Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament Decision and Security Assurances
Mukesh Kumar
June 10, 2022
Ukraine’s security predicament in the face of the Russian military onslaught brings into focus the vacuity of big power security assurances in the absence of legally binding security guarantees and treaty commitments.
In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Soviet nuclear weapons were present on Ukrainian territory, apart from the territories of Belarus and Kazakhstan. These included more than 1,900 strategic warheads, 2,500 tactical warheads, 176 Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and 44 bombers. On 30 December 1991, 11 members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signed the Minsk Declaration on Strategic Forces, agreeing to give the Russian government authority over all the nuclear weapons stationed on their territory, as per Article IV.1 Earlier on 16 July 1990, Ukraine adopted a ‘Declaration of Sovereignty’ wherein it pledged ‘not to accept, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons’.2
Political and diplomatic efforts to remove Russian nuclear weapons from Ukraine began with the Lisbon Protocol of 1992. As part of the protocol, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan pledged to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and become members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).3 Ukrainian members of parliament, though, were divided over the merits of signing the Protocol and demanded the conferment of the status of temporary nuclear weapon state.
In April 1993, the Ukrainian parliament insisted on 13 pre-conditions for ratification of START.4 These pre-conditions included security assurances from Russia and the US, economic assistance for the dismantlement of the weapons, and Ukrainian control over a part of the arsenal. These demands were rejected by the US and Russia, with the US, instead, offering to provide additional financial assistance, over and above the US$ 175 million promised in 1992, as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) commitments for Ukraine’s denuclearisation.
In September 1993, Russia and Ukraine started bilateral negotiations on dismantlement of nuclear warheads.5 However, issues relating to assurances for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, costs of dismantlement of nuclear arms, among others, resulted in failure to conclude a final document. Subsequently, the ‘Trilateral Statement’ was signed along with the US on 14 January 1994, wherein Ukraine agreed for complete disarmament of strategic and tactical weapons, in return for economic and security assurances on accession to NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.6
Ukraine ratified START on 3 February 1994 (Kazakhstan had done so on 2 July 1992, and Belarus on 4 February 1993) but did not join the NPT, till December 1994, when the Budapest Memorandum was concluded, with the United Kingdom (UK) joining the US and Russia.
In the Budapest Memorandum,
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States reaffirm[ed] their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the final act of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the Ukraine.
They also reaffirmed
Their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine …7
While acceding to the NPT as a NNWS, Ukraine sought legally binding assurances from the US, Russia and the UK, which they were reluctant to give. These countries, however, reaffirmed their commitment to take actions at the UN Security Council (UNSC) in face of any external aggression and act of war against Ukraine.8
Security Assurances vs Security Guarantees
The charter of the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) or Helsinki Accords, from which the Budapest Memorandum took inspiration from, condemns external aggression and annexation of territory by force. Russia breached the Budapest Memorandum in 2014 with the annexation of Crimean peninsula by force.9 Russia has since maintained a heavy troop presence of more than 1,00,000 soldiers in Crimea.
The security assurances, instead of security guarantees, provided to Ukraine seems void, in the face of the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2022. It is pertinent to note that a former US Ambassador to Ukraine in 2014 had stated that ‘the Budapest Memorandum was not an agreement on security guarantees’.10
During the current conflict, the UN has been unable to take substantive action, in face of disagreement among its veto members. The UNSC has failed to adopt resolutions in its meetings held on the issue. The UNSC, meeting on 21 February, rejected Russia’s recognition of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk.11 After hostilities began, the UNSC on 25 February failed to pass a resolution on account of Russia’s veto power. Finally, on 27 February, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2623 calling for an emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to resolve the Ukrainian crisis.12 The resolution was passed by 11 votes in favour, Russia voting against and three abstentions (China, India and the United Arab Emirates).
On 2 March 2022, in the Eleventh Emergency Special Session, the UNGA passed resolution ES-11/1, titled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’, calling for an immediate ceasefire, provision of humanitarian aid and withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of Ukraine.13 Later, on 24 March 2022, UNGA passed another resolution titled ‘Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine’, with overwhelming majority, demanding civilian protection and humanitarian access.14
Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelensky, in a hard-hitting speech before the UNSC on 5 April 2022, charged the UNSC to either act or dissolve itself and asked—‘Where is the security that the Security Council must guarantee?’15 The US and UK, parties to the Budapest Memorandum, though, have helped in training, economic assistance, and providing arms to Ukraine.16
Conclusion
The inability of international organisations like the United Nations to effectively protect the security interests of weaker countries is starkly apparent. The Russian military action in Ukraine will have negative consequences for the sanctity of international order and peaceful resolution of border disputes. Ukraine’s security predicament in the face of the Russian military onslaught brings into focus the vacuity of big power security assurances in the absence of legally binding security guarantees and treaty commitments.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India–Bhutan Hydropower Cooperation and Bhutanese Economy
Opangmeren Jamir
May 26, 2022
Hydropower cooperation between India and Bhutan should not only help achieve the larger aspirations of the Bhutanese people for peace, prosperity and happiness but also further strengthen bilateral bonds.
India–Bhutan bilateral relationship has been based on ‘utmost trust’ and ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’, since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1968. To maintain the tradition of regular high-level exchanges, External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, visited Bhutan on 29–30 April 2022, at the invitation of his counterpart, Lyonpo Dr Tandi Dorji.1
Hydropower cooperation is an important feature of India–Bhutan bilateral relations. Since the first hydropower agreement (the Jaldhaka project) signed in 1961, a series of agreements have been signed over the years accelerating the pace of hydropower development.2 In July 2006, an agreement on ‘cooperation in the field of Hydroelectric Hydropower’ was signed.3 In March 2009, the protocol to the 2006 agreement was signed to help Bhutan install 10,000 MW by 2020. Subsequently, on 22 April 2014, the two countries signed the ‘Framework Inter-Government Agreement’, concerning development of ‘Joint Venture Hydropower Projects’.4
India has supported the development of hydropower projects in Bhutan through a mix of grants and loans and technical support relating to design and construction of the projects. Such arrangements were seen as a win-win arrangement for several decades. However, over the years, several pressing issues have emerged from the accelerated hydropower development approach.
Increasing Hydropower Debt
For Bhutan, hydropower is a ‘strategic renewable energy resource’. It has stimulated high economic growth and has been fundamental in achieving prosperity for its people. Bhutan has an estimated hydropower potential of 36,900 MW with annual production capability of 154,000 gigawatt hours.5 In 2020, the hydropower sector contributed 17.74 per cent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).6
Though India and Bhutan consider the development of hydropower projects as a win-win, the economic feasibility from the implementation of several projects remains a big concern, particularly on the part of the Bhutanese government. One of the major worries of Bhutan’s hydropower sector is the steep rise in public debt. As seen in Table1, there has been an increase in the debt to GDP ratio. As of 30 June 2021, the government debt was Nu. 238,398.910 million of which Nu. 17,074.437 million is internal debt and Nu. 221,324.473 million is external debt. According to a report by the Royal Audit Authority (RAA), the major portion of the debt relates to borrowings for hydropower loans, amounting to Nu. 162,359.048 million, which is 73 per cent of the total external debt for the financial year (FY) 2020–21.
India's role in providing financial and technical support for development is much appreciated. However, it has been seen that since 2007, the hydropower sector's financial performance is deteriorating.7 Several reasons have contributed to the decline of economic benefits. One reason that has been flagged is the change of the financing system of hydropower projects by India from a 60:40 model (60 per cent grants and 40 per cent loans) to a 30:70 model (30 per cent grants and 70 per cent commercial loans) (Table 2).8
Table 2: Financing Pattern in Hydropower Projects of Bhutan by India
Further, the commissioning of projects has been delayed, and massive escalations in the cost of construction of hydropower projects has also occurred. For instance, from an estimated cost of Rs 34 billion for the 1,200 MW Punatsangchhu-I, the cost went up to Rs 97 billion; for the 1,020 MW Punatsangchhu-II from an estimated cost of Rs 38 billion, it went up to Rs 74 billion.9
According to the 2017 report of the Bhutan Electricity Authority (BEA), one of the reasons for cost escalation in hydropower projects is the failure to take into account the inflation rate in the initial cost estimates.10 Besides, the report underscored the failure to undertake rigorous Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). Due to a major landslide in July 2013 at the site of the 1,200 MW Punatsangchhu-I project, not only was it delayed but the cost of the project increased as well.
Poor Employment Opportunities for Local Population
The development of hydropower projects is highly capital-intensive but only diminutive employment opportunities are available for the local populace, leading to discontentment. Such displeasure among the Bhutanese officials and communities is evident from the ongoing construction of the 600 MW Kholongchu hydropower project, a joint venture project of Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN) of India and Druk Green Power Corporation (DGPC) of Bhutan. Reports noted that the SJVN wanted to allocate the construction work to an Indian contractor with the Bhutanese side acting as a sub-contractor. On the other hand, the DGPC is against such rules as it will impact Bhutan’s capacity development.11
One of the main reasons behind the jobless growth in the hydropower sector for local population is the cheap and easy accessibility of both skilled and non-skilled workers, especially from India. For instance, in FY 2017–18, as shown in Table 3, of the total 54,972 foreign workers that were issued work permits, Indian workers represent the majority compared to other nationalities. For FY 2019–20, the import of foreign workers declined due to restrictions on mobility of workers in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Table 3: Work Permits Issued to Foreign Workers in Bhutan
Financial Year
No. of Foreign workers
No. of Indians issued work permit
2017–18
54,972
54,533
2018–19
50,057
49,677
2019–20
16,417
N.A.
2020–21
18,688
18,509
Sources: “Annual Reports”, Ministry of Labour and Human Resources, Royal Government of Bhutan; “Annual Report 2021”, Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan.
Conclusion
The model on which India–Bhutan cooperation operates seems to be unravelling and deeper introspection is necessary to address the emerging issues. During the Doklam stand-off, the Editor of The Bhutanese, Tenzing Lamsang, pointed out that though Doklam was a serious issue, for the Bhutanese, the decline of economic feasibility in the hydropower sector is more worrisome.12 Both India and Bhutan need to engage profoundly and consider the economic, social and environmental impact of the development of hydropower resources.
The idea of development in Bhutan is rooted in the overall development philosophy of Gross National Happiness (GNP).13 The guiding principles for Bhutan in harnessing hydropower resources has been ‘The Sustainable Hydropower Development Policy (SHDP) 2008’. Such policies have, however, led to a rise in debt from the hydropower sector and have provided few employment opportunities for local communities. As a result, SHDP 2021 was launched, which aims to “guide the overall development of Bhutan’s abundant hydropower resources in consonance with national economic development goal”.14 It is to be hoped that hydropower cooperation between India and Bhutan will not only help achieve the larger aspirations of the Bhutanese people for peace, prosperity and happiness but also further strengthen bilateral bonds.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1.“Press Release”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Government of Bhutan, 29 April 2022.
13. The concept of GNH has often been explained by its four pillars: good governance, sustainable socio-economic development, cultural preservation and environmental conservation.
Spain extending support to the 2007 Moroccan plan of granting an autonomous status to Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty is a significant foreign policy shift.
Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, was to have a referendum when the Spaniards chose to leave in 1975. The people of Western Sahara were to choose between independence or integration with Morocco. Due to the complex interplay of factors, the referendum could not take place and the region was controlled by Morocco and Mauritania. In 1979, Mauritania signed a peace deal with the Polisario Front (an independence movement led by the Sahrawi natives which was founded in 1973) and gave up its control over Western Sahara. Currently, Morocco controls over 80 per cent of the territory and contends that its jurisdiction over the region even predates the Spanish rule. Spain has remained neutral on the Western Sahara conflict all these years and has pushed for a political resolution which is mutually acceptable to the parties involved.
Spain announced a shift in its policy stance on Western Sahara on 18 March 2022 when the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez extended his support to the 2007 Moroccan plan of granting an autonomous status to Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. The Kingdom of Morocco welcomed this announcement by resuming diplomatic relations with Spain. In 2021, when Spain allowed Brahim Ghali (Polisario Front leader) to get medical treatment for COVID-19 on humanitarian grounds, it angered Morocco.
Reports note that it retaliated by recalling its Ambassador to Spain and loosening border controls, which resulted in the crossover of thousands of migrants into Spanish territories bordering Morocco.1 After the Spanish announcement, Spain–Morocco bilateral relations have stabilised. King Mohammed VI met the Spanish leader and they agreed to ease the year-long tensed diplomatic relations.
The decision to back Morocco is intriguing since Algeria, which supports the Polisario Front, is Spain's biggest natural gas supplier. Even as it is trying to reduce dependence on Russian gas, Spain has chosen to support the territorial claims of its strategic partner, Morocco, at the cost of its energy partner, Algeria.
Western Sahara has rich deposits of phosphate, iron ore and potash. Its significance can be ascertained from the fact that phosphate is an important ingredient in fertiliser production and currently, there is a worldwide shortage of phosphate fertilisers. Also, its vast coastline and access to fertile fishing grounds and offshore oil in the Atlantic Ocean adds to the strategic importance of this contentious territory.2
If Morocco’s sovereignty over this region is recognised by international actors and states, it would mean proximity to yet another Spanish autonomous territory, i.e., Canary Islands, and other important port cities like Ceuta and Melilla, bordering Morocco. During turbulent times, Morocco has often laid claims to Ceuta, Melilla, and parts of Canary Islands.
Prime Minister Sanchez asserts that this policy shift would bring “a new phase of bilateral relations” in the strategic partnership with Morocco, which is Spain’s economic and anti-terrorism partner in the African continent. Additionally, it is also responsible for preventing Sub-Saharan and Moroccan migrants from entering Ceuta and Melilla. In the joint statement issued on 7 April 2022, both countries agreed to focus on airspace management, joint demarcation of borders and resuming cooperation in energy, migration, industry and economic fields.3
Algeria’s Reaction
After Italy, Spain imports the largest quantity of gas from Algeria. The Spanish declaration therefore came as a shock to the Algerians, supporters of the Polisario Front. Algerian Foreign Ministry stated that it was “very surprised by the surprising statements” of the Spanish leadership and recalled its Ambassador, posted in Madrid, back to Algiers for consultations.4
Algeria’s state-owned energy firm, Sonatrach, is planning to stick to ‘fair moderate gas prices’ for all its customers, barring Spain. Going forward, Spain might see a recalculation of domestic gas prices, owing to the increased prices in the global energy market.5 Tensions in Spain–Algeria relations could benefit other European nations in their energy deals. For instance, Italy has signed a deal with Algeria, to procure 12 per cent of its gas demands, in addition to the current supplies, to ease its dependence on Russia.6
Spain was already shifting its dependence from Algeria to Liquefied Natural Gas imported from other countries. Spain has a vast coastline and six LNG regasification terminals, out of the 20 across Europe.7 It is importing LNG in large quantities from US, Qatar, Nigeria and others.
If the gas prices increase for the Spaniards, it will not be the first skirmish involving the supply of gas between the two countries. Out of the two gas pipelines from Algeria to Spain, Algeria had closed supplies in Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline, passing through Morocco, in November 2021, owing to heightened tensions over Western Sahara. This incident prompted Spain to realise that a heavy gas dependence of almost 50 per cent on Algeria is strategically non-viable.
Algeria could also decide to increase the price of gas passing through the undersea Medgaz pipeline. Algeria, though, must work towards increasing the capacity of the Medgaz pipeline (the only functional pipeline from Algeria to Spain), if it wants to be a reliable energy partner for European nations.
Domestic Reactions
Spain’s ruling coalition primarily comprises the Socialists and the far left Unidas Podemos, supported by a few regional parties. The biggest opposition is the conservative Popular Party, which has charged that Prime Minister Pedro took the step on account of pressure tactics by Morocco. They charge that to mend relations with one country (Morocco), the government has damaged Spain’s relations with three parties—Algeria, the Polisario Front and the Sahrawi people. Alberto Feijoo, a prominent leader of the Popular Party, criticised the executive for not informing the parliament before taking the decision.
Some elements within his coalition government do not see the need to break away from the country’s decades-old stance. Spain’s Deputy Prime Minister, Yolanda Diaz tweeted that she is fully supportive of a UNSC resolution which gives importance to “dialogue and respect for the democratic will of the Saharawi people”.8
Spain is facing the worst inflation in over three decades, with rising food and fuel prices. In 2021, fuel prices rose by over 72 per cent, the highest increase in Europe. With the shift in policy over Western Sahara getting prominence, Spaniards are questioning the need to antagonise Algeria, as it could increase the fuel costs further. Analysts note that the impact of this decision will be felt in the 2023 national elections.
The Socialist Party, enjoying maximum support from the electorate, represents the other side of the public opinion. Their supporters view this move by the Spanish government as a step towards enhancing Spain’s strategic relations. Morocco is a very important partner for Spain, from geographic and strategic perspectives. Those opposing the viewpoint of the Popular Party consider the recognition of Morocco’s 2007 plan to be in line with the UN’s policy on Western Sahara. They claim that Spain is trying to take a realistic view of the situation, which seems to be the only practical way to resolve it.
EU’s Reaction
The European Commission (EC) welcomed Spain’s policy shift and stated that it is a “serious, credible and realistic” solution to an issue that has been ongoing for decades now. The EC has supported the move as it improves the Euro-Moroccan partnership and enhances Spain’s bilateral ties with its strategic partner. The office of EU foreign policy Chief Joseph Borrell has also expressed support for the United Nations stance on this issue, which calls for a just, realistic, pragmatic, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution to Western Sahara.
