On 21 February 2022, the Hon’ble President of India Shri Ram Nath Kovind during his address at the Presidential Fleet Review underscored the Indian Navy’s capability to conduct prompt and effective deployment in times of crisis as the cornerstone for India’s vision to become the Preferred Security Partner (PSP) and First Responder in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).1 This was also reiterated by the Chief of Indian Navy Admiral R. Hari Kumar during MILAN 2022 exercise where he stated that the Indian Navy seeks to become the PSP for all smaller nations in the IOR on the basis of its ability to swiftly respond due to its geographical proximity and military capability.2 The recently concluded Fifth National Security Advisor (NSA) level meeting of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) held in Maldives has provided a broad overview of India’s roadmap towards becoming the PSP in the IOR. India shares this forum with other IOR nations like Sri Lanka, Maldives and Mauritius, which is the newest member to join the grouping. In his opening remarks during the meeting, India’s NSA Mr Ajit Doval said that CSC is moving towards greater institutionalisation and expansion through developing a concrete roadmap and a defined charter of objectives.3 Seychelles and Bangladesh, currently observers, are likely to be included as members in the future iterations of CSC. This maritime security oriented sub-regional grouping has the scope for becoming an important platform for India to demonstrate its commitment and credibility for becoming the PSP for the smaller nations in the IOR.

Net Security Provider vs Preferred Security Partner

India’s vision for becoming PSP, as brought out by the Hon’ble President of India and the Indian Navy Chief, is an indicator of a major reorientation in the outlook for India’s collective security approach towards the IOR which was earlier denoted as ‘Net Security Provider’ (NSP). It is important to comprehend the rationale behind India now favouring the term PSP over NSP. In 2013, the former Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh had asserted that India as a ‘Net Security Provider’ of the IOR shapes its strategic role in the region.4 Since then, the term NSP has been predominantly used in the Indian security discourse including in India’s maritime security document to denote India’s role and responsibilities towards the security of the IOR.

The term NSP can be applied to a nation that is in possession of credible military power and is willing to employ its military assets for addressing the common security concerns at a regional or global level.5 India staking claim as the NSP of the IOR is substantiated by the historic track record of its proactive role in contributing to the security and stability of the region. India has successfully extended its military capability for preventing political instability in Maldives, Seychelles and most notably in Sri Lanka with the deployment of Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) during the 1980s. The Indian Armed Forces have carried out large-scale relief operations in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2005 Pakistan Earthquake and the 2015 Nepal Earthquake. India has time and again demonstrated its ability to be the first responder to a crisis in the region. In 2014 after the desalination plant in the Maldivian capital of Male was damaged by fire, the Indian Air Force airlifted over 200 tons of drinking water illustrating India’s swift response capabilities.6 Apart from this, India has been robustly involved in building its smaller maritime neighbours' maritime and coastal security capacity through the supply of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV), Fast Patrol Vessels (FPV), Surveillance Aircrafts and Helicopters, and establishment of Coastal Surveillance Radar System (CSRS) for enhancing the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in IOR. Military interoperability is being facilitated through regular joint military exercises and training of officers and personnel has been taking place regularly across the Indian Military Institutions.

Despite these multifaceted efforts undertaken by India towards the security of the region, a few misperceptions are being spread by certain political sections with vested interests. Ambassador Achal Malhotra has pointed out that unjustified and erroneous perceptions about India’s ‘Big Brother Attitude’ are floating around in the region, and that these views are being propagated by political actors with vested interests and lobbies who view their anti-India political stand as synonymous with nationalism.7 Realising the potential of such misperceptions creating a trust deficit between India and its neighbours, deliberate efforts have been made by some antagonistic regional actors to propagate such notions without any valid justification. This has become more evident from the recently released Pakistan’s National Security Policy which makes a veiled reference to this by stating that the self-professed role of any one nation as the NSP in the wider IOR will have a detrimental influence on the region’s security and economy.8 Though factors like geographical proximity, historical track record, social, political and cultural affinity weigh in favour of India as the NSP of the region, the growing geostrategic significance of the IOR has attracted various extra-regional powers into the foray of the power struggle that has been taking shape across the greater Indo-Pacific region. These powers view security and economic partnership with the island nations of IOR as crucial to consolidate their strategic foothold in the region. Attributing to this, the Indian Navy in the recent years has acknowledged that any voids or shortcomings on the part of India in terms of security of the region can be filled in by extra-regional powers. It is in this context that the Indian Navy has favoured using the term PSP over NSP to denote its commitment towards the collective maritime security challenges in IOR.

Although both NSP and PSP functionally denote credible military capacity capable of addressing the collective security challenges of the region, the subtle distinction between them can be inferred on the basis of how they might be perceived by other nations of the region. The term PSP indicates a more proactive yet inclusive and collaborative approach towards undertaking the core security responsibilities of the region. As stated by Admiral R. Hari Kumar, the status of PSP is centered on the high levels of trust with friendly neighbours.9   Such levels of trust can be achieved on the basis of the following factors:

• Possession of Military Capability that can swiftly respond to an emerging security situation.
• Unequivocal assurance of security assistance. 
• Accepting and accommodating the varied security priorities of security partners.
• Favourable track record of successful security collaboration in the past.

Taking these factors into consideration, CSC is emerging as a promising platform through which India can reorient its image from being perceived as the NSP to that of a PSP for regional challenges.

Significance of Colombo Security Conclave for India

Established in 2011 as a trilateral grouping consisting of India, Sri Lanka and Maldives for collaborating on collective maritime security issues, the CSC is moving towards expansion and greater institutionalisation.10 This has been evident from the most recent iteration of the grouping where Mauritius was welcomed as the fourth member and key areas of security cooperation were described in the joint statement as the five pillars of CSC—maritime security, counter-terrorism, combating transnational crime, cyber security and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).11 As the CSC is further projected to expand with the inclusion of Seychelles and Bangladesh in its future iterations, India’s capacity and commitment to collaborate with these nations across these five pillars will be a crucial determinant for shaping India’s image as the PSP in the IOR. India’s geography in the Indian Ocean is the most significant strategic advantage that enables India to project itself as the PSP in the region as opposed to the other contenders. This is a fact that the representatives from the Indian Navy highlighted in the recently convened parliamentary standing committee on defence.12 Geographical proximity combined with human, military and economic resources put India in a position of strength to assume a leadership role in the key areas of security cooperation laid out in the recent CSC meeting.

