Women play active roles in sustaining and facilitating extremist activities on the African continent.
Africa has been an epicentre of violent extremist activities, for the past few decades. As per the Global Terrorism Index 2022, 48 per cent of the global terrorism deaths took place in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel region is ‘home to the world’s fastest growing and most-deadly terrorist groups’.1 The poor socio-economic conditions, ideological trends, and weak governance have been causes for terrorist outfits laying inroads into African countries. Studies indicate that women play active roles in sustaining and facilitating extremist activities on the continent.2 There has also been an increase in the cases of women being arrested in terror-related incidents.3
Women vis-à-vis Terrorism in Africa
Women play multiple active and passive roles in carrying out terrorist activities. They are strategic as well as tactical actors for a terrorist organisation. Each parental organisation, such as the ISIS, their affiliates, or independent terrorist organisations, have relied on women to varying capacities to attain their goals. Women have assumed the roles of propagandists, recruiters, and participated in combat operations. ISIS, in Kano, Nigeria, has created all-women morality police units, Hisbah, to ensure other women toe the line on issues like dress codes, among others.4
While groups like the Al-Qaeda have restricted women to their societal roles of a wife and a mother, within the African context, groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia have exploited the society’s regressive understanding of women to their advantage. Women have been actively used to recruit, gather intelligence, disseminate propaganda, and shame other men into joining the jihadist cause. They have also raised funds and smuggled goods across checkpoints, evading security checks.5
The absence of adequate women’s participation in the police forces has also played into the terrorists’ hands as they are well aware that male officers, due to gender and cultural sensitivities, will refrain from indulging in security checks on women. By February 2022, only 1,400 women had been recruited into the Somali Police Force, for instance, out of the total 14,000 individuals serving as police officers.6 Furthermore, out of 300 members in Darwish, a special unit of the police force, only 30 women have been recruited into the ranks.7
The factors that propel women’s involvement in organisations like the Al-Shabaab stem from avenging the death of their kins on account of state-sponsored violence or due to ideological commitment. Recruiters exploit the fact that everyone in Al-Shabaab-controlled territories are mandated to receive religious education.8 Women have also married into the group for financial and physical security as the Somali state can provide neither.
Groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria have used coercion to recruit young women into their ranks as suicide bombers. Using a similar strategy as Al-Shabaab’s, they exploit the regressive gender narrative and rely on primarily dispensable foot soldiers, i.e., women and teenage girls, to cause instability and chaos. During the period 2011–17, Al-Shabaab had used 244 women as suicide bombers.9
A predominant factor for women to be involved in violent extremism is economic grievance and poverty. Many women who have joined Al-Shabaab are primarily from poor areas such as Majengo, Garissa and Kwale in Kenya. These women are coerced into joining extremist organisations as fighters or informants, on the pretext of securing job opportunity.10 The terrorist outfits purposefully create a situation where access to resources is denied, rendering the people with no choice but to join the outfit as a means to provide for livelihood.11 Besides, the involvement of their family members and friends in such groups also adds to the pressure. Corruption and lack of political capacities to provide for the people frustrates the local population to join terrorist groups to punish the government and state forces.
Of the several case studies in Africa to understand the role of women in terrorism, security trends in Western Africa and the Sahel provide compelling insights. The region surrounding northern Mali and bordering Niger and Burkina Faso is plagued with multiple violent extremist outfits, including Islamic State affiliate–Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), AQIM, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and others.12
The Islamic State has been openly receptive to including women into the rungs of its organisation and it even has a separate female brigade, ‘Al Khansaa Brigade’.13 The JNIM, while publicly denying the use of women as suicide bombers, does include them as informants and for other domestic support.14 The AQIM, on the other hand, has indulged in the practice of ‘jihadi brides’ and encouraged its members to marry the locals to gain local support.
One of the reasons which add to the complexity of the security situation in Mali is the nexus and linkages between local insurgent rebels and external organised terrorist outfits. One dimension of this linkage is that jihadist leaders marry women of the local communities, thus securing a sense of safety, support and belongingness to the people. A classic example is the case of AQIM leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who married four women from Tuareg and Arab Berabiche communities to ‘expand his network of influence’.15
Mitigation and DDR Measures
The foremost step in addressing this pressing issue is the imperative of government authorities and regional organisations acknowledging this phenomenon. Unfortunately, governments are often guilty of dealing with the threat of violent extremism as ‘mambo yavijana’ (Kiswahili term denoting ‘issues of male youth’), a phrase generally used for describing violent extremism. As a result, governments overlook the fact that women are visibly important actors in the domain of violent extremism. Therefore, there is a need for gender-sensitivisation of counter-terrorism activities.
The success of states’ mitigation strategies is contingent on developing and maintaining cohesive and efficient institutional structures which provide swift justice, holistic development, and security, across fault lines. However, this requires a long-term commitment to rebuilding the state capacities by domestic and regional actors—aided by external support, not interference.
The short-term adhesive that should be applied includes gender sensitising ongoing rehabilitation programmes and demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) measures. This is necessary to aid women who have left behind a life of terror voluntarily or due to the death of their husbands and to help them re-assimilate with the mainstream society that would be wary of accepting them. They need additional support in dealing with the mental anguish of surviving abuse, lack of adequate access to issues relating to women’s health, or finding employment to sustain their families.
Without adequate support, such women could suffer in detention camps or go back to violent activities. This will legitimise the propaganda of terrorist groups about the states’ indifference towards ordinary citizens while elites exploit primary resources, as in Syria’s Al-Hol Camp.16 The absence of security measures and deplorable conditions make the detainees susceptible to recidivism or indoctrination by recruiters who have maintained a visible presence. In addition, the terrorists can use such issues to convince the camp residents that they would fare better living under ISIS’ rule rather than under Kurdish control. The prospects of repatriation to their home countries where they would face persecution or be stripped from their families is another big concern.
The role of regional organisations is also equally important. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) held an event on 19 May 2021, along the margins of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, titled ‘Addressing Gender in Preventing Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Africa: Integrating Women’s Diverse Roles and Voices’.17 UNODC’s regional partners in Africa, like the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, African Union’s (AU) Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism and other organisations, participated in the discussions. It was emphasised that there needs to be a greater understanding on the roles women play in order to develop tailored strategies against violent extremism. The need for building institutional and community resilience, empowerment of women, increase in participation and representation of women in counter-terrorism and criminal justice agencies, among others, was stressed.
As part of fulfilling Aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063, the Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the AU could take steps to recognise the role of women in terrorism.18 With this as a launch pad, additional DDR measures could be taken. AU could empower governments with guidelines to implement the same. Any counter-terrorism measures that do not consider the subtle yet critical roles women play in extremist outfits would be ineffective.
Conclusion
The involvement of women in terrorist activities in Africa is nuanced, multi-layered, and dynamic. Women have advertently or inadvertently proliferated into terrorist outfits and have played supporting and enabling roles in these organisations. Violent extremist groups like the AQIM, JNIM, and others deal with the involvement of women differently. While some encourage and actively enable their role, others publicly denounce women’s inclusion even while relying on them. Furthermore, while some organisations only include women for tactical roles like cooks, recruiters, others have them for strategic roles like suicide bombers and informants.
It is imperative for affected states to engage in capacity-building through a bottom-up approach, taking on board local religious and community representatives. The AU should play an essential role in recognising the role of women in terrorism and tackling the threat the phenomenon poses. Successful state and civil society initiatives against terrorism are also hinged on measures to ensure their ideological defeat. This is because, even if violent extremist actors are eliminated or their organisations are disbanded, their ideological influence continues to foment fear and instability.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Digital Vaccines: Web 3.0 Solutions for Chronic Diseases
Krutika Patil
June 30, 2022
The opportunities for digital vaccines as tools to address modern-day chronic health problems are immense.
Digital Vaccines, along with Digital Medicines, are part of an emerging medical field termed Digital Therapeutics that amalgamates medicine with technology to tackle lifestyle ailments. These gamified, digital interventions provide safe and low-risk management of chronic diseases that require constant medical intervention.1 Digital vaccines can transform our medical systems which are generally not equipped to treat lifestyle diseases effectively. These solutions can be utilised by the Indian Armed Forces also to address chronic mental and physical health issues, especially for soldiers stationed in remote areas.
Relevance of Digital Vaccines
The healthcare system, more often than not, fails to provide regular and cheap care to patients suffering from chronic diseases, as it is geared more towards treating acute diseases. Chronic illnesses, which overwhelmingly affect the elderly population, often take a long time to develop and require continuous monitoring. They are caused by unhealthy behavioural choices like poor nutrition, lack of exercise, excessive alcohol use, and smoking. Ailments like diabetes, respiratory diseases, cardiovascular conditions, and physiological illnesses are examples of chronic diseases.
