Triggered by the recent hike in auto gas prices, the current crisis in Kazakhstan appears to be an expression of the long-term frustrations of common Kazakhs with the political system.
Kazakhstan is embroiled in its worst public unrest since it separated from the Soviet Union three decades ago. A simmering public discontent was always on the horizon,1 but the final straw accentuating the unease was the recent hike in auto gas prices announced by the government.2 Several residents of the western oil town of Zhanaozen took to streets on 2 January 2022. The protests soon spread across the country, with thousands joining in the demonstrations. Things took a turn for the worse two days later on account of large-scale arson throughout the country. Government buildings including the presidential palace in Almaty, the former capital of Kazakhstan, were breached and set on fire.3 Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev vainly tried to control the unrest by restoring back the subsidies and in a final desperate attempt, even ordered the resignation of the government. Realising the gravity of the situation, he turned to Russia for support. CSTO Peacekeepers, a joint force of about 3,600 personnel from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) countries and Russian paratroopers, have since been deployed in the country, notably the first operational deployment of CSTO since its inception in 1999.4 The violent protests have led to casualties on both sides amidst reports that President Tokayev has ordered troops to fire without warning.5
Current Crisis
The origins of the current crisis can be traced to the same energy-rich Zhanaozen region near the Caspian Sea, where in 2011,6 an unrest over low wages had led to oil workers going on strike. The crackdown that followed led to several fatalities. A precipitous calm had abounded the oil-rich region since then.
In the ongoing crisis, while the ground situation appears hazy yet it looks like the government has been able to suppress the unrest from rioters, whom President Tokayev has referred to as, “foreign backed armed terrorists” and “bandits disguised as protesters”.7 In a bid to calm the protests, President Tokayev took over the Chairmanship of National Security Council from his mentor Nazarbayev, replaced Prime Minister Askar Mamin with Alikhan Smailov and removed Head of National Security Committee (the domestic intelligence agency or KNB) Karim Massimov. A state of emergency has been declared in several regions and an uneasy quiet prevails in the country.
Rule of the Political Obstinacy
In the last three decades, the political dispensation in Kazakhstan has hovered around the personality of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who ruled Kazakhstan with an iron hand for 30 years, right from the time of its independence in 1991. An old communist leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev was the Prime Minister of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic even during Soviet times. He anointed himself as the ‘leader of the nation’ and retained key positions at the time of stepping down in 2019 at 81 years of age. These included the head of the all-powerful National Security Council and the Chief of the ruling Nur Otan party. A longstanding colleague of his, Kassym Tokayev took over as President in 2019 promising to continue his mentor’s policies.8
The popular belief in Kazakhstan is that it is Nazarbayev, not eager to relinquish power, who calls the shots in the government, and not Tokayev.9 Another popular perception is that Nazarbayev is preparing the ground to enable his daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva to emerge as the future leader.10 The common cry during the recent protests, therefore, was ‘Shal-ket’ meaning ‘Leave old man’.11 So intense were the protests against Nazarbayev in Almaty that his statue was pulled down, a visual reminiscent of the pulling down of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad.
In light of these sentiments, the current crisis appears to be an expression of the long-term frustrations of common Kazakhs with the political system, which has expanded the rich–poor divide and fuelled corruption.12 The opposition seems directed against Nazarbayev’s policies and systems which have bred kleptocracy.13
Notably, energy-rich Kazakhstan has recently faced several challenges in the energy and food sectors. Last year, it had to rely on Russia for electricity when its power plants failed to generate enough output.14 Rising food prices forced the government to ban export of several commodities.15
Interestingly, the ongoing protest is being supported by Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan Party. Headed by former Energy Minister Mukhtar Ablyazov, now in exile in France, Ablyazov has called upon the citizens to protest the presence of Russian troops in Kazakhstan, claiming that it will embolden President Putin to interfere and control Kazakhstan.16
In this context, Russia’s alacrity in sending troops embedded as CSTO Peacekeepers have raised many eyebrows. Given the fact that such a request had earlier been turned down17 for Kyrgyzstan amidst the ‘Melon Revolution’ as well as for Armenia in the recent Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, several questions loom large about their deployment and Kazakhstan’s inability to deal with internal security threats. President Tokayev’s panicky requisition of the CSTO and Russian forces and ordering key changes in administration is being projected by the opposition as a sign that the President no longer trusts his own forces.18 Critics have opined that the decision to rapidly deploy CSTO forces was a manoeuvre to protect Tokayev’s presidency.19
Regional Geo-political Stakes
Kazakhstan shares long boundaries with Russia, China, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Any instability in Astana will inevitably impact these countries. In this context, the importance of Kazakhstan for Russia can hardly be overstated. Russia has interests in the defence, space, oil and Uranium mining sectors in Kazakhstan. The two countries also share a 7,600-km long border. The border is porous and can be easily infiltrated.20 This is a serious vulnerability considering the likelihood of spill-over of radical Islam and narcotics from the Af-Pak region. President Tokayev had also indicated that the protesters were terrorists drawn from the ranks operating in the Middle East, Afghanistan and the IS.21
However, Kazakhstan has followed multi-vectored foreign and economic policies independent of Moscow. Nazarbayev had even changed Kazakh alphabets from Cyrillic to Latin.22 Russian–Kazakh ties saw consternation in 2020, when Deputy of Russian Duma called the current territory of Kazakhstan as a gift from Russia.23 There has been a lurking fear in Kazakhstan that Russia may annex the northern provinces of Kazakhstan which is home to 3.5 million ethnic Russians in a manner similar to Crimea.24 Such misgivings in bilateral relations have kept both countries on tenterhooks for long even though Kazakhstan is a member of CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)—brainchild of Russia to preserve its sphere of influence in Eurasia.
Russia’s intervention in the current crisis could draw the Kazakh government closer towards Russia possibly as a quid pro quo for its timely support. This could lead to Russia weaning Kazakhstan back to its orbit in a manner similar to the Belarus model. The widespread view, despite Russia’s denials is that, Russia could use the security forces deployment as an opportunity to seek space for a permanent military deployment in Kazakhstan.25 At present, Russia has no military bases in the country.
Similarly, the current crisis could also impact China. Kazakhstan is a Muslim majority country. Under Nazarbayev, there had been a massive crackdown on political Islam.26 Kazakh Muslims are the second largest indigenous community in Xinjiang after Uyghurs.27 Almaty, the epicentre of the current protests, is close to Xinjiang. Seen in this light, China has praised the Kazakh government’s crackdown on protestors. Stability in Central Asia is vital for the China’s Silk Road Economic Belt that passes through the region.
The US too has significant investments in the energy sector of Kazakhstan. Astana partners NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative28 apart from hosting an annual military peacekeeping exercise, Ex Steppe Eagle, with the US.29 So far, the US has denied any role in the unrest and links to fanning anti-Russian sentiments in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and elsewhere.30
Conclusion
Russia remains sensitive to its waning influence in its neighbourhood amidst the attempts by the West as well as China to expand their footprints in Eurasia. The guarded response of the western powers may not soothe Moscow’s nerves considering a large number of Russia’s neighbours have been rocked by socio-economic unrest and colour revolutions, such as Rose Revolution in Georgia and Orange Revolution in Ukraine.31 Ongoing developments in Ukraine can provide ‘fodder-fuel’ for anti-Russian sentiments in neighbouring countries including Kazakhstan. Russia is likely to do everything in its powers to keep Kazakhstan in a tight embrace. A Russia–West geo-political contestation could be in the offing.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Iran’s Regional Diplomatic Push: Is a Breakthrough with Riyadh Possible?
Deepika Saraswat
January 10, 2022
Iran’s readiness for restoring diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia after six years since Riyadh cut ties in January 2016 is part of broader revival of diplomacy in the region after a decade of intense geopolitical competition and proxy wars involving Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies and Turkey & Iran.
On 23 December 2021, Iran’s Foreign Minister (FM) Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, while addressing a joint press meet with his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein hailed the efforts made by the Iraqi government to clear misunderstandings between Iran and Saudi Arabia.1 Abdollahian declared that Tehran would participate in the next round of talks with Riyadh, which would also be held in Baghdad. More importantly, he expressed readiness for exchanging visits of technical delegations to their “respective embassies and make necessary preparations for the restoration of mutual relations”.2 Abdollahian’s remarks put to rest the doubts about future course of Iran–Saudi dialogue as many in Iran, including Abdollahian himself, have blamed Riyadh for “delayed repatriation” of Tehran’s envoy to Yemen, Hassan Irloo, who died of Covid-19 two days after he returned home.3
Since April 2021, when Tehran and Riyadh initiated behind-the-scenes talks in Baghdad in parallel to the talks between Iran and P4+1 and the US in Vienna to revive the nuclear agreement, four rounds of dialogue have been completed. The latest round of talks was held in September soon after Iran’s newly elected President Ebrahim Raisi had put together his foreign policy team. The Iranian side outlined regional diplomacy as its priority and expressed its willingness to raise the level of negotiators.4 Saudi FM Faisal bin-Farhan al-Saud, while confirming behind-the-scenes talks with Tehran, maintained that they were still in an “exploratory phase” and expressed hope that the “talks will resolve the issues stuck between the two countries”.5 Iran’s readiness for dialogue and restoring diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia after six years since Riyadh cut ties in January 2016 is part of broader revival of diplomacy in the region after a decade of intense geopolitical competition and proxy wars involving Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies and Turkey and Iran. A unified regional policy under Raisi administration and the US support for regional diplomacy means that a détente might be reached between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
A Unified Regional Policy under Raisi Administration
Unlike during the Rouhani administration, when there were differences over Iran’s regional policy between Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the powerful security-intelligence apparatus, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Raisi administration’s regional policy appears to be cohesive, and coordinated with the IRGC. It is worth noting that FM Hossein Abdollahian is a career diplomat with wide-ranging experience in Iran’s Arab neighbourhood. His last official title was deputy foreign minister for Arab and North Africa Affairs (2011–16). Having handled Iranian policies towards Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain in the tumultuous years after the Arab uprisings, his vision of Iran’s regional policy closely resembles that of the IRGC. Soon after being confirmed as the Foreign Minister, he met with the IRGC’s Quds Force’s Commander Brigadier General Esmail Qa’ani, during which he lauded the Quds Force for its role in fighting terrorism in the region and stated that foreign ministry under his watch “will proudly follow the path of martyred General Soleimani”.6
In May 2021 in the aftermath of the leaked audio of former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s interview criticising the IRGC for undermining foreign ministry’s regional diplomacy, Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, had publicly lauded the Guards as “being the biggest, effective factor in preventing passive diplomacy in West Asia”.7 As Raisi government seeks dialogue with its Gulf neighbours, the IRGC is strengthening military capabilities and deterrence against pressure from United States (US) and threats from Israel. As the Foreign Ministry pushes for political resolution of regional issues, the IRGC and its allies in the ‘resistance axis’ raise the costs of anti-Iran policy by regional rivals.8 This unified approach was on display in the wake of the five-day large-scale naval and air defense exercise by the IRGC covering the coastlines of the three southern provinces of Hormozgan, Bushehr and Khuzestan.9 The exercise took place just days before the eighth round of nuclear talks began between Iran and signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and amid renewed Israeli threats of military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Congratulating the IRGC on the exercise, President Raisi echoed the Guards message of deterrence: “Any hostile action by our enemies will face a comprehensive and definitive response from the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran that would change the strategic equations significantly.”10 The convergence of views between the executive and the IRGC which is loyal to the Supreme Leader Khamenei means that the Raisi administration does not have to fear domestic sabotage as it engages Riyadh in a dialogue on contentious regional issues.11 Further, dialogue with neighbours including Saudi Arabia is seen by Raisi administration as a crucial step towards strengthening economic relations with neighbours as the long-term strategy to counter Western economic sanctions. The GCC countries such as the UAE and Oman are seen by Iran as major re-exporting hub for Iranian goods. During the last Iranian financial year (March 2020–2021), Iran–UAE trade increased by 7 per cent in value terms at US$ 14.28 billion, Iran’s second biggest trading partner after China.12
Changing Regional Geopolitical Landscape
Over the last decade which started with Arab uprisings, regional states seeking regime survival and geopolitical influence resorted to direct military interventions, participated in shifting trans-national alliances, and supported proxy groups in other states resulting in the regionalisation of conflict and security in West Asia. However, the risks of tensions leading to a full-scale war, fears of overstretch among states involved in region’s various conflict theatres and the overriding domestic priority of economic concerns amid the Covid-19 pandemic seem to have nudged key regional states to seek de-escalation and dialogue. The year 2021 began with the thawing of Saudi–Emirati relations with Qatar, behind-the-scenes talk between Iran and Saudi Arabia began in April in Baghdad, in November the United Arab Emirates (UAE) FM Sheikh Abdulla bin Zayed visited Syria and Turkey, and in December the UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin-Zayed Al-Nahyan visited Tehran following the visit of Iran’s chief nuclear negotiation Ali Bagheri to Dubai just before the resumption of nuclear talks in Vienna. These diplomatic exchanges suggest that region’s rivals and adversaries are now seeking avenues to mitigate many conflicts within the region.
In November 2021, the commander of IRGC’s advisory forces in Syria for six years, General Javad Ghaffari returned to Iran. Reportedly, Gen Ghaffari’s departure came in the wake of drone attacks in October 2021 targeting Al-Tanf US military base near Syria’s border crossing with Iraq and Jordan.13 With war phase being nearly over in Syria, Damascus is fearful of actions triggering an unwanted war with Israel and is reaching out to its Arab neighbours. With the UAE and Egypt supporting Syria’s integration into Arab world after more than 10 years of isolation, Iran’s focus in Syria is likely to shift from military to political and economic relations conducted through embassies of the two states. Following Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership in August 2021, where he protested against Syria not being invited to the regional forum, he visited Syria. The focus of Abdollahian’s Syria visit was to enhance the bilateral relations in the face of “economic terrorism” or sanctions faced by the two countries.14 Similarly, in Yemen, another long-drawn conflict, notwithstanding the recent escalation in the two-year old battle for Marib, Riyadh is nowhere close to realising its objective of restoring the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi after six years of war.15 Further, Biden administration’s withdrawal of support from Saudi-led coalition’s offensive operations in Yemen means that Riyadh sooner or later will have to find political solution to the crisis. For its part, Tehran has offered to enable a political solution in Yemen, while its Houthis allies have kept up pressure on Riyadh by sustained attacks on Saudi territory. Riyadh is so far holding its breath arguing that it will judge the Raisi government’s invitation to diplomacy by the reality on the ground.16
US Support for Regional Diplomacy
The ongoing phase of de-escalation between Iran and its Gulf neighbours began in earnest in 2019 when Iran reeling under Washington’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, retaliated by attacking Gulf shipping and energy infrastructure. The risk of direct war with Iran and uncertainties about the US security guarantees led key US allies the UAE and Saudi Arabia to seek dialogue with Tehran. Further, Biden administration has not only reversed Trump’s anti-Iran efforts, by engaging Tehran to revive the JCPOA, it is also encouraging its Gulf allies for dialogue with Iran. In the run up to the resumption of nuclear talks following Iran’s presidential election, US special envoy on Iran, Robert Malley visited its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies and Israel. At Riyadh, Malley and political directors of the E3 (France, Germany, the UK) held dialogue with GCC states and issued joint statement noting that “a return to mutual compliance with the [nuclear deal] would benefit the entire Middle East”.17 Later, speaking at Manama Dialogue, Malley argued that Iran’s destabilising activities—ballistic missiles, explosive drones and terrorist militias—are not America’s problems, and should be solved independent of nuclear talks and in negotiations between Iran and its regional opponents.18 Notably, Malley’s position was closer to Iran’s own “principled position” on resolving regional issues through “interaction and cooperation”.19
Previously, in the wake of the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015, Rouhani administration had sought to initiate dialogue with Iran’s Gulf neighbours but the policy ran into straits as Iran and Saudi Arabia found themselves on the opposite sides in conflict in Syria, Yemen and competed for influence in the broader region of West Asia and North Africa. This time around, the dialogue between Tehran and Riyadh is happening in a vastly different regional and international context favouring continuing de-escalation of tensions. As the fate of Iran–Saudi diplomacy seems to be entwined with that of the nuclear talks in Vienna, Tehran is also keen on presenting itself as a ‘constructive player’ by taking forward its dialogue with Riyadh.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Japan is manifesting refreshing confidence drawing from its resolve to push the envelope of positive pacifism while determining the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.
The year 2022 will be a decisive year as defence policy elites in Tokyo are shoring up deterrence with review of Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS), in addition to key defence documents including the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP). From rebooting the Diet debate on constitutional reforms1 to deepening the conversation on enemy-base strike capability2 to doubling defence budget—how Japan rewires its national security doctrine is the space to watch for in the coming months.
Defence ministry as well as the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) Research Commission on Security and National Defence Division panel, led by former defence minister Itsunori Onodera3 are debating realistic options in pursuing Japan’s national security goals as the strategic environment has changed drastically since the first NSS was conceived in 2013. The current NSS predates intense US–China strategic competition and the Covid-19 pandemic. As Beijing advances naval and air power, further sophisticates its missile capability and nuclear force, and Pyongyang demonstrates no tangible progress on denuclearisation, Tokyo has no room for strategic ambivalence and miscalculations. The bold choice of an armoured samurai warrior on the cover page of Japan’s 2021 Defence White Paper demonstrates a refreshing confidence amongst the next generation defence planners.4 The shift in the optics—from the Fuji and plum flowers to an armoured samurai—carries the categorical message of Japan’s changing nature as a security actor and its resolve to push the envelope of positive pacifism in determining the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.5
In the year ahead, Japan’s political class, defence planners as well as the strategic community will have to navigate difficult choices amid post-Covid economic risks, demographic dilemma, constitutional limitations and alliance politics while addressing key security challenges on the high-table. These include reviewing the effectiveness of the US–Japan spear and shield strategy, alliance management, especially weaving an effective joint operational plan for a Taiwan contingency, and addressing the strike gap in US–Japan alliance and China6, and providing more teeth to the Coast Guard Act amid intensifying Chinese grey zone tactics. The policy options regarding missile defence and the discussion on enemy-base strike capabilities, and what type of strike capabilities to pursue, will be at the centre stage. The strategic discussion on whether to accept US intermediate range missiles on Japanese territory, and weighing the pros and cons of having nuclear-powered submarines, a conversation that gained traction following AUKUS, are also preoccupying the mind space of defence planners. Additionally, framing robust economic security legislations to advance Japan’s autonomy and indispensability7 is also amongst the top agendas.
