Belt and Road Initiative and Environmental Challenges
Opangmeren Jamir
August 31, 2022
Several Belt and Road Initiative projects pass through ecologically sensitive areas and in countries with weak environmental laws and governance.
China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) connects China globally through an overland ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and an ocean ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. As of March 2022, the BRI involves 147 countries with investments in the first half of 2022 at $28.4 billion.1 However, a profound apprehension on far-reaching environmental consequences have been aired by environmental experts as several BRI projects are known to pass through ecologically sensitive areas and in countries with weak environmental laws and governance.2
Green Development and BRI Guidelines
Promoting green development as part of the BRI is an essential requirement for Chinese policy makers. In response to environmental degradation in China, a national strategy, ‘Ecological Civilization’ (EC), was proposed at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2007. Later, in 2018, it was embedded in the country’s constitution and became part of the national development strategy.3
In the context of environmental protection and loss of biodiversity and ecosystem, several policies have been outlined in the recent past, encouraging Chinese investors to integrate green development throughout the overseas investment process.4 “Green Development Guidelines for Overseas Investment and Cooperation” issued on 15 July 2021, jointly by Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Ecology and Environment, stresses strengthening environmental protection in the host country, including environmental impact assessment (EIA). It calls for following the rules and regulations of the host country, supporting investments in clean energy, and restoration of affected eco-systems.5
The “Guidelines for Ecological Environmental Protection of Foreign Investment Cooperation and Construction Projects” issued on 6 January 2022 by Ministry of Ecology and Environment, incorporates environmental management in the energy, transport and mining sectors.6 For implementing hydropower projects, for instance, it encourages avoiding nature reserves and important biological habitants.
On 28 March 2022, “Opinion on Jointly Promoting Green Development of the Belt and Road” was issued by the National Development Reform Commission and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ecology and Environment and Commerce.7 Promoting low-carbon development of coal power and other projects and setting timelines for green BRI are important aspects under this ‘opinion’. It affirms that China will stop building new coal-fired power projects abroad and that existing coal projects under construction will be proceeded with ‘prudently’. It sets 2025 as the timeline to expect significant improvement of capacity for environmental risk prevention in overseas projects. The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) on 1 June 2022, called for ‘green finance’, including mitigating environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks, to foster low-carbon, sustainable development:8
Assessment
Critics have labeled some of these guidelines as ‘soft law’ and non-binding which cannot be enforced by courts.9 The potential contribution of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, especially from coal projects in BRI countries, has been a major concern as several Chinese state-owned banks have invested heavily in such projects.10In 2016, China was involved in 240 coal projects in BRI countries.11 But there are signs of retreat in Chinese-supported development of coal plants in the past five years.12 In September 2021, President Xi Jinping at the UN Assembly pledged that China “will not build new coal-fired power projects abroad.”13
In 2021, China's largest bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) announced it was abandoning a plan to finance $3 billion of the 2,800 MW Sengwa coal project in northern Zimbabwe. In 2022, the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM) announced the cancellation of coal investment in Bangladesh.14 Moreover, BRI underlined that in the first half of 2022, no coal projects have received finance or investment, with the majority of energy investment going to gas (56 per cent), followed by solar and wind (18 per cent) and oil (18 per cent).15
Meanwhile, the announcement of green finance guidelines by CBRIC signals that the existence of potentially significant financial risk from BRI environmental impact is being acknowledged. The Myitsone dam in Myanmar, for instance, was shelved, following stiff resistance from local communities. In 2019, ICBC also pulled out from the $1.2 billion, 1050 MW coal fired plant in Lamu, Kenya following environmental activists filing a lawsuit after which courts ordered the halting of work.
An important aspect concerns guidelines on implementation of EIA, which lack the essential details on public participation, which is an important tool in EIA. Ideally, before any large-scale infrastructure and extractive industries projects are undertaken, it needs to conduct ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (FPIC) which is recognized in International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 and the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of Indigenous People, 2007.
Several scientific studies have underscored the environmental risk from BRI projects, especially BRI linear projects i.e. roads, railway and pipeline infrastructures, which are likely to be the greatest threats to already fragile ecosystems and key biodiversity areas (KBAs). One research finding on the impact of KBAs from the proposed road and rail routes, was that since mining is clustered near the proposed route, “construction and development along the route may increase size and number of mines.” Also, it pointed out that up to 15 per cent KBA are within 1 km of proposed railways, and may pose a significant risk to biodiversity because the majority of KBAs are unprotected.16 Further in the quantification of current risks of biological invasion in 123 BRI countries, another study identified 14 global ‘hotspots’ facing a high risk of invasion by terrestrial vertebrate species – which includes 98 amphibians, 177 reptiles, 391 birds and 150 mammals, threatening their ecosystems.17
To alleviate environmental problems, while several Chinese institutes are involved, one study flags the growing deficit in terms of conservation research capacity, underlining that “China lacks a pipeline for training and development of conservation scientists locally and abroad.”18
Conclusion
One of the most commonly accepted definitions of ‘sustainable development’ featured in the Brundtland report states that “sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”19 Continual reckless development, however, is threatening both current and future generations. As laid out in the recent United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report, the enormity of the triple environmental emergencies – the climate crisis, biodiversity loss and pollution – cannot be solved in isolation.20 As emphasized by eminent economist, Sir Partha Dasgupta, failure to take into account the rapid depletion of ‘natural capital’ places the world at ‘extreme risk’.21 Poor planning as part of BRI projects could pose detrimental impacts to the ecosystem and regional biodiversity. Policymakers in China and the host countries need to consider the potential environmental risks associated with BRI while implementing the projects.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Mengxing Lu, “Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Another Road to Achieve Ecological Civilization and Green BRI”, Chinese Journal of Environmental Law, 4(1), 2020, pp. 182-199; Jeffrey B. Nugent and Jiaxuan Lu, “China’s Outward Foreign Investment in the Belt and Road Initiatives: What are the Motives for Chinese Firms to Invest? China Economic Review, 68(4), 2020, pp. 1-28; A.M. Lechner, et al. (2018), “Biodiversity Conservation Should Be A Core Value Of China’s Belt And Road Initiative”, Nature Ecology &Evolution, 2, 2018, pp. 408-409.
3. See Ma Kai, “Committing to the Development of Ecological Civilization”, Qiushi Journal, 5(4), 2013, pp. 1-11; M. H. Hansen, et al., “Ecological Civilization: Interpreting the Chinese Past, Projecting the Global Future” Global Environmental Change, 53, 2018, pp. 195-203; Xin Zhou, “Ecological Civilization in China: Challenges and Issues”, Capitalism Nature and Socialism, 32(3), 2020, pp. 84-99.
4. Since the launching of BRI in 2013, more than 10 guidelines have been issued by various ministries of the Chinese government.
5. See “Big Green Review”, Secretariat of BRI International Green Development Coalition, Beijing, July 2021, pp. 5-6.
7. “Opinions On Jointly Promoting Green Development Of The Belt And Road”, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, and Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, Translated by BRI International Green Development Coalition (BRIGC), 2 April 2022.
9. Johanna Coenen et al. (2019), “Environmental Governance of China’s Belt And Road Initiative”, Environmental Policy and Governance, 31, 2019, pp. 3-17; Christoph Nedopil et al., “Understanding China’s Latest Guidelines For Greening The Belt And Road”, China Dialogue, 2022.
10. Boqiang Lin and Francois Bega, “China’s Belt & Road Initiative Coal Power Cooperation: Transitioning towards Low-Carbon Development”, Energy Policy, 156, 2021, pp. 1-10.
16. Alice C. Hughes, “Understanding and Minimizing Environmental Impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative”, Conservation Biology, 33(4), 2019, pp. 883-894.
17. Xuan Liu et al., “Risks of Biological Invasion on the Belt and Road”, Current Biology, 29, 2019, pp. 499-505.
18. Peng-Fei Fan, et al., “Build Up Conservation Research Capacity in China for Biodiversity Governance”, Nature Ecology & Evolution, 4, 2020, pp. 1162-1167.
20. “Making Peace With Nature: A Scientific Blueprint to Tackle the Climate, Biodiversity and Pollution Emergencies”, United Nation Environment Programme, Nairobi, February 2021.
European imports of Russian gas have steadily declined either voluntarily or on account of Russia weaponising energy, propelling the push towards LNG imports.
Europe has been reeling under an energy crisis for the last few months. Amidst the war in Ukraine, which has seen both the European Union and Russia seek to wean themselves away from their mutual energy dependencies, the most pressing issue for Europe today appears to stave-off an energy blackout. While measures such as regulating energy consumption can only a short-term measure to overcome the shortages, the key challenge will be in finding viable long-term substitutes.
The lack of excess global oil and gas capacity to compensate for the Russian shortfall is likely to lead Europe to explore energy alternatives in the form of renewable, coal, nuclear and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), each with its own set of corresponding challenges.
While a full transition to renewables is likely to take time, the focus on fossil fuels like coal would push back the continent’s ambitious climate and green targets – an issue close to Europe’s heart. Similarly, nuclear energy has remained unpopular, particularly in the aftermath of the meltdown of Fukushima reactors. LNG can help cushion the blow, as evident in the huge uptick in European LNG imports. Yet, capacity and infrastructure constraints as well as its impact on carbon emissions present their own set of quandaries.
Against the backdrop of these dynamics, the pertinent question is can LNG offer Europe a lifeline amidst an unprecedented energy crisis?
European Efforts towards Acquiring LNG
European imports of Russian gas have steadily declined either voluntarily or on account of Russia weaponising energy, from 174.3 bcm in 2021 to 20.5 bcm in February 2022, propelling the push towards LNG imports.1 The intrinsic nature of LNG, in terms of storage and transport which enable large quantities to be carried in shipping tankers, makes it an efficient alternative. This has led to a renewed focus on fast-tracking the commissioning of an additional 33 LNG terminals apart from ensuring efficiency of scale in the existing 29 terminals.
Today, steps are being taken to expand capacities at the Świnoujście terminal in Poland, Adriatic Terminal in Italy, and Gate terminal in the Netherlands. With a gestation period of three to four years, these projects are expected to come online by 2025. Notably, Spain which houses the largest number of operational terminals in Europe, at six, faces structural constraints on account of limited connections with rest of Europe.
In contrast, Germany which houses a well-connected system of pipeline for gas distribution is the only European country with a sizeable coastline lacking an LNG terminal or even a Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU). To overcome this structural constraint, the Olaf Scholz government has approved the construction of an onshore LNG terminal apart from leasing four FSRUs (at Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbuttel and Stade,) with at least the one at Wilhelmshaven becoming functional by this winter.2
Europe’s long coastline, which is essential for receiving LNG ships, is a key enabler in attracting imported LNG. This puts countries like Spain, France and Italy, vis-à-vis the landlocked states of Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, at a considerable advantage to build regasification terminals along their shores. These countries can emerge as the fulcrum for redistribution to rest of Europe, aided by existing pipelines at a minimalist cost.
Similarly, FSRUs which are intrinsically mobile offer the advantage of freeing up vital real estate along the busy European coastline. They can also be readily leased out from other states, unlike the time consuming construction of on shore LNG terminals. Certain old LNG carriers are also being converted to FSRUs in a bid to provide increased alternatives in a short time span.
This two-pronged LNG strategy is a key step in Europe’s diversification. In fact, LNG should seamlessly blend in with existing European energy infrastructure on account of Europe relying largely on gas to meet its household and commercial consumption.
Challenges
The biggest challenge, however, for Europe today is the lack of excess global capacity. This is notwithstanding the fact that the US has emerged as the largest exporter of LNG to Europe in the first half of 2022. It has increased its LNG supplies to Europe from 34 bcm in 2021 to 39 bcm till June 2022. 3 Unsurprisingly, US energy firms are finding it more profitable to divert their cargoes towards Europe even at the cost of paying contractual penalties to their earlier export markets.4
Meanwhile, Europe’s attempts to buy additional LNG will reverberate across the world. Given the imbalance between demand and supply, which has pushed gas prices to their historic highs, the demand from EU is likely to create a shortfall elsewhere. This is particularly likely to be acute in Asia and Latin America. During the period 2016-2021, US LNG supplies to South Korea, Japan, and China accounted for 1.4 trillion, 1 trillion, and 865 billion cubic feet respectively.5 In fact, last year, China surpassed Japan to become the biggest importer of LNG, accounting for 21.3 per cent of global LNG imports.6
Even if these countries were to consider importing the European share of gas from Russia (as LNG due to the absence of gas pipelines), they would face the hurdle of low availability of LNG shipping tankers. The fact remains that a lion’s share of global shipping companies are headquartered in the West.7 And there is unlikely to be an appetite among these companies to trade in Russian energy for fear of western sanctions. They are also unlikely to forego supersized profits arising out of Europe’s pressing need for new sources of energy.
Incidentally, this emphasis on LNG will likely come at the cost of diverting finances from elsewhere. New investments in LNG infrastructure could eat into Europe’s green fund. Previously, European plans to consider natural gas as a bridge for green transition did not require additional investments.
Conclusion
Today, Europe’s attempts at raising the cost of Russia’s war in Ukraine by weaning itself off Russian energy appears to be backfiring. Energy shortages and astronomical prices have led to an unprecedented domestic turbulence. Not only is Europe scrambling to shore up supplies amidst global scarcity but is also doing so at rates which could undermine its economic and political stability. Quick solutions to Europe’s energy quagmire, however, appear unlikely. Meanwhile, Russia continues to earn an energy windfall despite shipping far lower quantities post the war in Ukraine.
In its diversification attempts, Europe appears to be banking on US LNG, with American imports making up for 10 per cent of imports from Russia, even if they are priced at a premium. This is likely to lead to a further strengthening of the trans-Atlantic partnership. However, Europe’s long-term energy security would perhaps lie in further diversifying energy sources apart from tapping its own green potential. For the short-term, however, Europe would likely have to brace for an acute energy pain.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Applicability of CVC Guidelines to Defence Procurement
Amit Cowshish
August 29, 2022
Given that the Department of Expenditure will henceforth be the nodal department for issuing procurement related instructions in future, the Ministry of Defence must institute a system to promptly incorporate them in the MoD procurement manuals.
A question that often worries those involved in procurement of goods and services in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Services is whether the procedure laid down in the manuals they follow is complete in all respects. There are, additionally, provisions of the General Financial Rules (GFR), supplementary instructions issued by other agencies like the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), and the tender guidelines issued by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC).
Many training programmes on acquisition include a session or two on the ‘CVC instructions’, which reinforces the impression that it is not enough to follow the departmental manuals and that one must also make sure that all CVC guidelines are complied with. Considering that the CVC has issued as many as 72 circulars containing various guidelines on public procurement till the end of June 2022, it would be an enormous task for anyone to sift through all these circulars to ensure compliance with the CVC guidelines. This impression merits dispelling.
To set the context, in the absence of any central law on public procurement in India, spending by the ministries and departments on procurement of goods and services is governed by the general principles laid down in the GFRs, which were first promulgated in 1947, and whose latest version was released by the Ministry of Finance’s (MoF’s) Department of Expenditure (DoE) in 2017.1
These rules deal with a wide range of subjects from budget formulation and government accounts to inventory management and grants-in-aid given by the government. There is only one small chapter that deals with procurement of goods and services, though another three even smaller chapters on works, inventory and contract management also have some bearing on the subject.
Cognisant of the fact that the GFRs are grossly inadequate for addressing the complexities of procurement by big departments like Defence and Railways, the framers of these rules permit them to issue detailed instructions ‘broadly in conformity with the general rules contained in’ the relevant chapter of the GFRs.2 Pursuant to this enabling clause, several ministries have promulgated their own procurement manuals containing detailed procedural instructions to address the peculiarities of their acquisition programmes.