Acute diseases, on the other hand, typically manifest rapidly, last for a short period, and are usually caused by viruses, infections, injuries sustained in accidents, or drug and medication abuse. Diseases like Covid-19, flu, burn injuries, pneumonia are some of the examples of acute diseases. Improved medical sanitation, antibiotics, vaccines, and surgical procedures have led to better treatment of acute conditions and decrease in mortality rates.
Leading health conditions are now linked to chronic diseases that are exacerbated due to lifestyle choices. As a result, our medical systems are ill-equipped to prevent, manage, and contain such chronic diseases. Therefore, digital vaccines, which enable widespread scaling of frequent, personalised interventions at a low cost, may become an essential tool in the prevention and management of chronic disorders.2
Technological Advancements in Digital Therapeutics
With the proliferation of web 3.0 technologies operating in metaverse platforms, wearable technologies, Internet of Things (IoT), and Virtual and Augmented Reality (AR/VR), the development of digital vaccines promises to address multiple medical conditions at much lower cost through constant behavioural interventions. Digital Therapeutics is an intersection of neuroscience, cognitive sciences, heath analytics, and AI-powered mobile VR gaming.3 This differs greatly from telemedicine that usually is just virtual communication between doctors and their patients.
Given below are digital interventions being pursued or in vogue to tackle health conditions.
Covid-19
Personal hygiene, disinfecting surfaces, and social distancing are important lifestyle changes that help reduce the spread of infectious diseases like Covid-19. FriendsLearn is currently working on a digital vaccine delivered through a gamified mobile application that will be culturally sensitive and flexible to use. The start-up aims to use “dynamic neuro-behavioural-physiological modulation” using machine learning models in this endeavour.4
Diabetes
The number of people infected with diabetes is expected to rise to more than 134 million by 2045 in India.5 Type 2 diabetes accounts for the majority of cases which are linked to behavioural tendencies like high-calorie consumption and lack of physical activities. To successfully manage diabetes, patients must engage in a number of behavioural changes that occur outside of the healthcare setting, such as frequent blood sugar monitoring, medication adherence, and insulin self-injection. This puts a lot of pressure on the patients to manage their condition on their own.
Several digital medicine companies have developed solutions to address the diabetes and prediabetes epidemic. These include Text2Move (TTM), a United States-based study, which aims to determine whether automated, personalised, targeted, and motivational text messages could increase activity levels among Type 2 diabetics, thereby improving outcomes and lowering healthcare costs. The BlueStar smartphone app helps patients choose the best time to test blood sugar. As a result, it gives patients a more accurate picture of how their blood sugar fluctuates throughout the day in response to environmental stimuli.6
Cardiovascular diseases
According to the findings of the Global Burden of Disease study, India has an age-standardised cardiovascular disease (CVD) death rate of 272 per 100,000 people, which is significantly higher than the global average of 235.7 Like diabetes, CVD is also linked to lifestyle and behavioural factors that require management of weight. 'Fooya!' is an interactive and immersive gaming platform for kids that works as a digital vaccine. It attempts to encourage lifestyle changes through video games by promoting healthy eating.8
Further, recording a patient's data over time with a granular data set via digital medicines will allow a physician to understand if an intervention will be effective.9 There are wireless blood pressure monitors that are used in conjunction with an app to display blood pressure data. Historic readings are saved and can be accessed via the cloud, allowing either the patient or the physician to identify changes from previous readings.10
Challenges
Despite the promise of digital vaccines, there are a few challenges like privacy and regulation issues. According to research by Mozilla, user privacy is much less protected in mental health apps than in most other types of apps. Privacy is a major concern for digital vaccines interventions, in particular for those that influence behaviour change through intensive monitoring of personal data, such as location, movement, and purchase data.11
Large amounts of aggregated health data may be valuable to third parties (state or non-state actors), incentivizing digital vaccine platforms to sell the data. This can increase the security and privacy risks of the patients. This could complicate the regulation challenges of these platforms for the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO), which is responsible for drug approval, clinical trials, drug standards, quality control of imported drugs in the country.
Digital vaccine platforms could bypass regulations by not directly mentioning the management of chronic conditions but through claims of tackling habit-based challenges like weight loss, smoking, alcohol consumption, and mental distress. The exponential surge in chronic diseases, however, demands approaches that differ from those provided by current medical systems. Therefore, with significant technological advancements and innovation in computer and behavioural science, the opportunities for digital vaccines as tools to address our modern day medical problems are immense.
Digital Vaccine Use-Case: Indian Armed Forces
Digital Vaccines hold tremendous potential for the Indian Armed Forces. Such interventions can be used for treatment of soldiers in remote areas and for treatment of psychological conditions. Many military personnel experience mental health-related issues, especially post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), due to their involvement in highly stressful operations.12
While the role of video games in training personnel is well known, video games (also called ‘serious games’ in the context of mental health) in the form of digital vaccines can also be used for addressing mental health challenges. For example, US DoD’s National Center for Telehealth and Technology (T2) – which coordinates initiatives on digital health tools, has created a Virtual PTSD Experience computer-based program called ‘Second Life’. This is a virtual-reality video game, where the military personnel can create a virtual avatar to navigate through realistic scenarios to address their mental health concerns.13
Research on intensive virtual models showed potential to increase access to evidence-based PTSD treatment for veterans and service persons.14 Serious games in the form of digital vaccines can address issues like PTSD, divorce, emotional distress, and mental health. Indian Armed Forces, too, can initiate digital vaccine programs for their personnel to help curb mental health and other chronic conditions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The French withdrawal from Mali exacerbates the regional security situation.
At the request of the then interim government led by President Dioncounda Traore, France militarily intervened in Mali in 2013, by launching Operation Serval. The operation was authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 The imperatives that drove the French decision included the need to safeguard its economic investments (uranium mining fields in neighbouring Niger), political interests (long-standing close relationship with Mali, Francophone African countries and international obligations as a UNSC permanent member), and security interests (protection of the French diaspora in the region and to prevent the threat of an Islamist takeover).2 Operation Serval was successful in pushing back the rebels to the northern part of Mali. Owing to the spread of these outfits to the neighbouring regions, Operation Barkhane, a counter-terrorism operation in the Sahel region, was launched in August 2014.
Over the years, international missions and regional players have made tremendous efforts to counter the terrorist threat and security challenges. International missions included the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), instituted in 2013 and the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), launched in February 2013. Regional efforts included the G5 Sahel Joint Force launched in 2017—comprising Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The European Special Task Force ‘Operation Takuba’ was also established in March 2020.
Despite such military interventions over the past decade, there has not been much improvement in Mali’s security condition. Apart from being the epicenter of terrorist, jihadist and insurgency activity in the Sahel, Mali also faces threats from vigilantes and communal violence between the farming and herding communities, and is a hub for organised crime and illegal activities like smuggling and drug trafficking. Apart from political instability and the worsening security situation, the Covid-19 pandemic has also weakened the Malian economy, one of the poorest countries in the world.3 The country is dealing with high rates of poverty and unemployment and is heavily dependent on gold exports and oil imports.
Triggering Factors for French Withdrawal
Mali is currently being governed by a transition government led by Col Assimi Goïta, who led two coups in August 2020 and May 2021, with Choguel Kokalla Maïga as the prime minister.4
The military coups exacerbated tensions between France and Mali. France decided in June 2021 to unilaterally end its latest military Operation Barkhane. Later in February 2022, France and its allies announced a ‘coordinated withdrawal’ of their forces due to ‘multiple obstructions’ by the military-led government.5
The triggering factors were the rising tensions and differences with the Junta, delay in elections and the deterioration of bilateral ties. While announcing the decision to withdraw, President Emmanuel Macron stated that “we cannot remain militarily engaged alongside de-facto authorities whose strategy and hidden aims we do not share”.6 The decision of the military government in January 2022 to postpone elections to 2026, the ban on the Danish contingent of Operation Takuba, expelling of the French Ambassador and entry of the Russian-based Wagner Group at the end of 2021 as a security provider, deteriorated the bilateral relationship and fueled the decision on troop withdrawal.
There are additional geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic imperatives underlying the French withdrawal.
Geopolitical Imperatives:France has become increasingly unpopular among its former colonies in Africa. There has been a growing anti-French sentiment, especially in Mali. The local population has been protesting against the nearly decade-long foreign military presence by the former colonial power, that has yielded limited results. In December 2021, local protestors blocked a convoy of French troops repeatedly at multiple instances as it crossed from Burkina Faso and Niger towards Mali.7
Geostrategic Imperatives: With French presidential elections scheduled in April 2022, France was cautious of the execution of its withdrawal. The French government took measures to avoid comparisons with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Prior to the announcement, it held a meeting with the G5 Sahel leaders (except Mali and Burkina Faso due to the Junta rule) and portrayed the exit as a “coordinated withdrawal”.8 At home, there has been a growing domestic public dissatisfaction with France’s prolonged military involvement in Mali.9 Moreover, of the 53 French soldiers killed in Operation Barkhane, 48 had died in Mali.