The policy deliberations on ramping up the defence budget to 2 per cent of the GDP vis-à-vis Japan’s unsustainable public debt challenge will further evolve.8 Ruling LDP's Research Commission on National Security has previously argued the case elevating the budget to around 2 per cent of GDP, a target embraced by NATO. The recent LDP election manifesto also referred to the NATO defence spending goals. Defence Minister Kishi Nobuo has argued in favour of stepping up defence budget with the aim of bolstering “capabilities at a radically different pace”9 at a time when China’s defence budget, despite issues of transparency, remains more than four times higher.10 As Japan sits on the front line, the self-imposed policy of 1 per cent cap on defence spending which can be traced back to early 1970s is outdated. In late December 2021, the Cabinet approved a defence budget of US$ 47 billion for fiscal 202211, continuing the northward trends in the last decade. While regional powers often critically analyse the discussion on increasing defence budget through the lens of Japan’s return to militarism, the debate itself is an old one. The US has long urged Japan for equitable burden sharing. For instance, in the late 1980s, former defence secretary Frank Carlucci in his report to the Congress advocated that Japan must significantly bolster its self-defence capability. There was resolution calling on Japan to spend around 3 per cent of its Gross National Product (GNP) annually on defence.12
As President Xi Jinping pursues a third term as general secretary of the party, Taiwan remains his core project and reunification is central to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. The military balance is shifting in the western Pacific and it is important to avoid miscalculations. The debate between strategic ambiguity versus strategic clarity vis-à-vis Taiwan has gained momentum in the defence policy conversation not just in Washington, but also in Tokyo. Is it time to impart strategic clarity on Taiwan without provoking conflict from China on the one hand and not emboldening Taiwan to formally declare independence on the other? While some argue that strategic ambiguity approach has lost steam, there is a school of thought which suggests that keeping the position on cross-strait contingency ambiguous serves Japan better to avoid entanglement.13
The pivotal issue of stabilising the situation surrounding Taiwan, which is intrinsically linked to Japan’s security, is not just framed in the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) and the 2021 Defence White Paper, leading political figures including Abe Shinzo, Kishi Nobuo, Nakayama Yasuhide, Aso Taro and Takaichi Sanae are also shaping the conversation that a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency given its proximity to Okinawa. Furthermore, the argument about protecting Taiwan as a fellow democracy has also gained traction.14 Meanwhile, the ruling LDP has intensified its discussion on formulating a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act.15 It has further consolidated its relationship with Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), especially on the economic security vertical. Former Prime Minister Abe is positioned centre stage in the Taiwan discussion. In his recent call “Rise up Taiwan” at the US–Japan–Taiwan Trilateral Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue, he advocated deeper defence technology cooperation across domains.
Although a conventional war on Taiwan is an unrealistic option and PLA’s power projection is essentially a pressure tactics, there is a strong view in Japan that invasion of Dongsha Islands situated in the South China Sea and controlled by Taipei, is a possibility.16 Some consider it as President Xi Jinping’s “easy target” to test waters on American response. Thus, US–Japan alliance must work towards defence of Taiwan by formulating joint operational plans beyond the Senkaku Islands, focussing on a possible Taiwan contingency, bolster missile defence capabilities and deploy medium-range missiles on the first island chain, deepen joint training and exercises, and strengthen intelligence sharing via the US.17 The revised NSS, NDPG, the US–Japan Defence Guidelines, and advanced interoperability will be indicative of the progress. Moreover, Tokyo may also consider enabling a legal framework on similar lines with Washington for providing arms to Taipei despite their commitment to the one-China principle.18 While a sense of crisis concerning Taiwan is dominating the mind space of defence elites amid internationalisation of the Taiwan issue, the key question is, will Japan outline a legal framework to add more depth to its Taiwan policy?
Meanwhile, the renewed debate on enemy-base strike capability after the cancellation of Aegis Ashore reflects that there is support for balancing offence and defence capabilities.19 Following the conversation in Japan indicate that while some argue for “limited” strike capability aimed at preserving the regional military balance,20 others articulate that striking the enemy with the objective of securing Japan is a defensive strategy—‘offensive defence’ or ‘active defence’.21 In July 2020, LDP advocated that Japan should have “the ability to head off missiles in enemy territory”.22 Meanwhile former defence and foreign minister Kono Taro advocates that the discussions should be anchored on deterrence, focussing on the ability to strike enemy-bases to take out launch sites, conduct ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) operations, building air superiority, and gauging the effectiveness of strikes.23 It is important to note that Tokyo already decided on hypersonic cruise missiles and hypervelocity guiding projectiles.
The discourse on strike capability is hardly new and the roots can be traced to Prime Minister Hatoyama’s administration in 1956, laying the foundation of strike debate. But garnering wider public support on the subject within the frame of the pacifist constitution proved challenging. This is reflective of the larger trend where defence and security policy debates often slide into constitutional and legal question, complicating Japan’s options. While Tokyo is expected to craft a defensive narrative on strike capability, how the region reacts will considerably determine the future course of East Asian security.
In the coming months, the region will keenly observe how Tokyo’s exclusively defence oriented post-war security posture evolves. In rejecting a Sino-centric regional order, the priority will be to reorient Tokyo’s defence posture in close coordination with Washington, and further synergising strategies for seamless operational coordination given the fast-changing dynamics of warfare and new domains of power projection such as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. NSS 2013 accorded priority to South Korea but Japan–South Korea relations suffered considerably in recent years drawing from the baggage of history. However, policy elites must ensure that bilateral fault lines should not adversely impact the strategic goals of the US–Japan–South Korea coordination in handling the threats coming from Pyongyang. The revised NSS will position US–Japan alliance at the core, and further align Tokyo’s security interests with the Quad powers—Australia and India, members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and strategic partners in Europe, including France, the UK and Germany in pursuit of keeping the strategic space of Indo-Pacific “free” and “open”. Japan as an ardent advocate of rules-based order will step up and is expected to proactively mobilise resources to deliver global public goods in the post-Covid era. Japan is manifesting refreshing confidence drawing from its resolve to push the envelope of positive pacifism in determining the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Kremlin’s increasingly assertive stance on the troop build-up along the Russia–Ukraine border can be viewed as not just prompted by Ukraine’s potential NATO membership but also as Russia underscoring its place as a stakeholder in shaping European security architecture.
Alarm bells have been ringing in Eastern Europe about the motives of the large Russian troop build-up along the Russia–Ukraine border. Moscow and Kiev have blamed each other for upping the ante. This has been followed by a sharp escalation in rhetoric and mutual recriminations. Naturally, a sense of déjà vu prevails in the region1 amidst the Kremlin’s increasingly assertive stance on the troop build-up. Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014 remains fresh in European memory.
Unsurprisingly, given the geo-political stakes involved in the heart of Europe, the ongoing standoff has brought the West led by the US into the existing security matrix. President Biden has assured Kiev of United States' “unwavering support”.2 Meanwhile, the European Union has been vocal in imposing "massive consequences and severe costs" on Russia.3
Notably, the fears of an imminent Russian invasion appear to have subsided post recent Putin–Biden talks. It seems that emphasis has been placed on dialogue4 to establish a new modus vivendi. This has seen Russia submit proposals to the US5 and NATO6 highlighting not only its red-lines but also to jointly build a new model of European security architecture. However, President Putin’s assertion of maintaining “tensions for as long as possible”7 to accommodate Russia’s concerns, some of which appear non-negotiable for the West, highlight the minefield which needs to be navigated in this standoff.
The pertinent questions which, therefore, arise are the timing of Russia’s sabre-rattling and its potential outcome.
Timing and Motive of Russian Troop Build-Up
The timing of Russia’s troop build-up can likely be attributed to Ukraine’s westward drift gaining momentum over the course of the last year. Kiev has increasingly acquired lethal Western weapons apart from conducting multiple military exercises with Russia's bête noire—the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).8 NATO has also helped build Ukraine’s military infrastructure, including ports and airfields. These developments are likely to have increased Russia’s insecurity of Ukraine becoming a de-facto NATO base right at Moscow’s doorstep.
In this context, the Ukrainian imbroglio remains an existential issue for Russia. Kiev’s importance as a geo-strategic buffer for the Kremlin vis-à-vis the West is a pivotal element of Russia’s security. This is particularly relevant amidst the Western attempts to seemingly contain and isolate Russia in its neighbourhood.
Meanwhile, contrary to Russia’s expectations, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appears to be putting all his eggs in the Western basket, in a volte-face of his election manifesto of normalising ties with Moscow. This is reflected in Ukraine reneging on the Minsk agreements, 9 which lay down the framework for creating an autonomous region in eastern Ukraine comprising Donbas and Luhansk. This would have given Russia the levers to maintain its influence in the region through its proxies. Notably, France and Germany, the two key interlocutors in the Minsk agreements, have increasingly sided with Ukraine, much to Russia’s chagrin.10
Arguably, the troop build-up is Russia’s signalling to the West to respect its red-lines. Ukrainian membership of NATO likely tops this list. For three decades, Russia has seen NATO ignore its concerns by inducting not only the erstwhile Warsaw Pact members but also former Soviet Republics. Similarly, the installation of NATO missile defences in Russia’s periphery has been another key bone of contention.11 Russia remains peeved at these historic injustices.12 The Kremlin believes that the West reneged on assurances of accommodating Russia’s security concerns, at the time of Soviet Union's dissolution.13 It appears that the Kremlin’s next move on the European geo-political chessboard is coercive diplomacy in order to force a security dialogue with the West. In that sense, the troop build-up can be viewed as not just prompted by Ukraine’s potential NATO membership but also as Russia underscoring its place as a stakeholder in shaping European security architecture.
Russia is perhaps leveraging its escalation dominance and the perceived lack of appetite in the West for a military confrontation to seek accommodation of its interests. Similarly, Moscow could be banking on President Biden’s message of building stable relationship with Russia.14 Implied in this is freeing up the US to confront head-on the challenge posed by China’s rise. Meanwhile, having weathered Western sanctions for seven years, it is unlikely that the threat of additional ones or even a freeze in an already frosty relationship with the West will deter Russia from upping the ante. It helps that foreign policy is increasingly a source of domestic legitimacy for the Russian political establishment, anchored in making Russia 'great again'. And Ukraine and NATO do strike an emotive chord among Russian citizens.
Outcome
From a Russian perspective, the Kremlin’s aggressive posture appears to have borne a few immediate dividends. This includes a flurry of interactions with Russia’s main antagonist, the US which culminated in a virtual summit between the two Presidents. One of its key takeaways was President Biden’s perceived conciliatory tone on both Ukraine and European security architecture.15 The US’ emphasis on Kiev fulfilling its obligations under the Minsk agreements16, where Russia has a distinct advantage, would likely have been music to Russia’s ears. Similarly, a dialogue on European security, long perceived to be a no-go area between Russia and the West, is now back on the agenda.17
Future Ramifications
As always, the devil lies in the details. Russia’s two draft treaty proposals18 to the US and NATO on legally binding security guarantees would upend the existing European security architecture. Three key propositions which are likely to be non-negotiable for the West stand out. These involve halting NATO expansion eastwards in the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, and a large-scale US military withdrawal from the European continent. The latter involves removal of American tactical and nuclear missiles. Russia is also seeking a dilution of NATO’s military commitment to its eastern European members who had joined the alliance in May 1997. Implied in these proposals is Russia’s message of Moscow and Europe alone determining the course of European security. From a Western perspective, these proposals would entail giving Russia a veto on NATO’s future course of action.
Arguably, a new model of security interaction in Europe can only emerge if Russia and the West start looking at each other through a new prism amidst their existing trust deficit, with Russia increasingly seen as a European outlier.
In this context, President Biden would have to do a tough balancing act to dial down, in his words, the “political temperature along the eastern front”.19 This includes, on one hand, preserving NATO’s alliance integrity amidst shared concerns about Russia, especially among its eastern European members, and, on the other hand, persevering with the US goal of building stable relations with Russia to enable it to fully focus on the China challenge.
Crucially, it is also in Russia’s interests to reset ties with the West. Today, the Western pressure on Moscow has pushed it towards a closer embrace of Beijing. However, Russia is paying the price of the unbalanced nature of its ties with China by being forced to cede space to Beijing in its core strategic space. For Russia’s strategic autonomy, it is essential to have a modicum of equilibrium in ties with both its western and eastern neighbours. Indeed, there exist multiple areas globally where Russia–West interests converge. Perhaps, raising the stakes of the draft treaty proposals is more of a negotiating tactic20 in discussions that are likely to be long-drawn.
Conclusion
Nevertheless, all bets on a reset of ties would likely be off if Russia feels rebuffed. Having put the onus of a détente on the West, Russia’s credibility of coercive diplomacy would be at stake if its concerns are not accommodated. The starting point for Russia is likely to be a neutral Ukraine.
An alternate viewpoint could be that by making it almost impossible for the West to accept Russia’s proposals, the Kremlin’s gameplan has all along been a military intervention. In the same vein, a provocation by Ukraine in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, similar to the modus operandi adopted by Georgia’s Saakashvili in 2008, could lead to a Russian military intervention. Kiev has increasingly found itself on the backfoot amidst the US calls for it to implement the Minsk agreements.
Needless to say, a Russian invasion of Ukraine would scupper chances of a détente between Russia and the West. Russia would face crippling sanctions including abrogation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Ukraine’s membership of NATO could also be fast-tracked. The Russia–China relationship could gain further traction.
For India, attempts by Russia and the West to explore a new modus vivendi is likely a positive development. For the last seven years, the push and pull of the Russia–West confrontation has complicated India’s foreign policy options, with India expected to choose sides. Their détente would make it easier to navigate ties with both sides. There is no gainsaying that India’s ties with Moscow and West remain mutually beneficial and bolster India’s strategic autonomy.
Crucially, normalisation of their ties could also give Moscow some breathing space in its growing strategic dependence on China, which has compelled Russia to increasingly bat for Beijing’s interests. The Russia–China tandem has muddied India’s geo-strategic environment. A Russia–US thaw could provide an opportunity to add more pillars to the Indo-Russian strategic partnership with ramifications stretching beyond their bilateral realm.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Prolonged political crisis, social unrest, pre-existing economic misery, and outbreak of a diplomatic crisis between Lebanon and the Gulf countries have left Lebanon in a debilitated state. Systemic reforms to tackle the economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian challenges, are the need of the hour.
Lebanon has been trapped in a seemingly endless turmoil since 2019 with little hope of any solution in immediate sight. The demonstrations which started as a response to the worsening economic situation and corruption in the political system have been haunting the country at regular intervals. Lebanon is facing a three-pronged crisis which has left it in a debilitated state on the economic and political fronts. While on the one hand, there had been a long-drawn political crisis resulting in almost a 2-year-long political deadlock in the country, on the other hand, the 2020 Beirut blast aggravated the pre-existing economic misery and brought the country close to a state collapse. Amidst the turmoil, in September 2021, the formation of a new government sparked hope for an improvement in the condition of the country. However, merely one and a half months later, the outbreak of a diplomatic crisis between Lebanon and the Gulf countries (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait), triggered by Lebanon’s former Information Minister George Kordahi’s comments over Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, has made the situation in Lebanon far more volatile. Not only has this proven to be the country’s worst economic nightmare, but coupled with the domestic unrest and pre-existing unstable political system, has made it immensely difficult for it to show any signs of recovery.
Political Instability
For Lebanon, maintaining political stability has been a major challenge. Since 2009, no prime minister has been able to serve for more than three years. One of the major reasons for this is the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics. The political system of Lebanon is such that the three key positions in government namely, President (Maronite Christian), Prime Minister (Sunni Muslim) and Speaker of the Parliament (Shia Muslim) belong to different religious affinities1, thus resulting in frequent dissents. Furthermore, the positions in the government are divided on the basis of quota among 18 recognised sects.2 Each group constituting the coalition has its supporters and claims to fight for the interests of the same. Thus, the leaders and the sectarian groups are continuously at loggerheads with each other.
In addition to this, the political elite are considered highly “self-centred” by the populace. They are accused of exploiting state resources and benefiting themselves at the cost of the public.3 They also collude with businesses and further their interests. Such discontent often takes the form of protests against the political establishment, making the government step down before the completion of its term. Instability of the government has a negative effect on the economy since there is persistent policy paralysis, further fuelling the anger among the already suffering population.
In October 2019, Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned due to massive anti-government protests, and in a span of merely two years Lebanon has seen a change of four prime ministers. In 2021, under severe domestic and international pressure a new government was formed after intense negotiations with other partners. However, political instability still looms over Lebanon as the next parliamentary elections are scheduled for 27 March 2022, which means that the current government has only a few more months to govern. Under such a situation, one cannot expect the government to take any major steps to resolve the economic degradation.
Internal Disorder
Domestically, a strong anti-government sentiment has taken root in the minds of the Lebanese population, reflected in the frequent protests against the state. The major reasons for this include widespread corruption and the inability of the government to stabilise the economy, which has given rise to distrust among the people. Lebanon has seen a fall in its score along the Corruption Perception Index from 28 in 2019 to 25 in 2020, effectively a change of 10.71 per cent.4
Lebanon has also lately witnessed some deepening of sectarian divisions. In an unfortunate spate of events, a protest organised by Hezbollah and Amal in October 2021 against Judge Tarek Bitar, who is leading the investigation in the Beirut Blast case, turned violent after an unknown armed sniper opened fire on protesters.5 This resulted in an armed conflict between the Lebanese armed forces, predominantly Christians, and the protestors who were Hezbollah and Amal supporters. This was the first time after the Civil War (1975–1990) that violent armed conflict was seen on the streets of Lebanon.6
Lebanon is also undergoing worst times in terms of availability of essentials and basic utilities. The Beirut blast coupled with the pandemic has caused shortages of fuel, food and medicines. Fuel shortages due to foreign exchange crises have shut down its power stations. The dearth of sufficient foreign exchange has also been a roadblock in Lebanon subsidising imports of essential commodities such as food and medicine.7
While the Lebanese state has been facing challenges in ensuring employment opportunities for its citizens, the immigration of refugees from Syria and Palestine has exerted additional pressure on the state resources. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates, there are 1.5 million Syrians in Lebanon and approximately 0.2 million Palestinians.8
Another irritant in Lebanon is Hezbollah, which has become a major obstacle in maintaining stability in the country. It is a political party and paramilitary force as well as a designated terror group by the US.9 Its strong military power, share of seats in parliament and overwhelming regional support from Syria and Iran, make it indispensable in the government formation process.However, it has also attracted the disdain of the public for its involvement in corrupt practices, violence against Lebanese citizens and exercising harshmeasures against peaceful protestors. Its members were also summoned by Judge Tarek Bitarfor their involvement in the 2020 Beirut Port Blast case, to which they retaliated by protesting along with Amal supporters in October 2021.10
Additionally, Hezbollah also receives outstanding support from Iran and works as its proxy in the country thereby allowing Iran to use Lebanon as a playground to achieve its regional objectives. This has been a major reason behind the Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia presenting an aggressive posture towards Lebanon as Saudi Arabia perceives Iran a major security threat in the region. It has also created a “state within a state” in Lebanon which is damaging its political economy and diplomatic standing, leaving the country isolated during difficult times.11
Struggling Economy
Lebanon’s unprecedented political, economic and diplomatic crisis has had major socio-economic outfalls accompanied by humanitarian misery. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, “the economy has already contracted by about 30 percent since 2017 and is expected to contract further in 2021–22”.12 The economic contraction has resulted in a rise in the unemployment rate from 6.04 per cent in 2019 to 6.6 per cent in 2020.13 This has left many on the brink of impoverishment. According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA) estimates, the multidimensional poverty rate doubled from 42 per cent in 2019 to 82 per cent in 2021.14
The Lebanese Lira has also seen a 90 per cent fall in its value, aggravating general inflationary pressures with food prices experiencing a ten-fold increase.15 At the same time, the pandemic has taken a heavy toll on the economy and there is an urgent need for governance and fiscal reforms coupled with financial restructuring. In the light of the above, the IMF has made certain policy recommendations to get the Lebanese economy back on track. These include strengthening the anti-corruption framework and reforming the state-owned enterprises; debt restructuring to enhance credibility and expanding the social safety net; establishing a robust monetary system, unifying multiple exchange rates and implementing formal capital controls. In order to avail IMF’s assistance in pulling itself out of this crisis, the implementation of the comprehensive reforms by the new government is the need of the hour.16
Diplomatic Problems with the Gulf Countries
Lebanon’s troubled ties with Saudi Arabia has emerged as another major challenge for the Lebanese leadership. Right after Kordahi's comments, Saudi Arabia banned imports from Lebanon, recalled its envoy from Beirut and expelled the Lebanese ambassador. The Gulf countries namely UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain followed suit and took similar action against Lebanon’s diplomats and recalled their ambassadors from Lebanon. In addition to the Gulf countries, Yemen also recalled its envoy from Beirut on 3 November 2021. Thus, the fallouts of Lebanon’s discord with Saudi Arabia can be seen in its strained relations with the Gulf countries and the subsequent diplomatic boycott.