The MoF itself has promulgated three procurement manuals: Manual on Procurement of Goods, Manual on Procurement of Works, and Manual on Procurement of Consultancy & Other Services.3 These manuals are followed by the ministries and departments which spend meagre amounts on procurement of routine goods and services and, therefore, do not need to formulate bespoke procedures for procurement.
The MoD too has promulgated at least four such manuals. The primary MoD manuals, currently in force, are the Defence Procurement Manual 2009 (DPM 2009), Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP 2020), and Defence Works Procedure 2020 (DWP 2020). These manuals contain the procedure for revenue and capital procurements, and execution of civil works, respectively. A separate Procurement Manual promulgated in 2020 applies to all types of procurement by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).4
Since these manuals have been, explicitly or implicitly, promulgated in terms of the aforesaid enabling clause in GFR 2017, the provisions thereof are, ipso facto, in conformity with the GFRs and other relevant government instructions, including those issued by the CVC. In fact, para 1.1.2 of DPM 2009 clearly states that it is ‘laid down in terms of Rule 135 of the General Financial Rules, 2005’, which corresponded to analogous clause in GFR 2017.
More to the point, para 1.5.1 of DPM 2009 states that ‘The provisions contained in this Manual are in conformity with other Government manuals like the General Financial Rules, Financial Regulations (Defence Services Regulations), as also other instructions issued by the Government and the Central Vigilance Commission from time to time’.
This should have put all apprehensions at rest, but it hasn’t. There are two reasons why the doubt about the need to factor in the CVC instructions while taking decisions keeps nagging the personnel involved in procurement of goods and services, despite the specific provisions in DPM 2009 quoted above.
The first reason is that DAP 2020, and its earlier versions, which regulates the armed forces’ capital budget, does not contain provisions analogous to the above-mentioned provisions in DPM 2009 and similar provisions in the DRDO Procurement Manual 2020. The second, more important, reason is that DPM 2009 itself nullifies the confidence generated by the aforesaid provisions by stipulating in para 1.5.4 that the ‘provisions of this Manual would be subject to general or special instructions/orders/ amendments which the Government may issue from time’.
A notification posted by the CVC on its website in July 20225 addresses the procurement executives’ dilemma to some extent. The notification mentions that while presently, guidelines are issued by the CVC, DoE, NITI Ayog, DPIIT, etc., the Commission had come to the ‘logical conclusion’ after deliberations with the DoE, that ‘it would only be appropriate if public procurement guidelines are issued from D/o Expenditure’ only. This is because ‘multiple organizations issuing guidelines, procurement executives were facing problems in having a single authoritative source of reference’.6
In pursuance of this decision, the DoE has already updated its manuals7 in which ‘all the CVC guidelines on public procurement have been merged’ and consequently ‘all the earlier guidelines of CVC on public procurement have been withdrawn’. The CVC notification goes on to say that all the organisations ‘are required to update/align their procurement guidelines/manuals in line with the above Manuals of D/o Expenditure and upload them on their website at the earliest for easy access of their officials and other stakeholders’.8
The ball is now in MoD’s court, as well as that of other ministries’ which have analogous manuals, as the CVC’s notification calls for immediate review of all the manuals promulgated by it to ensure that all government instructions, guidelines, and directives issued till date that must be followed by those engaged in procurement of goods and services are incorporated therein. But this one-time measure will not be good enough.
The MoD must institute a system to take cognisance of the instructions as and when issued by the DoE, which will henceforth be the nodal department for issuing procurement related instructions in future, and to promptly incorporate them in the MoD manuals. This alone will inspire confidence among the procurement executives and hasten decision-making. This will work if the task of reviewing the manuals is coordinated by a single authority within the MoD which, apart from immediate updating of the manuals, will also ensure that there are no ambiguities and contradictions within and across the manuals as regards the essential procedural requirements.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Ibid., ‘Chapter 6: Procurement of Goods and Services’, Rule 141 which reads: This chapter contains the general rules applicable to all Ministries or Departments, regarding procurement of goods required for use in the public service. Detailed instructions relating to procurement of goods may be issued by the procuring departments broadly in conformity with the general rules contained in this Chapter.
3. These manuals are posted on the DoE website but could not be accessed on 29 August 2022. See ‘Department of Expenditure’.
4. With the reorganisation of the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) into seven Defence Public Sector Undertakings on 15 October 2015, the OFB Procurement Manual 2018 is not mentioned here.
7. The latest version of all the three manuals, updated in June 2022, have been uploaded on the CVC website. See Central Vigilance Commission, ‘Tender Guidelines’, June 2022.
The Namibian Foreign Minister’s visit to India saw the signing of a critical wildlife pact relating to relocation of African Cheetahs, and provided a boost to bilateral ties.
The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Namibia, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, visited India to attend the 17th CII EXIM Bank Conclave on India–Africa Growth Partnership, which was held on 19–20 July 2022. While the two-day conclave was attended by 40 ministers from 17 African countries, Namibia was one of the five countries which had a dedicated Country Session during the Conclave, apart from the Republic of The Gambia, Zambia, Mauritius and Gabon. Issues related to energy, infrastructure, agriculture and health were discussed during the session.1
Ms Ndaitwah met Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Minister for Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Bhupender Yadav. India and Namibia signed three Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) related to wildlife conservation, sustainable biodiversity utilisation and employment of diplomatic spouses or dependants. As part of the wildlife pact, India is expected to get eight African cheetahs for captive breeding in Madhya Pradesh's Kuno National Park in August 2022, making it the world's first agreement for the transcontinental transfer of such a large number of carnivorous animals. The MoU between the National Forensic Science University (NFSU) and the Namibian Police Forensic Science Institute (NPFSI) will see India offering Namibia customised training in the fields of forensic science, cybersecurity, digital forensics, wildlife crime investigation, and homeland security.2
Historical Aspects
India was one of the first countries to support the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) party, founded in 1960, which led the country to independence from South Africa in 1990.3 The first SWAPO embassy abroad was established in India in 1986. It started a chain of diplomatic recognition by other countries and the inevitable process leading to Namibia's independence.4
At the Non-Aligned Movement conference in 1986, in Zimbabwe, the 'AFRICA Fund' was established to offer financial help to southern African liberation organisations. The AFRICA Fund Committee held its first summit in January 1987 in New Delhi. Namibia’s anti-colonial struggle gained from such efforts. When the country secured independence in 1990, Prime Minister VP Singh and Rajiv Gandhi, the then leader of the opposition, attended the celebrations at Windhoek.5
Subsequent high-level visits included those by President Shankar Dayal Sharma in 1995 and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998. Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba visited India in 2009 which resulted in the signing of a number of agreements including those on defence cooperation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Pan-African e-Network and mineral resources.6 President Hage G. Geingob participated in the 3rd India–Africa Forum Summit held in New Delhi in 2015.
This was followed by the highly successful visit of President Pranab Mukherjee to Namibia in 2016. India signed two MoUs during the visit, on capacity-building for civil servants and establishing the India–Namibia Centre of Excellence in Information Technology (INCEIT), at the Namibia University of Science and Technology (NUST). INCEIT is now offering IT programmes on subjects such as Big Data Technologies, among others, to Namibian students.
Economic and Commercial Relations
In the last two decades, strengthening economic cooperation has been the focus of India–Africa relations.7 Significant potential for economic cooperation with Namibia exists in diverse areas such as skill development, affordable housing, and agriculture and minerals, particularly gold and diamonds.
India–Namibia bilateral trade was worth US$ 251.88 million in 2021–22.8 The Namibia Trade Commission Office was established in Chennai in 2021 by the India Africa Trade Council (IATC) in partnership with the India Namibia Trade Forum (INTF). According to the present Indian High Commissioner to Namibia, India is currently the second largest exporter to Namibia, after South Africa.9
The pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors have emerged as key arenas of cooperation. India was among the first countries to provide Covid-19 vaccinations, PPE kits, and other supplies to Namibia to help mitigate the impact of the pandemic.10 India is a world leader when it comes to providing affordable healthcare services and pharmaceutical products. India’s low-cost pharmaceutical industry gives opportunities for Namibia to produce medicines domestically. Namibia also offers a great avenue for Indian companies in agricultural, food processing and animal husbandry industries. The southern African country has benefitted from the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme, which provides training via innovative technical cooperation. Since its inception, the initiative has provided scholarships to over 1,200 Namibians.11
Apart from the federal level, state governments are also pursuing cooperation. The Madhya Pradesh government, for instance, began the process of setting up a diamond park in Panna in 2021 and to send students to Namibia to learn the intrinsic details of the diamond sector. Namibia, the world's sixth largest producer of rough diamonds, issued trading licences to Indian firms as far back as 2008. Finestar Jewellery & Diamonds, an Indian firm, opened its factory in Namibia in July 2022.
India’s diamond imports from Namibia over the last five years, accounted for more than half of the country’s total imports of the commodity, as indicated in the table below.
Year
2017–18
2018–19
2019–20
2020–21
2021–22
Import of non-industrial diamonds (unworked) from Namibia (in US$ Million)
Defence collaboration between India and Namibia dates back to the mid-1990s, when an Indian Air Force Technical Team (IAFTT) was stationed in Namibia to train the Namibian Air Force helicopter pilots and hone their technical skills.12 In 2011, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) delivered one Cheetah and two Chetak helicopters to the Namibian Air Force.13 The HAL has provided training to Namibian pilots and ground crew in addition to the supply of necessary equipment and spare parts.
India has also sent military observers to Namibia (1989–91) as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group with the mandate to ensure free and fair elections. Namibia, along with 16 other African countries, participated in the first Africa–India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX) held from 18 March to 27 March 2019 at the Aundh Military station in Pune. The exercise aims to train participating contingents in Humanitarian Mine Assistance (HMA) and Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) under the United Nations Charter through practical and comprehensive discussions and tactical exercises.
Nuclear Cooperation
In 2021, Namibia emerged as the world's second largest producer of uranium from mines.14 India signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Namibia in 2009, after it got exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008. However, given that Namibia is a signatory to the Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, uranium exports to India—a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—have not materialised as yet. During former President Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Namibia in 2016, India was assured that legal implications of supplying uranium for peaceful civilian nuclear use were being studied.15 Given that India has an ambitious nuclear energy programme, made up of both indigenously developed reactors and those expected to be set up by foreign companies, a forward movement on this issue will open up economic opportunities to Namibia.
Conclusion
Namibia is one of the most peaceful nations in Africa, without any recent inter-group conflict or war. With the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement in place since 2018, Namibia will have access to a wider market. India is also interested in strengthening economic and trading links with African countries through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), of which Namibia is a member. While Africa benefits from India's growing interest in the region, Namibia has the potential to be a key partner.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
8. Data taken from the website of Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
9. a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tNKpkPpNbI">“India Grows to Namibia’s Second Largest Exporter after South Africa - NBC”, Namibian Broadcasting Cooperation, YouTube, 18 July 2022.
Issues in Co-Development and Co-Production of Defence Equipment
Amit Cowshish
August 17, 2022
The success of the co-development-cum-production push in Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 would depend on the commercial viability of the co-developed product, apart from overcoming a host of conceptual and procedural challenges.
The Make-in-India campaign puts a premium on co-development and co-production of defence equipment in India. In a bid to promote such projects, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) included two specific provisions in the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP 2020) which governs capital acquisitions for the armed forces and the Indian Coast Guard.
This is not a new concept, though. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2006 recognised Foreign Direct Investment in the Indian defence industry for co-development and co-production as one of the several ways in which the foreign vendors could discharge their offset obligations. All subsequent DPPs contained analogous provisions.
Co-development and co-production projects were undertaken even prior to DAP 2020 promulgation. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, manufactured by BrahMos Aerospace—a joint venture of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya, is a prime example.
The specific provisions in DAP 2020, though, are meant to enable the armed forces to initiate co-development and/or co-production proposals like any other acquisition proposal. However, the relevant paras in DAP 2020, encapsulated below, are too cryptic to give a clear picture of how these projects are to be conceptualised, executed, and financed.
The DAP 2020 provides that the ‘cases where it is proposed to co-develop a product/ equipment offering transformative/unique/niche technology; or a futuristic equipment/ platform with a foreign country; or where co-development is likely to benefit ongoing indigenous projects in India, ….. will be progressed under an IGA/specific Project Agreement….’.1
The DAP 2020 also permits the armed forces ‘to work with a foreign entity to co-produce equipment/assemblies/sub-assemblies/spares’, if the project aims at import substitution, the equipment to be manufactured is unique, or helps in making India a manufacturing hub or boosting defence exports, or it has the potential to produce equipment that could be used by the Indian armed forces in future.
Such projects can be undertaken on a single vendor basis if no other country is willing to participate in the project or where the shortlisted vendor offers higher technology transfer and indigenous content in the locally produced equipment than the other vendors.2
Conceptual differences
Conceptually, co-development projects are distinct from co-production projects, while some of them could also be mixed co-development-cum-production projects. Typically, co-production would not involve development of a new technology or product. Such projects only need an agreement between the technology provider and the Indian manufacturer for transfer of proven technology and related wherewithal.
Most of the capital acquisitions under categories like Buy (Indian), Buy and Make (Indian), and Buy (Global – Manufacture in India) would qualify as co-production projects in some form or the other. Projects under the Make category or the Strategic Partnership Model too are fundamentally co-production projects, though some design and development may also be involved.
In the circumstances, it would be normal for co-production proposals to be initiated by the armed forces and processed as per the procedure laid down in the DPP 2020. The other two types of projects, however, are on a different footing as development of new technologies, or even new products, constitutes the core of such projects. The sheer complexity of these projects, which may also entail an element of research and design, requires them to be treated differently.
DRDO’s Role
The DRDO is best suited to steer these projects, irrespective of whether the collaboration involves only the private sector entities, or both the public and private sector entities, with or without DRDO being a party to it.
Unlike the civil and military personnel who deal with normal capital acquisition cases, the DRDO scientists do not get rotated every few years. They have years of experience in working with the Indian and foreign industry at every stage from conceptualisation of projects to commencement of production. It can, therefore, provide the much-needed continuity in stewardship of the projects by utilising its managerial expertise even if it is not directly involved in technology or product development.
In what was the first event of its kind, the 155 mm x 52 calibre howitzer used this year for the ceremonial 21-shot salute at the Red Fort on the Independence Day is a prime example of DRDO’s expertise. This Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System was successfully developed by it in collaboration with Bharat Forge Limited and Tata Advanced Systems Limited as the eventual manufacturers.
Identification of projects
It is unpropitious to leave it to the armed forces to initiate these proposals. The criteria for undertaking such projects are so expansive, and the need of the armed forces so pressing, that almost all major acquisition proposals can easily be fitted into this category, making intra- and inter-service prioritisation very difficult.
These projects require a top-level push, though even that has had little success in the past. In 2018, for example, India and the US had agreed on two ‘pathfinder’ projects for the joint production of a helmet-mounted digital display and a biological tactical detection system under the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), but not much is known about what happened to these projects thereafter. The US had also unsuccessfully offered to make fighter jets in India.
These examples illustrate how difficult it is to bring these projects to fruition, even when these are primarily for co-production and the dialogue takes place at the highest levels. Leaving the proposals to be initiated by the individual service headquarters could mire them in bureaucratic tangles at any one or more of the intermediary stages through which they must pass before even being accepted in principle.
Challenges
The trickiest part of these projects, especially the ones that entail collaboration with the foreign entity, is estimation of the cost of technology development as a part of the feasibility study. This is important because even if the technology development is not to be funded by the MoD, this cost will eventually be borne by it as a part of the buying price of the product. It is unknown if an appropriate and universally acceptable costing methodology is in place.