Geo-economic Imperatives:France has withdrawn its troops only from Mali and not from the extended region. The troops are being re-deployed to Niger, giving France a base to continue its commitment to conduct anti-terrorist operations in Sahel and overlook its economic investments.10 As a country dependent on nuclear energy for electricity, French companies like Areva have huge investments in the uranium fields in Niger.11 Besides, the operation was proving to be costly for France, which was spending about one billion Euros (US$ 1.14 billion).12 By June 2022, France has handed over its military bases at Tessalit, Kidal, Timbuktu, Gossi and Menaka. The last withdrawal will be from the military base in Gao which would be returned to Malian forces “at the end of the summer”.13
Implications for Mali and the Region
The withdrawal of the French troops creates a security and political vacuum in the region and exacerbates the current security challenges.
Internal Implications: Mali has been left vulnerable to increased jihadist activity and militancy. The security crisis will continue to escalate with terrorist groups consolidating and setting up safe havens in northern parts of Mali. On the other hand, since the withdrawal of French troops and its allies indicates the withdrawal of foreign presence in the country, perhaps the insurgency elements and jihadist outfits would now be willing to negotiate with the Malian authorities. The withdrawal of foreign troops including the MINUSMA was one of the primary demands of these outfits as they perceived these forces to be an interference in the internal affairs of Mali, signifying an inability on the part of the government to handle its own matters.14
Additionally, there will be challenges in routing and distributing the developmental and humanitarian aid that comes into the country. French presence was complementing the efforts of MINUSMA. The mission was dependent on the logistical support and medical infrastructure of Operation Barkhane. MINUSMA Peacekeepers are equipped to protect civilians from attacks by armed groups and authorised to counter asymmetric threats but are not authorised to engage in counter-terrorism activities.15
The security and political vacuum created in Mali with the exit of France is being filled by external players like Russia. Reports indicate that mercenaries from the Wagner group are already stationed in Mali and Russia has given military equipment like combat helicopters and others to Mali.16Mali has renounced a military cooperation agreement with France and has withdrawn from the G5 Sahel Force. These developments isolate Mali and raise concerns on the success of regional efforts to fight against terrorism in Sahel.
External Implications: In the short-term, the French withdrawal would perhaps cause the security situation in Mali to escalate out of control. There could be an increase in transnational and cross-border terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the developments pose a security threat to countries south of the Sahel. These include the littoral countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana, Togo and others. There has been growing concern about the spillover of jihadi activities towards the Gulf of Guinea.
Macron, while announcing the troop withdrawal, had pointed out that
Al Qaeda and the Islamic State group have made the Sahel region of West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea nations ‘a priority for their strategy of expansion’. They are investing there and exploiting local causes in order to better pursue their global and regional agenda.17
Côte d'Ivoire President Alassane Ouattara warned that the withdrawal would create a political vacuum and pledged to take steps to enhance border protection.18
Another challenge is the political instability in the West Africa region. The region has witnessed three coups within a year, in Chad (April 2021), Mali (May 2021) and Burkina Faso (January 2022). Political instability would embolden the terrorist outfits who already control large territories in the region. Additionally, there has been an increase in the displacement and migration of people towards neighbouring countries, mostly northern Africa. Regional governments would need to prepare for the challenge of managing this influx.
Conclusion
The French withdrawal from Mali has created a security vacuum in the region. The security situation will likely deteriorate further, rendering Mali vulnerable to an increase in terrorist attacks. The efforts of MINUSMA would also be impacted. Apart from the challenge of tackling the increase in migration to neighbouring countries, the likelihood of the spread of terrorist threat to the littoral countries south of the Sahel has been heightened.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
4. In August 2020, President Keïta was ousted from power in a military coup led by Col Goïta. After nine months, owing to differences with the transitional authorities, Col Goïta who had been appointed as the Vice President of the transitional government, again staged a second coup in May 2021 and seized power from transitional President Bah Ndaw.
Quad’s Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative Needs Time to Deliver
Shruti Pandalai, Abhay Kumar Singh
June 24, 2022
The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) Initiative aims to enhance regional maritime security via technology and training support.
The Quad is often criticised for underplaying its security agenda for the greater good of consensus-building. The Tokyo Summit in May 2020 may have changed that, with an announcement which is being seen as a clearest signal yet to China on its aggressive tactics at sea. A collaborative effort by the US, India, Japan and Australia—the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) Initiative—is aimed at delivering on the promised goals of enhancing maritime security and shared domain awareness in the region via technology and training support.1 Capacity-building of regional countries to guard against Chinese misadventures near their waters, in essence, is the focus of this effort.
South East Asia is among the key focus regions of this initiative. The White House read-out outlines that the IPMDA will share commercially available satellite data and alert smaller Southeast Asian states on possible territorial intrusions or illicit activity such as illegal fishing, smuggling or piracy in waters within their maritime boundaries.2 China’s muscle-flexing in the South China Sea was discussed by India and the ASEAN leaders during the recently held Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue in New Delhi. For a grouping like the ASEAN, which finds itself at the receiving end of the strategic fallout of US–China competition and Chinese belligerence, capacity-building measures like IPDMA could augment strength.
Aims of the IPMDA
Simply put, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is about having comprehensive position and intentions of all actors at sea in the given area of interest. This requires creation of compilation, correlation and fusion of surveillance data collected from diverse sources, i.e., satellites, radar, reconnaissance planes or human intelligence, in order to detect and identify actors with irregular or threatening behaviour.
Given the vast expanse of the ocean and resources required for comprehensive surveillance at sea, a collaborative approach for information-sharing and domain awareness has remained a major ask. The end goal is to develop among like-minded countries a shared understanding of developments and threats at sea.
The key to this line of effort is to link up existing regional collaboration mechanisms which are already analysing and assessing threats and challenges in their respective areas of interest. Each of the Quad members have their space-based assets for maritime surveillance, which are supplemented by their airborne and land-based sensors.
In addition, the Quad countries support/operate regional fusion centres. These include India’s IOR IFC, Australia-sponsored Pacific Fusion Centre in South Pacific, Japan’s MDA Situational Indication Linkages (MSIL) and the US Navy’s SeaVision platform.3 Protocols exist, as it is, for information-sharing and by creating more linkages with other such mechanisms, the initiative aims to develop the ability to predict patterns for big picture analyses.4
Keeping China in Check
IPMDA is an effort to supplement existing arrangements and is a reiteration that habits of cooperation and trust among like-minded countries can help augment regional capacities through rapid distribution and processing of shared data.5 Official statements explain that integration of three regions—South East Asia, South Asia and the Pacific—and being responsive to their needs as to what “is happening in countries’ territorial waters and in their exclusive economic zones” in real time, drove this effort.6
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing has emerged as a major area of concern. Many regional countries are endowed with vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) but have limited resources for effective monitoring of these zones. IUU Fishing has led to many countries losing fiscal revenues and has had disastrous consequences on conservation and sustainability efforts.
The scale of the challenge is compounded given that most fishing vessels are not obligated to carry any vessel tracking system, i.e., Automatic Identification System (AIS) or Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). Even when they are mandated, as in the case of vessels more than 300 metres, illegal actors go dark by either switching their tracking system off or transmitting false/spurious data as spoof. Identifying such illegal actors requires persistent monitoring of relevant areas with high resolution, surveillance sensors. It is only when you process this data that illicit actors’ patterns of behaviour can be identified. Therefore, the challenge in identifying illegal actors at sea is as much about data collection as it is about data processing. IPMDA aims to address this gap via pooling of resources.
While the stated goal is to contribute towards an effective deployment of maritime assets by regional partners to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters, and combat illegal fishing, the signpost of ‘We are watching you’ to China is not explicitly stated but is implicit. It is no secret that fishing fleets from China have aggressively targeted Indo-Pacific waters and have sparked outrage with frequent clashes. The IPMDA initiative would in practical terms assist in not just identifying Chinese actions but also help push back on its grey-zone activities.
Limitations of the Initiative
Critics have argued that the announcement was the lowest hanging fruit the Quad countries could deliver on, given that the collaborative efforts this initiative aims to institutionalise are already in play. However, the fact is that regional MDA remains far from comprehensive and extensive gaps remain in terms of information sharing. To deter China actively at sea, investments for the long haul in terms of persistent tracking of the vast span of Indo-Pacific are essential for realising the stated goals.