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that sustaining an effective and robust regional mechanism for economic and security cooperation has been an enduring challenge for South Asia. The bilateral issues between India and Pakistan with the latter’s support to terrorism and insurgency induced instability in Jammu & Kashmir have rendered regional cooperation through the South Asia Association for Region Cooperation (SAARC) a non-starter.13 Inferring from the SAARC example, India along with the other members must note that success of security cooperation through the CSC will depend on certain prerequisites which are as follows:

• Averting Bilateral Issues: Ensuring that issues between two members are resolved through appropriate bilateral forums is the collective responsibility of all CSC members. Such issues may endanger the multilateral consensus required to sustain multilateral security forums such as CSC.
• Avoiding superimposition of any particular Security Concern: In the recent NSA level meeting of CSC, the Maldivian Minister of Defence Ms Mariya Didi in her opening remarks stated that it is important to acknowledge that no country’s security predicament can be the exact reflection of any other country.14 This statement underscores that member states must take cognizance of the fact that the core focus of CSC must be centered on collective security issues.
• Countering false narratives: The members other than India in CSC must ensure that baseless political narratives such as India’s ‘Big Brother Attitude’ being promoted in some corners of their political spectrum must be addressed. Such narratives can prove to be counterproductive for the collective resolve of the CSC.

Conclusion

India’s aspiration for being recognised as the PSP in the IOR is underscored by its commitment to the security of its smaller neighbours in the region. India possesses the military capability necessary for swiftly responding to a crisis in its vicinity and has the track record of unequivocally extending its military, economic and human resources for the security of its neighbours. Minilateral forums such as the CSC are significant in accentuating India’s image as the PSP to its maritime neighbours. On 9 August 2021, Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his remarks at the United Nations Security Council’s high-level open debate on enhancing maritime security brought out five key principles—removing economic barriers from legitimate maritime trade, peaceful settlement of maritime disputes, coordinated response to natural disasters and maritime terrorism, preservation and sustainable use of maritime resources and lastly promoting maritime connectivity.15 It must be taken into account that there is a considerable overlap between the five principles brought out by the Hon’ble Prime Minister and the five pillars of security cooperation that have been laid down in the recent CSC meet. As the CSC moves towards developing a concrete roadmap and a defined charter of objectives, it can contribute immensely towards shaping India’s image as the PSP for meeting regional security challenges.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Address by the President of India, Shri Ram Nath Kovind on the Occasion of the Presidential Fleet Review – 2022”, The President of India, 21 February 2022.
• 2. “Indian Navy Seeking to be Preferred Security Partner, Says its Chief”, The Economic Times, 27 February 2022.
• 3. Rezaul H. Laskar, “At Maldives Meet, NSA Ajit Doval Calls Roadmap for Colombo Security Conclave”, Hindustan Times, 10 March 2022.
• 4. David Brewster, “India: Regional Net Security Provider”, Gateway House, Indian Council on Global    Relations, 5 November 2013.
• 5. In other words, NSP denotes a nation’s capacity to positively influence the regional or global security environment by addressing issues of common security concerns. This entails the engagement of that nation with other friendly governments for capacity building, conducting various facets of military diplomacy, providing military assistance and deploying military forces in the event of a crisis situation. See Abhay Kumar Singh, “India as a Net Security Provider in the Indian Ocean Region: The Strategic Approach of Responsible Stakeholder”, in Jivanta Schottli, ed., Maritime Governance and South Asia: Trade, Security and Sustainable Development in the Indian Ocean World Scientific Publishing Company, pp. 63–78; Anit Mukherjee, “India as a Net Security Provider: Concept and Impediments”, Policy Brief, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, August 2014.
• 6. “Maldives in Water Crisis after fire at Treatment Plant”, BBC News, 5 December 2014.
• 7. “India’s Relationship with its Neighbours: Conflict and Cooperation”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 6 March 2014.
• 8. “National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026”, Government of Pakistan, 14 January 2022.
• 9. No. 2.
• 10. Nirupama Subramanian, “Colombo Security Conclave: Ajith Doval Calls for Better Coordination to Address Shared Maritime Challenges”, The Indian Express, 10 March 2022.
• 11. “Joint Press Statement of the 5th NSA Level Meeting of the Colombo Security Conclave held on 09 – 10 March 2022 in Maldives”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 10 March 2022.
• 12. Dinakar Peri, “Geography Gives India an Advantage: Navy”, The Hindu, 19 March 2022.
• 13. Raviprasad Narayanan, “The India-Pakistan Dyad: Challenge to the Rest or to Themselves?”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 165–90, 2010.
• 14. “Minister of Defence Uza. Mariya Didi Delivers Opening Remarks at 5th Edition of Colombo Security Conclave”, Ministry of Defence, Government of Maldives, 9 March 2022.
• 15. “English Translation of Prime Minister’s Remarks at the UNSC High-Level Open Debate on Enhancing Maritime Security: A Case for International Cooperation”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 10 August 2021.

The ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict showcases how various technologies can be vehemently used on the battlefield through both land and air. With Russia’s advanced air combat capabilities, it has reportedly used only Tu-22M3 bombers, Ka-52 attack helicopters, SU25, Su27 flanker and Su30 fighters to destroy Ukraine’s military bases and other critical infrastructures. Russia’s new Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities include AI-enabled robotic weapons, autonomous tanks, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and long-range strikes involving high-precision missiles.1 Russia is heavily committed to the use of AI for military systems for intelligence gathering, C4ISR, logistics and development of autonomous weapons.