It is equally important that there is a reasonable certainty of the co-developed product being bought by the MoD to make the project commercially viable for the development-cum-production agency. Dogged by perennial shortage of funds for capital expenditure—estimated by the Fifteenth Finance Commission to be Rs 5,27,491 crore for the financial years 2023–24 to 2025–26,3 success of the co-development-cum-production push in DAP 2020 would depend on the confidence MoD inspires in the potential partners as regards future budgetary allocations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Facial Recognition Technology and Counter-Terror Operations
Akshat Upadhyay
August 05, 2022
The challenges associated with facial recognition technology (FRT) need to be studied in detail before deploying them in counter-insurgency/counter-terror operations.
The ‘Artificial Intelligence in Defence (AIDef)’ symposium and exhibition, the first of its kind held on 11 July 2022, showcased 75 products based on Artificial Intelligence (AI), in keeping with the theme of ‘Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav’ celebrating 75 years of India’s independence.1 The Armed Forces, as well as research organisations, industry, defence start-ups and innovators took part in the exhibition. The exhibition was a culmination of a four-year old process of initially introducing and subsequently leveraging AI and AI-based products in defence. The aim is to speed up decision-making processes, enhance cybersecurity, strengthen perimeter security, enable predictive maintenance and use natural language processing (NLP) algorithms for on-the-spot translation for troops, especially when facing adversaries along disputed borders.2
Ministry of Defence Initiatives on AI
An AI Task Force was set up under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in February 2018, which came out with recommendations in less than six months in June 2018.3 The report identified five areas for developing AI-based solutions for the Indian Armed Forces. These included lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), unmanned surveillance, simulated wargames and training, cyber and aerospace security and intelligence and reconnaissance.4
These recommendations were in addition to the proposals suggested by the Task Force on AI for India’s Economic Transformation of 19 January 2018, headed by Professor V. Kamakoti, which identified 10 domains where AI could be used.5 Pertaining to the sphere of national security, the four areas highlighted were related to autonomous surveillance and combat systems, adaptive communication systems, cyber-attack mitigation and counter-attack systems and multi-sensor data fusion based systems.
Based on these inputs, the Defence AI Council (DAIC) headed by the Raksha Mantri and the Defence AI Project Agency (DAIPA) headed by the Secretary (Defence Production) were formed in February 2019.6 While the DAIC has been established as a policy-making body, DAIPA is responsible for implementing DAIC’s policy decisions and has been tasked to come out with pragmatic solutions, in collaboration with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), academia and industry.7 An AI-based defence roadmap was formulated for the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) in August 2019, based on which 40 AI products were developed by March 2022.8
In the AIDef symposium, out of 75 products, 15 were based on Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), 10 on autonomous and unmanned robotic systems, 10 on intelligent monitoring systems, seven on manufacturing and maintenance, six each on process flow automation and NLP, four each on AI platform automation and perimeter security system, three each on internet of things (IoT) and operational data analytics, two on LAWS and one each on simulator/test equipment, logistics and supply chain management, block-chain based automation, cyber security and human behavioral analysis.9 Out of these, there were two projects based on Facial Recognition Technology (FRT), i.e., the iSentinel and the Silent Sentry system.10
The iSentinel notes that its capabilities will include ‘historical tracking of people’, detecting ‘emotions, facial expressions and body language for patterns of argument, restlessness and sweating’ and ‘behaviour analysis’ for threat identification.11 The Silent Sentry boasts of both ‘human detection’ and ‘facial recognition’.12 Both these products arguably use an AI-based technology known as FRT which is based on the quantification of distinctive features (80, as per one study) of a human face such as distance between eyes, distance from the forehead to the chin, etc.13 This data is then compared with a database to decipher the identity of the individual recorded by a camera.
Challenges of FRT in Counter-insurgency/Counter-terrorism Operations
Though a case can be made for the use of FRT by the Indian Army in counter-insurgency (CI)/ counter-terrorism (CT) operations in certain areas such as Kashmir or parts of the North East, there are some challenges that need to be surmounted. The basic principle behind use of FRT in a CI/CT environment is to identify threats to either an Army camp or a company operating base (COB). The AI solutions currently being marketed are for static installations, and provide an early warning for defence measures to get activated.
The prerequisites of an effective FRT system are an exhaustive digital library or inventory of resident or terrorist facial data, excellent camera for capturing the images of individuals approaching the camp, secure and fast communications and strong processor for the mapping and matching algorithms to produce results in real time. Maintaining them in a CI/CT environment along with adequate power backup is a challenge, though these can still be taken care of.
The challenges of using FRT software in a CI/CT scenario, though, go beyond the prerequisites of a solid data set and hardware/software. Firstly, a decision needs to be made regarding the kind of identification required. If the intention is to ‘negatively identify’, i.e., any individual not matching with the resident database may be deemed to be an alleged militant and liable to be handled as such, the database and processing requirement is formidable. Increased urbanisation and search for livelihood has resulted in migrations from rural to urban areas. There is an inherent population flux in the rural and semi-urban areas that needs to be accounted for in the picture library which cannot be limited to a particular area, but needs to be expanded to the entire Union Territory (UT) and maybe even beyond.
If the intent is to ‘positively identify’, i.e., confirm the identity of a terrorist, militant or an over ground worker (OGW), an exhaustive database of such terrorists needs to be maintained. Such efforts may be hampered by the lack of updated photographs of such terrorists. The legal implications of creating and maintaining this database also need to be understood in detail by the Army. As of date, only two FRT projects are being planned to run in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). These include a project by the J&K Police which has collaborated with the Srinagar Municipal Corporation to install FRT across Srinagar to weed out terror threats. The second is by the Housing and Urban Development Department for authenticating identities of the applicants for residence.14
The use and maintenance of FRT across the country and by various state governments has also been challenged by activists in court. Add to this the challenges of poor visibility conditions, changes in surroundings, quality of photographs and finally the learning algorithm. False positives and false negatives are acceptable in any AI-based systems. However, in a CI/CT scenario, such outcomes may translate into a matter of life and death. FRT-based systems need to be test-bedded, vetted and analysed before deploying them in real-life conditions.
Further, FRT broadly has two subsets when it comes to recognising an individual. The first is the ‘facial recognition’, which identifies the individual. The other is the ‘affect recognition’, which attempts to decipher the emotions and thereby, the intentions of the individual. Affect recognition, though used by a number of FRT firms around the world, is based on shaky scientific understanding and may not be accurate or even correlated with the actual emotion of the individual.15 Applying dubious scientific standards in a CI/CT scenario may lead to cases of mistaken identities. Cyber security measures for the security of the recorded data also need to be robust, lest the recorded data be hacked, spoofed or changed.
All these challenges are formidable and need a careful and even cautious approach to operationalising FRT. The Indian Army needs to consider these issues in detail before deploying AI-based systems in a CI/CT environment.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
3. “Artificial Intelligence in Defence: Presenting AI Preparedness of the Country in Defence”, no. 2.
4. “lmplementation of the recommendations of the multi-stakeholder Task Force constituted by the Ministry of Defence for 'Strategic lmplementation of Artificial Intelligence for National Security and Defence'”,Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2019, pp. 1–4.
5. “The Artificial Intelligence Task Force”, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2018, p. 32.
6. “Artificial Intelligence in Defence: Presenting AI Preparedness of the Country in Defence”, no. 2.
Micro and macro-level budgetary reforms are required to ensure optimum utilisation of the allocated resources for executing financially viable plans.
“Lack of money is the root of all evil”, said Mark Twain. This is certainly true of India’s defence budget and, if one may contextualise it, perennial lack of money for defence is also what often triggers the debate on budgetary reforms. For many analysts, these reforms are a means of addressing the Twainian evil. Somewhere in a corner of their hearts they nurture the hope that appropriate reforms will make more money available for spending. This seems quite unlikely, though.
Looking at the extent of mismatch between the requirement projected by the Services and the funds allocated every year, the defence outlay will have to be doubled—a virtual impossibility, to meet the armed forces’ expectations. As the American cartoonist, humourist, and journalist, Frank McKinney Hubbard, better known as Kin Hubbard, famously said, “The safe way to double your money is to fold it once and put it in your pocket”. Only magic, and not reforms, can produce that result.
But reforms are required as the budget can be an effective device to ensure optimum utilisation of the allocated resources for executing financially viable plans. Conceptually, achieving that objective calls for reforms at the intertwined levels: micro and macro.
At the micro level, the structure of the Demands for Grant (DG) of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) merits a review, primarily to give an outcome-orientation to the defence budget. The term ‘structure’ refers to the way the overall defence budget is divided into four DGs and how the funds are then sub-divided into several ‘Major’, ‘Minor’, ‘Sub’ or ‘Detailed’ Budget Heads.
Presently, the defence budget is divided into four DGs: Ministry of Defence (Civil), Defence Services (Revenue), Capital Outlay on Defence Services, and Defence Pensions. The Minor and Detailed Budget Heads within each of these DGs, especially the first three, are far too many to be captured here. Broadly speaking, the funds are earmarked for salaries, stores, transportation, maintenance works, miscellaneous expenditure, and various categories of capital expenditure that include acquisition of land and assorted defence equipment, and development of civil infrastructure.
Thanks to this archaic structure, it is well-nigh impossible to evaluate the outcomes of the budgetary allocation. Consequently, the efficacy of defence outlay is generally evaluated through the prism of allocation and utilisation of funds, with very little institutionalised focus on the outcomes intended to be achieved from the annual budgetary outlay, the actual achievement at the end of the year, identification of the reasons for the mismatch between the goals and the achievement, and remedial or corrective action required to be taken. This needs to change.
A half-hearted effort was made in the Union Budget for the Financial Year (FY) 2016–17 when the number of MoD’s DGs were reduced from eight to four, as enumerated above. It was claimed at the time that “With a view to provide [sic] a holistic picture of budgetary allocations and effective expenditure monitoring, some Demands for Grants in a Ministry have been merged into other Demand for Grants of the Ministry/Department”.1
It was also claimed that, “For effective outcome oriented monitoring of implementation of programmes and schemes/projects and to ensure optimum utilization of resources, a comprehensive exercise to rationalize Plan and Non-Plan schemes of all Ministries and Departments has been undertaken. The existing programmes and schemes have been reorganized into outcome-based Umbrella programmes and schemes. This process would be carried forward in the coming years”2.
But there was no follow-up of the process, at least not in relation to the defence budget. On the contrary, the limited practice of factorising the Indian Navy’s capital budget into several outcome-oriented budget heads also seems to have been abandoned in the last two–three years. To illustrate, in the DG for Capital Outlay on Defence Services for the FY 2018–19, allocation made for several projects was indicated separately.
In the said budget, specific allocations were made for Project 1135.6 (Talwar class frigates), Project Varsha, Air Defence Ships, VLF Project, Naval Academy Ezhimalai Project, Missile Technical Positions, Project Sea Bird Phase IIA, Construction of protective retaining Bund/Dry Dock, etc.3 At least in theory, this made it possible for the MoD to assess the outcome of the allocation made for these projects at the end of the year with reference to the targets set for that year.
Instead of extending this practice to other areas of defence expenditure which lend themselves to outcome-oriented monitoring, even the above-mentioned budget sub-heads entirely vanished from the DG for the FY 2019–20.
This outcome-oriented approach to structuring of the defence budget needs to be adopted in relation to every segment of the defence budget which lends itself to evaluation of outcomes, such as the allocation made for capital acquisitions. Adoption of this approach will require a relook at the existing scheme of budget heads which is outdated and serves little purpose in so far proper outcome-oriented classification of expenditure is concerned.
These micro-level ‘reforms’ cannot, however, yield the desired results without an enabling broad framework and hard-nosed guidelines for defence budgeting. This macro-level reform would require the MoD, and more particularly the armed forces, to be more pragmatic, by aligning the process of budget formulation with the fiscal reality. It means that the annual budgetary projections must conform to the likely availability of funds and not be based on some self-serving assumptions about what the defence outlay ought to be.
A lot of energy has been frittered away over the years in pursuit of fruitless or impractical ideas like pegging the defence budget at 3 per cent of the GDP, creation of a non-lapsable pool of funds for modernisation and taking defence pensions out of the ambit of defence budget. Some half-hearted attempts have also been made at containing the expenditure through outsourcing, manpower rationalisation, and indigenisation of defence production.
There is some merit in exploring these options but there is no saying how much money can be saved through these means, and more importantly, whether the money so saved will be good enough to exorcise the Twainian evil of paucity of funds. According to the Fifteenth Finance Commission’s report, the defence outlay for the next three financial years is likely to fall short of the requirement by Rs 9,87,470 crore, of which Rs 5,27,491 crore will be under the capital segment that caters for the expenditure on modernisation.4 This gap cannot be bridged by any realistic hike in the defence budget or through the proposed Defence Modernisation Fund of Rs 1,38,354 crore.5
Financially viable defence planning is required based on zero-based budgeting approach to estimate budgetary requirements. This will cut wasteful expenditure and compel the planners to look at more efficient ways of spending money, monitoring the expenditure, evaluating the outcomes, and taking corrective action. Sadly, this has not been the case with defence planning so far.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
3. “Demand for Grant on Capital Outlay on Defence Services, 2018-19”, Defence Services Estimates, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, pp. 114–16.
Iran is focussing its diplomatic energies on advancing its ‘neighbourhood policy’ and long-term cooperation with China and Russia.
When European Union-mediated negotiations between Iran and the United States in Doha ended on 29 June 2022 without breaking the nearly four months’ long stalemate in nuclear talks, Iran and its Western interlocutors articulated very divergent views on the prospects of reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In a telephone call with his Qatari counterpart Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Abdollahian noted his positive assessment of talks and underlined that Iran was determined to continue the negotiations till a good, strong and lasting agreement is reached. He added that if the US is realistic, an agreement will be “achievable”.1
Refuting claims by US Special representative for Iran, Robert Malley, that Iran has been making ‘new demands’, Abdollahian stated that one of the main issues was “effective guarantees” from the American side on “economic benefits” from the deal.2 When European Union foreign policy Chief Josep Borrell, in his capacity as the chairman of JCPOA joint-commission, proposed a new text that will ensure sustainability of the deal, Abdollahian once again stated that Iran welcomes continuation of diplomacy.3
Prolonging the Nuclear Talks
The Raisi administration delayed resumption of nuclear talks for four months after assuming office in August last year. By sticking to its key demands on guarantees and comprehensive sanctions relief, Iran aims to underline that Trump-era ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, which has continued under the Biden administration, will not lead Tehran to compromise. Since the new Iranian team led by Ali Bagheri Kani, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, entered nuclear negotiations in November last year, its negotiating approach has been marked by brinkmanship. Officials in the conservative Raisi administration contrast this approach with the ‘passive diplomacy’ attributed to moderates and reformists, who pursued policy of dialogue and compromise while engaging with the West on Iran’s nuclear file.
After the IAEA Board of Governors passed the US and EU-3 drafted censure resolution against Iran in June 2022 for ‘insufficient cooperation’ with the agency, Iran responded by disconnecting JCPOA-related monitoring cameras.4 In a further escalatory move in July, Iran began enriching uranium to 20 per cent using advanced IR-6 centrifuges at its second nuclear facility in Fordow, which had been converted into a ‘nuclear, physics and technology center’ under the JCPOA.
When President Joe Biden, while visiting Israel, reaffirmed that his administration is open to the ‘military option’ should the diplomatic efforts to bring Iran back into compliance fail, Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, noted that “Iran is technically capable of building a nuclear bomb but has not decided whether to build one”.5 He went on to argue that Biden administration’s refusal on guarantees on preserving the nuclear deal ruins the possibility of any agreement.