Saudi Arabia’s political influence over Lebanon has drastically diminished since 2017 after Saad Hariri’s abrupt resignation while he was in Saudi Arabia. It has also made its displeasure about Hezbollah’s growing influence in Lebanese politics evident and distanced itself from Lebanon in recent years. However, Saudi Arabia has enjoyed an upper hand with respect to its economic engagements with the latter. Lebanon's economy majorly depends on remittances from its diaspora. Of its approximately 5,50,00017 expatriates who work in the Gulf countries, 3,00,00018 work in Saudi Arabia itself.19 The current import ban will have a severe impact on the Lebanese fruit and vegetable trade with Saudi Arabia which accounts between US$ 20 million and US$ 34 million annually.20 The fall in the value of Lira has also made imports from Saudi Arabia costlier for Lebanon, further increasing its trade deficit.
Lebanon is also heavily dependent on the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, for oil. There has been an oil crisis in the country due to shortage of oil leading to petrol price hike thereby crippling the economy and triggering protests. The rift with the Gulf countries will act as a roadblock in seeking their aid to restore sufficient energy supplies.
Way Forward
To end the current crisis in Lebanon, efforts ranging from resolution of the diplomatic crisis to setting its internal economic condition and political system in order, are required. This can be achieved by addressing the problem of corruption, initiating economic reforms and establishing better relations with the Gulf countries. To end the diplomatic impasse, Kordahi resigned under severe pressure from all sides. Additionally, France along with Saudi Arabia has extended support to Lebanon in strengthening its army to maintain security and stability along with carrying out joint consultations on all issues.
Thus, in order to resolve these economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian challenges, the Lebanese government needs to introduce reform measures immediately, without any further delay. These include restructuring the economic order, ensuring fiscal prudence, reforming the financial sector and recalibrating the monetary policy. Only with such measures in place, the country will be able to attract assistance from international organisations such as the IMF. On the diplomatic front, it is difficult to ascertain whether the resignation of Kordahi will aid in ending the diplomatic crisis, considering the influence of Hezbollah on Lebanese politics as a major source of condemnation by the Gulf countries. Furthermore, the extent and magnitude of the sectarian divide shall also have a major impact on the country through its direct implications for peace and development, thus having domestic and regional ramifications.
On the positive side however, outreach by the international community including countries such as Saudi Arabia, France, US and the UK along with the UN, after the Beirut Port Blast, has ushered in some ray of hope. On 9 August 2020, France hosted an international donor conference with the UN to support Lebanon and pledged US$ 298 million to the country. In August 2021, the US announced US$ 100 million humanitarian assistance for Lebanon.21 On 1 October 2021, the UN and humanitarian partners announced a US$ 383 million Emergency Response Plan (ERP) for Lebanon to provide critical life-saving assistance.22 However, the prolonged political crisis, social unrest and periodic violence in several parts of the country have discouraged the international community from dispersing aid to the country. Thus, Lebanon will be able to benefit from these aid initiatives only if it introduces systemic reforms and tackles the problem of corruption, which are its major handicaps.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Southeast Asian Defence Markets: Opportunities for India
Akash Sahu
December 29, 2021
A larger exchange of defence business between India and Southeast Asia may consolidate India’s position in the regional security architecture, and also forge greater political alignment with important ASEAN partners.
The Philippines is set to buy from India at least seven Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) and eight Dornier 228 aircraft under a recently concluded deal.1 The bilateral defence relations received an impetus after the ‘Implementing Agreement’ was signed earlier this year, which would facilitate legal framework for Philippines’ defence acquisitions from India.2 The Philippines defence secretary had also been quoted saying that his country will purchase BrahMos missiles, jointly developed by India and Russia.3 Meanwhile, talks are in progress regarding the export of BrahMos to Indonesia.4
These developments are reflective of growing interest in Southeast Asia to purchase arms from India. India will therefore need to upgrade its domestic defence manufacturing capabilities, perhaps in conjunction with friendly advanced nations, to sustain this interest from Southeast Asia. An overview of their defence markets and demands will help India develop these capabilities accordingly. A larger exchange of defence business between India and Southeast Asia may consolidate India’s position in the regional security architecture, and also forge greater political alignment with important ASEAN partners.
Increased Spending and Military Modernisation
Southeast Asian countries have shown an expansion in their defence spending, particularly over the last decade with an increase of 36 per cent.5 In 2020 alone, the military spending in the region increased by 5.2 per cent. Many ASEAN nations have also adopted medium to long term military modernisation plans to improve their defence. Under its Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) programme, Indonesia has earmarked US$ 79 billion from a total of US$ 125 billion (rest for sustenance and interests) for modernisation of its defence forces in the next 25-year-period.6 Philippines has allocated US$ 4.3 billion to its defence budget in 2021, under the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program (RAFPMP)7. There has also been talk about Philippines’ interest in acquiring submarines as the conflict in the region is primarily over disputed maritime claims.8 The largest military spender in the region, Singapore’s defence modernisation plans may see the next-generation Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) using Artificial Intelligence in weaponry, automation, data analytics, cyber and space-based assets for “multi-domain operations”.9
In its 2019 defence white paper, Vietnam set the goal of full military modernisation by 2030. The case of Vietnam is, however, a special one. Its geographical proximity and territorial dispute with China have both aggravated tension in their bilateral relations, and also restrained Hanoi’s actions that may be interpreted by Beijing as provocative. The tendency to opt for political action instead of military action10 will likely put any major defence spending plans, especially acquisitions, on the back-burner for Vietnam. Thailand has shown a resolve to upgrade its arsenal with the 10-year “Modernization Plan: Vision 2026” adopted in 2017. However, its defence purchases have been mired in controversies around questions of strategic relevance and high expense. For instance, the three diesel-electric submarines (valued US$ 1.03 billion) that Thailand has decided to buy from China are unsuitable to be operated in its own coastal zones due to large size.11 Although the government seems determined to procure more, internal corruption in Thailand’s defence ecosystem may affect the decision-making process.
Indigenous Industry and Intermediate Goods Market
Even though China’s not-so-peaceful military and economic rise factors strongly into the trend of defence spending in the region, some analysts believe that there are other formidable reasons as well. Much of the defence budgets of ASEAN countries is spent in maintaining large armies and old arsenals, and threats of piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling, etc., pull their own share from these already constrained budgets.12 As a consequence of limited spending in Research & Development and lack of infrastructure for defence manufacturing, import of arms is the most suitable choice for many ASEAN nations.
There is considerable realisation of this handicap in all major ASEAN capitals, and governments aim to keep importing vital defence items while at the same time enhance indigenous capabilities. This means Southeast Asia will continue to be an attractive market for finished defence products as well as intermediate products. For instance, Indonesia passed a law in 2012 requiring its armed forces to acquire arms domestically as much as possible.13 PT Pindad, PT Digantara Indonesia, PT PAL Indonesia and PT Dahana are some state-owned Indonesian companies that are involved in production of naval vessels, propeller aircraft, helicopters, explosives, artillery and land combat vehicles.14 Similarly, Malaysia’s Bousted Heavy Industries is working with French DCNS to build six coastal combat ships for Malaysian Navy. Singapore’s state-owned ST Engineering has sold arms to a number of countries including armoured troop carriers to Britain under a deal in 2008.15
India in the Mix
India aspires to radically boost its indigenous defence industry and become a major exporter. The Indian government has also encouraged foreign players to manufacture in India. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has set goals of US$ 25 billion of domestic defence production and US$ 5 billion of defence exports for India.16 Naturally, Southeast Asia is a lucrative market for India’s defence exports given the cordial relations with ASEAN partners, and growing political alignment over issues of international importance. Apart from aiming to deliver high-end strategic assets in the region, India may also exploit the promising segment of intermediate goods in the defence sector.
In a roundtable discussion on defence industry cooperation organised jointly by Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) and US-India Business Council (USIBC)17 in October 2021, a key takeaway was to boost Indian manufacturers of defence intermediate goods. Major industry players such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing India expressed that fulfilling requirements of Indigenous Content (IC) becomes difficult due to lack of forthcoming Indian companies involved in production of intermediate goods. As a consequence, much of these items are imported. On similar lines, India’s dependence on intermediate goods from foreign nations limits its autonomy to export defence products abroad.18 Asia-Pacific is likely to witness substantial growth in aerospace and defence sector, and the demand for titanium and alloys, aluminium and alloys, steel and alloys, and composites will drive the intermediate goods market for a long time.19 By investing to build a base in this segment, not only will India be equipped to host more Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)20 for manufacturing in India, but also provide a resilient and reliable supply chain for large-scale production in aerospace and defence sector.
Policy Options
Policymakers may like to focus exclusively on attracting investment for intermediate goods industry. A starting point can be encouraging foreign OEMs to discharge offset obligations by investing in these industries. A thriving intermediate goods industry will achieve three-pronged objectives of sufficient supply to locally operating OEMs, export to foreign markets, and incentivise more foreign OEMs to set shop in India. While it is ideal for India to increase number of defence production units that deliver ‘final goods’ like finished aircraft, it may be difficult feat to achieve given many structural constraints. Allowing ‘intermediate goods’ industry to flourish will naturally attract more foreign OEMs that can eventually deliver final goods and strengthen India’s defence exports.
In this scenario, it may be important to foster dialogue among potential investors, entrepreneurs in the aerospace and defence sector, and policymakers. Think tanks and advocacy groups can bring these parties together to reach consensus on the road ahead. Since the restructuring of supply chains is happening now, inaction at this time could mean losing out to aptly-located other suppliers that will eventually emerge in the global market.21 India has the advantage of a political class that is interested in boosting defence exports, creating infrastructure for large-scale production, and addressing issues faced by private players involved in the sector. It must make use of this window of opportunity.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
20. Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) is a company that delivers a finished product. In this case, a finished product in the defence sector such as helicopters, missiles, naval vessels, etc.
The Biden Administration and the Future of ‘No First Use’
Rajiv Nayan
December 28, 2021
Although the ideas of nuclear arms control, nuclear security and nuclear disarmament have featured in several US official statements and joint statements with other countries, will US adopt the ‘No First Use’ policy, remains to be seen.
Will the United States (US) adopt the No First Use (NFU) policy? Those who had followed the Presidential/election campaign of Joe Biden and who generally read the formal and rhetorical statements of the leaders as truth, seemed optimistic. However, a closer scrutiny matched with the harsher reality or dynamics of the world politics and security is required. Biden made statements in favour of NFU during his Presidential elections and even before. He said during the campaign that the US should be pushing for NFU. In this context, he had put special emphasis on no use of nuclear-laden ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). Biden, in general, expressed his views on it while discussing no exchange of nuclear weapons in the world. He underscored that a policy of NFU could be a step in that direction. He repeatedly talked about nuclear reduction.
After assuming Presidency, Biden seemingly wanted to translate his old personal NFU principles into the US policy, and possibly, as part of its nuclear doctrine. The ideas of nuclear arms control, nuclear security and nuclear disarmament kept featuring in several US official statements and joint statements issued with other countries.1 Even though nuclear arms control as an instrument of nuclear and strategic stability was underlined on many occasions when Russia–US bilateral relationship was discussed2, yet NFU has hardly become a key component of strategic or nuclear stability in the US–Russia partnership.
Admittedly, the 16 June 2021 US–Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability did acknowledge, “Today, we reaffirm the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”3 The joint statement also underscored the significance of “ensuring predictability in the strategic sphere”, and one of the tools envisaged was diminishing “the threat of nuclear war”.4
Media reports and writings published by Western think tanks inform that in the run-up to the new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Biden has tried to do an exercise on NFU as well. Through NPR, it seems, he wants to change the American approach to the use of nuclear weapons. The US government has officially stated on NPR and consultation of allies for it.5 Although no official statement has come regarding the exercise on NFU in the NPR, yet indications coming through the media reports and think tanks tell the world that allies are being consulted on the possible adoption of the NFU policy.
Why is the Biden Administration consulting its allies for its national policy or NPR? It is doing so because of its commitment to preserve a united nuclear alliance and for maintaining its credibility at least in the near future. Biden’s entire campaign was centered on restoring the American leadership in the multilateral settings, including in security matters. The US is supposed to have meticulous consultations with its NATO partners on nuclear and arms control issues. The Administration noted: “We have declared our nuclear deterrents to the defence of [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] NATO and as long as there are nuclear weapons, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. Our NATO Allies and partners will always be able to count on us, even as they continue to strengthen their own national forces.”6
The quiet exercise seemingly has not only resulted in some nervous response from the allies who share liberal or security values with the US but has also triggered debate within the policy community of the US and other Western countries on NFU, though this debate has been going on in a subdued manner for a long period. The allies were apparently sent a set of questionnaire to respond. Quite interestingly, even Chinese media like the Global Times7 also joined the debate and reacted to Western media reports.
The Chinese media’s reaction tells a complex story about the unique position of the US in the world. It is one of the two countries which have been possessing more than 90 per cent of the declared arsenals of the world, and a decision about how to use nuclear weapons may have an extraordinary impact on global nuclear thinking and behaviour. China and its media are well aware of America’s hegemonic position even if the unipolar moment for the US is overlooked. China may be a challenger to the US but to influence and shape the world order, China understands that it has to undertake complex entanglement with the American decision-making process, possibly accepting the hierarchy in the global order.
The responses, reactions and debate on NFU have brought to light several issues, some of which are lingering on for decades, some have been discussed in the recent past and others are reflection of the new issues and challenges tossed by the contemporary reality. The status-quoists argue for distancing from the policy of NFU, the arms control and disarmament group favour adopting the NFU, and some contend and predict a middle path in the form of either fundamental purpose or existential threats instead of NFU. In fact, inclusion of nuclear deterrence as the ‘sole purpose’ of nuclear weapons has been an old issue. Earlier the phrase ‘sole purpose’ was considered the middle path and it became quite intense in the run up to 2010 NPR. The Obama Administration somehow found an innovative way to skirt the issue.
The much talked about Financial Times report8 informed that the US allies had objected to the adoption of NFU. The report named some of the allies who opposed the NFU. These were: Australia, Germany, France, the UK and Japan. The basic contention of the allies apparently was that the change of the posture may “undermine long-established deterrence strategies aimed at Russia and China”.9 There is a fear that the adoption of NFU may lead to nuclearisation by the US allies such as Japan and South Korea. Undoubtedly, this fear does not have much basis because the adoption of NFU does not mean the withdrawal of nuclear protection umbrella or extended deterrence.
Some opponents maintain that the NFU is disturbing the allies but American adversaries may yet not find the posture credible.10 Some of the allies apprehend large-scale conventional strike, which they feel may be deterred only by ambiguity regarding the use of nuclear weapons. This will lead to a lose-lose situation for the US. The reports indicate that the US allies expect some kind of pre-emptive nuclear strike from the US, which will not happen if the US adopts NFU. The US nuclear weapons policy to deter large-scale conventional and biological and chemical attacks to reassure its allies and partners does not mean the pre-emptive nuclear strike.
Some argue that China is fast increasing its nuclear arsenals (about 1,000 by 2030) as the 2021 Pentagon report notes, and the US, under START treaty, is limiting its deployable nuclear warheads to 1,50011, which could lead to a difficult security situation. The argument goes that the adoption of NFU or sole purpose will weaken nuclear deterrence as China will consider it a sign of weakness of the US. In such a situation it is believed that instead of reciprocating,12 China will be emboldened. The basic argument is that the removal of strategic ambiguity through NFU will dismantle American nuclear deterrence.
Proponents of NFU argue that by embracing it, the US will steer the world to a low risk, if not ‘no risk’ zone. It may reduce the chance of miscalculation and wrong signalling. NFU is also considered an effective tool to constrain a President like Trump in the future.13 Democrats and a section of the Republican Party dread a future scenario in which a President like Trump has nuclear briefcase and button.
It is assumed that the US NFU policy will set an example for the world, and others may also be forced to imitate. The world will not have to encounter the danger of escalation to a level of nuclear exchange. The common refrain is that despite tall claims of its adversaries, the US has conventional superiority. It can achieve its strategic objectives without provoking any possibility of nuclear escalation. Advocates of NFU claim that the reduction of salience of the use of nuclear weapons may eventually result in realising the redundancy of nuclear weapons and the virtue of nuclear disarmament.
Considering the emerging trend, it can be easily predicted that the US is not going to adopt the NFU notwithstanding the legislation for the purpose introduced by some Democrat Congress members and the open letters sent to Japan or the US politicians. The Administration is also not going to adopt the narrowly or broadly defined ‘sole purpose’. Predominantly, the US policy making community sees ‘sole purpose’ as a sophisticated version of NFU. Some new phrases may be coined and a few new measures may be taken to convey the message that steps towards reducing nuclear risks have been taken. Such recommendatory measures14 are appearing on the websites of different think tanks.
To mitigate apprehensions of its allies, the US ought to exercise Expanded Multilateral Option. If a NFU treaty is concluded and all the nuclear weapon countries become parties to it, this could be an ideal situation. Otherwise, it should approach Russia and other nuclear weapon countries for developing an understanding on NFU, and have an arrangement similar to 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, popularly known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The allies of US may feel less threatened if a universal protocol exists. As for the use of nuclear weapons against an advanced conventional weapon or chemical or biological attack, it is a remote possibility. It would be better if US allies and opponents of NFU realise this soon.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Various Facets of the ‘Traffic Light Coalition’ in Germany
Swasti Rao
December 23, 2021
With few convergences among partners, the path of the “traffic light coalition” headed by Olaf Scholz is laden with challenges, but also offers spaces for positive action. With several new faces in key positions, its success would lie in maintaining continuity, and tweaking it to accommodate necessary changes when required.
The Merkel era had shaped not only Germany’s economic and strategic worldview, but also that of the European Union where she remained the most formidable cohesive leader. Olaf Scholz, the new chancellor from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) had served as the finance minister in Merkel’s coalition government since 2018. Hailing from Hamburg, the important port town where Chinese multinational giant COSCO holds the economic reins with an ever-increasing footprint, his chancellorship is under keen observation from world over for the changes or continuities Germany will show under his leadership.1
Traffic Light Coalition
The rather catchy phrase “traffic light coalition” comes from how the first traffic light, an unusual technology back in 1924 when first introduced, became a game-changer in modernising Germany. Scholz has described his Social Democrats’ coalition with the Free Democrats and the Greens as a similar path-breaking event that will become indispensable in times to come and will radically change Germany.2 While part of it is usual electoral optics, there is no denying that there is some truth in the claim as well. It is for the first time that a difficult coalition has been formed (in departure from Merkel-era coalitions that lasted for decades). As Scholz takes office, speculations are flying high about how he will manage the “traffic light” coalition as per the 177-page deal that was struck after two months of negotiations with its partners.3 The deal lays out the coalition plan to run the country. With major cabinet reshuffles to reconcile the ideologically opposed coalition members on key issues to steer Germany’s future course in months (perhaps years to come), the deal document is rife with several sharp divisions among the coalition partners on major economic, fiscal and foreign policy issues especially with regard to energy security, Russia and China.4
The policies (directly or indirectly) away from Russia and China would mean closer ties with the US, especially with regard to the new energy security deal and the nuclear umbrella. In a welcome step for the US, the coalition document has already indicated that it will observe a longstanding nuclear sharing arrangement allowing the US to continue deploying 20 atomic bombs at an airbase in western Germany. This has prompted a sigh of relief in Washington because in their election manifestos, both the SPD and the Greens election programmes condemned the basing of nuclear weapons in Germany.5 That these differences have been reconciled in the final coalition document is indeed a sign of the incoming administration responding to the fast-changing geopolitical scenario.
