or the State Government to be known as Highway Administrators. These are for defined lengths of the highway and, by default, Project Directors of the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) are also nominated as Highway Administrators under this act and notified in the gazette. Their task is to exercise powers and discharge functions conferred on them under this Act. Among others, their powers include:
Hence for any activity to be done on the Highways or at the Toll plaza, the army formations need to interact and co-ordinate with these officers.
Traffic Data
Actual data on annual, monthly, weekly or daily basis is available at all toll plazas and they (both NHAI and Concessionaire Managed [Public Private Partnership (PPP), Operate maintain and Toll (OMT)] toll plazas report to NHAI HQs on a monthly basis. The data is structured based on user fee (as toll is legally referred to) classification and these would suit (almost tailor made) the Army’s requirement. The table below for rates applicable for one such toll plaza illustrates this:
To avail concessional rates, monthly pass holders and locally registered vehicles have to register with the toll plaza and have to produce documents (including RC). Thus, all relevant details are available with the toll plaza.
Digital Environment
The initiative taken by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MORTH), NHAI, and Concessionaire to introduce Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) has been gathering momentum. They have introduced FASTag for vehicles (a dedicated Epurse for toll) which can be topped up online. Each time the vehicle crosses a toll plaza, the toll would be deducted. In addition to having the registration details, class of the vehicle etc., the tag will also have the owner’s name and mobile number (SMS will automatically be sent each time toll is deducted both indicating the amount and the toll plaza location). There are 346 FASTag enabled Active Toll Plazas and demonetisation is going to be a catalyst for commercial vehicles migrating from cash based tolling to ETC. This will result in faster moving traffic and, for the purpose of issue under discussion, real time information on location of the desired class of vehicles.
Conclusion
The Army needs to comprehensively review the existing SoP for this exercise, liaise with MORTH and NHAI and jointly develop a software which can generate traffic data reports that would be accurate and useful for its planning purposes. A database of Highway Administrators, NHAI Project Directors and their contact details should be created, and kept updated. Details of ‘Way Side Amenities’ and ‘Truck layby’ locations, again available with the Highway Administrators, should be maintained and dovetailed into convoy movement plans so that halts of convoys are planned in a manner that facilitates the movement of normal road traffic. An old management principle, ‘There is always a better way of doing things and the one best way is never achieved” is truer today (in an interdependent world marked by rapid ICT developments) than ever before.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The November elections in Kuwait have thrown up some intriguing scenarios. Having won nearly half the seats, if the opposition groups decide to unite under one banner and insist on taking on the government, the possibility of a fresh stalemate in the country cannot be ruled out.
On November 26, parliamentary elections were held in Kuwait and the results have thrown up an interesting scenario with opposition candidates winning nearly half the seats. Notably, many of the sitting members have lost and as many as 30 of the elected members are new and young including a woman. According to the election authority, the turnout was over 65 per cent and a total of 290 candidates including 14 women were in the fray. Kuwait’s unicameral legislature known as Majlis al-Umma or national assembly is one of the most vibrant among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, with the members having right to question the cabinet. The total strength of the Assembly is 65 with 15 appointed ministers who are ex-officio members and 50 directly elected—10 each from five electoral districts.
The previous house was dissolved by the Emir on October 16, citing deteriorating security situation having necessitated a fresh mandate. Analysts, however, believe that the Emir decided to dissolve the house because of persistent questions raised by the members of parliament (MPs) against austerity measures introduced by the cabinet. The Kuwaiti Constitution gives power to the Emir as well as the constitutional court to dissolve the national assembly. Though the term of the house is of four years, there have been seven elections in the last 10 years and three between 2011 and 2013, indicating political challenges facing the tiny oil-rich Emirate. During 2011-13, Kuwait witnessed sporadic protests and heightened political activism amidst regional upheavals, forcing the ruling al-Sabah family to dissolve the national assembly and the opposition groups to boycott the fresh elections.
The campaigns for this election were intense and austerity measures and rising prices were main issues. Opposition groups including Islamists and liberals, who had boycotted the previous election held in July 2013 over the new electoral laws that they alleged favoured the pro-government candidates, participated this time and campaigned vigorously. Downward economic turn due to low oil prices, forcing cut in social security and subsidies, and high youth unemployment, were issues that the opposition groups raised. Analysts have argued that some of the measures taken by the government were not appreciated by the electorate, and the opposition by raising these issues during campaign could connect with the people, leading to their good performance.
