China has become the world’s largest exporter of military UAVs and has also captured a significant chunk of the global civilian drone market.
China has established the world’ largest Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) industry. It has become the world’s largest exporter of military UAVs, with its signature models—the Wing Loong and Rainbow Series UAV.1 According to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, between 2008 and 2018, China exported a total of 181 fighter/combat drones and 163 strike-capable UAVs. The UAE (22 per cent), Saudi Arabia (19 per cent), Egypt (15 per cent) and Pakistan (14 per cent) have been the most significant recipients of Chinese drones, during this time period.2 According to the SIPRI, China has delivered more than 200 combat drones to 17 countries in the period 2013–2023.3
Chinese Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) have been used on battlefields in the Middle East and Africa. For instance, the Nigerian Air Force has been using CH-3 fighter drone in operations against Boko Haram, and Saudi Arabia has used Wing Loong II drones in the war against Houthi militias in Yemen. Egypt uses Wing Loong-II fighter drones against militant groups in north Sinai.4 In Iraq, Chinese combat drones carried out 260 air raids against ISIL (ISIS) targets as of mid-2018, with a success rate of nearly 100 per cent.5 Iraq had purchased four CH-4B Rainbow fighter drones in 2015.
Saudi Arabia has been one of the oldest and regular customers of Chinese drones, and has imported 70 Chinese combat drones. Saudi Arabia first purchased a few CH-4 drones in 2014 and has since acquired at least 15 of the more lethal Wing Loong II drones, with an expressed interest to buy 285 more. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) has set up a drone manufacturing unit in Saudi Arabia after the agreement was reached between Xi Jinping and King Salman in February 2017. The state-owned Saudi Technology Development and Investment Company (TAQNIA) and CASC subsidiary Aerospace Long-March International Trade (ALIT) have worked on establishing this manufacturing unit.
Abu Dhabi was the first export customer for the Wing Loong II drones, and received the first units in 2017.6 Similarly, China sold at least five Wing Loong I drones to UAE in 2011. In early 2017, the UAE purchased five Wing Loong II fighter drones. The Pakistani Air Force purchased five CH-4 Rainbow combat drones in January 2021,7 and in May 2024, Pakistan ordered 10 more CH-4 Rainbow-series of combat drones at around US$ 24 million.8 In 2013, Myanmar purchased 12 CH-3 fighter drones.9 The Serbian military has purchased CH-92A Reconnaissance/Attack drones worth US$ 19.3 million in June 2020.10
Chinese drones are cheaper than their Western counterparts, and therefore, are more appealing to those countries with limitations of budget. The CH-4 and the Wing Loong 2 are estimated to cost between US$ 1 m and US$ 2 m each, while the US-made Reaper costs US$ 16m and the Predator US$ 4m, according to CSIS, the US-based think tank. China also offers flexible payment terms to interested buyers, and many African buyers pay the amount in terms of oil and other natural resources.11
China is able to keep pace with the market demands of military drones in terms of innovation and quality, as regards flight control, integrated navigation, relay data link system, sensor technology, among others.12[xii] China has successfully developed dozens of new generation military unmanned aerial vehicles, models and prototypes, including stealth unmanned aerial vehicles, foldable wing unmanned aerial vehicles, short-distance take-off and landing ring-wing unmanned aerial vehicles, micro unmanned aerial vehicles and flying wing unmanned aerial vehicles.13
In order to increase its market share, China is investing to upgrade its drone manufacturing units. In late 2021, Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (Chengfei), a subsidiary of China Aviation Industry Corporation, signed an agreement with the Zigong Municipal Government of Sichuan to jointly build ‘the largest domestic UAV industrial base (无人机工业园区)’ worth 10 billion Yuan (US$ 1.55 billion) to manufacture military and commercial UAVs. It got operationalised in 2023.14
PLA and Military Uses of Drones
China has a number of UAVs in service with the PLA Rocket Force, PLA Ground Force/Army, PLA Air Force and PLA Navy.15 The PLA is currently equipped with several long-endurance reconnaissance and strike drones. For example, the PLA Air Force’s drone brigade uses the Wing Loong-2 (GJ-2) drone, and the PLA Army uses Rainbow-4 reconnaissance and strike drone. According to Chinese media reports, the PLA Army has begun using KVD002 medium-altitude long-flight reconnaissance and strike drone at the theatre command and group army levels, unveiled in September 2023.16
The TB-001 drone is not just a reconnaissance and strike drone, but can be used along with the PLA Rocket Force’s anti-ship ballistic missiles.17 In August 2021, the China Central Television (CCTV) disclosed that the PLA Rocket Force had mastered the ability to accurately hit large mobile ships thousands of kilometers away at sea by guiding the DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles. China has improved its applications of drone for patrolling its land borders as well as coastlines, and particularly along the Sino-Indian border and Taiwan Strait.
PLA’s UAV troops have been deployed in large numbers in the Western Theatre Command. At present, PLA has deployed ‘GJ-2’ drones and ‘Rainbow-4’ drones in the Western Theatre Command for reconnaissance activities along the borders. In 2019, the AV500W reconnaissance and strike integrated helicopter was also deployed on the Tibetan plateau. This unmanned helicopter weighs 450 kilograms and has a ceiling of 6,700 meters. It can carry four small laser-guided air-to-surface missiles to accurately strike enemy personnel and light vehicles.18
Similarly, China has been using its drones to carry out surveillance and reconnaissance activities in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. Japan and Taiwan reported Chinese drone patrols over their claimed waters. In May 2024, the Japanese Ministry of Defense reported that the WZ-10 UAV flew over the East China Sea and approached Japan.19
PLA used the BZK-005 and TB-001 drones to fly into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone. Both drones have reconnaissance and attack capabilities. The BZK-005 is a large multi-purpose drone with a maximum endurance of 40 hours, and its cruising altitude is 3,000 to 7,000 meters.20 Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed on 25 August 2023 that two Chinese drones flew around Taiwan for nearly 24 hours. The two Chinese drones identified were reconnaissance/attack drone ‘TB001’ and the reconnaissance drone ‘BZK005’.21 In August 2024, a Wing Loong 10 was seen flying along the Vietnamese coastline to the southern city of Nha Trang.22
In recent times, China has entered into foreign collaborations to develop military drones. On 25 September, Reuters reported that Russian UAV company IEMZ Kupol, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned arms company Almaz-Antey, is working with Chinese specialists to develop a new drone model called Garpiya-3 (G3), which is a 2,000 km range attack drone. Another Russian firm Redlepus TSK Vector Industrial has set up 80-hectare ‘Advanced UAV Research and Manufacturing Base’ in Shenzhen in China that would be able to produce 800 long-range attack drones per year, similar to G3 attack drones. 23
Conclusion
The Chinese military is gradually being equipped with drones of increasing lethality and capabilities. Chinese defence universities have special programmes to train PLA soldiers majoring in drone technology and applications. Chinese drone manufacturers such as DJI have captured a significant chunk of global civilian drone market. According to the 2023–2024 China Drone Development Report released by the China Air Transport Association, as of the end of August 2024, nearly 2 million drones were registered in China, an increase of 720,000 from the end of 2023. By 2025, the output of China’s civilian drones is expected to exceed 200 billion yuan.24 Chinese military drones, meanwhile, are widely being used in conflict hotspots across the world, particularly so in Africa and the Middle East. The PLA has intensified the military drones R&D as well as manufacturing activities. Going forward, the global footprint of Chinese military as well as civilian drone programmes is only expected to grow exponentially.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
12."New Military Drones Unveiled! (新型军用无人机亮相！)", QQ News, 4 October 2023.
13. Zhi Tao (智韬) Li Wei (李伟), "China has Made "Explosive" Progress in the Field of Military Drones (我国在军用无人机领域取得“井喷式”进步)", China Youth Daily , 23 January 2015.
14."China's Military Enterprises and Local Governments Jointly Build the Largest UAV Industrial Park (中国军工企业和地方合建最大的无人机工业园区)", BBC, 12 May 2021.
15. AK Agarwal, “China’s UAV Programme”, Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, USI, 14 June 2013.
16. Korolev, "The Second Rainbow-4 Brigade Debuted, and the PLA Army has a 1,000-kilometer mace (第二个彩虹-4旅亮相，解放军陆军有了一根，1000公里的狼牙棒)", USTC Fenghuo, 20 September 2023.
17."The Eye of the Dongfeng Missile Approaches Japan! Chinese Drones Hide Strong Strength: They Can Guide Dongfeng Missiles (东风导弹之眼抵近日本！中国无人机暗藏强大实力：可引导东风导弹)", Toutiao, 26 August 2021.
19."Reuters: China's Large Unmanned Electronic Reconnaissance Aircraft ‘Flies Close to Vietnam's Coastline’ (路透社：中国大型无人电子侦察机“贴着越南海岸线飞”)", China.com, 9 August 2024.
20. Xiao Shan (小山), "The PLA Appears to Have Launched a New Type of Drone in the Taiwan Strait (解放军在台海似乎推出一种新型无人机)”, Rfi, 15 August 2024.
21."Is the Flight Route of Chinese Drones Around Taiwan Unusual? (中国无人机绕台湾飞行路线不寻常？)", Rfi, 26 August 2023.
22."South China Sea Monitoring Group Says Chinese Military Drone Spotted Near Vietnam Coast (南海监测组织称在越南海岸附近发现中国军用无人机)", Rfi, 5 August 2024.
ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 3.0: Why Southeast Asia Matters?
Temjenmeren Ao
November 06, 2024
The increasing ASEAN–China economic interdependence ensures both sides have a stake in maintaining stability, despite the trust deficit.
At the sidelines of the 27th ASEAN–China Summit in Vientiane, Lao PDR on 10 October 2024, both sides announced the ‘substantial conclusion of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) 3.0 Upgrade Negotiations’ which is expected to be finalised and signed by 2025. The ACFTA was established in 2002.The FTA between ASEAN and China covers over 2 billion people, with a combined gross domestic product of over US$ 20 trillion. At the 25th ASEAN–China Summit in November 2022, the ACFTA 3.0 Upgrade Negotiations was launched in order to circumvent the growing protectionism in the world. It aimed to accelerate post-pandemic economic recovery through deeper economic integration and cooperation by tapping into future growth areas that includes digital and green economies.1
China’s Economic Statecraft in Southeast Asia
In the last two decades, there has been a considerable shift in China’s relations with the countries in Southeast Asia. Geographically, China shares maritime as well as land borders with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam.2 China’s geographical proximity to Southeast Asia is a potent factor. Every Southeast Asian nation, moreover, has a sizable ethnic Chinese population which also aids in deepening China influence in the region. China has also deployed skillful economic and political diplomacy based on long-term strategic thinking and systematic execution.
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 was a turning point as it enabled China to become the most dominant economic and political-strategic power in Southeast Asia. The 1997 economic crisis which impacted development and growth across Southeast Asia intersected with the emergence of China’s economic modernisation fuelled by its manufacturing sector. China came forward with timely help that included bilateral loans which helped Southeast Asian countries avoid devaluing their currency. Since devaluation would have added to the region’s woes, refraining from such a policy enabled China to reap tremendous good will amongst the ASEAN countries. The emergence of China as a dominant power in the region is also attributed to its efforts towards further elevating its economic engagement with the Southeast Asian countries. In this regard, the ACFTA facilitated greater market access and helped solidify its preeminence and presence in the region.
Other trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) lowered tariffs rates and promoted the integration of supply chains, further accelerating bilateral trade. China is today ASEAN’s largest trading partner, while for Beijing, the region accounts for 15 per cent of its total trade and 14 per cent of its investment, at US$ 17.3 billion in 2023. China is the third-largest source of foreign direct investment after the US and the European Union. ASEAN's trade in goods with China has increased substantially from US$ 89.3 billion in 2004 to US$ 696.7 billion in 2023.3 ASEAN’s exports to China has increased by more than 55 per cent, with major items like electronic equipment, metals such as ferronickel and stainless steel, coal, plastics, rubber and agricultural products such as palm oil and fruits. At the same time, imports from China has increased by 70 per cent from 2017 to 2022, creating a huge trade imbalance which is equivalent to 4 per cent of ASEAN’s total GDP.4
As trade between ASEAN and China in the 21st century has surged, the region also faces increasing vulnerabilities stemming from its growing economic dependency. China in recent years has been undertaking a more aggressive push into Southeast Asia in order to maintain its position as the primary economic partner. These actions include taking the lead in establishing trade initiatives such as RCEP; deepening supply chain integration, as well as engaging in infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).5
All of the ASEAN member states are formally part of the BRI. In terms of investments under the BRI, transport and logistic sector has been the major recipient followed by energy-related sectors. Under transport and logistics, there is huge BRI investment in the railway sector in Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam. In the energy sector, the China General Nuclear has made a US$ 5.9 billion investment in Malaysia, and Chinese energy entity Zhejiang Hengyi has invested US$ 3.4 billion in Brunei’s oil sector.6
Overall, the scale of infrastructure development and connectivity projects under the BRI has been well received. This is despite some of the ASEAN countries facing persisting issues with China such as frictions stemming from the ongoing contestations in the South China Sea to fear of debt servicing, loss of sovereign rights to Chinese companies, unfair financial and contract terms, and lack of local raw materials and workers being hired by Chinese companies for various projects.7
China’s Interest in Southeast Asia
ASEAN countries have a combined GDP of more than US$ 3.6 trillion, with its global trade projected to be one of the fastest growing sector.8 The region today is a major economic hub which is well integrated into the global value chains with strong links to production networks in China, Japan and Korea. Further, a robust manufacturing sector, a huge consumer market and a number of well-established free trade agreements reinforce ASEAN as an economic powerhouse.9 Therefore, in an unpredictable global economic environment on account of increasing protectionism, wars and conflicts, the region is relatively stable and is seen as an engine of growth. Southeast Asia is geographically located at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region where vital sea lanes makes the region essential for the free flow of trade and commerce.
China has always looked at Southeast Asia as an integral part of its security environment. In the current decade, given its strategic position in the wider Indo-Pacific framework characterised by intensifying geopolitical competition with the US, Beijing has adopted concerted efforts towards strengthening its primacy in Southeast Asia. China’s security interests in the region are also leading to expanding cooperation in the military domain through high-level dialogues, military training and bilateral naval exercises.10 In the post-pandemic period, China’s defence diplomacy activities in Southeast Asia have increased as part of its Global Security Initiative. Through its expanding military engagement in the region, China is attempting to show that it can step up and be an alternative to the US in providing regional security goods.11
As per the latest findings from the 2024 State of Southeast Asia survey, there has been a notable surge in China’s influence. Majority of the respondents say that China has the most influence and strategic power in Southeast Asia. However, given the overlapping maritime claims between China and five other ASEAN countries in the South China Sea and assertive and aggressive tactics by the former has led to deep apprehensions.
Given China’s expanding influence, there remains strong distrust as to whether Beijing would uphold the rules-based order and international law.12 While there are still major pockets of distrust against China within Southeast Asia, their governments remain keen on strengthening economic interactions with Beijing by engaging in projects under the BRI to upgrading the trade agreements such as the ACFTA. At the BRI forum for international cooperation held in October 2023, all leaders of ASEAN member states, except Myanmar and Brunei, attended. The overwhelming participation is indicative of their pragmatic thinking since the region sees developmental initiatives such as the BRI as an enormous opportunity that would help in realising their move towards establishing the ASEAN Economic Community.
Over the decades, Southeast Asian countries have been pragmatic in their approach towards the rise of China by intensifying their economic interactions. This stems from the fact that Southeast Asia is willing to pay a premium for economic security which remains indispensable for their national growth and stability. It is important to note that China sees Southeast Asia not only as a key element in its Global Development Initiative but part of its security-led order through its defence diplomacy.
Conclusion
Southeast Asia in recent decades has been developing rapidly with a huge market growth potential along with a prominent role in the global value chain. This has resulted in Beijing prioritising its outreach to the region especially at a time when there is growing erosion of the global international trade system that has offset its growth. The upgradation of the ACFTA is aimed at mitigating the fall-out of the economic environment which is becoming more complex on account of various external factors. Despite the trust deficit which prevails, the increasing ASEAN–China economic interdependence ensures both sides have a stake in maintaining stability.
Given that the region is at the centre of the highly contested Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asian countries through ASEAN have to navigate through the complex geopolitical environment. Responding to the heightened geopolitical competition, Southeast Asia for regional stability is forced to remain non-aligned and broaden its partnerships with other major powers. While Beijing considers the region to be its backyard and natural sphere of influence, given the primacy it enjoys in Southeast Asia, in recent years, other regional powers along with the US are also imposing their presence in the region by enhancing bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Going forward, the renewed engagement of the US and other major regional powers in Southeast Asia will be critical towards diversifying and re-balancing trade ties, which will reduce the over-dependency on China.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s military staged a coup, rejecting the 2020 election results and assuming control of the government, citing election fraud. The coup sparked widespread protests, civil disobedience and armed resistance. Despite international condemnation, the military has maintained power, suspending democratic elections and declaring a state of emergency. A September 2024 UN report states that 5,350 civilians have been killed by the military since the coup.1
Myanmar is one of Southeast Asia's most ethnically diverse countries, home to over 135 recognised ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities such as the Shan, Kachin, Karen, Chin, Mon and Rakhine reside in the seven states, each named after its largest ethnic group.2 These minorities constitute 40 to 60 per cent of the population and occupy nearly half of the country’s territory.3 Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1948, the country has faced persistent insurgencies from ethnic groups seeking autonomy or independence due to grievances over political marginalisation, economic inequality and cultural suppression.4
The presence of powerful non-state armed groups in border regions exacerbates the instability, while the government’s refusal to embrace democratic processes further fuels the conflict.5 In June 2019, three armed groups—the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—formed an alliance called ‘The Three Brotherhood Alliance’.6 The alliance rose to prominence in 2023 in resisting the Burmese junta following the 2021 Myanmar coup d'état. On 27 October 2023, the alliance launched Operation 1027, an offensive against the junta in northern Shan state, bordering China, Laos and Thailand.