What also binds them together is their desire to modernise and overhaul Germany. However, while the document furnishes good-sounding plans, it offers little insight into how those plans would work on the ground. In current geopolitical times, Germany’s new leadership will have to tackle the fact that industrial policy cannot be separated from foreign policy especially in the context of over-reliance on certain countries for energy, specially fossil fuels and industrial exports.
Resetting Relations with Russia
The new cabinet has an interesting composition. Heiko Maas, foreign minister for the past three years and a keen advocate of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has been replaced by Annalena Baerbock, co-leader of the Greens, who has opposed the Nord Stream 2. The new Economic Minister is Robert Habeck, again a Greens leader. He will oversee the regulatory approval process for Nord Stream 2. Things were different with his predecessor Peter Altmaier, who lobbied on behalf of Russia and was instrumental in getting the controversial Nord Stream project through.6 Whether Robert Habeck will do so, seems unlikely because Greens view Nord Stream 2 as symbolic of Germany’s subservient relationship with Moscow.
Not Scholz himself, but other members of his Social Democratic Party have been close to Russia. Former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (from SPD) has been Putin’s chief international lobbyist as well as the chairman of the Nord Stream 2 company.7 But with radically opposed Economic and Foreign Ministers, the earlier relationship with Russia will be challenged. The success of Scholz’s coalition will depend to a large extent on whether he can distance himself from his party’s Putin loyalists and define a more even relationship with Russia. He has to aim for some continuity but with enough flexibility to tackle the tweaks. The Nord Stream 2 project therefore offers the first test of his resolve towards resetting relations with Russia. With delays costing millions of euros every day, Putin has been warned time and again by the new German administration that invading Ukraine would result in “severe consequences” that could mean shutting off the multi-billion gas pipeline.8 The future of Nord Stream then depends on the extent to which it is continued being used as a political weapon, first by Putin and now by Germany and the West.
Trends in Germany–China Relations
An array of interesting facets emerge upon examining the trends in Germany–China relations. Under Merkel’s chancellorship, Germany became China’s biggest trade partner in Europe. However, the Greens have been more critical of Xi’s regime with some of their MPs being subjected to sanctions by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for critiquing China’s human rights violations against the Uighurs.9 How will Scholz coalition maintain close ties with China under prevailing conditions, will be a matter of interest. Scholz recently drew flak from CCP when he unveiled the coalition deal document that includes surprisingly strong language on China, pledging to call out on human rights violations of Uighurs and backing a “democratic” Taiwan’s entry in international organisations.10 It is noteworthy that the coalition agreement mentions China at least a dozen times and that terms such as "system rivalry", "human rights" and "fair rules of the game” feature repeatedly in China’s context.11
The bright side is Scholz’s reputation as a balancer, just like Merkel. He is likely to deftly balance the economic dependence on China with his Atlanticist enthusiasm and is expected to coordinate his China policy more closely with Washington and US nuclear umbrella.12
Germany and the Equation with EU
The coming months would see Scholz immersed in key negotiations in Brussels that have already started with his first trip to meet Ursula von der Leyen, the EU Commission president.13 The same trip, however, saw him dodge questions about the Nord Stream 2.14 However, it may be extrapolated that with new US and EU sanctions against Russia’s Wagner group to step up pressure, Putin knows that any undesirable action on the Ukrainian front will lead to further delaying (or even dumping) the expensive Nord Stream 2.15
In coming days, in his negotiations with EU, Scholz would focus on the reform of fiscal rules (officially, the Stability and Growth Pact), the long-term viability of the EU's €750-billion recovery fund (Next Generation EU) and the huge investment needs to decarbonise and digitalise the whole economy.16 In his maiden trip to Brussels as a Chancellor, Scholz has reiterated “a stronger Europe” where “German politics has to take on a role of responsibility”.17
A pertinent question is how does Germany plan to play a strong, responsible role when Scholz’s choice of defence minister seems like a let-down for now. Picking up a virtually unknown former Justice Minister Christine Lambrecht, a member of the SPD’s leftist wing, suggests that Scholz’s coalition is not likely to develop Germany’s dysfunctional military. It needs to be noted that Lambrecht has neither military nor foreign policy experience nor an international profile. Her nomination itself has come as a surprise.18 In her new role, she is expected to bring about sustainable changes. Speculation is strife about how that will happen though.
Back in 2014, Lambrecht, considered at the leftist end of the SPD's political spectrum, expressed her opposition to the German military acquiring armed drones. And now in 2021, she is likely to oversee the procurement of drones, though, as commentators fear, perhaps not without protest.19 She has also said that her first priority in office would be to re-evaluate all of the German army’s foreign engagements, which primarily consist of peacekeeping missions around the world involving about 3,000 troops and devising an “exit strategy” when needed.20
How German defence outlook will shape in coming months will depend on how Scholz and his defence minister react to global pulls and pressures. Yet to defend its own interests on the international stage, a more proactive stance and posturing is required.
Scholz’s Policy towards the Indo-Pacific
Scholz coalition’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific is noteworthy. The coalition agreement lays out plans to build relations with key players in the region like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India as part of Berlin’s fledgling Indo-Pacific strategy to protect its economic interests in the region.21 Germany aims to strengthen its trade and investment linkages with Australia, New Zealand, India, ASEAN, Japan and South Korea. A rules-based order, freedom of navigation and supporting multilateralism are the pillars of German outlook towards Indo-Pacific.22 Post AUKUS, as the French take over presidency of the EU Council from 1 January 2022, there will be a renewed attention and engagement of France and the EU.23 A sharper German focus on the region would follow.
Apart from the obvious push that Germany–India bilateral relations would get as Germany expands footprints in the Indo-Pacific, the two countries also have a longstanding cooperation on climate change that in the coming times will focus on financial and technical assistance.24 Germany sees India as a central partner for tackling issues of energy, climate change, food security and international order. Scholz Administration has been forthcoming in stressing on continuity towards Merkel-era policy on India.
Economic Tensions among Coalition Partners and Covid-19 Fourth Wave
The bigger tension lies in the nature of the coalition parties themselves. While the Social Democrats want to increase social spending, the pro-business Free Democratic Party rejects higher taxes. At the same time, the coalition, on the whole, wants to spend €50 billion annually to accelerate the transition to green energy and modernise the outdated public infrastructure.25 The July 2021 US–Germany green energy deal that aims to invest more than €200 million in energy security in Ukraine as well as sustainable energy across Europe, is too fresh to show sustainable results. Hence, the mutually exclusive policies among the coalition partners have to be worked out in equilibrium soon. Without the money to put into green energy transition, Germany will continue to rely on natural gas from Russia.
Domestically, as the new administration takes charge, the rising number of cases of the fourth wave of Covid-19 pandemic needs utmost attention. As the incoming Health Minister Karl Lauterbach takes office, Germany has been fighting one of its deadliest Covid-19 waves.26 One of the many reasons behind the rising number is that ‘epidemic situation of national importance’ status has expired and as a result, state governments have lost the legal basis to introduce emergency measures such as lockdowns and school closures. This governance failure has directly resulted in the worsening situation. Karl Lauterbach’s success will be determined by how deftly he manages to not further alienate the anti-vaxxers and the unvaccinated on whom punishments like nation-wide contact restrictions and ‘2G’ rules barring them from entering most public places, were introduced.27
The path of the “traffic light coalition” headed by Scholz, on the one hand, is laden with challenges and on the other, replete with spaces for positive action. With several new faces in key positions, its success would lie in maintaining continuity, and tweaking it to accommodate necessary changes when required.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Putin’s Visit to India: Launch of a Revitalised Partnership
Ashok Sajjanhar
December 16, 2021
President Putin’s short but highly consequential visit to India and the launch of the 2+2 format have imbued new dynamism into the bilateral partnership. There might be a few areas of divergence between the two sides but spheres of convergence are much greater.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India for a few hours on 6 December 2021 for the 21st Annual Summit between India and Russia. Putin decided to go ahead with this visit although the clouds of confrontation over his country’s border with Ukraine loomed menacingly. As Covid-19 cases in Russia continue to surge, with about 32,000 cases and 1,200 deaths being reported every day, his visit is therefore, a testimony to the strategic significance Putin attaches to relations with India. Just a little more than two months ago, Putin had declined to travel to Dushanbe, Tajikistan for the SCO Summit at the last minute due to high incidence of Covid-19 cases in that country.
This is Putin’s second visit outside Russia since the beginning of the pandemic 21 months ago; the first one was to Geneva in June 2021 for a bilateral Summit with US President Joe Biden. Putin’s visit to India has delivered an unambiguous message that notwithstanding the speculation about the health of the India–Russia partnership, it continues to be robust. In addition, the fact that the visit to India has taken place before his trip to China, which in recent years has emerged as a highly consequential partner of Russia, is also a reaffirmation that the India–Russia relationship is pivotal.
The 28 Agreements signed between the two sides, both at the governmental as well as at the private sector level, demonstrate the extensive gamut of the bilateral relationship. The first 2+2 Dialogue between the Defence and Foreign Ministers of the two countries took place, which provided an opportunity to share views about the current security, political and economic situation at the bilateral, regional as well as the global levels. The visit concluded in a Joint Statement titled “India-Russia: Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity”, which captures the state and future potential of the bilateral relationship.1
Considerable attention was paid to trade and investment relations. Putin noted that trade between the two sides had declined by 17 per cent last year but has grown by 38 per cent in the first nine months of this year.2 The two countries have fixed a target of bilateral trade of US$ 30 billion and investment of US$ 50 billion by 2025.3 While it might be possible to achieve the target of investment which has already reached around US$ 38 billion, it appears that it would be difficult to meet the bilateral trade target which is languishing around sub-US$ 10 billion level.
Both sides have agreed to give a strong impetus to ties in the traditional areas of collaboration including defence, nuclear energy, fossil fuels, counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, space, health and others. Defence cooperation continues to be the lynchpin of the time-tested partnership between India and Russia. The two sides agreed to extend the Defence Agreement for a further period of 10 years. An agreement was concluded for the joint production of more than 6,00,000 AK-203 Kalashnikov rifles with Transfer of Technology under the ‘Made in India’ initiative of the Government of India.4 It is a matter of satisfaction that Russia expeditiously supplied essential military equipment as requisitioned by India during Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow in September 2020, in the wake of the Galwan attack by China. This was done in spite of the demand by China to delay the supply of crucial items to India.
Both sides agreed to expand cooperation in Central Asia. China’s footprint in the Central Asian states in economic field has grown at an unprecedented pace in recent years. This is a matter of concern for Russia which considers Central Asia as its ‘Near Abroad’. All the Central Asian countries are active partners, to varying degrees, in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China had established a small military base in Tajikistan in 2016. This has been considerably expanded in the wake of the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021. Enhanced India–Russia collaboration in Central Asia will be a win-win proposition not only for these two countries but also for the Central Asian States who want to protect their sovereignty from Chinese dominance.
Russia’s Far East has the potential to emerge as an important area of bilateral cooperation. This region is extremely well endowed with natural and mineral resources. It covers about 40 per cent of Russia’s land area but accounts for only 5 per cent of the Russian population. It urgently needs investment and trained manpower. PM Modi had extended a Line of Credit of US$ 1 billion during his visit to Vladivostok in 2019 to explore opportunities for greater Indian engagement with that region.5 The Chief Ministers of four Indian States, viz., Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Goa and Gujarat, as well as the Indian Commerce and Industry Minister, Piyush Goyal, had travelled to the region before Prime Minister Modi’s visit in 2019 to explore possibilities of enhancing co-operation. In the post-pandemic period, this region beckons strongly for greater Indian engagement. This would be particularly welcome for Russia due to the lurking danger of Chinese expansionism which appears to have increased in recent years, going by the sinister comments in some sections of the Chinese social media after the celebration of Vladivostok Day by the Russian Embassy in Beijing last year.
The Arctic is another region where both sides can collaborate for mutual benefits. President Putin had extended an invitation to India to collaborate on Arctic during PM Modi’s visit in 2019. The region is extremely rich in mineral resources including hydrocarbons and fossil fuels. It also faces risk of increased Chinese presence which has declared itself as a ‘Near Arctic State’ although no such concept exists in the Constitution of the Arctic Council. The India–Russia Joint Statement refers to the potential of cooperation between the two countries in this area.6
In the face of the huge flux in the global security and economic architecture in recent years, India–Russia ties have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Russia has gone deep into the embrace of China as a result of sanctions imposed by the US and the West in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and accession of Crimea to Russia in 2014. It has also moved closer to Pakistan for establishing a direct connect with the Taliban, and for exploring greater military and economic opportunities in Pakistan. India has moved closer to the US on account of the threat it confronts from China on the northern land frontier as well as in the Indian Ocean. As evidence of the strategic autonomy exercised by India, it has imported five units of the S-400 Triumf ballistic missile defence system, worth more than US$ 5 billion, notwithstanding the US threat of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
Afghanistan was a major subject of bilateral deliberations between Modi and Putin, as also during the 2+2 dialogue. There have been differences in the perspectives of the two sides on Afghanistan over the last several years. Russia was actively engaging with the Taliban and had also established some dialogue formats at which it did not invite India. The ground situation changed drastically in mid-August 2021 when the Taliban took over Kabul and gave no indication of abiding by its commitments of forming an inclusive government, respecting the rights of minorities as well as of the women and children, and not allowing its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against neighbours. Currently, there is near-complete convergence on the viewpoints of India and Russia on the way forward in Afghanistan. This is extensively reflected in the Joint Declaration.
The one jarring note was the rather aggressive criticism by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of the Indo-Pacific (he called it a ‘slogan’), non-inclusive alliances, AUKUS, etc. in his press conference after the meeting. The propriety of such combative statements and also of open criticism of the US on CAATSA from Indian soil is highly questionable. This is in spite of the fact that Putin has shown understanding of India’s position on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad.
President Putin’s short but highly consequential visit and the launch of the 2+2 format have imbued new dynamism into the bilateral partnership. There might be a few areas of divergence between the two sides but spheres of convergence are much greater. These will continue to navigate the bilateral partnership to make it more robust and vigorous in the coming days.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Considering that the year 2021 marks the fifth anniversary of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between India and Vietnam, the upcoming visit of Mr Vuong Dinh Hue, the current Chairman of the Vietnam National Assembly, to India is likely to strengthen India–Vietnam relationship further.
The Covid-19 pandemic has had a serious impact on international relations, especially the visits by foreign dignitaries to various countries, including India. Though various summits have been conducted virtually since March 2020, the enthusiasm that a physical visit creates is unmatchable. It was a nice gesture by President Putin of Russia to visit India for a few hours on 6 December 2021 and attend the 21st bilateral summit.1 This was Putin’s second visit outside Russia this year and it has set the stage for visits by other dignitaries. The next high-level dignitary to visit India is from our Comprehensive Strategic Partner, Vietnam. Mr Vuong Dinh Hue, the current Chairman of the Vietnam National Assembly, is visiting India on 15 December 2021. The visit will be up to 19 December 2021. As per the Vietnamese Constitution, the National Assembly is “the highest representative organ of the people, the highest organ of state power”.
Mr Vuong Dinh Hue was the Chairman of the 14th National Assembly of Vietnam, and was elected as Chairman of the 15th National Assembly on 20 July 2021.2 He is a Professor of Economics and has good knowledge of political and financial matters. The visit is being made at the invitation of Lok Sabha Speaker, Shri Om Birla and Speaker of the Rajya Sabha of India, Shri M. Venkaiah Naidu who is also our Vice President.3
Importance of the Visit
The year 2021 marks the fifth anniversary of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between India and Vietnam, and in 2022 the two countries are going to celebrate 50 years of their diplomatic ties.4 The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed between the two countries in 2016. Five Years have elapsed since then and both the countries have put across to the World Trade Organization and UN the case for promoting global south cooperation, mitigating effects of climate change, maritime security, renewable energy, promotion of culture and other aspects with regard to developing countries. The visit by Mr Vuong Dinh Hue would lay the foundation for further strengthening of the relations between the two countries.
Mr Vuong Dinh Hue is a seasoned and respected statesman who has undertaken numerous reforms in the National Assembly of Vietnam, and has ushered in flexibility and creativity in the organisation of National Assembly meetings.5 It is hoped that he would extend cooperation and build upon the Vision 2020 that was set by the Prime Ministers of both the countries in December 2020. It would be pertinent to look at the issues mentioned in the Vision Document.
Need to Build Upon Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People—2020
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc of Vietnam co-chaired a virtual summit on 21 December 2020, in which they formulated a Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People to guide the future development of India–Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The main aspects are enumerated below:
Peace:This would be achieved through institutional exchanges and mutual strategic trust. Noting the importance of ASEAN, fostering practical relations between ASEAN and India would result in peaceful conditions in the region. There is also a need to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Both countries need to step up joint efforts in building a strong consensus for early adoption of Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT).
Prosperity: Considering the Covid-19 pandemic, the two countries need to work towards developing reliable and efficient supply chains. In view of the economic strength of both the countries, there is a need for enhancing investments, promoting joint ventures, engaging in new global value chains, enhancing physical and digital connectivity, encouraging e-commerce, facilitating business travels and upgrading regional trading architecture. Prosperity would come by also strengthening partnership in the oil and gas sector, climate change and Sustainable Development Goals. In addition to this, India would be expanding Mekong-Ganga Quick Impact Projects, ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation) and e-ITEC programmes in diverse sectors.
People:People of both the countries have an affinity for each other which must be exploited for greater people-to-people exchanges by simplifying visa procedures and facilitating tourism. Cultural exchanges should be strengthened by Parliamentary exchanges and relations between Indian States and Vietnamese provinces.6
Viewing the Joint Vision Statement, a Plan of Action for 2021–2023 was signed by the Foreign Ministers of both countries. A year has elapsed since then, hence the delegation of the Chairman of National Assembly would have the opportunity to discuss the issues pertaining to the Plan which need attention or course correction, during the upcoming visit.
A few other pertinent issues that could be discussed, are listed below:
Vietnam has utilised the US$ 100 million Line of Credit and procured from Larsen & Toubro, High Speed Guard Boats for the Vietnamese Border Guard Command. While few of these boats would be manufactured in Chennai, the remaining will be manufactured in Haiphong, Vietnam. These boats would be used in the South China Sea.
Completion of seven development projects with grant-in-aid assistance of US$ 1.5 million for the benefit of local community in Vietnam’s Ninh Thuan province.
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) signed are as under:
Implementing Agreement on Defence Industry Cooperation.
Agreement for US$ 5 million Indian Grant Assistance for Army Software Park at National Telecommunications University, Nha Trang.
Implementing Agreement for CUNPKO-VNDPKO for cooperation in UN Peacekeeping.
MoU between India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety.
MoU between CSIR, Indian Institute of Petroleum and Vietnam Petroleum Institute.
MoU between National Solar Foundation and Vietnam Clean Energy Association.
MoU between Tata Memorial Centre and Vietnam National Cancer Hospital.
Enhancing the number of Quick Impact Projects from 5 per year at present to 10 per year.