Despite having advanced AI-based military capabilities, Russia has not used any lethal autonomous weapon systems in the recent conflict. Moreover, Russia’s development and use of weaponised AI is not only attributed to the quest of power or the global AI race but also to the strategic implications and risks involved with autonomy. The technological modernisation with AI has been declared as one of the key areas for the future of defence strategy. One significant aspect of AI is that it is not a weapon but a range of functions and technologies that can be devised through integrating it with systems to gain a strategic advantage over adversaries.

Today, countries with geopolitical conflicts are using AI and Machine Learning (ML) in cyberattacks, misinformation and disinformation campaigns to their advantage. This has been visible in the current Russia–Ukraine conflict, where Russia has been suspected of having used asymmetric warfare by using AI-based cyber-attacks, electronic warfare and information weapons on Ukraine’s infrastructure like electrical grids and communication systems before the incursion. Russia has in the past also used this discreet use of technology for destabilising its opponents’ infrastructures. The discourse on the use of weaponised AI in such conflicts entails domestic challenges in addition to geopolitical implications. Therefore, Russia is being careful and heading with a strategised course of action in using this technology on battlefield.

Russia’s AI Strategy vis-à-vis AI Global Race

Russia is spearheading its AI strategy with heavy investments in military, state-sponsored actors and the private sector. It has been stated that with Russia’s increasing adoption of futuristic technologies and modern battlefield capabilities, the US might be outmatched in the areas of armour, artillery, air defence, space and cyberspace.2  

Russia’s AI strategy gained momentum in 2014 when the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) adopted the concept for the use of Robotic Systems for military use by 2030, with 30 per cent of combat power being robotised to partial or complete autonomy. In 2016, the strategy of scientific and technological development of the Russian Federation was approved with the priority on the creation of systems for Big Data, AI and ML. In 2017, Russia launched its AI-enabled virtual assistant Alice by Yandex and a cooperation agreement was signed between Yandex and Gazprom Neft to implement machine learning projects in the oil industry.3 The same year Vladimir Putin declared that “whichever country becomes the leader in artificial intelligence (AI) will become the ruler of the world”.4 Despite this, Russia is still behind when compared to US and China in terms of AI capabilities, according to a report by the US government-funded Center for Naval Analyses.5 Russia was not a leader in communication networks but used this technology for weaponising itself for advanced cyber capabilities and became a leader. Considering Russia’s capabilities in advanced weapon systems, it is likely that it will soon be a leader in AI-enabled warfare. In 2018, the Russian MoD hosted a joint conference with the Ministry of Education and Science and the Russian Academy of Sciences, which led to the 10-point statement that specifically focuses on innovative and AI-driven solutions.6 In 2019, another initiative was led by the Russian government for National Strategy for the Development of AI with AI Federal Project inclined towards the private sector. The AI Roadmap drafted by SberBank estimated an investment of US$ 5.13 billion, which was later revised to US$ 3.83 billion.7

In 2021, the Russian President again stated that 2021 will be the year of Science and Technology in Russia with a breakthrough in technology, economy and social progress.8 In the modernisation of Russian armed forces, AI has been highlighted as a priority for integrating autonomous and robotic weapon systems. For this, the National Defence Management Centre has been established to set up coordination between various military units.9

With the recent announcement by Xi Jinping on China–Russia “no limits partnership” and deciding to back each other on Ukraine and Taiwan conflicts, it is evident that these two nations will have more collaborations in future.10 Russia also suggested China for partnership in garnering and building Russia’s AI readiness in the wake of Ukraine crisis. Russia’s AI programme functions differently when compared to other countries as it is run by the state-owned firms and not by the government. Russia’s defence conglomerate Rostec is working dedicatedly on building AI capabilities. The Russian government is shorthanded due to its lack in a strong defence industrial base.11 Currently, there are more than 150 AI-enabled military systems at various stages of development in the areas of autonomous air, underwater, surface and ground platforms.12

Role of AI in Information Warfare in Russia–Ukraine Conflict

AI plays a vital role in information warfare, which is evident in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, as it helps in analysing the vast amount of open-source intelligence from videos to Telegram posts on troops and attacks, to fact check the events and claims made by both sides and can be further used for future war crime prosecutions. One issue with the use of such technology is deep fakes that use AI techniques to create realistic videos to launch disinformation campaigns. However, ML can detect such fake videos, and various social media platforms are already used to deploy such systems. 

Some of the world’s biggest AI companies have become the battlefield for information warfare amidst this conflict, with the data and services becoming vital links to it. Some companies like Apple and Dell have ceased their sales in Russia and have removed apps like RT News and Sputnik News from the app store.13 To mitigate the disinformation campaigns, companies like Meta, Twitter and Telegram are either limiting or suspending the promotional posts for the safety of the people in the conflict zone. Tesla and SpaceX have opened the Starlink for Ukraine at the request of the Vice Prime Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov. Elon Musk has also made superchargers free to use in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary to help people escape from the war zone.