By early November, the Brotherhood Alliance announced significant territorial advances, asserting control over more than 100 military bases and several towns. The conflict intensified further in November, extending into both Sagaing, a north-western administrative region, and Rakhine State, located on Myanmar's western coast along the Bay of Bengal and bordering Bangladesh. By January 2024, MNDAA captured Laukkai (Shan State), resulting in the surrender of 2,389 Tatmadaw soldiers. Mid-January 2024 saw additional gains by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which captured Mabein (Shan State) and secured a crucial Tatmadaw base. In June, the conflict escalated with the capture of strategic towns, including Kyaukme in northern Shan State. By July, coordinated assaults by the MNDAA and TNLA yielded further victories, most notably the seizure of Mogok and Lashio (junta’s Northeastern Command base). The alliance and other ‘resistance forces’ have now control over 60 per cent of the country.7
Along with major strategic areas of Shan State, resistance forces control parts of northern Rakhine, Chin, Karen, Karenni, Sagaing and Magway, while in Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Army has captured numerous military positions. Active battles are ongoing in the Mandalay region, particularly around Mandalay city itself, as well as in key towns in northern Shan State. Resistance offensives are advancing into central Myanmar, solidifying their approach towards Mandalay and challenging the junta’s hold on power.
Military setbacks have led to low morale in the Tatmadaw, weakened unit cohesion and increased desertions. The junta's forces have weakened, with troop numbers dropping to 130,000 and auxiliary forces to 70,000.8 Reports note of “unprecedented levels of defection” (numbering nearly 6,000), desertions (a conservative estimate is 15,000).9 While the military's state-run publication, The Global New Light of Myanmar, typically avoids direct acknowledgment of military setbacks, a shift in tone is evident as the military grapples with operational challenges, rising instability and infrastructure attacks across the country. The paper in June 2024 acknowledged that ‘certain states and regions have restricted access due to the presence of anti-government forces’.10 In August 2024, one report noted that senior officers ‘comforted Tatmadaw members and Myanmar Police Force (MPF) members receiving medical treatments for their injuries suffered while serving the defence and security duties of the State’.11 Another article flagged ‘attempts to deteriorate peace and stability in the area of Southern Command’, including blowing up of communication routes, bridges and railways and highlighted efforts of Tatmadaw and MPF in taking measures for ‘ensuring peace and stability of the region’.12
While the Tatmadaw accuses the insurgent groups of using civilians as ‘human shields’,13 rebel forces, pro-democratic groups and international groups such as Amnesty International note that there is increasing reliance on airstrikes and targeting of civilians in conflict zones in the military’s counteroffensive. An investigation by Amnesty International into Myanmar’s military airstrikes on 7 January 2024 revealed the tragic deaths of 17 civilians, including nine children, during an attack near Saint Peter Baptist Church in Kanan village, Sagaing region.14 Despite the Myanmar military denying involvement, evidence—including satellite imagery, witness testimonies and videos—indicates the use of A-5 fighter jets during the attack. According to a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the frequency of airstrikes in Myanmar increased by over 300 per cent from 2021 to 2023.15
By early 2024, given that the rebel groups had seized key border crossings in Shan State and captured strategic military positions in Chin State, the government decided to bolster its military strength through conscription. On 10 February 2024, Myanmar enforced compulsory military service under a 2010 law, requiring men aged 18–35 and women aged 18–27 to serve at least two years, extendable to five during emergencies. Non-compliance can lead to imprisonment. This enforcement followed three months after the launch of ‘OP.1027’.16
Reports of forced recruitment have emerged, with accounts of young men being abducted from urban areas and villagers coerced into military service.17 Human Rights Watch reports that over 1,000 Rohingya Muslim men and boys from Rakhine State were forcibly recruited between February and April 2024.18 There are also reports which note of a significant youth exodus. Human rights groups confirm tens of thousands have fled to avoid military service.19 It has become apparent that the popular support for the junta has weakened.
In September 2024, Myanmar’s military and State Administration Council (SAC) chief invited rebel groups to resolve political issues through “party politics or electoral processes”,20 signaling a reversal from the regime’s previous hardline stance in pursuing dialogue with groups it had previously denounced as ‘terrorists’. In October 2024, though, the SAC reiterated its designation of these rebel and resistance factions as ‘terrorists’. The SAC further issued warnings to international organisations, expressing concerns regarding their potential assistance to armed rebel groups.21
Along with weakened legitimacy, the junta is also facing increasing international pressure to recognise pro-democratic groups. Japan reduced its diplomatic presence in Myanmar in September 2023 by replacing its ambassador with a chargé d’affaires,22 following similar moves by the US, UK and Australia. ASEAN also faces mounting pressure, internally and from neighbouring countries, due to Myanmar’s non-compliance with the bloc’s Five-Point consensus for resolving the conflict. 23 This state-centric approach, which primarily engages with the formal government,24 is increasingly seen as ineffective because the junta has made little progress towards fulfilling the agreement, particularly in halting violence or initiating inclusive dialogue. In the October 2024 ASEAN Summits, the President of the Philippines acknowledged these concerns, stating:
We have to admit that although the Five-Point (Consensus) has been out there since 2021, we have not been very successful in actually improving the situation. So, we are trying to think of new strategies.25
In response to the deteriorating situation, Thailand has taken a proactive step by organising an informal consultation in December 2024.26 The informal nature of this consultation could allow discussions that go beyond the rigid, state-centric approach, potentially engaging non-state actors and local authorities who now hold significant power.
What Lies Ahead
Myanmar is at a critical juncture, with no resolution to the civil war in sight. The ruling junta is facing challenges in sustaining the war efforts amid resource strain and waning public morale. The National Unity Government (NUG) interprets these statements as signs of the regime’s possible collapse, and asserts that genuine dialogue with the military is only possible if it guarantees that ‘it no longer has a role in politics’.27 With anti-junta forces gaining ground, questions linger about whether the different armed groups would continue to fight for the larger cause of a democratic and federal Myanmar. There are also fears of balkanisation of the country.28 While resistance efforts in major cities have yet to achieve the success seen in peripheral areas, the junta is unlikely to regain lost territory, focusing instead on defending critical towns and supply routes. Although anti-junta forces remain disinterested in negotiations and face limited international support, they continue to advocate for a federal democratic structure.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
15.“Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Council, Fifty-fourth session, 11 September 2023–6 October 2023.
It is curious to note that the ‘jihadist’ tag is almost exclusively given to violent Sunni extremists.1 In fact, Western experts usually use the term ‘militias’ when referring to Shia violent non-state actors and just a few journalists like Danny Postel ever employ the term ‘Shia jihad’.2 In fact, the Arabic term of muqawama (resistance) is now replacing jihad across West Asia and the neologism muqawamist is being used by English-speaking Arab commentators while referring to Iran-backed militancy.3 Deriving its resonance from the Shia ideology of resistance against the ‘oppression’ of Islam’s larger Sunni community, the term is now getting applied to rising pan-Islamist opposition towards the US-Israeli sway over the region.4
The recent popularity and support for Iran-backed Shia groups in the Arab world is remarkable, because it seems to have significantly reduced the intense hate and animosity generated by the Syrian civil war and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) hostilities over the last decade between the Sunni and Shia communities. Today, Sunni states like Salafi Qatar and the Deobandi Taliban regime are coming closer to Shia Iran and have apparently turned away from their old allies—the Salafi jihadists.5 No wonder, ISIS and its global affiliates are now targeting Iran, Russia and Shia groups out of sheer spite and desperation.6
But perhaps Salafi jihadists are themselves to blame for their present predicament. Al-Qaeda and the ISIS always opposed the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and even Hamas for fighting a nationalist Palestinian cause,7 rather than opposing the Westphalian and democratic nation-state system of the so-called ‘taghut’.8 By resorting to indiscriminate violence against civilians (particularly women and children), targeting the existing international political and economic order, by alienating all Western and Eastern countries (even Hanafi Sunni nations and groups like Turkey, Taliban and Hamas), Salafi jihadists are today seen in West Asia as strategically demented doomsday cultists, perpetually baying for blood.9
On the other hand, Iran has projected itself as a pan-Islamist power, and not just a Shia theocracy. By following this strategy, it has managed to extend its influence up to the Mediterranean, and has successfully brought the Lebanon, Syria and Iraq under its hegemonic sway. Unlike unruly Salafi jihadist groups that often turn on their own patrons, Iran has exercised effective command and control over its regional proxies, equipping them with latest know-how in warfare and weaponry as well as the use of sharp power to infiltrate and attack opponents. It has made them competent militias in their own right, fighting regional wars with greater strategic acumen and self-reliance. In fact, the inability of Salafi-jihadists to establish an enduring Islamic State has denied them the ability to promote proxies around the world and is the main cause of their failures.
In comparison to Salafi jihadists and Israel, Iran has also proven to be more adept at running successful media and public relations campaigns that has been able to extinguish the flames of vengeance from its Sunni rivals in the Levant and by targeting mainly military sites in its attacks that has presented it as a more responsible military force to the world thus far. The impact of Iran’s mostly precise intermediate range ballistic missiles and drone attacks—making unprecedented forays into Israeli airspace, undermining its much-vaunted air defence systems and its supposed and still unverified nuclear status—seem to have captured the fancy of demoralised Arab masses, who are blaming Israel and not Iran for the plight of Palestinians, at least for now.
Meanwhile, the theocratic state has also promoted its image as a champion of the developing world, voice of the Global South and supporter of humanitarian causes,10 even though it has conveniently ignored the plight of Uyghur Muslims to please the Chinese government and allegedly oppresses minorities and women within its borders. By focusing solely on the so-called ‘Far Enemy’—the West and Israel—Iran has successfully exploited the anti-liberal political discourse presently popular around the world and has upstaged the myopic Near Enemy outlook of Salafi jihadist groups like ISIS by calling them ‘takfiri’ (Muslims who commit the big sin of accusing fellow Muslims ‘kafir’).11
It is noteworthy that Shia theology like traditional Judaism practised political quietism for centuries as the community patiently awaits the manifestation of its promised saviour (the Divinely Guided Mahdi).12 Again like Zionism, Shia thinkers and clergy started advocating militant activism only in modern times, as Red Shiism of Shariati culminated into the Khomeini-led Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979.
According to Shia tradition, only the most senior theologians (mujtahids), have the authority to declare a ‘defensive’ jihad, while only the 12th or ‘hidden’ Imam—who the Shia believe is still alive after disappearing 1,100 years ago—will declare an ‘offensive’ jihad on his return.13 Although most orthodox Sunni jurists also advocate defensive jihad, modern-day jihadists like Qutb, Faraj and Zawahiri ridicule the difference between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ warfare,14 with ISIS being particularly notorious in killing the so-called Shia ‘Rafida’ (Rejectors of the First Three Pious Caliphs).15
The moot question here is how long Iran and its three main proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthis—sustain their ongoing campaign in West Asia? Can the Islamic Republic of Iran depend on Russian and Chinese support for a favourable resolution of the present conflict? Will the highly demoralised and weakened Arab states, that continue to suffer from the so-called Stockholm syndrome, switching loyalties from one regional hegemon to the other—championing the slogans of Abraham Accords and non-sectarian pan-Islamism in the same breath—ever hold their own? However, even in the current context of the beleaguered Arab states, continuing internecine sectarian feud and ever-escalating regional conflicts, the declining Salafi-jihadist threat can be discounted only at one’s own peril.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
8. In Islam, Taghut refers to worship of dieties and demons other than God, but in ISIS literature it refers to tyrannical power. Moojan Momen, "Țāghūt", in John L. Esposito, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.
15. Etan Kohlberg, “al-Rāfiḍa”, in P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.
Armenia hosted the 28th World Congress on Innovation and Technology (WCIT) from 4 to 7 October 2024, with issues relating to artificial intelligence being the key theme.
Armenia hosted the 28th World Congress on Innovation and Technology (WCIT) from 4 to 7 October 2024. The theme of this year's Congress was ‘The Power of the Mind: AI Beyond Limits, Within Ethics’. The Congress focused on the role of Artificial Intelligence (AI), ethical innovation, Green AI, AI for crisis management and eco-friendly technologies among other topics.1 Armenia had previously hosted the Congress in October 2019. The WCIT is one of the oldest technology conferences and some of the largest companies participate in this conference. India had hosted the WCIT in 2018 in Hyderabad, which was inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi through video conference.
Armenia’s tech industry contributes around 5 per cent to the country’s GDP and is one of the fastest growing sectors of its economy registering an annual growth of 20 per cent with a steady growth rate at 41.4 per cent annually. Armenia’s Minister of High-Tech Industry, Mkhitar Hayrapetyan stated that the country “is focusing on high technologies and information technologies as the most important pillars of economic development.”2
The Congress focused on the technological component of the innovation industry, particularly the production of semiconductors for high-speed information processing and energy efficiency.3 The Congress also discussed the Global Network of Artificial Intelligence, which connects six continents and promotes innovation and development in artificial intelligence.4 As per the organisers, the Congress was meant to showcase Armenia as a developed IT country and to ensure that Armenian companies are connected to the foreign markets.5
One of the major highlights of the Congress was the announcement of the launch of Starlink in Armenia. Starlink has been used by various nations, including Ukraine, during its conflict with Russia. The WCIT sessions held in 2019 and 2024 have been backed by the Armenian government, the Union of Advanced Technology Enterprises (UATE)6, and the World Innovation Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA).7
It is pertinent to note that Soviet electronics and military hardware industries had a significant presence in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR).8 Many institutes such as the Yerevan Computer Research Institute were established. Armenian factories were involved in the making of various radio electronics, space communication devices and automated control units.9 The Armenians were also involved in the making of military tech items such as rocket launchers and parts used in submarines and ships. During the Soviet period, Armenia was responsible for 30 to 40 per cent of electronic and computer components of the Soviet defence and aerospace industries.10
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large number of Armenians left the country and began immigrating to various parts of the globe. This exodus delayed the nation's aspirations in the field of technology. The ‘ArmTech’ Congress organised in 2007 in San Francisco to engage the global Armenian community was a key event to ensure the engagement of Armenian-born start-up companies seeking investments and partnerships. In 2008, a 10-year roadmap for technology was announced.11 The main focus of the 10-year roadmap was on developing the telecommunications and business incubation infrastructure, improving the quality and quantity of tech graduates, increasing support and financing mechanisms for tech start-ups.12
By 2011, the first major investor in Armenian tech initiatives was Microsoft, leading to the launch of the Microsoft Innovation Centre. This joint project saw cooperation between the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Microsoft Corporation and EIF.13 The Centre has trained about 12,500 students and ensured an 84 per cent employment success rate, with some of the students working in companies like XCloud Networks, Volo and Bluenet.
This was followed by the launching of the PicsArt company in 2011 by an Armenian-American entrepreneur Hovhannes Avoyan with headquarters in both Yerevan and San Francisco. This is seen as the first major investment of a tech company in Armenia. Following this, an agreement for a research centre of Intel was signed in 2012.14
The 2014 ‘Law on Technology Advancements’ allowed tax exemptions for companies focused on the IT sector. It ensured exemptions for companies that employed more than 30 people and a preferential reduction in the income tax to 10 per cent, instead of the general tax bracket which ranged from 23 per cent to 36 per cent,15 2017 also saw the fastest growth of the Armenian IT sector when it expanded by 20 per cent over the previous year.
In 2018, the Velvet Revolution changed Armenia's political structure, with the new leadership under Nicol Pashinyan. During the protests, many youths (under 30), popularly known as the ‘Independence Generation’ from the tech sector, came out in support of Pashinyan, thus showing a deep connection of the tech sector to the domestic political context. Under Pashinyan, from 2018 until now, the nation has seen some significant policy changes, ranging from political and economic and particularly in foreign policy, amidst the regional turmoil (Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia–Ukraine conflicts).
The first significant tech initiative of the Pashinyan government was in 2019 when it hosted a delegation from Index Ventures, an international venture capital firm focusing on tech investments, including e-commerce, gaming, infrastructure and intelligence and security.16 The meeting ensured that Index Ventures provided funding to start-ups like Embry, Retention Force and D’efekt. Nina Achadjian, a partner of Index Ventures who has invested in these companies, is also of Armenian origin and is the founder of Hive Ventures, the first seed venture fund focusing on Armenian entrepreneurs.
The government has faced many challenges on the regional front, especially the resumption of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020. However, these developments have not deterred tech advancement and development. In 2021, the tech wave saw significant investments, accumulating US$ 200 million dollars from domestic companies.17 The same year saw PicsArt become the first Armenian-based company to become the first tech unicorn.18 In 2022, the tech industry also saw more entries from early-stage venture capital funds groups including Zoomerang, Mythrill and BlueQubit.
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has also boosted the Armenian tech industry. The conflict ensured an influx of Russians, and to a lesser extent, Ukrainians and Belarussian tech experts, into Armenia. In 2023, about 60,000 Russians remained in Armenia out of the 100,000 Russians who entered in 2022, most of whom were IT experts.19 Russian companies have also expanded or opened their offices in Armenia, such as Miro, thus ensuring more employment opportunities for the local Armenian population. The Russian influx into Armenia and the shift of the Russian companies has been seen as a positive for the Armenian tech industry and could contribute to the overall advancement and investments in the industry.