Clearer answers on how Quad members will mobilise necessary space-, air- or land-based surveillance assets required for such constant tracking or queries on how demands for additional resource mobilisation will be met, requires further elaboration. India, for one, is already setting up coastal surveillance radar stations (CSRS) in strategically located IOR countries, but has faced problems where demand has exceeded supply.7
For Quad to succeed as a force of public good, a strategic buy-in from South East Asia is essential. Given the region’s scepticism towards the Quad and apprehensions about the Quad’s rhetoric on ASEAN centrality, the IPMDA could serve as a reassuring platform to deliver on the most fundamental requirements on regional maritime security and prove its effectiveness.8 However, time will be of essence, as Quad countries divvy up responsibilities and resources while managing the crunch of post-pandemic economies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Quad has cautiously carved out a practical and cooperative agenda on issues of cybersecurity.
The Tokyo Summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the ‘Quad’, was held on 24 May, 14 months after the first Summit-level meeting held in March 2021. Apart from pledging to advance ‘a common vision of free and open Indo-Pacific through practical cooperation on diverse 21st century challenges’, and ‘uphold the international rules-based order …’, the Quad also highlighted issues like global health security, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, and cyber and space security.1 An assessment of Quad’s cybersecurity initiatives indicate that they are designed keeping into consideration cyber threats from China as well as the Quad’s emphasis on ‘cyber resilience’ rather than on ‘offensive cyber capabilities, which is a more robust way to tackle widespread cybersecurity challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
Quad’s Cybersecurity Initiatives
At the Tokyo Summit, Quad leaders recognised the urgent need for a ‘collective approach to enhancing cybersecurity’ through initiatives like Quad Cybersecurity Partnership guided by the 10 Joint Cyber Principles2, the first-ever Quad Cybersecurity Day, information-sharing among Quad countries’ Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), and improving software and Managed Service Provider (MSP) security by coordinating cybersecurity standards for Quad governments’ procurement of software.
The Quad’s progress on cybersecurity issues has been encouraging since the September 2021 Summit meeting in Washington, where the members pledged to ‘facilitate public–private cooperation and demonstrate in 2022 the scalability & cybersecurity of open, standard-based technology’. The Quad Senior Cyber Group was also launched then.3 Experts met on 25 March 2022 to discuss strategies to improve cybersecurity in an increasingly digital world with sophisticated cyber threats.4 During the February 2022 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Quad members reiterated their support for ASEAN neighbours to ‘build resilience and counter disinformation’ while developing coordinated efforts to assist Indo-Pacific partners to address the growing threat of ransomware and capability-building to counter cybercrime.5
Each of these initiatives indicates implicitly the critical security challenges Quad members face, and an understanding of practical deliverables. The Quad Cybersecurity Partnership aims to build resilience to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and cyber threats by focusing on critical infrastructure protection (led by Australia), supply-chain resilience and security (led by India), workforce development and talent (led by Japan), and software security standards (led by the US). This targeted approach is coherent with the cyber threat trend and patterns in 2021 where multiple ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure led to supply-chain related disruptions all across the world.6
CERTs are nodal agencies that collect, analyse and disseminate information on cyber incidents; take emergency measures and coordinate handling of cybersecurity incidents; forecast and alert cybersecurity incidents and issue guidelines, advisories, and vulnerability reports of information security. Information-sharing and exchange of best practices will help Quad members' CERTs to develop a comprehensive and trust-based strategy for all stakeholders.
The US government and the Five Eyes intelligence partners—the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—issued a joint advisory in March 2022 warning about the ‘increasing cyberattacks by nation-state threat actors’ against managed service providers (MSPs). A MSP is a third-party organisation that maintains a customer's IT infrastructure and end-user systems from a remote location. Because MSPs have privileged access to their customers' networks at all times, successful cyberattacks against them can be disastrous.7 Hence, Quad's attention to MSPs’ security is linked to safeguarding software product supply chains from cyberattacks, especially ransomware attacks as witnessed in 2021.8 Three of the Quad members—India, the US and Japan—were also victims of the 2018 compromise of the MSPs that severely affected the software product supply chains all around the world, an attack that originated from China.9
The Cybersecurity Day campaign is an effort to strengthen cybersecurity awareness and promote action on cybersecurity for countries across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This will enable Quad members to push for the UN Voluntary Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace for norm-building and the promotion of ‘international peace and stability in cyberspace, and to help build the capacity of regional countries’.10
Critical and Emerging Technologies Initiatives
While there is a different working group for Critical and Emerging Technologies, many of its initiatives on 5G supplier diversification, semiconductor supply chains, and global technical standards have a direct impact on cybersecurity. At the Tokyo Summit, Quad members launched the Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains to enhance supply chain resilience.11
The push for having a diverse, competitive and reliable market for semiconductors is due to the complexity of the semiconductor supply chain management, which increases the chances of tampering.12 While China accounts for only 6 per cent of the total value of the global semiconductor supply chain,13 it is China’s manufacturing base and hold on Rare Earth Metals14 which is troublesome for the safety of the semiconductor supply chain.
Further, for the pursuit of ‘open and secure telecommunications technologies’ in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad members have committed to Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) Track 1.5 dialogues with the industry stakeholders. These dialogues will also include a Memorandum of Cooperation in 5G Supplier Diversification, cooperation between Quad for ‘technical exchanges and testbed activity to advance interoperability and telecommunications cybersecurity’.15
The Prague Proposals on Telecommunication Supplier Diversity16 recognises the need for a successful transition to 5G and beyond. This can be achieved through O-RAN interfaces where interoperability standards between suppliers' equipment are supported, and network flexibility is provided at a lesser cost. The O-RAN standards aim to break the RAN market's monolithic nature, where a handful of RAN suppliers offer exclusive equipment and software.17
While there are some cybersecurity concerns pertaining to 5G,18 in comparison to previous generation networks, O-RAN 5G networks might offer greater security and subscriber privacy. As the technology shifts from centralised core and RAN to distributed, virtual networks, security will become more agile and layered.19 Quad’s focus on 5G Supplier Diversification and Open RAN is due to the security threat from Chinese telecommunications companies like Huawei and ZTE that have invested heavily in the development of global 5G standards and have a sizable number of 5G patents.20 It is pertinent to note that many countries have banned Huawei and ZTE 5G equipment.21
While standardisation and promotion of open-source technologies in 5G technologies is the Quad’s focus, it is also committed to cooperation in international standardisation organisations like International Telecommunication Unit (ITU) and Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) through the newly established International Standards Cooperation Network (ISCN).22 Quad's attention to this initiative is due to China's assertive international standards promotion strategy and its China Standards 2035 project,23 which has cybersecurity implications. China's advocacy for cyber sovereignty has aided the country's elevation as a ‘great cyber power’ as it focuses on controlling norms, information, data, next-generation technology and standards.24
Recognising that the above-discussed initiatives require collaboration with academia and the industry to foster innovation in these technologies, Quad has launched the Quad Fellowship and Quad Investor Network. The Quad Fellowship intends to bring 100 students from Quad countries to the US each year to pursue graduate degrees in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) subjects. This will help develop a talented cohort of next-generation STEM leaders who will lead in cutting-edge research and innovation.25 The Quad Investor Network aims to seek funding for critical and emerging technologies within and across the Indo-Pacific, by engaging with an independent consortium of investors.26
Conclusion
While many cyber threat actors are operating in the Indo-Pacific, the attacks from China are particularly politically motivated. Chinese-based actors have indulged in nearly 200 cyber operations since 2005, primarily against the US.27 China has also perpetrated cyber-espionage operations against all Quad members to gain access to critical information. Due to China’s Civil–Military Fusion initiatives, select Chinese universities and research centres in association with Chinese military have been directly involved in these aggressive and successful cyber-espionage operations.28
The Quad’s approach to strengthen cyber resilience through its various initiatives is essential to mitigate such threats. Quad’s ‘practical cooperation’ approach is an attempt to solve existing cybersecurity challenges that affect millions of people in the region and beyond. The Quad has indeed cautiously carved out a practical and cooperative agenda on issues of cyber security.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India–Russia Energy Cooperation in Russian Far East
Bipandeep Sharma
June 21, 2022
The exit of Western oil companies from energy projects in the Russian Far East provides opportunities for India to enhance its stakes in these projects.
The Ukraine crisis has led many Western oil and gas companies to terminate their joint energy projects with Russia in the Arctic. This has been due to the fear of Western economic sanctions as well as to mark opposition against Russia for its military operation in Ukraine. Companies like BP, Equinor, ExxonMobil and Shell are some of the major energy giants that are in the process of finding suitable exits from Russian energy projects.1
Sakhalin-1, which is an international consortium of oil and gas development companies in the Russian Far East, has started witnessing similar trends. The US energy giant, ExxonMobil, which owned 30 per cent stake in Sakhalin-1, has already stopped its operations and is expected to formally exit from this joint venture.2 The other entities in Sakhalin-1 are Sakhalin Oil & Gas Development Co. Ltd. (Japan), ONGC Videsh Ltd. (India) and Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf and RN-Astra (Russia). These companies hold 30 per cent, 20 per cent, 11.5 per cent and 8.5 per cent stakes respectively.