New Development Partnership projects in heritage conservation in Vietnam, which include the temple at My Son, Dong Duong Buddhist monastery in Quang Nam province and Nhan Cham tower in Phu Yen province.
Launch of a bilateral project for Encyclopedia on India-Vietnam Civilizational and Cultural interactions.7
The delegation is likely to discuss aspects concerning these issues with the Indian authorities during the upcoming visit.
China and Other Issues
Mr Vuong Dinh Hue, Chairman of the National Assembly, is a mature politician and a member of the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party. He would certainly discuss the issues pertaining to the assertiveness of China. India’s bone of contention with China ranges from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean. Both Vietnam and India share territorial borders with China.8 Vietnam is always careful in its strategic relationship with China. The islands in the South China Sea remain a contentious area where China has been sporadically active. The moot point is whether the Indian Navy should play a more active role in the region. It has conducted Exercise Passex which has improved its interoperability with the Vietnam Navy. In an article in Strategic Analysis, Le Dinh Tinh assesses Vietnam as a middle power,9 which could offer port facilities to Indian Navy at the port of Cam Ranh which has excellent facilities.
Similarly, India could offer the BrahMos Supersonic Cruise missile and the Akash Ground to Air Missile for improving Vietnam’s operational effectiveness. These issues need constant dialogue and are likely to be discussed by the delegation.
Apart from these areas, the delegation could also discuss about improving Vietnam’s Information Technology (IT) capabilities. It is hoped that India would make all possible efforts to assist Vietnam, its Comprehensive Strategic Partner, and make this visit a success.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Triggered by the recent hike in auto gas prices, the current crisis in Kazakhstan appears to be an expression of the long-term frustrations of common Kazakhs with the political system.
Kazakhstan is embroiled in its worst public unrest since it separated from the Soviet Union three decades ago. A simmering public discontent was always on the horizon,1 but the final straw accentuating the unease was the recent hike in auto gas prices announced by the government.2 Several residents of the western oil town of Zhanaozen took to streets on 2 January 2022. The protests soon spread across the country, with thousands joining in the demonstrations. Things took a turn for the worse two days later on account of large-scale arson throughout the country. Government buildings including the presidential palace in Almaty, the former capital of Kazakhstan, were breached and set on fire.3 Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev vainly tried to control the unrest by restoring back the subsidies and in a final desperate attempt, even ordered the resignation of the government. Realising the gravity of the situation, he turned to Russia for support. CSTO Peacekeepers, a joint force of about 3,600 personnel from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) countries and Russian paratroopers, have since been deployed in the country, notably the first operational deployment of CSTO since its inception in 1999.4 The violent protests have led to casualties on both sides amidst reports that President Tokayev has ordered troops to fire without warning.5
Current Crisis
The origins of the current crisis can be traced to the same energy-rich Zhanaozen region near the Caspian Sea, where in 2011,6 an unrest over low wages had led to oil workers going on strike. The crackdown that followed led to several fatalities. A precipitous calm had abounded the oil-rich region since then.
In the ongoing crisis, while the ground situation appears hazy yet it looks like the government has been able to suppress the unrest from rioters, whom President Tokayev has referred to as, “foreign backed armed terrorists” and “bandits disguised as protesters”.7 In a bid to calm the protests, President Tokayev took over the Chairmanship of National Security Council from his mentor Nazarbayev, replaced Prime Minister Askar Mamin with Alikhan Smailov and removed Head of National Security Committee (the domestic intelligence agency or KNB) Karim Massimov. A state of emergency has been declared in several regions and an uneasy quiet prevails in the country.
Rule of the Political Obstinacy
In the last three decades, the political dispensation in Kazakhstan has hovered around the personality of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who ruled Kazakhstan with an iron hand for 30 years, right from the time of its independence in 1991. An old communist leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev was the Prime Minister of Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic even during Soviet times. He anointed himself as the ‘leader of the nation’ and retained key positions at the time of stepping down in 2019 at 81 years of age. These included the head of the all-powerful National Security Council and the Chief of the ruling Nur Otan party. A longstanding colleague of his, Kassym Tokayev took over as President in 2019 promising to continue his mentor’s policies.8
The popular belief in Kazakhstan is that it is Nazarbayev, not eager to relinquish power, who calls the shots in the government, and not Tokayev.9 Another popular perception is that Nazarbayev is preparing the ground to enable his daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva to emerge as the future leader.10 The common cry during the recent protests, therefore, was ‘Shal-ket’ meaning ‘Leave old man’.11 So intense were the protests against Nazarbayev in Almaty that his statue was pulled down, a visual reminiscent of the pulling down of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad.
In light of these sentiments, the current crisis appears to be an expression of the long-term frustrations of common Kazakhs with the political system, which has expanded the rich–poor divide and fuelled corruption.12 The opposition seems directed against Nazarbayev’s policies and systems which have bred kleptocracy.13
Notably, energy-rich Kazakhstan has recently faced several challenges in the energy and food sectors. Last year, it had to rely on Russia for electricity when its power plants failed to generate enough output.14 Rising food prices forced the government to ban export of several commodities.15
Interestingly, the ongoing protest is being supported by Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan Party. Headed by former Energy Minister Mukhtar Ablyazov, now in exile in France, Ablyazov has called upon the citizens to protest the presence of Russian troops in Kazakhstan, claiming that it will embolden President Putin to interfere and control Kazakhstan.16
In this context, Russia’s alacrity in sending troops embedded as CSTO Peacekeepers have raised many eyebrows. Given the fact that such a request had earlier been turned down17 for Kyrgyzstan amidst the ‘Melon Revolution’ as well as for Armenia in the recent Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, several questions loom large about their deployment and Kazakhstan’s inability to deal with internal security threats. President Tokayev’s panicky requisition of the CSTO and Russian forces and ordering key changes in administration is being projected by the opposition as a sign that the President no longer trusts his own forces.18 Critics have opined that the decision to rapidly deploy CSTO forces was a manoeuvre to protect Tokayev’s presidency.19
Regional Geo-political Stakes
Kazakhstan shares long boundaries with Russia, China, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Any instability in Astana will inevitably impact these countries. In this context, the importance of Kazakhstan for Russia can hardly be overstated. Russia has interests in the defence, space, oil and Uranium mining sectors in Kazakhstan. The two countries also share a 7,600-km long border. The border is porous and can be easily infiltrated.20 This is a serious vulnerability considering the likelihood of spill-over of radical Islam and narcotics from the Af-Pak region. President Tokayev had also indicated that the protesters were terrorists drawn from the ranks operating in the Middle East, Afghanistan and the IS.21
However, Kazakhstan has followed multi-vectored foreign and economic policies independent of Moscow. Nazarbayev had even changed Kazakh alphabets from Cyrillic to Latin.22 Russian–Kazakh ties saw consternation in 2020, when Deputy of Russian Duma called the current territory of Kazakhstan as a gift from Russia.23 There has been a lurking fear in Kazakhstan that Russia may annex the northern provinces of Kazakhstan which is home to 3.5 million ethnic Russians in a manner similar to Crimea.24 Such misgivings in bilateral relations have kept both countries on tenterhooks for long even though Kazakhstan is a member of CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)—brainchild of Russia to preserve its sphere of influence in Eurasia.
Russia’s intervention in the current crisis could draw the Kazakh government closer towards Russia possibly as a quid pro quo for its timely support. This could lead to Russia weaning Kazakhstan back to its orbit in a manner similar to the Belarus model. The widespread view, despite Russia’s denials is that, Russia could use the security forces deployment as an opportunity to seek space for a permanent military deployment in Kazakhstan.25 At present, Russia has no military bases in the country.
Similarly, the current crisis could also impact China. Kazakhstan is a Muslim majority country. Under Nazarbayev, there had been a massive crackdown on political Islam.26 Kazakh Muslims are the second largest indigenous community in Xinjiang after Uyghurs.27 Almaty, the epicentre of the current protests, is close to Xinjiang. Seen in this light, China has praised the Kazakh government’s crackdown on protestors. Stability in Central Asia is vital for the China’s Silk Road Economic Belt that passes through the region.
The US too has significant investments in the energy sector of Kazakhstan. Astana partners NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative28 apart from hosting an annual military peacekeeping exercise, Ex Steppe Eagle, with the US.29 So far, the US has denied any role in the unrest and links to fanning anti-Russian sentiments in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and elsewhere.30
Conclusion
Russia remains sensitive to its waning influence in its neighbourhood amidst the attempts by the West as well as China to expand their footprints in Eurasia. The guarded response of the western powers may not soothe Moscow’s nerves considering a large number of Russia’s neighbours have been rocked by socio-economic unrest and colour revolutions, such as Rose Revolution in Georgia and Orange Revolution in Ukraine.31 Ongoing developments in Ukraine can provide ‘fodder-fuel’ for anti-Russian sentiments in neighbouring countries including Kazakhstan. Russia is likely to do everything in its powers to keep Kazakhstan in a tight embrace. A Russia–West geo-political contestation could be in the offing.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Putin's Nightmare?”, Qantara.de, 7 January 2022.
Iran’s readiness for restoring diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia after six years since Riyadh cut ties in January 2016 is part of broader revival of diplomacy in the region after a decade of intense geopolitical competition and proxy wars involving Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies and Turkey & Iran.
On 23 December 2021, Iran’s Foreign Minister (FM) Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, while addressing a joint press meet with his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein hailed the efforts made by the Iraqi government to clear misunderstandings between Iran and Saudi Arabia.1 Abdollahian declared that Tehran would participate in the next round of talks with Riyadh, which would also be held in Baghdad. More importantly, he expressed readiness for exchanging visits of technical delegations to their “respective embassies and make necessary preparations for the restoration of mutual relations”.2 Abdollahian’s remarks put to rest the doubts about future course of Iran–Saudi dialogue as many in Iran, including Abdollahian himself, have blamed Riyadh for “delayed repatriation” of Tehran’s envoy to Yemen, Hassan Irloo, who died of Covid-19 two days after he returned home.3
Since April 2021, when Tehran and Riyadh initiated behind-the-scenes talks in Baghdad in parallel to the talks between Iran and P4+1 and the US in Vienna to revive the nuclear agreement, four rounds of dialogue have been completed. The latest round of talks was held in September soon after Iran’s newly elected President Ebrahim Raisi had put together his foreign policy team. The Iranian side outlined regional diplomacy as its priority and expressed its willingness to raise the level of negotiators.4 Saudi FM Faisal bin-Farhan al-Saud, while confirming behind-the-scenes talks with Tehran, maintained that they were still in an “exploratory phase” and expressed hope that the “talks will resolve the issues stuck between the two countries”.5 Iran’s readiness for dialogue and restoring diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia after six years since Riyadh cut ties in January 2016 is part of broader revival of diplomacy in the region after a decade of intense geopolitical competition and proxy wars involving Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies and Turkey and Iran. A unified regional policy under Raisi administration and the US support for regional diplomacy means that a détente might be reached between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
A Unified Regional Policy under Raisi Administration
Unlike during the Rouhani administration, when there were differences over Iran’s regional policy between Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the powerful security-intelligence apparatus, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Raisi administration’s regional policy appears to be cohesive, and coordinated with the IRGC. It is worth noting that FM Hossein Abdollahian is a career diplomat with wide-ranging experience in Iran’s Arab neighbourhood. His last official title was deputy foreign minister for Arab and North Africa Affairs (2011–16). Having handled Iranian policies towards Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain in the tumultuous years after the Arab uprisings, his vision of Iran’s regional policy closely resembles that of the IRGC. Soon after being confirmed as the Foreign Minister, he met with the IRGC’s Quds Force’s Commander Brigadier General Esmail Qa’ani, during which he lauded the Quds Force for its role in fighting terrorism in the region and stated that foreign ministry under his watch “will proudly follow the path of martyred General Soleimani”.6
In May 2021 in the aftermath of the leaked audio of former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s interview criticising the IRGC for undermining foreign ministry’s regional diplomacy, Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, had publicly lauded the Guards as “being the biggest, effective factor in preventing passive diplomacy in West Asia”.7 As Raisi government seeks dialogue with its Gulf neighbours, the IRGC is strengthening military capabilities and deterrence against pressure from United States (US) and threats from Israel. As the Foreign Ministry pushes for political resolution of regional issues, the IRGC and its allies in the ‘resistance axis’ raise the costs of anti-Iran policy by regional rivals.8 This unified approach was on display in the wake of the five-day large-scale naval and air defense exercise by the IRGC covering the coastlines of the three southern provinces of Hormozgan, Bushehr and Khuzestan.9 The exercise took place just days before the eighth round of nuclear talks began between Iran and signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and amid renewed Israeli threats of military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Congratulating the IRGC on the exercise, President Raisi echoed the Guards message of deterrence: “Any hostile action by our enemies will face a comprehensive and definitive response from the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran that would change the strategic equations significantly.”10 The convergence of views between the executive and the IRGC which is loyal to the Supreme Leader Khamenei means that the Raisi administration does not have to fear domestic sabotage as it engages Riyadh in a dialogue on contentious regional issues.11 Further, dialogue with neighbours including Saudi Arabia is seen by Raisi administration as a crucial step towards strengthening economic relations with neighbours as the long-term strategy to counter Western economic sanctions. The GCC countries such as the UAE and Oman are seen by Iran as major re-exporting hub for Iranian goods. During the last Iranian financial year (March 2020–2021), Iran–UAE trade increased by 7 per cent in value terms at US$ 14.28 billion, Iran’s second biggest trading partner after China.12
Changing Regional Geopolitical Landscape
Over the last decade which started with Arab uprisings, regional states seeking regime survival and geopolitical influence resorted to direct military interventions, participated in shifting trans-national alliances, and supported proxy groups in other states resulting in the regionalisation of conflict and security in West Asia. However, the risks of tensions leading to a full-scale war, fears of overstretch among states involved in region’s various conflict theatres and the overriding domestic priority of economic concerns amid the Covid-19 pandemic seem to have nudged key regional states to seek de-escalation and dialogue. The year 2021 began with the thawing of Saudi–Emirati relations with Qatar, behind-the-scenes talk between Iran and Saudi Arabia began in April in Baghdad, in November the United Arab Emirates (UAE) FM Sheikh Abdulla bin Zayed visited Syria and Turkey, and in December the UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin-Zayed Al-Nahyan visited Tehran following the visit of Iran’s chief nuclear negotiation Ali Bagheri to Dubai just before the resumption of nuclear talks in Vienna. These diplomatic exchanges suggest that region’s rivals and adversaries are now seeking avenues to mitigate many conflicts within the region.
In November 2021, the commander of IRGC’s advisory forces in Syria for six years, General Javad Ghaffari returned to Iran. Reportedly, Gen Ghaffari’s departure came in the wake of drone attacks in October 2021 targeting Al-Tanf US military base near Syria’s border crossing with Iraq and Jordan.13 With war phase being nearly over in Syria, Damascus is fearful of actions triggering an unwanted war with Israel and is reaching out to its Arab neighbours. With the UAE and Egypt supporting Syria’s integration into Arab world after more than 10 years of isolation, Iran’s focus in Syria is likely to shift from military to political and economic relations conducted through embassies of the two states. Following Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership in August 2021, where he protested against Syria not being invited to the regional forum, he visited Syria. The focus of Abdollahian’s Syria visit was to enhance the bilateral relations in the face of “economic terrorism” or sanctions faced by the two countries.14 Similarly, in Yemen, another long-drawn conflict, notwithstanding the recent escalation in the two-year old battle for Marib, Riyadh is nowhere close to realising its objective of restoring the government of Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi after six years of war.15 Further, Biden administration’s withdrawal of support from Saudi-led coalition’s offensive operations in Yemen means that Riyadh sooner or later will have to find political solution to the crisis. For its part, Tehran has offered to enable a political solution in Yemen, while its Houthis allies have kept up pressure on Riyadh by sustained attacks on Saudi territory. Riyadh is so far holding its breath arguing that it will judge the Raisi government’s invitation to diplomacy by the reality on the ground.16
US Support for Regional Diplomacy
The ongoing phase of de-escalation between Iran and its Gulf neighbours began in earnest in 2019 when Iran reeling under Washington’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, retaliated by attacking Gulf shipping and energy infrastructure. The risk of direct war with Iran and uncertainties about the US security guarantees led key US allies the UAE and Saudi Arabia to seek dialogue with Tehran. Further, Biden administration has not only reversed Trump’s anti-Iran efforts, by engaging Tehran to revive the JCPOA, it is also encouraging its Gulf allies for dialogue with Iran. In the run up to the resumption of nuclear talks following Iran’s presidential election, US special envoy on Iran, Robert Malley visited its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies and Israel. At Riyadh, Malley and political directors of the E3 (France, Germany, the UK) held dialogue with GCC states and issued joint statement noting that “a return to mutual compliance with the [nuclear deal] would benefit the entire Middle East”.17 Later, speaking at Manama Dialogue, Malley argued that Iran’s destabilising activities—ballistic missiles, explosive drones and terrorist militias—are not America’s problems, and should be solved independent of nuclear talks and in negotiations between Iran and its regional opponents.18 Notably, Malley’s position was closer to Iran’s own “principled position” on resolving regional issues through “interaction and cooperation”.19
Previously, in the wake of the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015, Rouhani administration had sought to initiate dialogue with Iran’s Gulf neighbours but the policy ran into straits as Iran and Saudi Arabia found themselves on the opposite sides in conflict in Syria, Yemen and competed for influence in the broader region of West Asia and North Africa. This time around, the dialogue between Tehran and Riyadh is happening in a vastly different regional and international context favouring continuing de-escalation of tensions. As the fate of Iran–Saudi diplomacy seems to be entwined with that of the nuclear talks in Vienna, Tehran is also keen on presenting itself as a ‘constructive player’ by taking forward its dialogue with Riyadh.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Japan is manifesting refreshing confidence drawing from its resolve to push the envelope of positive pacifism while determining the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.
The year 2022 will be a decisive year as defence policy elites in Tokyo are shoring up deterrence with review of Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS), in addition to key defence documents including the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP). From rebooting the Diet debate on constitutional reforms1 to deepening the conversation on enemy-base strike capability2 to doubling defence budget—how Japan rewires its national security doctrine is the space to watch for in the coming months.
Defence ministry as well as the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) Research Commission on Security and National Defence Division panel, led by former defence minister Itsunori Onodera3 are debating realistic options in pursuing Japan’s national security goals as the strategic environment has changed drastically since the first NSS was conceived in 2013. The current NSS predates intense US–China strategic competition and the Covid-19 pandemic. As Beijing advances naval and air power, further sophisticates its missile capability and nuclear force, and Pyongyang demonstrates no tangible progress on denuclearisation, Tokyo has no room for strategic ambivalence and miscalculations. The bold choice of an armoured samurai warrior on the cover page of Japan’s 2021 Defence White Paper demonstrates a refreshing confidence amongst the next generation defence planners.4 The shift in the optics—from the Fuji and plum flowers to an armoured samurai—carries the categorical message of Japan’s changing nature as a security actor and its resolve to push the envelope of positive pacifism in determining the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.5
In the year ahead, Japan’s political class, defence planners as well as the strategic community will have to navigate difficult choices amid post-Covid economic risks, demographic dilemma, constitutional limitations and alliance politics while addressing key security challenges on the high-table. These include reviewing the effectiveness of the US–Japan spear and shield strategy, alliance management, especially weaving an effective joint operational plan for a Taiwan contingency, and addressing the strike gap in US–Japan alliance and China6, and providing more teeth to the Coast Guard Act amid intensifying Chinese grey zone tactics. The policy options regarding missile defence and the discussion on enemy-base strike capabilities, and what type of strike capabilities to pursue, will be at the centre stage. The strategic discussion on whether to accept US intermediate range missiles on Japanese territory, and weighing the pros and cons of having nuclear-powered submarines, a conversation that gained traction following AUKUS, are also preoccupying the mind space of defence planners. Additionally, framing robust economic security legislations to advance Japan’s autonomy and indispensability7 is also amongst the top agendas.