The EU has not only welcomed the Spanish move but has been supportive of Germany’s tilt towards Morocco (on the same issue) as well. In fact, the first major power to recognise Morocco’s authority over Western Sahara was the United States. At the end of his tenure, President Donald Trump signed a deal with Morocco in December 2020 along with Israel, in return for Morocco mending ties with Israel. The three countries pledged to cooperate on matters of common interest and boost multilateral and bilateral ties.9 On Western Sahara, Morocco also enjoys the support of a few African and Arab nations.
Going Forward
The global rise in fuel prices has predominantly impacted Europe and Africa is turning out to be a promising supplier to the European gas market. While it cannot wholly replace Russian supplies, the geographical proximity of the continent has ensured that the strategic importance of Africa for Europe has increased manifold after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Spain is keen on normalising ties with Morocco and resuming the strategic bilateral partnership, since it cannot afford border tensions due to the migrant crisis. Externally, while the demarcation of land and sea borders will help resolve overlapping territorial claims between Morocco and Spanish islands and coastal cities, domestically, Prime Minister Sanchez will have to contend with voices opposed to his decision, especially so ahead of national elections next year.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Chinese News Media Narratives on the Ukraine Crisis
Mayuri Banerjee
May 17, 2022
The Chinese news media has peddled dual narrative of vilifying the West and glorifying China’s supposed mediatory role in the Russia–Ukraine crisis.
Prior to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, Western media outlets reported that the Chinese government circulated guidelines to Chinese news media agencies explicitly forbidding publication of anti-Russia or pro-Western content. The guidelines required these agencies to use only those hashtags approved by the three state news organisations—People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency and the state broadcaster, CCTV.1 A review of news reports in Chinese mainstream media like People’s Daily, CGTN, CCTV, Xinhua, People’s Liberation Army Daily and China News Service gives a sense of pro-Russian reportage.
In the initial phase of Russia’s military build-up near the Ukraine border, Chinese news media focused primarily on projecting Western interventionist approach and system of military alliances as the cause of the Russia–Ukraine tensions. They highlighted the purported divergences within major Western powers as a reflection of these countries’ unitary pursuit of geopolitical goals. Secondly, there was a marked eulogization of China’s supposed role as a force for stability in international politics.2
‘The West is Lying and is Divided’
Categorising US warnings of possibility of Russian invasion of Ukraine as “hype” and “propaganda”, Chinese news media charged the US of falsely exaggerating the risk of war and perpetrating tension and conflict in the region.3 An article in the Xinhua News Agency charged that the US supply of weapons to Ukraine under the pretext of Russian invasion was aggravating tensions between the two countries. It described NATO’s deployments to Eastern Europe in response to Russia’s military exercises as aggressive and warned the US not to ‘play with fire’.4
In the aftermath of the telephonic conversation between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on 27 January 2022, CGTN accused the Biden administration of causing panic and instigating conflict between Russia and Ukraine.5 An Editorial in CGTN stated that Russia made no military threat to Ukraine and instead accused the US and NATO of nibbling at Ukrainian territory to antagonise Russia.6 Several reports titled “Western politicians amplify the idea that Russia is about to ‘invade’ Ukraine”, “The United States continues to incite the Russian President”, “The US concocted fake news to exaggerate the ‘Russian threat theory’” across popular media outlets like China News Service, CCTV News, Caixin conveyed the narrative that alleged US threat-mongering was causing tensions in the region. Mutual distrust between Kiev and Moscow, existing acrimony over Crimea, and Russia’s support to Ukrainian separatists, among other issues, were left out of Chinese news media’s assessments of the crisis.
In the wake of Russian military build-up prior to start of hostilities, Chinese news media sought to portray Western countries as divided and only striving to secure their respective interests. An article in CGTN stated that the Ukraine crisis exposed the cracks within the Western alliance and had failed to forge consensus in their response to Russian policies. Highlighting the alleged depth of the disagreements, Chinese media reported not only on trans-Atlantic divergences between the US and its European allies but also on differences of opinion among the European countries themselves.7
An article published in People’s Liberation Army’s official media outlet, PLA Daily, argued that Germany and France, owing to their close economic cooperation with Russia “have a more rational attitude towards Russia, and have obvious differences with the United States on the Ukraine issue”. At the same time, it argued that “Lithuania and other Central and Eastern European ‘New European’ countries have obvious doubts and fears of Russia, and have adopted more radical pro-US policies in terms of security”.8Xinhua News Agency cited statements of American and European politicians to support the thesis. These statements included France’s call for dialogue with Russia, Germany’s reluctance to provide military aid to Ukraine and Croatia’s (a NATO member) suggestion to take into account Russia’s security considerations.9
It is noteworthy that this negative press coverage of West’s policy approach and response towards Russia–Ukraine crisis fits into the larger Chinese narrative about the superficiality of the West-led international order. For long, Chinese experts have contended that major Western powers under the garb of protecting rules-based international order are brewing instability across the world through military interventions and military alliances, driven by their geopolitical ambitions.10
In comparison, it is contended that Chinese foreign policy aims to forge consensus and stability through mediation and ‘win-win’ cooperation to shape global order. Incidentally, this narrative building has also constituted Chinese press coverage of several other events like the formation of the QUAD, the AUKUS submarine deal, and US withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that such type of narrative gained traction largely in response to the ‘China threat theory’ and a perceived need to promote Chinese perception of international relations that will enable the world to view China’s rise favourably.11
‘China is the stabilising force’
The Chinese news media’s coverage of the Ukraine crisis has highlighted alleged Western culpability while simultaneously emphasising Chinese efforts towards resolving the crisis in an effort to help project China in a positive light vis-à-vis the Western countries. With China calling for adherence to Minsk Agreements signed between Ukraine and Russia in 2015, the Chinese media projected Beijing’s stance as guided by the principles of non-interference.
After Blinken’s talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on 27 January 2022, CGTN suggested that while NATO was increasing tensions by reinforcing its military presence in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, China was “playing a constructive role in promoting peace and solidarity in the region, calling for all sides to remain calm and refrain from hyping up tensions”.12
After Russia launched the Ukraine invasion, the Chinese press carried limited coverage on Russian military operations and focused largely on Chinese efforts to mitigate the crisis. China Daily suggested in its editorials that Russia–Ukraine negotiations were being impeded by non-conciliatory stance of US and major European powers. Chinese calls for restraint and dialogue were contrasted with that of the US and the West, with commentaries arguing that the US was adopting hostile policy measures.
The provision of military aid to Ukraine by the US, among others and reinforcing of NATO’s presence in Eastern European countries and the Black Sea, were highlighted. Efforts by NATO members like Germany, France and Turkey to facilitate negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s reluctance to cease hostilities despite calls for the same were hardly highlighted in this context.
Conclusion
Despite strict censorship of Chinese media and control over the flow of information, reports flag that Chinese public opinion is deeply divided about the nature and extent of Chinese support to Russian actions.13 In the context of both countries professing strategic alignment in early February, the Chinese media’s explicit endorsement of Russia’s actions in Ukraine could have projected China as a co-collaborator to the international community.14
The Russian military intervention though challenged the Chinese narrative of the Western countries being the prime aggressors. The Chinese media has peddled the dual narrative of vilifying the West and glorifying China’s supposed mediatory role in the crisis, even as the war continues to rage in Ukraine. The Chinese media’s coverage of the crisis has been less about Ukraine and Russia and more about China and the West.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
11. William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?”, International Studies Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, December 2008, pp. 749–61. The China threat theory contends that China will use its rising economic and military profile to disrupt regional security orders and revise the international order in accordance with Chinese political values.
The Central Asian states have had to deal with significant economic and security challenges in the wake of the Russia–Ukraine conflict.
Russia enjoys significant economic, political and societal influence in Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.1 The region is highly dependent on Russia for its export routes, security assistance and labour markets.2 These factors have ensured that Central Asian states, known for their multi-vector foreign policies, have had to walk a tightrope regarding their stand on Russia’s ongoing ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine.
Central Asian countries have also been cautious in their stance on Russia’s past military activities in Crimea. All of these countries abstained in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on the issue.3 Kyrgyzstan was notable in taking a contradictory stand vis-à-vis Moscow with regard to recognising Viktor Yanukovych as the president of Ukraine.4 Kazakhstan was also the most active among these nations and even offered to host negotiations to resolve the issue.5 It further abstained in the UNGA on resolutions introduced by Ukraine demanding non-recognition of the changes in status of Crimea.6
In the current crisis, these states have taken a neutral stance. They have neither condemned Russia’s special military operation nor endorsed it.7 They also choose to abstain or not vote in all the UNGA resolutions.8 There was, however, one exception. On 8 April 2022, when the UNGA decided to vote out Russia from the Human Rights Council, four Central Asian states voted in support of Russia, apart from Turkmenistan.9
On 1 March 2022, Kazakh President Qasym-Jomart Tokayev, like his predecessor Nursultan Nazarbayev offered to act as a mediator to bring about peace in the region.10 Kazakhstan has also been vocal about its stand not to recognise the two breakaway regions of Ukraine—Luhansk and Donetsk.11 These policy measures are again reminiscent of its stance during the Crimean Crisis of 2014. While Kazakhstan has maintained a neutral stance diplomatically, its population has shown discontent towards Russian policies in the Ukraine crisis. Reports flag that the Kazakhs have a sense of fear that they could be the next post-Soviet state that could be in Russia’s radar.12 This fear stems from the presence of a Russian minority population in North Kazakhstan which borders Russia. Both Crimea and Donbas also have Russian minority population in their midst.
Russia’s involvement in the conflict has led to it being one of the most sanctioned nations in the world. These sanctions against the Russian economy will have direct implications for Central Asian states. Their economies are highly dependent on Russia for remittances, as well as for the strength of their currencies. Like most economies across the international arena, they have experienced the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, any impact on one of its major economic providers could have supplementary impact on their economies in the near future. According to the World Bank, due to the Russia–Ukraine crisis, Central Asian economy is forecasted to shrink by 4.1 per cent this year, compared to 3 per cent before the crisis.13 The currencies of states like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan dropped in value post the fall of the ruble, in the early period of the crisis.14
Investment projects funded by Russian banks under sanctions will have to be cancelled.15 Since Russia is heavily sanctioned, Russia’s flagship economic organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), of which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are a part of, could lose its relevance as the viable economic partner in the region in the long run.16
Several million Central Asian migrant labourers work in Russia, mainly from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.17 Due to the damage to the Russian economy, the income of the Central Asian labourers would be impacted, which would mean lesser chances of sending home remittances and reverse migration in search of livelihood. The money sent back home by the workers is crucial for the economies, and makes up 31, 27, and 12 per cent of their GDP, respectively.18 The World Bank estimates that the value of remittances from Russia would drop in Uzbekistan by 21 per cent, in Tajikistan by 22 per cent and by 33 per cent in Kyrgyzstan.19
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine could affect the region’s food security. On 10 March 2022, Russia temporarily banned the export of white sugar and grain crops to the EAEU countries.20 This could have an impact on Kazakhstan. Last year, Kazakhstan increased its grain purchases by 77 per cent, importing 2.3 million tonnes of grain, third only to Turkey and Egypt.21 Post the ban on export on Russian grains, Kazakh authorities have decided to ban wheat exports.22 This step is being planned to protect the domestic production and supply and to ensure that there is no shortage. Any shortage could lead to new protests and further fuel animosity towards the government that has already seen disapproval from the public just three months ago, on account of rising gas prices.
There could also be a trickledown effect towards other Central Asian states, particularly fellow EAEU country, Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan imports 90 per cent of its wheat from Russia and Kazakhstan.23 Therefore, any ban in both countries would impact the domestic supply for Kyrgyzstan. This could lead to Kyrgyzstan scrambling to find new countries for importing grains, at higher costs.
Security is another area of concern with the Russians pre-occupied in Ukraine. Central Asia is highly dependent on Russia for its security and this was evident in January when the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) troops were needed in Kazakhstan to quell protests that erupted due to high gas prices. In order to subdue the protests, the Kazakh government requested CSTO intervention. The coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan has created an unsettling feeling for Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan. With Russia pre-occupied in Ukraine, the fear of the revival of terror groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, or Islamic Jihadi Union could make Central Asia look for other options for security. Tajikistan, a member of CSTO, is highly dependent on Russia’s 201st Division in Tajikistan for its security. The presence of the Russian troops emboldens Tajikistan to stand up to the Taliban.24 Therefore, with Russia focused on Ukraine, Tajikistan in the immediate term could look towards other powers like China for assistance.
While the Russia–Ukraine conflict has affected the international arena in more ways than one, regionally, the impact has been quite significant on Central Asian countries, presenting them with economic and security challenges, over and above the challenges of dealing with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India and Australia need to take a leadership role in maritime security affairs in the two oceans and have deeper engagements with the Pacific and Indian Ocean island countries.
The Second India–Australia Summit, held on 21 March 2022, took stock of various new initiatives and mechanisms agreed under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), inked in June 2020.1 The relationship has been further bolstered by the signing of the India–Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (IndAus ECTA) on 2 April 2022 between the two Trade Ministers, in the presence of the respective Prime Ministers.2 The agreement is a major milestone that promises to propel bilateral trade to new heights and achieve ambitious targets for Indian and Australian economies.
India–Australia relations have indeed transitioned from a difficult past to a promising future. Till the year 2000, there was considerable cynicism between the two countries and lack of cooperation in most sectors, primarily owing to contrasting views on the commonwealth, India’s independent foreign policy and Cold War dynamics. When India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, Australia imposed tough economic sanctions, resulting in further deterioration of relations. Economic and trade cooperation as well as people-to-people links were also limited.
However, since 2000, the two countries began to forge an increasingly cooperative partnership, essentially driven by the changing regional landscape in Asia and China’s aggressive behaviour, as also improving India–US relations, as signified by the nuclear deal . Bilateral relations were further bolstered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia in 2014 and recent partnerships forged as part of the Quad meetings and other mini-laterals.
Virtual Summit
At the Virtual Summit on 21 March 2022, all areas of cooperation were discussed between the two leaders, and the key strategic and economic outcomes were highlighted in the joint statement.3 Regarding Indo-Pacific region, the two leaders expressed their shared commitment to free, open and rules-based order, supported by a robust regional architecture, and ASEAN centrality. On the Ukraine crisis, they expressed concern over the conflict and the resultant humanitarian crisis, as also emphasised on the importance of dialogue and diplomacy based on the UN charter, international law, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, to resolve the crisis. The leaders called for immediate cessation of violence against the civilian population in Myanmar, release of detained leaders there and unhindered humanitarian access. The two leaders committed to humanitarian assistance, adherence to counter-terrorism commitments and human rights in Afghanistan. Concerning South China Sea, both sides underlined the importance of freedom of navigation and over flight, consistent with international laws, particularly UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). It was announced that India will participate in the Indo-Pacific Endeavour Exercise 2022, which aims to promote security and stability in Australia’s near region through bilateral and multilateral engagement, training and capacity building.4.
On the economic front, Australia–India Infrastructure Forum was launched to enable Australian firms to explore India’s vast infrastructure opportunities. A new Consulate-General in Bengaluru was announced to help plug Australian businesses into India’s digital economy and innovation ecosystem.5 The Progress on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) was reviewed, with both sides committed to a full CECA by the end of the year. The two countries shared their commitment to cooperate on such aspects as critical minerals, and emphasised the need for resilient and sustainable supply chains for their transportation. An MoU was signed between Australia’s Critical Minerals Facilitation Office and Khanij Bidesh Ltd for joint cooperation on critical minerals. Further, Australia and India pledged to cooperate on research, production and commercialisation of clean technologies, critical minerals and energy.
Among other new declarations are the India–Australia Centre of Excellence for Critical and Emerging Technology Policy, to be set up in Bengaluru, and establishment of Gen Rawat India–Australia Young Defence Officers’ Exchange Programme. Australia committed the largest single investment in the bilateral relationship with India of about US$ 280 million across skills, diplomacy, clean technology, critical minerals and space exploration.6 Indian diaspora in Australia is more than 6 lakh people and about 1 lakh students, totalling about 3 per cent of the Australian population.
Convergences
Recent years have seen a significant transformation of the India–Australia strategic relationship. With CSP signed in June 2020, an array of institutional mechanisms have been initiated to promote bilateral cooperation, including Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation, Arrangement on Mutual Logistics Support, Framework arrangement for Cyber & Cyber Enabled Critical Tech Cooperation and MoU on Mining and Processing of Critical and Strategic Minerals. The inaugural 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue was held in September 2021 and the two Foreign Ministers have been meeting regularly. The two nations have a robust defence partnership. Besides dialogues, training and exchanges, they conduct regular joint military exercises, as also anti-piracy coordination and white shipping information sharing. Bilateral military exercises that have been conducted include AUSINDEX 2021, PITCH BLACK 2018 and AUSTRAHIND 2018.Australia has consistently supported India’s NSG membership, and permanent seat in the UN Security Council.7 India and Australia signed the civil nuclear agreement in 2014 and Australia made the first uranium shipment to India in 2017. However, trade in uranium since then has been lacklustre owing to issues regarding safeguards, and Australian domestic politics. 8
On multilateral issues, both countries are members of the Quad, along with Japan and the United States, and cooperate on various positive agendas relating to the Indo-Pacific. India and Australia have similar concerns vis-à-vis China’s coercive behaviour. Australia has pushed back on China’s aggressive trade barriers, and has called for independent investigation of COVID-19 origins. India, on its part, has given a strong response to China’s unilateral attempts to alter status quo on the Ladakh border.
India and Australia cooperate closely at ASEAN forums viz. East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, as also at G20, which India is going to host next year. The two countries have a robust issue-based trilateral mechanisms with Japan (since 2015), Indonesia (2017) and France (2020). Some multilateral initiatives where India has taken lead and the two countries cooperate are Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), Coalition of Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), and Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS) and International Solar Alliance (ISA). In the Indian Ocean, both countries engage with partners in forums at Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS); as also at many multilateral exercises, such as Malabar and now Talisman Sabre and Indo-Pacific Endeavour.