In January 2024, the newly appointed Minister of the tech industry Mkhitar Hayrapetyan highlighted that the tech and military industries would collaborate. The draft strategy for developing science and technology was presented on 4 March 2024. Focus areas include artificial intelligence and machine learning, microelectronics, advanced robotics, quantum technologies, biotechnology and sciences, which contain educational, scientific and industrial components.20 The government will create working groups to promote and develop these areas and increase the efficiency of investments for tech in Armenia.
Hayrapetyan was a former minister of diaspora under Pashinyan. This may ensure a strong connection between the diaspora and the government on tech. There is also focus on improving the connections between the educational system and the tech industry. The University-Private Sector Cooperation for Training Specialists in 2020 by the Ministry of High-Tech Industry is one such effort. The initiative seeks to create educational programmes in collaboration with universities and technology companies.
The Armenian tech industry has withstood various challenges ranging from the economic slowdown in 2014–16, the political instability and revolution in 2018, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war and its aftereffects since 2020, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The two WCIT conferences are a testament to Armenia’s tech aspirations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
6. UATE is a business association that represents the collective interests of the companies in the field of technology. The organisation works closely with the government to unite private sector, international companies and NGOs which focuses on Armenian tech. See “Who We Are”,The Union of Advanced Technology Enterprise, 2024.
7. The WITSA is an alliance of 80 countries and is seen as the voice of the global tech industry. Armenia is a member of this organisation. See “Who We Are”, The World Innovation, Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA), 2023.
18. A tech unicorn is one where a private company has gained 1 billion dollars within its first 10 years. See Syuzan Tosunyan, “Unicorns Spotted in Armenia”,EVN Report, 6 October 2021.
The 2024 Austrian Elections and the Rise of the Freedom Party of Austria
Saman Ayesha Kidwai
October 28, 2024
The Freedom Party of Austria’s (FPÖ) performance in the 2024 general elections reinforces the broader trend of the continental shift favouring a Eurosceptic and far-right worldview.
The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) emerged as the largest party in the 2024 general elections, winning over 28 per cent of total votes (almost 13 per cent more than the previous election).1 The Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) secured around 26 per cent of the vote share followed by Social Democrats with 21 per cent, the New Austrians with 9 per cent, and Greens with 8 per cent.2 President Alexander Van der Bellen has entrusted Chancellor Karl Nehammer’s government with administrative duties (as a caretaker administration) until a new leader assumes charge. Notably, the Austrian constitution does not specify a time period within which a new government must be formed after election results are announced. It could vary depending on the pace and success (or failure) of negotiations between various parties.
The FPÖ was founded by Anton Reinthaller, a former SS Officer associated with the Nazi party.3 It was part of coalition governments in 2000 and during 2017–2019. While its primary support base is made up of people between the age of 35 and 59,4 it also acquired the largest support this year from a critical voting bloc—the youth and those part of the labour force—voters under 35. This development has spurred a wave of celebration among other far-right figures5 across Europe like Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orbán.
FPO’s performance shows that Austria’s political landscape is aligned with the broader shift to the far-right across Europe, with hardening anti-migrant rhetoric. Across Hungary, Italy, France and Germany, far-right politicians are steadily gaining ground amid the growing popularisation of conspiracy theories through social media, such as the Great Replacement6 and concepts such as Remigration.7 The recent policy measures introduced by the EU regarding immigration,8 which human rights organisations have decried, is a testament to disenchantment with the liberal democratic governance and globalisation.
These trends have been supplemented by a resurgence of tribalism9 and nationalism, rejection of multiculturalism, widening socio-economic marginalisation and misinformation and disinformation that have become rampant on social media platforms. As has been observed since the 1800s, far-right and populist policies have gained momentum following a period of upheaval or crisis. Concerns regarding the viability of the Bretton Woods system and rising immigration levels across Europe, which had begun simmering mainly after the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis, boiled over after the COVID-19 outbreak.
As parties across the continent faced backlash for the lockdown measures and imposition of vaccination drives, the locals’ disgruntlement and skepticism about the implications of COVID-19 vaccines and handling of the health crisis grew louder. The anti-government sentiments festered as governments found themselves increasingly challenged at countering the false narratives about the lockdown measures and vaccines being promoted by conspiracy theorists rampantly.
Austria was no exception to the pushback felt across the continent against vaccine mandates,10 and the far-right conservatives sought to capitalise on the resentment felt deeply by the populace in order to secure electoral benefits. The measure to impose a fine—ranging from 600 to 3,600—on those adults refusing vaccination, despite being quickly shelved, had evidently generated significant hostility among the people on the ground.
Furthermore, the paranoia generated by FPÖ about Muslim immigrants outnumbering the majority population, failure of these immigrants to assimilate into the national culture, and potential Islamist radicalisation, potentially contributed to its recent success. It would not be improbable to assume that the projections by the Austrian Academy of Science that Muslims could comprise 12 to 21 per cent11 of the Austrian society by 2046, would have exacerbated the anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric that has extensively been propounded by far-right parties such as FPÖ as part of its Fortress Austria platform.12
At the same time, the rising cost of living and gas prices and socio-economic crisis have worked in FPÖ’s favour. In the background of the Ukraine conflict and Austria’s dependence on Russian gas (surpassing the EU average), inflation and total household expenditures will surge as the bloc doubles down on Austrian consumption of Russian gas. Notably, FPÖ has argued favourably about continuing the purchase of Russian gas despite European attempts to diversify since 2022.13
Key Considerations
The possibility of the Social Democrats combining with ÖVP and other smaller parties like Greens to form an alternative coalition government to prevent the FPÖ from assuming office has been discussed. President Van der Bellen has proposed14 that ÖVP enter into a coalition government with Social Democrats. However, such ideologically opposing movements would find themselves at odds over key domestic and foreign policy issues and could bolster the FPO’s capacity to emerge much stronger moving forward. The ÖVP, The New Austria, Social Democratic Party, among others, profess differing views on issues such as immigration, climate change, economic policies and multiculturalism.15 In the event a pan-ideological coalition government takes charge, there seems little to suggest that it would be able to curb the rise of the far-right FPÖ while maintaining a consensus on policy issues. The FPÖ and the ÖVP came together as allies in a coalition government in 2000 and then in 2017.
Any political party hoping to enter into a coalition government would require to muster at least 92 out of 183 seats in the National Council (Legislature). At the moment, the FPÖ has the largest vote share with 57 seats. The ÖVP has 51 seats, the Social Democrats 41 seats, the New Austria Party 18 seats, followed by Greens with 16 seats.16 It remains to be seen whether the centre-right ÖVP will come to the aid of the FPÖ in exchange for concessions that involve a stake beyond the Chancellery.17
One of the key concessions, which seems unlikely at the moment, would require FPÖ’s leader, Herbert Kickl, to be sidelined from the subsequent coalition government. His party ran the campaign with him as Austria’s future leader. Simultaneously, he could step aside from claims to leadership in the government, based on the precedent established by the party’s previous head, Jörg Haider, in 2000, while exercising power through a proxy. If no coalition government can be proposed, the country and its leaders could be thrust into another round of elections.
If negotiations between other political parties falter, Austria might find itself breaking ranks with the rest of the European Union members regarding the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The FPÖ has been critical of the sanctions against President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials due to the Ukraine crisis. This makes Kickl’s party one of the few pro-Russian political factions in Europe. FPÖ’s potential presence in a future government would be perceived as another concerning development following Robert Fico’s victory in Slovakia last year. Fico had also campaigned on an anti-Ukrainian narrative. Furthermore, FPÖ has envisaged remodelling Austria as per the model of governance practiced in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. Several EU parliamentarians have criticised18 the erosion of liberal democracy under Orbán’s leadership and, therefore, would want Austria to presumably avoid the same fate.
Conclusion
It remains to be seen whether the FPÖ can convert the zeitgeist favouring far-right populism to emerge as the single-largest party and form a government without external support following the next elections. This is because, despite the Austrian tilt towards the far-right over the past several years, some key factors continue hindering the far-right from sweeping into power single-handedly with a majority stake. This includes the stark reminders of the policies enacted during the Nazi era, continued resistance (with its ebbs and flows) by political and civil society actors against cooperating with the far-right across Europe, and a largely pro-Ukrainian worldview among Europeans. Widespread protests, with numbers ranging between 15,000 and 17,000,19 were held in Vienna to express outrage against the far-right’s victory and to display resistance to Kickl’s ambition to sweep into power. These trends indicate that the FPÖ has challenges in its path of power and unless significant compromises can be made on its ideological platform and tangible assurances given to the public, it is unlikely to secure a stake in the government in the immediate future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Rising Tensions in the Horn: Ethiopia, Egypt and Somalia on a Collision Course
Mohanasakthivel J
October 24, 2024
Ethiopia's foreign policy priorities in the Horn of Africa on maritime access and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam have fuelled tensions with both Somalia and Egypt.
On 8 September 2024, during National Sovereignty Day, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed asserted that Ethiopia’s name is synonymous with freedom and dignity. He reaffirmed that the country has never initiated aggression against others throughout its history but has bravely defended its sovereignty against numerous threats.1 This assertion comes at a time of growing tensions in the Horn of Africa, particularly as Ethiopia seeks avenues for maritime access and Egypt opposes the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt is also forging new regional alliances. Cairo signed a defence pact with Somalia in August 2024.2 It has also deployed soldiers to Somalia as part of the new African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia,3 further underscoring shifting regional dynamics and rising tensions.
Strategic Realignments and Rising Animosity
The Ethiopia–Somaliland agreement on 1 January 2024, has reshaped strategic interests across the Horn of Africa, prompting Somalia to reassess its diplomatic and defence strategies. Ethiopia’s actions have spurred Somalia to actively pursue new alliances to counterbalance Addis Ababa’s expanding regional footprint. Central to this effort is Somalia’s deepening defence cooperation with regional countries starting with Turkey, marked by the signing of new agreements aimed at strengthening its military capacity amid growing regional uncertainty.4 Turkey also has a good relationship with Ethiopia and is mediating between the two countries.5 The possibility of Turkey taking antagonistic positions against either Ethiopia or Somalia is, therefore, unlikely.
The more significant development is Somalia’s evolving relationship with Egypt, which carries broader geopolitical ramifications. Egypt has expressed its intention to deploy troops in Somalia, officially under the pretext of combating the Al-Qaeda-linked group Al-Shabaab. Yet, the strategic impact of an Egyptian military presence in the Horn extends far beyond counterterrorism. For Cairo, this move serves two purposes: solidifying its influence in Somalia, signalling its resolve to challenge Ethiopia’s growing dominance in the region and forcing it to return to negotiations.
Somalia’s growing ties with Egypt, coupled with its expanding relations with Eritrea, another historical adversary of Ethiopia, suggests a broader realignment. The foreign ministers of Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia met on the sidelines of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York to discuss their common strategic goals, underscoring this trilateral alignment.6
The growing cooperation was further reinforced on 10 October 2024, when the leaders of Somalia, Egypt and Eritrea convened in Asmara, Eritrea, and issued a joint communiqué.7 While the official discourse centered on the protection of Somalia’s sovereignty and stability, the subtext indicated a concerted effort to challenge Ethiopia’s regional influence.
Ethiopia’s concerns have deepened with Eritrea’s involvement in the evolving alliance. The suspension of Ethiopian Airlines flights to Eritrea8 on 3 September, attributed to ‘difficult operating conditions’, reflects the worsening diplomatic ties between the two neighbours. Although Addis Ababa and Asmara cooperated temporarily during the Tigray War (2020–2022), their post-war relationship has reverted to historic rivalries.9 The Eritrean leadership also fears that Ethiopia harbours ambitions to reclaim access to Eritrean ports, which it lost when Eritrea gained independence in 1993.
Ethiopia's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa is shaped by two primary objectives: securing maritime access and safeguarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). These priorities have fuelled tensions with both Somalia and Egypt, as the latter intensifies efforts to obstruct the dam's progress. Egypt views Somalia as a strategic ally to counter Ethiopia’s ambitions on both fronts. Cairo's increasingly assertive rhetoric and military activities have elevated the risk of conflict, compounded by its recent military cooperation agreement with Somalia. Within a month, Egypt supplied Mogadishu with two shipments of military equipment, with Somali Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur publicly expressing gratitude for the support10. In the coming months, the strategic competition between Cairo and Addis Ababa is expected to escalate, potentially drawing both regional and external actors into the conflict.
Assessment
Ethiopia plays an indispensable role in stabilising Somalia, driven by the need to secure its borders and combat the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Given Somalia’s persistent fragility, Ethiopia has supported regional governance structures in Somaliland and Puntland, creating buffer zones11 to shield itself from terrorist threats while consolidating its influence. Over the years, Ethiopia’s continued involvement in Somalia’s peacekeeping efforts has made it an important actor.
Ethiopia was the driving force behind the ‘building blocks’ approach, which facilitated the introduction of federalism in Somalia. In 1998, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs articulated this strategy in a position paper, asserting that 'local administrative structures could constitute building blocks' for the restoration of the Somali state. However, Egypt’s recent proposal to deploy 5,000 troops to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and an additional 5,000 troops on a bilateral basis has raised concerns in Ethiopia, which views Cairo’s growing presence as a potential challenge to its influence and strategic interests.12
Moreover, General Michael Langley of AFRICOM referred to Ethiopia as an "anchor state", emphasising its vital contributions to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Ethiopian forces, particularly in Southwest State, have been instrumental in driving Al-Shabaab out of key areas and fostering stability.13 Beyond security engagement, Ethiopia’s involvement in strengthening local governance structures has helped prevent the spread of extremism. Without Ethiopia’s sustained engagement, Somalia would likely face a dangerous security vacuum, jeopardising not only Somalia’s stability but also the security of the wider Horn of Africa.
Second, the federal system in Somalia, long beset by challenges in maintaining unity, is now facing heightened pressure. Several semi-autonomous regions, including Puntland, Jubaland14 and Southwest State, oppose Egypt’s deployment of troops and instead align with Ethiopia.15 Tensions within the federal system have deepened, as evidenced by Puntland’s recent declaration that it will operate as an independent government until Somalia's federal constitution is finalised.
It is important to note that the constitutional disagreements are also influenced by clan dynamics. The Hawiye clans, dominant in central and southern Somalia, especially in the greater Mogadishu area, tend to favour a unitary state. In contrast, the Darod clans, influential in Puntland and Jubaland, strongly support federalism. These two clans have shaped Somalia’s political landscape since the post-conflict period, with their divergent visions often driving political competition. To resolve these persistent disputes, Somalia requires a comprehensive constitutional revision followed by a nationwide referendum.16 Without such measures, tensions between the federal government and its member states are likely to persist. If unresolved, these political divisions spanning both the federal and clan levels could become a major source of instability, especially in the post-ATMIS era.
Third, Uganda, another key player in the region, has also voiced scepticism. Uganda’s State Minister for International Affairs, Henry Okello Oryem, questioned why Egypt is only now seeking to join the mission. “The TCCs are asking, why does Egypt want to join now? Where have they been all this time?”, he remarked, highlighting the concerns of other troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Meanwhile, the European Union (EU), the primary donor to African Union (AU) missions in Somalia, has expressed a neutral stance but emphasised the need for participating countries to focus entirely on combating al-Shabaab.17
Fourth, Somalia has emerged as Egypt's key ally in countering Ethiopia since the start of the Sudanese civil war, which has weakened Egypt's influence in Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have supported Egypt’s position on the GERD since Sudan is also a downstream country on the Nile. The historical rivalries and current political situations between Ethiopia and Egypt contribute to ongoing tensions, with the Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) acting as a trigger for recent escalations. However, it is not the main cause of the conflict. If Somalia becomes a battleground in the dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt, this could have serious negative effects on the entire region.
Finally, in order to prevent the situation from escalating into a broader regional conflict, it is important to restart peace negotiations. Somalia could consider reopening discussions through established mediators like Turkey, which has previously facilitated talks between the two countries. Alternatively, the African Union could play a mediating role to help prevent further escalation. Experience from Sudan shows that outside interference can worsen conflicts, as external powers often prioritise their own interests over long-term stability.18 It is crucial for African nations to address these tensions internally rather than letting external parties influence the situation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Claudia Sheinbaum was sworn in as the first woman President of Mexico on 1 October 2024. Sheinbaum was the Mayor of Mexico City prior to her election as president. She succeeds Andrés Manuel López Obrador, popularly known as AMLO, whose approval ratings has never been less than 60 per cent.1 Both Obrador and Sheinbaum belong to the democratic left-wing Morena Party that was founded and nurtured by AMLO. Obrador had to demit office due to Mexico’s constitutional limit on presidential terms.
Sheinbaum campaigned as a candidate for ‘continuity with change’,2 and secured 60.7 per cent of the vote share in a landslide victory.3 She improved the Morena party tally both in terms of vote percentage and the number of seats acquired in the two houses of the Mexican Parliament. Obrador had secured about 53 per cent of the popular votes in 2018.4 Sheinbaum also achieved a supermajority in the Lower House (Chamber of Deputies) of the Parliament, falling just three seats short in the Upper House (Senate). Given that two opposition senators flipped to her side recently, she needs to convince only one more member to make any constitutional changes.5
For a party (Morena) which began as a social movement in 2011 and formally registered with the National Electoral Institute (INE) only in 2014, the two consecutive presidential victories successively improving parliamentary seat tallies are nothing short of a historic and meteoric rise. The stage for Mexico to get its first woman president was almost set when another woman Xóchitl Gálvez became the presidential candidate of the main opposition, a coalition of the traditional old parties—National Action Party (PAN), Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).
President Sheinbaum in the past had worked as a climate scientist representing Mexico in the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). She was a member of the panel when it received the Nobel Prize in 2007. Given her administrative and technocratic experiences, there are expectations that there could be improvements on policies related to the economy, war against narcotics, militarisation and climate change. She portrayed herself as a candidate who will continue AMLO’s legacy with changes, promising Mexicans a non-discriminatory and investor-friendly government.