The policy deliberations on ramping up the defence budget to 2 per cent of the GDP vis-à-vis Japan’s unsustainable public debt challenge will further evolve.8 Ruling LDP's Research Commission on National Security has previously argued the case elevating the budget to around 2 per cent of GDP, a target embraced by NATO. The recent LDP election manifesto also referred to the NATO defence spending goals. Defence Minister Kishi Nobuo has argued in favour of stepping up defence budget with the aim of bolstering “capabilities at a radically different pace”9 at a time when China’s defence budget, despite issues of transparency, remains more than four times higher.10 As Japan sits on the front line, the self-imposed policy of 1 per cent cap on defence spending which can be traced back to early 1970s is outdated. In late December 2021, the Cabinet approved a defence budget of US$ 47 billion for fiscal 202211, continuing the northward trends in the last decade. While regional powers often critically analyse the discussion on increasing defence budget through the lens of Japan’s return to militarism, the debate itself is an old one. The US has long urged Japan for equitable burden sharing. For instance, in the late 1980s, former defence secretary Frank Carlucci in his report to the Congress advocated that Japan must significantly bolster its self-defence capability. There was resolution calling on Japan to spend around 3 per cent of its Gross National Product (GNP) annually on defence.12
As President Xi Jinping pursues a third term as general secretary of the party, Taiwan remains his core project and reunification is central to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. The military balance is shifting in the western Pacific and it is important to avoid miscalculations. The debate between strategic ambiguity versus strategic clarity vis-à-vis Taiwan has gained momentum in the defence policy conversation not just in Washington, but also in Tokyo. Is it time to impart strategic clarity on Taiwan without provoking conflict from China on the one hand and not emboldening Taiwan to formally declare independence on the other? While some argue that strategic ambiguity approach has lost steam, there is a school of thought which suggests that keeping the position on cross-strait contingency ambiguous serves Japan better to avoid entanglement.13
The pivotal issue of stabilising the situation surrounding Taiwan, which is intrinsically linked to Japan’s security, is not just framed in the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) and the 2021 Defence White Paper, leading political figures including Abe Shinzo, Kishi Nobuo, Nakayama Yasuhide, Aso Taro and Takaichi Sanae are also shaping the conversation that a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency given its proximity to Okinawa. Furthermore, the argument about protecting Taiwan as a fellow democracy has also gained traction.14 Meanwhile, the ruling LDP has intensified its discussion on formulating a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act.15 It has further consolidated its relationship with Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), especially on the economic security vertical. Former Prime Minister Abe is positioned centre stage in the Taiwan discussion. In his recent call “Rise up Taiwan” at the US–Japan–Taiwan Trilateral Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue, he advocated deeper defence technology cooperation across domains.
Although a conventional war on Taiwan is an unrealistic option and PLA’s power projection is essentially a pressure tactics, there is a strong view in Japan that invasion of Dongsha Islands situated in the South China Sea and controlled by Taipei, is a possibility.16 Some consider it as President Xi Jinping’s “easy target” to test waters on American response. Thus, US–Japan alliance must work towards defence of Taiwan by formulating joint operational plans beyond the Senkaku Islands, focussing on a possible Taiwan contingency, bolster missile defence capabilities and deploy medium-range missiles on the first island chain, deepen joint training and exercises, and strengthen intelligence sharing via the US.17 The revised NSS, NDPG, the US–Japan Defence Guidelines, and advanced interoperability will be indicative of the progress. Moreover, Tokyo may also consider enabling a legal framework on similar lines with Washington for providing arms to Taipei despite their commitment to the one-China principle.18 While a sense of crisis concerning Taiwan is dominating the mind space of defence elites amid internationalisation of the Taiwan issue, the key question is, will Japan outline a legal framework to add more depth to its Taiwan policy?
Meanwhile, the renewed debate on enemy-base strike capability after the cancellation of Aegis Ashore reflects that there is support for balancing offence and defence capabilities.19 Following the conversation in Japan indicate that while some argue for “limited” strike capability aimed at preserving the regional military balance,20 others articulate that striking the enemy with the objective of securing Japan is a defensive strategy—‘offensive defence’ or ‘active defence’.21 In July 2020, LDP advocated that Japan should have “the ability to head off missiles in enemy territory”.22 Meanwhile former defence and foreign minister Kono Taro advocates that the discussions should be anchored on deterrence, focussing on the ability to strike enemy-bases to take out launch sites, conduct ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) operations, building air superiority, and gauging the effectiveness of strikes.23 It is important to note that Tokyo already decided on hypersonic cruise missiles and hypervelocity guiding projectiles.
The discourse on strike capability is hardly new and the roots can be traced to Prime Minister Hatoyama’s administration in 1956, laying the foundation of strike debate. But garnering wider public support on the subject within the frame of the pacifist constitution proved challenging. This is reflective of the larger trend where defence and security policy debates often slide into constitutional and legal question, complicating Japan’s options. While Tokyo is expected to craft a defensive narrative on strike capability, how the region reacts will considerably determine the future course of East Asian security.
In the coming months, the region will keenly observe how Tokyo’s exclusively defence oriented post-war security posture evolves. In rejecting a Sino-centric regional order, the priority will be to reorient Tokyo’s defence posture in close coordination with Washington, and further synergising strategies for seamless operational coordination given the fast-changing dynamics of warfare and new domains of power projection such as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. NSS 2013 accorded priority to South Korea but Japan–South Korea relations suffered considerably in recent years drawing from the baggage of history. However, policy elites must ensure that bilateral fault lines should not adversely impact the strategic goals of the US–Japan–South Korea coordination in handling the threats coming from Pyongyang. The revised NSS will position US–Japan alliance at the core, and further align Tokyo’s security interests with the Quad powers—Australia and India, members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and strategic partners in Europe, including France, the UK and Germany in pursuit of keeping the strategic space of Indo-Pacific “free” and “open”. Japan as an ardent advocate of rules-based order will step up and is expected to proactively mobilise resources to deliver global public goods in the post-Covid era. Japan is manifesting refreshing confidence drawing from its resolve to push the envelope of positive pacifism in determining the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Politics”, Nippon.com, 8 December 2021.
20 May 2021.
Kremlin’s increasingly assertive stance on the troop build-up along the Russia–Ukraine border can be viewed as not just prompted by Ukraine’s potential NATO membership but also as Russia underscoring its place as a stakeholder in shaping European security architecture.
Alarm bells have been ringing in Eastern Europe about the motives of the large Russian troop build-up along the Russia–Ukraine border. Moscow and Kiev have blamed each other for upping the ante. This has been followed by a sharp escalation in rhetoric and mutual recriminations. Naturally, a sense of déjà vu prevails in the region1 amidst the Kremlin’s increasingly assertive stance on the troop build-up. Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014 remains fresh in European memory.
Unsurprisingly, given the geo-political stakes involved in the heart of Europe, the ongoing standoff has brought the West led by the US into the existing security matrix. President Biden has assured Kiev of United States' “unwavering support”.2 Meanwhile, the European Union has been vocal in imposing "massive consequences and severe costs" on Russia.3
Notably, the fears of an imminent Russian invasion appear to have subsided post recent Putin–Biden talks. It seems that emphasis has been placed on dialogue4 to establish a new modus vivendi. This has seen Russia submit proposals to the US5 and NATO6 highlighting not only its red-lines but also to jointly build a new model of European security architecture. However, President Putin’s assertion of maintaining “tensions for as long as possible”7 to accommodate Russia’s concerns, some of which appear non-negotiable for the West, highlight the minefield which needs to be navigated in this standoff.
The pertinent questions which, therefore, arise are the timing of Russia’s sabre-rattling and its potential outcome.
Timing and Motive of Russian Troop Build-Up
The timing of Russia’s troop build-up can likely be attributed to Ukraine’s westward drift gaining momentum over the course of the last year. Kiev has increasingly acquired lethal Western weapons apart from conducting multiple military exercises with Russia's bête noire—the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).8 NATO has also helped build Ukraine’s military infrastructure, including ports and airfields. These developments are likely to have increased Russia’s insecurity of Ukraine becoming a de-facto NATO base right at Moscow’s doorstep.
In this context, the Ukrainian imbroglio remains an existential issue for Russia. Kiev’s importance as a geo-strategic buffer for the Kremlin vis-à-vis the West is a pivotal element of Russia’s security. This is particularly relevant amidst the Western attempts to seemingly contain and isolate Russia in its neighbourhood.
Meanwhile, contrary to Russia’s expectations, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appears to be putting all his eggs in the Western basket, in a volte-face of his election manifesto of normalising ties with Moscow. This is reflected in Ukraine reneging on the Minsk agreements, 9 which lay down the framework for creating an autonomous region in eastern Ukraine comprising Donbas and Luhansk. This would have given Russia the levers to maintain its influence in the region through its proxies. Notably, France and Germany, the two key interlocutors in the Minsk agreements, have increasingly sided with Ukraine, much to Russia’s chagrin.10
Arguably, the troop build-up is Russia’s signalling to the West to respect its red-lines. Ukrainian membership of NATO likely tops this list. For three decades, Russia has seen NATO ignore its concerns by inducting not only the erstwhile Warsaw Pact members but also former Soviet Republics. Similarly, the installation of NATO missile defences in Russia’s periphery has been another key bone of contention.11 Russia remains peeved at these historic injustices.12 The Kremlin believes that the West reneged on assurances of accommodating Russia’s security concerns, at the time of Soviet Union's dissolution.13 It appears that the Kremlin’s next move on the European geo-political chessboard is coercive diplomacy in order to force a security dialogue with the West. In that sense, the troop build-up can be viewed as not just prompted by Ukraine’s potential NATO membership but also as Russia underscoring its place as a stakeholder in shaping European security architecture.
Russia is perhaps leveraging its escalation dominance and the perceived lack of appetite in the West for a military confrontation to seek accommodation of its interests. Similarly, Moscow could be banking on President Biden’s message of building stable relationship with Russia.14 Implied in this is freeing up the US to confront head-on the challenge posed by China’s rise. Meanwhile, having weathered Western sanctions for seven years, it is unlikely that the threat of additional ones or even a freeze in an already frosty relationship with the West will deter Russia from upping the ante. It helps that foreign policy is increasingly a source of domestic legitimacy for the Russian political establishment, anchored in making Russia 'great again'. And Ukraine and NATO do strike an emotive chord among Russian citizens.
Outcome
From a Russian perspective, the Kremlin’s aggressive posture appears to have borne a few immediate dividends. This includes a flurry of interactions with Russia’s main antagonist, the US which culminated in a virtual summit between the two Presidents. One of its key takeaways was President Biden’s perceived conciliatory tone on both Ukraine and European security architecture.15 The US’ emphasis on Kiev fulfilling its obligations under the Minsk agreements16, where Russia has a distinct advantage, would likely have been music to Russia’s ears. Similarly, a dialogue on European security, long perceived to be a no-go area between Russia and the West, is now back on the agenda.17
Future Ramifications
As always, the devil lies in the details. Russia’s two draft treaty proposals18 to the US and NATO on legally binding security guarantees would upend the existing European security architecture. Three key propositions which are likely to be non-negotiable for the West stand out. These involve halting NATO expansion eastwards in the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, and a large-scale US military withdrawal from the European continent. The latter involves removal of American tactical and nuclear missiles. Russia is also seeking a dilution of NATO’s military commitment to its eastern European members who had joined the alliance in May 1997. Implied in these proposals is Russia’s message of Moscow and Europe alone determining the course of European security. From a Western perspective, these proposals would entail giving Russia a veto on NATO’s future course of action.
Arguably, a new model of security interaction in Europe can only emerge if Russia and the West start looking at each other through a new prism amidst their existing trust deficit, with Russia increasingly seen as a European outlier.
In this context, President Biden would have to do a tough balancing act to dial down, in his words, the “political temperature along the eastern front”.19 This includes, on one hand, preserving NATO’s alliance integrity amidst shared concerns about Russia, especially among its eastern European members, and, on the other hand, persevering with the US goal of building stable relations with Russia to enable it to fully focus on the China challenge.
Crucially, it is also in Russia’s interests to reset ties with the West. Today, the Western pressure on Moscow has pushed it towards a closer embrace of Beijing. However, Russia is paying the price of the unbalanced nature of its ties with China by being forced to cede space to Beijing in its core strategic space. For Russia’s strategic autonomy, it is essential to have a modicum of equilibrium in ties with both its western and eastern neighbours. Indeed, there exist multiple areas globally where Russia–West interests converge. Perhaps, raising the stakes of the draft treaty proposals is more of a negotiating tactic20 in discussions that are likely to be long-drawn.
Conclusion
Nevertheless, all bets on a reset of ties would likely be off if Russia feels rebuffed. Having put the onus of a détente on the West, Russia’s credibility of coercive diplomacy would be at stake if its concerns are not accommodated. The starting point for Russia is likely to be a neutral Ukraine.
An alternate viewpoint could be that by making it almost impossible for the West to accept Russia’s proposals, the Kremlin’s gameplan has all along been a military intervention. In the same vein, a provocation by Ukraine in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, similar to the modus operandi adopted by Georgia’s Saakashvili in 2008, could lead to a Russian military intervention. Kiev has increasingly found itself on the backfoot amidst the US calls for it to implement the Minsk agreements.
Needless to say, a Russian invasion of Ukraine would scupper chances of a détente between Russia and the West. Russia would face crippling sanctions including abrogation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Ukraine’s membership of NATO could also be fast-tracked. The Russia–China relationship could gain further traction.
For India, attempts by Russia and the West to explore a new modus vivendi is likely a positive development. For the last seven years, the push and pull of the Russia–West confrontation has complicated India’s foreign policy options, with India expected to choose sides. Their détente would make it easier to navigate ties with both sides. There is no gainsaying that India’s ties with Moscow and West remain mutually beneficial and bolster India’s strategic autonomy.
Crucially, normalisation of their ties could also give Moscow some breathing space in its growing strategic dependence on China, which has compelled Russia to increasingly bat for Beijing’s interests. The Russia–China tandem has muddied India’s geo-strategic environment. A Russia–US thaw could provide an opportunity to add more pillars to the Indo-Russian strategic partnership with ramifications stretching beyond their bilateral realm.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Prolonged political crisis, social unrest, pre-existing economic misery, and outbreak of a diplomatic crisis between Lebanon and the Gulf countries have left Lebanon in a debilitated state. Systemic reforms to tackle the economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian challenges, are the need of the hour.
Lebanon has been trapped in a seemingly endless turmoil since 2019 with little hope of any solution in immediate sight. The demonstrations which started as a response to the worsening economic situation and corruption in the political system have been haunting the country at regular intervals. Lebanon is facing a three-pronged crisis which has left it in a debilitated state on the economic and political fronts. While on the one hand, there had been a long-drawn political crisis resulting in almost a 2-year-long political deadlock in the country, on the other hand, the 2020 Beirut blast aggravated the pre-existing economic misery and brought the country close to a state collapse. Amidst the turmoil, in September 2021, the formation of a new government sparked hope for an improvement in the condition of the country. However, merely one and a half months later, the outbreak of a diplomatic crisis between Lebanon and the Gulf countries (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait), triggered by Lebanon’s former Information Minister George Kordahi’s comments over Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, has made the situation in Lebanon far more volatile. Not only has this proven to be the country’s worst economic nightmare, but coupled with the domestic unrest and pre-existing unstable political system, has made it immensely difficult for it to show any signs of recovery.
Political Instability
For Lebanon, maintaining political stability has been a major challenge. Since 2009, no prime minister has been able to serve for more than three years. One of the major reasons for this is the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics. The political system of Lebanon is such that the three key positions in government namely, President (Maronite Christian), Prime Minister (Sunni Muslim) and Speaker of the Parliament (Shia Muslim) belong to different religious affinities1, thus resulting in frequent dissents. Furthermore, the positions in the government are divided on the basis of quota among 18 recognised sects.2 Each group constituting the coalition has its supporters and claims to fight for the interests of the same. Thus, the leaders and the sectarian groups are continuously at loggerheads with each other.
In addition to this, the political elite are considered highly “self-centred” by the populace. They are accused of exploiting state resources and benefiting themselves at the cost of the public.3 They also collude with businesses and further their interests. Such discontent often takes the form of protests against the political establishment, making the government step down before the completion of its term. Instability of the government has a negative effect on the economy since there is persistent policy paralysis, further fuelling the anger among the already suffering population.
In October 2019, Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned due to massive anti-government protests, and in a span of merely two years Lebanon has seen a change of four prime ministers. In 2021, under severe domestic and international pressure a new government was formed after intense negotiations with other partners. However, political instability still looms over Lebanon as the next parliamentary elections are scheduled for 27 March 2022, which means that the current government has only a few more months to govern. Under such a situation, one cannot expect the government to take any major steps to resolve the economic degradation.
Internal Disorder
Domestically, a strong anti-government sentiment has taken root in the minds of the Lebanese population, reflected in the frequent protests against the state. The major reasons for this include widespread corruption and the inability of the government to stabilise the economy, which has given rise to distrust among the people. Lebanon has seen a fall in its score along the Corruption Perception Index from 28 in 2019 to 25 in 2020, effectively a change of 10.71 per cent.4
Lebanon has also lately witnessed some deepening of sectarian divisions. In an unfortunate spate of events, a protest organised by Hezbollah and Amal in October 2021 against Judge Tarek Bitar, who is leading the investigation in the Beirut Blast case, turned violent after an unknown armed sniper opened fire on protesters.5 This resulted in an armed conflict between the Lebanese armed forces, predominantly Christians, and the protestors who were Hezbollah and Amal supporters. This was the first time after the Civil War (1975–1990) that violent armed conflict was seen on the streets of Lebanon.6
Lebanon is also undergoing worst times in terms of availability of essentials and basic utilities. The Beirut blast coupled with the pandemic has caused shortages of fuel, food and medicines. Fuel shortages due to foreign exchange crises have shut down its power stations. The dearth of sufficient foreign exchange has also been a roadblock in Lebanon subsidising imports of essential commodities such as food and medicine.7
While the Lebanese state has been facing challenges in ensuring employment opportunities for its citizens, the immigration of refugees from Syria and Palestine has exerted additional pressure on the state resources. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates, there are 1.5 million Syrians in Lebanon and approximately 0.2 million Palestinians.8
Another irritant in Lebanon is Hezbollah, which has become a major obstacle in maintaining stability in the country. It is a political party and paramilitary force as well as a designated terror group by the US.9 Its strong military power, share of seats in parliament and overwhelming regional support from Syria and Iran, make it indispensable in the government formation process.However, it has also attracted the disdain of the public for its involvement in corrupt practices, violence against Lebanese citizens and exercising harshmeasures against peaceful protestors. Its members were also summoned by Judge Tarek Bitarfor their involvement in the 2020 Beirut Port Blast case, to which they retaliated by protesting along with Amal supporters in October 2021.10
Additionally, Hezbollah also receives outstanding support from Iran and works as its proxy in the country thereby allowing Iran to use Lebanon as a playground to achieve its regional objectives. This has been a major reason behind the Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia presenting an aggressive posture towards Lebanon as Saudi Arabia perceives Iran a major security threat in the region. It has also created a “state within a state” in Lebanon which is damaging its political economy and diplomatic standing, leaving the country isolated during difficult times.11
Struggling Economy
Lebanon’s unprecedented political, economic and diplomatic crisis has had major socio-economic outfalls accompanied by humanitarian misery. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, “the economy has already contracted by about 30 percent since 2017 and is expected to contract further in 2021–22”.12 The economic contraction has resulted in a rise in the unemployment rate from 6.04 per cent in 2019 to 6.6 per cent in 2020.13 This has left many on the brink of impoverishment. According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA) estimates, the multidimensional poverty rate doubled from 42 per cent in 2019 to 82 per cent in 2021.14
The Lebanese Lira has also seen a 90 per cent fall in its value, aggravating general inflationary pressures with food prices experiencing a ten-fold increase.15 At the same time, the pandemic has taken a heavy toll on the economy and there is an urgent need for governance and fiscal reforms coupled with financial restructuring. In the light of the above, the IMF has made certain policy recommendations to get the Lebanese economy back on track. These include strengthening the anti-corruption framework and reforming the state-owned enterprises; debt restructuring to enhance credibility and expanding the social safety net; establishing a robust monetary system, unifying multiple exchange rates and implementing formal capital controls. In order to avail IMF’s assistance in pulling itself out of this crisis, the implementation of the comprehensive reforms by the new government is the need of the hour.16
Diplomatic Problems with the Gulf Countries
Lebanon’s troubled ties with Saudi Arabia has emerged as another major challenge for the Lebanese leadership. Right after Kordahi's comments, Saudi Arabia banned imports from Lebanon, recalled its envoy from Beirut and expelled the Lebanese ambassador. The Gulf countries namely UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain followed suit and took similar action against Lebanon’s diplomats and recalled their ambassadors from Lebanon. In addition to the Gulf countries, Yemen also recalled its envoy from Beirut on 3 November 2021. Thus, the fallouts of Lebanon’s discord with Saudi Arabia can be seen in its strained relations with the Gulf countries and the subsequent diplomatic boycott.