Russia is also engaging in three-front information warfare against Ukraine which includes:14

• Disinformation: Russia has emancipated one of the most extensive influence operations with AI-based targeted adversarial tactics through automatic generation of social media accounts and uses them as disinformation signal generators.
• Cyberwarfare: Russia has employed advanced cyberwarfare operations that use AI to impede Ukrainian weapon systems and shut down critical infrastructures.
• Kinetic warfare: Russia’s incursion into Ukraine with 4x military assets have been attributed with kinetic offensives that guide precision weaponry and specialised army units towards high-value targets through the automated signal collection and AI-enabled signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Russia’s AI-enabled Autonomous Military Capabilities

The Joint All-Command & Control (JADC2) has become today’s buzzword across militaries. Russia calls it an Automated Control System (ACS) that connects all the domains like air, sea, land, cyber and space together, collects and distribute the data from sensors shooters into one information space. Russia is exuberantly working on using AI and autonomous systems to make its forces more lethal. It is believed that Russia is using AI-enabled systems in the Ukraine conflict to gather surveillance footage from drones and analyse the battlefield data. There is also a possibility that Russia might receive advanced AI-enabled weapons from China in exchange for information on the efficient integration of drones in combat operations.15 Russia has battle-tested expertise on the use of drones for combat operations in Syria, which China currently does not have. Russia has Kamikaze drones called Lantset, which has autonomous capabilities to attack tanks or troop concentrations by loitering the pre-selected target and crashing into it with the warhead. Russia has reportedly used these in Syria, and it is said to have been used in Ukraine as well.16 Some other uncrewed systems that Russia has include the new version of S-70 Okhotnik which is a stealth combat drone that has the capability to hit the target from an altitude with the unguided bomb. Russia has also procured predator-type stealth aircraft called Inokhodets-RU (“Sirius”) and Forpost ("Outpost") drones from Israel.17 Ukraine, on the other hand, is using a Turkish-made TB2 drone, which works autonomously and can perform laser-guided artillery strikes. 

The Russian armada of latest AI-enabled weapon system includes Altius RU drone, an unmanned craft equipped with AI capabilities that can operate independently and interact with SU-57. Altius is the counterpart of the US’s RQ-4 Global Hawk, which is capable of carrying out reconnaissance operations as well as carry a ton of missiles and bombs in its payload.18 Another AI-enabled weapon system is the Msta-SM 2S19M2, a robotised artillery system equipped with new automated guidance and fire control system from the howitzers.19 The Russian military is also using an unmanned ground vehicle called Marker capable of functioning autonomously and creating swarms to operate on the battlefield. It uses neural network, a subfield of AI, to perform the swarming operation.20 Considering Russia’s military capabilities there is not much that Ukraine has to withstand Russia in the ongoing war.

Conclusion

With the proliferation of AI, the weapons of war are becoming more technologically equipped, which is changing the battlefield scenarios, as seen in Russia’s current incursion in Ukraine. As Russia is being suspected of having used AI-based cyber-attacks on Ukraine, it is also believed that the US and other NATO members are also pursuing similar tactics against Russia. However, there is no denying that Russia’s AI-enabled military capabilities and autonomy have made its forces more lethal. The anonymity with the use of AI-enabled asymmetric warfare like cyber warfare and information warfare allows countries to flex their asymmetric power without any retribution. Furthermore, this makes the impact more offensive by destabilising the country without any restrictions of geography, causing direct, material and economic impact on the opponent.

The exacerbating threat to global security with the advent of these technologies is a subject of debate. Therefore, it is essential to identify the future risks involved with these technologies, and to prevent crisis escalation, new agreements and discussions should be initiated to avoid future confrontations. 

AI will play a significant role in developing advanced autonomous systems, and the countries with indigenous development of such systems will lead the future battlefield, as the inconspicuous use of technology will be the first step to disable any country’s infrastructure in case of such conflicts. Hence, it is essential to reiterate that this technology’s range and potential use in defence applications like cyber-attacks, information warfare, disseminating and detection of disinformation, deep fakes and autonomous weapon systems, is critical, challenging and ambiguous, which in future will be the default blueprint of the war strategy.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Jason Sherman, “Russia-Ukraine Conflict Prompted U.S. to Develop Autonomous Drone Swarms, 1,000-Mile Cannon”, Scientific American, 14 February 2022.
• 2. Peter L. Jones, Ricky Waddell, Wilson Jr C. Blythe and Thomas Pappas, “Unclassified Summary of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command Russian New Generation Warfare Study”, TRADOC Ft. Eustis United States, 2017.
• 3. Kirill Petrov, “Local Knowledge and Personality Help Yandex’s Alice Virtual Assistant Dominate the Russian Market” , voicebot.ai, 17 May 2019; “Gazprom Neft Signs Cooperation Agreement with Yandex”, Gazprom Neft, 1 June 2017.
• 4. “Putin: Leader in Artificial Intelligence Will Rule World”, CNBC, 4 September 2017.
• 5. “AI and Autonomy in Russia”, Center for Naval Analyses, Issue 30, 24 January 2022.
• 6. The 10-point statement tries to cover all aspects of AI-driven technologies from AI and big data consortiums, establishing funding & the national centre for AI, AI training and education, and domestic AI proposals on military forums. See “Conference ‘Artificial Intelligence: Problems and Their Solutions – 2018’”, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2018.
• 7. Stephanie Petrella, Chris Miller and Benjamin Cooper, “Russia's Artificial Intelligence Strategy: The Role of State-Owned Firms”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Vol. 65, No. 1, 2021, pp. 75–100.
• 8. Russian leadership signalled its interest in AI, marking November as the month of AI.
• 9. This centre provides a complete status of military units deployed on the domestic and international front and provides AI-enabled decision-making capabilities to the operator.
• 10. Tony Munroe, Andrew Osborn and Humeyra Pamuk, “China, Russia Partner Up against West at Olympics Summit”, Reuters, 5 February 2022.
• 11. No. 7
• 12. Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Algorithmic Warfare: Russia Expanding Fleet of AI-Enabled Weapons”, National Defense, 20 July 2021.
• 13. Aratrika Dutta, “Russia-Ukraine War: 10 Ai Companies Facing The Consequences”, Analytics Insight, 2 March 2022.
• 14. Charlie Greenbacker and Nic Acton, “How AI can be Used to Rapidly Respond to Information Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict”, Snorkel.ai, 28 February 2022.
• 15. Jeremy Kahn, “A.I. is on the Front Lines of the War in Ukraine”, Fortune, 1 March 2022.
• 16. Ibid.
• 17. David Hambling, “Russia Reveals New Drone Capabilities, Hinting At What It Could Bring to Bear in Ukraine”, Forbes, 23 December 2021.
• 18. Ibid. It works on an AI algorithm that finds the optimal route to the target, identifies the suitable locations for dropping bombs and returns to the base through the safest path without any human intervention.
• 19. Its capabilities include information exchange with the battalion and the command post, including information on individual combat vehicles with other active vehicles for better-coordinated attacks.
• 20. SharthKumar Nair, “A Closer Look at Russia’s AI-powered Artillery”, Tech Policy, 26 January 2022.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 is the most serious escalation in the dispute between Moscow and Kyiv since 2014. Russia considers Ukraine a sphere of influence and wants it to keep away from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For Moscow, NATO’s eastward expansion is a pressing concern. Ukrainian attempts to join NATO poses a security threat and challenges Russian supremacy in its “near abroad”. Ukraine, on the other hand, aspires to develop closer ties with the European Union (EU) and NATO, and eventually join both these groupings, for it will be economically rewarding and would provide a security cover, which is essential for maintaining its sovereignty and independence. For the EU, Ukraine is a prospective partner not only for its economic potentials but also as a security buffer between Russia and Western Europe.