In the face of the US intransigence on key Iranian demands that also include removal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from US State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO), Iran has maintained a positive outlook towards continuing diplomacy. While rejecting deadlines for concluding the negotiations, it has steadily advanced its nuclear programme and limited its cooperation with the IAEA, thus playing on fears of its Western interlocutors about Iran reaching the nuclear threshold, and perhaps a breakout. Tehran seems to have calculated that given the US involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war and its strategic interests in containing China in the Indo-pacific, Washington will not seek a serious escalation with Iran by leaving the diplomatic path.
Regional Diplomacy delinked from Nuclear Diplomacy
Iran’s dialogue with Saudi Arabia, which was initiated in parallel with the nuclear talks under the Rouhani administration, has seen progress under Raisi, suggesting dynamics at play independent of the state of the nuclear talks. Iraq has mediated five rounds of Iran–Saudi dialogue at the level of security elites and focussing on ceasefire in Yemen, among other issues. In July, Iran confirmed that the dialogue will now move to the political level between foreign ministers of the two countries.6
As Iran works with Riyadh towards de-escalation and potential restoration of diplomatic ties, the Raisi government sees Iran’s network of non-state actors and state allies as having a crucial role in strengthening the country’s hand in regional diplomacy. Tehran knows that it is indispensable to the resolution of multiple crises in the region.7
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, while hosting the Emir of Qatatr, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in May 2022, underlined his support for what he described as ‘active diplomacy’ for resolution of regional issues by regional countries. Khamenei noted
The issues of Syria and Yemen too can be resolved through dialogue. Of course, dialogue should not take place from a position of weakness while the other side—primarily the U.S. and others—rely on their military and financial power.
The Raisi administration has focussed on its neighbourhood policy to render ineffective US economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Iran. Tehran also wants to mitigate the development of a strategic coalition against it by its Gulf neighbours and Israel.8 President Biden’s July 2022 visits to Israel and then Saudi Arabia, where he attended a US–Arab summit, was aimed at stressing US leadership in the region, while also forging collective security efforts between Israel and US Arab allies.
Iran’s Gulf neighbours, meanwhile, are using their ties with Israel to draw Iran into a serious dialogue on regional security issues. Saudi Arabia recently denied being party to any discussions on creating an integrated Middle East air defence network that included Israel. Abu Dhabi also revealed that it was in the process of sending an ambassador to Tehran and sought diplomatic solution to address its concerns about Iran’s regional activities.9
Also, the targeting of Gulf shipping in the summer of 2019 and the incidents of drone attacks on energy facilities and critical infrastructure of the UAE and Saudi Arabia earlier this year have exposed the limitations of US security guarantees to these countries, leading them to seek dialogue with Iran.
Further, by hosting the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin for the 7th trilateral summit in the Astana format on Syria soon after Biden’s Middle East tour in July 2022, Tehran demonstrated the centrality of Russia and Iran in the Syrian theatre and the wider region. The three leaders sought to avoid new conflict in Syria by addressing Turkey’s security concerns from Kurdish groups, particularly the People’s Defense Units (YPG), which has links with Turkey’s separatist Kurdish group, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). By reaffirming their ongoing cooperation in the fight against terrorist groups and a joint stand against "separatist agendas aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and threatening the national security of neighboring countries”, they agreed to find a political solution to the crisis.10
The Iranian and Russian Presidents also called for withdrawal of the ‘unjustifiable’ presence of US forces from east of the Euphrates river in northeast Syria. Both Russia and Iran support expanding sovereignty of Syrian government to north-eastern Syria where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operate and deny them access to oil and gas fields in the region. Since Israeli strikes at Damascus airport in June 2022, Russia has also become increasingly critical of Israel’s air-campaign targeting Iranian assets in Syria.11
Conclusion
Iran’s influence in key conflict theatres in Yemen and Syria, its proven capabilities for raising collective insecurity for the region and deepening security ties with Russia, have given it the upper hand in diplomacy with its regional rivals. Over more than a year of nuclear negotiations have shown that instead of banking on a successful outcome in Vienna, Iran, especially under Raisi, is focussing its diplomatic energies on advancing its ‘neighbourhood policy’ and long-term cooperation with China and Russia. These policies are not only in line with the Supreme Leader Khamenei’s vision of ‘resistance economy’ aimed at minimising the economic impact of US sanctions, but also aim to situate Iran favourably in the emerging alternative Eurasian order.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
National Hospital Ship and India’s Maritime Security Strategy
R. Vignesh
July 29, 2022
Hospital ships play a critical role in supplementing a navy’s combat potential and enhance its soft power capability.
In May 2022, a Request for Information (RFI) was issued by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the construction of a National Hospital Ship (NHS) for the Indian Navy.1 The RFI has indicated that the navy seeks the construction of a task-specific ship that is capable of providing mobile and comprehensive medical care to patients on the high seas. The acquisition of such a ship for the Indian Navy’s fleet is timely, taking into consideration two important factors. First, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is increasingly becoming susceptible to recurrent natural disasters owing to the effects of climate change. Second, India is currently engaged in making efforts for the reorientation of its image from being perceived regionally as a ‘Net Security Provider’ to that of a ‘Preferred Security Partner’.2 Hospital ships play a critical role in supplementing a navy’s combat potential, enhancing its soft power capability and augmenting its ability to be the first responder to humanitarian crises.
Strategic and Tactical Naval Asset
Major naval powers across the world possess hospital ships in their fleets. The 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits belligerent parties from attacking vessels that are designated as hospital ships. Article 22 in the Third Chapter of the Second Geneva Conventions 1949 defines military hospital ships as vessels built or equipped by navies solely for the purpose of treating the wounded and transporting them.3
Even though hospital ships are generally unarmed, they have enormous tactical and strategic significance for navies, both during combat and peacetime. The global maritime security environment is imperiled by both traditional and non-traditional threats. Hospital ships act as multi-faceted naval assets that can augment maritime capability.
Supplement Combat Capability
Supporting combat operations has always been the traditional role of hospital ships of navies the world over. Hospital ships have played a pivotal role in supporting the US Navy’s combat operations since the American Civil War in the 19th century.4 These ships are forward-deployed by navies to provide rapid and flexible medical support to injured combatants and civilians. During the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq, the US Navy forward-deployed its 1,000-bed hospital ship, USNS Comfort, to the Persian Gulf. As the invasion progressed, hundreds of US military personnel received immediate medical treatment on board the USNS Comfort for combat-related injuries. After the combat operations, the ship provided trauma care to some Iraqi civilians injured during the invasion.5
Hospital ships have become an important requirement for navies for conducting combat operations in the distant seas. When the Falklands War broke out in April 1982, the Royal Navy was in dire need of hospital ships for supporting its combat operations over 12,000 kilometres away from the British Coast.For this purpose, three civilian liners, namely Uganda, Canberra and Queen Elizabeth,were requisitioned and retrofitted.6 These examples illustrate the fact that hospital ships are an indispensable requirement for blue water navies.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Over 40 per cent of the world’s population resides within 100 kilometres of the coast. The heavy population density and economic activity in the littoral regions puts tremendous pressure on the coastal ecosystem.7The effects of climate change have resulted in the growing recurrences of cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and tidal surges. This creates a domino effect on poverty, famine and societal imbalances in the world’s coastal zones. As a result, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) have become key maritime security challenges for modern navies.8
Hospital Ships are best suited to undertake large-scale and complex HADR operations in the aftermath of disasters. The US Navy’s hospital ship, USNS Mercy, played an important role in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Thousands of Indonesian victims received advanced medical treatment on board the USNS Mercy deployed off the coast of Sumatra. The 2004 Tsunami underscored the importance of naval assets like hospital ships for mounting large-scale HADR operations.
Projecting Soft Power
Joseph S. Nye defined soft power as the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through appeal and attractions.9 To this end, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has extensively utilised its first hospital ship, Dhaishan Dao (also known as Peace Ark), for projecting Chinese soft power across the IOR and beyond. Since 2010, the ship has regularly embarked on voyages to South Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. During its port visits to several developing nations, the Peace Ark engages in conducting altruistic and philanthropic activities among the local populace. A notable example of this was during the Peace Ark’s first port visit to Chittagong in 2010, where the crew of the ship saved a local Bangladeshi woman with complications arising from pregnancy. This is an illustration of how these vessels can play an important role in building favourable public opinion at the grassroots level overseas, even during non-crisis times.10
Similarly, in the post 2004 Tsunami relief operations, the US’s public opinion among the Indonesians increased. In today’s complex geopolitical environment, a state’s foreign policy objective overseas can be better achieved through winning over local populations than delivering ordnance on targets.11 Hospital ships are the most conspicuous naval assets for projecting a state’s soft power overseas.
Importance of a Hospital Ship for the Indian Navy
India has always been a de facto first responder to crises in the IOR owing to its geographical position and military prowess. However, the IOR and its littorals have become far more vulnerable to natural disasters and other calamities than any other maritime region. The 2004 Tsunami underscored the necessity for naval assets like hospital ships to spearhead large-scale HADR operations. Robert Kaplan opines that in the face of receding American naval presence in the region, the US can no longer be the prime deliverer of disaster assistance in the IOR.12 In such a scenario, naval capabilities of India, China, Australia, Japan and South Korea must be augmented to respond to future emergencies.13
India’s October 2015 maritime security document has acknowledged the fact that HADR and NEO have become a mainstay in the security dynamics of the IOR.14 As a result, the most important advantage of possessing a hospital ship is its potential to critically enhance the Indian Navy’s HADR capabilities.
Secondly, naval assets like hospital ships are essential for the Indian Navy considering its efforts to become a multi-dimensional blue water force. India’s maritime security strategy earmarks the IOR in its entirety as the Indian Navy’s primary area of interest.15 In such a scenario, hospital ships are bound to play a pivotal role in supporting the Indian Navy’s combat operations across the IOR.
Finally, given India’s endeavours to strengthen its engagement with its maritime neighbours, the acquisition of the hospital ship becomes all the more significant. The potential of a hospital ship to project India’s soft power across the IOR is in consonance with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of ‘SAGAR- Security and Growth for All in the Region’.
Apart from these factors, considering India’s 7,516 kilometre coastline, hospital ships can play a pivotal role in responding to national emergencies. In the past, there have been several instances when hospital ships were deployed to meet domestic contingencies. After the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, the US Navy deployed USNS Comfort in the New York City harbour and hundreds of victims received treatment onboard. More recently in 2020, USNS Comfort was once again deployed in New York to relieve pressure on the city’s hospitals owing to the Covid-19 pandemic.16
These instances have also underscored the importance of reconfiguring the designs of modern hospital ships. For instance, the massive 1000-bed hospital ships of the US Navy including Mercy and Comfort, were originally oil tankers. The open-bay design and single ventilation system hindered infection control that was necessary for treating Covid-19 patients. As a result of this, the US Navy’s hospital ships were not successful in supporting America’s fight against the pandemic.
Similarly, during the 2004 Tsunami relief, USNS Mercy took five weeks to transit to the crisis location and could not participate in the immediate relief operations. Owing to these factors, US Naval officers have suggested smaller and faster hospital ships similar to China’s Peace Ark for replacing the ageing Mercy and Comfort in the US Naval fleet.17 The schematics and technical parameters that have been specified in the May 2022 RFI have indicated that India seeks to build a purpose-specific hull like that of China’s Peace Ark and induct it within four years after the finalisation of the contract with an Indian Shipyard.
Conclusion
The significance of hospital ships in navies has acquired greater strategic significance owing to changing maritime security dimensions. The threat to the coastal population from natural disasters, pandemics and other man-made calamities has increased substantially. Recent developments in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have also underscored the resurgence of great-power competition and the risk of state-on-state confrontation. In this context, the relevance of hospital ships to modern navies has risen considering their potential as combat enablers, first responders and symbols of the state’s soft power. As an emerging blue water navy, the national hospital ship provides great value addition to India’s maritime capability by serving as the flagship for projecting Indian soft power and as an auxiliary ship for augmenting Indian hard power across the IOR.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Lebanon is yet to witness the formation of a new stable government, two months after parliamentary elections.
The general elections held in Lebanon on 15 May 2022 failed to determine a clear winner, thus ensuring no end to the political uncertainty. Over a month after the elections, President Michel Aoun finally tasked the caretaker Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, with the responsibility of forming a new government. Mikati was backed by 54 out of 128 parliamentarians.1 While Nawaf Salam, Lebanon’s former ambassador to the United Nations, received 25 votes, 46 MPs abstained from naming any candidate.2
The elections happened at a time when the country is in the midst of a major economic and sectarian crisis. The elections sparked a ray of hope among the people that it could perhaps bring in some relief from the economic hardships and corruption plaguing the country. The government’s proposal to increase taxes on WhatsApp, gasoline and tobacco in 2019, triggered widespread protests which have continued to occur intermittently since then.
The formation of a stable government was also crucial as it can secure support from the international community. The United Nations, United States, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Lebanon’s former colonial power, France, have time and again emphasised that their support is conditional on the political leadership undertaking economic reforms at the earliest.
Parliamentary Elections 2022
Lebanon follows an open list proportional representation system to elect the 128 members of parliament for a four-year term.3 Its political system functions on confessional basis, which means that the key political positions such as that of the President (Maronite Christian), Prime Minister (Sunni) and Speaker of parliament (Shia) are reserved on religious and sectarian lines.
To form a new government, nationwide parliamentary elections were held on 15 May 2022. The voter turnout was recorded at nearly 50 per cent.4 The low voter turnout was surprising for many experts as they expected that protests and anger among the Lebanese citizens against the government will drive them to participate in the elections more vociferously.
In comparison to the 2018 election, the 2022 election registered a large number of candidates willing to contest for the opportunity to enter the parliament. According to the Interior Ministry, 718 candidates (20 per cent higher than the 2018 elections) and 103 lists of registered candidates contested in the elections, including 118 women candidates.5
The increase in the number of candidates (from 77 in 2018 election) and lists can be linked with the decision of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri to not contest the election, thereby providing space for independent and civil society list candidates to fight for the Sunni votes. Furthermore, political protests which have taken place in the country since 2019, gave rise to various local leaders entering the political scene, and have contributed to the increased number of candidates in this election.
The most surprising aspect of the election results was the decline in the number of seats of Hezbollah allies. Pro-Hezbollah independents and allies could secure only eight seats as compared to 15 in the 2018 elections. Although Hezbollah allies have lost their majority, the parliamentary seats of Hezbollah remain unchanged. This reveals a minor and temporary loss of popularity.6
Lebanese Forces, a Christian political party, and its allies won 21 seats, up from 15 in 2018. President Aoun’s Christian Free Patriotic Movement and its allies also registered a fall in their support and secured only 18 seats as compared to 29 in 2018.7 In addition, Saad Hariri’s surprising withdrawal from the election adversely impacted the performance of Future Movement Party which could only secure seven seats in comparison to 20 in the previous parliamentary election.
Though Hezbollah's allies have lost seats in the parliament, one should not undermine their role in government formation as Hezbollah and Amal together account for 28 seats (Hezbollah 13 and Amal 15) in the parliament. However, government formation will be a difficult task as none of the political parties or alliances has secured a clear majority in the new parliament.
With regard to Hezbollah, the election results also falsified the “predictions of mass voter desertion from the Shia camp” due to the economic meltdown.8 The improved performance of the civil society and activists also came as a pleasant surprise as they secured 13 seats, in comparison to one seat in the previous election (see Table 1). However, the gains of anti-Hezbollah opposition are insufficient to generate any major shift in the parliament.9
There is no doubt that Lebanon needs a major economic and political overhaul to halt the ongoing systemic collapse, as has also been suggested by the UN, France and the IMF, time and again. However, large-scale changes cannot be expected from the new parliament. This is mainly because Lebanon’s traditional parties such as Hezbollah, Amal, Free Patriotic Movement and others are not ready to bring any major shift in their policy stance.10 They have constantly undermined the Lebanese economy by indulging in corrupt practices and financial mismanagement, which has resulted in a significant systemic degradation of the country. Furthermore, they have followed policies that have only benefitted the feudal warlords.