India and Australia have a shared vision on the Indo-Pacific. India’s approach to the region was articulated by PM Modi in 2018 through the vision of SAGAR9 (Security and Growth for All). To implement the vision of SAGAR, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) was launched in 2019.10. India has also strengthened its outreach with Pacific island countries, through FIPIC (Forum for India–Pacific Island Cooperation). Australia’s strategic view on Indo-Pacific is spelt out in 2020 Defence Strategic Update. Australia’s strategic objectives as defined in this document include –the shaping of strategic environment in the region, deterring actions that are against Australian interests and responding with credible military force, if required. South Pacific region is Australia’s primary area of influence and its deep engagement in the region is defined by the Pacific Step-up initiative, which was first announced at the Pacific Island Forum Leaders' Meeting in September 2016 as a 'step-change' in its engagement with the region.11
Divergences
While India and Australia cooperate on most areas, analysts observe that there are many issues of divergences also. Australia has looked at strategic and security issues through the lens of its US alliance, which has now got further strengthened with AUKUS deal, whereas India follows an independent foreign policy in international relations and tries to balance its strategic calculations. The two nations have differing views on Myanmar, for instance. For India, developments in Myanmar are a matter of strategic concern, due to its proximity to the country’s northeast region and militants operating from across the border. Australia, on its part, has strongly condemned the military coup and detainment of senior leaders. Australia’s response to the Ukraine crisis is aligned with its allies in West, while Indian response is based on its national interests and historic ties with Russia. Australia, just as India, Japan and many others, has realised the importance of self-reliance in defence manufacturing and resilient supply chains. Australia has increased its defence budget and is acquiring advanced weapon systems, including nuclear-propelled submarines and hypersonic missiles under AUKUS deal.12
The Promise of IndAus ECTA
Recognising that a free trade agreement between the two countries will usher in economic growth and build trust and respect, the two nations signed the historic IndAus ECTA on 2 April 2022.13 With ECTA in place, the trade is likely to increase from the current estimates of US$ 27 billion to about US$ 45–50 billion over the next five years, and is expected to create over 10 lakh additional jobs.14 The deal will eliminate tariffs on more than 85 per cent of Australian goods entering India and almost all Indian exports to Australia. Indian companies will get supply of energy and raw material, while Australia will get better access to the rapidly growing Indian market. Labour-intensive sectors in India like textiles, pharmaceuticals, etc., will create new jobs and Indian students and software professionals will benefit from the liberalised visa regime. In addition, the agreement will assist Indian finished product exports in petroleum, cosmetics, linen clothing, jewellery and furniture.
Way Forward
Being two major powers with shared interests, India and Australia can play a significant role in creating a strong and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. The Quad partnership must be leveraged and widened in its relevance and influence, by enhancing security and economic cooperation among the member nations. India needs to engage more proactively with ASEAN nations and give required assistance, including in the defence field, like in the case of the supply of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to Philippines. India and Australia need to take a leadership role in maritime security affairs in the two oceans, and have deeper engagements with the Pacific and Indian Ocean island countries. Joint defence manufacturing has a tremendous potential to be explored, leveraging Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative. Furthermore, broader long-term reciprocal access arrangements, similar to foundational agreements with US, can be looked at to emphasise real-time maritime domain awareness and information sharing, besides interoperability and operational coordination. Close cooperation in critical emerging technologies will be a win-win for both countries, for example in fields of Artificial Intelligence, semiconductors, drones, 6G, blockchain, etc. While the ECTA has been inked, CECA should be concluded at the earliest. Some other focus areas can be enhanced trade in uranium under the rubric of civil nuclear cooperation and joint infrastructure connectivity projects.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Russia’s military action in Ukraine has negatively impacted the cooperative engagement architecture of the Arctic Council.
The Arctic region witnessed extensive militarisation during the Second World War. In the Cold War period, despite military exercises conducted by rival blocks—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact countries—the Arctic remained stable without any confrontation. In fact, the 196-km border between the Soviet Union and Norway (the only NATO-member country to share a border with the Soviet Union) remained peaceful throughout the Cold War. In 1987, with the Cold War in its end-phase, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in his famous ‘Murmansk Speech’, called for the Arctic as a ‘Zone of Peace’ and emphasised the need for cooperation in the region. 1
Gorbachev’s vision was reciprocated by the West. The first environmental cooperative initiative, called the ‘Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy’ (AEPS), was signed by eight Arctic states in 1991.2 AEPS was the initiative of government of Finland that resulted in successful conclusion of various cooperative measures to protect the Arctic environment. 3 These eight Arctic states in 1996 signed the Ottawa Declaration which led to the establishment of the Arctic Council.4 Since its formation, the Arctic Council has become an important forum for addressing issues of environment, sustainable development and purveying the socio-economic context in the region.5 The Arctic Council is the most important intergovernmental forum for cooperation between the Arctic states in the high north. The working of the Arctic Council is executed through its six working groups and the decision making within the Council is based on ‘consensus basis’.
In February 2022, as a result of Russia’s military action in Ukraine, the seven Western Arctic states (A7), 6 five of which are members of NATO,7 have issued a joint statement to ‘temporarily pause’ their participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies.8 These states argued that the Arctic Council works on the fundamental rules of international law, and Russia, which currently holds the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, has violated it. While describing the action as 'regrettable', Russia, in response, highlighted that the Arctic Council has remained depoliticised, despite the past geopolitical issues.9
The A7’s decision could have serious implications for the Arctic. First, all the eight Arctic states are at close geographical proximity to one another. Even a temporary suspension of the Arctic Council could challenge its established credibility and decision making. This could enhance geopolitical competition by superseding the existing scientific cooperation, consensus on environmental concerns and other mutually agreed solidarities between the states in the region.
Second, the Arctic contains multiple existing issues of territorial sovereignty, resource exploitation and disagreements over national/international shipping routes. Suspending the working of the Arctic Council would terminate the existing cooperation, resulting in unwanted strategic competition in the region. Furthermore, in order to protect their own self-interests in the Arctic, a potential military build-up can be expected.
Third, Russia holds the largest territorial and coastal extent in the Arctic. It remains the only state with strong Arctic infrastructure and military capabilities. The Russian Arctic accounts for almost half of the total Arctic population living in the region.10 If the current situation prevails or the A7 countries consider forming any new alliance or forum without Russia, it would polarise the Arctic region, which could lead to dangerous outcomes. Similarly, any such alternative approach/alliance by Russia with non-Arctic states, would further challenge the existing cooperation in the region.11
Fourth, the issue of climate change is serious in the Arctic, where the global warming is occurring at thrice the average normal. Suspension of all established cooperation with Russia through Arctic Council, would seriously affect academic and scientific engagements between states on climate research in the region.
Fifth, the Arctic Council has become successful in negotiating three important legally binding agreements in the region. These include ‘Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation’,12‘Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response’,13 and the ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic’.14 Also, all the Arctic states have successfully concluded an ‘International Agreement on Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean’.15 As a counter measure to A7’s decision on the Arctic Council, Russia may consider withdrawing from these important agreements in the Arctic, which would further lead to greater insecurities in the region.
Sixth, apart from the Arctic permanent states, there are 13 non-Arctic observer states in the Arctic Council.16 Though these states remain outside the decision-making process of the Council, they are actively engaged in the various working groups of the Council. Asian observers such as India, China, Japan, Singapore and South Korea face vulnerabilities as a result of climate change in the Arctic. A pause in the Working Groups of the Arctic Council will have significant implications for the ongoing and future projects undertaken by these states.
Finally, the ongoing debate within the Finish and the Swedish parliaments to join NATO membership will make the revival of the Arctic Council difficult, if not impossible. As and when these two Arctic Council members join NATO, it will have significant geopolitical repercussions for the region. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, has already warned of Russia’s nuclear and hypersonic deployments, if Finland and Sweden secured NATO membership.17
Conclusion
The Arctic Council, till recently, has proved itself to be a successful model of cooperation. Security issues were consciously kept away from the charter of the Arctic Council. The heightened political contestations in the wake of Russia–Ukraine war could radically alter the spirit as well as structure of the Council. With Finland and Sweden seeking membership of NATO, the situation in the region will, in all likelihood, aggravate further. How the Arctic Council responds to these developments and whether it will remould itself is a moot question.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. The eight members of the Arctic Council are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States.
16. The non-Arctic Observer states are France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, China, Poland, India, South Korea, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
What Viktor Orban’s Landslide Win Means for the European Union?
Swasti Rao
April 21, 2022
The Orban government’s foreign and domestic policies will continue to be under the EU’s scanner, as it seeks to ramp up pressure on Russia for precipitating the worst security crisis that Europe is witnessing after the Second World War.
Viktor Orban, the longest-serving head of government in the European Union (EU), won the national elections in Hungary for the fourth consecutive term on 4 April 2022. However, Orban’s victory speech created resentment throughout Europe where he hit out not only at “opponents”, but also took a dig at “Brussels bureaucrats” and Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelensky.1 His controversial speech seemed even more vexing because it came shortly after the West had reacted strongly to the Bucha atrocities in Ukraine.2
To add to the EU’s consternation, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his congratulations to Orban, a long-term Kremlin ally, and pledged to further develop bilateral ties, despite Hungary’s support for EU sanctions against Russia.3 As a member of both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU, Hungary has treaded the fine balance between condemning Russia’s invasion and backing EU sanctions. It is opposed to a ban on Russian energy imports and has agreed to pay for the same in rubles.4
Orban’s fourth landslide win will have implications for how the EU retains its unity as a bloc while simultaneously co-opting fissures with countries like Hungary.5 Luxembourg’s representatives have previously stated that Hungary should not be in the EU anymore,6 which Hungary dismissed as ‘Hungarophobia’.7
Orban’s Hold on Hungary’s Electorate
Orban’s long political career is rife with allegations of corruption and suppression of democratic values. Despite such record, he has been able to win successive elections. It is interesting to note that for the first time, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) had deployed a full-scale mission involving over 200 observers to Hungary for the election.8 These international observers raised concerns regarding electoral conditions being tilted in favour of Orban’s government.9 In the 2022 elections, Orban’s party Fidesz (in alliance with KNDP), got 53 per cent of votes compared to the opposition coalition, which got only 35 per cent.10 Although some of the factors discussed below have put him in an advantageous position, they have also alienated Hungary from EU policies.
Orban’s electoral base: Apart from Christian, conservative and patriotic values that Fidesz espouses, labour law deregulation and extensive social welfare schemes have helped Orban secure his electoral base among the middle and lower middle class.11 The government’s low corporate tax rates have attracted investment, which has helped reduce unemployment from 11 per cent when he took office in 2018 to 3.4 per cent before the pandemic.12
Favourable Electoral System: Fidesz drafted a new electoral system after a two-third majority in the 2010 elections allowed it to make constitutional amendments.13 The Hungarian national assembly has 199 members out of which 106 are elected by ‘first past the post’ system in single member constituencies and the remaining 93 are decided by proportional representation system. This system gives advantage to larger parties like Fidesz at the expense of smaller parties, which has enabled Fidesz to win 68 per cent of the seats (135 seats) with just 53 per cent of the vote this time. Another factor that helps Orban is the support of the large expatriate Hungarian community to whom Orban has granted citizenship.14
Media freedom in Hungary: State-owned media in Hungary is pro-government and private media is also in the hands of pro-government oligarchs.15 In 2018, Orban created the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), an organisation that brings together the main media in the country. In effect, Orban has created a media empire with hundreds of outlets that coordinates content in favour of the government.16
Favourable Judicial system: Orban has also reshuffled the judicial system to his advantage by creating a parallel court system to deal with controversial issues like human rights, free and fair elections, refugee asylum and political protests, where judges are appointed by the government.17
Weak opposition: Major opposition parties like MSZP, DK and Parbeszed formed a coalition pact in 2014 to challenge Fidesz, but won only 25 per cent vote then. The coalition expanded the alliance by adding the green party and post-communist left-wing parties but could not build consensus to navigate the country’s economic or foreign and security policies.18 The leader of the united opposition in 2022 was Peter Marki-Zay (a small-town mayor without party affiliation) who campaigned on a broad anti-corruption and human rights agenda based on furthering cooperation with the EU. His sole criticism against Orban was that the latter had driven Hungary to isolation within the EU. Orban, to an extent, reaped electoral advantages by showcasing his government as the saviour of Hungarian people by ensuring uninterrupted supply of Russian gas and oil by staying neutral. Hungary is hugely dependent on Russia for its energy.19 Hungary, for instance, decided not to send troops or weapons or allow for weapon transit to Ukraine, claiming that such a decision might put the country and its people at huge risk.20
Fissures with the European Union
Orban-led Hungary has been locked in a struggle with Brussels over its actions that according to the EU, undermine basic democratic rights. Orban’s crackdown on the media, NGOs, his government’s policies on migrants and the LGBTIQ community, as well as charges of cronyism and corruption, have generated concerns from the EU.21 The OSCE had described the 2014, 2018 and the 2022 Hungarian elections as not fair, even if free.22
Two days after Orban’s win, the European Commission launched the EU’s new rule-of-law disciplinary procedure for the first time against Hungary.23 The hitherto untested conditionality mechanism, which was agreed by all 27 EU member states in 2020, is a new tool for protecting the EU's financial interests against breaches of rule of law inside a member state.24 The context was the economic pain inflicted on the EU economy by the COVID-19 pandemic for which a € 750 billion fund was set up to accelerate recovery. This fund, financed through common debt, was negotiated in parallel to the € 1.1 trillion seven-year EU budget.25 Countries like Poland and Hungary have been suspected of democratic backsliding and are currently also under the Article 7 procedure, which remains stalled as the two countries have promised to veto each other's file.26
The European Commission also has long-standing concerns regarding Hungary's judicial independence and systemic corruption.27 European Anti-Fraud office (OLAF) ranks Hungary at the top in the list of countries exhibiting irregularities involving EU funds.28 These considerations have prevented the EU from approving Hungary’s national recovery fund, amounting to € 7.2 billion in grants. In a counter-measure, Hungary’s finance ministry has been quick to reach out to investors and announce that this mechanism would not make Hungary lose out on money.29
Hungary’s Policy on China
Hungary has built close ties with China through the "Eastern Opening" policy in order to attract investment and economic opportunities. The ‘Eastern Opening’, introduced at the beginning of 2010, was supposed to attract capital from China to counterbalance that from the EU but it has not delivered as per expectations.30 It must be noted that Hungary is also among China’s closest partners in the latter’s ambitious 17+1 format (now 16 +1). One of the reasons why Chinese investments in Hungary have not lived up to expectations is the underperformance of China’s 17+1 arrangement in Central Europe which got marred by unfulfilled projects.31 In 2020, Hungary formally questioned the capability of the EU and the West to provide adequate humanitarian aid, stating that China would be a better partner.32 In a bid to further appease China, Hungary became the first and the only EU country to approve Chinese vaccines.33 In a first-ever for an EU country, Orban’s government signed an agreement with Shanghai-based Fudan University in April 2021 to build a campus at a disputed site in Budapest, sparking fears that it will help Beijing increase its influence in Hungary and the EU.34 However, contrary to Hungary’s initial hopes and appeasement, the partnership with China has not become a viable alternative to the West and the EU remains the biggest trading partner for Hungary. Most of Hungary’s exports go to the EU and the share of EU members in Hungary’s exports has been more than 75 per cent in the last couple of years.35
Therefore, both China and Russia have been additional foreign policy openings for the Orban government for balancing strained relations with the EU and countering the narrative of an isolated Hungary within the EU. Despite close economic ties with China, Hungary wants to pursue economic benefits flowing from EU membership as well. Hence, Orban’s government is treading the double path of wanting to benefit from the EU’s economic architecture, while pursuing close economic relations with China and also maintaining neutrality towards Russia—a policy that has often placed Hungary at loggerheads with the EU.36
Conclusion
Orban’s electoral victory will have implications for European politics and specially, EU unity. The Russia–Ukraine War is fundamentally altering the geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of Europe. Hungary’s relations with Slovakia, the Czech Republic and even Poland, which so far has been a staunch regional ally of Hungary, have come under pressure over the last few weeks because of the clash of views over Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Czech Republic and Poland, for instance, cancelled their participation in the March 2022 defense ministers’ meeting between the Visegrád 4 nations over Hungary’s stand on Russia. Pressure will mount on Orban to mend ties with Central Europeans allies, to consolidate Hungary’s position within the EU with regard to getting their support on Article 7 proceedings.
The Orban government’s foreign and domestic policies will continue to be under the EU’s scanner, as it seeks to ramp up pressure on Russia for precipitating the worst security crisis that Europe is witnessing after the Second World War.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
5. It is to be noted that the EU also has had problems with Poland regarding the independence of Polish Courts but Poland’s stance towards Russia in the Ukrainian crisis has been in solidarity with the EU’s official stand, hence the only country that has challenged the official EU stand remains to be Hungary.
Japan in India’s Northeast: The Indo-Pacific Connect
Titli Basu
April 19, 2022
Japan is likely to play a decisive role in positioning Northeast India as a powerhouse through improved connectivity, opening up trade corridors and driving better economic integration.
Major powers often leverage infrastructure financing as a consequential geo-economic tool of statecraft. China’s grand design of Belt and Road Initiative prompted high power politics, and the competitive space of infrastructure financing has seen alternative solutions, including Japan’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI), US-led Blue Dot Network, G7’s Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership and the European Union’s Global Gateway.