Notwithstanding the geopolitical contours of the crisis, neighbouring Turkey faces tough choices in responding to the conflict. For Ankara, the problem is manifold with far-reaching implications for its struggling economy, damaged relations with the United States (US) and EU, its complex partnership with Russia, but above all, the regional security architecture in the Black Sea.

Turkish response to the crisis underlines some of the dilemmas facing Ankara. While it has taken a clear stand against the use of force by Russia, Ankara has been careful not to come out as too hostile to Moscow. A Turkish foreign ministry press release on 24 February, soon after Russia announced its “military operation” in Ukraine, noted that Turkey “consider[s] the military operation launched by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against Ukraine unacceptable and reject it”.1 The carefully drafted statement underlined that the attack “is a grave violation of international law and poses a serious threat to regional and global security”. Turkish statement emphasised the “necessity to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of countries”, and expressed its opposition to “changing of borders by use of arms”.2 The statement called on Moscow to reconsider its actions and extended support for the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Ukraine.

Ankara has proactively engaged with all parties involved as well as held consultations with regional leaders, EU members, NATO and the US. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in touch with the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and has talked to him at least three times over phone since 24 February, expressing Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s unity and seeking support for Turkish mediation efforts. On 6 March, Erdogan talked to Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to the Turkish side, the talks focused on the need for immediate end of hostilities and ceasefire on humanitarian grounds.3 Erdogan apparently offered Turkish mediation to “pave the way” for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In between, Erdogan held telephonic conversations with several regional and international leaders to discuss the developing situation.

A careful examination of the Turkish response to the Ukrainian crisis underlines four foreign policy dimensions to it. Firstly, Ankara is concerned with the impact on Turkey–Russia relations. Given the delicate partnership between the two countries, Ankara does not want to take any step that might harm the relationship. The two sides have enhanced bilateral trade, energy and business cooperation in recent years. Further, Turkey depends on Russian gas imports for its energy security and has procured Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system reflecting growing strategic ties. Besides, Turkey and Russia have stakes in regional issues, such as Syria, Libya and Nagorno–Karabakh conflict, wherein they have engaged in a complicated balancing to manage divergent interests. From Ankara’s perspective, Russia is a bigger neighbour, a strong military and a great power with which Turkey has shared interests, making it irreplaceable to Turkey’s economic and territorial security. Ankara has also grown sceptical of relying on NATO and West for its security, especially after its experiences in Syria, Libya and Eastern Mediterranean, as reflected by President Erdogan on several occasions on the need for Turkey to be strong economically as well as militarily.4

Secondly, there are concerns regarding relations with the Western powers. In fact, over the past decade, Turkey’s relations with the US, NATO and EU have gone through tumultuous times with divergent views on a myriad domestic, regional and international issues. Turkey is frustrated with the EU for not making any progress in its accession efforts. On the other hand, it has faced scathing criticism from EU and its members for its falling human rights record and democratic backsliding. It has locked horns with EU members, especially France and Greece, due to differences over claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.5 Turkey­­­–US relations have also suffered in the past decade due to serious problems in bilateral ties. A case in point was President Erdogan had to wait nearly six months for meeting President Joe Biden after the latter took over US Administration.6 There are several outstanding bilateral issues but the most contentious one is the US opposition to Turkey buying Russian S-400 missile system that in Washington’s view goes against the bilateral partnership and violates Turkey’s commitment to NATO. Turkey, on the other hand, has been miffed at the US support for Kurdish fighters in northern Syria that Ankara considers a serious security threat and terms them as terrorists.

Notwithstanding the problems, Ankara has engaged in extensive consultations with EU, NATO and the US to exchange views on the Ukrainian crisis. On 25 February, President Erdogan attended the extraordinary virtual NATO summit, but not before issuing a veiled criticism of NATO for failing to take “a more decisive step”.7 Turkish officials have been in constant touch with their counterparts in the US and Europe. Wendy Sherman, the US Deputy Secretary of State, was in Ankara on 5 March to hold discussions on the Ukraine crisis with her Turkish counterparts.8 Besides, Ibrahim Kalin, the presidential spokesperson and a close aide of Erdogan had held multiple conversations with officials in US, Russia and other countries.

Thirdly, an important concern for Turkey is the regional geopolitics in the Black Sea. Ankara carefully invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention to close the Bosporus Strait for passage of warships to and from the Sea. The measure was seen as a hostile step against Russia after specific request was received from Ukraine, and gained praise from EU and NATO.9 But the move is well considered as from a Russian point of view the Montreux Convention, which Russia is also a signatory of, effectively prevents the possibility of a direct NATO military intervention in the Black Sea. Hence, Russia has not reacted sharply to this Turkish move.