The parliamentary consultations to decide the new Prime Minister were held on 23 June 2022, over a month after the elections. On 29 June 2022, Mikati handed details of his government to President Aoun, which were leaked to the media. The media reports suggest that majority of ministers from his caretaker government have been included in the list of new ministers.
Notwithstanding the above, Lebanon is yet to witness the formation of a new stable government. Based on past experience, government formation process would not be easy and may take a lot of time. In addition, many experts feel that the new government will not help in reversing the country’s economic downturn.11 This is mainly due to the re-election of a majority of old political elites in the parliament, who were responsible for stalling political and economic reforms.12
The current parliament is highly fragmented on the basis of diverse opinions held by various parties. Even those who favoured Mikati during the parliamentary consultations differ on issues such as maritime negotiations with Israel and relations with the Gulf countries. Thus, confrontations on foreign and economic policy and other political matters can be expected. This will result in major policy paralysis at each stage of decision-making and implementation.
Furthermore, Hezbollah’s presence in the government can potentially discourage Saudi Arabia from extending economic support to Lebanon. It is no secret that Lebanon’s relations with Saudi Arabia remain tense owing to the Iranian influence in the domestic and foreign policy of the former. Thus, it seems that the parties which have extended support to Mikati, have merely done so for the sake of forming a government, with no intention of introducing the much-needed reforms in the country.
Along with the imperative of improving the economic condition of the country, a stable government in Lebanon is also the need of the hour in order to determine its relations with the Gulf countries. The latter will keenly observe the extent of Iranian influence on the functioning of the new government, which has been a major sore point in Lebanon and Gulf countries’ relations, particularly with respect to Saudi Arabia.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Several Belt and Road Initiative projects pass through ecologically sensitive areas and in countries with weak environmental laws and governance.
China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) connects China globally through an overland ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and an ocean ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. As of March 2022, the BRI involves 147 countries with investments in the first half of 2022 at $28.4 billion.1 However, a profound apprehension on far-reaching environmental consequences have been aired by environmental experts as several BRI projects are known to pass through ecologically sensitive areas and in countries with weak environmental laws and governance.2
Green Development and BRI Guidelines
Promoting green development as part of the BRI is an essential requirement for Chinese policy makers. In response to environmental degradation in China, a national strategy, ‘Ecological Civilization’ (EC), was proposed at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2007. Later, in 2018, it was embedded in the country’s constitution and became part of the national development strategy.3
In the context of environmental protection and loss of biodiversity and ecosystem, several policies have been outlined in the recent past, encouraging Chinese investors to integrate green development throughout the overseas investment process.4 “Green Development Guidelines for Overseas Investment and Cooperation” issued on 15 July 2021, jointly by Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Ecology and Environment, stresses strengthening environmental protection in the host country, including environmental impact assessment (EIA). It calls for following the rules and regulations of the host country, supporting investments in clean energy, and restoration of affected eco-systems.5
The “Guidelines for Ecological Environmental Protection of Foreign Investment Cooperation and Construction Projects” issued on 6 January 2022 by Ministry of Ecology and Environment, incorporates environmental management in the energy, transport and mining sectors.6 For implementing hydropower projects, for instance, it encourages avoiding nature reserves and important biological habitants.
On 28 March 2022, “Opinion on Jointly Promoting Green Development of the Belt and Road” was issued by the National Development Reform Commission and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ecology and Environment and Commerce.7 Promoting low-carbon development of coal power and other projects and setting timelines for green BRI are important aspects under this ‘opinion’. It affirms that China will stop building new coal-fired power projects abroad and that existing coal projects under construction will be proceeded with ‘prudently’. It sets 2025 as the timeline to expect significant improvement of capacity for environmental risk prevention in overseas projects. The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) on 1 June 2022, called for ‘green finance’, including mitigating environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks, to foster low-carbon, sustainable development:8
Assessment
Critics have labeled some of these guidelines as ‘soft law’ and non-binding which cannot be enforced by courts.9 The potential contribution of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, especially from coal projects in BRI countries, has been a major concern as several Chinese state-owned banks have invested heavily in such projects.10 In 2016, China was involved in 240 coal projects in BRI countries.11 But there are signs of retreat in Chinese-supported development of coal plants in the past five years.12 In September 2021, President Xi Jinping at the UN Assembly pledged that China “will not build new coal-fired power projects abroad.”13
In 2021, China's largest bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) announced it was abandoning a plan to finance $3 billion of the 2,800 MW Sengwa coal project in northern Zimbabwe. In 2022, the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM) announced the cancellation of coal investment in Bangladesh.14 Moreover, BRI underlined that in the first half of 2022, no coal projects have received finance or investment, with the majority of energy investment going to gas (56 per cent), followed by solar and wind (18 per cent) and oil (18 per cent).15
Meanwhile, the announcement of green finance guidelines by CBRIC signals that the existence of potentially significant financial risk from BRI environmental impact is being acknowledged. The Myitsone dam in Myanmar, for instance, was shelved, following stiff resistance from local communities. In 2019, ICBC also pulled out from the $1.2 billion, 1050 MW coal fired plant in Lamu, Kenya following environmental activists filing a lawsuit after which courts ordered the halting of work.
An important aspect concerns guidelines on implementation of EIA, which lack the essential details on public participation, which is an important tool in EIA. Ideally, before any large-scale infrastructure and extractive industries projects are undertaken, it needs to conduct ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (FPIC) which is recognized in International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 and the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of Indigenous People, 2007.
Several scientific studies have underscored the environmental risk from BRI projects, especially BRI linear projects i.e. roads, railway and pipeline infrastructures, which are likely to be the greatest threats to already fragile ecosystems and key biodiversity areas (KBAs). One research finding on the impact of KBAs from the proposed road and rail routes, was that since mining is clustered near the proposed route, “construction and development along the route may increase size and number of mines.” Also, it pointed out that up to 15 per cent KBA are within 1 km of proposed railways, and may pose a significant risk to biodiversity because the majority of KBAs are unprotected.16 Further in the quantification of current risks of biological invasion in 123 BRI countries, another study identified 14 global ‘hotspots’ facing a high risk of invasion by terrestrial vertebrate species – which includes 98 amphibians, 177 reptiles, 391 birds and 150 mammals, threatening their ecosystems.17
To alleviate environmental problems, while several Chinese institutes are involved, one study flags the growing deficit in terms of conservation research capacity, underlining that “China lacks a pipeline for training and development of conservation scientists locally and abroad.”18
Conclusion
One of the most commonly accepted definitions of ‘sustainable development’ featured in the Brundtland report states that “sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”19 Continual reckless development, however, is threatening both current and future generations. As laid out in the recent United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report, the enormity of the triple environmental emergencies – the climate crisis, biodiversity loss and pollution – cannot be solved in isolation.20 As emphasized by eminent economist, Sir Partha Dasgupta, failure to take into account the rapid depletion of ‘natural capital’ places the world at ‘extreme risk’.21 Poor planning as part of BRI projects could pose detrimental impacts to the ecosystem and regional biodiversity. Policymakers in China and the host countries need to consider the potential environmental risks associated with BRI while implementing the projects.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
European imports of Russian gas have steadily declined either voluntarily or on account of Russia weaponising energy, propelling the push towards LNG imports.
Europe has been reeling under an energy crisis for the last few months. Amidst the war in Ukraine, which has seen both the European Union and Russia seek to wean themselves away from their mutual energy dependencies, the most pressing issue for Europe today appears to stave-off an energy blackout. While measures such as regulating energy consumption can only a short-term measure to overcome the shortages, the key challenge will be in finding viable long-term substitutes.
The lack of excess global oil and gas capacity to compensate for the Russian shortfall is likely to lead Europe to explore energy alternatives in the form of renewable, coal, nuclear and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), each with its own set of corresponding challenges.
While a full transition to renewables is likely to take time, the focus on fossil fuels like coal would push back the continent’s ambitious climate and green targets – an issue close to Europe’s heart. Similarly, nuclear energy has remained unpopular, particularly in the aftermath of the meltdown of Fukushima reactors. LNG can help cushion the blow, as evident in the huge uptick in European LNG imports. Yet, capacity and infrastructure constraints as well as its impact on carbon emissions present their own set of quandaries.
Against the backdrop of these dynamics, the pertinent question is can LNG offer Europe a lifeline amidst an unprecedented energy crisis?
European Efforts towards Acquiring LNG
European imports of Russian gas have steadily declined either voluntarily or on account of Russia weaponising energy, from 174.3 bcm in 2021 to 20.5 bcm in February 2022, propelling the push towards LNG imports.1 The intrinsic nature of LNG, in terms of storage and transport which enable large quantities to be carried in shipping tankers, makes it an efficient alternative. This has led to a renewed focus on fast-tracking the commissioning of an additional 33 LNG terminals apart from ensuring efficiency of scale in the existing 29 terminals.
Today, steps are being taken to expand capacities at the Świnoujście terminal in Poland, Adriatic Terminal in Italy, and Gate terminal in the Netherlands. With a gestation period of three to four years, these projects are expected to come online by 2025. Notably, Spain which houses the largest number of operational terminals in Europe, at six, faces structural constraints on account of limited connections with rest of Europe.
In contrast, Germany which houses a well-connected system of pipeline for gas distribution is the only European country with a sizeable coastline lacking an LNG terminal or even a Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU). To overcome this structural constraint, the Olaf Scholz government has approved the construction of an onshore LNG terminal apart from leasing four FSRUs (at Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbuttel and Stade,) with at least the one at Wilhelmshaven becoming functional by this winter.2
Europe’s long coastline, which is essential for receiving LNG ships, is a key enabler in attracting imported LNG. This puts countries like Spain, France and Italy, vis-à-vis the landlocked states of Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, at a considerable advantage to build regasification terminals along their shores. These countries can emerge as the fulcrum for redistribution to rest of Europe, aided by existing pipelines at a minimalist cost.
Similarly, FSRUs which are intrinsically mobile offer the advantage of freeing up vital real estate along the busy European coastline. They can also be readily leased out from other states, unlike the time consuming construction of on shore LNG terminals. Certain old LNG carriers are also being converted to FSRUs in a bid to provide increased alternatives in a short time span.
This two-pronged LNG strategy is a key step in Europe’s diversification. In fact, LNG should seamlessly blend in with existing European energy infrastructure on account of Europe relying largely on gas to meet its household and commercial consumption.
Challenges
The biggest challenge, however, for Europe today is the lack of excess global capacity. This is notwithstanding the fact that the US has emerged as the largest exporter of LNG to Europe in the first half of 2022. It has increased its LNG supplies to Europe from 34 bcm in 2021 to 39 bcm till June 2022. 3 Unsurprisingly, US energy firms are finding it more profitable to divert their cargoes towards Europe even at the cost of paying contractual penalties to their earlier export markets.4
Meanwhile, Europe’s attempts to buy additional LNG will reverberate across the world. Given the imbalance between demand and supply, which has pushed gas prices to their historic highs, the demand from EU is likely to create a shortfall elsewhere. This is particularly likely to be acute in Asia and Latin America. During the period 2016-2021, US LNG supplies to South Korea, Japan, and China accounted for 1.4 trillion, 1 trillion, and 865 billion cubic feet respectively.5 In fact, last year, China surpassed Japan to become the biggest importer of LNG, accounting for 21.3 per cent of global LNG imports.6
Even if these countries were to consider importing the European share of gas from Russia (as LNG due to the absence of gas pipelines), they would face the hurdle of low availability of LNG shipping tankers. The fact remains that a lion’s share of global shipping companies are headquartered in the West.7 And there is unlikely to be an appetite among these companies to trade in Russian energy for fear of western sanctions. They are also unlikely to forego supersized profits arising out of Europe’s pressing need for new sources of energy.
Incidentally, this emphasis on LNG will likely come at the cost of diverting finances from elsewhere. New investments in LNG infrastructure could eat into Europe’s green fund. Previously, European plans to consider natural gas as a bridge for green transition did not require additional investments.
Conclusion
Today, Europe’s attempts at raising the cost of Russia’s war in Ukraine by weaning itself off Russian energy appears to be backfiring. Energy shortages and astronomical prices have led to an unprecedented domestic turbulence. Not only is Europe scrambling to shore up supplies amidst global scarcity but is also doing so at rates which could undermine its economic and political stability. Quick solutions to Europe’s energy quagmire, however, appear unlikely. Meanwhile, Russia continues to earn an energy windfall despite shipping far lower quantities post the war in Ukraine.
In its diversification attempts, Europe appears to be banking on US LNG, with American imports making up for 10 per cent of imports from Russia, even if they are priced at a premium. This is likely to lead to a further strengthening of the trans-Atlantic partnership. However, Europe’s long-term energy security would perhaps lie in further diversifying energy sources apart from tapping its own green potential. For the short-term, however, Europe would likely have to brace for an acute energy pain.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Given that the Department of Expenditure will henceforth be the nodal department for issuing procurement related instructions in future, the Ministry of Defence must institute a system to promptly incorporate them in the MoD procurement manuals.
A question that often worries those involved in procurement of goods and services in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Services is whether the procedure laid down in the manuals they follow is complete in all respects. There are, additionally, provisions of the General Financial Rules (GFR), supplementary instructions issued by other agencies like the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), and the tender guidelines issued by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC).
Many training programmes on acquisition include a session or two on the ‘CVC instructions’, which reinforces the impression that it is not enough to follow the departmental manuals and that one must also make sure that all CVC guidelines are complied with. Considering that the CVC has issued as many as 72 circulars containing various guidelines on public procurement till the end of June 2022, it would be an enormous task for anyone to sift through all these circulars to ensure compliance with the CVC guidelines. This impression merits dispelling.
To set the context, in the absence of any central law on public procurement in India, spending by the ministries and departments on procurement of goods and services is governed by the general principles laid down in the GFRs, which were first promulgated in 1947, and whose latest version was released by the Ministry of Finance’s (MoF’s) Department of Expenditure (DoE) in 2017.1
These rules deal with a wide range of subjects from budget formulation and government accounts to inventory management and grants-in-aid given by the government. There is only one small chapter that deals with procurement of goods and services, though another three even smaller chapters on works, inventory and contract management also have some bearing on the subject.
Cognisant of the fact that the GFRs are grossly inadequate for addressing the complexities of procurement by big departments like Defence and Railways, the framers of these rules permit them to issue detailed instructions ‘broadly in conformity with the general rules contained in’ the relevant chapter of the GFRs.2 Pursuant to this enabling clause, several ministries have promulgated their own procurement manuals containing detailed procedural instructions to address the peculiarities of their acquisition programmes.
The MoF itself has promulgated three procurement manuals: Manual on Procurement of Goods, Manual on Procurement of Works, and Manual on Procurement of Consultancy & Other Services.3 These manuals are followed by the ministries and departments which spend meagre amounts on procurement of routine goods and services and, therefore, do not need to formulate bespoke procedures for procurement.
The MoD too has promulgated at least four such manuals. The primary MoD manuals, currently in force, are the Defence Procurement Manual 2009 (DPM 2009), Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP 2020), and Defence Works Procedure 2020 (DWP 2020). These manuals contain the procedure for revenue and capital procurements, and execution of civil works, respectively. A separate Procurement Manual promulgated in 2020 applies to all types of procurement by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).4
Since these manuals have been, explicitly or implicitly, promulgated in terms of the aforesaid enabling clause in GFR 2017, the provisions thereof are, ipso facto, in conformity with the GFRs and other relevant government instructions, including those issued by the CVC. In fact, para 1.1.2 of DPM 2009 clearly states that it is ‘laid down in terms of Rule 135 of the General Financial Rules, 2005’, which corresponded to analogous clause in GFR 2017.