Economic Policies
Sheinbaum inherits successes of AMLO’s economic interventions that has brought poverty to a historic low (36.3 per cent in 2022) bringing millions out of poverty.6 The average income of the people has increased while the minimum wage has doubled.7 However, the number of people in extreme poverty and inadequate access to health have also increased.8 The public expenditure in the country is at an all-time high and fiscal deficit is at its highest (5.9 per cent) in the last four decades.9 Sheinbaum has promised not only to continue AMLO’s direct cash schemes to the poor Mexicans but also to expand the net and bring in those who are still outside.
Sheinbaum seems determined to adhere to fiscal discipline which was not under control in the later part of the AMLO administration.10 Given the expectations of the people with rising government expenditure, it may be challenging for her to balance the promise of bringing the fiscal deficit down to 3.5 per cent and make Mexico attractive for further investments.11 The Mexican Peso saw further decline with President Sheinbaum reaffirming continuation of the economic policies of her predecessor.12 Her economic and political astuteness is to be tested as the US, Spain and Canada and several other countries are wary of the policies of the Morena party.
Constitutional Amendments
AMLO had pushed for 18 constitutional changes which he could not implement in the absence of the required two-thirds majority in both the houses. Electing the judiciary, integrating National Guard with the defence ministry, eliminating proportional representation in parliament, ending autonomy of several constitutional agencies were the most controversial proposals among them.13 But the elections in June 2024 provided him the opportunity to carry out these changes with the support of President elect Sheinbaum. He enacted the judicial as well National Guard reforms through constitutional amendments in the last month of his tenure before handing over the reins of government to his protégé.
The changes in judiciary recruitment have been intensely criticised by both professionals as well as members of the civil society. They do not expect any immediate change on the issue as Sheinbaum has initiated for secondary legislations to implement the reforms. She wants the electoral laws to be amended in line with the constitution so that the people could henceforth elect their judges from bottom to the top level of the judiciary.14 The reforms have been highly divisive with concerns that the judiciary could be influenced by criminal groups, money power and electoral politics. Although the Supreme Court has accepted to consider a constitutional challenge to the enacted judicial reforms,15 Sheinbaum's role and the outcome of the whole reform process will be keenly watched. The agenda for constitutional amendments is long and provocative, ranging from constitutionalising health, rights of indigenous people, new electoral powers, to expanding scope of preventive custody, etc. The bottom-line of these amendments is generally read as centralising of powers and more fiscal burden for the state.
War against Narcotic Drugs and Militarisation
Mexico is experiencing a political and economic paradigm shift with the popularity of Morena party, and the momentum continues with President Sheinbaum. However, party policies on the issues of security and law and order have not received the expected applause even from quarters that are appreciative of the developmental successes of the Morena party. The party has been accused of continuing militarisation of the state, contrary to the promise made by AMLO when he was campaigning for his election.16 The presence of the military in the civilian domain has only increased. The military has been handed over many civilian functions to keep the state machinery efficient. The number of homicides in Mexico has been higher than the years before AMLO, while violence by drug cartels continues unabashedly.17 The recent elections also saw killings of many candidates by criminal gangs to influence the outcomes of the electoral process.
Drug cartels and disappearances of many citizens and migrants is a pandemic in Mexico. AMLO had promised to address the problem and put the military off the streets. People in Mexico believe that elements of military and police are complicit with the drug and criminal cartels responsible for these disappearances,18 while AMLO is strengthening them. Civil society and social groupings in Mexico, especially the feminist groups, are unhappy with the government policy of militarisation to deal with the problem. To them, the cause cannot be the remedy, and they expect Sheinbaum to prioritise the issue of disappearances, putting the military and police under question for their complicity or failure. Bringing violence and disappearances down, especially against the women, is another daunting task before the new president.
Feminist and Environmental Policies
Mexico takes pride in its identity of a country with a feminist foreign policy, which is now under a woman for the first time.19 Sheinbaum, in her campaign as well as the inaugural speech, has put extra emphasis on her being a woman president. Ironically, violence against women in Mexico is rampant despite women being active, visible and functional at all the levels of society. AMLO had publicly fallen out with the feminist groups of the country on the issue of violence and disappearances. It is to be seen how President Sheinbaum responds to these criticisms and translates her promises into action.
Sheinbaum’s policies relating to the environment will be keenly watched. She is known for aligning with President Obrador’s hydrocarbon policies. However, in her first public speech on Zocalo square after being sworn in as President, she assured a return to energy transition policies discontinued by her predecessor. She promised a 45 per cent share of renewable sources in electricity production by 2030.20
Conclusion
The euphoria following Sheinbaum’s swearing in as the first woman president of Mexico is reflective of the people’s expectations from her. She faces many challenges, though. On the economic front, these include the welfarist benchmarks left by AMLO. As the first female president who was also an environment scientist, her policies relating to energy transition and countering violence against women will be keenly watched. Sheinbaum has a difficult task of bridging the euphoria and reality, as Obrador has left office with historic popularity but at the cost of fiscal balance and civilian control. She has not come up with a clear policy against militarisation of the Mexican society, and it seems it will be difficult for her to shake off the tag of continuity, except on the issue of energy transition.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Mozambique’s Presidential Elections and Implications for India’s Energy Security
Abhishek Mishra
October 16, 2024
The results of Mozambique’s presidential elections have key implications not only for regional security in southern Africa but also for India’s quest for energy security.
On 9 October 2024, Mozambicans voted in the country’s presidential elections in which the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), is expected to maintain its grip on power since gaining independence from Portugal in 1975. The incumbent President Filipe Nyusi is stepping down after two terms and the party’s candidate—Daniel Chapo—is expected to replace him. His main opponents are Ossufo Momade of the largest opposition party the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), Lutero Simango from the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), and Venancio Mondlane, an independent candidate who has a strong base among young Mozambicans. The principal issues for the electorate include poverty, youth unemployment, government corruption and the challenge of addressing insurgency and restoring stability in Cabo Delgado province.
Mozambique is a coastal and resource-rich country in southern Africa situated along the Mozambique Channel, a key maritime chokepoint in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It is key transit and trading hub which connects the Indian Ocean to the world but is often overlooked as a global maritime chokepoint.1 The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 reduced the Mozambique Channel’s significance to global commerce. However, the recent discovery of 100 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the Rovuma basin and huge coal reserves has renewed major powers’ interest in the region.2 The discovery prompted the prospects of earning gas revenues and achieve sustainable economic development.
Genesis of Civil War in Cabo Delgado
Unfortunately, since October 2017, the humanitarian situation in northern Mozambique has been alarmingly deteriorating, triggered by escalating armed Islamist insurgency. Jihadist group Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama’a (ASJW) continues to target Mozambican security establishment in response to grinding poverty, a deep sense of marginalisation, and inequality among locals and elites. The objectives of ASJW, locally known as ‘Al Shabaab’, are clear—to establish a society ruled by the Islamic law (Sharia) and gain access to resources and power.
The capture of the port city Mocimboa da Praia and the 2021 attacks in Palma, which is the center of TotalEnergies’ planned US$ 20 billion liquified natural gas (LNG) project on the Afungi peninsula, has been a cause of serious concern.3 Even ExxonMobil has a nearby project that is currently on hold. Initially, Rwandan troops were deployed to secure the peninsula followed by troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), faced several challenges such as outdated military equipment, funding constraint, lack of coordination with the Rwandan forces.4 This eventually led to the decision to withdraw the mission in July 2024.
Mozambique’s insurgency was borne out of resentment over the Cabo Delgado region’s poverty.5 The region is “a resource treasure trove, boasting Africa’s largest gas reserve”, huge deposits of ruby, and graphite mines that Tesla has been sourcing from since 2021. The exclusion of local communities, especially Muslim Mwani and Mauka, from economic opportunities led to marginalisation which is symbolised by the LNG project. Instead of opting to mine less and create a viable developmental path, the Mozambican government chose to militarise the situation. They are focusing on raw extractivism and achieving short-term gains rather than addressing more complex developmental root causes.6
Who is Daniel Chapo?
Media houses are touting Daniel Chapo, a 47-year-old politician and governor of Inhambane province for the past eight years as the new kid in the old block. He has formerly been a radio host and a law lecturer and is a newcomer in the political scene. Although FRELIMO’s dominance in Mozambique’s political scene make Chapo the favourite to win the election, several challenges persist.
His government will have to deal with the fallout of the ‘tuna bond’ corruption scandal which trigged Mozambique’s worst economic crisis.7 The Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), leaders of opposition parties, and Mozambique’s National Electoral Commission (CNE) have all previously criticised the lack of transparency and irregularities in the electoral process. However, the biggest challenge for the new administration will be to address the jihadist insurgency, particularly in northern Mozambique.
Following SAMIM’s withdrawal of troops, insurgents have taken advantage of the security vacuum leading to an uptick in violence and displacement of people. The attack on the town of Mocomia on 10 May 2024 resulted in almost 700 people fleeing and 10 soldiers losing their lives.8 The threat of violence from insurgents continues to disrupt daily life. Therefore, Mozambique’s new president must take few necessary steps.
Since Rwanda is currently leading the counter-insurgency efforts, it is necessary to provide more transparency about the terms of the arrangement between Mozambique and Rwanda which is not available in the public domain. Mozambique’s new government must also take into account army reforms more seriously if it wants its security forces to eventually to take over from Rwanda.9 Finally, the drivers of conflict, including the Cabo Delgado province’s enduring socio-economic problems, must be addressed.
Whoever wins the President election will inherit an Islamist insurgency in the country’s north, which has halted multi-billion-dollar gas projects and displaced thousands of people. Whether Daniel Chapo’s administration demonstrates continuity in its approach to solving security challenges or makes any noteworthy changes remains to be seen.
Implications for India’s energy security
In many ways, India’s quest for resource and energy security is a primary driver of growing engagement with countries such as Mozambique. The Indian government is attempting to diversify its sourcing of LNG and subsequently reduce its energy reliance on the Middle East. Mozambique’s strategic location along the Indian Ocean and the fact that it’s only a three-day journey from India makes Mozambique an ideal candidate to meet India’s growing fuel needs. Three Indian Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) led by ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) hold 30 per cent stake in the marquee Rovuma Offshore Area 1 project.10 With investments amounting to US$ 20 billion, it represents India’s single-largest investment in Africa.
However, the venture has been beset with difficulties after the suspension of operations in April 2021 following attacks by Islamist insurgents in the coastal town of Palma. Rwandan troops along with its Mozambican counterparts have been able to normalise the security situation in the region to an extent although pockets of violent incidents continue to take place. Political uncertainty is the primary risk to the project. Additionally, there are speculations as to whether major extractive contracts will be revised, which has spooked investors. Despite the setback, it seems the project is set for resumption with TotalEnergies head Patrick Pouyanne stating that “nearly 80 percent of the $14 billion financial package underpinning the project has been confirmed by lenders”.11
Reports in Indian media indicate that the project is likely to resume operations this year, following the election of possibly Daniel Chapo, as the new president.12 He has clearly stated his intention to simultaneously work with Mozambique’s LNG investors and partners and combat the scourge of terrorism in Cabo Delgado province.13 For India, this is good news. Recent visits to Mozambique by External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Hardeep Singh Puri is indicative of India’s interest in the early resumption and monetisation of the project by Indian PSUs.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Al-Qaeda has begun increasingly replicating the tactics employed by its Salafi-jihadi rival, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS), in Africa’s Sahel region, especially so in Mali and Burkina Faso by relying on powerful affiliates like Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). It has done so to revitalise its ideological appeal and rejuvenate its primacy in the global jihadi fold, even as ISIS has remained the deadliest terror group for the ninth consecutive year.
Given the global geopolitical flux animated by the great power rivalry between the United States and China, escalating conflicts in West Asia and Ukraine, and strong opposition to presence of foreign military presence, terrorism hotspots like Sahel can expect to encounter growing instability. These factors are bound to create a conducive ecosystem for terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and their affiliates to inflict more violence than before. The deteriorating security conditions have been matched by the regional military juntas’ faltering responses to the security challenges. These regimes have not translated their rhetoric and proclamations at international forums1 into credible deterrent actions against terrorism-related activities.
Breakdown of Security in Sahel
The regional landscape presents complex challenges. The jihadi activities that have kept Burkina Faso embroiled in heightened insecurity since August 2015 have gradually destabilised its neighbouring country, Mali. According to the Global Terrorism Index Report 2024,2 Burkina Faso and Mali are the first and third most affected countries due to terrorism-related activities, respectively. Additionally, with 26 per cent of all terrorism-related incidents and nearly 50 per cent of all deaths last year due to such incidents, Sahel has supplanted West Asia and North Africa as the region worst affected by terrorism.
The announcement by the military chiefs of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali in August 2024 about establishing a task force, the Alliance of Sahel States, to counter the terrorism threat plaguing their countries has remained limited to verbal proclamations until now. There is no clarity as yet about the specifications of the mandate, long and short-term goals, binding commitments and strategy. Mercenary groups like Wagner or Africa Corps,3 meanwhile, whose deployment was intended to stabilise Sahelian countries, have found it beyond their capability to fight back against assaults launched by terrorist groups lately.
These trends indicate the relevance of the warning bells that the United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, sounded at the beginning of this year. He had argued that4 ‘local conflicts and fragilities’ had been ‘exploited’ by terrorist organisations such as ‘Daesh (ISIS), Al-Qaeda, and their affiliates’ transforming Africa into a ‘global epicentre of terrorism’.
Mali and Burkina Faso: Hotbeds of Terrorism in Sahel
Mali
In August 2024, an ambush by Tuareg rebels (possibly now in cohorts with JNIM) resulted in the death of 47 Malian and 84 Wagner5 officers. In May 2024, the leaders of the Tuareg rebel movement reportedly initiated efforts to sign a non-aggression pact6 with JNIM. More than 70 individuals were killed and at least 200 others wounded7 after JNIM targeted critical locations such as Faladie Gendarmerie School (an elite paramilitary training school in Bamako) and a military base near the airport in September this year.
The September attacks in Mali are a significant escalation by the terrorist groups, marking their renewed campaign against the regime. This is because this can be considered the first major attack by JNIM inside the capital in nearly a decade. Moreover, in October 2024, Talha Abu Hind, the Emir of JNIM released a message8 warning the Malian government and Russian mercenary groups of greater attacks following the suicide attacks on Gao and Timbuktu military airports.
Burkina Faso
Recently, the military regime in Burkina Faso dealt with a significant blow in its attempts to eradicate the jihadist threat in the country nearly two years after the coup took place in September 2022, as Al-Qaeda affiliated groups shot dead hundreds of civilians in August 2024. The above-mentioned targeted attack indicates how the coup, which its architects legitimised as a means to more efficiently address the problems pertaining to terrorism compared to the civilian government, has been gravely undermined.
In the same month, in the lead-up to this deadly attack, at least two other incidents occurred in Burkina Faso, which were attributed to JNIM. On 8 August 2024, a military convoy in the eastern part of the country came under attack after JNIM fighters ambushed the soldiers,9 the assault forcing the latter to leave behind hundreds of arms intended for official use. Additionally, during the same month, over 400 unarmed villagers10 were indiscriminately killed by JNIM.
While the country has recorded over 20,000 terrorism-related casualties over the past nine years, 2024 itself has witnessed approximately 3,800 fatalities. Therefore, it is unsurprising that regular clashes or systematic targeted attacks carried out by JNIM have left the country’s armed forces or its civilian populace in a vulnerable position.
Key Challenges
Despite the presence of two significant regional organisations in Africa, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), positive regional intervention to strengthen countries’ counter-terrorism campaign in the Sahel seems unlikely. Notably, there has been nothing to indicate that the regional organisation—ECOWAS—would expand its mandate beyond taking on economic and political issues under its consideration. The coups that took place in Burkina Faso and Mali, their subsequent exit from the organisation along with imposition of sanctions imposed by the member states, has created internal fissures and undermined it from within. The sanctioned and member states of ECOWAS would need to reconcile issues such as expansion of mandate to include counter-terrorism efforts.
At the same time, regional support, backed by the AU, in military terms to the Sahel seems far-fetched. This is considering its challenge in mustering a consolidated regional counter-terror strategy (especially in an increasingly polarised climate). The challenge arises due to competing interests and inter-state disputes or the limitations placed on deploying the African Standby Force (ASF) to Burkina Faso or Mali.
As per the guidelines, the ASF can, besides instances of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity, be deployed to a country ‘at the request of a member state to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and 4(J) of the AU Constitutive act.’11 However, its deployment to Mali or Burkina Faso, given the regional outcry12 to the recent coups, seems implausible to envisage at the moment.
Moreover, one of the largest contributors in Africa to missions deployed in other countries affected by terrorism like Somalia, most notably Ethiopia, is in the throes of domestic and regional conflicts (including in Amhara) and is reducing its strength even in Somalia, limiting the effectiveness of regional response to security crises.
In addition, it has been found that issues of concern, including poor governance, festering conflicts between herders and farmers, rising unemployment, and lack of political stability, have failed to garner regional consensus regarding their redressal. Simultaneously, there has been little willingness to devote adequate attention and resources to address such challenges.
Finally, the domestic infrastructure and state apparatus in Burkina Faso and Mali are in a weakened position after years of political instability, the power struggle between civilian and military rulers, militancy and a dearth of economic growth. As a result, they have been unable to address the multifaceted challenges.