Making its mark, Japan’s instrumental role in global norm-setting vis-à-vis quality infrastructure1 is effectively demonstrated, be it in the G7 Ise-Shima Principles2 or the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment endorsed at the Osaka Summit. Openness, transparency, economic efficiency taking into account life-cycle cost, and debt sustainability drive Japan’s quality infrastructure strategy as it responds to Beijing’s global infrastructure agenda.3
Much before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in its 2017 projections indicated that developing Asia requires to invest US$ 1.7 trillion every year in infrastructure until 2030 to maintain its economic growth and to manage poverty alleviation and climate change. Infrastructure financing in emerging economies of South and Southeast Asia serves the dual objectives of generating new growth frontiers for Japanese economy by seizing the global infrastructure market on the one hand and buttressing strategic partnerships to manage the rise of a Sino-centric order on the other.4
Quality Infrastructure: Positioning Japan in Global Norm-setting
Japan’s global pitch for quality infrastructure is embedded in five principles which entails: (a) effective mobilisation of financial resources through public–private partnerships; (b) alignment with development strategies of emerging economies; (c) maintaining high-quality rules for environmental and social standards; (d) ensuring quality infrastructure by way of economic efficiency, low life-cycle cost, inclusiveness, resilience, sustainability; and (e) contribution to the local economy.5
In policy conversations, infrastructure exporthas remained a central pillar in Japanese economic growth strategy. The “Infrastructure System Overseas Promotion Strategy (2021–2025)”not only advances the strategic objectives of Japan’sFree and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and strives to promote Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in partner countries, but also pursues the objective of economic growth through carbon neutrality and digital transformation.The aim is to co-create development models with partner countries that share Tokyo’s FOIP vision.6 It advocates involvement in operation and maintenance (O&M) of infrastructure rather than just one-off sales.
Additionally, the concept of “quality growth” constitutes the mainstay of Japan’s 2015 Development Cooperation Charter.7 Meanwhile, Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) in its policy proposal “Towards Strategic Promotion of the Infrastructure Export” simultaneously argued the case of leveraging high-quality and disaster-resilient features of Japan's infrastructure systems while identifying Asia, and especially countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, India and Myanmar as the priority regions.8
Mapping Japan in India’s Infrastructure Modernisation
The External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar has underscored that economic development is propelled by 3Cs: connectivity, commerce and contacts. The latest Economic Survey estimates suggest that for India to realise the goal of US$ 5 trillion Gross Domestic Product by 2025, it has to spend roughly US$ 1.4 trillion on infrastructure.9 To this end, Gati Shakti, the National Master Plan for Multi-modal Connectivity will be a force multiplier as India aims to streamline implementation of infrastructure connectivity. As India mobilise resources, the goal is to plug into the regional value chains and production networks.
However, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s 2021 Asian Infrastructure Finance Report underscored that India stands 7.4 per cent below the average global value chain participation rate for emerging economies.10 Participation in global value chains will be contingent on improved infrastructure, bolstering institutional quality, capacity, connectivity and competitiveness.
Japan’s infrastructure export policy aligns perfectly with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Make in India’ policy as it seeks to be the epicentre of global manufacturing. This necessitates offering world-class infrastructure and improving investment climate. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been an enabler in advancing quality infrastructure and modernising connectivity within India and beyond. India has been a beneficiary of Japan’s EPQI initiative which committed financing of about US$ 200 billion in 2016 for a period of five years.11
Japanese ODA not only played an instrumental role in mega-infrastructure projects, be it Mumbai–Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail, Delhi–Mumbai and Chennai–Bengaluru Industrial Corridors, Dedicated Freight Corridor and urban mass rapid transport systems, it is also a force multiplier in India’s strategic peripheries. Furthermore, Japan features as the right fit in India’s regional infrastructure and connectivity pursuit, be it the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) or Coalition for Disaster-Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) announced at the UN Climate Action Summit in 2019.
Japan in India’s Northeast
Building beyond the history of “Imphal Campaign”, today Japan is an indispensable partner as India advances regional infrastructure and connectivity corridors, especially in the Northeast strategic frontier over the Bay of Bengal to the Indo-Pacific. As India connects with Southeast Asia, Northeast is the crucial geostrategic plank bordering China and Bhutan in the north and Bangladesh and Myanmar to the west and east. It is the key theatre where India’s Act East traverses with Japan’s FOIP vision.
Driven by Northeast’s strategic significance, Prime Minister Modi has turned around the discourse on ‘tyranny of distance’ and mainstreamed the region in Delhi’s Act East Policy.12 The discussion on Northeast industrial corridor from Dawki (on Bangladesh border), Shillong via Guwahati to Nagoan and from Golaghat via Dimapur via Imphal to Moreh (on Myanmar border)13 paves the gateway to Southeast Asia, as it would facilitate seamless connectivity, and position India favourably in regional value chains and production networks. Meanwhile, the NITI Forum for Northeast is geared towards inclusive and sustainable economic growth in the region. As such, the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) has set up the Make-In-North-East Initiative with a dedicated Northeast Desk within Invest India.14
Northeast is being prioritised in the developmental agenda since it holds the potential to emerge as the growth engine of India. However, this demands significant infrastructure investment. As India seeks support from multilateral and bilateral funding agencies to drive innovation and imbibe international best practices, Japan has emerged as a trusted partner. Prioritising Northeast in India–Japan relations is driven by the constructive leadership of Prime Minister Modi and former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo keeping the broader Indo-Pacific strategic vision into consideration. Japanese ODA is playing a crucial role in advancing connectivity in the strategic periphery of Northeast India.
Moreover, Japan’s engagement with Northeast India remains steadfast, and sometimes as argued by Japanese scholars, shaped by “common history”. 15 The World War II connects Northeast India with Japan in a “personal and emotional way” drawing from the “shared historical experience” as many Japanese soldiers not only arrived but also lost their lives in the Northeast.16 Today, Japan’s role in the Northeast is not restricted to infrastructure and connectivity but a greater investment in deepening people-to-people contact, from skill development, IRIS programme and capacity building to peace museum demonstrates the importance Tokyo attaches to this region of India.
Institution of the Act East Forum in 2017 has delivered effectively in positioning Northeast India as a strategic priority in India–Japan strategic partnership. The recent launch of the Sustainable Development Initiative for the North Eastern Region during Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to India adds qualitative depth to India–Japan cooperation as it not just prioritises connectivity projects and capacity building for the maintenance of resilient mountainous highways but also developing agro-industries mainly through small and medium enterprises (SMEs), supporting bamboo value chain, advancing skill development, strengthening quality healthcare, renewable energy and conservation.17 Japan’s current ODA projects in this region amounts to around ¥ 246 billion.
India’s Northeast: Gateway to Indo-Pacific
India is acting east with a sense of urgency to accelerate regional connectivity corridors, particularly via Bangladesh and Myanmar. As India and Japan make concerted efforts towards promoting regional connectivity and infrastructure through Northeast India (see Map 1), it would be practical to further create synergy with complementary ADB projects.18
Map 1. Mapping Japan in India’s Regional Connectivity and Infrastructure Projects Source: Prepared by GIS Lab, MP-IDSA based on data drawn from Act East Forum, Japan International Cooperation Agency and Asian Development Bank. [Click on Image for Larger View]
ADB supports India’s regional connectivity agenda, especially linking North Bengal and Northeast of India under South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) programme. SASEC aims to connect Kathmandu (Nepal)–Kakarbhitta (Nepal)–Panitanki (India)–Phulbari (India)–Banglabandha (Bangladesh)–Mongla/Chittagong (Bangladesh), and Thimphu (Bhutan)–Phuentsholing (Bhutan)–Jaigaon (India)–Changrabandha (India)–Burimari (Bangladesh)–Mongla/Chittagong (Bangladesh). Some SASEC corridors in Bangladesh and India connect with some parts of the Asian Highway 1 and 2 to Myanmar.19 In the period 2011–2020, 66.2 per cent of Japanese ODA was directed towards the transportation sector.20 The transportation sector is being prioritised both by JICA and ADB, thus creating synergy will reinforce the goal of linking India to South and Southeast Asian markets.21 Working together with Japan will buttress global standards of transparency and economic sustainability.
India’s aim is to facilitate deeper economic linkages and integration between Northeast India and Southeast and East Asian economies through various cross-border infrastructure corridors such as SASEC, Asian Highways, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Project, and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and its potential eastward extension. Furthermore, Japan’s own infrastructure and connectivity projects in Southeast Asia, the East–West Economic Corridor and the Southern Economic Corridor could be effectively utilised to reach regional markets.
Advancing regional connectivity and infrastructure development would be a shot in the arm amid COVID-19 recovery driving productivity, competitiveness, market access, economic growth and employment amongst developing Asian economies. Japanese ODA complements India’s North Eastern Region Vision 2020, and reinforces intra-regional and inter-regional connectivity both from geostrategic and geo-economic perspective. In future, Japan will play a significant role in addressing the infrastructure-deficit, and help India alleviate the development gap by positioning Northeast as a powerhouse through improved connectivity, opening up trade corridors and driving better economic integration.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
21. Titli Basu, “Infrastructure Financing and Institutional Statecraft: Japan’s Role in India’s Modernisation”, in Jagannath Panda, ed., Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond 2025: Corridors, Connectivity and Contours, KW Publishers, 2019, pp. 195–218.
India-Japan Relations, Northeast India, Indo-Pacific, India, Japan
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has put Kazakhstan’s foreign policy to a severe test. Though there are similarities between Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the NATO factor doesn’t exist in the case of the latter. In Kazakhstan’s approach to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, it is possible to discern a distinct tilt towards Russia.
Kazakhstan can be a good starting point for studying the impact of the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict on the Central Asian States (CAS). It is the only CAS sharing a land boundary with Russia, stretching almost 7,644 kilometres, and has a sizeable Russian minority on its territory. The Kazakh situation is somewhat analogous to Ukraine regarding the concentration of ethnic Russians in northern Kazakhstan, adjoining Russia, mirroring eastern and southern parts of Ukraine.
Declining Ethnic Russian Population
Kazakhstan's demography in the country as a whole has changed since it became independent in 1991, with the proportion of Kazakhs rising steadily.1 In 1989, ethnic Russians were 37.4 per cent of the population, which was almost equal to ethnic Kazakhs at 39.6 per cent.2 However, by 2016, the Russian population in Kazakhstan had declined to about 21 per cent.3 The share of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan’s population is now estimated at only 18 per cent of 19 million.4
Notwithstanding the change in the composition of Kazakhstan’s population on account of the emigration of Russians5 and the inflow of expatriate Kazakhs into the country, the situation in northern Kazakhstan is different,6 with ethnic Kazakhs being a minority at 35.03 per cent of the population in this region. On the other hand, ethnic Russians in northern Kazakhstan are estimated at 49.53 per cent.7 The sizeable Russian landmass nearby may be the cause of a minority syndrome in the Kazakh majority of Kazakhstan. Russians in northern Kazakhstan could look towards Russia to protect their interests, creating a feeling of vulnerability among Kazakhs. On 10 June 1998, the Government of Kazakhstan had transferred the national capital from Almaty, located on the southern periphery, to Astana in central Kazakhstan, perhaps with the intention of reinforcing the government’s authority over the entire territory of the country from a more central location.
Kazakh National Sentiments
Periodic statements made by influential Russians suggesting that Kazakhstan was an artificial construct have not helped. On 29 August 2014, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said Kazakhs never had any statehood.8 On 10 December 2020, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Chairman of the Education and Science Committee of the Russian Duma, said that much of Kazakhstan's territory was a great gift from Russia and the Soviet Union.9 Nikonov also said, “northern Kazakhstan was not inhabited at all. Kazakhs had existed, but much further to the south”.10 On 15 December 2020, the Former Kazakh President Nazarbayev reacted angrily and the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) delivered a note of protest to the Russian Embassy.
In his address to the nation on 21 February 2022, President Putin had rejected the notion that Ukraine ever had “real statehood” and claimed that Ukraine had always been a part of Russia’s “own history, culture, spiritual space”.11 When provoked, Kazakhs have appeared eager to defend their distinct identity. In 1986, the Soviet leadership had replaced long-standing General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Dinmukhamed Kunaev with the non-Kazakh, Gennady Kolbin (a Russian). Although the widespread protests were suppressed, the Soviet leadership replaced Kolbin with ethnic Kazakh Nursultan Nazarbayev.
In recent times, issues relating to China have also been expressed. In 2016, protests had targeted the draft bill, which would have allowed the leasing of land by foreigners for 25 years. These protests were mainly aimed at Chinese nationals, increasingly visible in the country. In May 2018, the Kazakh President Tokayev signed a bill into legislation banning the sale and leasing of agricultural land to foreigners.12 With this law, Kazakh leadership hoped to adequately address public anger about Chinese entrepreneurs grabbing land in the country. Moreover, in April 2020, Kazakh MFA protested to the Chinese Ambassador after a Chinese website (Sohu.com) wrote that Kazakhstan had been a "vassal of the Qing dynasty".13
Russia and Stability in Kazakhstan
While Kazakh nationalism manifests itself from time to time in various forms, the paradox is that Kazakhstan’s leadership may be dependent on Russia for its survival in extreme situations. In January 2022, there were violent demonstrations in Kazakhstan in response to the government's decision to lift the price cap on liquified petroleum gas from 1 January 2022.14 The protests started in the oil-producing city of Zhanaozen and spread to other cities, including the largest city, Almaty, and acquired a political dimension. Responding to Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s request, the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) deployed troops to support the Kazakh Government. The protests were believed to have led to over 200 deaths.15
Apart from Russia, China with its comprehensive capabilities, has a big presence and stakes in Central Asia and Kazakhstan and therefore its conduct in this crisis is of interest. China has both extensive commercial interests in the country and security concerns on account of Uyghurs and other cross-border ethnic linkages. While China is an influential player in Kazakhstan, initially, it kept a low profile during the January 2022 crisis.16 However, after President Tokayev's speech on 7 January 2022 blaming terrorists trained abroad for the violence, China’s President Xi Jinping offered support to put down the attempt to engineer a 'colour revolution' in Kazakhstan. In the end, China should have been satisfied with the intervention by Russia and CSTO in support of the Kazakh Government.
Russia and China are not the only big players in the country. Kazakhstan is a resource-rich country, and in 2022 almost 600 US firms were operating in Kazakhstan with an investment of US$ 45 billion.17 In addition, US companies had made a cumulative investment of US$ 161 billion in the energy sector from 2005 till 2020. Of this, US$ 30 billion came directly from the US.18
The Russia–Ukraine Conflict Since 2014
In a sense, the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict is a continuation of the process which began in 2014 with the Maidan protests in Ukraine, leading to the overthrow of pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych with encouragement from the West. Kazakhstan had agreed with the 16 March 2014 referendum in Crimea to legitimise Russian annexation as “yet another manifestation of realising a nation’s right to self-determination”.19 However, in response to Ukraine's concerns, the Kazakh side explained that it neither recognised the referendum nor the annexation. Still, the Crimean people had legitimate security, humanitarian and other interests. It could be argued that Kazakhstan has avoided explicitly criticising Russia, Ukraine or the West. But in different ways, it has favoured Russia.
Official Kazakh Response to the Conflict
This time as well, Kazakhstan’s response to the Ukrainian conflict appeared as weighed in favour of Russia. In his address to the 22nd Extraordinary Congress of the ruling Amanat Party on 1 March 2022, President Tokayev called on Russia and Ukraine to find common ground and reach an agreement at the negotiating table.20 He said that a bad peace was better than a good war. He went on to say that “the principle of indivisibility and commonality of security stipulates mutual understanding based on mutual trust. Unfortunately, this has not happened. The Minsk agreements had remained only on paper, which led to the military operations on the territory of Ukraine”. Kazakhstan offered all possible assistance, including mediation if, of course, it was required.
When President Putin discussed the Ukrainian situation with Tokayev the next day, the latter pushed for a compromise between Russia and Ukraine.21 Kazakh authorities also discouraged anti-Russia protests.22 In early March, Kazakh authorities had allowed anti-war activists to hold a rally in Almaty against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in which about 2,000 demonstrators had taken part. But Kazakh authorities were understood to have refused permission to hold a similar protest rally on 19 March 2022.
Some reports from the West suggested that Kazakhstan had denied the Russian request to let its troops participate in the offensive in Ukraine and indicated that it would not recognise the so-called Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk.23 Previously, Kazakhstan has not recognised Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the so-called republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgian territories occupied by Russia after the August 2008 Russia–Georgia war.
Protecting Kazakhstan from Sanctions on Russia
What came out more strongly was a sense of urgency for Kazakhstan to shield its economy from western sanctions on Russia. Apart from traditional economic and other linkages, Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Eurasian Customs Union, along with Russia, Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan’s MFA tasked its Embassies to engage with key European ports authorities urgently. Kazakh MFA also initiated a study of the impact of sanctions on Russian transport and logistic companies.
On 11 March 2022, Kazakhstan engaged in online consultations with the US on sanctions.24 It appears that this was a Kazakh initiative, with almost 80 participants from the Kazakh side in what was, in effect, a workshop on the sanctions. The American team briefed the Kazakh participants on the new trade, economic, banking, financial, and energy sanctions.
There are reports that Kazakhstan is attempting to redirect imports and exports away from Russian ports to Latvia to avoid international sanctions. The Caspian Sea Pipeline Consortium (CPC), stretching over 1,500 km, connects the Tengiz oilfield in Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. This pipeline accounts for 2/3 of Kazakhstan's oil exports. The US has excluded the Chevron-led Caspian pipeline concession from its ban on Russian oil and gas imports in an attempt to leave open this export route, provided that the crude oil is not of Russian origin.25
In a virtual meeting with Central Asian Foreign Ministers held on 28 February 2022, the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken condemned Russia's attack on Ukraine and reiterated Washington's support for that nation's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.26 His Central Asian colleagues however did not join him in expressing similar sentiments.