Political parties are not allowed in Kuwait but historically likeminded individuals have formed groups and coordinated election campaigns. Islamists, Salafists, liberals, Shias, pro-government individuals backed by dominant tribes such as Ajman, Mutair and Awazem have been the dominant groups. Since the last election was boycotted by the Islamists and liberals, dominant tribe-backed individuals, pro-government Salafists and Shia groups dominated the house. In this election, however, opposition Islamists with links to Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists, liberals and individuals backed by smaller tribes such as Enezi and Jahra have done well. This can create rifts and political instability witnessed earlier might return. Issues such as austerity measures, rising prices, and the issue of citizenship might lead to confrontation between the government and opposition.
There is, however, a larger question that this election has thrown up, that is, whether Kuwait will proceed on the path of political reforms and democratisation. Kuwait has taken significant steps towards reforms since the 1990s, precisely after liberation from Iraq. Kuwaiti MPs are directly elected and can question and discuss policy decisions and the cabinet. The constitutional court has the right to dissolve the parliament and alter decisions taken by the Emir but political reforms and an empowered parliament has largely resulted in political instability. One of the main long-term demands of the opposition is to have an elected government, which has been so far rejected by the monarchy. Analysts believe that the idea of an elected government will not materialise in the current regional climate, because strong political reforms can lead to riddles in the neighbourhood.
There are other political issues especially the status of Bidoon (stateless tribal Bedouins), corruption scandals and tough security measures that have marred previous governments. Security has emerged as a major issue in the past two years as Kuwait has witnessed a number of terrorist attacks. A suicide attack on a Shia mosque killed 27 worshippers on June 26, 2015. There was also an attempt to target the US soldiers in October 2016; an incident that was initially seen as an accident but was later confirmed as a terrorist attack. Crackdown by the security agencies had led to the discovery of many sleeper cells of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), prompting the government to take some extraordinary measures, which were deemed by the opposition as stifling of free speech and dissent. A government proposal to collect DNA samples of all citizens for identification purposes was highly unpopular and has been postponed for now.
In recent years, economic crisis and corruption scandals have often impacted the functioning of the government. On November 15, 2011, during the height of Arab Spring, many MPs along with their supporters had “stormed” the parliament protesting against a scandal involving Prime Minister Nasser al-Sabah who was later removed. After the February 2012 election, an opposition “anti-corruption” bloc had emerged in the national assembly. The judiciary later dissolved the house that led to government introducing new electoral laws, diminishing the possibility of opposition groups forming a bloc in the parliament. Now with austerity measures, cut in social security, rising prices and youth unemployment, and a strong opposition showing in the elections, the oft-seen government paralysis might return.
Kuwait is the only GCC state to have a semblance of democratic elections and a strong parliament. However, in the last one decade, the country has witnessed repeated political stalemate between the parliament and the government. While the opposition groups have been pushing for political reforms, the ruling al-Sabah family has preferred to keep governance in its hand and focus on economic reforms. The November 26 elections have thrown up some intriguing scenarios. Having won nearly half the seats, if the opposition groups decide to unite under one banner and insist on taking on the government, the possibility of a fresh stalemate in the functioning of the government and the national assembly cannot be ruled out.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Although President-elect Trump has declared his intention to deregulate the fossil fuel sector in order to make America less energy import dependent, but over time, this will lead to an increase in supplies in an already over-supplied oil (and gas) market and send prices into a further downward spiral.
As the US President-elect Donald Trump forms his team in preparation of his inauguration on January 20, the policy contours of his administration remain a matter of conjecture. Among issues that have elicited substantial debate are climate change, as it is not clear whether the new US administration will remain as invested in clean energy as the current administration. Under President Barack Obama, climate change had been a priority issue. As outlined in the section on climate change in The Economic Record of The Obama Administration, released by the White House in September 2016, the capacity of renewable energy (RE) from non-hydro resources tripled between 2008 and 2015, while the share of US electricity generation from RE increased from under three per cent in 2008 to seven per cent in 2015.1
Now, with Trump poised to take office next month, there are concerns that clean technology and climate change issues, in general, may take a backseat, while oil, natural gas and particularly coal may stage a comeback. Trump has never made his scepticism about climate change policy a secret. During the election campaign, he had (in)famously tweeted, “(climate change) was created by and for the Chinese in order to make US manufacturing non-competitive”. He had also declared that if elected, he would pull America out of the Paris Agreement.