Finally, Turkish position gets complicated because of its strong economic and security relations with Ukraine. Turkish defence manufacturers have deals with Ukrainian armed forces for supply of drones, which have been deployed to fight the Russian forces. In the wake of the media debate on the issue, Ankara, while acknowledging the supply of drones to Ukraine, has sought to underscore the “impartial” stand and underplay the Turkish government’s role to placate possible Russian anger.10

Thus far, Ankara’s response has treaded a fine line of maintaining neutrality without jeopardising relations with either Russia or Ukraine, and at the same time, not taking any position that can harm ties with EU and NATO. Turkey has offered itself as a possible mediator to diffuse the crisis. However,  a trilateral meeting of Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers on the side-lines of Antalya Diplomacy Forum on 10 March failed to achieve any breakthrough.11 Turkey is the only country, besides Israel, which is currently able to engage in diplomatic exchanges with both Russia and Ukraine, and is talking to Western powers as well. Ankara is seeking international support for Turkish mediation efforts, and if it succeeds, this will be considered a major foreign policy achievement of President Erdogan who is trying to arrest his falling popularity at home. Besides, this can also help repair some of the damage in relations with the US, NATO and EU, and enhance Turkey’s international status, as part of the ongoing realignment in Turkish foreign policy. This also does no harm to Turkey’s existing partnership and cooperation with both Russia and Ukraine.

Turkey is facing serious challenges in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In addition to the implications on regional and global security, Turkey is concerned with the immediate fallouts of the conflict on its economy, security and external relations. It has treaded a fine line of expressing solidarity with Ukraine, not taking steps to antagonise and harm relations with Russia, and simultaneously, engaging the US, NATO and EU. This serves the Turkish foreign policy interest of maintaining a delicate balance vis-à-vis Russia and the West, and yet not shy away from expressing its support and solidarity with Ukraine.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Press Release Regarding the Russian Federation’s Military Operation Against Ukraine”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, No. 62, 24 February 2022.
• 2. Ibid.
• 3. President @RTErdogan Spoke by Phone with President Vladimir Putin of Russia”, Twitter @trpresidency (official handle of Presidency of the Republic of Turkey), 6 March 2022, 5:44 PM.
• 4. “Türkiye Must be Strong with its Economy and Military”, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 3 March 2022.
• 5. Md. Muddassir Quamar, “Turkey and the Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean”, West Asia Watch, July–September 2020, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 3–5.
• 6. Md. Muddassir Quamar, “Outcomes of the First Biden-Erdoğan Meeting”, MP-IDSA Comment, 21 June 2021.
• 7. “NATO should have Taken a More Decisive Step”, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 25 February 2022.
• 8. “Press Release Regarding the Meeting Between Deputy Minister Ambassador Sedat Önal and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, No. 76, 5 March 2022.
• 9. Serkan Demirtaş, “EU Praises Turkey’s Role in Ukraine, Proposes Cooperation”, Hurriyet Daily News, 7 March 2022.
• 10. “Bayraktar UAVs Purchased by Ukraine, Not Aid from Turkey: Deputy FM”, Daily Sabah, 2 March 2022.
• 11. “Ukrainian, Russian FMs to Meet in Turkey, FM Çavuşoğlu Says”, Daily Sabah, 7 March 2022.

One of the major developments in Japan in the recent months has been the election to the 465-member House of Representatives, in which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s leadership secured 261 votes, while its junior partner Komeito got only 32.1

Earlier in September, at the ruling party’s election some important changes occurred, one of which was removal of its long-time Secretary General Toshihiro Nikai, a pro-China politician.2 The pro-China faction within the LDP has weakened due to several reasons. First, a few of Nikai’s faction members got involved in scandals.3 Second, since several senior members of the faction had to retire in recent times, the faction is now filled with young and inexperienced legislators. Nikai’s announcement of his faction’s support for former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga in the 2021 LDP presidential election was done without any prior consultation with other faction members, which seems to have created friction within the Nikai faction and has affected its unity.

Balancing Act

Kishida has been very tactful in his selection of important officials to run the government. His chief cabinet secretary, Hirokazu Matsuno, has been critical of Chinese military development and has proposed stepping up Japan’s own missile defence capability.4 Kishida’s defence minister, Nobuo Kishi, is former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s younger brother. He has directly linked Taiwan’s security to that of Japan’s.5 Kishida’s minister of economy, trade and industry, Koichi Hagiuda, is known for his revisionist thinking. He has drawn flak from China for paying a visit to Yasukuni Shrine.6 All of them are members of the Abe faction, which is the largest faction within LDP with a strong nationalist agenda. Kishida’s finance minister, Shunichi Suzuki, is the brother-in-law of former prime minister and finance minister Taro Aso. He is a member of the Aso faction (the second largest in LDP) and is known for his strong stance vis-à-vis China.7

Kishida has appointed Yoshimasa Hayashi, a pro-China politician, as his foreign minister. Hayashi has made his intentions clear regarding Japan’s concerns about China’s actions.8 He has also resigned from his position as Chairman of Japan–China Friendship Parliamentarians’ Union in order “to avoid causing unnecessary misunderstandings”.9 

Environment Minister Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi and Economic Security Minister Takayuki Kobayashi are the only members of the Nikai faction in the present cabinet, but both of them are relatively new to the political dynamics of LDP and have been selected because of their support for Kishida, rather than their loyalty to Nikai.

The bonhomie between Toshihiro Nikai and Beijing is well established. During the previous two administrations, the faction known as Shisuikai, led by Nikai and Takaya Imai, had sought stronger economic relations with China.10 Nikai was an advocate of Japan’s foreign aid to China and cooperation on the latter’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).11 Former secretary general of the national security secretariat, Shotaro Yachi,12 and Japan’s business community13 as well as Komeito14 also favoured friendship with China.

When Nikai was elected to the National Diet in 1983, he advocated for Japan’s funding of ODA (Official Development Assistance) to China.15 Beijing also used it to create policy dissonance between Washington and Tokyo.