Similarly, Sakhalin-2 is an international energy development consortium of Gazprom (Russia), Shell (US-based subsidiary of Royal Dutch), Mitsui & Co. (Japan) and Mitsubishi Corp. (Japan). Shell, which holds 27.5 per cent stake in Sakhalin-2, has announced plans to exit this energy consortium. There were also reports that Japanese companies, Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp., which hold 12.5 per cent and 10 per cent stakes in Sakhalin-2 respectively, were also under strong Western pressure to terminate their partnership with Russia.3 Though Japan has so far resisted this pressure owning to the country’s dire energy needs, uncertainty remains as to the future prospects of this cooperation.
Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 are Russia’s most important integrated oil and gas development projects that operate in one of the world’s harshest climatic conditions. The Sakhalin-1 is estimated to hold approximately 2.3 billion barrels of oil and 17.1 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves.4 Sakhalin 2 accounts for 4 per cent of the world’s total LNG supply.5 The region is prone to earthquakes and requires special technical expertise and engineering skills for exploration. Moreover, the development and operational costs of these projects is much higher.
Russia, therefore, needs reliable long-term partners to develop its Far Eastern regions and sustain its economy. Oil and Gas are sectors whose strength is vital for reviving the Russian economy, post the Ukraine crisis. If European and Western countries become successful in reducing their oil and gas dependency on Russia6 (which they intend to do so in near future), the most viable option for Russia is to tap energy markets in East, South East and South Asian countries. Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, therefore, can become the most promising projects for supplying Russian oil and gas to these markets.
India–Russia Energy equation
Oil and Gas trade between India and Russia remains significantly low, despite Russia being the world’s third largest producer and India being the third largest consumer.7 The most obvious reason for this pertains to the shipping distance, cargo delivery time and cost escalation as a result of long geographical distances between the two countries. India’s energy engagements with Russia, other than the direct purchase of oil and gas, is through ONGC Videsh Limited’s (OVL) direct investments in Russian energy projects.
Apart from Sakhalin-1, OVL holds 100 per cent stake in Russia’s Imperial Energy Corporation and 26 per cent stake in the Vankorneft field. Also, 23.9 per cent stake in Russia’s Vankorneft field and 29.9 per stake in the Taas-Yuryakh field, are jointly held by the consortium of Oil India Limited, Indian Oil Corporation and Bharat PetroResource Limited.8
In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s offer to supply India with cheaper crude oil (US$ 35 lesser than the international market price), was criticised by the West. Indian companies though significantly increased their volumes of oil imports from Russia. India’s total import of Russian oil despite buying additional volumes in March 2022, remained less than 1 per cent of its total oil import.9 These figures increased to 18 per cent in May, 2022 as per a report published by CREA.10
The Western exit from Russian oil projects could become a big opportunity for Indian oil companies to directly invest in Russian energy projects to secure the country’s long-term energy needs. ExxonMobil’s decision to sell its 30 per cent stake from Sakhalin-1 needs to be carefully thought through, and India’s OVL could consider increasing its stakes in Sakhalin-1. Similarly, OVL or a joint consortium of companies led by OVL, could consider buying Shell’s 27.5 per cent stake that it intends to sell in Russia’s Sakhalin-2 project. OVL already maintains the technical expertise required for drilling in these harsh terrains. Therefore, such investments would significantly strengthen and diversify India’s energy supply chains and reduce the country’s dependency on Middle East countries for oil imports.
Strategic Calculus
Both Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 offer tremendous opportunities for India. Though there looms the current fear of Western economic sanctions and other technical shipping hindrances, India needs to pragmatically think through the long-term energy benefits from this region. Western exits from Sakhalin energy projects may negatively impact Russia economically, but it would simultaneously create investment voids, thereby giving a free hand to China to make long-term energy investments. China’s stakes in Sakhalin could enhance geopolitical disparities, owning to the presence of Japan and India as the other two partners in these projects. But, if India becomes successful in increasing its stakes in Sakhalin, it would not only benefit Indian oil refineries with high-grade sweet crude (especially Sokol grade form Sakhalin-111) to sustain domestic needs, but Indian oil companies could also process and can further sell Sakhalin crude and its derivatives to South East Asian, South Asian and even European markets.
An increase in energy investments in the Russian Far East would further enhance India–Russia naval cooperation and would significantly strengthen Indian naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. Indian oil shipments coming from the Russian Far East would also be free from piracy risks which remains a threat near the Horn of Africa. One may argue that in an adverse case scenario, China may put a blockade to Indian oil shipments coming from the Russian Far East. But a valid counter argument is the fact that it would be difficult for China to stop Russian oil shipments to India, given the China–Russia strategic partnership. Still, if ever the situation arises, India may also use similar leverage against China on its energy shipments passing through the Malacca Strait.
Shipping Factor and Distance Analysis
India has four major oil refineries located on its eastern coast. These include Haldia Refinery (West Bengal), Paradip Refinery (Odisha), Manali Refinery (Chennai) and Visakhapatnam Refinery (Andhra Pradesh). The shipping distance between Russia’s De-Kastri oil export terminal (Sakhalin-1) and Chennai Port is 9,626 km. It would take approximately 16 days and 15 hours for a large oil cargo ship to cover this distance, running at an average speed of 13 knots. Similarly, the average distance between Korsakov port (Sakhalin-2) and the Indian ports of Haldia, Chennai, Paradip and Visakhapatnam is around 9,256 km (Map 1). At an average speed of 13 knots, it would take approximately 16 days for these oil shipments to reach all major Indian refineries on its eastern coast. This is a significant reduction in travel time as compared to Russian oil coming to India’s western coast from its Baltic Sea ports, for which average transit time is 23 days.
Map 1: Shipping distance between Sakhalin ports and oil refineries on India’s Eastern Coast
If we compare India’s oil shipments coming from US Gulf Coast to Mumbai port, the approximate transit time is 31 days and this further increases to 35–40 days, if the shipments need to reach Indian refineries on the country’s eastern ports.12 The only limitations that currently hinder enhancing India–Russia oil trade relate to payments, availability of shipping vessels and cargo insurances. Western sanctions on shipping companies and insurance providers are hindering the transportation of Russian crude to its required destinations. If India and Russia develop credible mechanisms to bypass Western economic sanctions or can find suitable alternatives complying with international norms, there remains immense potential for both the countries to cooperate in Sakhalin.
Conclusion
India in 2019 issued a US$ 1 billion line of credit for the development of the Russian Far East region.13 The government’s vision inclines well with the current emerging opportunities in Sakhalin. The government is in talks with state-run oil companies to consider increasing their stakes in Russian energy projects.14 Though the Middle East remains India’s most viable choice for energy imports, emerging geopolitics and shifting traditional alliances compels India to diversify its partners. Russia, with its abundant energy resources, coupled with the exit of Western oil companies from its energy projects, offers tremendous opportunity for India.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
11. ‘Sokol’ is a very high grade sweet crude oil found in Russia’s Sakhalin-1 oil fields. Sokol grade has a high API gravity of 37.9° and low Sulphur content (0.23%). Sokol is light grade crude and on refining generates large volumes of diesel.
Agnipath: Addressing the Manpower Challenges of the Indian Armed Forces
D. Padma Kumar Pillay
June 21, 2022
The Agnipath scheme provides an opportunity for the armed forces to leap into the next generation of warfare with a manpower that can embrace technological challenges.
The ‘Agnipath’ scheme has been baptised by fire even before it has been launched and has turned into an ‘Agnipariksha’ for the Government of India. Given the ‘out of the box’ nature of the proposal, many have raised questions about the scheme negatively impacting the ethos of the armed forces that have brought glory to the country.
Army recruitment policies over the years
To understand what the future holds and if indeed the Agnipath is as radical as it is made out to be, one should place in historical perspective the recruitment policies of the armed forces. In the armed forces, especially so in the Army, soldiers have traditionally come from the same socio-economic strata. Until 1977, soldiers were enlisted only for seven years, plus eight years in reserve, which was then changed to 17 years. In other words, all the major wars fought by the army were won by soldiers on seven-year terms of active duty.
The selection of soldiers then was based only on a certain standard of physical fitness. The written test for examining standards of literacy got introduced in the 1980s. The literacy standards of the recruits were not uniform and they therefore went through lengthy processes of training, as compared to other armies, to bring them up to certain minimum levels of education. The training also helped in improving the health and physique of the soldiers, given the rigorous physical training and better diet provided to them. It was in the 1980s that the army extended the basic training from 36 to 52 weeks, at the end of which they were granted an Army Third Class Certificate of Education. The soldiers also got introduced to specific subjects such as map-reading and other necessary skills.