Conclusion
Kazakhstan’s immediate priority is to safeguard its economic and commercial interests by ensuring that the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West do not adversely impact its exports. However, alternative transit options, such as China and Iran, have limitations.
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has put Kazakhstan’s foreign policy to a severe test with no easy solutions. There are similarities between Ukraine and Kazakhstan, but they should not be exaggerated. A critical provocation for Russia in its ties with Ukraine was the prospect of NATO at its doorstep. This may not be the case with Kazakhstan, although Russia would tend to keep a watchful eye on American activities in Central Asia even without the NATO factor.
During a telephonic conversation with President Putin on 2 April 2022, President Tokayev said that “a common understanding was expressed of the exceptional importance of reaching agreements on the neutral, non-aligned, nuclear-free status of Ukraine”.27 Therefore, Kazakhstan seems to agree with Russia on the terms on which the war with Ukraine can be ended. In Kazakhstan’s approach to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, it is possible to discern a distinct tilt in the direction of Russia.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Ukraine’s security predicament in the face of the Russian military onslaught brings into focus the vacuity of big power security assurances in the absence of legally binding security guarantees and treaty commitments.
In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Soviet nuclear weapons were present on Ukrainian territory, apart from the territories of Belarus and Kazakhstan. These included more than 1,900 strategic warheads, 2,500 tactical warheads, 176 Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and 44 bombers. On 30 December 1991, 11 members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signed the Minsk Declaration on Strategic Forces, agreeing to give the Russian government authority over all the nuclear weapons stationed on their territory, as per Article IV.1 Earlier on 16 July 1990, Ukraine adopted a ‘Declaration of Sovereignty’ wherein it pledged ‘not to accept, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons’.2
Political and diplomatic efforts to remove Russian nuclear weapons from Ukraine began with the Lisbon Protocol of 1992. As part of the protocol, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan pledged to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and become members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).3 Ukrainian members of parliament, though, were divided over the merits of signing the Protocol and demanded the conferment of the status of temporary nuclear weapon state.
In April 1993, the Ukrainian parliament insisted on 13 pre-conditions for ratification of START.4 These pre-conditions included security assurances from Russia and the US, economic assistance for the dismantlement of the weapons, and Ukrainian control over a part of the arsenal. These demands were rejected by the US and Russia, with the US, instead, offering to provide additional financial assistance, over and above the US$ 175 million promised in 1992, as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) commitments for Ukraine’s denuclearisation.
In September 1993, Russia and Ukraine started bilateral negotiations on dismantlement of nuclear warheads.5 However, issues relating to assurances for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, costs of dismantlement of nuclear arms, among others, resulted in failure to conclude a final document. Subsequently, the ‘Trilateral Statement’ was signed along with the US on 14 January 1994, wherein Ukraine agreed for complete disarmament of strategic and tactical weapons, in return for economic and security assurances on accession to NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.6
Ukraine ratified START on 3 February 1994 (Kazakhstan had done so on 2 July 1992, and Belarus on 4 February 1993) but did not join the NPT, till December 1994, when the Budapest Memorandum was concluded, with the United Kingdom (UK) joining the US and Russia.
In the Budapest Memorandum,
They also reaffirmed
While acceding to the NPT as a NNWS, Ukraine sought legally binding assurances from the US, Russia and the UK, which they were reluctant to give. These countries, however, reaffirmed their commitment to take actions at the UN Security Council (UNSC) in face of any external aggression and act of war against Ukraine.8
Security Assurances vs Security Guarantees
The charter of the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) or Helsinki Accords, from which the Budapest Memorandum took inspiration from, condemns external aggression and annexation of territory by force. Russia breached the Budapest Memorandum in 2014 with the annexation of Crimean peninsula by force.9 Russia has since maintained a heavy troop presence of more than 1,00,000 soldiers in Crimea.
The security assurances, instead of security guarantees, provided to Ukraine seems void, in the face of the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2022. It is pertinent to note that a former US Ambassador to Ukraine in 2014 had stated that ‘the Budapest Memorandum was not an agreement on security guarantees’.10
During the current conflict, the UN has been unable to take substantive action, in face of disagreement among its veto members. The UNSC has failed to adopt resolutions in its meetings held on the issue. The UNSC, meeting on 21 February, rejected Russia’s recognition of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk.11 After hostilities began, the UNSC on 25 February failed to pass a resolution on account of Russia’s veto power. Finally, on 27 February, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2623 calling for an emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to resolve the Ukrainian crisis.12 The resolution was passed by 11 votes in favour, Russia voting against and three abstentions (China, India and the United Arab Emirates).
On 2 March 2022, in the Eleventh Emergency Special Session, the UNGA passed resolution ES-11/1, titled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’, calling for an immediate ceasefire, provision of humanitarian aid and withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of Ukraine.13 Later, on 24 March 2022, UNGA passed another resolution titled ‘Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine’, with overwhelming majority, demanding civilian protection and humanitarian access.14
Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelensky, in a hard-hitting speech before the UNSC on 5 April 2022, charged the UNSC to either act or dissolve itself and asked—‘Where is the security that the Security Council must guarantee?’15 The US and UK, parties to the Budapest Memorandum, though, have helped in training, economic assistance, and providing arms to Ukraine.16
Conclusion
The inability of international organisations like the United Nations to effectively protect the security interests of weaker countries is starkly apparent. The Russian military action in Ukraine will have negative consequences for the sanctity of international order and peaceful resolution of border disputes. Ukraine’s security predicament in the face of the Russian military onslaught brings into focus the vacuity of big power security assurances in the absence of legally binding security guarantees and treaty commitments.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Hydropower cooperation between India and Bhutan should not only help achieve the larger aspirations of the Bhutanese people for peace, prosperity and happiness but also further strengthen bilateral bonds.
India–Bhutan bilateral relationship has been based on ‘utmost trust’ and ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’, since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1968. To maintain the tradition of regular high-level exchanges, External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, visited Bhutan on 29–30 April 2022, at the invitation of his counterpart, Lyonpo Dr Tandi Dorji.1
Hydropower cooperation is an important feature of India–Bhutan bilateral relations. Since the first hydropower agreement (the Jaldhaka project) signed in 1961, a series of agreements have been signed over the years accelerating the pace of hydropower development.2 In July 2006, an agreement on ‘cooperation in the field of Hydroelectric Hydropower’ was signed.3 In March 2009, the protocol to the 2006 agreement was signed to help Bhutan install 10,000 MW by 2020. Subsequently, on 22 April 2014, the two countries signed the ‘Framework Inter-Government Agreement’, concerning development of ‘Joint Venture Hydropower Projects’.4
India has supported the development of hydropower projects in Bhutan through a mix of grants and loans and technical support relating to design and construction of the projects. Such arrangements were seen as a win-win arrangement for several decades. However, over the years, several pressing issues have emerged from the accelerated hydropower development approach.
Increasing Hydropower Debt
For Bhutan, hydropower is a ‘strategic renewable energy resource’. It has stimulated high economic growth and has been fundamental in achieving prosperity for its people. Bhutan has an estimated hydropower potential of 36,900 MW with annual production capability of 154,000 gigawatt hours.5 In 2020, the hydropower sector contributed 17.74 per cent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).6
Though India and Bhutan consider the development of hydropower projects as a win-win, the economic feasibility from the implementation of several projects remains a big concern, particularly on the part of the Bhutanese government. One of the major worries of Bhutan’s hydropower sector is the steep rise in public debt. As seen in Table1, there has been an increase in the debt to GDP ratio. As of 30 June 2021, the government debt was Nu. 238,398.910 million of which Nu. 17,074.437 million is internal debt and Nu. 221,324.473 million is external debt. According to a report by the Royal Audit Authority (RAA), the major portion of the debt relates to borrowings for hydropower loans, amounting to Nu. 162,359.048 million, which is 73 per cent of the total external debt for the financial year (FY) 2020–21.
Financial Year
Source: “Annual Audit Report 2020-2021”, Royal Audit Authority, Royal Government of Bhutan.
Deteriorating Economic Benefits
India's role in providing financial and technical support for development is much appreciated. However, it has been seen that since 2007, the hydropower sector's financial performance is deteriorating.7 Several reasons have contributed to the decline of economic benefits. One reason that has been flagged is the change of the financing system of hydropower projects by India from a 60:40 model (60 per cent grants and 40 per cent loans) to a 30:70 model (30 per cent grants and 70 per cent commercial loans) (Table 2).8
Project
Source: “Note on Cooperation with Bhutan”, Central Electricity Authority, Government of India.
Further, the commissioning of projects has been delayed, and massive escalations in the cost of construction of hydropower projects has also occurred. For instance, from an estimated cost of Rs 34 billion for the 1,200 MW Punatsangchhu-I, the cost went up to Rs 97 billion; for the 1,020 MW Punatsangchhu-II from an estimated cost of Rs 38 billion, it went up to Rs 74 billion.9
According to the 2017 report of the Bhutan Electricity Authority (BEA), one of the reasons for cost escalation in hydropower projects is the failure to take into account the inflation rate in the initial cost estimates.10 Besides, the report underscored the failure to undertake rigorous Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). Due to a major landslide in July 2013 at the site of the 1,200 MW Punatsangchhu-I project, not only was it delayed but the cost of the project increased as well.
Poor Employment Opportunities for Local Population
The development of hydropower projects is highly capital-intensive but only diminutive employment opportunities are available for the local populace, leading to discontentment. Such displeasure among the Bhutanese officials and communities is evident from the ongoing construction of the 600 MW Kholongchu hydropower project, a joint venture project of Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN) of India and Druk Green Power Corporation (DGPC) of Bhutan. Reports noted that the SJVN wanted to allocate the construction work to an Indian contractor with the Bhutanese side acting as a sub-contractor. On the other hand, the DGPC is against such rules as it will impact Bhutan’s capacity development.11
One of the main reasons behind the jobless growth in the hydropower sector for local population is the cheap and easy accessibility of both skilled and non-skilled workers, especially from India. For instance, in FY 2017–18, as shown in Table 3, of the total 54,972 foreign workers that were issued work permits, Indian workers represent the majority compared to other nationalities. For FY 2019–20, the import of foreign workers declined due to restrictions on mobility of workers in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sources: “Annual Reports”, Ministry of Labour and Human Resources, Royal Government of Bhutan; “Annual Report 2021”, Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan.
Conclusion
The model on which India–Bhutan cooperation operates seems to be unravelling and deeper introspection is necessary to address the emerging issues. During the Doklam stand-off, the Editor of The Bhutanese, Tenzing Lamsang, pointed out that though Doklam was a serious issue, for the Bhutanese, the decline of economic feasibility in the hydropower sector is more worrisome.12 Both India and Bhutan need to engage profoundly and consider the economic, social and environmental impact of the development of hydropower resources.
The idea of development in Bhutan is rooted in the overall development philosophy of Gross National Happiness (GNP).13 The guiding principles for Bhutan in harnessing hydropower resources has been ‘The Sustainable Hydropower Development Policy (SHDP) 2008’. Such policies have, however, led to a rise in debt from the hydropower sector and have provided few employment opportunities for local communities. As a result, SHDP 2021 was launched, which aims to “guide the overall development of Bhutan’s abundant hydropower resources in consonance with national economic development goal”.14 It is to be hoped that hydropower cooperation between India and Bhutan will not only help achieve the larger aspirations of the Bhutanese people for peace, prosperity and happiness but also further strengthen bilateral bonds.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Spain extending support to the 2007 Moroccan plan of granting an autonomous status to Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty is a significant foreign policy shift.
Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, was to have a referendum when the Spaniards chose to leave in 1975. The people of Western Sahara were to choose between independence or integration with Morocco. Due to the complex interplay of factors, the referendum could not take place and the region was controlled by Morocco and Mauritania. In 1979, Mauritania signed a peace deal with the Polisario Front (an independence movement led by the Sahrawi natives which was founded in 1973) and gave up its control over Western Sahara. Currently, Morocco controls over 80 per cent of the territory and contends that its jurisdiction over the region even predates the Spanish rule. Spain has remained neutral on the Western Sahara conflict all these years and has pushed for a political resolution which is mutually acceptable to the parties involved.
Spain announced a shift in its policy stance on Western Sahara on 18 March 2022 when the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez extended his support to the 2007 Moroccan plan of granting an autonomous status to Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. The Kingdom of Morocco welcomed this announcement by resuming diplomatic relations with Spain. In 2021, when Spain allowed Brahim Ghali (Polisario Front leader) to get medical treatment for COVID-19 on humanitarian grounds, it angered Morocco.
Reports note that it retaliated by recalling its Ambassador to Spain and loosening border controls, which resulted in the crossover of thousands of migrants into Spanish territories bordering Morocco.1 After the Spanish announcement, Spain–Morocco bilateral relations have stabilised. King Mohammed VI met the Spanish leader and they agreed to ease the year-long tensed diplomatic relations.
The decision to back Morocco is intriguing since Algeria, which supports the Polisario Front, is Spain's biggest natural gas supplier. Even as it is trying to reduce dependence on Russian gas, Spain has chosen to support the territorial claims of its strategic partner, Morocco, at the cost of its energy partner, Algeria.
Western Sahara has rich deposits of phosphate, iron ore and potash. Its significance can be ascertained from the fact that phosphate is an important ingredient in fertiliser production and currently, there is a worldwide shortage of phosphate fertilisers. Also, its vast coastline and access to fertile fishing grounds and offshore oil in the Atlantic Ocean adds to the strategic importance of this contentious territory.2
If Morocco’s sovereignty over this region is recognised by international actors and states, it would mean proximity to yet another Spanish autonomous territory, i.e., Canary Islands, and other important port cities like Ceuta and Melilla, bordering Morocco. During turbulent times, Morocco has often laid claims to Ceuta, Melilla, and parts of Canary Islands.
Prime Minister Sanchez asserts that this policy shift would bring “a new phase of bilateral relations” in the strategic partnership with Morocco, which is Spain’s economic and anti-terrorism partner in the African continent. Additionally, it is also responsible for preventing Sub-Saharan and Moroccan migrants from entering Ceuta and Melilla. In the joint statement issued on 7 April 2022, both countries agreed to focus on airspace management, joint demarcation of borders and resuming cooperation in energy, migration, industry and economic fields.3
Algeria’s Reaction
After Italy, Spain imports the largest quantity of gas from Algeria. The Spanish declaration therefore came as a shock to the Algerians, supporters of the Polisario Front. Algerian Foreign Ministry stated that it was “very surprised by the surprising statements” of the Spanish leadership and recalled its Ambassador, posted in Madrid, back to Algiers for consultations.4
Algeria’s state-owned energy firm, Sonatrach, is planning to stick to ‘fair moderate gas prices’ for all its customers, barring Spain. Going forward, Spain might see a recalculation of domestic gas prices, owing to the increased prices in the global energy market.5 Tensions in Spain–Algeria relations could benefit other European nations in their energy deals. For instance, Italy has signed a deal with Algeria, to procure 12 per cent of its gas demands, in addition to the current supplies, to ease its dependence on Russia.6
Spain was already shifting its dependence from Algeria to Liquefied Natural Gas imported from other countries. Spain has a vast coastline and six LNG regasification terminals, out of the 20 across Europe.7 It is importing LNG in large quantities from US, Qatar, Nigeria and others.
If the gas prices increase for the Spaniards, it will not be the first skirmish involving the supply of gas between the two countries. Out of the two gas pipelines from Algeria to Spain, Algeria had closed supplies in Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline, passing through Morocco, in November 2021, owing to heightened tensions over Western Sahara. This incident prompted Spain to realise that a heavy gas dependence of almost 50 per cent on Algeria is strategically non-viable.
Algeria could also decide to increase the price of gas passing through the undersea Medgaz pipeline. Algeria, though, must work towards increasing the capacity of the Medgaz pipeline (the only functional pipeline from Algeria to Spain), if it wants to be a reliable energy partner for European nations.
Domestic Reactions
Spain’s ruling coalition primarily comprises the Socialists and the far left Unidas Podemos, supported by a few regional parties. The biggest opposition is the conservative Popular Party, which has charged that Prime Minister Pedro took the step on account of pressure tactics by Morocco. They charge that to mend relations with one country (Morocco), the government has damaged Spain’s relations with three parties—Algeria, the Polisario Front and the Sahrawi people. Alberto Feijoo, a prominent leader of the Popular Party, criticised the executive for not informing the parliament before taking the decision.
Some elements within his coalition government do not see the need to break away from the country’s decades-old stance. Spain’s Deputy Prime Minister, Yolanda Diaz tweeted that she is fully supportive of a UNSC resolution which gives importance to “dialogue and respect for the democratic will of the Saharawi people”.8
Spain is facing the worst inflation in over three decades, with rising food and fuel prices. In 2021, fuel prices rose by over 72 per cent, the highest increase in Europe. With the shift in policy over Western Sahara getting prominence, Spaniards are questioning the need to antagonise Algeria, as it could increase the fuel costs further. Analysts note that the impact of this decision will be felt in the 2023 national elections.
The Socialist Party, enjoying maximum support from the electorate, represents the other side of the public opinion. Their supporters view this move by the Spanish government as a step towards enhancing Spain’s strategic relations. Morocco is a very important partner for Spain, from geographic and strategic perspectives. Those opposing the viewpoint of the Popular Party consider the recognition of Morocco’s 2007 plan to be in line with the UN’s policy on Western Sahara. They claim that Spain is trying to take a realistic view of the situation, which seems to be the only practical way to resolve it.
EU’s Reaction
The European Commission (EC) welcomed Spain’s policy shift and stated that it is a “serious, credible and realistic” solution to an issue that has been ongoing for decades now. The EC has supported the move as it improves the Euro-Moroccan partnership and enhances Spain’s bilateral ties with its strategic partner. The office of EU foreign policy Chief Joseph Borrell has also expressed support for the United Nations stance on this issue, which calls for a just, realistic, pragmatic, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution to Western Sahara.