Conclusion
The governments in Burkina Faso and Mali have confronted obstacles in deterring or curbing terrorism for nearly a decade at great costs as fatalities—military and civilian—have continued rising. Moreover, Africa as a continent has experienced rising cases of terrorism-related incidents, including in Somalia, where Al-Shabaab, another Al-Qaeda affiliate, has inflicted significant chaos and violence. Local stakeholders and mercenary groups have proven largely ineffective in curbing the menace of terrorism for the past several years, while terrorist groups continue carrying out attacks simultaneously against military and civilian personnel. This has allowed parent organisations like the Al-Qaeda to retain their importance in the global jihad discourse and use the emergence of Sahel as a global hotspot of terrorism to rejuvenate its ideological movement.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the Burkina Faso and Malian governments’ increasing disenchantment with the former security partners (France), placing the culpability of escalating terrorism on Ukraine’s shoulders13 on the one hand and growing closeness with the Russian government and Russian mercenary groups. Notably, Andrei Belousov, Russia’s Minister of Defence, announced14 that discussions to expand Russia–Burkina Faso military ties have taken place. This follows Moscow’s announcement about deploying instructors and supplies to bolster Burkina Faso’s counter-terror campaign.
The accusations against Ukraine could be understood through their voting patterns in the United Nations15 amid the Russia–Ukraine conflict, in which they have abstained or voted against resolutions concerning Ukraine. Additionally, since the Russia–Ukraine conflict broke out in 2022, Ukraine has been a benefactor of European and American (hostile to the military regimes in Sahel) support, diplomatically and militarily. These factors have collectively made multilateral cooperation, which is critical in a rapidly evolving threat landscape, seem implausible in addressing security concerns moving forward, leaving the regional actors in a lurch for the foreseeable future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
China has become the world’s largest exporter of military UAVs and has also captured a significant chunk of the global civilian drone market.
China has established the world’ largest Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) industry. It has become the world’s largest exporter of military UAVs, with its signature models—the Wing Loong and Rainbow Series UAV.1 According to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, between 2008 and 2018, China exported a total of 181 fighter/combat drones and 163 strike-capable UAVs. The UAE (22 per cent), Saudi Arabia (19 per cent), Egypt (15 per cent) and Pakistan (14 per cent) have been the most significant recipients of Chinese drones, during this time period.2 According to the SIPRI, China has delivered more than 200 combat drones to 17 countries in the period 2013–2023.3
Chinese Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) have been used on battlefields in the Middle East and Africa. For instance, the Nigerian Air Force has been using CH-3 fighter drone in operations against Boko Haram, and Saudi Arabia has used Wing Loong II drones in the war against Houthi militias in Yemen. Egypt uses Wing Loong-II fighter drones against militant groups in north Sinai.4 In Iraq, Chinese combat drones carried out 260 air raids against ISIL (ISIS) targets as of mid-2018, with a success rate of nearly 100 per cent.5 Iraq had purchased four CH-4B Rainbow fighter drones in 2015.
Saudi Arabia has been one of the oldest and regular customers of Chinese drones, and has imported 70 Chinese combat drones. Saudi Arabia first purchased a few CH-4 drones in 2014 and has since acquired at least 15 of the more lethal Wing Loong II drones, with an expressed interest to buy 285 more. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) has set up a drone manufacturing unit in Saudi Arabia after the agreement was reached between Xi Jinping and King Salman in February 2017. The state-owned Saudi Technology Development and Investment Company (TAQNIA) and CASC subsidiary Aerospace Long-March International Trade (ALIT) have worked on establishing this manufacturing unit.
Abu Dhabi was the first export customer for the Wing Loong II drones, and received the first units in 2017.6 Similarly, China sold at least five Wing Loong I drones to UAE in 2011. In early 2017, the UAE purchased five Wing Loong II fighter drones. The Pakistani Air Force purchased five CH-4 Rainbow combat drones in January 2021,7 and in May 2024, Pakistan ordered 10 more CH-4 Rainbow-series of combat drones at around US$ 24 million.8 In 2013, Myanmar purchased 12 CH-3 fighter drones.9 The Serbian military has purchased CH-92A Reconnaissance/Attack drones worth US$ 19.3 million in June 2020.10
Chinese drones are cheaper than their Western counterparts, and therefore, are more appealing to those countries with limitations of budget. The CH-4 and the Wing Loong 2 are estimated to cost between US$ 1 m and US$ 2 m each, while the US-made Reaper costs US$ 16m and the Predator US$ 4m, according to CSIS, the US-based think tank. China also offers flexible payment terms to interested buyers, and many African buyers pay the amount in terms of oil and other natural resources.11
China is able to keep pace with the market demands of military drones in terms of innovation and quality, as regards flight control, integrated navigation, relay data link system, sensor technology, among others.12[xii] China has successfully developed dozens of new generation military unmanned aerial vehicles, models and prototypes, including stealth unmanned aerial vehicles, foldable wing unmanned aerial vehicles, short-distance take-off and landing ring-wing unmanned aerial vehicles, micro unmanned aerial vehicles and flying wing unmanned aerial vehicles.13
In order to increase its market share, China is investing to upgrade its drone manufacturing units. In late 2021, Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (Chengfei), a subsidiary of China Aviation Industry Corporation, signed an agreement with the Zigong Municipal Government of Sichuan to jointly build ‘the largest domestic UAV industrial base (无人机工业园区)’ worth 10 billion Yuan (US$ 1.55 billion) to manufacture military and commercial UAVs. It got operationalised in 2023.14
PLA and Military Uses of Drones
China has a number of UAVs in service with the PLA Rocket Force, PLA Ground Force/Army, PLA Air Force and PLA Navy.15 The PLA is currently equipped with several long-endurance reconnaissance and strike drones. For example, the PLA Air Force’s drone brigade uses the Wing Loong-2 (GJ-2) drone, and the PLA Army uses Rainbow-4 reconnaissance and strike drone. According to Chinese media reports, the PLA Army has begun using KVD002 medium-altitude long-flight reconnaissance and strike drone at the theatre command and group army levels, unveiled in September 2023.16
The TB-001 drone is not just a reconnaissance and strike drone, but can be used along with the PLA Rocket Force’s anti-ship ballistic missiles.17 In August 2021, the China Central Television (CCTV) disclosed that the PLA Rocket Force had mastered the ability to accurately hit large mobile ships thousands of kilometers away at sea by guiding the DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles. China has improved its applications of drone for patrolling its land borders as well as coastlines, and particularly along the Sino-Indian border and Taiwan Strait.
PLA’s UAV troops have been deployed in large numbers in the Western Theatre Command. At present, PLA has deployed ‘GJ-2’ drones and ‘Rainbow-4’ drones in the Western Theatre Command for reconnaissance activities along the borders. In 2019, the AV500W reconnaissance and strike integrated helicopter was also deployed on the Tibetan plateau. This unmanned helicopter weighs 450 kilograms and has a ceiling of 6,700 meters. It can carry four small laser-guided air-to-surface missiles to accurately strike enemy personnel and light vehicles.18
Similarly, China has been using its drones to carry out surveillance and reconnaissance activities in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. Japan and Taiwan reported Chinese drone patrols over their claimed waters. In May 2024, the Japanese Ministry of Defense reported that the WZ-10 UAV flew over the East China Sea and approached Japan.19
PLA used the BZK-005 and TB-001 drones to fly into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone. Both drones have reconnaissance and attack capabilities. The BZK-005 is a large multi-purpose drone with a maximum endurance of 40 hours, and its cruising altitude is 3,000 to 7,000 meters.20 Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed on 25 August 2023 that two Chinese drones flew around Taiwan for nearly 24 hours. The two Chinese drones identified were reconnaissance/attack drone ‘TB001’ and the reconnaissance drone ‘BZK005’.21 In August 2024, a Wing Loong 10 was seen flying along the Vietnamese coastline to the southern city of Nha Trang.22
In recent times, China has entered into foreign collaborations to develop military drones. On 25 September, Reuters reported that Russian UAV company IEMZ Kupol, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned arms company Almaz-Antey, is working with Chinese specialists to develop a new drone model called Garpiya-3 (G3), which is a 2,000 km range attack drone. Another Russian firm Redlepus TSK Vector Industrial has set up 80-hectare ‘Advanced UAV Research and Manufacturing Base’ in Shenzhen in China that would be able to produce 800 long-range attack drones per year, similar to G3 attack drones. 23
Conclusion
The Chinese military is gradually being equipped with drones of increasing lethality and capabilities. Chinese defence universities have special programmes to train PLA soldiers majoring in drone technology and applications. Chinese drone manufacturers such as DJI have captured a significant chunk of global civilian drone market. According to the 2023–2024 China Drone Development Report released by the China Air Transport Association, as of the end of August 2024, nearly 2 million drones were registered in China, an increase of 720,000 from the end of 2023. By 2025, the output of China’s civilian drones is expected to exceed 200 billion yuan.24 Chinese military drones, meanwhile, are widely being used in conflict hotspots across the world, particularly so in Africa and the Middle East. The PLA has intensified the military drones R&D as well as manufacturing activities. Going forward, the global footprint of Chinese military as well as civilian drone programmes is only expected to grow exponentially.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The increasing ASEAN–China economic interdependence ensures both sides have a stake in maintaining stability, despite the trust deficit.
At the sidelines of the 27th ASEAN–China Summit in Vientiane, Lao PDR on 10 October 2024, both sides announced the ‘substantial conclusion of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) 3.0 Upgrade Negotiations’ which is expected to be finalised and signed by 2025. The ACFTA was established in 2002.The FTA between ASEAN and China covers over 2 billion people, with a combined gross domestic product of over US$ 20 trillion. At the 25th ASEAN–China Summit in November 2022, the ACFTA 3.0 Upgrade Negotiations was launched in order to circumvent the growing protectionism in the world. It aimed to accelerate post-pandemic economic recovery through deeper economic integration and cooperation by tapping into future growth areas that includes digital and green economies.1
China’s Economic Statecraft in Southeast Asia
In the last two decades, there has been a considerable shift in China’s relations with the countries in Southeast Asia. Geographically, China shares maritime as well as land borders with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam.2 China’s geographical proximity to Southeast Asia is a potent factor. Every Southeast Asian nation, moreover, has a sizable ethnic Chinese population which also aids in deepening China influence in the region. China has also deployed skillful economic and political diplomacy based on long-term strategic thinking and systematic execution.
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 was a turning point as it enabled China to become the most dominant economic and political-strategic power in Southeast Asia. The 1997 economic crisis which impacted development and growth across Southeast Asia intersected with the emergence of China’s economic modernisation fuelled by its manufacturing sector. China came forward with timely help that included bilateral loans which helped Southeast Asian countries avoid devaluing their currency. Since devaluation would have added to the region’s woes, refraining from such a policy enabled China to reap tremendous good will amongst the ASEAN countries. The emergence of China as a dominant power in the region is also attributed to its efforts towards further elevating its economic engagement with the Southeast Asian countries. In this regard, the ACFTA facilitated greater market access and helped solidify its preeminence and presence in the region.
Other trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) lowered tariffs rates and promoted the integration of supply chains, further accelerating bilateral trade. China is today ASEAN’s largest trading partner, while for Beijing, the region accounts for 15 per cent of its total trade and 14 per cent of its investment, at US$ 17.3 billion in 2023. China is the third-largest source of foreign direct investment after the US and the European Union. ASEAN's trade in goods with China has increased substantially from US$ 89.3 billion in 2004 to US$ 696.7 billion in 2023.3 ASEAN’s exports to China has increased by more than 55 per cent, with major items like electronic equipment, metals such as ferronickel and stainless steel, coal, plastics, rubber and agricultural products such as palm oil and fruits. At the same time, imports from China has increased by 70 per cent from 2017 to 2022, creating a huge trade imbalance which is equivalent to 4 per cent of ASEAN’s total GDP.4
As trade between ASEAN and China in the 21st century has surged, the region also faces increasing vulnerabilities stemming from its growing economic dependency. China in recent years has been undertaking a more aggressive push into Southeast Asia in order to maintain its position as the primary economic partner. These actions include taking the lead in establishing trade initiatives such as RCEP; deepening supply chain integration, as well as engaging in infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).5
All of the ASEAN member states are formally part of the BRI. In terms of investments under the BRI, transport and logistic sector has been the major recipient followed by energy-related sectors. Under transport and logistics, there is huge BRI investment in the railway sector in Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam. In the energy sector, the China General Nuclear has made a US$ 5.9 billion investment in Malaysia, and Chinese energy entity Zhejiang Hengyi has invested US$ 3.4 billion in Brunei’s oil sector.6
Overall, the scale of infrastructure development and connectivity projects under the BRI has been well received. This is despite some of the ASEAN countries facing persisting issues with China such as frictions stemming from the ongoing contestations in the South China Sea to fear of debt servicing, loss of sovereign rights to Chinese companies, unfair financial and contract terms, and lack of local raw materials and workers being hired by Chinese companies for various projects.7
China’s Interest in Southeast Asia
ASEAN countries have a combined GDP of more than US$ 3.6 trillion, with its global trade projected to be one of the fastest growing sector.8 The region today is a major economic hub which is well integrated into the global value chains with strong links to production networks in China, Japan and Korea. Further, a robust manufacturing sector, a huge consumer market and a number of well-established free trade agreements reinforce ASEAN as an economic powerhouse.9 Therefore, in an unpredictable global economic environment on account of increasing protectionism, wars and conflicts, the region is relatively stable and is seen as an engine of growth. Southeast Asia is geographically located at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region where vital sea lanes makes the region essential for the free flow of trade and commerce.
China has always looked at Southeast Asia as an integral part of its security environment. In the current decade, given its strategic position in the wider Indo-Pacific framework characterised by intensifying geopolitical competition with the US, Beijing has adopted concerted efforts towards strengthening its primacy in Southeast Asia. China’s security interests in the region are also leading to expanding cooperation in the military domain through high-level dialogues, military training and bilateral naval exercises.10 In the post-pandemic period, China’s defence diplomacy activities in Southeast Asia have increased as part of its Global Security Initiative. Through its expanding military engagement in the region, China is attempting to show that it can step up and be an alternative to the US in providing regional security goods.11
As per the latest findings from the 2024 State of Southeast Asia survey, there has been a notable surge in China’s influence. Majority of the respondents say that China has the most influence and strategic power in Southeast Asia. However, given the overlapping maritime claims between China and five other ASEAN countries in the South China Sea and assertive and aggressive tactics by the former has led to deep apprehensions.
Given China’s expanding influence, there remains strong distrust as to whether Beijing would uphold the rules-based order and international law.12 While there are still major pockets of distrust against China within Southeast Asia, their governments remain keen on strengthening economic interactions with Beijing by engaging in projects under the BRI to upgrading the trade agreements such as the ACFTA. At the BRI forum for international cooperation held in October 2023, all leaders of ASEAN member states, except Myanmar and Brunei, attended. The overwhelming participation is indicative of their pragmatic thinking since the region sees developmental initiatives such as the BRI as an enormous opportunity that would help in realising their move towards establishing the ASEAN Economic Community.
Over the decades, Southeast Asian countries have been pragmatic in their approach towards the rise of China by intensifying their economic interactions. This stems from the fact that Southeast Asia is willing to pay a premium for economic security which remains indispensable for their national growth and stability. It is important to note that China sees Southeast Asia not only as a key element in its Global Development Initiative but part of its security-led order through its defence diplomacy.
Conclusion
Southeast Asia in recent decades has been developing rapidly with a huge market growth potential along with a prominent role in the global value chain. This has resulted in Beijing prioritising its outreach to the region especially at a time when there is growing erosion of the global international trade system that has offset its growth. The upgradation of the ACFTA is aimed at mitigating the fall-out of the economic environment which is becoming more complex on account of various external factors. Despite the trust deficit which prevails, the increasing ASEAN–China economic interdependence ensures both sides have a stake in maintaining stability.
Given that the region is at the centre of the highly contested Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asian countries through ASEAN have to navigate through the complex geopolitical environment. Responding to the heightened geopolitical competition, Southeast Asia for regional stability is forced to remain non-aligned and broaden its partnerships with other major powers. While Beijing considers the region to be its backyard and natural sphere of influence, given the primacy it enjoys in Southeast Asia, in recent years, other regional powers along with the US are also imposing their presence in the region by enhancing bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Going forward, the renewed engagement of the US and other major regional powers in Southeast Asia will be critical towards diversifying and re-balancing trade ties, which will reduce the over-dependency on China.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
While resistance efforts in major cities have yet to achieve the success seen in peripheral areas, the junta is unlikely to regain lost territory.
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Introduction
On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s military staged a coup, rejecting the 2020 election results and assuming control of the government, citing election fraud. The coup sparked widespread protests, civil disobedience and armed resistance. Despite international condemnation, the military has maintained power, suspending democratic elections and declaring a state of emergency. A September 2024 UN report states that 5,350 civilians have been killed by the military since the coup.1
Myanmar is one of Southeast Asia's most ethnically diverse countries, home to over 135 recognised ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities such as the Shan, Kachin, Karen, Chin, Mon and Rakhine reside in the seven states, each named after its largest ethnic group.2 These minorities constitute 40 to 60 per cent of the population and occupy nearly half of the country’s territory.3 Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1948, the country has faced persistent insurgencies from ethnic groups seeking autonomy or independence due to grievances over political marginalisation, economic inequality and cultural suppression.4
The presence of powerful non-state armed groups in border regions exacerbates the instability, while the government’s refusal to embrace democratic processes further fuels the conflict.5 In June 2019, three armed groups—the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—formed an alliance called ‘The Three Brotherhood Alliance’.6 The alliance rose to prominence in 2023 in resisting the Burmese junta following the 2021 Myanmar coup d'état. On 27 October 2023, the alliance launched Operation 1027, an offensive against the junta in northern Shan state, bordering China, Laos and Thailand.