Defenders of the lingual/caste-based/regional recruitment model overlook the fact that some of the most battle-hardened units in Independent India’s military history had All-India, All-Class compositions. The most notable among these are the Brigade of Guards and the Parachute regiments (Special Forces) as well as the Artillery and Armoured Corps. No doubt, the overall recruitment practice did throw up some anomalies. Personnel from less than 200 districts of India were supplying soldiers to the armed forces. Also, certain classes/communities had higher representation in the military, fuelled no doubt by such concepts like martial races, stemming from the prejudices and biases nurtured by the British.
Current protests in context
It is important to understand why the current protests against the Agnipath recruitment model have gained steam. Unlike the protests against the farm laws that impacted nearly 46 per cent of the population, or the protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) that generated the angst of a particular community, it was not anticipated that a sector that employs less than 0.5 per cent of the workforce or one per thousand capita of population would lead to such widespread protests.
It is important to highlight that the appeal of the armed forces as a profession lies in the fact that the armed forces is open to all Indians purely on a merit-based entry. Secondly, joining the military service is seen as being honourable and patriotic, given the status soldiers have always enjoyed in Indian society. No one can deny the riveting and mesmerising hold of military power and even war itself, on society. Membership of the armed forces is not just an identity but also an opportunity to escape from the anonymity of the rural socio-economic strata of society which supplies the majority of men in uniform. Last but not the least, this profession afforded a security for a lifetime which included a lifetime pension, including medical cover.
The current demonstrations on the street are, therefore, fuelled in part by concerns that the aspirations of the aspirants may not be fulfilled, concerns which are no doubt being fanned by the political opposition, which sees an opportunity to challenge the decisions of the government.
Options before the Government
It is pertinent to highlight the previous instance of the roll-back of the government’s policy on farm laws, on account of the opposition which charged that such laws were anti-farmer and pro-business. Instead of tweaking the laws, the government was forced to withdraw the laws. Subsequently, the Supreme Court-appointed Experts Committee report revealed that a majority of the stakeholders were in favour of those laws while only around 13 per cent were against them. The recall, in effect, stalled reforms in the farm sector.
The current government’s many successes in reforming the national security system include the creation of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), fulfilling the principles of One Rank One Pension (OROP)—which was pending since 1972, the establishment of the National War Memorial, pioneering initiatives to strengthen self-reliance like Make In India, among many others.
In the current context of the protests against the Agnipath scheme, it is a challenging task to set right the narrative that the recruitment policy is against the interests of the youth of the country. It is to the credit of the government that several amendments have been made which indicates that the scheme is not set in stone.
However, what can make the scheme more trustworthy and appealing is changing the method of selection to a national-level examination instead of focusing on regional recruitment. The testing has to be at a national-level, similar to the Combined Defence Service (CDS) exams and a common merit list must be prepared. The qualifying candidates then need to be subjected to an intelligence and aptitude test at the testing centres. This will call for a major change in the existing practice. Based on the various matrices that should include allocations for physical fitness, qualifying marks and medical fitness, a hierarchy of selection criteria can be decided for allotment to various arms and services.
There are apprehensions that biases and prejudices may set in for identifying the soldiers to be retained, four years after recruitment. To address such apprehensions, the percentage considered for retention may be increased to anything between 33 to 50 per cent and the term may be extended to five years, instead of the current four. Furthermore, the retained soldiers have to be again on an all-India merit list, that will take into consideration the achievements and progress made by them, which not only includes the annual appraisals but also the standards of fitness and individual accomplishment, all of which have to be quantified.
As a spin-off, the current agitation has succeeded in kindling interest in post-military employment of soldiers. Many additional benefits, including on the long-standing demand of assured entry into the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) and other organisations, have been announced. This demand has been routinely aired, and was also highlighted by the Group of Ministers report following the Kargil War. The option of lateral entry has to be streamlined and an added commitment could be shown by enrolling all Agniveers to the National Pension Scheme (NPS), with the government footing the additional burden for the service. Their NPS accounts could then be transferred to the CAPF or other organisations that the Agniveers subsequently join.
Finally, there is a need to change the narrative that the government is looking to abdicate its responsibility to soldiers. It needs to be highlighted that the government is looking for a talent pool that is not just qualified, but also capable of being absorbed into the needs of a futuristic army. The fact that the Agnipath is not a short-term contract needs to be emphasised. History has always shown that forces that fail to keep up with technology have been overwhelmed by smaller, more agile and lethal forces. This scheme provides an opportunity for the armed forces to leap into the next generation of warfare with a manpower that can embrace the technological challenges.
The government should also launch public outreach programmes showcasing the advantages that will accrue as a result of its implementation. Instances of youth preventing mob rampages whose sole purpose is to destroy national property have to be highlighted, as they gel with the ethos of soldiering, which is that a true soldier will give his life than destroy what his country stands for.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Security and Foreign Policy Priorities of Australia’s New Labor Party Government
R.P. Singh
June 15, 2022
The new Labor Party government in Australia is likely to show continuity on AUKUS and Quad initiatives in the Indo-Pacific, while policy approaches on Pacific Islands and China, as also on climate change, may get a re-look.
Anthony Albanese won the closely contested general election in Australia in May 2022, marking the return of the Labor Party to power after nine years. Though the election campaign revealed minimal differences in foreign policy positions between the two major parties, it is expected that the change in foreign and security policies is likely to be in the process rather than on substance. Experts believe that there will be a stronger emphasis on bolstering close relationships with regional partners.
Albanese’s first overseas visit was the Quad Leaders’ Meeting at Tokyo on 24 May 2022.1 Before the Quad Summit meet in Tokyo, Albanese stated that the "Quad leaders' meeting is an absolute priority for Australia, there will be some changes in policy, particularly in regard to climate change and our engagement with the world."2
During his address at the Lowy Institute on 10 March 2022, Albanese enunciated three key principles for national security policy.3 These included:
defending Australia’s territorial integrity, protecting nation’s political sovereignty from external pressure, and promoting Australia’s economic prosperity and social stability, with sustainable growth, secure employment, and a unified community.4
He further articulated that the Labor Government will achieve these objectives and build a more secure and resilient Australia by supporting a stronger Australian Defence Force, prioritise better and smarter cybersecurity, shore-up economic self-reliance, strengthen institutions, deepen partnerships in the region and globally, and take action on climate change.
Australia’s foreign policy is reasonably bipartisan and it has remained apolitical, which helps the relationships with partners in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Albanese has consistently stated in the run up to the elections that his government’s aim will be to “deepen” defence cooperation with close partners like Japan, India, Singapore as well as “bolster our joint capabilities, shape our strategic environment and uphold the rules of the road”.5
On China, Australia’s biggest trading partner, the Labor government has traditionally taken a more nuanced approach. While speaking to The Guardian Australia, Albanese admitted that relations with China "will continue to be difficult".6 Albanese also affirmed that Canberra will continue to stand up for its values and interests, against any aggressive behaviour by China in the region against Australian interests. Albanese further added that he supported the Biden administration's perspective on China—‘competition without catastrophe’—and called for “more considered responses to China's more aggressive positioning in the region than just ramping up rhetoric”.7 Whether Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong will be less forceful than the previous government in dealing with China’s assertiveness and expansionist activities remains to be seen.
Australian diplomacy and tug of war with China was on display in South Pacific in the recent weeks, after China signed a security deal with Solomon Islands and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited eight Pacific countries in May–June 2022. As Australia is changing its relationship with Pacific nations to a more cooperative one, Wong asserted that Australia would ‘listen (to Pacific Family) because we care what the Pacific has to say’.8
During Wang’s visit, the China–Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision was proposed by China, which caused deep concern among some of the island nations as well as in Canberra and Washington DC, pushing Penny Wong to make two quick trips to the Pacific. Wang Yi had hoped to ink the ambitious deal with 10 South Pacific nations covering cooperation in areas ranging from security aspects to fisheries. Consensus on that deal was elusive but Wang was able to sign bilateral agreements with many of the countries he visited. Concomitantly, Wong met Pacific leaders in Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and conveyed that Australia respected the right of sovereign nations to make their own security decisions, but added that those decisions "have the potential to affect the nature of the security arrangements of the region”.9
Australia’s bilateral relationship with the US, its only treaty-ally in the Indo-Pacific, is likely to continue growing deeper and broader. When the Morrison government announced AUKUS in September 2021, the Labor Party supported the decision. Moreover, Labor Party has maintained that to defend Australia and deter its potential aggressors, the government needs to quickly increase Australia’s strike capabilities. While addressing Lowy Institute, Albanese pointed out that there were some contradictions between the 10-year time-frame as indicated in the 2020 Strategic Update to examine issues of national security and other policy statements that look towards building future defence capabilities.10 Albanese has also talked about the need to address the submarine capability gap in the period until the nuclear-powered submarines are delivered.