The EU has not only welcomed the Spanish move but has been supportive of Germany’s tilt towards Morocco (on the same issue) as well. In fact, the first major power to recognise Morocco’s authority over Western Sahara was the United States. At the end of his tenure, President Donald Trump signed a deal with Morocco in December 2020 along with Israel, in return for Morocco mending ties with Israel. The three countries pledged to cooperate on matters of common interest and boost multilateral and bilateral ties.9 On Western Sahara, Morocco also enjoys the support of a few African and Arab nations.
Going Forward
The global rise in fuel prices has predominantly impacted Europe and Africa is turning out to be a promising supplier to the European gas market. While it cannot wholly replace Russian supplies, the geographical proximity of the continent has ensured that the strategic importance of Africa for Europe has increased manifold after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Spain is keen on normalising ties with Morocco and resuming the strategic bilateral partnership, since it cannot afford border tensions due to the migrant crisis. Externally, while the demarcation of land and sea borders will help resolve overlapping territorial claims between Morocco and Spanish islands and coastal cities, domestically, Prime Minister Sanchez will have to contend with voices opposed to his decision, especially so ahead of national elections next year.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Chinese news media has peddled dual narrative of vilifying the West and glorifying China’s supposed mediatory role in the Russia–Ukraine crisis.
Prior to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, Western media outlets reported that the Chinese government circulated guidelines to Chinese news media agencies explicitly forbidding publication of anti-Russia or pro-Western content. The guidelines required these agencies to use only those hashtags approved by the three state news organisations—People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency and the state broadcaster, CCTV.1 A review of news reports in Chinese mainstream media like People’s Daily, CGTN, CCTV, Xinhua, People’s Liberation Army Daily and China News Service gives a sense of pro-Russian reportage.
In the initial phase of Russia’s military build-up near the Ukraine border, Chinese news media focused primarily on projecting Western interventionist approach and system of military alliances as the cause of the Russia–Ukraine tensions. They highlighted the purported divergences within major Western powers as a reflection of these countries’ unitary pursuit of geopolitical goals. Secondly, there was a marked eulogization of China’s supposed role as a force for stability in international politics.2
‘The West is Lying and is Divided’
Categorising US warnings of possibility of Russian invasion of Ukraine as “hype” and “propaganda”, Chinese news media charged the US of falsely exaggerating the risk of war and perpetrating tension and conflict in the region.3 An article in the Xinhua News Agency charged that the US supply of weapons to Ukraine under the pretext of Russian invasion was aggravating tensions between the two countries. It described NATO’s deployments to Eastern Europe in response to Russia’s military exercises as aggressive and warned the US not to ‘play with fire’.4
In the aftermath of the telephonic conversation between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on 27 January 2022, CGTN accused the Biden administration of causing panic and instigating conflict between Russia and Ukraine.5 An Editorial in CGTN stated that Russia made no military threat to Ukraine and instead accused the US and NATO of nibbling at Ukrainian territory to antagonise Russia.6 Several reports titled “Western politicians amplify the idea that Russia is about to ‘invade’ Ukraine”, “The United States continues to incite the Russian President”, “The US concocted fake news to exaggerate the ‘Russian threat theory’” across popular media outlets like China News Service, CCTV News, Caixin conveyed the narrative that alleged US threat-mongering was causing tensions in the region. Mutual distrust between Kiev and Moscow, existing acrimony over Crimea, and Russia’s support to Ukrainian separatists, among other issues, were left out of Chinese news media’s assessments of the crisis.
In the wake of Russian military build-up prior to start of hostilities, Chinese news media sought to portray Western countries as divided and only striving to secure their respective interests. An article in CGTN stated that the Ukraine crisis exposed the cracks within the Western alliance and had failed to forge consensus in their response to Russian policies. Highlighting the alleged depth of the disagreements, Chinese media reported not only on trans-Atlantic divergences between the US and its European allies but also on differences of opinion among the European countries themselves.7
An article published in People’s Liberation Army’s official media outlet, PLA Daily, argued that Germany and France, owing to their close economic cooperation with Russia “have a more rational attitude towards Russia, and have obvious differences with the United States on the Ukraine issue”. At the same time, it argued that “Lithuania and other Central and Eastern European ‘New European’ countries have obvious doubts and fears of Russia, and have adopted more radical pro-US policies in terms of security”.8Xinhua News Agency cited statements of American and European politicians to support the thesis. These statements included France’s call for dialogue with Russia, Germany’s reluctance to provide military aid to Ukraine and Croatia’s (a NATO member) suggestion to take into account Russia’s security considerations.9
It is noteworthy that this negative press coverage of West’s policy approach and response towards Russia–Ukraine crisis fits into the larger Chinese narrative about the superficiality of the West-led international order. For long, Chinese experts have contended that major Western powers under the garb of protecting rules-based international order are brewing instability across the world through military interventions and military alliances, driven by their geopolitical ambitions.10
In comparison, it is contended that Chinese foreign policy aims to forge consensus and stability through mediation and ‘win-win’ cooperation to shape global order. Incidentally, this narrative building has also constituted Chinese press coverage of several other events like the formation of the QUAD, the AUKUS submarine deal, and US withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that such type of narrative gained traction largely in response to the ‘China threat theory’ and a perceived need to promote Chinese perception of international relations that will enable the world to view China’s rise favourably.11
‘China is the stabilising force’
The Chinese news media’s coverage of the Ukraine crisis has highlighted alleged Western culpability while simultaneously emphasising Chinese efforts towards resolving the crisis in an effort to help project China in a positive light vis-à-vis the Western countries. With China calling for adherence to Minsk Agreements signed between Ukraine and Russia in 2015, the Chinese media projected Beijing’s stance as guided by the principles of non-interference.
After Blinken’s talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on 27 January 2022, CGTN suggested that while NATO was increasing tensions by reinforcing its military presence in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, China was “playing a constructive role in promoting peace and solidarity in the region, calling for all sides to remain calm and refrain from hyping up tensions”.12
After Russia launched the Ukraine invasion, the Chinese press carried limited coverage on Russian military operations and focused largely on Chinese efforts to mitigate the crisis. China Daily suggested in its editorials that Russia–Ukraine negotiations were being impeded by non-conciliatory stance of US and major European powers. Chinese calls for restraint and dialogue were contrasted with that of the US and the West, with commentaries arguing that the US was adopting hostile policy measures.
The provision of military aid to Ukraine by the US, among others and reinforcing of NATO’s presence in Eastern European countries and the Black Sea, were highlighted. Efforts by NATO members like Germany, France and Turkey to facilitate negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s reluctance to cease hostilities despite calls for the same were hardly highlighted in this context.
Conclusion
Despite strict censorship of Chinese media and control over the flow of information, reports flag that Chinese public opinion is deeply divided about the nature and extent of Chinese support to Russian actions.13 In the context of both countries professing strategic alignment in early February, the Chinese media’s explicit endorsement of Russia’s actions in Ukraine could have projected China as a co-collaborator to the international community.14
The Russian military intervention though challenged the Chinese narrative of the Western countries being the prime aggressors. The Chinese media has peddled the dual narrative of vilifying the West and glorifying China’s supposed mediatory role in the crisis, even as the war continues to rage in Ukraine. The Chinese media’s coverage of the crisis has been less about Ukraine and Russia and more about China and the West.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Central Asian states have had to deal with significant economic and security challenges in the wake of the Russia–Ukraine conflict.
Russia enjoys significant economic, political and societal influence in Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.1 The region is highly dependent on Russia for its export routes, security assistance and labour markets.2 These factors have ensured that Central Asian states, known for their multi-vector foreign policies, have had to walk a tightrope regarding their stand on Russia’s ongoing ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine.
Central Asian countries have also been cautious in their stance on Russia’s past military activities in Crimea. All of these countries abstained in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on the issue.3 Kyrgyzstan was notable in taking a contradictory stand vis-à-vis Moscow with regard to recognising Viktor Yanukovych as the president of Ukraine.4 Kazakhstan was also the most active among these nations and even offered to host negotiations to resolve the issue.5 It further abstained in the UNGA on resolutions introduced by Ukraine demanding non-recognition of the changes in status of Crimea.6
In the current crisis, these states have taken a neutral stance. They have neither condemned Russia’s special military operation nor endorsed it.7 They also choose to abstain or not vote in all the UNGA resolutions.8 There was, however, one exception. On 8 April 2022, when the UNGA decided to vote out Russia from the Human Rights Council, four Central Asian states voted in support of Russia, apart from Turkmenistan.9
On 1 March 2022, Kazakh President Qasym-Jomart Tokayev, like his predecessor Nursultan Nazarbayev offered to act as a mediator to bring about peace in the region.10 Kazakhstan has also been vocal about its stand not to recognise the two breakaway regions of Ukraine—Luhansk and Donetsk.11 These policy measures are again reminiscent of its stance during the Crimean Crisis of 2014. While Kazakhstan has maintained a neutral stance diplomatically, its population has shown discontent towards Russian policies in the Ukraine crisis. Reports flag that the Kazakhs have a sense of fear that they could be the next post-Soviet state that could be in Russia’s radar.12 This fear stems from the presence of a Russian minority population in North Kazakhstan which borders Russia. Both Crimea and Donbas also have Russian minority population in their midst.
Russia’s involvement in the conflict has led to it being one of the most sanctioned nations in the world. These sanctions against the Russian economy will have direct implications for Central Asian states. Their economies are highly dependent on Russia for remittances, as well as for the strength of their currencies. Like most economies across the international arena, they have experienced the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, any impact on one of its major economic providers could have supplementary impact on their economies in the near future. According to the World Bank, due to the Russia–Ukraine crisis, Central Asian economy is forecasted to shrink by 4.1 per cent this year, compared to 3 per cent before the crisis.13 The currencies of states like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan dropped in value post the fall of the ruble, in the early period of the crisis.14
Investment projects funded by Russian banks under sanctions will have to be cancelled.15 Since Russia is heavily sanctioned, Russia’s flagship economic organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), of which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are a part of, could lose its relevance as the viable economic partner in the region in the long run.16
Several million Central Asian migrant labourers work in Russia, mainly from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.17 Due to the damage to the Russian economy, the income of the Central Asian labourers would be impacted, which would mean lesser chances of sending home remittances and reverse migration in search of livelihood. The money sent back home by the workers is crucial for the economies, and makes up 31, 27, and 12 per cent of their GDP, respectively.18 The World Bank estimates that the value of remittances from Russia would drop in Uzbekistan by 21 per cent, in Tajikistan by 22 per cent and by 33 per cent in Kyrgyzstan.19
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine could affect the region’s food security. On 10 March 2022, Russia temporarily banned the export of white sugar and grain crops to the EAEU countries.20 This could have an impact on Kazakhstan. Last year, Kazakhstan increased its grain purchases by 77 per cent, importing 2.3 million tonnes of grain, third only to Turkey and Egypt.21 Post the ban on export on Russian grains, Kazakh authorities have decided to ban wheat exports.22 This step is being planned to protect the domestic production and supply and to ensure that there is no shortage. Any shortage could lead to new protests and further fuel animosity towards the government that has already seen disapproval from the public just three months ago, on account of rising gas prices.
There could also be a trickledown effect towards other Central Asian states, particularly fellow EAEU country, Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan imports 90 per cent of its wheat from Russia and Kazakhstan.23 Therefore, any ban in both countries would impact the domestic supply for Kyrgyzstan. This could lead to Kyrgyzstan scrambling to find new countries for importing grains, at higher costs.
Security is another area of concern with the Russians pre-occupied in Ukraine. Central Asia is highly dependent on Russia for its security and this was evident in January when the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) troops were needed in Kazakhstan to quell protests that erupted due to high gas prices. In order to subdue the protests, the Kazakh government requested CSTO intervention. The coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan has created an unsettling feeling for Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan. With Russia pre-occupied in Ukraine, the fear of the revival of terror groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, or Islamic Jihadi Union could make Central Asia look for other options for security. Tajikistan, a member of CSTO, is highly dependent on Russia’s 201st Division in Tajikistan for its security. The presence of the Russian troops emboldens Tajikistan to stand up to the Taliban.24 Therefore, with Russia focused on Ukraine, Tajikistan in the immediate term could look towards other powers like China for assistance.
While the Russia–Ukraine conflict has affected the international arena in more ways than one, regionally, the impact has been quite significant on Central Asian countries, presenting them with economic and security challenges, over and above the challenges of dealing with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India and Australia need to take a leadership role in maritime security affairs in the two oceans and have deeper engagements with the Pacific and Indian Ocean island countries.
The Second India–Australia Summit, held on 21 March 2022, took stock of various new initiatives and mechanisms agreed under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), inked in June 2020.1 The relationship has been further bolstered by the signing of the India–Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (IndAus ECTA) on 2 April 2022 between the two Trade Ministers, in the presence of the respective Prime Ministers.2 The agreement is a major milestone that promises to propel bilateral trade to new heights and achieve ambitious targets for Indian and Australian economies.
India–Australia relations have indeed transitioned from a difficult past to a promising future. Till the year 2000, there was considerable cynicism between the two countries and lack of cooperation in most sectors, primarily owing to contrasting views on the commonwealth, India’s independent foreign policy and Cold War dynamics. When India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, Australia imposed tough economic sanctions, resulting in further deterioration of relations. Economic and trade cooperation as well as people-to-people links were also limited.
However, since 2000, the two countries began to forge an increasingly cooperative partnership, essentially driven by the changing regional landscape in Asia and China’s aggressive behaviour, as also improving India–US relations, as signified by the nuclear deal . Bilateral relations were further bolstered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia in 2014 and recent partnerships forged as part of the Quad meetings and other mini-laterals.
Virtual Summit
At the Virtual Summit on 21 March 2022, all areas of cooperation were discussed between the two leaders, and the key strategic and economic outcomes were highlighted in the joint statement.3 Regarding Indo-Pacific region, the two leaders expressed their shared commitment to free, open and rules-based order, supported by a robust regional architecture, and ASEAN centrality. On the Ukraine crisis, they expressed concern over the conflict and the resultant humanitarian crisis, as also emphasised on the importance of dialogue and diplomacy based on the UN charter, international law, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, to resolve the crisis. The leaders called for immediate cessation of violence against the civilian population in Myanmar, release of detained leaders there and unhindered humanitarian access. The two leaders committed to humanitarian assistance, adherence to counter-terrorism commitments and human rights in Afghanistan. Concerning South China Sea, both sides underlined the importance of freedom of navigation and over flight, consistent with international laws, particularly UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). It was announced that India will participate in the Indo-Pacific Endeavour Exercise 2022, which aims to promote security and stability in Australia’s near region through bilateral and multilateral engagement, training and capacity building.4.
On the economic front, Australia–India Infrastructure Forum was launched to enable Australian firms to explore India’s vast infrastructure opportunities. A new Consulate-General in Bengaluru was announced to help plug Australian businesses into India’s digital economy and innovation ecosystem.5 The Progress on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) was reviewed, with both sides committed to a full CECA by the end of the year. The two countries shared their commitment to cooperate on such aspects as critical minerals, and emphasised the need for resilient and sustainable supply chains for their transportation. An MoU was signed between Australia’s Critical Minerals Facilitation Office and Khanij Bidesh Ltd for joint cooperation on critical minerals. Further, Australia and India pledged to cooperate on research, production and commercialisation of clean technologies, critical minerals and energy.
Among other new declarations are the India–Australia Centre of Excellence for Critical and Emerging Technology Policy, to be set up in Bengaluru, and establishment of Gen Rawat India–Australia Young Defence Officers’ Exchange Programme. Australia committed the largest single investment in the bilateral relationship with India of about US$ 280 million across skills, diplomacy, clean technology, critical minerals and space exploration.6 Indian diaspora in Australia is more than 6 lakh people and about 1 lakh students, totalling about 3 per cent of the Australian population.
Convergences
Recent years have seen a significant transformation of the India–Australia strategic relationship. With CSP signed in June 2020, an array of institutional mechanisms have been initiated to promote bilateral cooperation, including Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation, Arrangement on Mutual Logistics Support, Framework arrangement for Cyber & Cyber Enabled Critical Tech Cooperation and MoU on Mining and Processing of Critical and Strategic Minerals. The inaugural 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue was held in September 2021 and the two Foreign Ministers have been meeting regularly. The two nations have a robust defence partnership. Besides dialogues, training and exchanges, they conduct regular joint military exercises, as also anti-piracy coordination and white shipping information sharing. Bilateral military exercises that have been conducted include AUSINDEX 2021, PITCH BLACK 2018 and AUSTRAHIND 2018.Australia has consistently supported India’s NSG membership, and permanent seat in the UN Security Council.7 India and Australia signed the civil nuclear agreement in 2014 and Australia made the first uranium shipment to India in 2017. However, trade in uranium since then has been lacklustre owing to issues regarding safeguards, and Australian domestic politics. 8
On multilateral issues, both countries are members of the Quad, along with Japan and the United States, and cooperate on various positive agendas relating to the Indo-Pacific. India and Australia have similar concerns vis-à-vis China’s coercive behaviour. Australia has pushed back on China’s aggressive trade barriers, and has called for independent investigation of COVID-19 origins. India, on its part, has given a strong response to China’s unilateral attempts to alter status quo on the Ladakh border.
India and Australia cooperate closely at ASEAN forums viz. East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, as also at G20, which India is going to host next year. The two countries have a robust issue-based trilateral mechanisms with Japan (since 2015), Indonesia (2017) and France (2020). Some multilateral initiatives where India has taken lead and the two countries cooperate are Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), Coalition of Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), and Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS) and International Solar Alliance (ISA). In the Indian Ocean, both countries engage with partners in forums at Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS); as also at many multilateral exercises, such as Malabar and now Talisman Sabre and Indo-Pacific Endeavour.