More to the point, para 1.5.1 of DPM 2009 states that ‘The provisions contained in this Manual are in conformity with other Government manuals like the General Financial Rules, Financial Regulations (Defence Services Regulations), as also other instructions issued by the Government and the Central Vigilance Commission from time to time’.
This should have put all apprehensions at rest, but it hasn’t. There are two reasons why the doubt about the need to factor in the CVC instructions while taking decisions keeps nagging the personnel involved in procurement of goods and services, despite the specific provisions in DPM 2009 quoted above.
The first reason is that DAP 2020, and its earlier versions, which regulates the armed forces’ capital budget, does not contain provisions analogous to the above-mentioned provisions in DPM 2009 and similar provisions in the DRDO Procurement Manual 2020. The second, more important, reason is that DPM 2009 itself nullifies the confidence generated by the aforesaid provisions by stipulating in para 1.5.4 that the ‘provisions of this Manual would be subject to general or special instructions/orders/ amendments which the Government may issue from time’.
A notification posted by the CVC on its website in July 20225 addresses the procurement executives’ dilemma to some extent. The notification mentions that while presently, guidelines are issued by the CVC, DoE, NITI Ayog, DPIIT, etc., the Commission had come to the ‘logical conclusion’ after deliberations with the DoE, that ‘it would only be appropriate if public procurement guidelines are issued from D/o Expenditure’ only. This is because ‘multiple organizations issuing guidelines, procurement executives were facing problems in having a single authoritative source of reference’.6
In pursuance of this decision, the DoE has already updated its manuals7 in which ‘all the CVC guidelines on public procurement have been merged’ and consequently ‘all the earlier guidelines of CVC on public procurement have been withdrawn’. The CVC notification goes on to say that all the organisations ‘are required to update/align their procurement guidelines/manuals in line with the above Manuals of D/o Expenditure and upload them on their website at the earliest for easy access of their officials and other stakeholders’.8
The ball is now in MoD’s court, as well as that of other ministries’ which have analogous manuals, as the CVC’s notification calls for immediate review of all the manuals promulgated by it to ensure that all government instructions, guidelines, and directives issued till date that must be followed by those engaged in procurement of goods and services are incorporated therein. But this one-time measure will not be good enough.
The MoD must institute a system to take cognisance of the instructions as and when issued by the DoE, which will henceforth be the nodal department for issuing procurement related instructions in future, and to promptly incorporate them in the MoD manuals. This alone will inspire confidence among the procurement executives and hasten decision-making. This will work if the task of reviewing the manuals is coordinated by a single authority within the MoD which, apart from immediate updating of the manuals, will also ensure that there are no ambiguities and contradictions within and across the manuals as regards the essential procedural requirements.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Namibian Foreign Minister’s visit to India saw the signing of a critical wildlife pact relating to relocation of African Cheetahs, and provided a boost to bilateral ties.
The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Namibia, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, visited India to attend the 17th CII EXIM Bank Conclave on India–Africa Growth Partnership, which was held on 19–20 July 2022. While the two-day conclave was attended by 40 ministers from 17 African countries, Namibia was one of the five countries which had a dedicated Country Session during the Conclave, apart from the Republic of The Gambia, Zambia, Mauritius and Gabon. Issues related to energy, infrastructure, agriculture and health were discussed during the session.1
Ms Ndaitwah met Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Minister for Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Bhupender Yadav. India and Namibia signed three Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) related to wildlife conservation, sustainable biodiversity utilisation and employment of diplomatic spouses or dependants. As part of the wildlife pact, India is expected to get eight African cheetahs for captive breeding in Madhya Pradesh's Kuno National Park in August 2022, making it the world's first agreement for the transcontinental transfer of such a large number of carnivorous animals. The MoU between the National Forensic Science University (NFSU) and the Namibian Police Forensic Science Institute (NPFSI) will see India offering Namibia customised training in the fields of forensic science, cybersecurity, digital forensics, wildlife crime investigation, and homeland security.2
Historical Aspects
India was one of the first countries to support the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) party, founded in 1960, which led the country to independence from South Africa in 1990.3 The first SWAPO embassy abroad was established in India in 1986. It started a chain of diplomatic recognition by other countries and the inevitable process leading to Namibia's independence.4
At the Non-Aligned Movement conference in 1986, in Zimbabwe, the 'AFRICA Fund' was established to offer financial help to southern African liberation organisations. The AFRICA Fund Committee held its first summit in January 1987 in New Delhi. Namibia’s anti-colonial struggle gained from such efforts. When the country secured independence in 1990, Prime Minister VP Singh and Rajiv Gandhi, the then leader of the opposition, attended the celebrations at Windhoek.5
Subsequent high-level visits included those by President Shankar Dayal Sharma in 1995 and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998. Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba visited India in 2009 which resulted in the signing of a number of agreements including those on defence cooperation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Pan-African e-Network and mineral resources.6 President Hage G. Geingob participated in the 3rd India–Africa Forum Summit held in New Delhi in 2015.
This was followed by the highly successful visit of President Pranab Mukherjee to Namibia in 2016. India signed two MoUs during the visit, on capacity-building for civil servants and establishing the India–Namibia Centre of Excellence in Information Technology (INCEIT), at the Namibia University of Science and Technology (NUST). INCEIT is now offering IT programmes on subjects such as Big Data Technologies, among others, to Namibian students.
Economic and Commercial Relations
In the last two decades, strengthening economic cooperation has been the focus of India–Africa relations.7 Significant potential for economic cooperation with Namibia exists in diverse areas such as skill development, affordable housing, and agriculture and minerals, particularly gold and diamonds.
India–Namibia bilateral trade was worth US$ 251.88 million in 2021–22.8 The Namibia Trade Commission Office was established in Chennai in 2021 by the India Africa Trade Council (IATC) in partnership with the India Namibia Trade Forum (INTF). According to the present Indian High Commissioner to Namibia, India is currently the second largest exporter to Namibia, after South Africa.9
The pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors have emerged as key arenas of cooperation. India was among the first countries to provide Covid-19 vaccinations, PPE kits, and other supplies to Namibia to help mitigate the impact of the pandemic.10 India is a world leader when it comes to providing affordable healthcare services and pharmaceutical products. India’s low-cost pharmaceutical industry gives opportunities for Namibia to produce medicines domestically. Namibia also offers a great avenue for Indian companies in agricultural, food processing and animal husbandry industries. The southern African country has benefitted from the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme, which provides training via innovative technical cooperation. Since its inception, the initiative has provided scholarships to over 1,200 Namibians.11
Apart from the federal level, state governments are also pursuing cooperation. The Madhya Pradesh government, for instance, began the process of setting up a diamond park in Panna in 2021 and to send students to Namibia to learn the intrinsic details of the diamond sector. Namibia, the world's sixth largest producer of rough diamonds, issued trading licences to Indian firms as far back as 2008. Finestar Jewellery & Diamonds, an Indian firm, opened its factory in Namibia in July 2022.
India’s diamond imports from Namibia over the last five years, accounted for more than half of the country’s total imports of the commodity, as indicated in the table below.
Year
2017–18
2018–19
2019–20
2020–21
2021–22
Import of non-industrial diamonds (unworked) from Namibia (in US$ Million)
53.62
44.72
14.89
15.16
0.81
Total Import to country
(in US$ Million)
62.20
53.55
28.54
30.23
45.99
Source: Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India
Defence Cooperation
Defence collaboration between India and Namibia dates back to the mid-1990s, when an Indian Air Force Technical Team (IAFTT) was stationed in Namibia to train the Namibian Air Force helicopter pilots and hone their technical skills.12 In 2011, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) delivered one Cheetah and two Chetak helicopters to the Namibian Air Force.13 The HAL has provided training to Namibian pilots and ground crew in addition to the supply of necessary equipment and spare parts.
India has also sent military observers to Namibia (1989–91) as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group with the mandate to ensure free and fair elections. Namibia, along with 16 other African countries, participated in the first Africa–India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX) held from 18 March to 27 March 2019 at the Aundh Military station in Pune. The exercise aims to train participating contingents in Humanitarian Mine Assistance (HMA) and Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) under the United Nations Charter through practical and comprehensive discussions and tactical exercises.
Nuclear Cooperation
In 2021, Namibia emerged as the world's second largest producer of uranium from mines.14 India signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Namibia in 2009, after it got exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008. However, given that Namibia is a signatory to the Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, uranium exports to India—a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—have not materialised as yet. During former President Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Namibia in 2016, India was assured that legal implications of supplying uranium for peaceful civilian nuclear use were being studied.15 Given that India has an ambitious nuclear energy programme, made up of both indigenously developed reactors and those expected to be set up by foreign companies, a forward movement on this issue will open up economic opportunities to Namibia.
Conclusion
Namibia is one of the most peaceful nations in Africa, without any recent inter-group conflict or war. With the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement in place since 2018, Namibia will have access to a wider market. India is also interested in strengthening economic and trading links with African countries through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), of which Namibia is a member. While Africa benefits from India's growing interest in the region, Namibia has the potential to be a key partner.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The success of the co-development-cum-production push in Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 would depend on the commercial viability of the co-developed product, apart from overcoming a host of conceptual and procedural challenges.
The Make-in-India campaign puts a premium on co-development and co-production of defence equipment in India. In a bid to promote such projects, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) included two specific provisions in the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 (DAP 2020) which governs capital acquisitions for the armed forces and the Indian Coast Guard.
This is not a new concept, though. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2006 recognised Foreign Direct Investment in the Indian defence industry for co-development and co-production as one of the several ways in which the foreign vendors could discharge their offset obligations. All subsequent DPPs contained analogous provisions.
Co-development and co-production projects were undertaken even prior to DAP 2020 promulgation. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, manufactured by BrahMos Aerospace—a joint venture of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya, is a prime example.
The specific provisions in DAP 2020, though, are meant to enable the armed forces to initiate co-development and/or co-production proposals like any other acquisition proposal. However, the relevant paras in DAP 2020, encapsulated below, are too cryptic to give a clear picture of how these projects are to be conceptualised, executed, and financed.
The DAP 2020 provides that the ‘cases where it is proposed to co-develop a product/ equipment offering transformative/unique/niche technology; or a futuristic equipment/ platform with a foreign country; or where co-development is likely to benefit ongoing indigenous projects in India, ….. will be progressed under an IGA/specific Project Agreement….’.1
The DAP 2020 also permits the armed forces ‘to work with a foreign entity to co-produce equipment/assemblies/sub-assemblies/spares’, if the project aims at import substitution, the equipment to be manufactured is unique, or helps in making India a manufacturing hub or boosting defence exports, or it has the potential to produce equipment that could be used by the Indian armed forces in future.
Such projects can be undertaken on a single vendor basis if no other country is willing to participate in the project or where the shortlisted vendor offers higher technology transfer and indigenous content in the locally produced equipment than the other vendors.2
Conceptual differences
Conceptually, co-development projects are distinct from co-production projects, while some of them could also be mixed co-development-cum-production projects. Typically, co-production would not involve development of a new technology or product. Such projects only need an agreement between the technology provider and the Indian manufacturer for transfer of proven technology and related wherewithal.
Most of the capital acquisitions under categories like Buy (Indian), Buy and Make (Indian), and Buy (Global – Manufacture in India) would qualify as co-production projects in some form or the other. Projects under the Make category or the Strategic Partnership Model too are fundamentally co-production projects, though some design and development may also be involved.
In the circumstances, it would be normal for co-production proposals to be initiated by the armed forces and processed as per the procedure laid down in the DPP 2020. The other two types of projects, however, are on a different footing as development of new technologies, or even new products, constitutes the core of such projects. The sheer complexity of these projects, which may also entail an element of research and design, requires them to be treated differently.
DRDO’s Role
The DRDO is best suited to steer these projects, irrespective of whether the collaboration involves only the private sector entities, or both the public and private sector entities, with or without DRDO being a party to it.
Unlike the civil and military personnel who deal with normal capital acquisition cases, the DRDO scientists do not get rotated every few years. They have years of experience in working with the Indian and foreign industry at every stage from conceptualisation of projects to commencement of production. It can, therefore, provide the much-needed continuity in stewardship of the projects by utilising its managerial expertise even if it is not directly involved in technology or product development.
In what was the first event of its kind, the 155 mm x 52 calibre howitzer used this year for the ceremonial 21-shot salute at the Red Fort on the Independence Day is a prime example of DRDO’s expertise. This Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System was successfully developed by it in collaboration with Bharat Forge Limited and Tata Advanced Systems Limited as the eventual manufacturers.
Identification of projects
It is unpropitious to leave it to the armed forces to initiate these proposals. The criteria for undertaking such projects are so expansive, and the need of the armed forces so pressing, that almost all major acquisition proposals can easily be fitted into this category, making intra- and inter-service prioritisation very difficult.
These projects require a top-level push, though even that has had little success in the past. In 2018, for example, India and the US had agreed on two ‘pathfinder’ projects for the joint production of a helmet-mounted digital display and a biological tactical detection system under the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), but not much is known about what happened to these projects thereafter. The US had also unsuccessfully offered to make fighter jets in India.
These examples illustrate how difficult it is to bring these projects to fruition, even when these are primarily for co-production and the dialogue takes place at the highest levels. Leaving the proposals to be initiated by the individual service headquarters could mire them in bureaucratic tangles at any one or more of the intermediary stages through which they must pass before even being accepted in principle.
Challenges
The trickiest part of these projects, especially the ones that entail collaboration with the foreign entity, is estimation of the cost of technology development as a part of the feasibility study. This is important because even if the technology development is not to be funded by the MoD, this cost will eventually be borne by it as a part of the buying price of the product. It is unknown if an appropriate and universally acceptable costing methodology is in place.
It is equally important that there is a reasonable certainty of the co-developed product being bought by the MoD to make the project commercially viable for the development-cum-production agency. Dogged by perennial shortage of funds for capital expenditure—estimated by the Fifteenth Finance Commission to be Rs 5,27,491 crore for the financial years 2023–24 to 2025–26,3 success of the co-development-cum-production push in DAP 2020 would depend on the confidence MoD inspires in the potential partners as regards future budgetary allocations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The challenges associated with facial recognition technology (FRT) need to be studied in detail before deploying them in counter-insurgency/counter-terror operations.
The ‘Artificial Intelligence in Defence (AIDef)’ symposium and exhibition, the first of its kind held on 11 July 2022, showcased 75 products based on Artificial Intelligence (AI), in keeping with the theme of ‘Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav’ celebrating 75 years of India’s independence.1 The Armed Forces, as well as research organisations, industry, defence start-ups and innovators took part in the exhibition. The exhibition was a culmination of a four-year old process of initially introducing and subsequently leveraging AI and AI-based products in defence. The aim is to speed up decision-making processes, enhance cybersecurity, strengthen perimeter security, enable predictive maintenance and use natural language processing (NLP) algorithms for on-the-spot translation for troops, especially when facing adversaries along disputed borders.2
Ministry of Defence Initiatives on AI
An AI Task Force was set up under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in February 2018, which came out with recommendations in less than six months in June 2018.3 The report identified five areas for developing AI-based solutions for the Indian Armed Forces. These included lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), unmanned surveillance, simulated wargames and training, cyber and aerospace security and intelligence and reconnaissance.4
These recommendations were in addition to the proposals suggested by the Task Force on AI for India’s Economic Transformation of 19 January 2018, headed by Professor V. Kamakoti, which identified 10 domains where AI could be used.5 Pertaining to the sphere of national security, the four areas highlighted were related to autonomous surveillance and combat systems, adaptive communication systems, cyber-attack mitigation and counter-attack systems and multi-sensor data fusion based systems.