Amidst tensions between Japan and China over Senkaku Islands,16  Nikai led a delegation of lawmakers in 2015, to Beijing. Nikai reportedly had a ‘warm’ exchange with Chinese President Xi Jinping. In the meantime, Washington was tussling with Beijing over its cyberthefts.17

Nikai visited China twice in 2017 and was welcomed by Xi Jinping both the times. In May, he appeared at a forum promoting Beijing’s ‘One Belt One Road’ development project, promoting China–Japan economic relations.18 The meetings were followed by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to China, which created doubts over Japan’s commitment to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD, between India, Japan, US and Australia).19 Chinese gestures occurred when US President Donald Trump was demanding that Japan pay for the US defence umbrella in East Asia.20

In 2020, Chinese ships intruded into Japanese territory near the Senkaku Islands causing tensions between the two.21 Yet, Nikai met the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Tokyo, and expressed LDP’s commitment to deepening relations between Japan and China.22 Meanwhile, in the 2020 US presidential elections, both the candidates, Donald Trump and Joseph Biden, had adopted a hardline stance against China.23

Road Ahead

With the weakening of the pro-China lobby inside the LDP, Prime Minister Kishida is well positioned to further pursue Tokyo’s engagement with QUAD and the US, which remains central to Japan’s foreign policy. Previously, China had raised hue and cry over QUAD.24 China had also spread anti-Japanese sentiments in an effort to meddle in Taiwan’s 2020 elections. One rumour reportedly charged President Tsai Ing-wen of “selling out” Taiwan to the US and Japan.25 Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) United Front has fostered anti-Japanese sentiments to “promote a common narrative” on Japan’s revived militarism.26 Beijing has also opposed Tokyo’s attempt at increasing its defence spending.27

Beijing has often tried to stir up trouble in Tokyo over Okinawa.28 In one of the instances, Global Times encouraged China to call Okinawa by its former name ‘Ryukyu’.29 However, with the pro-China lobby led by Nikai losing the clout, Prime Minister Kishida can focus better on his defence and foreign policy objectives than his predecessors. He aims to double Japan's defence spending to around 2 per cent of the gross domestic product.30 Recently, his Cabinet has approved a supplementary budget that has increased Japan’s defence expenditure to 1.13 per cent for the current year.31 The government plans to set a defence budget of US$ 264 billion under the mid-term defence programme from the fiscal year 2023.32

Furthermore, Kishida may seek to build Japan’s missile-strike capability and develop its nuclear-powered submarines.33 He has shown interest in the idea of boosting Japan’s ties with India, the US, Australia, and other democratic Asian powers.34

On the foreign policy front, Prime Minister Kishida needs to put on track Japan's relations with China, the two Koreas, and Russia. Beijing continues to pursue its aggressive policies in the region.35 Japan's rift with South Korea over issues of history is still where it was earlier.36 North Korea remains too ambitious about its nuclear missile programme in the region.37 Japan's friction with Russia over four islands off the eastern coast of Hokkaido is yet to be resolved.38

Kishida may be interested in working on a contingency plan allowing Tokyo to coordinate with the US more substantially to defend Taipei against any Chinese aggression.39 Pertinently, the clause for collective self-defence allows Tokyo to defend the US bases located in Japan and abroad.40 Japan’s latest defence white paper states that “Stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important for Japan’s security”.41

Japan’s Defense Minister Kishi has mentioned the need to “bolster trilateral relations between Japan, US and Taiwan”.42 This will help in trilateral modes of intelligence-sharing and decision-making during the Taiwan crisis. There have been discussions over the need for a Japanese version of the US’ Taiwan Relations Act, which reaffirms US commitment to “the preservation of human rights of the people of Taiwan”. There is strong support for it amongst members of the LDP like Kishi and former State Minister of Defence Yasuhide Nakayama. Kishida is also likely to focus on China’s treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, and pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong. For this, Kishida has appointed former Defence Minister Gen Nakatani as the special advisor on human rights issues.43

Kishida has managed his China policy wisely. He has kept diplomatic channels open with Beijing. On 27 December 2021, Defence Minister Kishi and his Chinese counterpart Wei Fenghe agreed to set up a hotline by the end of 2022.44 While Tokyo values Beijing as its largest trading partner, it remains cautious against China’s continued military aggression. Kishida is a member of the ultra-rightist Nippon Kaigi lobby.45 There is a near consensus in Kishida’s cabinet on the need to contain China. Even Komeito, known for its emphasis on China–Japan historical and socio-cultural ties, has voiced its concerns over Chinese authoritarianism.46

The exclusion of pro-China Nikai from the ruling LDP’s power structure is likely to help Kishida advance his defence and foreign policy agenda more independently. Beijing’s continued aggressive actions in the region suggest that it is unlikely to change its approach towards Tokyo in the near future. Kishida is likely to prioritise a foreign policy that is in harmony with that of the US. He may also look towards strengthening Tokyo’s relations with democratic nations, including Taiwan, South Korea, and India.  