India and Australia have a shared vision on the Indo-Pacific. India’s approach to the region was articulated by PM Modi in 2018 through the vision of SAGAR9 (Security and Growth for All). To implement the vision of SAGAR, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) was launched in 2019.10. India has also strengthened its outreach with Pacific island countries, through FIPIC (Forum for India–Pacific Island Cooperation). Australia’s strategic view on Indo-Pacific is spelt out in 2020 Defence Strategic Update. Australia’s strategic objectives as defined in this document include –the shaping of strategic environment in the region, deterring actions that are against Australian interests and responding with credible military force, if required. South Pacific region is Australia’s primary area of influence and its deep engagement in the region is defined by the Pacific Step-up initiative, which was first announced at the Pacific Island Forum Leaders' Meeting in September 2016 as a 'step-change' in its engagement with the region.11
Divergences
While India and Australia cooperate on most areas, analysts observe that there are many issues of divergences also. Australia has looked at strategic and security issues through the lens of its US alliance, which has now got further strengthened with AUKUS deal, whereas India follows an independent foreign policy in international relations and tries to balance its strategic calculations. The two nations have differing views on Myanmar, for instance. For India, developments in Myanmar are a matter of strategic concern, due to its proximity to the country’s northeast region and militants operating from across the border. Australia, on its part, has strongly condemned the military coup and detainment of senior leaders. Australia’s response to the Ukraine crisis is aligned with its allies in West, while Indian response is based on its national interests and historic ties with Russia. Australia, just as India, Japan and many others, has realised the importance of self-reliance in defence manufacturing and resilient supply chains. Australia has increased its defence budget and is acquiring advanced weapon systems, including nuclear-propelled submarines and hypersonic missiles under AUKUS deal.12
The Promise of IndAus ECTA
Recognising that a free trade agreement between the two countries will usher in economic growth and build trust and respect, the two nations signed the historic IndAus ECTA on 2 April 2022.13 With ECTA in place, the trade is likely to increase from the current estimates of US$ 27 billion to about US$ 45–50 billion over the next five years, and is expected to create over 10 lakh additional jobs.14 The deal will eliminate tariffs on more than 85 per cent of Australian goods entering India and almost all Indian exports to Australia. Indian companies will get supply of energy and raw material, while Australia will get better access to the rapidly growing Indian market. Labour-intensive sectors in India like textiles, pharmaceuticals, etc., will create new jobs and Indian students and software professionals will benefit from the liberalised visa regime. In addition, the agreement will assist Indian finished product exports in petroleum, cosmetics, linen clothing, jewellery and furniture.
Way Forward
Being two major powers with shared interests, India and Australia can play a significant role in creating a strong and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. The Quad partnership must be leveraged and widened in its relevance and influence, by enhancing security and economic cooperation among the member nations. India needs to engage more proactively with ASEAN nations and give required assistance, including in the defence field, like in the case of the supply of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to Philippines. India and Australia need to take a leadership role in maritime security affairs in the two oceans, and have deeper engagements with the Pacific and Indian Ocean island countries. Joint defence manufacturing has a tremendous potential to be explored, leveraging Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative. Furthermore, broader long-term reciprocal access arrangements, similar to foundational agreements with US, can be looked at to emphasise real-time maritime domain awareness and information sharing, besides interoperability and operational coordination. Close cooperation in critical emerging technologies will be a win-win for both countries, for example in fields of Artificial Intelligence, semiconductors, drones, 6G, blockchain, etc. While the ECTA has been inked, CECA should be concluded at the earliest. Some other focus areas can be enhanced trade in uranium under the rubric of civil nuclear cooperation and joint infrastructure connectivity projects.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Russia’s military action in Ukraine has negatively impacted the cooperative engagement architecture of the Arctic Council.
The Arctic region witnessed extensive militarisation during the Second World War. In the Cold War period, despite military exercises conducted by rival blocks—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact countries—the Arctic remained stable without any confrontation. In fact, the 196-km border between the Soviet Union and Norway (the only NATO-member country to share a border with the Soviet Union) remained peaceful throughout the Cold War. In 1987, with the Cold War in its end-phase, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in his famous ‘Murmansk Speech’, called for the Arctic as a ‘Zone of Peace’ and emphasised the need for cooperation in the region. 1
Gorbachev’s vision was reciprocated by the West. The first environmental cooperative initiative, called the ‘Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy’ (AEPS), was signed by eight Arctic states in 1991.2 AEPS was the initiative of government of Finland that resulted in successful conclusion of various cooperative measures to protect the Arctic environment. 3 These eight Arctic states in 1996 signed the Ottawa Declaration which led to the establishment of the Arctic Council.4 Since its formation, the Arctic Council has become an important forum for addressing issues of environment, sustainable development and purveying the socio-economic context in the region.5 The Arctic Council is the most important intergovernmental forum for cooperation between the Arctic states in the high north. The working of the Arctic Council is executed through its six working groups and the decision making within the Council is based on ‘consensus basis’.
In February 2022, as a result of Russia’s military action in Ukraine, the seven Western Arctic states (A7), 6 five of which are members of NATO,7 have issued a joint statement to ‘temporarily pause’ their participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies.8 These states argued that the Arctic Council works on the fundamental rules of international law, and Russia, which currently holds the chairmanship of the Arctic Council, has violated it. While describing the action as 'regrettable', Russia, in response, highlighted that the Arctic Council has remained depoliticised, despite the past geopolitical issues.9
The A7’s decision could have serious implications for the Arctic. First, all the eight Arctic states are at close geographical proximity to one another. Even a temporary suspension of the Arctic Council could challenge its established credibility and decision making. This could enhance geopolitical competition by superseding the existing scientific cooperation, consensus on environmental concerns and other mutually agreed solidarities between the states in the region.
Second, the Arctic contains multiple existing issues of territorial sovereignty, resource exploitation and disagreements over national/international shipping routes. Suspending the working of the Arctic Council would terminate the existing cooperation, resulting in unwanted strategic competition in the region. Furthermore, in order to protect their own self-interests in the Arctic, a potential military build-up can be expected.
Third, Russia holds the largest territorial and coastal extent in the Arctic. It remains the only state with strong Arctic infrastructure and military capabilities. The Russian Arctic accounts for almost half of the total Arctic population living in the region.10 If the current situation prevails or the A7 countries consider forming any new alliance or forum without Russia, it would polarise the Arctic region, which could lead to dangerous outcomes. Similarly, any such alternative approach/alliance by Russia with non-Arctic states, would further challenge the existing cooperation in the region.11
Fourth, the issue of climate change is serious in the Arctic, where the global warming is occurring at thrice the average normal. Suspension of all established cooperation with Russia through Arctic Council, would seriously affect academic and scientific engagements between states on climate research in the region.
Fifth, the Arctic Council has become successful in negotiating three important legally binding agreements in the region. These include ‘Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation’,12‘Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response’,13 and the ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic’.14 Also, all the Arctic states have successfully concluded an ‘International Agreement on Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean’.15 As a counter measure to A7’s decision on the Arctic Council, Russia may consider withdrawing from these important agreements in the Arctic, which would further lead to greater insecurities in the region.
Sixth, apart from the Arctic permanent states, there are 13 non-Arctic observer states in the Arctic Council.16 Though these states remain outside the decision-making process of the Council, they are actively engaged in the various working groups of the Council. Asian observers such as India, China, Japan, Singapore and South Korea face vulnerabilities as a result of climate change in the Arctic. A pause in the Working Groups of the Arctic Council will have significant implications for the ongoing and future projects undertaken by these states.
Finally, the ongoing debate within the Finish and the Swedish parliaments to join NATO membership will make the revival of the Arctic Council difficult, if not impossible. As and when these two Arctic Council members join NATO, it will have significant geopolitical repercussions for the region. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, has already warned of Russia’s nuclear and hypersonic deployments, if Finland and Sweden secured NATO membership.17
Conclusion
The Arctic Council, till recently, has proved itself to be a successful model of cooperation. Security issues were consciously kept away from the charter of the Arctic Council. The heightened political contestations in the wake of Russia–Ukraine war could radically alter the spirit as well as structure of the Council. With Finland and Sweden seeking membership of NATO, the situation in the region will, in all likelihood, aggravate further. How the Arctic Council responds to these developments and whether it will remould itself is a moot question.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Orban government’s foreign and domestic policies will continue to be under the EU’s scanner, as it seeks to ramp up pressure on Russia for precipitating the worst security crisis that Europe is witnessing after the Second World War.
Viktor Orban, the longest-serving head of government in the European Union (EU), won the national elections in Hungary for the fourth consecutive term on 4 April 2022. However, Orban’s victory speech created resentment throughout Europe where he hit out not only at “opponents”, but also took a dig at “Brussels bureaucrats” and Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelensky.1 His controversial speech seemed even more vexing because it came shortly after the West had reacted strongly to the Bucha atrocities in Ukraine.2
To add to the EU’s consternation, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his congratulations to Orban, a long-term Kremlin ally, and pledged to further develop bilateral ties, despite Hungary’s support for EU sanctions against Russia.3 As a member of both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU, Hungary has treaded the fine balance between condemning Russia’s invasion and backing EU sanctions. It is opposed to a ban on Russian energy imports and has agreed to pay for the same in rubles.4
Orban’s fourth landslide win will have implications for how the EU retains its unity as a bloc while simultaneously co-opting fissures with countries like Hungary.5 Luxembourg’s representatives have previously stated that Hungary should not be in the EU anymore,6 which Hungary dismissed as ‘Hungarophobia’.7
Orban’s Hold on Hungary’s Electorate
Orban’s long political career is rife with allegations of corruption and suppression of democratic values. Despite such record, he has been able to win successive elections. It is interesting to note that for the first time, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) had deployed a full-scale mission involving over 200 observers to Hungary for the election.8 These international observers raised concerns regarding electoral conditions being tilted in favour of Orban’s government.9 In the 2022 elections, Orban’s party Fidesz (in alliance with KNDP), got 53 per cent of votes compared to the opposition coalition, which got only 35 per cent.10 Although some of the factors discussed below have put him in an advantageous position, they have also alienated Hungary from EU policies.
Orban’s electoral base: Apart from Christian, conservative and patriotic values that Fidesz espouses, labour law deregulation and extensive social welfare schemes have helped Orban secure his electoral base among the middle and lower middle class.11 The government’s low corporate tax rates have attracted investment, which has helped reduce unemployment from 11 per cent when he took office in 2018 to 3.4 per cent before the pandemic.12
Favourable Electoral System: Fidesz drafted a new electoral system after a two-third majority in the 2010 elections allowed it to make constitutional amendments.13 The Hungarian national assembly has 199 members out of which 106 are elected by ‘first past the post’ system in single member constituencies and the remaining 93 are decided by proportional representation system. This system gives advantage to larger parties like Fidesz at the expense of smaller parties, which has enabled Fidesz to win 68 per cent of the seats (135 seats) with just 53 per cent of the vote this time. Another factor that helps Orban is the support of the large expatriate Hungarian community to whom Orban has granted citizenship.14
Media freedom in Hungary: State-owned media in Hungary is pro-government and private media is also in the hands of pro-government oligarchs.15 In 2018, Orban created the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), an organisation that brings together the main media in the country. In effect, Orban has created a media empire with hundreds of outlets that coordinates content in favour of the government.16
Favourable Judicial system: Orban has also reshuffled the judicial system to his advantage by creating a parallel court system to deal with controversial issues like human rights, free and fair elections, refugee asylum and political protests, where judges are appointed by the government.17
Weak opposition: Major opposition parties like MSZP, DK and Parbeszed formed a coalition pact in 2014 to challenge Fidesz, but won only 25 per cent vote then. The coalition expanded the alliance by adding the green party and post-communist left-wing parties but could not build consensus to navigate the country’s economic or foreign and security policies.18 The leader of the united opposition in 2022 was Peter Marki-Zay (a small-town mayor without party affiliation) who campaigned on a broad anti-corruption and human rights agenda based on furthering cooperation with the EU. His sole criticism against Orban was that the latter had driven Hungary to isolation within the EU. Orban, to an extent, reaped electoral advantages by showcasing his government as the saviour of Hungarian people by ensuring uninterrupted supply of Russian gas and oil by staying neutral. Hungary is hugely dependent on Russia for its energy.19 Hungary, for instance, decided not to send troops or weapons or allow for weapon transit to Ukraine, claiming that such a decision might put the country and its people at huge risk.20
Fissures with the European Union
Orban-led Hungary has been locked in a struggle with Brussels over its actions that according to the EU, undermine basic democratic rights. Orban’s crackdown on the media, NGOs, his government’s policies on migrants and the LGBTIQ community, as well as charges of cronyism and corruption, have generated concerns from the EU.21 The OSCE had described the 2014, 2018 and the 2022 Hungarian elections as not fair, even if free.22
Two days after Orban’s win, the European Commission launched the EU’s new rule-of-law disciplinary procedure for the first time against Hungary.23 The hitherto untested conditionality mechanism, which was agreed by all 27 EU member states in 2020, is a new tool for protecting the EU's financial interests against breaches of rule of law inside a member state.24 The context was the economic pain inflicted on the EU economy by the COVID-19 pandemic for which a € 750 billion fund was set up to accelerate recovery. This fund, financed through common debt, was negotiated in parallel to the € 1.1 trillion seven-year EU budget.25 Countries like Poland and Hungary have been suspected of democratic backsliding and are currently also under the Article 7 procedure, which remains stalled as the two countries have promised to veto each other's file.26
The European Commission also has long-standing concerns regarding Hungary's judicial independence and systemic corruption.27 European Anti-Fraud office (OLAF) ranks Hungary at the top in the list of countries exhibiting irregularities involving EU funds.28 These considerations have prevented the EU from approving Hungary’s national recovery fund, amounting to € 7.2 billion in grants. In a counter-measure, Hungary’s finance ministry has been quick to reach out to investors and announce that this mechanism would not make Hungary lose out on money.29
Hungary’s Policy on China
Hungary has built close ties with China through the "Eastern Opening" policy in order to attract investment and economic opportunities. The ‘Eastern Opening’, introduced at the beginning of 2010, was supposed to attract capital from China to counterbalance that from the EU but it has not delivered as per expectations.30 It must be noted that Hungary is also among China’s closest partners in the latter’s ambitious 17+1 format (now 16 +1). One of the reasons why Chinese investments in Hungary have not lived up to expectations is the underperformance of China’s 17+1 arrangement in Central Europe which got marred by unfulfilled projects.31 In 2020, Hungary formally questioned the capability of the EU and the West to provide adequate humanitarian aid, stating that China would be a better partner.32 In a bid to further appease China, Hungary became the first and the only EU country to approve Chinese vaccines.33 In a first-ever for an EU country, Orban’s government signed an agreement with Shanghai-based Fudan University in April 2021 to build a campus at a disputed site in Budapest, sparking fears that it will help Beijing increase its influence in Hungary and the EU.34 However, contrary to Hungary’s initial hopes and appeasement, the partnership with China has not become a viable alternative to the West and the EU remains the biggest trading partner for Hungary. Most of Hungary’s exports go to the EU and the share of EU members in Hungary’s exports has been more than 75 per cent in the last couple of years.35
Therefore, both China and Russia have been additional foreign policy openings for the Orban government for balancing strained relations with the EU and countering the narrative of an isolated Hungary within the EU. Despite close economic ties with China, Hungary wants to pursue economic benefits flowing from EU membership as well. Hence, Orban’s government is treading the double path of wanting to benefit from the EU’s economic architecture, while pursuing close economic relations with China and also maintaining neutrality towards Russia—a policy that has often placed Hungary at loggerheads with the EU.36
Conclusion
Orban’s electoral victory will have implications for European politics and specially, EU unity. The Russia–Ukraine War is fundamentally altering the geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of Europe. Hungary’s relations with Slovakia, the Czech Republic and even Poland, which so far has been a staunch regional ally of Hungary, have come under pressure over the last few weeks because of the clash of views over Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Czech Republic and Poland, for instance, cancelled their participation in the March 2022 defense ministers’ meeting between the Visegrád 4 nations over Hungary’s stand on Russia. Pressure will mount on Orban to mend ties with Central Europeans allies, to consolidate Hungary’s position within the EU with regard to getting their support on Article 7 proceedings.
The Orban government’s foreign and domestic policies will continue to be under the EU’s scanner, as it seeks to ramp up pressure on Russia for precipitating the worst security crisis that Europe is witnessing after the Second World War.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Japan is likely to play a decisive role in positioning Northeast India as a powerhouse through improved connectivity, opening up trade corridors and driving better economic integration.
Major powers often leverage infrastructure financing as a consequential geo-economic tool of statecraft. China’s grand design of Belt and Road Initiative prompted high power politics, and the competitive space of infrastructure financing has seen alternative solutions, including Japan’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI), US-led Blue Dot Network, G7’s Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership and the European Union’s Global Gateway.