The Quad Summit meeting in Tokyo presented an opportunity for Albanese to meet Joe Biden and to reiterate Australia's commitment to the AUKUS security pact with the United States and the United Kingdom, under which Canberra aspires to acquire nuclear-powered submarines and other high-end defence technologies. The new government observes that given the present challenges and geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific, a credible deterrent capability is vital to maintain peace and security in the region. Labor Party has also underscored the need to resource Australian Defence to defend Australia and deter potential aggressors.
At the Lowy Institute address, Albanese observed,
We will consider whether tomahawk missiles can be fitted to the Collins Class submarines. We will review progress of the Frigates project, and explore whether our naval power could be bolstered through upgraded weapons on the Arafura Class offshore patrol vessels or through additional Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers.11
The new Australian government has renewed its focus on Southeast Asia, looking at a broader engagement in the region, rather than the earlier focus on the US–China competition. Southeast Asia has been the pivot of Australian diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, as was demonstrated by Albanese and Wong during their first visit to Indonesia, a major economic and strategic partner, on 6–7 June 2022.12 Albanese is trying to create a new constructive environment in its relationship with Indonesia, and Southeast Asia, as against merely condemning Chinese coercion and expansionist activities in the South China Sea.
As for climate change issues, the Labor government has highlighted the need for firm obligation that Australia will reduce its own carbon footprint in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact 2021 and Paris Accord 2015. Albanese and Wong will look at implementing Labor Party’s promise for a climate infrastructure partnership and recently announced plans to boost development assistance and labour mobility. Under the Labor government, Australia intends to co-host a future global climate summit with Pacific partners. This will address Australia’s security concerns in the region, as also ensure dialogue with Pacific leaders to meet their development requirements. At the Lowy Institute address, Albanese stated that climate change was the “number one issue that Pacific nations are concerned about”. At the Quad Leaders’ Summit also, Albanese articulated climate change as one of the biggest security threats facing the Indo-Pacific.13
The Labor government is likely to broaden trade diversification with a focus on new markets for exports, as also work with businesses to build domestic economic capacities, as part of the Future Made in Australia plan, so that Australia will be “less vulnerable to economic coercion and global shocks…”.14 In addition, Labor Party’s shadow government had released Defence Industry Development Plan which looks at sustenance of defence supply chains, development of self-reliant defence industry and encouraging innovation in both defence and wider industry. Labor Party’s plan for a National Strategic Fleet of Australian-flagged vessels reinforces security of supply for critical resources.
Australia has joined the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which goes beyond the original Quad intent and includes many other Asian and Pacific nations. Canberra supported IPEF and Quad initiatives for larger functional aspects of economic connectivity, supply chain resilience, clean energy initiatives and standards based on just economy. The resilient supply chain initiatives are an effort to protect the region from disruptions and inflationary pressures, as was seen during the pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict.
With the new government in Australia, India will look to bolster and broaden the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership as well as have renewed focus on economic and technological cooperation. There are enormous opportunities for growth in cooperation at multilateral bodies, namely Quad and G20, East Asia Summit, among others. Broader synergy between the two nations is expected to continue in maritime security issues as also in non-traditional security matters, namely, energy security, climate change and foreign policy objectives. Analysts will also closely watch India’s bilateral relationship with Labor government on issues of differences, in particular, Russia–Ukraine conflict and developments in Myanmar and Afghanistan.
In conclusion, the Labor government in Australia is likely to strengthen and deepen its strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region by leveraging AUKUS and Quad frameworks. Defence and strategic issues, particularly those against China, may get a re-look. Moreover, the government can be expected to look at Australia’s security and economic engagement in the Pacific and Southeast Asia with new vision and energy, and may take significant and concrete actions to maintain its regional sphere of influence.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
China’s Response to Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
Mayuri Banerjee
June 15, 2022
Beijing’s pushback against the Washington-backed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is likely to result in an intense regional geo-economic competition.
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), launched in Tokyo on 23 May 2022, is being touted by the US as a mechanism to counter China’s regional economic influence. The four policy pillars of the initiative include digital trade, building of resilient supply chains, fulfilment of clean energy commitments and implementation of fair trade rules with effective taxation and elimination of corruption.1 Reports cite US officials as stating that the initiative will present the Indo-Pacific countries “an alternative to China’s approach and strengthen political and economic ties with partner countries”.2 China has responded strongly to the initiative, calling it an ‘economic NATO’ aimed at stoking regional divisions. Beijing has also moved rapidly to initiate counter-moves against the IPEF.3
IPEF as a cause of anxiety
Chinese analyses of IPEF contend that the economic pact, if implemented, is unlikely to immediately affect Chinese economic interests.4 Highlighting existing China-led cooperative mechanisms like Regional Comprehensive Economic Programme (RCEP) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese policy experts opine that China is better integrated with the region than the US.5 For instance, many South East Asian industries are dependent on China for raw materials which are processed for export to the US or European Union (EU). Further, China’s economic cooperation with the region is also deepening. Besides trade with RCEP countries, China’s trade with ASEAN bloc totalled US$ 212 billion in the first quarter of 2022. Due to China’s large domestic market, South Korea and Japan could also be inclined to strengthen economic cooperation with Beijing under RCEP.6
As regards possibility of China’s economic isolation from the regional economic framework, analysts assert that China cannot be ignored due to its economic influence. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a press briefing on 22 May, claimed that China has emerged as the largest trading partner of most of the countries in the region and those trying to isolate China will eventually isolate themselves.7 A section of Chinese media and members of strategic community reiterated the sentiment.8 Another prominent Chinese commentator argued that it will be impossible to exclude China economically since it is the largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity and the largest trading nation with most of the Asia-Pacific countries.9 Chinese observers conclude that IPEF is bound to fail as it is a ‘political tool’ to target China and devoid of any economic substance which will benefit the Asian region.10
However, a sense of alarm was also perceptible, with Beijing declaring policy measures relating to trade and cooperation in the region while criticising the framework as being divisive at the same time. On the day US President launched the IPEF, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the UN ESCAP summit pledged deeper cooperation with the Indo-Pacific through better BRI projects and higher investments.11 Reportedly, he also promised to proactively pursue China's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement to counter the new trade and economic initiative of the Quad alliance.12
Similarly, the urgency with which Wang toured the Pacific Island Countries offering them ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ demonstrated Beijing’s anxiety regarding IPEF. In a bid to undercut Washington’s network of alliance and consolidate China’s economic and military footprint, Wang offered economic, infrastructural and security cooperation to these island countries and pledged greater support in terms of humanitarian relief and ensuring food security and climate change mitigation.13 Some Chinese observers, though, affirmed the possibility of adverse impact like reduced regional trade and shift in production chain, and suggested that China should strengthen RCEP cooperation through accelerating digital partnership negotiations with the ASEAN members. Moreover, analysts suggested that China should leverage its geographical proximity and attractiveness of its markets to deepen cooperation with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea.14
In view of China’s robust trade linkages with the Indo-Pacific countries, Beijing is confident that economic decoupling is not in the horizon in the near future. However, the cause of its concern is the “exclusive institutional balancing” underlying the idea of IPEF.15 Such institutional balancing can be used to diminish China’s economic edge in the region by pressurising Chinese economy through export controls, import screening and shifting supply chains, which could eventually reduce China’s strategic clout.16
Implications for the region
Anxious about the threat posed by IPEF to China’s regional economic clout, Chinese leaders and analysts have called for enhancing regional economic cooperation. Beijing’s pushback against Washington’s IPEF strategy is likely to result in an intense zero-sum geo-economic competition. China is likely to add more teeth to its regional economic diplomacy. We can, therefore, witness China rolling out more capital investment, technology transfer and infrastructure development plans for the neighbouring countries. For the smaller regional economies, it does offer an opportunity to resist economic domination by one power while simultaneously compelling them to provide public goods tailored to their needs. Further, competition between China and US-led institutions could perhaps drive reforms within these institutions that could lead to an improvement in the regional economic architecture, ensure greater supply chain resilience and enhance intra-regional trade. The increased geo-economic competition in a region with security deficits, though, could also result in greater diplomatic confrontations and further deterioration of regional security.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
13. China’s interest in the Pacific encompasses both economic, strategic and military aspects. A strong presence in this region will not only enable China to tap the natural resources in these islands but will also boost its maritime and surveillance capabilities.