Although Trump has since downplayed much of his contentious campaign rhetoric, scepticism and ambiguity about his likely policy approach on the issue still persists. In an interview with The New York Times on November 23, he did claim to have an “open mind” on climate change issue, that he would study it very carefully, but at the same time also stated that one of the factors that had seen the exodos of 70,000 factories from America was the climate change policy, and that this situation has to be reversed.2 Whether the figures he quoted are based on facts are questionable, but the fact that he has appointed a well-known climate sceptic, Myron Ebell, to lead his Environment Protection Agency (EPA) transition team, and Harold Hamm, an oil man, as a potential Energy Secretary, might be an indication that some dramatic reforms are in the making.
Whatever be the fate of the US’ climate change policy, there is, however, a general consensus that the fossil fuel industry will benefit under the new administration. During his campaign, Trump had promised that the US would “become and stay independent of any need to import energy from the OPEC cartel or any nations hostile to our interests”, and that allowing companies to drill into untapped natural gas and oil reserves beneath the US land and coastal waters would be a massive economic boon, creating millions of jobs and billions of dollars in revenue.3
The question now is, whether the revamped fossil fuel-centric energy policy deliver the expected results? And, more importantly, what impact will it have for the global oil market?
First, although Trump has declared his intention to deregulate the fossil fuel sector in order to make America less energy import dependent, which may bring cheer to production companies in the short term, but over time, this will lead to an increase in supplies in an already over-supplied oil (and gas) market and send prices into a further downward spiral. While production efficiency technology has seen shale oil hold its own at $45-50/barrel, any fall in price levels will once again impact the output. At the same time, it will also impact the RE sector. While it may not stop the momentum in the growth of green technology, it may slow it down as a result of drop in investment for the sector.
Much of Trump’s attempt at reviving the domestic fossil fuel sector will however depend on how the international oil market reacts. On November 30, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) finally arrived at a consensus on market intervention and agreed to cut production by1.2 million barrels a day for six months, starting January 2017, causing Brent crude prices to jump by almost nine per cent overnight to over $50/barrel. Russia too has agreed to cut production by 300,000 barrels a day. But given that higher oil price will benefit the US shale drillers and will lead to more supply in an already over-supplied market, the issue is how OPEC members reached such a consensus.
Following Trump’s election, the US dollar has surged, causing oil prices to weaken further. Again, with Trump promising to end the US dependence on OPEC and removing regulatory hurdles to the US oil production, prices would have been poised to drop even further. Neither did months of low oil prices have had the desired impact on big shale production. For OPEC producers, it could well be a do-or-die situation. Hence, after Riyadh, which ran $100 billion in deficit in 2015, acquiesced to Iran’s demand to agree to its freezing production after reaching pre-sanctions levels, as well as output concessions for Libya and Nigeria, the deal was made. OPEC is also hopeful that the winter demand will pick up and reduce the oil inventories, which had piled up, due to over-supply and falling demand.
Nevertheless, there is scepticism regarding OPEC’s ability to abide by production quotas, as well as Russia honouring its promise on output cuts. Furthermore, as shale production recovers, it may not be long before market once again witnesses increased liquidity. But for the six months starting January 2017, if OPEC production is reduced, it may shore up prices for the short term.
For large fossil fuel consuming countries like India, the prospects of an increase in prices – or volatility -- is not welcome, even if short-lived. Already, some Asian countries are looking for ways to diversify their imports away from OPEC sources, and they may well begin looking up to the US for supplies, to the detriment of traditional West Asian suppliers. Moreover, if Trump carries through with his election promise of re-imposing sanctions on Iran, it may lead to a further tightening of the oil market. This could be a double whammy for India, which recently saw Iran overtaking Saudi Arabia as its largest oil source as Tehran offered discounted prices. If the US goes ahead and imposes additional sanctions against Iran, it may not only impact India’s oil imports from Iran but also its investments in Chabahar, which has only recently started moving forward.
As of now, therefore, the picture is far from clear. The assumptions about the new US administration’s energy and climate policy are largely based on Trump’s campaign rhetoric, many of which have since been rescinded. Some analysts believe that his priorities may shift once he takes office. What seems almost certain, however, is that the hydrocarbon sector will be a priority for the new US administration, even if the US does not exit the Paris climate deal. This could be a game changer for the beleaguered international oil market and the West Asian politics, which in turn will have a cascading impact on global geopolitics in general.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Terrorists pursuing an atavistic agenda through the brutal killing of common people are not performing jihad. They only seek to legitimize their vile acts in the name of Islam.