By early November, the Brotherhood Alliance announced significant territorial advances, asserting control over more than 100 military bases and several towns. The conflict intensified further in November, extending into both Sagaing, a north-western administrative region, and Rakhine State, located on Myanmar's western coast along the Bay of Bengal and bordering Bangladesh. By January 2024, MNDAA captured Laukkai (Shan State), resulting in the surrender of 2,389 Tatmadaw soldiers. Mid-January 2024 saw additional gains by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which captured Mabein (Shan State) and secured a crucial Tatmadaw base. In June, the conflict escalated with the capture of strategic towns, including Kyaukme in northern Shan State. By July, coordinated assaults by the MNDAA and TNLA yielded further victories, most notably the seizure of Mogok and Lashio (junta’s Northeastern Command base). The alliance and other ‘resistance forces’ have now control over 60 per cent of the country.7
Along with major strategic areas of Shan State, resistance forces control parts of northern Rakhine, Chin, Karen, Karenni, Sagaing and Magway, while in Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Army has captured numerous military positions. Active battles are ongoing in the Mandalay region, particularly around Mandalay city itself, as well as in key towns in northern Shan State. Resistance offensives are advancing into central Myanmar, solidifying their approach towards Mandalay and challenging the junta’s hold on power.
Military setbacks have led to low morale in the Tatmadaw, weakened unit cohesion and increased desertions. The junta's forces have weakened, with troop numbers dropping to 130,000 and auxiliary forces to 70,000.8 Reports note of “unprecedented levels of defection” (numbering nearly 6,000), desertions (a conservative estimate is 15,000).9 While the military's state-run publication, The Global New Light of Myanmar, typically avoids direct acknowledgment of military setbacks, a shift in tone is evident as the military grapples with operational challenges, rising instability and infrastructure attacks across the country. The paper in June 2024 acknowledged that ‘certain states and regions have restricted access due to the presence of anti-government forces’.10 In August 2024, one report noted that senior officers ‘comforted Tatmadaw members and Myanmar Police Force (MPF) members receiving medical treatments for their injuries suffered while serving the defence and security duties of the State’.11 Another article flagged ‘attempts to deteriorate peace and stability in the area of Southern Command’, including blowing up of communication routes, bridges and railways and highlighted efforts of Tatmadaw and MPF in taking measures for ‘ensuring peace and stability of the region’.12
While the Tatmadaw accuses the insurgent groups of using civilians as ‘human shields’,13 rebel forces, pro-democratic groups and international groups such as Amnesty International note that there is increasing reliance on airstrikes and targeting of civilians in conflict zones in the military’s counteroffensive. An investigation by Amnesty International into Myanmar’s military airstrikes on 7 January 2024 revealed the tragic deaths of 17 civilians, including nine children, during an attack near Saint Peter Baptist Church in Kanan village, Sagaing region.14 Despite the Myanmar military denying involvement, evidence—including satellite imagery, witness testimonies and videos—indicates the use of A-5 fighter jets during the attack. According to a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the frequency of airstrikes in Myanmar increased by over 300 per cent from 2021 to 2023.15
By early 2024, given that the rebel groups had seized key border crossings in Shan State and captured strategic military positions in Chin State, the government decided to bolster its military strength through conscription. On 10 February 2024, Myanmar enforced compulsory military service under a 2010 law, requiring men aged 18–35 and women aged 18–27 to serve at least two years, extendable to five during emergencies. Non-compliance can lead to imprisonment. This enforcement followed three months after the launch of ‘OP.1027’.16
Reports of forced recruitment have emerged, with accounts of young men being abducted from urban areas and villagers coerced into military service.17 Human Rights Watch reports that over 1,000 Rohingya Muslim men and boys from Rakhine State were forcibly recruited between February and April 2024.18 There are also reports which note of a significant youth exodus. Human rights groups confirm tens of thousands have fled to avoid military service.19 It has become apparent that the popular support for the junta has weakened.
In September 2024, Myanmar’s military and State Administration Council (SAC) chief invited rebel groups to resolve political issues through “party politics or electoral processes”,20 signaling a reversal from the regime’s previous hardline stance in pursuing dialogue with groups it had previously denounced as ‘terrorists’. In October 2024, though, the SAC reiterated its designation of these rebel and resistance factions as ‘terrorists’. The SAC further issued warnings to international organisations, expressing concerns regarding their potential assistance to armed rebel groups.21
Along with weakened legitimacy, the junta is also facing increasing international pressure to recognise pro-democratic groups. Japan reduced its diplomatic presence in Myanmar in September 2023 by replacing its ambassador with a chargé d’affaires,22 following similar moves by the US, UK and Australia. ASEAN also faces mounting pressure, internally and from neighbouring countries, due to Myanmar’s non-compliance with the bloc’s Five-Point consensus for resolving the conflict. 23 This state-centric approach, which primarily engages with the formal government,24 is increasingly seen as ineffective because the junta has made little progress towards fulfilling the agreement, particularly in halting violence or initiating inclusive dialogue. In the October 2024 ASEAN Summits, the President of the Philippines acknowledged these concerns, stating:
We have to admit that although the Five-Point (Consensus) has been out there since 2021, we have not been very successful in actually improving the situation. So, we are trying to think of new strategies.25
In response to the deteriorating situation, Thailand has taken a proactive step by organising an informal consultation in December 2024.26 The informal nature of this consultation could allow discussions that go beyond the rigid, state-centric approach, potentially engaging non-state actors and local authorities who now hold significant power.
What Lies Ahead
Myanmar is at a critical juncture, with no resolution to the civil war in sight. The ruling junta is facing challenges in sustaining the war efforts amid resource strain and waning public morale. The National Unity Government (NUG) interprets these statements as signs of the regime’s possible collapse, and asserts that genuine dialogue with the military is only possible if it guarantees that ‘it no longer has a role in politics’.27 With anti-junta forces gaining ground, questions linger about whether the different armed groups would continue to fight for the larger cause of a democratic and federal Myanmar. There are also fears of balkanisation of the country.28 While resistance efforts in major cities have yet to achieve the success seen in peripheral areas, the junta is unlikely to regain lost territory, focusing instead on defending critical towns and supply routes. Although anti-junta forces remain disinterested in negotiations and face limited international support, they continue to advocate for a federal democratic structure.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Shia Iran and its proxies have captured Sunni Arab support, notwithstanding the Arab Spring sectarian carnage a decade ago.
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It is curious to note that the ‘jihadist’ tag is almost exclusively given to violent Sunni extremists.1 In fact, Western experts usually use the term ‘militias’ when referring to Shia violent non-state actors and just a few journalists like Danny Postel ever employ the term ‘Shia jihad’.2 In fact, the Arabic term of muqawama (resistance) is now replacing jihad across West Asia and the neologism muqawamist is being used by English-speaking Arab commentators while referring to Iran-backed militancy.3 Deriving its resonance from the Shia ideology of resistance against the ‘oppression’ of Islam’s larger Sunni community, the term is now getting applied to rising pan-Islamist opposition towards the US-Israeli sway over the region.4
The recent popularity and support for Iran-backed Shia groups in the Arab world is remarkable, because it seems to have significantly reduced the intense hate and animosity generated by the Syrian civil war and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) hostilities over the last decade between the Sunni and Shia communities. Today, Sunni states like Salafi Qatar and the Deobandi Taliban regime are coming closer to Shia Iran and have apparently turned away from their old allies—the Salafi jihadists.5 No wonder, ISIS and its global affiliates are now targeting Iran, Russia and Shia groups out of sheer spite and desperation.6
But perhaps Salafi jihadists are themselves to blame for their present predicament. Al-Qaeda and the ISIS always opposed the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and even Hamas for fighting a nationalist Palestinian cause,7 rather than opposing the Westphalian and democratic nation-state system of the so-called ‘taghut’.8 By resorting to indiscriminate violence against civilians (particularly women and children), targeting the existing international political and economic order, by alienating all Western and Eastern countries (even Hanafi Sunni nations and groups like Turkey, Taliban and Hamas), Salafi jihadists are today seen in West Asia as strategically demented doomsday cultists, perpetually baying for blood.9
On the other hand, Iran has projected itself as a pan-Islamist power, and not just a Shia theocracy. By following this strategy, it has managed to extend its influence up to the Mediterranean, and has successfully brought the Lebanon, Syria and Iraq under its hegemonic sway. Unlike unruly Salafi jihadist groups that often turn on their own patrons, Iran has exercised effective command and control over its regional proxies, equipping them with latest know-how in warfare and weaponry as well as the use of sharp power to infiltrate and attack opponents. It has made them competent militias in their own right, fighting regional wars with greater strategic acumen and self-reliance. In fact, the inability of Salafi-jihadists to establish an enduring Islamic State has denied them the ability to promote proxies around the world and is the main cause of their failures.
In comparison to Salafi jihadists and Israel, Iran has also proven to be more adept at running successful media and public relations campaigns that has been able to extinguish the flames of vengeance from its Sunni rivals in the Levant and by targeting mainly military sites in its attacks that has presented it as a more responsible military force to the world thus far. The impact of Iran’s mostly precise intermediate range ballistic missiles and drone attacks—making unprecedented forays into Israeli airspace, undermining its much-vaunted air defence systems and its supposed and still unverified nuclear status—seem to have captured the fancy of demoralised Arab masses, who are blaming Israel and not Iran for the plight of Palestinians, at least for now.
Meanwhile, the theocratic state has also promoted its image as a champion of the developing world, voice of the Global South and supporter of humanitarian causes,10 even though it has conveniently ignored the plight of Uyghur Muslims to please the Chinese government and allegedly oppresses minorities and women within its borders. By focusing solely on the so-called ‘Far Enemy’—the West and Israel—Iran has successfully exploited the anti-liberal political discourse presently popular around the world and has upstaged the myopic Near Enemy outlook of Salafi jihadist groups like ISIS by calling them ‘takfiri’ (Muslims who commit the big sin of accusing fellow Muslims ‘kafir’).11
It is noteworthy that Shia theology like traditional Judaism practised political quietism for centuries as the community patiently awaits the manifestation of its promised saviour (the Divinely Guided Mahdi).12 Again like Zionism, Shia thinkers and clergy started advocating militant activism only in modern times, as Red Shiism of Shariati culminated into the Khomeini-led Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979.
According to Shia tradition, only the most senior theologians (mujtahids), have the authority to declare a ‘defensive’ jihad, while only the 12th or ‘hidden’ Imam—who the Shia believe is still alive after disappearing 1,100 years ago—will declare an ‘offensive’ jihad on his return.13 Although most orthodox Sunni jurists also advocate defensive jihad, modern-day jihadists like Qutb, Faraj and Zawahiri ridicule the difference between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ warfare,14 with ISIS being particularly notorious in killing the so-called Shia ‘Rafida’ (Rejectors of the First Three Pious Caliphs).15
The moot question here is how long Iran and its three main proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthis—sustain their ongoing campaign in West Asia? Can the Islamic Republic of Iran depend on Russian and Chinese support for a favourable resolution of the present conflict? Will the highly demoralised and weakened Arab states, that continue to suffer from the so-called Stockholm syndrome, switching loyalties from one regional hegemon to the other—championing the slogans of Abraham Accords and non-sectarian pan-Islamism in the same breath—ever hold their own? However, even in the current context of the beleaguered Arab states, continuing internecine sectarian feud and ever-escalating regional conflicts, the declining Salafi-jihadist threat can be discounted only at one’s own peril.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Armenia hosted the 28th World Congress on Innovation and Technology (WCIT) from 4 to 7 October 2024, with issues relating to artificial intelligence being the key theme.
Armenia hosted the 28th World Congress on Innovation and Technology (WCIT) from 4 to 7 October 2024. The theme of this year's Congress was ‘The Power of the Mind: AI Beyond Limits, Within Ethics’. The Congress focused on the role of Artificial Intelligence (AI), ethical innovation, Green AI, AI for crisis management and eco-friendly technologies among other topics.1 Armenia had previously hosted the Congress in October 2019. The WCIT is one of the oldest technology conferences and some of the largest companies participate in this conference. India had hosted the WCIT in 2018 in Hyderabad, which was inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi through video conference.
Armenia’s tech industry contributes around 5 per cent to the country’s GDP and is one of the fastest growing sectors of its economy registering an annual growth of 20 per cent with a steady growth rate at 41.4 per cent annually. Armenia’s Minister of High-Tech Industry, Mkhitar Hayrapetyan stated that the country “is focusing on high technologies and information technologies as the most important pillars of economic development.”2
The Congress focused on the technological component of the innovation industry, particularly the production of semiconductors for high-speed information processing and energy efficiency.3 The Congress also discussed the Global Network of Artificial Intelligence, which connects six continents and promotes innovation and development in artificial intelligence.4 As per the organisers, the Congress was meant to showcase Armenia as a developed IT country and to ensure that Armenian companies are connected to the foreign markets.5
One of the major highlights of the Congress was the announcement of the launch of Starlink in Armenia. Starlink has been used by various nations, including Ukraine, during its conflict with Russia. The WCIT sessions held in 2019 and 2024 have been backed by the Armenian government, the Union of Advanced Technology Enterprises (UATE)6 , and the World Innovation Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA).7
It is pertinent to note that Soviet electronics and military hardware industries had a significant presence in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR).8 Many institutes such as the Yerevan Computer Research Institute were established. Armenian factories were involved in the making of various radio electronics, space communication devices and automated control units.9 The Armenians were also involved in the making of military tech items such as rocket launchers and parts used in submarines and ships. During the Soviet period, Armenia was responsible for 30 to 40 per cent of electronic and computer components of the Soviet defence and aerospace industries.10
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large number of Armenians left the country and began immigrating to various parts of the globe. This exodus delayed the nation's aspirations in the field of technology. The ‘ArmTech’ Congress organised in 2007 in San Francisco to engage the global Armenian community was a key event to ensure the engagement of Armenian-born start-up companies seeking investments and partnerships. In 2008, a 10-year roadmap for technology was announced.11 The main focus of the 10-year roadmap was on developing the telecommunications and business incubation infrastructure, improving the quality and quantity of tech graduates, increasing support and financing mechanisms for tech start-ups.12
By 2011, the first major investor in Armenian tech initiatives was Microsoft, leading to the launch of the Microsoft Innovation Centre. This joint project saw cooperation between the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Microsoft Corporation and EIF.13 The Centre has trained about 12,500 students and ensured an 84 per cent employment success rate, with some of the students working in companies like XCloud Networks, Volo and Bluenet.
This was followed by the launching of the PicsArt company in 2011 by an Armenian-American entrepreneur Hovhannes Avoyan with headquarters in both Yerevan and San Francisco. This is seen as the first major investment of a tech company in Armenia. Following this, an agreement for a research centre of Intel was signed in 2012.14
The 2014 ‘Law on Technology Advancements’ allowed tax exemptions for companies focused on the IT sector. It ensured exemptions for companies that employed more than 30 people and a preferential reduction in the income tax to 10 per cent, instead of the general tax bracket which ranged from 23 per cent to 36 per cent,15 2017 also saw the fastest growth of the Armenian IT sector when it expanded by 20 per cent over the previous year.
In 2018, the Velvet Revolution changed Armenia's political structure, with the new leadership under Nicol Pashinyan. During the protests, many youths (under 30), popularly known as the ‘Independence Generation’ from the tech sector, came out in support of Pashinyan, thus showing a deep connection of the tech sector to the domestic political context. Under Pashinyan, from 2018 until now, the nation has seen some significant policy changes, ranging from political and economic and particularly in foreign policy, amidst the regional turmoil (Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia–Ukraine conflicts).
The first significant tech initiative of the Pashinyan government was in 2019 when it hosted a delegation from Index Ventures, an international venture capital firm focusing on tech investments, including e-commerce, gaming, infrastructure and intelligence and security.16 The meeting ensured that Index Ventures provided funding to start-ups like Embry, Retention Force and D’efekt. Nina Achadjian, a partner of Index Ventures who has invested in these companies, is also of Armenian origin and is the founder of Hive Ventures, the first seed venture fund focusing on Armenian entrepreneurs.
The government has faced many challenges on the regional front, especially the resumption of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020. However, these developments have not deterred tech advancement and development. In 2021, the tech wave saw significant investments, accumulating US$ 200 million dollars from domestic companies.17 The same year saw PicsArt become the first Armenian-based company to become the first tech unicorn.18 In 2022, the tech industry also saw more entries from early-stage venture capital funds groups including Zoomerang, Mythrill and BlueQubit.
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has also boosted the Armenian tech industry. The conflict ensured an influx of Russians, and to a lesser extent, Ukrainians and Belarussian tech experts, into Armenia. In 2023, about 60,000 Russians remained in Armenia out of the 100,000 Russians who entered in 2022, most of whom were IT experts.19 Russian companies have also expanded or opened their offices in Armenia, such as Miro, thus ensuring more employment opportunities for the local Armenian population. The Russian influx into Armenia and the shift of the Russian companies has been seen as a positive for the Armenian tech industry and could contribute to the overall advancement and investments in the industry.
In January 2024, the newly appointed Minister of the tech industry Mkhitar Hayrapetyan highlighted that the tech and military industries would collaborate. The draft strategy for developing science and technology was presented on 4 March 2024. Focus areas include artificial intelligence and machine learning, microelectronics, advanced robotics, quantum technologies, biotechnology and sciences, which contain educational, scientific and industrial components.20 The government will create working groups to promote and develop these areas and increase the efficiency of investments for tech in Armenia.
Hayrapetyan was a former minister of diaspora under Pashinyan. This may ensure a strong connection between the diaspora and the government on tech. There is also focus on improving the connections between the educational system and the tech industry. The University-Private Sector Cooperation for Training Specialists in 2020 by the Ministry of High-Tech Industry is one such effort. The initiative seeks to create educational programmes in collaboration with universities and technology companies.