Based on these inputs, the Defence AI Council (DAIC) headed by the Raksha Mantri and the Defence AI Project Agency (DAIPA) headed by the Secretary (Defence Production) were formed in February 2019.6 While the DAIC has been established as a policy-making body, DAIPA is responsible for implementing DAIC’s policy decisions and has been tasked to come out with pragmatic solutions, in collaboration with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), academia and industry.7 An AI-based defence roadmap was formulated for the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) in August 2019, based on which 40 AI products were developed by March 2022.8
In the AIDef symposium, out of 75 products, 15 were based on Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), 10 on autonomous and unmanned robotic systems, 10 on intelligent monitoring systems, seven on manufacturing and maintenance, six each on process flow automation and NLP, four each on AI platform automation and perimeter security system, three each on internet of things (IoT) and operational data analytics, two on LAWS and one each on simulator/test equipment, logistics and supply chain management, block-chain based automation, cyber security and human behavioral analysis.9 Out of these, there were two projects based on Facial Recognition Technology (FRT), i.e., the iSentinel and the Silent Sentry system.10
The iSentinel notes that its capabilities will include ‘historical tracking of people’, detecting ‘emotions, facial expressions and body language for patterns of argument, restlessness and sweating’ and ‘behaviour analysis’ for threat identification.11 The Silent Sentry boasts of both ‘human detection’ and ‘facial recognition’.12 Both these products arguably use an AI-based technology known as FRT which is based on the quantification of distinctive features (80, as per one study) of a human face such as distance between eyes, distance from the forehead to the chin, etc.13 This data is then compared with a database to decipher the identity of the individual recorded by a camera.
Challenges of FRT in Counter-insurgency/Counter-terrorism Operations
Though a case can be made for the use of FRT by the Indian Army in counter-insurgency (CI)/ counter-terrorism (CT) operations in certain areas such as Kashmir or parts of the North East, there are some challenges that need to be surmounted. The basic principle behind use of FRT in a CI/CT environment is to identify threats to either an Army camp or a company operating base (COB). The AI solutions currently being marketed are for static installations, and provide an early warning for defence measures to get activated.
The prerequisites of an effective FRT system are an exhaustive digital library or inventory of resident or terrorist facial data, excellent camera for capturing the images of individuals approaching the camp, secure and fast communications and strong processor for the mapping and matching algorithms to produce results in real time. Maintaining them in a CI/CT environment along with adequate power backup is a challenge, though these can still be taken care of.
The challenges of using FRT software in a CI/CT scenario, though, go beyond the prerequisites of a solid data set and hardware/software. Firstly, a decision needs to be made regarding the kind of identification required. If the intention is to ‘negatively identify’, i.e., any individual not matching with the resident database may be deemed to be an alleged militant and liable to be handled as such, the database and processing requirement is formidable. Increased urbanisation and search for livelihood has resulted in migrations from rural to urban areas. There is an inherent population flux in the rural and semi-urban areas that needs to be accounted for in the picture library which cannot be limited to a particular area, but needs to be expanded to the entire Union Territory (UT) and maybe even beyond.
If the intent is to ‘positively identify’, i.e., confirm the identity of a terrorist, militant or an over ground worker (OGW), an exhaustive database of such terrorists needs to be maintained. Such efforts may be hampered by the lack of updated photographs of such terrorists. The legal implications of creating and maintaining this database also need to be understood in detail by the Army. As of date, only two FRT projects are being planned to run in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). These include a project by the J&K Police which has collaborated with the Srinagar Municipal Corporation to install FRT across Srinagar to weed out terror threats. The second is by the Housing and Urban Development Department for authenticating identities of the applicants for residence.14
The use and maintenance of FRT across the country and by various state governments has also been challenged by activists in court. Add to this the challenges of poor visibility conditions, changes in surroundings, quality of photographs and finally the learning algorithm. False positives and false negatives are acceptable in any AI-based systems. However, in a CI/CT scenario, such outcomes may translate into a matter of life and death. FRT-based systems need to be test-bedded, vetted and analysed before deploying them in real-life conditions.
Further, FRT broadly has two subsets when it comes to recognising an individual. The first is the ‘facial recognition’, which identifies the individual. The other is the ‘affect recognition’, which attempts to decipher the emotions and thereby, the intentions of the individual. Affect recognition, though used by a number of FRT firms around the world, is based on shaky scientific understanding and may not be accurate or even correlated with the actual emotion of the individual.15 Applying dubious scientific standards in a CI/CT scenario may lead to cases of mistaken identities. Cyber security measures for the security of the recorded data also need to be robust, lest the recorded data be hacked, spoofed or changed.
All these challenges are formidable and need a careful and even cautious approach to operationalising FRT. The Indian Army needs to consider these issues in detail before deploying AI-based systems in a CI/CT environment.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Micro and macro-level budgetary reforms are required to ensure optimum utilisation of the allocated resources for executing financially viable plans.
“Lack of money is the root of all evil”, said Mark Twain. This is certainly true of India’s defence budget and, if one may contextualise it, perennial lack of money for defence is also what often triggers the debate on budgetary reforms. For many analysts, these reforms are a means of addressing the Twainian evil. Somewhere in a corner of their hearts they nurture the hope that appropriate reforms will make more money available for spending. This seems quite unlikely, though.
Looking at the extent of mismatch between the requirement projected by the Services and the funds allocated every year, the defence outlay will have to be doubled—a virtual impossibility, to meet the armed forces’ expectations. As the American cartoonist, humourist, and journalist, Frank McKinney Hubbard, better known as Kin Hubbard, famously said, “The safe way to double your money is to fold it once and put it in your pocket”. Only magic, and not reforms, can produce that result.
But reforms are required as the budget can be an effective device to ensure optimum utilisation of the allocated resources for executing financially viable plans. Conceptually, achieving that objective calls for reforms at the intertwined levels: micro and macro.
At the micro level, the structure of the Demands for Grant (DG) of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) merits a review, primarily to give an outcome-orientation to the defence budget. The term ‘structure’ refers to the way the overall defence budget is divided into four DGs and how the funds are then sub-divided into several ‘Major’, ‘Minor’, ‘Sub’ or ‘Detailed’ Budget Heads.
Presently, the defence budget is divided into four DGs: Ministry of Defence (Civil), Defence Services (Revenue), Capital Outlay on Defence Services, and Defence Pensions. The Minor and Detailed Budget Heads within each of these DGs, especially the first three, are far too many to be captured here. Broadly speaking, the funds are earmarked for salaries, stores, transportation, maintenance works, miscellaneous expenditure, and various categories of capital expenditure that include acquisition of land and assorted defence equipment, and development of civil infrastructure.
Thanks to this archaic structure, it is well-nigh impossible to evaluate the outcomes of the budgetary allocation. Consequently, the efficacy of defence outlay is generally evaluated through the prism of allocation and utilisation of funds, with very little institutionalised focus on the outcomes intended to be achieved from the annual budgetary outlay, the actual achievement at the end of the year, identification of the reasons for the mismatch between the goals and the achievement, and remedial or corrective action required to be taken. This needs to change.
A half-hearted effort was made in the Union Budget for the Financial Year (FY) 2016–17 when the number of MoD’s DGs were reduced from eight to four, as enumerated above. It was claimed at the time that “With a view to provide [sic] a holistic picture of budgetary allocations and effective expenditure monitoring, some Demands for Grants in a Ministry have been merged into other Demand for Grants of the Ministry/Department”.1
It was also claimed that, “For effective outcome oriented monitoring of implementation of programmes and schemes/projects and to ensure optimum utilization of resources, a comprehensive exercise to rationalize Plan and Non-Plan schemes of all Ministries and Departments has been undertaken. The existing programmes and schemes have been reorganized into outcome-based Umbrella programmes and schemes. This process would be carried forward in the coming years”2 .
But there was no follow-up of the process, at least not in relation to the defence budget. On the contrary, the limited practice of factorising the Indian Navy’s capital budget into several outcome-oriented budget heads also seems to have been abandoned in the last two–three years. To illustrate, in the DG for Capital Outlay on Defence Services for the FY 2018–19, allocation made for several projects was indicated separately.
In the said budget, specific allocations were made for Project 1135.6 (Talwar class frigates), Project Varsha, Air Defence Ships, VLF Project, Naval Academy Ezhimalai Project, Missile Technical Positions, Project Sea Bird Phase IIA, Construction of protective retaining Bund/Dry Dock, etc.3 At least in theory, this made it possible for the MoD to assess the outcome of the allocation made for these projects at the end of the year with reference to the targets set for that year.
Instead of extending this practice to other areas of defence expenditure which lend themselves to outcome-oriented monitoring, even the above-mentioned budget sub-heads entirely vanished from the DG for the FY 2019–20.
This outcome-oriented approach to structuring of the defence budget needs to be adopted in relation to every segment of the defence budget which lends itself to evaluation of outcomes, such as the allocation made for capital acquisitions. Adoption of this approach will require a relook at the existing scheme of budget heads which is outdated and serves little purpose in so far proper outcome-oriented classification of expenditure is concerned.
These micro-level ‘reforms’ cannot, however, yield the desired results without an enabling broad framework and hard-nosed guidelines for defence budgeting. This macro-level reform would require the MoD, and more particularly the armed forces, to be more pragmatic, by aligning the process of budget formulation with the fiscal reality. It means that the annual budgetary projections must conform to the likely availability of funds and not be based on some self-serving assumptions about what the defence outlay ought to be.
A lot of energy has been frittered away over the years in pursuit of fruitless or impractical ideas like pegging the defence budget at 3 per cent of the GDP, creation of a non-lapsable pool of funds for modernisation and taking defence pensions out of the ambit of defence budget. Some half-hearted attempts have also been made at containing the expenditure through outsourcing, manpower rationalisation, and indigenisation of defence production.
There is some merit in exploring these options but there is no saying how much money can be saved through these means, and more importantly, whether the money so saved will be good enough to exorcise the Twainian evil of paucity of funds. According to the Fifteenth Finance Commission’s report, the defence outlay for the next three financial years is likely to fall short of the requirement by Rs 9,87,470 crore, of which Rs 5,27,491 crore will be under the capital segment that caters for the expenditure on modernisation.4 This gap cannot be bridged by any realistic hike in the defence budget or through the proposed Defence Modernisation Fund of Rs 1,38,354 crore.5
Financially viable defence planning is required based on zero-based budgeting approach to estimate budgetary requirements. This will cut wasteful expenditure and compel the planners to look at more efficient ways of spending money, monitoring the expenditure, evaluating the outcomes, and taking corrective action. Sadly, this has not been the case with defence planning so far.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Iran is focussing its diplomatic energies on advancing its ‘neighbourhood policy’ and long-term cooperation with China and Russia.
When European Union-mediated negotiations between Iran and the United States in Doha ended on 29 June 2022 without breaking the nearly four months’ long stalemate in nuclear talks, Iran and its Western interlocutors articulated very divergent views on the prospects of reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In a telephone call with his Qatari counterpart Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Abdollahian noted his positive assessment of talks and underlined that Iran was determined to continue the negotiations till a good, strong and lasting agreement is reached. He added that if the US is realistic, an agreement will be “achievable”.1
Refuting claims by US Special representative for Iran, Robert Malley, that Iran has been making ‘new demands’, Abdollahian stated that one of the main issues was “effective guarantees” from the American side on “economic benefits” from the deal.2 When European Union foreign policy Chief Josep Borrell, in his capacity as the chairman of JCPOA joint-commission, proposed a new text that will ensure sustainability of the deal, Abdollahian once again stated that Iran welcomes continuation of diplomacy.3
Prolonging the Nuclear Talks
The Raisi administration delayed resumption of nuclear talks for four months after assuming office in August last year. By sticking to its key demands on guarantees and comprehensive sanctions relief, Iran aims to underline that Trump-era ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, which has continued under the Biden administration, will not lead Tehran to compromise. Since the new Iranian team led by Ali Bagheri Kani, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, entered nuclear negotiations in November last year, its negotiating approach has been marked by brinkmanship. Officials in the conservative Raisi administration contrast this approach with the ‘passive diplomacy’ attributed to moderates and reformists, who pursued policy of dialogue and compromise while engaging with the West on Iran’s nuclear file.
After the IAEA Board of Governors passed the US and EU-3 drafted censure resolution against Iran in June 2022 for ‘insufficient cooperation’ with the agency, Iran responded by disconnecting JCPOA-related monitoring cameras.4 In a further escalatory move in July, Iran began enriching uranium to 20 per cent using advanced IR-6 centrifuges at its second nuclear facility in Fordow, which had been converted into a ‘nuclear, physics and technology center’ under the JCPOA.
When President Joe Biden, while visiting Israel, reaffirmed that his administration is open to the ‘military option’ should the diplomatic efforts to bring Iran back into compliance fail, Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, noted that “Iran is technically capable of building a nuclear bomb but has not decided whether to build one”.5 He went on to argue that Biden administration’s refusal on guarantees on preserving the nuclear deal ruins the possibility of any agreement.
In the face of the US intransigence on key Iranian demands that also include removal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from US State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO), Iran has maintained a positive outlook towards continuing diplomacy. While rejecting deadlines for concluding the negotiations, it has steadily advanced its nuclear programme and limited its cooperation with the IAEA, thus playing on fears of its Western interlocutors about Iran reaching the nuclear threshold, and perhaps a breakout. Tehran seems to have calculated that given the US involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war and its strategic interests in containing China in the Indo-pacific, Washington will not seek a serious escalation with Iran by leaving the diplomatic path.
Regional Diplomacy delinked from Nuclear Diplomacy
Iran’s dialogue with Saudi Arabia, which was initiated in parallel with the nuclear talks under the Rouhani administration, has seen progress under Raisi, suggesting dynamics at play independent of the state of the nuclear talks. Iraq has mediated five rounds of Iran–Saudi dialogue at the level of security elites and focussing on ceasefire in Yemen, among other issues. In July, Iran confirmed that the dialogue will now move to the political level between foreign ministers of the two countries.6
As Iran works with Riyadh towards de-escalation and potential restoration of diplomatic ties, the Raisi government sees Iran’s network of non-state actors and state allies as having a crucial role in strengthening the country’s hand in regional diplomacy. Tehran knows that it is indispensable to the resolution of multiple crises in the region.7
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, while hosting the Emir of Qatatr, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in May 2022, underlined his support for what he described as ‘active diplomacy’ for resolution of regional issues by regional countries. Khamenei noted
The issues of Syria and Yemen too can be resolved through dialogue. Of course, dialogue should not take place from a position of weakness while the other side—primarily the U.S. and others—rely on their military and financial power.
The Raisi administration has focussed on its neighbourhood policy to render ineffective US economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Iran. Tehran also wants to mitigate the development of a strategic coalition against it by its Gulf neighbours and Israel.8 President Biden’s July 2022 visits to Israel and then Saudi Arabia, where he attended a US–Arab summit, was aimed at stressing US leadership in the region, while also forging collective security efforts between Israel and US Arab allies.
Iran’s Gulf neighbours, meanwhile, are using their ties with Israel to draw Iran into a serious dialogue on regional security issues. Saudi Arabia recently denied being party to any discussions on creating an integrated Middle East air defence network that included Israel. Abu Dhabi also revealed that it was in the process of sending an ambassador to Tehran and sought diplomatic solution to address its concerns about Iran’s regional activities.9
Also, the targeting of Gulf shipping in the summer of 2019 and the incidents of drone attacks on energy facilities and critical infrastructure of the UAE and Saudi Arabia earlier this year have exposed the limitations of US security guarantees to these countries, leading them to seek dialogue with Iran.