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Satoshi Sugiyama, “The LDP Won the Lower House Election, But it has Few Reasons to Celebrate”, The Japan Times, 1 November 2021.
• 2. “Japan's Next PM Kishida Fills Ruling Party Key Posts with Abe Allies”, Kyodo News, 30 September 2021; and Julian Ryall, “Is Toshihiro Nikai, the ‘Most Pro-China’ Politician in Japan’s Ruling LDP, Losing his Shine?”, South China Morning Post, 18 February 2021.
• 3. Eric Johnston, “Heavyweight Nikai and his Scandal-plagued LDP Faction Ruffling Feathers”, The Japan Times, 15 December 2020.
• 4. “Japan Leader Calls for Greater Military Capability, Spending”, The Mainichi, 18 October 2021.
• 5. Isabel Reynolds and Emi Nobuhiro, “Japan Sees China-Taiwan Friction as Threat to its Security”, The Japan Times, 25 June 2021.
• 6. Laura Zhou, “China Hits Out at Japan Over Ministers’ Yasukuni Shrine Visits”, South China Morning Post, 15 August 2021.
• 7. See Shunichi Suzuki, Senkyo Mainichi (in Japanese).
• 8. “Profile: Harvard-educated New Foreign Minister Hayashi Often Seen as Pro-China”, Kyodo News, 10 November 2021; and “New Top Envoy Yoshimasa Hayashi Vows to Defend Universal Values Amid China Rise”, The Japan Times, 11 November 2021.
• 9. “Press Conference by Foreign Minister HAYASHI Yoshimasa”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 11 November 2021.
• 10. Tsukasa Hadano, “Japanese Government Split over China Policy”, Nikkei Asia, 8 July 2017.
• 11. Satoshi Sugiyama, “China Hawks Gain Ground among Japan's Conservatives, Long Divided on Beijing”, The Japan Times, 29 July 2020.
• 12. Yuka Hayashi, “Strategic Patience the New Mantra for Abe's China Policy”, The Wall Street Journal, 12 November 2013.
• 13. Mitsuru Obe, “Decoupling Denied: Japan Inc Lays its Bets on China”, Financial Times, 17 February 2021.
• 14. Julian Ryall, “Tricky Tokyo-Beijing Relations Weigh on Japan’s Political Parties as Kishida Seeks Mandate in Lower House Election”, South China Morning Post, 29 October 2021.
• 15. Between 1980 and 1990, Japan gave over a trillion yen in special loans and hundreds of billions of yen in grants and technical assistance to China. China used it for infrastructural development, including dual-use architecture benefitting the Chinese military. See Yoshihisa Komori, “Which Country’s Interests Does Nikai’s Pro-China Diplomacy Serve?”, Japan Forward, 31 January 2018.
• 16. Masaaki Kameda, “Defense White Paper Stresses Threat Posed by China”, The Japan Times, 21 July 2015.
• 17. “Obama: China Cyber Attacks 'Unacceptable'”, BBC News, 12 September 2015.
• 18. “LDP Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai Invites Xi to Visit Tokyo Next Year amid Warming Ties with Beijing”, The Japan Times, 28 December 2017; and “METI State Minister Matsumura Visits China”, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan, 17 May 2017.
• 19. Atul Aneja, “Indo-Pacific Quad May Soon Have a Gaping Hole as China Re-engages Japan”, The Hindu, 3 January 2018.
• 20. Mark Landler and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trump Tells Japan It Can Protect Itself by Buying U.S. Arms”, The New York Times, 6 November 2017.
• 21. “China's Longest Dispatch of Ships Near Senkakus ‘Serious’: Japan”, Kyodo News, 22 July 2020.
• 22. “Wang Yi Meets with Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan Toshihiro Nikai”, Embassy Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, 25 November 2020.
• 23. Jacob M. Schlesinger, “What’s Biden’s New China Policy? It Looks a Lot Like Trump’s”, The Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2020.
• 24. Zhang Jiadong, “QUAD Desires ‘Asian NATO,’ but China has Smarter Solutions”, Global Times, 11 October 2020.
• 25. Raymond Zhong, “Awash in Disinformation Before Vote, Taiwan Points Finger at China”, The New York Times, 6 January 2020.
• 26. Russell Hsiao, “In A Bid to Co-opt Taiwan, China Wages History War Against Japan”, Japan Forward, 12 December 2019.
• 27. Laura Zhou, “China Warns Japan against Stoking Military Tensions over Taiwan”, South China Morning Post, 21 May 2021.
• 28. Taylor Washburn, “Why Japan Should Ignore China’s Okinawa Provocation”, The Diplomat, 17 May 2013.
• 29. Devin Stewart, “China’s Influence in Japan: Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 2020.
• 30. Tim Kelly and Ju-min Park, “Analysis: With an Eye on China, Japan's Ruling Party Makes Unprecedented Defence Spending Pledge”, Reuters, 31 October 2021.
• 31. Robin Harding and Andy Lin, “Japan Approves Extra Defence Spending Amid Concerns Over China’s Rising Power”, Financial Times, 26 November 2021.
• 32. “Japan's 5-year Defense Budget to Hit Record $264bn”, Nikkei Asia, 15 December 2021.
• 33. Peter Landers, “Japan Prime Minister Contender Takes Harder Line on Missile-Strike Ability”, The Wall Street Journal, 7 September 2021.
• 34. Ibid.
• 35. Motoko Rich and Makiko Inoue, “As the World Gets Tougher on China, Japan Tries to Thread a Needle”, The New York Times, 25 July 2020.
• 36. “Kishida and South Korea's Moon Discuss Lingering Wartime Disputes”, The Japan Times, 16 October 2021.
• 37. Jesse Johnson and Satoshi Sugiyama, “North Korea Tests Apparent Sub-launched Ballistic Missile for First Time Since 2019”, The Japan Times, 19 October 2021.
• 38. Dmitry Antonov and Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, “Kremlin Says It Disagrees with Japan's Sovereignty Claim Over Islands”, Reuters, 12 October 2021.
• 39. “Japan PM Kishida Faces Diplomatic Challenges After Election Win”, Kyodo News, 1 November 2021.
• 40. “Japan Military Legislation Changes Draw Protests”, BBC News, 30 August 2015.
• 41. “Defense White Paper”, Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2021, p. 19.
• 42. “Interview: Kishi Urges Stronger Taiwan-US-Japan Ties”, Taipei Times, 19 December 2016.
• 43. William Sposato, “Japan’s Foreign Minister Faces Tough Calls on China”, Foreign Policy, 11 November 2021.
• 44. “Japan, China Agree to Begin Operating Defense Hotline Next Year”, Kyodo News, 27 December 2021.
• 45. Kim Hyun-Ki and Sarah Kim, “Abe’s Reshuffle Promotes Right-wingers”, Korea JoongAng Daily, 4 September 2014.
• 46. Tobias Harris, “The Small Pacifist Party That Could Shape Japan’s Future”, Foreign Policy, 4 November 2021.