The Armenian tech industry has withstood various challenges ranging from the economic slowdown in 2014–16, the political instability and revolution in 2018, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war and its aftereffects since 2020, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The two WCIT conferences are a testament to Armenia’s tech aspirations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Freedom Party of Austria’s (FPÖ) performance in the 2024 general elections reinforces the broader trend of the continental shift favouring a Eurosceptic and far-right worldview.
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The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) emerged as the largest party in the 2024 general elections, winning over 28 per cent of total votes (almost 13 per cent more than the previous election).1 The Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) secured around 26 per cent of the vote share followed by Social Democrats with 21 per cent, the New Austrians with 9 per cent, and Greens with 8 per cent.2 President Alexander Van der Bellen has entrusted Chancellor Karl Nehammer’s government with administrative duties (as a caretaker administration) until a new leader assumes charge. Notably, the Austrian constitution does not specify a time period within which a new government must be formed after election results are announced. It could vary depending on the pace and success (or failure) of negotiations between various parties.
The FPÖ was founded by Anton Reinthaller, a former SS Officer associated with the Nazi party.3 It was part of coalition governments in 2000 and during 2017–2019. While its primary support base is made up of people between the age of 35 and 59,4 it also acquired the largest support this year from a critical voting bloc—the youth and those part of the labour force—voters under 35. This development has spurred a wave of celebration among other far-right figures5 across Europe like Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orbán.
FPO’s performance shows that Austria’s political landscape is aligned with the broader shift to the far-right across Europe, with hardening anti-migrant rhetoric. Across Hungary, Italy, France and Germany, far-right politicians are steadily gaining ground amid the growing popularisation of conspiracy theories through social media, such as the Great Replacement6 and concepts such as Remigration.7 The recent policy measures introduced by the EU regarding immigration,8 which human rights organisations have decried, is a testament to disenchantment with the liberal democratic governance and globalisation.
These trends have been supplemented by a resurgence of tribalism9 and nationalism, rejection of multiculturalism, widening socio-economic marginalisation and misinformation and disinformation that have become rampant on social media platforms. As has been observed since the 1800s, far-right and populist policies have gained momentum following a period of upheaval or crisis. Concerns regarding the viability of the Bretton Woods system and rising immigration levels across Europe, which had begun simmering mainly after the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis, boiled over after the COVID-19 outbreak.
As parties across the continent faced backlash for the lockdown measures and imposition of vaccination drives, the locals’ disgruntlement and skepticism about the implications of COVID-19 vaccines and handling of the health crisis grew louder. The anti-government sentiments festered as governments found themselves increasingly challenged at countering the false narratives about the lockdown measures and vaccines being promoted by conspiracy theorists rampantly.
Austria was no exception to the pushback felt across the continent against vaccine mandates,10 and the far-right conservatives sought to capitalise on the resentment felt deeply by the populace in order to secure electoral benefits. The measure to impose a fine—ranging from 600 to 3,600—on those adults refusing vaccination, despite being quickly shelved, had evidently generated significant hostility among the people on the ground.
Furthermore, the paranoia generated by FPÖ about Muslim immigrants outnumbering the majority population, failure of these immigrants to assimilate into the national culture, and potential Islamist radicalisation, potentially contributed to its recent success. It would not be improbable to assume that the projections by the Austrian Academy of Science that Muslims could comprise 12 to 21 per cent11 of the Austrian society by 2046, would have exacerbated the anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric that has extensively been propounded by far-right parties such as FPÖ as part of its Fortress Austria platform.12
At the same time, the rising cost of living and gas prices and socio-economic crisis have worked in FPÖ’s favour. In the background of the Ukraine conflict and Austria’s dependence on Russian gas (surpassing the EU average), inflation and total household expenditures will surge as the bloc doubles down on Austrian consumption of Russian gas. Notably, FPÖ has argued favourably about continuing the purchase of Russian gas despite European attempts to diversify since 2022.13
Key Considerations
The possibility of the Social Democrats combining with ÖVP and other smaller parties like Greens to form an alternative coalition government to prevent the FPÖ from assuming office has been discussed. President Van der Bellen has proposed14 that ÖVP enter into a coalition government with Social Democrats. However, such ideologically opposing movements would find themselves at odds over key domestic and foreign policy issues and could bolster the FPO’s capacity to emerge much stronger moving forward. The ÖVP, The New Austria, Social Democratic Party, among others, profess differing views on issues such as immigration, climate change, economic policies and multiculturalism.15 In the event a pan-ideological coalition government takes charge, there seems little to suggest that it would be able to curb the rise of the far-right FPÖ while maintaining a consensus on policy issues. The FPÖ and the ÖVP came together as allies in a coalition government in 2000 and then in 2017.
Any political party hoping to enter into a coalition government would require to muster at least 92 out of 183 seats in the National Council (Legislature). At the moment, the FPÖ has the largest vote share with 57 seats. The ÖVP has 51 seats, the Social Democrats 41 seats, the New Austria Party 18 seats, followed by Greens with 16 seats.16 It remains to be seen whether the centre-right ÖVP will come to the aid of the FPÖ in exchange for concessions that involve a stake beyond the Chancellery.17
One of the key concessions, which seems unlikely at the moment, would require FPÖ’s leader, Herbert Kickl, to be sidelined from the subsequent coalition government. His party ran the campaign with him as Austria’s future leader. Simultaneously, he could step aside from claims to leadership in the government, based on the precedent established by the party’s previous head, Jörg Haider, in 2000, while exercising power through a proxy. If no coalition government can be proposed, the country and its leaders could be thrust into another round of elections.
If negotiations between other political parties falter, Austria might find itself breaking ranks with the rest of the European Union members regarding the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The FPÖ has been critical of the sanctions against President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials due to the Ukraine crisis. This makes Kickl’s party one of the few pro-Russian political factions in Europe. FPÖ’s potential presence in a future government would be perceived as another concerning development following Robert Fico’s victory in Slovakia last year. Fico had also campaigned on an anti-Ukrainian narrative. Furthermore, FPÖ has envisaged remodelling Austria as per the model of governance practiced in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. Several EU parliamentarians have criticised18 the erosion of liberal democracy under Orbán’s leadership and, therefore, would want Austria to presumably avoid the same fate.
Conclusion
It remains to be seen whether the FPÖ can convert the zeitgeist favouring far-right populism to emerge as the single-largest party and form a government without external support following the next elections. This is because, despite the Austrian tilt towards the far-right over the past several years, some key factors continue hindering the far-right from sweeping into power single-handedly with a majority stake. This includes the stark reminders of the policies enacted during the Nazi era, continued resistance (with its ebbs and flows) by political and civil society actors against cooperating with the far-right across Europe, and a largely pro-Ukrainian worldview among Europeans. Widespread protests, with numbers ranging between 15,000 and 17,000,19 were held in Vienna to express outrage against the far-right’s victory and to display resistance to Kickl’s ambition to sweep into power. These trends indicate that the FPÖ has challenges in its path of power and unless significant compromises can be made on its ideological platform and tangible assurances given to the public, it is unlikely to secure a stake in the government in the immediate future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Ethiopia's foreign policy priorities in the Horn of Africa on maritime access and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam have fuelled tensions with both Somalia and Egypt.
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On 8 September 2024, during National Sovereignty Day, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed asserted that Ethiopia’s name is synonymous with freedom and dignity. He reaffirmed that the country has never initiated aggression against others throughout its history but has bravely defended its sovereignty against numerous threats.1 This assertion comes at a time of growing tensions in the Horn of Africa, particularly as Ethiopia seeks avenues for maritime access and Egypt opposes the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt is also forging new regional alliances. Cairo signed a defence pact with Somalia in August 2024.2 It has also deployed soldiers to Somalia as part of the new African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia,3 further underscoring shifting regional dynamics and rising tensions.
Strategic Realignments and Rising Animosity
The Ethiopia–Somaliland agreement on 1 January 2024, has reshaped strategic interests across the Horn of Africa, prompting Somalia to reassess its diplomatic and defence strategies. Ethiopia’s actions have spurred Somalia to actively pursue new alliances to counterbalance Addis Ababa’s expanding regional footprint. Central to this effort is Somalia’s deepening defence cooperation with regional countries starting with Turkey, marked by the signing of new agreements aimed at strengthening its military capacity amid growing regional uncertainty.4 Turkey also has a good relationship with Ethiopia and is mediating between the two countries.5 The possibility of Turkey taking antagonistic positions against either Ethiopia or Somalia is, therefore, unlikely.
The more significant development is Somalia’s evolving relationship with Egypt, which carries broader geopolitical ramifications. Egypt has expressed its intention to deploy troops in Somalia, officially under the pretext of combating the Al-Qaeda-linked group Al-Shabaab. Yet, the strategic impact of an Egyptian military presence in the Horn extends far beyond counterterrorism. For Cairo, this move serves two purposes: solidifying its influence in Somalia, signalling its resolve to challenge Ethiopia’s growing dominance in the region and forcing it to return to negotiations.
Somalia’s growing ties with Egypt, coupled with its expanding relations with Eritrea, another historical adversary of Ethiopia, suggests a broader realignment. The foreign ministers of Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia met on the sidelines of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York to discuss their common strategic goals, underscoring this trilateral alignment.6
The growing cooperation was further reinforced on 10 October 2024, when the leaders of Somalia, Egypt and Eritrea convened in Asmara, Eritrea, and issued a joint communiqué.7 While the official discourse centered on the protection of Somalia’s sovereignty and stability, the subtext indicated a concerted effort to challenge Ethiopia’s regional influence.
Ethiopia’s concerns have deepened with Eritrea’s involvement in the evolving alliance. The suspension of Ethiopian Airlines flights to Eritrea8 on 3 September, attributed to ‘difficult operating conditions’, reflects the worsening diplomatic ties between the two neighbours. Although Addis Ababa and Asmara cooperated temporarily during the Tigray War (2020–2022), their post-war relationship has reverted to historic rivalries.9 The Eritrean leadership also fears that Ethiopia harbours ambitions to reclaim access to Eritrean ports, which it lost when Eritrea gained independence in 1993.
Ethiopia's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa is shaped by two primary objectives: securing maritime access and safeguarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). These priorities have fuelled tensions with both Somalia and Egypt, as the latter intensifies efforts to obstruct the dam's progress. Egypt views Somalia as a strategic ally to counter Ethiopia’s ambitions on both fronts. Cairo's increasingly assertive rhetoric and military activities have elevated the risk of conflict, compounded by its recent military cooperation agreement with Somalia. Within a month, Egypt supplied Mogadishu with two shipments of military equipment, with Somali Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur publicly expressing gratitude for the support10 . In the coming months, the strategic competition between Cairo and Addis Ababa is expected to escalate, potentially drawing both regional and external actors into the conflict.
Assessment
Ethiopia plays an indispensable role in stabilising Somalia, driven by the need to secure its borders and combat the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Given Somalia’s persistent fragility, Ethiopia has supported regional governance structures in Somaliland and Puntland, creating buffer zones11 to shield itself from terrorist threats while consolidating its influence. Over the years, Ethiopia’s continued involvement in Somalia’s peacekeeping efforts has made it an important actor.
Ethiopia was the driving force behind the ‘building blocks’ approach, which facilitated the introduction of federalism in Somalia. In 1998, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs articulated this strategy in a position paper, asserting that 'local administrative structures could constitute building blocks' for the restoration of the Somali state. However, Egypt’s recent proposal to deploy 5,000 troops to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and an additional 5,000 troops on a bilateral basis has raised concerns in Ethiopia, which views Cairo’s growing presence as a potential challenge to its influence and strategic interests.12
Moreover, General Michael Langley of AFRICOM referred to Ethiopia as an "anchor state", emphasising its vital contributions to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Ethiopian forces, particularly in Southwest State, have been instrumental in driving Al-Shabaab out of key areas and fostering stability.13 Beyond security engagement, Ethiopia’s involvement in strengthening local governance structures has helped prevent the spread of extremism. Without Ethiopia’s sustained engagement, Somalia would likely face a dangerous security vacuum, jeopardising not only Somalia’s stability but also the security of the wider Horn of Africa.
Second, the federal system in Somalia, long beset by challenges in maintaining unity, is now facing heightened pressure. Several semi-autonomous regions, including Puntland, Jubaland14 and Southwest State, oppose Egypt’s deployment of troops and instead align with Ethiopia.15 Tensions within the federal system have deepened, as evidenced by Puntland’s recent declaration that it will operate as an independent government until Somalia's federal constitution is finalised.
It is important to note that the constitutional disagreements are also influenced by clan dynamics. The Hawiye clans, dominant in central and southern Somalia, especially in the greater Mogadishu area, tend to favour a unitary state. In contrast, the Darod clans, influential in Puntland and Jubaland, strongly support federalism. These two clans have shaped Somalia’s political landscape since the post-conflict period, with their divergent visions often driving political competition. To resolve these persistent disputes, Somalia requires a comprehensive constitutional revision followed by a nationwide referendum.16 Without such measures, tensions between the federal government and its member states are likely to persist. If unresolved, these political divisions spanning both the federal and clan levels could become a major source of instability, especially in the post-ATMIS era.
Third, Uganda, another key player in the region, has also voiced scepticism. Uganda’s State Minister for International Affairs, Henry Okello Oryem, questioned why Egypt is only now seeking to join the mission. “The TCCs are asking, why does Egypt want to join now? Where have they been all this time?”, he remarked, highlighting the concerns of other troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Meanwhile, the European Union (EU), the primary donor to African Union (AU) missions in Somalia, has expressed a neutral stance but emphasised the need for participating countries to focus entirely on combating al-Shabaab.17
Fourth, Somalia has emerged as Egypt's key ally in countering Ethiopia since the start of the Sudanese civil war, which has weakened Egypt's influence in Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have supported Egypt’s position on the GERD since Sudan is also a downstream country on the Nile. The historical rivalries and current political situations between Ethiopia and Egypt contribute to ongoing tensions, with the Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) acting as a trigger for recent escalations. However, it is not the main cause of the conflict. If Somalia becomes a battleground in the dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt, this could have serious negative effects on the entire region.
Finally, in order to prevent the situation from escalating into a broader regional conflict, it is important to restart peace negotiations. Somalia could consider reopening discussions through established mediators like Turkey, which has previously facilitated talks between the two countries. Alternatively, the African Union could play a mediating role to help prevent further escalation. Experience from Sudan shows that outside interference can worsen conflicts, as external powers often prioritise their own interests over long-term stability.18 It is crucial for African nations to address these tensions internally rather than letting external parties influence the situation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The euphoria following Claudia Sheinbaum’s swearing in as the first woman president of Mexico is reflective of the people’s expectations from her.
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Claudia Sheinbaum was sworn in as the first woman President of Mexico on 1 October 2024. Sheinbaum was the Mayor of Mexico City prior to her election as president. She succeeds Andrés Manuel López Obrador, popularly known as AMLO, whose approval ratings has never been less than 60 per cent.1 Both Obrador and Sheinbaum belong to the democratic left-wing Morena Party that was founded and nurtured by AMLO. Obrador had to demit office due to Mexico’s constitutional limit on presidential terms.
Sheinbaum campaigned as a candidate for ‘continuity with change’,2 and secured 60.7 per cent of the vote share in a landslide victory.3 She improved the Morena party tally both in terms of vote percentage and the number of seats acquired in the two houses of the Mexican Parliament. Obrador had secured about 53 per cent of the popular votes in 2018.4 Sheinbaum also achieved a supermajority in the Lower House (Chamber of Deputies) of the Parliament, falling just three seats short in the Upper House (Senate). Given that two opposition senators flipped to her side recently, she needs to convince only one more member to make any constitutional changes.5
For a party (Morena) which began as a social movement in 2011 and formally registered with the National Electoral Institute (INE) only in 2014, the two consecutive presidential victories successively improving parliamentary seat tallies are nothing short of a historic and meteoric rise. The stage for Mexico to get its first woman president was almost set when another woman Xóchitl Gálvez became the presidential candidate of the main opposition, a coalition of the traditional old parties—National Action Party (PAN), Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).
President Sheinbaum in the past had worked as a climate scientist representing Mexico in the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). She was a member of the panel when it received the Nobel Prize in 2007. Given her administrative and technocratic experiences, there are expectations that there could be improvements on policies related to the economy, war against narcotics, militarisation and climate change. She portrayed herself as a candidate who will continue AMLO’s legacy with changes, promising Mexicans a non-discriminatory and investor-friendly government.
Economic Policies
Sheinbaum inherits successes of AMLO’s economic interventions that has brought poverty to a historic low (36.3 per cent in 2022) bringing millions out of poverty.6 The average income of the people has increased while the minimum wage has doubled.7 However, the number of people in extreme poverty and inadequate access to health have also increased.8 The public expenditure in the country is at an all-time high and fiscal deficit is at its highest (5.9 per cent) in the last four decades.9 Sheinbaum has promised not only to continue AMLO’s direct cash schemes to the poor Mexicans but also to expand the net and bring in those who are still outside.
Sheinbaum seems determined to adhere to fiscal discipline which was not under control in the later part of the AMLO administration.10 Given the expectations of the people with rising government expenditure, it may be challenging for her to balance the promise of bringing the fiscal deficit down to 3.5 per cent and make Mexico attractive for further investments.11 The Mexican Peso saw further decline with President Sheinbaum reaffirming continuation of the economic policies of her predecessor.12 Her economic and political astuteness is to be tested as the US, Spain and Canada and several other countries are wary of the policies of the Morena party.
Constitutional Amendments
AMLO had pushed for 18 constitutional changes which he could not implement in the absence of the required two-thirds majority in both the houses. Electing the judiciary, integrating National Guard with the defence ministry, eliminating proportional representation in parliament, ending autonomy of several constitutional agencies were the most controversial proposals among them.13 But the elections in June 2024 provided him the opportunity to carry out these changes with the support of President elect Sheinbaum. He enacted the judicial as well National Guard reforms through constitutional amendments in the last month of his tenure before handing over the reins of government to his protégé.