The November 2016 announcement by the Union Government to henceforth change the nomenclature of the “Islamic State” (IS) to “Daish” in all its official communications concerning the global terrorist organisation is an appropriate move.1 Banned in 2015 under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act,2 the terror outfit has until now been referred to in official records by its various existing nomenclatures including Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Caliphate and Daish. Reportedly, the Union Home Ministry is likely to send instructions to the effect that only the name 'Daish' is to be used in all official communications while referring to the group. Measures are under consideration for circulating an advisory on these lines to all state governments. The rationale behind this step is that the nomenclature ‘Islamic State’ tantamounts to acknowledging the existence of the terrorist organization as a legitimate state. The initiative to reconsider the nomenclature is a prudent decision that would not only help in delegitimizing the IS ideology for potential Indian recruits but also prevent or at least lessen the number of potential recruits from India.
The goal of the Daish is to establish a state that does not recognize any international boundaries. In July 2014, the group proclaimed its ambition to establish a Caliphate across Asia, Africa and Europe. It released a map identifying several countries in the Middle East, North Africa and large areas of South Asia including India as potential territories of such an entity. As part of its strategy, the Daish has established terrorist modules to lure recruits. Recruits from the US, Canada, Europe, South Africa, Middle East, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia have surged the group’s ranks in recent years.
Delegitimizing the IS
In spite of the heavy losses in terms of territory and recruits in recent months, the Daish’s influence remains far from diminished. In India, the National Investigation Agency, entrusted with the job of investigating several cases relating to people joining the Daish, has successfully busted several terror modules operating including in Kerala and Tamil Nadu.3 However, it still remains necessary to maintain vigilance and craft a strategy that reduces the group’s attractiveness and influence. One possible way of doing this is to strip the Daish of its self-proclaimed esteem that it is the sole representative of Muslims worldwide. Investigations have revealed that the group’s handlers of Indian origin are actively “seeking to establish Caliphate in India with allegiance to the ISIS/ISIL” and “recruit Muslim youths to work for the ISIS.”4 During investigations, the accused have provided detailed accounts of how they “had used numerous social networking platforms for waging jihad by violent means to attract the attention of likeminded persons and motivate vulnerable youngsters to commit terrorist acts to strike terror in the minds of the people by joining a banned international terrorist organisation, ISIS, with an intent to threaten the Unity, Integrity, Security and Sovereignty of India.”5 The IS is using its propaganda tool to convince its targets that it is the sole successor of the original seventh-century Islamic State. By that “virtue”, it seeks to bring back a version of the Sharia law (far more radical than the prevalent Islamic legal code) and calls upon Muslims around the world to swear their loyalty to the group. For instance, Md. Ataullah Rehman, @ Ghouse, aged 32, a resident of Hyderabad arrested for his key role in the Hyderabad conspiracy case of July 2016, revealed his involvement in radicalising the group members and administering to them the Bayáh – oath of allegiance to the Khalifa-Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi.6 Recruits are also put through a “detailed course in Shariya followed by combat training.”7 Given all this, it is necessary to tear of the veil of virtue that the IS has covered itself with.
Daish was initially named as ISIL or ISIS, referring to the Levant and Syria as the region over which its territory spread from southern Turkey through Syria to Egypt. Reportedly, in June 2014, with territories under its control expanding, the ISIS/ISIL renamed itself as the Islamic State, portending its ambitions to establish a Caliphate that extends beyond the Middle East and proclaiming its desire to represent all Muslims worldwide. The IS released maps marking territories extending from Spain to China including North Africa to be seized by 2020 as part of a successful propaganda campaign.8
In order to curb this ominous development, there has been a global effort on for some time now to coin a fourth name for the group, namely, Daish.9 While military operations are already in full swing against the group in Iraq and Syria, the additional step of a changed nomenclature to de-legitimize it is an important initiative to counter the group’s propaganda and restrain it spread. The IS considers the nomenclature “Daish” as insulting and thus abhors it.10 The reasons for this is evident from the fact that the word Daish is an acronym of al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham, which, transliterated in Arabic, stands for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Phonetically, the word Daish sounds more like Daes, which in Arabic implies “a group of hypocrites who impose their will on others.” It also refers to people who propagate disharmony and chaos. Such a group is dogmatic and seeks to impose its will by subjugating all “nonconformists”. This is precisely the agenda of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and IS that seek to impose their will upon their targets through “coercion, provocation, attrition, intimidation, spoiling, and outbidding.”11 The IS thus hates the nomenclature of Daish given these negative connotations that significantly impair its self-proclaimed prerogative of re-establishing the Caliphate and be the sole representative of all Muslims. Given, however, the offensive connotation associated with the use of the word “Daish”, it provides an excellent step to defame the terrorist group not only in India but also worldwide. It also signifies India’s commitment to extend its support to strengthen global forces in the fight against the Daish.