Saudi Arabia’s political influence over Lebanon has drastically diminished since 2017 after Saad Hariri’s abrupt resignation while he was in Saudi Arabia. It has also made its displeasure about Hezbollah’s growing influence in Lebanese politics evident and distanced itself from Lebanon in recent years. However, Saudi Arabia has enjoyed an upper hand with respect to its economic engagements with the latter. Lebanon's economy majorly depends on remittances from its diaspora. Of its approximately 5,50,00017 expatriates who work in the Gulf countries, 3,00,00018 work in Saudi Arabia itself.19 The current import ban will have a severe impact on the Lebanese fruit and vegetable trade with Saudi Arabia which accounts between US$ 20 million and US$ 34 million annually.20 The fall in the value of Lira has also made imports from Saudi Arabia costlier for Lebanon, further increasing its trade deficit.
Lebanon is also heavily dependent on the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, for oil. There has been an oil crisis in the country due to shortage of oil leading to petrol price hike thereby crippling the economy and triggering protests. The rift with the Gulf countries will act as a roadblock in seeking their aid to restore sufficient energy supplies.
Way Forward
To end the current crisis in Lebanon, efforts ranging from resolution of the diplomatic crisis to setting its internal economic condition and political system in order, are required. This can be achieved by addressing the problem of corruption, initiating economic reforms and establishing better relations with the Gulf countries. To end the diplomatic impasse, Kordahi resigned under severe pressure from all sides. Additionally, France along with Saudi Arabia has extended support to Lebanon in strengthening its army to maintain security and stability along with carrying out joint consultations on all issues.
Thus, in order to resolve these economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian challenges, the Lebanese government needs to introduce reform measures immediately, without any further delay. These include restructuring the economic order, ensuring fiscal prudence, reforming the financial sector and recalibrating the monetary policy. Only with such measures in place, the country will be able to attract assistance from international organisations such as the IMF. On the diplomatic front, it is difficult to ascertain whether the resignation of Kordahi will aid in ending the diplomatic crisis, considering the influence of Hezbollah on Lebanese politics as a major source of condemnation by the Gulf countries. Furthermore, the extent and magnitude of the sectarian divide shall also have a major impact on the country through its direct implications for peace and development, thus having domestic and regional ramifications.
On the positive side however, outreach by the international community including countries such as Saudi Arabia, France, US and the UK along with the UN, after the Beirut Port Blast, has ushered in some ray of hope. On 9 August 2020, France hosted an international donor conference with the UN to support Lebanon and pledged US$ 298 million to the country. In August 2021, the US announced US$ 100 million humanitarian assistance for Lebanon.21 On 1 October 2021, the UN and humanitarian partners announced a US$ 383 million Emergency Response Plan (ERP) for Lebanon to provide critical life-saving assistance.22 However, the prolonged political crisis, social unrest and periodic violence in several parts of the country have discouraged the international community from dispersing aid to the country. Thus, Lebanon will be able to benefit from these aid initiatives only if it introduces systemic reforms and tackles the problem of corruption, which are its major handicaps.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
A larger exchange of defence business between India and Southeast Asia may consolidate India’s position in the regional security architecture, and also forge greater political alignment with important ASEAN partners.
The Philippines is set to buy from India at least seven Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) and eight Dornier 228 aircraft under a recently concluded deal.1 The bilateral defence relations received an impetus after the ‘Implementing Agreement’ was signed earlier this year, which would facilitate legal framework for Philippines’ defence acquisitions from India.2 The Philippines defence secretary had also been quoted saying that his country will purchase BrahMos missiles, jointly developed by India and Russia.3 Meanwhile, talks are in progress regarding the export of BrahMos to Indonesia.4
These developments are reflective of growing interest in Southeast Asia to purchase arms from India. India will therefore need to upgrade its domestic defence manufacturing capabilities, perhaps in conjunction with friendly advanced nations, to sustain this interest from Southeast Asia. An overview of their defence markets and demands will help India develop these capabilities accordingly. A larger exchange of defence business between India and Southeast Asia may consolidate India’s position in the regional security architecture, and also forge greater political alignment with important ASEAN partners.
Increased Spending and Military Modernisation
Southeast Asian countries have shown an expansion in their defence spending, particularly over the last decade with an increase of 36 per cent.5 In 2020 alone, the military spending in the region increased by 5.2 per cent. Many ASEAN nations have also adopted medium to long term military modernisation plans to improve their defence. Under its Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) programme, Indonesia has earmarked US$ 79 billion from a total of US$ 125 billion (rest for sustenance and interests) for modernisation of its defence forces in the next 25-year-period.6 Philippines has allocated US$ 4.3 billion to its defence budget in 2021, under the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program (RAFPMP)7. There has also been talk about Philippines’ interest in acquiring submarines as the conflict in the region is primarily over disputed maritime claims.8 The largest military spender in the region, Singapore’s defence modernisation plans may see the next-generation Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) using Artificial Intelligence in weaponry, automation, data analytics, cyber and space-based assets for “multi-domain operations”.9
In its 2019 defence white paper, Vietnam set the goal of full military modernisation by 2030. The case of Vietnam is, however, a special one. Its geographical proximity and territorial dispute with China have both aggravated tension in their bilateral relations, and also restrained Hanoi’s actions that may be interpreted by Beijing as provocative. The tendency to opt for political action instead of military action10 will likely put any major defence spending plans, especially acquisitions, on the back-burner for Vietnam. Thailand has shown a resolve to upgrade its arsenal with the 10-year “Modernization Plan: Vision 2026” adopted in 2017. However, its defence purchases have been mired in controversies around questions of strategic relevance and high expense. For instance, the three diesel-electric submarines (valued US$ 1.03 billion) that Thailand has decided to buy from China are unsuitable to be operated in its own coastal zones due to large size.11 Although the government seems determined to procure more, internal corruption in Thailand’s defence ecosystem may affect the decision-making process.
Indigenous Industry and Intermediate Goods Market
Even though China’s not-so-peaceful military and economic rise factors strongly into the trend of defence spending in the region, some analysts believe that there are other formidable reasons as well. Much of the defence budgets of ASEAN countries is spent in maintaining large armies and old arsenals, and threats of piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling, etc., pull their own share from these already constrained budgets.12 As a consequence of limited spending in Research & Development and lack of infrastructure for defence manufacturing, import of arms is the most suitable choice for many ASEAN nations.
There is considerable realisation of this handicap in all major ASEAN capitals, and governments aim to keep importing vital defence items while at the same time enhance indigenous capabilities. This means Southeast Asia will continue to be an attractive market for finished defence products as well as intermediate products. For instance, Indonesia passed a law in 2012 requiring its armed forces to acquire arms domestically as much as possible.13 PT Pindad, PT Digantara Indonesia, PT PAL Indonesia and PT Dahana are some state-owned Indonesian companies that are involved in production of naval vessels, propeller aircraft, helicopters, explosives, artillery and land combat vehicles.14 Similarly, Malaysia’s Bousted Heavy Industries is working with French DCNS to build six coastal combat ships for Malaysian Navy. Singapore’s state-owned ST Engineering has sold arms to a number of countries including armoured troop carriers to Britain under a deal in 2008.15
India in the Mix
India aspires to radically boost its indigenous defence industry and become a major exporter. The Indian government has also encouraged foreign players to manufacture in India. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has set goals of US$ 25 billion of domestic defence production and US$ 5 billion of defence exports for India.16 Naturally, Southeast Asia is a lucrative market for India’s defence exports given the cordial relations with ASEAN partners, and growing political alignment over issues of international importance. Apart from aiming to deliver high-end strategic assets in the region, India may also exploit the promising segment of intermediate goods in the defence sector.
In a roundtable discussion on defence industry cooperation organised jointly by Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) and US-India Business Council (USIBC)17 in October 2021, a key takeaway was to boost Indian manufacturers of defence intermediate goods. Major industry players such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing India expressed that fulfilling requirements of Indigenous Content (IC) becomes difficult due to lack of forthcoming Indian companies involved in production of intermediate goods. As a consequence, much of these items are imported. On similar lines, India’s dependence on intermediate goods from foreign nations limits its autonomy to export defence products abroad.18 Asia-Pacific is likely to witness substantial growth in aerospace and defence sector, and the demand for titanium and alloys, aluminium and alloys, steel and alloys, and composites will drive the intermediate goods market for a long time.19 By investing to build a base in this segment, not only will India be equipped to host more Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)20 for manufacturing in India, but also provide a resilient and reliable supply chain for large-scale production in aerospace and defence sector.
Policy Options
Policymakers may like to focus exclusively on attracting investment for intermediate goods industry. A starting point can be encouraging foreign OEMs to discharge offset obligations by investing in these industries. A thriving intermediate goods industry will achieve three-pronged objectives of sufficient supply to locally operating OEMs, export to foreign markets, and incentivise more foreign OEMs to set shop in India. While it is ideal for India to increase number of defence production units that deliver ‘final goods’ like finished aircraft, it may be difficult feat to achieve given many structural constraints. Allowing ‘intermediate goods’ industry to flourish will naturally attract more foreign OEMs that can eventually deliver final goods and strengthen India’s defence exports.
In this scenario, it may be important to foster dialogue among potential investors, entrepreneurs in the aerospace and defence sector, and policymakers. Think tanks and advocacy groups can bring these parties together to reach consensus on the road ahead. Since the restructuring of supply chains is happening now, inaction at this time could mean losing out to aptly-located other suppliers that will eventually emerge in the global market.21 India has the advantage of a political class that is interested in boosting defence exports, creating infrastructure for large-scale production, and addressing issues faced by private players involved in the sector. It must make use of this window of opportunity.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Although the ideas of nuclear arms control, nuclear security and nuclear disarmament have featured in several US official statements and joint statements with other countries, will US adopt the ‘No First Use’ policy, remains to be seen.
Will the United States (US) adopt the No First Use (NFU) policy? Those who had followed the Presidential/election campaign of Joe Biden and who generally read the formal and rhetorical statements of the leaders as truth, seemed optimistic. However, a closer scrutiny matched with the harsher reality or dynamics of the world politics and security is required. Biden made statements in favour of NFU during his Presidential elections and even before. He said during the campaign that the US should be pushing for NFU. In this context, he had put special emphasis on no use of nuclear-laden ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). Biden, in general, expressed his views on it while discussing no exchange of nuclear weapons in the world. He underscored that a policy of NFU could be a step in that direction. He repeatedly talked about nuclear reduction.
After assuming Presidency, Biden seemingly wanted to translate his old personal NFU principles into the US policy, and possibly, as part of its nuclear doctrine. The ideas of nuclear arms control, nuclear security and nuclear disarmament kept featuring in several US official statements and joint statements issued with other countries.1 Even though nuclear arms control as an instrument of nuclear and strategic stability was underlined on many occasions when Russia–US bilateral relationship was discussed2, yet NFU has hardly become a key component of strategic or nuclear stability in the US–Russia partnership.
Admittedly, the 16 June 2021 US–Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability did acknowledge, “Today, we reaffirm the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”3 The joint statement also underscored the significance of “ensuring predictability in the strategic sphere”, and one of the tools envisaged was diminishing “the threat of nuclear war”.4
Media reports and writings published by Western think tanks inform that in the run-up to the new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Biden has tried to do an exercise on NFU as well. Through NPR, it seems, he wants to change the American approach to the use of nuclear weapons. The US government has officially stated on NPR and consultation of allies for it.5 Although no official statement has come regarding the exercise on NFU in the NPR, yet indications coming through the media reports and think tanks tell the world that allies are being consulted on the possible adoption of the NFU policy.
Why is the Biden Administration consulting its allies for its national policy or NPR? It is doing so because of its commitment to preserve a united nuclear alliance and for maintaining its credibility at least in the near future. Biden’s entire campaign was centered on restoring the American leadership in the multilateral settings, including in security matters. The US is supposed to have meticulous consultations with its NATO partners on nuclear and arms control issues. The Administration noted: “We have declared our nuclear deterrents to the defence of [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] NATO and as long as there are nuclear weapons, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. Our NATO Allies and partners will always be able to count on us, even as they continue to strengthen their own national forces.”6
The quiet exercise seemingly has not only resulted in some nervous response from the allies who share liberal or security values with the US but has also triggered debate within the policy community of the US and other Western countries on NFU, though this debate has been going on in a subdued manner for a long period. The allies were apparently sent a set of questionnaire to respond. Quite interestingly, even Chinese media like the Global Times7 also joined the debate and reacted to Western media reports.
The Chinese media’s reaction tells a complex story about the unique position of the US in the world. It is one of the two countries which have been possessing more than 90 per cent of the declared arsenals of the world, and a decision about how to use nuclear weapons may have an extraordinary impact on global nuclear thinking and behaviour. China and its media are well aware of America’s hegemonic position even if the unipolar moment for the US is overlooked. China may be a challenger to the US but to influence and shape the world order, China understands that it has to undertake complex entanglement with the American decision-making process, possibly accepting the hierarchy in the global order.
The responses, reactions and debate on NFU have brought to light several issues, some of which are lingering on for decades, some have been discussed in the recent past and others are reflection of the new issues and challenges tossed by the contemporary reality. The status-quoists argue for distancing from the policy of NFU, the arms control and disarmament group favour adopting the NFU, and some contend and predict a middle path in the form of either fundamental purpose or existential threats instead of NFU. In fact, inclusion of nuclear deterrence as the ‘sole purpose’ of nuclear weapons has been an old issue. Earlier the phrase ‘sole purpose’ was considered the middle path and it became quite intense in the run up to 2010 NPR. The Obama Administration somehow found an innovative way to skirt the issue.
The much talked about Financial Times report8 informed that the US allies had objected to the adoption of NFU. The report named some of the allies who opposed the NFU. These were: Australia, Germany, France, the UK and Japan. The basic contention of the allies apparently was that the change of the posture may “undermine long-established deterrence strategies aimed at Russia and China”.9 There is a fear that the adoption of NFU may lead to nuclearisation by the US allies such as Japan and South Korea. Undoubtedly, this fear does not have much basis because the adoption of NFU does not mean the withdrawal of nuclear protection umbrella or extended deterrence.
Some opponents maintain that the NFU is disturbing the allies but American adversaries may yet not find the posture credible.10 Some of the allies apprehend large-scale conventional strike, which they feel may be deterred only by ambiguity regarding the use of nuclear weapons. This will lead to a lose-lose situation for the US. The reports indicate that the US allies expect some kind of pre-emptive nuclear strike from the US, which will not happen if the US adopts NFU. The US nuclear weapons policy to deter large-scale conventional and biological and chemical attacks to reassure its allies and partners does not mean the pre-emptive nuclear strike.
Some argue that China is fast increasing its nuclear arsenals (about 1,000 by 2030) as the 2021 Pentagon report notes, and the US, under START treaty, is limiting its deployable nuclear warheads to 1,50011, which could lead to a difficult security situation. The argument goes that the adoption of NFU or sole purpose will weaken nuclear deterrence as China will consider it a sign of weakness of the US. In such a situation it is believed that instead of reciprocating,12 China will be emboldened. The basic argument is that the removal of strategic ambiguity through NFU will dismantle American nuclear deterrence.
Proponents of NFU argue that by embracing it, the US will steer the world to a low risk, if not ‘no risk’ zone. It may reduce the chance of miscalculation and wrong signalling. NFU is also considered an effective tool to constrain a President like Trump in the future.13 Democrats and a section of the Republican Party dread a future scenario in which a President like Trump has nuclear briefcase and button.
It is assumed that the US NFU policy will set an example for the world, and others may also be forced to imitate. The world will not have to encounter the danger of escalation to a level of nuclear exchange. The common refrain is that despite tall claims of its adversaries, the US has conventional superiority. It can achieve its strategic objectives without provoking any possibility of nuclear escalation. Advocates of NFU claim that the reduction of salience of the use of nuclear weapons may eventually result in realising the redundancy of nuclear weapons and the virtue of nuclear disarmament.
Considering the emerging trend, it can be easily predicted that the US is not going to adopt the NFU notwithstanding the legislation for the purpose introduced by some Democrat Congress members and the open letters sent to Japan or the US politicians. The Administration is also not going to adopt the narrowly or broadly defined ‘sole purpose’. Predominantly, the US policy making community sees ‘sole purpose’ as a sophisticated version of NFU. Some new phrases may be coined and a few new measures may be taken to convey the message that steps towards reducing nuclear risks have been taken. Such recommendatory measures14 are appearing on the websites of different think tanks.
To mitigate apprehensions of its allies, the US ought to exercise Expanded Multilateral Option. If a NFU treaty is concluded and all the nuclear weapon countries become parties to it, this could be an ideal situation. Otherwise, it should approach Russia and other nuclear weapon countries for developing an understanding on NFU, and have an arrangement similar to 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, popularly known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The allies of US may feel less threatened if a universal protocol exists. As for the use of nuclear weapons against an advanced conventional weapon or chemical or biological attack, it is a remote possibility. It would be better if US allies and opponents of NFU realise this soon.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
With few convergences among partners, the path of the “traffic light coalition” headed by Olaf Scholz is laden with challenges, but also offers spaces for positive action. With several new faces in key positions, its success would lie in maintaining continuity, and tweaking it to accommodate necessary changes when required.