The changes in judiciary recruitment have been intensely criticised by both professionals as well as members of the civil society. They do not expect any immediate change on the issue as Sheinbaum has initiated for secondary legislations to implement the reforms. She wants the electoral laws to be amended in line with the constitution so that the people could henceforth elect their judges from bottom to the top level of the judiciary.14 The reforms have been highly divisive with concerns that the judiciary could be influenced by criminal groups, money power and electoral politics. Although the Supreme Court has accepted to consider a constitutional challenge to the enacted judicial reforms,15 Sheinbaum's role and the outcome of the whole reform process will be keenly watched. The agenda for constitutional amendments is long and provocative, ranging from constitutionalising health, rights of indigenous people, new electoral powers, to expanding scope of preventive custody, etc. The bottom-line of these amendments is generally read as centralising of powers and more fiscal burden for the state.
War against Narcotic Drugs and Militarisation
Mexico is experiencing a political and economic paradigm shift with the popularity of Morena party, and the momentum continues with President Sheinbaum. However, party policies on the issues of security and law and order have not received the expected applause even from quarters that are appreciative of the developmental successes of the Morena party. The party has been accused of continuing militarisation of the state, contrary to the promise made by AMLO when he was campaigning for his election.16 The presence of the military in the civilian domain has only increased. The military has been handed over many civilian functions to keep the state machinery efficient. The number of homicides in Mexico has been higher than the years before AMLO, while violence by drug cartels continues unabashedly.17 The recent elections also saw killings of many candidates by criminal gangs to influence the outcomes of the electoral process.
Drug cartels and disappearances of many citizens and migrants is a pandemic in Mexico. AMLO had promised to address the problem and put the military off the streets. People in Mexico believe that elements of military and police are complicit with the drug and criminal cartels responsible for these disappearances,18 while AMLO is strengthening them. Civil society and social groupings in Mexico, especially the feminist groups, are unhappy with the government policy of militarisation to deal with the problem. To them, the cause cannot be the remedy, and they expect Sheinbaum to prioritise the issue of disappearances, putting the military and police under question for their complicity or failure. Bringing violence and disappearances down, especially against the women, is another daunting task before the new president.
Feminist and Environmental Policies
Mexico takes pride in its identity of a country with a feminist foreign policy, which is now under a woman for the first time.19 Sheinbaum, in her campaign as well as the inaugural speech, has put extra emphasis on her being a woman president. Ironically, violence against women in Mexico is rampant despite women being active, visible and functional at all the levels of society. AMLO had publicly fallen out with the feminist groups of the country on the issue of violence and disappearances. It is to be seen how President Sheinbaum responds to these criticisms and translates her promises into action.
Sheinbaum’s policies relating to the environment will be keenly watched. She is known for aligning with President Obrador’s hydrocarbon policies. However, in her first public speech on Zocalo square after being sworn in as President, she assured a return to energy transition policies discontinued by her predecessor. She promised a 45 per cent share of renewable sources in electricity production by 2030.20
Conclusion
The euphoria following Sheinbaum’s swearing in as the first woman president of Mexico is reflective of the people’s expectations from her. She faces many challenges, though. On the economic front, these include the welfarist benchmarks left by AMLO. As the first female president who was also an environment scientist, her policies relating to energy transition and countering violence against women will be keenly watched. Sheinbaum has a difficult task of bridging the euphoria and reality, as Obrador has left office with historic popularity but at the cost of fiscal balance and civilian control. She has not come up with a clear policy against militarisation of the Mexican society, and it seems it will be difficult for her to shake off the tag of continuity, except on the issue of energy transition.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The results of Mozambique’s presidential elections have key implications not only for regional security in southern Africa but also for India’s quest for energy security.
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On 9 October 2024, Mozambicans voted in the country’s presidential elections in which the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), is expected to maintain its grip on power since gaining independence from Portugal in 1975. The incumbent President Filipe Nyusi is stepping down after two terms and the party’s candidate—Daniel Chapo—is expected to replace him. His main opponents are Ossufo Momade of the largest opposition party the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), Lutero Simango from the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), and Venancio Mondlane, an independent candidate who has a strong base among young Mozambicans. The principal issues for the electorate include poverty, youth unemployment, government corruption and the challenge of addressing insurgency and restoring stability in Cabo Delgado province.
Mozambique is a coastal and resource-rich country in southern Africa situated along the Mozambique Channel, a key maritime chokepoint in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It is key transit and trading hub which connects the Indian Ocean to the world but is often overlooked as a global maritime chokepoint.1 The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 reduced the Mozambique Channel’s significance to global commerce. However, the recent discovery of 100 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the Rovuma basin and huge coal reserves has renewed major powers’ interest in the region.2 The discovery prompted the prospects of earning gas revenues and achieve sustainable economic development.
Genesis of Civil War in Cabo Delgado
Unfortunately, since October 2017, the humanitarian situation in northern Mozambique has been alarmingly deteriorating, triggered by escalating armed Islamist insurgency. Jihadist group Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama’a (ASJW) continues to target Mozambican security establishment in response to grinding poverty, a deep sense of marginalisation, and inequality among locals and elites. The objectives of ASJW, locally known as ‘Al Shabaab’, are clear—to establish a society ruled by the Islamic law (Sharia) and gain access to resources and power.
The capture of the port city Mocimboa da Praia and the 2021 attacks in Palma, which is the center of TotalEnergies’ planned US$ 20 billion liquified natural gas (LNG) project on the Afungi peninsula, has been a cause of serious concern.3 Even ExxonMobil has a nearby project that is currently on hold. Initially, Rwandan troops were deployed to secure the peninsula followed by troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), faced several challenges such as outdated military equipment, funding constraint, lack of coordination with the Rwandan forces.4 This eventually led to the decision to withdraw the mission in July 2024.
Mozambique’s insurgency was borne out of resentment over the Cabo Delgado region’s poverty.5 The region is “a resource treasure trove, boasting Africa’s largest gas reserve”, huge deposits of ruby, and graphite mines that Tesla has been sourcing from since 2021. The exclusion of local communities, especially Muslim Mwani and Mauka, from economic opportunities led to marginalisation which is symbolised by the LNG project. Instead of opting to mine less and create a viable developmental path, the Mozambican government chose to militarise the situation. They are focusing on raw extractivism and achieving short-term gains rather than addressing more complex developmental root causes.6
Who is Daniel Chapo?
Media houses are touting Daniel Chapo, a 47-year-old politician and governor of Inhambane province for the past eight years as the new kid in the old block. He has formerly been a radio host and a law lecturer and is a newcomer in the political scene. Although FRELIMO’s dominance in Mozambique’s political scene make Chapo the favourite to win the election, several challenges persist.
His government will have to deal with the fallout of the ‘tuna bond’ corruption scandal which trigged Mozambique’s worst economic crisis.7 The Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), leaders of opposition parties, and Mozambique’s National Electoral Commission (CNE) have all previously criticised the lack of transparency and irregularities in the electoral process. However, the biggest challenge for the new administration will be to address the jihadist insurgency, particularly in northern Mozambique.
Following SAMIM’s withdrawal of troops, insurgents have taken advantage of the security vacuum leading to an uptick in violence and displacement of people. The attack on the town of Mocomia on 10 May 2024 resulted in almost 700 people fleeing and 10 soldiers losing their lives.8 The threat of violence from insurgents continues to disrupt daily life. Therefore, Mozambique’s new president must take few necessary steps.
Since Rwanda is currently leading the counter-insurgency efforts, it is necessary to provide more transparency about the terms of the arrangement between Mozambique and Rwanda which is not available in the public domain. Mozambique’s new government must also take into account army reforms more seriously if it wants its security forces to eventually to take over from Rwanda.9 Finally, the drivers of conflict, including the Cabo Delgado province’s enduring socio-economic problems, must be addressed.
Whoever wins the President election will inherit an Islamist insurgency in the country’s north, which has halted multi-billion-dollar gas projects and displaced thousands of people. Whether Daniel Chapo’s administration demonstrates continuity in its approach to solving security challenges or makes any noteworthy changes remains to be seen.
Implications for India’s energy security
In many ways, India’s quest for resource and energy security is a primary driver of growing engagement with countries such as Mozambique. The Indian government is attempting to diversify its sourcing of LNG and subsequently reduce its energy reliance on the Middle East. Mozambique’s strategic location along the Indian Ocean and the fact that it’s only a three-day journey from India makes Mozambique an ideal candidate to meet India’s growing fuel needs. Three Indian Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) led by ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) hold 30 per cent stake in the marquee Rovuma Offshore Area 1 project.10 With investments amounting to US$ 20 billion, it represents India’s single-largest investment in Africa.
However, the venture has been beset with difficulties after the suspension of operations in April 2021 following attacks by Islamist insurgents in the coastal town of Palma. Rwandan troops along with its Mozambican counterparts have been able to normalise the security situation in the region to an extent although pockets of violent incidents continue to take place. Political uncertainty is the primary risk to the project. Additionally, there are speculations as to whether major extractive contracts will be revised, which has spooked investors. Despite the setback, it seems the project is set for resumption with TotalEnergies head Patrick Pouyanne stating that “nearly 80 percent of the $14 billion financial package underpinning the project has been confirmed by lenders”.11
Reports in Indian media indicate that the project is likely to resume operations this year, following the election of possibly Daniel Chapo, as the new president.12 He has clearly stated his intention to simultaneously work with Mozambique’s LNG investors and partners and combat the scourge of terrorism in Cabo Delgado province.13 For India, this is good news. Recent visits to Mozambique by External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Hardeep Singh Puri is indicative of India’s interest in the early resumption and monetisation of the project by Indian PSUs.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Sahel has supplanted West Asia and North Africa as the region worst affected by terrorism.
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Al-Qaeda has begun increasingly replicating the tactics employed by its Salafi-jihadi rival, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS), in Africa’s Sahel region, especially so in Mali and Burkina Faso by relying on powerful affiliates like Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). It has done so to revitalise its ideological appeal and rejuvenate its primacy in the global jihadi fold, even as ISIS has remained the deadliest terror group for the ninth consecutive year.
Given the global geopolitical flux animated by the great power rivalry between the United States and China, escalating conflicts in West Asia and Ukraine, and strong opposition to presence of foreign military presence, terrorism hotspots like Sahel can expect to encounter growing instability. These factors are bound to create a conducive ecosystem for terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and their affiliates to inflict more violence than before. The deteriorating security conditions have been matched by the regional military juntas’ faltering responses to the security challenges. These regimes have not translated their rhetoric and proclamations at international forums1 into credible deterrent actions against terrorism-related activities.
Breakdown of Security in Sahel
The regional landscape presents complex challenges. The jihadi activities that have kept Burkina Faso embroiled in heightened insecurity since August 2015 have gradually destabilised its neighbouring country, Mali. According to the Global Terrorism Index Report 2024,2 Burkina Faso and Mali are the first and third most affected countries due to terrorism-related activities, respectively. Additionally, with 26 per cent of all terrorism-related incidents and nearly 50 per cent of all deaths last year due to such incidents, Sahel has supplanted West Asia and North Africa as the region worst affected by terrorism.
The announcement by the military chiefs of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali in August 2024 about establishing a task force, the Alliance of Sahel States, to counter the terrorism threat plaguing their countries has remained limited to verbal proclamations until now. There is no clarity as yet about the specifications of the mandate, long and short-term goals, binding commitments and strategy. Mercenary groups like Wagner or Africa Corps,3 meanwhile, whose deployment was intended to stabilise Sahelian countries, have found it beyond their capability to fight back against assaults launched by terrorist groups lately.
These trends indicate the relevance of the warning bells that the United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, sounded at the beginning of this year. He had argued that4 ‘local conflicts and fragilities’ had been ‘exploited’ by terrorist organisations such as ‘Daesh (ISIS), Al-Qaeda, and their affiliates’ transforming Africa into a ‘global epicentre of terrorism’.
Mali and Burkina Faso: Hotbeds of Terrorism in Sahel
Mali
In August 2024, an ambush by Tuareg rebels (possibly now in cohorts with JNIM) resulted in the death of 47 Malian and 84 Wagner5 officers. In May 2024, the leaders of the Tuareg rebel movement reportedly initiated efforts to sign a non-aggression pact6 with JNIM. More than 70 individuals were killed and at least 200 others wounded7 after JNIM targeted critical locations such as Faladie Gendarmerie School (an elite paramilitary training school in Bamako) and a military base near the airport in September this year.
The September attacks in Mali are a significant escalation by the terrorist groups, marking their renewed campaign against the regime. This is because this can be considered the first major attack by JNIM inside the capital in nearly a decade. Moreover, in October 2024, Talha Abu Hind, the Emir of JNIM released a message8 warning the Malian government and Russian mercenary groups of greater attacks following the suicide attacks on Gao and Timbuktu military airports.
Burkina Faso
Recently, the military regime in Burkina Faso dealt with a significant blow in its attempts to eradicate the jihadist threat in the country nearly two years after the coup took place in September 2022, as Al-Qaeda affiliated groups shot dead hundreds of civilians in August 2024. The above-mentioned targeted attack indicates how the coup, which its architects legitimised as a means to more efficiently address the problems pertaining to terrorism compared to the civilian government, has been gravely undermined.
In the same month, in the lead-up to this deadly attack, at least two other incidents occurred in Burkina Faso, which were attributed to JNIM. On 8 August 2024, a military convoy in the eastern part of the country came under attack after JNIM fighters ambushed the soldiers,9 the assault forcing the latter to leave behind hundreds of arms intended for official use. Additionally, during the same month, over 400 unarmed villagers10 were indiscriminately killed by JNIM.
While the country has recorded over 20,000 terrorism-related casualties over the past nine years, 2024 itself has witnessed approximately 3,800 fatalities. Therefore, it is unsurprising that regular clashes or systematic targeted attacks carried out by JNIM have left the country’s armed forces or its civilian populace in a vulnerable position.
Key Challenges
Despite the presence of two significant regional organisations in Africa, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), positive regional intervention to strengthen countries’ counter-terrorism campaign in the Sahel seems unlikely. Notably, there has been nothing to indicate that the regional organisation—ECOWAS—would expand its mandate beyond taking on economic and political issues under its consideration. The coups that took place in Burkina Faso and Mali, their subsequent exit from the organisation along with imposition of sanctions imposed by the member states, has created internal fissures and undermined it from within. The sanctioned and member states of ECOWAS would need to reconcile issues such as expansion of mandate to include counter-terrorism efforts.
At the same time, regional support, backed by the AU, in military terms to the Sahel seems far-fetched. This is considering its challenge in mustering a consolidated regional counter-terror strategy (especially in an increasingly polarised climate). The challenge arises due to competing interests and inter-state disputes or the limitations placed on deploying the African Standby Force (ASF) to Burkina Faso or Mali.
As per the guidelines, the ASF can, besides instances of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity, be deployed to a country ‘at the request of a member state to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and 4(J) of the AU Constitutive act.’11 However, its deployment to Mali or Burkina Faso, given the regional outcry12 to the recent coups, seems implausible to envisage at the moment.
Moreover, one of the largest contributors in Africa to missions deployed in other countries affected by terrorism like Somalia, most notably Ethiopia, is in the throes of domestic and regional conflicts (including in Amhara) and is reducing its strength even in Somalia, limiting the effectiveness of regional response to security crises.
In addition, it has been found that issues of concern, including poor governance, festering conflicts between herders and farmers, rising unemployment, and lack of political stability, have failed to garner regional consensus regarding their redressal. Simultaneously, there has been little willingness to devote adequate attention and resources to address such challenges.
Finally, the domestic infrastructure and state apparatus in Burkina Faso and Mali are in a weakened position after years of political instability, the power struggle between civilian and military rulers, militancy and a dearth of economic growth. As a result, they have been unable to address the multifaceted challenges.
Conclusion
The governments in Burkina Faso and Mali have confronted obstacles in deterring or curbing terrorism for nearly a decade at great costs as fatalities—military and civilian—have continued rising. Moreover, Africa as a continent has experienced rising cases of terrorism-related incidents, including in Somalia, where Al-Shabaab, another Al-Qaeda affiliate, has inflicted significant chaos and violence. Local stakeholders and mercenary groups have proven largely ineffective in curbing the menace of terrorism for the past several years, while terrorist groups continue carrying out attacks simultaneously against military and civilian personnel. This has allowed parent organisations like the Al-Qaeda to retain their importance in the global jihad discourse and use the emergence of Sahel as a global hotspot of terrorism to rejuvenate its ideological movement.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the Burkina Faso and Malian governments’ increasing disenchantment with the former security partners (France), placing the culpability of escalating terrorism on Ukraine’s shoulders13 on the one hand and growing closeness with the Russian government and Russian mercenary groups. Notably, Andrei Belousov, Russia’s Minister of Defence, announced14 that discussions to expand Russia–Burkina Faso military ties have taken place. This follows Moscow’s announcement about deploying instructors and supplies to bolster Burkina Faso’s counter-terror campaign.
The accusations against Ukraine could be understood through their voting patterns in the United Nations15 amid the Russia–Ukraine conflict, in which they have abstained or voted against resolutions concerning Ukraine. Additionally, since the Russia–Ukraine conflict broke out in 2022, Ukraine has been a benefactor of European and American (hostile to the military regimes in Sahel) support, diplomatically and militarily. These factors have collectively made multilateral cooperation, which is critical in a rapidly evolving threat landscape, seem implausible in addressing security concerns moving forward, leaving the regional actors in a lurch for the foreseeable future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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