Further, by hosting the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin for the 7th trilateral summit in the Astana format on Syria soon after Biden’s Middle East tour in July 2022, Tehran demonstrated the centrality of Russia and Iran in the Syrian theatre and the wider region. The three leaders sought to avoid new conflict in Syria by addressing Turkey’s security concerns from Kurdish groups, particularly the People’s Defense Units (YPG), which has links with Turkey’s separatist Kurdish group, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). By reaffirming their ongoing cooperation in the fight against terrorist groups and a joint stand against "separatist agendas aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and threatening the national security of neighboring countries”, they agreed to find a political solution to the crisis.10
The Iranian and Russian Presidents also called for withdrawal of the ‘unjustifiable’ presence of US forces from east of the Euphrates river in northeast Syria. Both Russia and Iran support expanding sovereignty of Syrian government to north-eastern Syria where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operate and deny them access to oil and gas fields in the region. Since Israeli strikes at Damascus airport in June 2022, Russia has also become increasingly critical of Israel’s air-campaign targeting Iranian assets in Syria.11
Conclusion
Iran’s influence in key conflict theatres in Yemen and Syria, its proven capabilities for raising collective insecurity for the region and deepening security ties with Russia, have given it the upper hand in diplomacy with its regional rivals. Over more than a year of nuclear negotiations have shown that instead of banking on a successful outcome in Vienna, Iran, especially under Raisi, is focussing its diplomatic energies on advancing its ‘neighbourhood policy’ and long-term cooperation with China and Russia. These policies are not only in line with the Supreme Leader Khamenei’s vision of ‘resistance economy’ aimed at minimising the economic impact of US sanctions, but also aim to situate Iran favourably in the emerging alternative Eurasian order.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Hospital ships play a critical role in supplementing a navy’s combat potential and enhance its soft power capability.
In May 2022, a Request for Information (RFI) was issued by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the construction of a National Hospital Ship (NHS) for the Indian Navy.1 The RFI has indicated that the navy seeks the construction of a task-specific ship that is capable of providing mobile and comprehensive medical care to patients on the high seas. The acquisition of such a ship for the Indian Navy’s fleet is timely, taking into consideration two important factors. First, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is increasingly becoming susceptible to recurrent natural disasters owing to the effects of climate change. Second, India is currently engaged in making efforts for the reorientation of its image from being perceived regionally as a ‘Net Security Provider’ to that of a ‘Preferred Security Partner’.2 Hospital ships play a critical role in supplementing a navy’s combat potential, enhancing its soft power capability and augmenting its ability to be the first responder to humanitarian crises.
Strategic and Tactical Naval Asset
Major naval powers across the world possess hospital ships in their fleets. The 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits belligerent parties from attacking vessels that are designated as hospital ships. Article 22 in the Third Chapter of the Second Geneva Conventions 1949 defines military hospital ships as vessels built or equipped by navies solely for the purpose of treating the wounded and transporting them.3
Even though hospital ships are generally unarmed, they have enormous tactical and strategic significance for navies, both during combat and peacetime. The global maritime security environment is imperiled by both traditional and non-traditional threats. Hospital ships act as multi-faceted naval assets that can augment maritime capability.
Supplement Combat Capability
Supporting combat operations has always been the traditional role of hospital ships of navies the world over. Hospital ships have played a pivotal role in supporting the US Navy’s combat operations since the American Civil War in the 19th century.4 These ships are forward-deployed by navies to provide rapid and flexible medical support to injured combatants and civilians. During the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq, the US Navy forward-deployed its 1,000-bed hospital ship, USNS Comfort, to the Persian Gulf. As the invasion progressed, hundreds of US military personnel received immediate medical treatment on board the USNS Comfort for combat-related injuries. After the combat operations, the ship provided trauma care to some Iraqi civilians injured during the invasion.5
Hospital ships have become an important requirement for navies for conducting combat operations in the distant seas. When the Falklands War broke out in April 1982, the Royal Navy was in dire need of hospital ships for supporting its combat operations over 12,000 kilometres away from the British Coast. For this purpose, three civilian liners, namely Uganda, Canberra and Queen Elizabeth,were requisitioned and retrofitted.6 These examples illustrate the fact that hospital ships are an indispensable requirement for blue water navies.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Over 40 per cent of the world’s population resides within 100 kilometres of the coast. The heavy population density and economic activity in the littoral regions puts tremendous pressure on the coastal ecosystem.7 The effects of climate change have resulted in the growing recurrences of cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and tidal surges. This creates a domino effect on poverty, famine and societal imbalances in the world’s coastal zones. As a result, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) have become key maritime security challenges for modern navies.8
Hospital Ships are best suited to undertake large-scale and complex HADR operations in the aftermath of disasters. The US Navy’s hospital ship, USNS Mercy, played an important role in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Thousands of Indonesian victims received advanced medical treatment on board the USNS Mercy deployed off the coast of Sumatra. The 2004 Tsunami underscored the importance of naval assets like hospital ships for mounting large-scale HADR operations.
Projecting Soft Power
Joseph S. Nye defined soft power as the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through appeal and attractions.9 To this end, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has extensively utilised its first hospital ship, Dhaishan Dao (also known as Peace Ark), for projecting Chinese soft power across the IOR and beyond. Since 2010, the ship has regularly embarked on voyages to South Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. During its port visits to several developing nations, the Peace Ark engages in conducting altruistic and philanthropic activities among the local populace. A notable example of this was during the Peace Ark’s first port visit to Chittagong in 2010, where the crew of the ship saved a local Bangladeshi woman with complications arising from pregnancy. This is an illustration of how these vessels can play an important role in building favourable public opinion at the grassroots level overseas, even during non-crisis times.10
Similarly, in the post 2004 Tsunami relief operations, the US’s public opinion among the Indonesians increased. In today’s complex geopolitical environment, a state’s foreign policy objective overseas can be better achieved through winning over local populations than delivering ordnance on targets.11 Hospital ships are the most conspicuous naval assets for projecting a state’s soft power overseas.
Importance of a Hospital Ship for the Indian Navy
India has always been a de facto first responder to crises in the IOR owing to its geographical position and military prowess. However, the IOR and its littorals have become far more vulnerable to natural disasters and other calamities than any other maritime region. The 2004 Tsunami underscored the necessity for naval assets like hospital ships to spearhead large-scale HADR operations. Robert Kaplan opines that in the face of receding American naval presence in the region, the US can no longer be the prime deliverer of disaster assistance in the IOR.12 In such a scenario, naval capabilities of India, China, Australia, Japan and South Korea must be augmented to respond to future emergencies.13
India’s October 2015 maritime security document has acknowledged the fact that HADR and NEO have become a mainstay in the security dynamics of the IOR.14 As a result, the most important advantage of possessing a hospital ship is its potential to critically enhance the Indian Navy’s HADR capabilities.
Secondly, naval assets like hospital ships are essential for the Indian Navy considering its efforts to become a multi-dimensional blue water force. India’s maritime security strategy earmarks the IOR in its entirety as the Indian Navy’s primary area of interest.15 In such a scenario, hospital ships are bound to play a pivotal role in supporting the Indian Navy’s combat operations across the IOR.
Finally, given India’s endeavours to strengthen its engagement with its maritime neighbours, the acquisition of the hospital ship becomes all the more significant. The potential of a hospital ship to project India’s soft power across the IOR is in consonance with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of ‘SAGAR- Security and Growth for All in the Region’.
Apart from these factors, considering India’s 7,516 kilometre coastline, hospital ships can play a pivotal role in responding to national emergencies. In the past, there have been several instances when hospital ships were deployed to meet domestic contingencies. After the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, the US Navy deployed USNS Comfort in the New York City harbour and hundreds of victims received treatment onboard. More recently in 2020, USNS Comfort was once again deployed in New York to relieve pressure on the city’s hospitals owing to the Covid-19 pandemic.16
These instances have also underscored the importance of reconfiguring the designs of modern hospital ships. For instance, the massive 1000-bed hospital ships of the US Navy including Mercy and Comfort, were originally oil tankers. The open-bay design and single ventilation system hindered infection control that was necessary for treating Covid-19 patients. As a result of this, the US Navy’s hospital ships were not successful in supporting America’s fight against the pandemic.
Similarly, during the 2004 Tsunami relief, USNS Mercy took five weeks to transit to the crisis location and could not participate in the immediate relief operations. Owing to these factors, US Naval officers have suggested smaller and faster hospital ships similar to China’s Peace Ark for replacing the ageing Mercy and Comfort in the US Naval fleet.17 The schematics and technical parameters that have been specified in the May 2022 RFI have indicated that India seeks to build a purpose-specific hull like that of China’s Peace Ark and induct it within four years after the finalisation of the contract with an Indian Shipyard.
Conclusion
The significance of hospital ships in navies has acquired greater strategic significance owing to changing maritime security dimensions. The threat to the coastal population from natural disasters, pandemics and other man-made calamities has increased substantially. Recent developments in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have also underscored the resurgence of great-power competition and the risk of state-on-state confrontation. In this context, the relevance of hospital ships to modern navies has risen considering their potential as combat enablers, first responders and symbols of the state’s soft power. As an emerging blue water navy, the national hospital ship provides great value addition to India’s maritime capability by serving as the flagship for projecting Indian soft power and as an auxiliary ship for augmenting Indian hard power across the IOR.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Lebanon is yet to witness the formation of a new stable government, two months after parliamentary elections.
The general elections held in Lebanon on 15 May 2022 failed to determine a clear winner, thus ensuring no end to the political uncertainty. Over a month after the elections, President Michel Aoun finally tasked the caretaker Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, with the responsibility of forming a new government. Mikati was backed by 54 out of 128 parliamentarians.1 While Nawaf Salam, Lebanon’s former ambassador to the United Nations, received 25 votes, 46 MPs abstained from naming any candidate.2
The elections happened at a time when the country is in the midst of a major economic and sectarian crisis. The elections sparked a ray of hope among the people that it could perhaps bring in some relief from the economic hardships and corruption plaguing the country. The government’s proposal to increase taxes on WhatsApp, gasoline and tobacco in 2019, triggered widespread protests which have continued to occur intermittently since then.
The formation of a stable government was also crucial as it can secure support from the international community. The United Nations, United States, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Lebanon’s former colonial power, France, have time and again emphasised that their support is conditional on the political leadership undertaking economic reforms at the earliest.
Parliamentary Elections 2022
Lebanon follows an open list proportional representation system to elect the 128 members of parliament for a four-year term.3 Its political system functions on confessional basis, which means that the key political positions such as that of the President (Maronite Christian), Prime Minister (Sunni) and Speaker of parliament (Shia) are reserved on religious and sectarian lines.
To form a new government, nationwide parliamentary elections were held on 15 May 2022. The voter turnout was recorded at nearly 50 per cent.4 The low voter turnout was surprising for many experts as they expected that protests and anger among the Lebanese citizens against the government will drive them to participate in the elections more vociferously.
In comparison to the 2018 election, the 2022 election registered a large number of candidates willing to contest for the opportunity to enter the parliament. According to the Interior Ministry, 718 candidates (20 per cent higher than the 2018 elections) and 103 lists of registered candidates contested in the elections, including 118 women candidates.5
The increase in the number of candidates (from 77 in 2018 election) and lists can be linked with the decision of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri to not contest the election, thereby providing space for independent and civil society list candidates to fight for the Sunni votes. Furthermore, political protests which have taken place in the country since 2019, gave rise to various local leaders entering the political scene, and have contributed to the increased number of candidates in this election.
The most surprising aspect of the election results was the decline in the number of seats of Hezbollah allies. Pro-Hezbollah independents and allies could secure only eight seats as compared to 15 in the 2018 elections. Although Hezbollah allies have lost their majority, the parliamentary seats of Hezbollah remain unchanged. This reveals a minor and temporary loss of popularity.6
Lebanese Forces, a Christian political party, and its allies won 21 seats, up from 15 in 2018. President Aoun’s Christian Free Patriotic Movement and its allies also registered a fall in their support and secured only 18 seats as compared to 29 in 2018.7 In addition, Saad Hariri’s surprising withdrawal from the election adversely impacted the performance of Future Movement Party which could only secure seven seats in comparison to 20 in the previous parliamentary election.
Though Hezbollah's allies have lost seats in the parliament, one should not undermine their role in government formation as Hezbollah and Amal together account for 28 seats (Hezbollah 13 and Amal 15) in the parliament. However, government formation will be a difficult task as none of the political parties or alliances has secured a clear majority in the new parliament.
With regard to Hezbollah, the election results also falsified the “predictions of mass voter desertion from the Shia camp” due to the economic meltdown.8 The improved performance of the civil society and activists also came as a pleasant surprise as they secured 13 seats, in comparison to one seat in the previous election (see Table 1). However, the gains of anti-Hezbollah opposition are insufficient to generate any major shift in the parliament.9
S. No.
Party
2018
2022
Change in Seats
1
Future Movement
20
7
13 -
2
Lebanese Forces + allies
15
21
6+
3
Kataeb
3
5
2+
4
Progressive Socialist Party + allies
9
8
1-
5
Independents
6
15
9+
6
Civil Society/Opposition
1
13
12
7
Free Patriotic Movement + allies
29
18
11-
8
Tachnag
----
3
3
9
Marada Movement
6
2
4-
10
Amal
17
15
2-
11
Pro-Hezbollah independents and allies
15
8
7-
12
Hezbollah
13
13
0
Source: “Lebanon Election Results 2022 in Full: Which Candidates and Parties Won?”, The National News, 17 May 2022.
What the future holds
There is no doubt that Lebanon needs a major economic and political overhaul to halt the ongoing systemic collapse, as has also been suggested by the UN, France and the IMF, time and again. However, large-scale changes cannot be expected from the new parliament. This is mainly because Lebanon’s traditional parties such as Hezbollah, Amal, Free Patriotic Movement and others are not ready to bring any major shift in their policy stance.10 They have constantly undermined the Lebanese economy by indulging in corrupt practices and financial mismanagement, which has resulted in a significant systemic degradation of the country. Furthermore, they have followed policies that have only benefitted the feudal warlords.
The parliamentary consultations to decide the new Prime Minister were held on 23 June 2022, over a month after the elections. On 29 June 2022, Mikati handed details of his government to President Aoun, which were leaked to the media. The media reports suggest that majority of ministers from his caretaker government have been included in the list of new ministers.
Notwithstanding the above, Lebanon is yet to witness the formation of a new stable government. Based on past experience, government formation process would not be easy and may take a lot of time. In addition, many experts feel that the new government will not help in reversing the country’s economic downturn.11 This is mainly due to the re-election of a majority of old political elites in the parliament, who were responsible for stalling political and economic reforms.12
The current parliament is highly fragmented on the basis of diverse opinions held by various parties. Even those who favoured Mikati during the parliamentary consultations differ on issues such as maritime negotiations with Israel and relations with the Gulf countries. Thus, confrontations on foreign and economic policy and other political matters can be expected. This will result in major policy paralysis at each stage of decision-making and implementation.
Furthermore, Hezbollah’s presence in the government can potentially discourage Saudi Arabia from extending economic support to Lebanon. It is no secret that Lebanon’s relations with Saudi Arabia remain tense owing to the Iranian influence in the domestic and foreign policy of the former. Thus, it seems that the parties which have extended support to Mikati, have merely done so for the sake of forming a government, with no intention of introducing the much-needed reforms in the country.
Along with the imperative of improving the economic condition of the country, a stable government in Lebanon is also the need of the hour in order to determine its relations with the Gulf countries. The latter will keenly observe the extent of Iranian influence on the functioning of the new government, which has been a major sore point in Lebanon and Gulf countries’ relations, particularly with respect to Saudi Arabia.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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