The Merkel era had shaped not only Germany’s economic and strategic worldview, but also that of the European Union where she remained the most formidable cohesive leader. Olaf Scholz, the new chancellor from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) had served as the finance minister in Merkel’s coalition government since 2018. Hailing from Hamburg, the important port town where Chinese multinational giant COSCO holds the economic reins with an ever-increasing footprint, his chancellorship is under keen observation from world over for the changes or continuities Germany will show under his leadership.1
Traffic Light Coalition
The rather catchy phrase “traffic light coalition” comes from how the first traffic light, an unusual technology back in 1924 when first introduced, became a game-changer in modernising Germany. Scholz has described his Social Democrats’ coalition with the Free Democrats and the Greens as a similar path-breaking event that will become indispensable in times to come and will radically change Germany.2 While part of it is usual electoral optics, there is no denying that there is some truth in the claim as well. It is for the first time that a difficult coalition has been formed (in departure from Merkel-era coalitions that lasted for decades). As Scholz takes office, speculations are flying high about how he will manage the “traffic light” coalition as per the 177-page deal that was struck after two months of negotiations with its partners.3 The deal lays out the coalition plan to run the country. With major cabinet reshuffles to reconcile the ideologically opposed coalition members on key issues to steer Germany’s future course in months (perhaps years to come), the deal document is rife with several sharp divisions among the coalition partners on major economic, fiscal and foreign policy issues especially with regard to energy security, Russia and China.4
The policies (directly or indirectly) away from Russia and China would mean closer ties with the US, especially with regard to the new energy security deal and the nuclear umbrella. In a welcome step for the US, the coalition document has already indicated that it will observe a longstanding nuclear sharing arrangement allowing the US to continue deploying 20 atomic bombs at an airbase in western Germany. This has prompted a sigh of relief in Washington because in their election manifestos, both the SPD and the Greens election programmes condemned the basing of nuclear weapons in Germany.5 That these differences have been reconciled in the final coalition document is indeed a sign of the incoming administration responding to the fast-changing geopolitical scenario.
What also binds them together is their desire to modernise and overhaul Germany. However, while the document furnishes good-sounding plans, it offers little insight into how those plans would work on the ground. In current geopolitical times, Germany’s new leadership will have to tackle the fact that industrial policy cannot be separated from foreign policy especially in the context of over-reliance on certain countries for energy, specially fossil fuels and industrial exports.
Resetting Relations with Russia
The new cabinet has an interesting composition. Heiko Maas, foreign minister for the past three years and a keen advocate of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has been replaced by Annalena Baerbock, co-leader of the Greens, who has opposed the Nord Stream 2. The new Economic Minister is Robert Habeck, again a Greens leader. He will oversee the regulatory approval process for Nord Stream 2. Things were different with his predecessor Peter Altmaier, who lobbied on behalf of Russia and was instrumental in getting the controversial Nord Stream project through.6 Whether Robert Habeck will do so, seems unlikely because Greens view Nord Stream 2 as symbolic of Germany’s subservient relationship with Moscow.
Not Scholz himself, but other members of his Social Democratic Party have been close to Russia. Former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (from SPD) has been Putin’s chief international lobbyist as well as the chairman of the Nord Stream 2 company.7 But with radically opposed Economic and Foreign Ministers, the earlier relationship with Russia will be challenged. The success of Scholz’s coalition will depend to a large extent on whether he can distance himself from his party’s Putin loyalists and define a more even relationship with Russia. He has to aim for some continuity but with enough flexibility to tackle the tweaks. The Nord Stream 2 project therefore offers the first test of his resolve towards resetting relations with Russia. With delays costing millions of euros every day, Putin has been warned time and again by the new German administration that invading Ukraine would result in “severe consequences” that could mean shutting off the multi-billion gas pipeline.8 The future of Nord Stream then depends on the extent to which it is continued being used as a political weapon, first by Putin and now by Germany and the West.
Trends in Germany–China Relations
An array of interesting facets emerge upon examining the trends in Germany–China relations. Under Merkel’s chancellorship, Germany became China’s biggest trade partner in Europe. However, the Greens have been more critical of Xi’s regime with some of their MPs being subjected to sanctions by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for critiquing China’s human rights violations against the Uighurs.9 How will Scholz coalition maintain close ties with China under prevailing conditions, will be a matter of interest. Scholz recently drew flak from CCP when he unveiled the coalition deal document that includes surprisingly strong language on China, pledging to call out on human rights violations of Uighurs and backing a “democratic” Taiwan’s entry in international organisations.10 It is noteworthy that the coalition agreement mentions China at least a dozen times and that terms such as "system rivalry", "human rights" and "fair rules of the game” feature repeatedly in China’s context.11
The bright side is Scholz’s reputation as a balancer, just like Merkel. He is likely to deftly balance the economic dependence on China with his Atlanticist enthusiasm and is expected to coordinate his China policy more closely with Washington and US nuclear umbrella.12
Germany and the Equation with EU
The coming months would see Scholz immersed in key negotiations in Brussels that have already started with his first trip to meet Ursula von der Leyen, the EU Commission president.13 The same trip, however, saw him dodge questions about the Nord Stream 2.14 However, it may be extrapolated that with new US and EU sanctions against Russia’s Wagner group to step up pressure, Putin knows that any undesirable action on the Ukrainian front will lead to further delaying (or even dumping) the expensive Nord Stream 2.15
In coming days, in his negotiations with EU, Scholz would focus on the reform of fiscal rules (officially, the Stability and Growth Pact), the long-term viability of the EU's €750-billion recovery fund (Next Generation EU) and the huge investment needs to decarbonise and digitalise the whole economy.16 In his maiden trip to Brussels as a Chancellor, Scholz has reiterated “a stronger Europe” where “German politics has to take on a role of responsibility”.17
A pertinent question is how does Germany plan to play a strong, responsible role when Scholz’s choice of defence minister seems like a let-down for now. Picking up a virtually unknown former Justice Minister Christine Lambrecht, a member of the SPD’s leftist wing, suggests that Scholz’s coalition is not likely to develop Germany’s dysfunctional military. It needs to be noted that Lambrecht has neither military nor foreign policy experience nor an international profile. Her nomination itself has come as a surprise.18 In her new role, she is expected to bring about sustainable changes. Speculation is strife about how that will happen though.
Back in 2014, Lambrecht, considered at the leftist end of the SPD's political spectrum, expressed her opposition to the German military acquiring armed drones. And now in 2021, she is likely to oversee the procurement of drones, though, as commentators fear, perhaps not without protest.19 She has also said that her first priority in office would be to re-evaluate all of the German army’s foreign engagements, which primarily consist of peacekeeping missions around the world involving about 3,000 troops and devising an “exit strategy” when needed.20
How German defence outlook will shape in coming months will depend on how Scholz and his defence minister react to global pulls and pressures. Yet to defend its own interests on the international stage, a more proactive stance and posturing is required.
Scholz’s Policy towards the Indo-Pacific
Scholz coalition’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific is noteworthy. The coalition agreement lays out plans to build relations with key players in the region like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India as part of Berlin’s fledgling Indo-Pacific strategy to protect its economic interests in the region.21 Germany aims to strengthen its trade and investment linkages with Australia, New Zealand, India, ASEAN, Japan and South Korea. A rules-based order, freedom of navigation and supporting multilateralism are the pillars of German outlook towards Indo-Pacific.22 Post AUKUS, as the French take over presidency of the EU Council from 1 January 2022, there will be a renewed attention and engagement of France and the EU.23 A sharper German focus on the region would follow.
Apart from the obvious push that Germany–India bilateral relations would get as Germany expands footprints in the Indo-Pacific, the two countries also have a longstanding cooperation on climate change that in the coming times will focus on financial and technical assistance.24 Germany sees India as a central partner for tackling issues of energy, climate change, food security and international order. Scholz Administration has been forthcoming in stressing on continuity towards Merkel-era policy on India.
Economic Tensions among Coalition Partners and Covid-19 Fourth Wave
The bigger tension lies in the nature of the coalition parties themselves. While the Social Democrats want to increase social spending, the pro-business Free Democratic Party rejects higher taxes. At the same time, the coalition, on the whole, wants to spend €50 billion annually to accelerate the transition to green energy and modernise the outdated public infrastructure.25 The July 2021 US–Germany green energy deal that aims to invest more than €200 million in energy security in Ukraine as well as sustainable energy across Europe, is too fresh to show sustainable results. Hence, the mutually exclusive policies among the coalition partners have to be worked out in equilibrium soon. Without the money to put into green energy transition, Germany will continue to rely on natural gas from Russia.
Domestically, as the new administration takes charge, the rising number of cases of the fourth wave of Covid-19 pandemic needs utmost attention. As the incoming Health Minister Karl Lauterbach takes office, Germany has been fighting one of its deadliest Covid-19 waves.26 One of the many reasons behind the rising number is that ‘epidemic situation of national importance’ status has expired and as a result, state governments have lost the legal basis to introduce emergency measures such as lockdowns and school closures. This governance failure has directly resulted in the worsening situation. Karl Lauterbach’s success will be determined by how deftly he manages to not further alienate the anti-vaxxers and the unvaccinated on whom punishments like nation-wide contact restrictions and ‘2G’ rules barring them from entering most public places, were introduced.27
The path of the “traffic light coalition” headed by Scholz, on the one hand, is laden with challenges and on the other, replete with spaces for positive action. With several new faces in key positions, its success would lie in maintaining continuity, and tweaking it to accommodate necessary changes when required.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
President Putin’s short but highly consequential visit to India and the launch of the 2+2 format have imbued new dynamism into the bilateral partnership. There might be a few areas of divergence between the two sides but spheres of convergence are much greater.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India for a few hours on 6 December 2021 for the 21st Annual Summit between India and Russia. Putin decided to go ahead with this visit although the clouds of confrontation over his country’s border with Ukraine loomed menacingly. As Covid-19 cases in Russia continue to surge, with about 32,000 cases and 1,200 deaths being reported every day, his visit is therefore, a testimony to the strategic significance Putin attaches to relations with India. Just a little more than two months ago, Putin had declined to travel to Dushanbe, Tajikistan for the SCO Summit at the last minute due to high incidence of Covid-19 cases in that country.
This is Putin’s second visit outside Russia since the beginning of the pandemic 21 months ago; the first one was to Geneva in June 2021 for a bilateral Summit with US President Joe Biden. Putin’s visit to India has delivered an unambiguous message that notwithstanding the speculation about the health of the India–Russia partnership, it continues to be robust. In addition, the fact that the visit to India has taken place before his trip to China, which in recent years has emerged as a highly consequential partner of Russia, is also a reaffirmation that the India–Russia relationship is pivotal.
The 28 Agreements signed between the two sides, both at the governmental as well as at the private sector level, demonstrate the extensive gamut of the bilateral relationship. The first 2+2 Dialogue between the Defence and Foreign Ministers of the two countries took place, which provided an opportunity to share views about the current security, political and economic situation at the bilateral, regional as well as the global levels. The visit concluded in a Joint Statement titled “India-Russia: Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity”, which captures the state and future potential of the bilateral relationship.1
Considerable attention was paid to trade and investment relations. Putin noted that trade between the two sides had declined by 17 per cent last year but has grown by 38 per cent in the first nine months of this year.2 The two countries have fixed a target of bilateral trade of US$ 30 billion and investment of US$ 50 billion by 2025.3 While it might be possible to achieve the target of investment which has already reached around US$ 38 billion, it appears that it would be difficult to meet the bilateral trade target which is languishing around sub-US$ 10 billion level.
Both sides have agreed to give a strong impetus to ties in the traditional areas of collaboration including defence, nuclear energy, fossil fuels, counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, space, health and others. Defence cooperation continues to be the lynchpin of the time-tested partnership between India and Russia. The two sides agreed to extend the Defence Agreement for a further period of 10 years. An agreement was concluded for the joint production of more than 6,00,000 AK-203 Kalashnikov rifles with Transfer of Technology under the ‘Made in India’ initiative of the Government of India.4 It is a matter of satisfaction that Russia expeditiously supplied essential military equipment as requisitioned by India during Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow in September 2020, in the wake of the Galwan attack by China. This was done in spite of the demand by China to delay the supply of crucial items to India.
Both sides agreed to expand cooperation in Central Asia. China’s footprint in the Central Asian states in economic field has grown at an unprecedented pace in recent years. This is a matter of concern for Russia which considers Central Asia as its ‘Near Abroad’. All the Central Asian countries are active partners, to varying degrees, in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China had established a small military base in Tajikistan in 2016. This has been considerably expanded in the wake of the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021. Enhanced India–Russia collaboration in Central Asia will be a win-win proposition not only for these two countries but also for the Central Asian States who want to protect their sovereignty from Chinese dominance.
Russia’s Far East has the potential to emerge as an important area of bilateral cooperation. This region is extremely well endowed with natural and mineral resources. It covers about 40 per cent of Russia’s land area but accounts for only 5 per cent of the Russian population. It urgently needs investment and trained manpower. PM Modi had extended a Line of Credit of US$ 1 billion during his visit to Vladivostok in 2019 to explore opportunities for greater Indian engagement with that region.5 The Chief Ministers of four Indian States, viz., Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Goa and Gujarat, as well as the Indian Commerce and Industry Minister, Piyush Goyal, had travelled to the region before Prime Minister Modi’s visit in 2019 to explore possibilities of enhancing co-operation. In the post-pandemic period, this region beckons strongly for greater Indian engagement. This would be particularly welcome for Russia due to the lurking danger of Chinese expansionism which appears to have increased in recent years, going by the sinister comments in some sections of the Chinese social media after the celebration of Vladivostok Day by the Russian Embassy in Beijing last year.
The Arctic is another region where both sides can collaborate for mutual benefits. President Putin had extended an invitation to India to collaborate on Arctic during PM Modi’s visit in 2019. The region is extremely rich in mineral resources including hydrocarbons and fossil fuels. It also faces risk of increased Chinese presence which has declared itself as a ‘Near Arctic State’ although no such concept exists in the Constitution of the Arctic Council. The India–Russia Joint Statement refers to the potential of cooperation between the two countries in this area.6
In the face of the huge flux in the global security and economic architecture in recent years, India–Russia ties have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Russia has gone deep into the embrace of China as a result of sanctions imposed by the US and the West in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and accession of Crimea to Russia in 2014. It has also moved closer to Pakistan for establishing a direct connect with the Taliban, and for exploring greater military and economic opportunities in Pakistan. India has moved closer to the US on account of the threat it confronts from China on the northern land frontier as well as in the Indian Ocean. As evidence of the strategic autonomy exercised by India, it has imported five units of the S-400 Triumf ballistic missile defence system, worth more than US$ 5 billion, notwithstanding the US threat of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
Afghanistan was a major subject of bilateral deliberations between Modi and Putin, as also during the 2+2 dialogue. There have been differences in the perspectives of the two sides on Afghanistan over the last several years. Russia was actively engaging with the Taliban and had also established some dialogue formats at which it did not invite India. The ground situation changed drastically in mid-August 2021 when the Taliban took over Kabul and gave no indication of abiding by its commitments of forming an inclusive government, respecting the rights of minorities as well as of the women and children, and not allowing its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against neighbours. Currently, there is near-complete convergence on the viewpoints of India and Russia on the way forward in Afghanistan. This is extensively reflected in the Joint Declaration.
The one jarring note was the rather aggressive criticism by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of the Indo-Pacific (he called it a ‘slogan’), non-inclusive alliances, AUKUS, etc. in his press conference after the meeting. The propriety of such combative statements and also of open criticism of the US on CAATSA from Indian soil is highly questionable. This is in spite of the fact that Putin has shown understanding of India’s position on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad.
President Putin’s short but highly consequential visit and the launch of the 2+2 format have imbued new dynamism into the bilateral partnership. There might be a few areas of divergence between the two sides but spheres of convergence are much greater. These will continue to navigate the bilateral partnership to make it more robust and vigorous in the coming days.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Considering that the year 2021 marks the fifth anniversary of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between India and Vietnam, the upcoming visit of Mr Vuong Dinh Hue, the current Chairman of the Vietnam National Assembly, to India is likely to strengthen India–Vietnam relationship further.
The Covid-19 pandemic has had a serious impact on international relations, especially the visits by foreign dignitaries to various countries, including India. Though various summits have been conducted virtually since March 2020, the enthusiasm that a physical visit creates is unmatchable. It was a nice gesture by President Putin of Russia to visit India for a few hours on 6 December 2021 and attend the 21st bilateral summit.1 This was Putin’s second visit outside Russia this year and it has set the stage for visits by other dignitaries. The next high-level dignitary to visit India is from our Comprehensive Strategic Partner, Vietnam. Mr Vuong Dinh Hue, the current Chairman of the Vietnam National Assembly, is visiting India on 15 December 2021. The visit will be up to 19 December 2021. As per the Vietnamese Constitution, the National Assembly is “the highest representative organ of the people, the highest organ of state power”.
Mr Vuong Dinh Hue was the Chairman of the 14th National Assembly of Vietnam, and was elected as Chairman of the 15th National Assembly on 20 July 2021.2 He is a Professor of Economics and has good knowledge of political and financial matters. The visit is being made at the invitation of Lok Sabha Speaker, Shri Om Birla and Speaker of the Rajya Sabha of India, Shri M. Venkaiah Naidu who is also our Vice President.3
Importance of the Visit
The year 2021 marks the fifth anniversary of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between India and Vietnam, and in 2022 the two countries are going to celebrate 50 years of their diplomatic ties.4 The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed between the two countries in 2016. Five Years have elapsed since then and both the countries have put across to the World Trade Organization and UN the case for promoting global south cooperation, mitigating effects of climate change, maritime security, renewable energy, promotion of culture and other aspects with regard to developing countries. The visit by Mr Vuong Dinh Hue would lay the foundation for further strengthening of the relations between the two countries.
Mr Vuong Dinh Hue is a seasoned and respected statesman who has undertaken numerous reforms in the National Assembly of Vietnam, and has ushered in flexibility and creativity in the organisation of National Assembly meetings.5 It is hoped that he would extend cooperation and build upon the Vision 2020 that was set by the Prime Ministers of both the countries in December 2020. It would be pertinent to look at the issues mentioned in the Vision Document.
Need to Build Upon Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People—2020
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc of Vietnam co-chaired a virtual summit on 21 December 2020, in which they formulated a Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People to guide the future development of India–Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The main aspects are enumerated below:
Viewing the Joint Vision Statement, a Plan of Action for 2021–2023 was signed by the Foreign Ministers of both countries. A year has elapsed since then, hence the delegation of the Chairman of National Assembly would have the opportunity to discuss the issues pertaining to the Plan which need attention or course correction, during the upcoming visit.
A few other pertinent issues that could be discussed, are listed below:
The delegation is likely to discuss aspects concerning these issues with the Indian authorities during the upcoming visit.
China and Other Issues
Mr Vuong Dinh Hue, Chairman of the National Assembly, is a mature politician and a member of the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party. He would certainly discuss the issues pertaining to the assertiveness of China. India’s bone of contention with China ranges from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean. Both Vietnam and India share territorial borders with China.8 Vietnam is always careful in its strategic relationship with China. The islands in the South China Sea remain a contentious area where China has been sporadically active. The moot point is whether the Indian Navy should play a more active role in the region. It has conducted Exercise Passex which has improved its interoperability with the Vietnam Navy. In an article in Strategic Analysis, Le Dinh Tinh assesses Vietnam as a middle power,9 which could offer port facilities to Indian Navy at the port of Cam Ranh which has excellent facilities.
Similarly, India could offer the BrahMos Supersonic Cruise missile and the Akash Ground to Air Missile for improving Vietnam’s operational effectiveness. These issues need constant dialogue and are likely to be discussed by the delegation.
Apart from these areas, the delegation could also discuss about improving Vietnam’s Information Technology (IT) capabilities. It is hoped that India would make all possible efforts to assist Vietnam, its Comprehensive Strategic Partner, and make this visit a success.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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