Making its mark, Japan’s instrumental role in global norm-setting vis-à-vis quality infrastructure1 is effectively demonstrated, be it in the G7 Ise-Shima Principles2 or the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment endorsed at the Osaka Summit. Openness, transparency, economic efficiency taking into account life-cycle cost, and debt sustainability drive Japan’s quality infrastructure strategy as it responds to Beijing’s global infrastructure agenda.3
Much before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in its 2017 projections indicated that developing Asia requires to invest US$ 1.7 trillion every year in infrastructure until 2030 to maintain its economic growth and to manage poverty alleviation and climate change. Infrastructure financing in emerging economies of South and Southeast Asia serves the dual objectives of generating new growth frontiers for Japanese economy by seizing the global infrastructure market on the one hand and buttressing strategic partnerships to manage the rise of a Sino-centric order on the other.4
Quality Infrastructure: Positioning Japan in Global Norm-setting
Japan’s global pitch for quality infrastructure is embedded in five principles which entails: (a) effective mobilisation of financial resources through public–private partnerships; (b) alignment with development strategies of emerging economies; (c) maintaining high-quality rules for environmental and social standards; (d) ensuring quality infrastructure by way of economic efficiency, low life-cycle cost, inclusiveness, resilience, sustainability; and (e) contribution to the local economy.5
In policy conversations, infrastructure export has remained a central pillar in Japanese economic growth strategy. The “Infrastructure System Overseas Promotion Strategy (2021–2025)” not only advances the strategic objectives of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and strives to promote Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in partner countries, but also pursues the objective of economic growth through carbon neutrality and digital transformation. The aim is to co-create development models with partner countries that share Tokyo’s FOIP vision.6 It advocates involvement in operation and maintenance (O&M) of infrastructure rather than just one-off sales.
Additionally, the concept of “quality growth” constitutes the mainstay of Japan’s 2015 Development Cooperation Charter.7 Meanwhile, Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) in its policy proposal “Towards Strategic Promotion of the Infrastructure Export” simultaneously argued the case of leveraging high-quality and disaster-resilient features of Japan's infrastructure systems while identifying Asia, and especially countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, India and Myanmar as the priority regions.8
Mapping Japan in India’s Infrastructure Modernisation
The External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar has underscored that economic development is propelled by 3Cs: connectivity, commerce and contacts. The latest Economic Survey estimates suggest that for India to realise the goal of US$ 5 trillion Gross Domestic Product by 2025, it has to spend roughly US$ 1.4 trillion on infrastructure.9 To this end, Gati Shakti, the National Master Plan for Multi-modal Connectivity will be a force multiplier as India aims to streamline implementation of infrastructure connectivity. As India mobilise resources, the goal is to plug into the regional value chains and production networks.
However, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s 2021 Asian Infrastructure Finance Report underscored that India stands 7.4 per cent below the average global value chain participation rate for emerging economies.10 Participation in global value chains will be contingent on improved infrastructure, bolstering institutional quality, capacity, connectivity and competitiveness.
Japan’s infrastructure export policy aligns perfectly with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Make in India’ policy as it seeks to be the epicentre of global manufacturing. This necessitates offering world-class infrastructure and improving investment climate. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been an enabler in advancing quality infrastructure and modernising connectivity within India and beyond. India has been a beneficiary of Japan’s EPQI initiative which committed financing of about US$ 200 billion in 2016 for a period of five years.11
Japanese ODA not only played an instrumental role in mega-infrastructure projects, be it Mumbai–Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail, Delhi–Mumbai and Chennai–Bengaluru Industrial Corridors, Dedicated Freight Corridor and urban mass rapid transport systems, it is also a force multiplier in India’s strategic peripheries. Furthermore, Japan features as the right fit in India’s regional infrastructure and connectivity pursuit, be it the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) or Coalition for Disaster-Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) announced at the UN Climate Action Summit in 2019.
Japan in India’s Northeast
Building beyond the history of “Imphal Campaign”, today Japan is an indispensable partner as India advances regional infrastructure and connectivity corridors, especially in the Northeast strategic frontier over the Bay of Bengal to the Indo-Pacific. As India connects with Southeast Asia, Northeast is the crucial geostrategic plank bordering China and Bhutan in the north and Bangladesh and Myanmar to the west and east. It is the key theatre where India’s Act East traverses with Japan’s FOIP vision.
Driven by Northeast’s strategic significance, Prime Minister Modi has turned around the discourse on ‘tyranny of distance’ and mainstreamed the region in Delhi’s Act East Policy.12 The discussion on Northeast industrial corridor from Dawki (on Bangladesh border), Shillong via Guwahati to Nagoan and from Golaghat via Dimapur via Imphal to Moreh (on Myanmar border)13 paves the gateway to Southeast Asia, as it would facilitate seamless connectivity, and position India favourably in regional value chains and production networks. Meanwhile, the NITI Forum for Northeast is geared towards inclusive and sustainable economic growth in the region. As such, the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) has set up the Make-In-North-East Initiative with a dedicated Northeast Desk within Invest India.14
Northeast is being prioritised in the developmental agenda since it holds the potential to emerge as the growth engine of India. However, this demands significant infrastructure investment. As India seeks support from multilateral and bilateral funding agencies to drive innovation and imbibe international best practices, Japan has emerged as a trusted partner. Prioritising Northeast in India–Japan relations is driven by the constructive leadership of Prime Minister Modi and former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo keeping the broader Indo-Pacific strategic vision into consideration. Japanese ODA is playing a crucial role in advancing connectivity in the strategic periphery of Northeast India.
Moreover, Japan’s engagement with Northeast India remains steadfast, and sometimes as argued by Japanese scholars, shaped by “common history”. 15 The World War II connects Northeast India with Japan in a “personal and emotional way” drawing from the “shared historical experience” as many Japanese soldiers not only arrived but also lost their lives in the Northeast.16 Today, Japan’s role in the Northeast is not restricted to infrastructure and connectivity but a greater investment in deepening people-to-people contact, from skill development, IRIS programme and capacity building to peace museum demonstrates the importance Tokyo attaches to this region of India.
Institution of the Act East Forum in 2017 has delivered effectively in positioning Northeast India as a strategic priority in India–Japan strategic partnership. The recent launch of the Sustainable Development Initiative for the North Eastern Region during Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to India adds qualitative depth to India–Japan cooperation as it not just prioritises connectivity projects and capacity building for the maintenance of resilient mountainous highways but also developing agro-industries mainly through small and medium enterprises (SMEs), supporting bamboo value chain, advancing skill development, strengthening quality healthcare, renewable energy and conservation.17 Japan’s current ODA projects in this region amounts to around ¥ 246 billion.
India’s Northeast: Gateway to Indo-Pacific
India is acting east with a sense of urgency to accelerate regional connectivity corridors, particularly via Bangladesh and Myanmar. As India and Japan make concerted efforts towards promoting regional connectivity and infrastructure through Northeast India (see Map 1), it would be practical to further create synergy with complementary ADB projects.18
Source: Prepared by GIS Lab, MP-IDSA based on data drawn from Act East Forum, Japan International Cooperation Agency and Asian Development Bank. [Click on Image for Larger View]
ADB supports India’s regional connectivity agenda, especially linking North Bengal and Northeast of India under South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) programme. SASEC aims to connect Kathmandu (Nepal)–Kakarbhitta (Nepal)–Panitanki (India)–Phulbari (India)–Banglabandha (Bangladesh)–Mongla/Chittagong (Bangladesh), and Thimphu (Bhutan)–Phuentsholing (Bhutan)–Jaigaon (India)–Changrabandha (India)–Burimari (Bangladesh)–Mongla/Chittagong (Bangladesh). Some SASEC corridors in Bangladesh and India connect with some parts of the Asian Highway 1 and 2 to Myanmar.19 In the period 2011–2020, 66.2 per cent of Japanese ODA was directed towards the transportation sector.20 The transportation sector is being prioritised both by JICA and ADB, thus creating synergy will reinforce the goal of linking India to South and Southeast Asian markets.21 Working together with Japan will buttress global standards of transparency and economic sustainability.
India’s aim is to facilitate deeper economic linkages and integration between Northeast India and Southeast and East Asian economies through various cross-border infrastructure corridors such as SASEC, Asian Highways, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Project, and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and its potential eastward extension. Furthermore, Japan’s own infrastructure and connectivity projects in Southeast Asia, the East–West Economic Corridor and the Southern Economic Corridor could be effectively utilised to reach regional markets.
Advancing regional connectivity and infrastructure development would be a shot in the arm amid COVID-19 recovery driving productivity, competitiveness, market access, economic growth and employment amongst developing Asian economies. Japanese ODA complements India’s North Eastern Region Vision 2020, and reinforces intra-regional and inter-regional connectivity both from geostrategic and geo-economic perspective. In future, Japan will play a significant role in addressing the infrastructure-deficit, and help India alleviate the development gap by positioning Northeast as a powerhouse through improved connectivity, opening up trade corridors and driving better economic integration.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has put Kazakhstan’s foreign policy to a severe test. Though there are similarities between Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the NATO factor doesn’t exist in the case of the latter. In Kazakhstan’s approach to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, it is possible to discern a distinct tilt towards Russia.
Kazakhstan can be a good starting point for studying the impact of the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict on the Central Asian States (CAS). It is the only CAS sharing a land boundary with Russia, stretching almost 7,644 kilometres, and has a sizeable Russian minority on its territory. The Kazakh situation is somewhat analogous to Ukraine regarding the concentration of ethnic Russians in northern Kazakhstan, adjoining Russia, mirroring eastern and southern parts of Ukraine.
Declining Ethnic Russian Population
Kazakhstan's demography in the country as a whole has changed since it became independent in 1991, with the proportion of Kazakhs rising steadily.1 In 1989, ethnic Russians were 37.4 per cent of the population, which was almost equal to ethnic Kazakhs at 39.6 per cent.2 However, by 2016, the Russian population in Kazakhstan had declined to about 21 per cent.3 The share of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan’s population is now estimated at only 18 per cent of 19 million.4
Notwithstanding the change in the composition of Kazakhstan’s population on account of the emigration of Russians5 and the inflow of expatriate Kazakhs into the country, the situation in northern Kazakhstan is different,6 with ethnic Kazakhs being a minority at 35.03 per cent of the population in this region. On the other hand, ethnic Russians in northern Kazakhstan are estimated at 49.53 per cent.7 The sizeable Russian landmass nearby may be the cause of a minority syndrome in the Kazakh majority of Kazakhstan. Russians in northern Kazakhstan could look towards Russia to protect their interests, creating a feeling of vulnerability among Kazakhs. On 10 June 1998, the Government of Kazakhstan had transferred the national capital from Almaty, located on the southern periphery, to Astana in central Kazakhstan, perhaps with the intention of reinforcing the government’s authority over the entire territory of the country from a more central location.
Kazakh National Sentiments
Periodic statements made by influential Russians suggesting that Kazakhstan was an artificial construct have not helped. On 29 August 2014, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said Kazakhs never had any statehood.8 On 10 December 2020, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Chairman of the Education and Science Committee of the Russian Duma, said that much of Kazakhstan's territory was a great gift from Russia and the Soviet Union.9 Nikonov also said, “northern Kazakhstan was not inhabited at all. Kazakhs had existed, but much further to the south”.10 On 15 December 2020, the Former Kazakh President Nazarbayev reacted angrily and the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) delivered a note of protest to the Russian Embassy.
In his address to the nation on 21 February 2022, President Putin had rejected the notion that Ukraine ever had “real statehood” and claimed that Ukraine had always been a part of Russia’s “own history, culture, spiritual space”.11 When provoked, Kazakhs have appeared eager to defend their distinct identity. In 1986, the Soviet leadership had replaced long-standing General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Dinmukhamed Kunaev with the non-Kazakh, Gennady Kolbin (a Russian). Although the widespread protests were suppressed, the Soviet leadership replaced Kolbin with ethnic Kazakh Nursultan Nazarbayev.
In recent times, issues relating to China have also been expressed. In 2016, protests had targeted the draft bill, which would have allowed the leasing of land by foreigners for 25 years. These protests were mainly aimed at Chinese nationals, increasingly visible in the country. In May 2018, the Kazakh President Tokayev signed a bill into legislation banning the sale and leasing of agricultural land to foreigners.12 With this law, Kazakh leadership hoped to adequately address public anger about Chinese entrepreneurs grabbing land in the country. Moreover, in April 2020, Kazakh MFA protested to the Chinese Ambassador after a Chinese website (Sohu.com) wrote that Kazakhstan had been a "vassal of the Qing dynasty".13
Russia and Stability in Kazakhstan
While Kazakh nationalism manifests itself from time to time in various forms, the paradox is that Kazakhstan’s leadership may be dependent on Russia for its survival in extreme situations. In January 2022, there were violent demonstrations in Kazakhstan in response to the government's decision to lift the price cap on liquified petroleum gas from 1 January 2022.14 The protests started in the oil-producing city of Zhanaozen and spread to other cities, including the largest city, Almaty, and acquired a political dimension. Responding to Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s request, the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) deployed troops to support the Kazakh Government. The protests were believed to have led to over 200 deaths.15
Apart from Russia, China with its comprehensive capabilities, has a big presence and stakes in Central Asia and Kazakhstan and therefore its conduct in this crisis is of interest. China has both extensive commercial interests in the country and security concerns on account of Uyghurs and other cross-border ethnic linkages. While China is an influential player in Kazakhstan, initially, it kept a low profile during the January 2022 crisis.16 However, after President Tokayev's speech on 7 January 2022 blaming terrorists trained abroad for the violence, China’s President Xi Jinping offered support to put down the attempt to engineer a 'colour revolution' in Kazakhstan. In the end, China should have been satisfied with the intervention by Russia and CSTO in support of the Kazakh Government.
Russia and China are not the only big players in the country. Kazakhstan is a resource-rich country, and in 2022 almost 600 US firms were operating in Kazakhstan with an investment of US$ 45 billion.17 In addition, US companies had made a cumulative investment of US$ 161 billion in the energy sector from 2005 till 2020. Of this, US$ 30 billion came directly from the US.18
The Russia–Ukraine Conflict Since 2014
In a sense, the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict is a continuation of the process which began in 2014 with the Maidan protests in Ukraine, leading to the overthrow of pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych with encouragement from the West. Kazakhstan had agreed with the 16 March 2014 referendum in Crimea to legitimise Russian annexation as “yet another manifestation of realising a nation’s right to self-determination”.19 However, in response to Ukraine's concerns, the Kazakh side explained that it neither recognised the referendum nor the annexation. Still, the Crimean people had legitimate security, humanitarian and other interests. It could be argued that Kazakhstan has avoided explicitly criticising Russia, Ukraine or the West. But in different ways, it has favoured Russia.
Official Kazakh Response to the Conflict
This time as well, Kazakhstan’s response to the Ukrainian conflict appeared as weighed in favour of Russia. In his address to the 22nd Extraordinary Congress of the ruling Amanat Party on 1 March 2022, President Tokayev called on Russia and Ukraine to find common ground and reach an agreement at the negotiating table.20 He said that a bad peace was better than a good war. He went on to say that “the principle of indivisibility and commonality of security stipulates mutual understanding based on mutual trust. Unfortunately, this has not happened. The Minsk agreements had remained only on paper, which led to the military operations on the territory of Ukraine”. Kazakhstan offered all possible assistance, including mediation if, of course, it was required.
When President Putin discussed the Ukrainian situation with Tokayev the next day, the latter pushed for a compromise between Russia and Ukraine.21 Kazakh authorities also discouraged anti-Russia protests.22 In early March, Kazakh authorities had allowed anti-war activists to hold a rally in Almaty against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in which about 2,000 demonstrators had taken part. But Kazakh authorities were understood to have refused permission to hold a similar protest rally on 19 March 2022.
Some reports from the West suggested that Kazakhstan had denied the Russian request to let its troops participate in the offensive in Ukraine and indicated that it would not recognise the so-called Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk.23 Previously, Kazakhstan has not recognised Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the so-called republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgian territories occupied by Russia after the August 2008 Russia–Georgia war.
Protecting Kazakhstan from Sanctions on Russia
What came out more strongly was a sense of urgency for Kazakhstan to shield its economy from western sanctions on Russia. Apart from traditional economic and other linkages, Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Eurasian Customs Union, along with Russia, Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan’s MFA tasked its Embassies to engage with key European ports authorities urgently. Kazakh MFA also initiated a study of the impact of sanctions on Russian transport and logistic companies.
On 11 March 2022, Kazakhstan engaged in online consultations with the US on sanctions.24 It appears that this was a Kazakh initiative, with almost 80 participants from the Kazakh side in what was, in effect, a workshop on the sanctions. The American team briefed the Kazakh participants on the new trade, economic, banking, financial, and energy sanctions.
There are reports that Kazakhstan is attempting to redirect imports and exports away from Russian ports to Latvia to avoid international sanctions. The Caspian Sea Pipeline Consortium (CPC), stretching over 1,500 km, connects the Tengiz oilfield in Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. This pipeline accounts for 2/3 of Kazakhstan's oil exports. The US has excluded the Chevron-led Caspian pipeline concession from its ban on Russian oil and gas imports in an attempt to leave open this export route, provided that the crude oil is not of Russian origin.25
In a virtual meeting with Central Asian Foreign Ministers held on 28 February 2022, the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken condemned Russia's attack on Ukraine and reiterated Washington's support for that nation's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.26 His Central Asian colleagues however did not join him in expressing similar sentiments.
Conclusion
Kazakhstan’s immediate priority is to safeguard its economic and commercial interests by ensuring that the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West do not adversely impact its exports. However, alternative transit options, such as China and Iran, have limitations.
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has put Kazakhstan’s foreign policy to a severe test with no easy solutions. There are similarities between Ukraine and Kazakhstan, but they should not be exaggerated. A critical provocation for Russia in its ties with Ukraine was the prospect of NATO at its doorstep. This may not be the case with Kazakhstan, although Russia would tend to keep a watchful eye on American activities in Central Asia even without the NATO factor.
During a telephonic conversation with President Putin on 2 April 2022, President Tokayev said that “a common understanding was expressed of the exceptional importance of reaching agreements on the neutral, non-aligned, nuclear-free status of Ukraine”.27 Therefore, Kazakhstan seems to agree with Russia on the terms on which the war with Ukraine can be ended. In Kazakhstan’s approach to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, it is possible to discern a distinct tilt in the direction of Russia.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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