Here, it is worth noting that many leaders and countries are seeking to delegitimise the IS by beginning to refer to it as Daish. In December 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron while addressing the British Parliament emphasized that it was “important” to refer to ISIL, ISIS or IS as ‘Daesh’. Following his announcement, a British government Twitter handle “UK Against ISIL” was changed to “UK Against Daesh”. A month earlier, President Francois Hollande termed the Paris attacks as “an act of war… by Daesh against France”. In January 2015, former Australian Premier Tony Abbott announced that Daesh would be the designated name for IS. At the G20 Summit in Turkey just after the Paris attacks, President Barack Obama condemned the activities of Daesh. In an August 2016 press conference, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau described Canada’s mission in Iraq as part of the “coalition against Daesh.”
The Indian government’s decision to refer to the IS as Daish needs to be viewed as a part of this larger trend. Alongside the decision on the nomenclature to be used for describing the IS, the government must also take steps to convey the message that there is nothing virtuous about the dreaded terror outfit and that its objective is to spread instability in the country. And to counter the Daish propaganda, the authorities should take necessary measures to educate the vulnerable demographic about the Daish being a dangerous terror group that seeks to impose an insidious influence upon innocent minds. Further, in the struggle against the Daish, the government should seek the active support of all responsible segments like Muslim political leaders and religious leaders. Particularly important in this regard is local religious leaders holding regular sermons to educate the youth that the actions of the Daish are against the basic tenets of Islam12 and that there is nothing Koranic about its ideology. The Daish’s actions of beheadings, mindless killings, torture, and slavery are against civilization. In this regard, it is worth nothing that, in September 2015, the Islamic seminary of Sunni Muslims, Darul Uloom, issued a fatwa against the Daish calling its activities as “anti-Islam”.13 This important ideological step condemned the killing of any innocent person and exhorted Indian Muslim youth not to get influenced by the deceitful propaganda of the Daish.
At a broader conceptual level, in the struggle against international terrorism and radicalization, terms like jihad and jihadists with reference to terrorists needs to be discontinued. The current discourse on international terrorism uses these concepts interchangeably with terrorists and terrorism. However, terrorists pursuing an atavistic agenda based upon a lethal modus operandi that involves the brutal killing of common people are not performing jihad. They only seek to legitimize their vile acts in the name of Islam and make it appealing to people. Terrorists must not be conferred the nomenclature jihadists, which only bestows upon them a legitimacy that they do not deserve.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
http://www.nia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/PressReleaseNew/350_1_PressRe..., p.1 (Accessed on December 1, 2016); Press Release, “One foreign terrorist fighter, arrested for associating with ISIS terrorist conspiracy Case no. RC-05/2016/NIA/KOC (ISIS Omar Al Hindi Module),” National Investigation Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, October 6, 2016, at
http://www.nia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/PressReleaseNew/352_1_PressRe..., p.1 (Accessed on December 1, 2016).
http://www.nia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/PressReleaseNew/328_1_PressRe..., p.1 (Accessed on December 1, 2016).
http://www.nia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/PressReleaseNew/327_1_PRESS_R..., p.1 (Accessed on December 1, 2016).
http://www.nia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/PressReleaseNew/326_1_284_1_P..., p.1 (Accessed on December 1, 2016).
http://www.nia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/PressReleaseNew/352_1_PressRe..., p.1 (Accessed on December 1, 2016).
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/12/23/one-more-name-for-islamic-state... (Accessed on December 1, 2016).
https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/sep/21/islamic-state-is... (Accessed on December 1, 2016).
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/indias-first-sunni-s... (Accessed December 1, 2016).
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