15. ‘Exclusive institutional balancing’ can be defined as a strategy aiming to exclude a target state from an institutional grouping so the cohesion and unity of the institution will undermine the influence and power of the target state. See Kai He, “US’ Indo-Pacific Economic Bloc Irks China but It May Not be All Bad for the Region”, South China Morning Post, 3 June 2022.
Decoding Turkey’s Foreign Policy Recalibration in West Asia
Md. Muddassir Quamar
June 14, 2022
The change in Turkey’s foreign policy approach in West Asia underlines a desire on part of Ankara to eschew confrontationist politics.
Turkey’s approach towards its West Asian neighbourhood in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings evoked sharp criticisms from regional countries, which accused Ankara of pursuing a neo-Ottoman and pan-Islamic foreign policy. The regional response partly emerged from the growing popularity of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the Arab streets, at least in the early phase of the uprisings. Turkey, on the other hand, was driven by global power aspirations, as articulated in the Strategic Depth doctrine promulgated by the former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. This contributed to the sharp geopolitical competition among regional powers for influence, and shaped the outcomes of protest movements in countries such as Syria, Egypt and Libya.
Turkey’s confrontationist approach led to serious diplomatic and political backlash leading to deterioration of ties between Ankara and other regional capitals, including Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Turkey–Israel relations had already worsened, prior to Arab Spring, over Ankara’s stand on Israel–Palestine conflict, and support for the militant-Islamist Palestinian movement, Hamas. What this meant was that the so-called policy of “zero-problem” with neighbours turned into “zero-friends” in the neighbourhood.1
A Foreign Policy Rethink?
Since 2021, a discernible shift in Turkey’s approach towards neighbours in West Asia is noticeable. In the past year and a half, Turkey has initiated rapprochement with Israel, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and has also initiated a rethink in its policy towards Syria and Libya. In March 2022, President Isaac Herzog became the first Israeli head of state to visit Ankara since 2007. There have been talks on enhancing bilateral economic ties, especially in the energy sector with an eye on tapping the potential for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean (East Med). Erdoğan termed Herzog’s visit as heralding a “new era” in bilateral relations.2
Turkey and UAE too have taken steps to improve relations. Mohammed Bin Zayed’s visit in November 2021 was a departure from the acrimonious relations since Turkey accused Abu Dhabi of meddling in domestic politics, and funding the July 2016 failed coup. Bin Zayed’s visit paved the way for a return visit by Erdoğan in February 2022. The two countries have focused on economic cooperation with a promise of US$ 10 billion Emirati investment fund in Turkey, and several agreements for collaboration in defence industry, climate change, healthcare, food security and other sectors.3
With Saudi Arabia, the signs of a reconciliation emerged when Turkey’s foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited Riyadh in May 2021. The tense relations between the two regional giants had ruptured over the Jamal Khashoggi murder case wherein the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received international backlash for his alleged involvement. Weeks before Erdoğan visited the Kingdom, and met the King and embraced Bin Salman, a Turkish court suspended the Khashoggi murder trial and decided to transfer it to Saudi Arabia. The focus of the discussion during Erdogan’s visit was again on tapping the economic potential.
In the case of Egypt, although there are no high-level exchange of visits, the two have engaged in delegation-level talks between officials from the foreign ministries focussing on improving trade and commercial ties. Importantly, Ankara has asked Muslim Brotherhood-linked media houses in Turkey to tone down their criticism of the government in Cairo.4 This indicates that Turkey might be ready to be more accommodative of Egyptian concerns vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood than it has been in the past. Ankara has been keen to improve relations with Cairo eyeing the lucrative energy fields in the East Med wherein Egypt has emerged as major player through the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Additionally, Turkey has taken steps to reach out to the Bashar al-Assad regime for peace and stability in Syria, and has reviewed its policy of military intervention in Libya.
Drivers of Change
The most important drivers for the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy approach lie in domestic political and economic developments. Turkey has been struggling with economic challenges since 2017, and the hopes for a recovery in 2019 were dashed with the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. In 2021, the Turkish economy recorded a sharp upturn in GDP growth at 11.7 per cent, but the World Bank has projected a modest growth of 2 per cent for 2022.5 Notwithstanding the uncertain growth trajectory, other economic indicators, including record inflation at 70 per cent in April 2022, devaluation of Lira, rising poverty and Covid-induced slump in tourism and export sectors, underline the seriousness of the economic challenge facing Turkey.6 President Erdoğan in his re-election bid in the 2023 elections does not want to leave any stone unturned to revive the economy, which is vital for winning the vote of his conservative-nationalist support base.
Given that economic situation can harm Erdoğan’s electoral prospects, he is focussing on improving trade and commercial ties with West Asian countries to help recover the export slump. Turkey also depends on imports for both agricultural and manufactured products. That it can also bring the tourists from the regional countries is an additional advantage. Besides Erdogan’s foreign policy failures have become a domestic political issue, which the opposition, buoyed by their performance in the 2019 municipal elections, can raise to undermine the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) electoral prospects. Hence, the chance of presenting Erdogan’s foreign policy volte face as an achievement in an election year can be a worthwhile factor in Ankara’s conduct in the region.
The foreign policy recalibration is also linked to regional and international politics. The Middle East has over the past two years witnessed a shift from geopolitics to geo-economics with many parallel ongoing talks and negotiations including, for example, between Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the rapprochement between the Arab Gulf and Israel after the Abraham Accords. Additionally, Iraq has taken initiatives for talks among regional countries held in Baghdad, while UAE had taken lead in re-inducting Syria into the Arab fold. This can be attributed to several factors but the two most important developments that have impinged on the regional trend are the need for economic recovery after Covid-19 and the change in US approach to the region with the transition from the Trump to the Biden administrations. The flux in international politics and the resultant gradual shift in US focus away from the Middle East is also one of the driving factors for Ankara to pursue a more reconciliatory approach regionally, underlining the desire for recognition as a “middle power” in international politics.
Challenges and Implications
While the change in Turkish approach is refreshing, one cannot ignore the challenges Ankara faces in this pursuit. With Israel, serious difference over the Palestinian issue remain, and Turkey has not indicated any reversal in its policy of supporting Hamas. Similarly, with Egypt and Arab Gulf countries, the challenges remain because of Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, with Saudi Arabia, the claim to global Islamic leadership can adversely impact the reconciliation. More importantly, there is no evidence to suggest an ideational change guiding Turkish foreign policy conduct. That is, Ankara continues to be guided by the neo-Ottoman and pan-Islamic principles that had led to deterioration in ties with the regional countries in the first place. The change in foreign policy conduct are rather tactical wherein the foreign policy managers in Ankara now view a reconciliatory approach as more beneficial in securing Turkey’s interests and advance its regional ambitions.
Nonetheless, the change in Turkey’s foreign policy approach in West Asia can be seen as an encouraging sign that can help reduce regional tensions. It also underlines a desire on part of Ankara to pursue diplomacy rather than confrontationist politics. Seen together with the wider regional trend of diplomatic engagements and geo-economic prospects, Turkey’s foreign policy recalibration generates some hope. Unfortunately, those familiar with the fractious nature of Middle East politics know that this is way too optimistic.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Women play active roles in sustaining and facilitating extremist activities on the African continent.
Africa has been an epicentre of violent extremist activities, for the past few decades. As per the Global Terrorism Index 2022, 48 per cent of the global terrorism deaths took place in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel region is ‘home to the world’s fastest growing and most-deadly terrorist groups’.1 The poor socio-economic conditions, ideological trends, and weak governance have been causes for terrorist outfits laying inroads into African countries. Studies indicate that women play active roles in sustaining and facilitating extremist activities on the continent.2 There has also been an increase in the cases of women being arrested in terror-related incidents.3
Women vis-à-vis Terrorism in Africa
Women play multiple active and passive roles in carrying out terrorist activities. They are strategic as well as tactical actors for a terrorist organisation. Each parental organisation, such as the ISIS, their affiliates, or independent terrorist organisations, have relied on women to varying capacities to attain their goals. Women have assumed the roles of propagandists, recruiters, and participated in combat operations. ISIS, in Kano, Nigeria, has created all-women morality police units, Hisbah, to ensure other women toe the line on issues like dress codes, among others.4
While groups like the Al-Qaeda have restricted women to their societal roles of a wife and a mother, within the African context, groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia have exploited the society’s regressive understanding of women to their advantage. Women have been actively used to recruit, gather intelligence, disseminate propaganda, and shame other men into joining the jihadist cause. They have also raised funds and smuggled goods across checkpoints, evading security checks.5
The absence of adequate women’s participation in the police forces has also played into the terrorists’ hands as they are well aware that male officers, due to gender and cultural sensitivities, will refrain from indulging in security checks on women. By February 2022, only 1,400 women had been recruited into the Somali Police Force, for instance, out of the total 14,000 individuals serving as police officers.6 Furthermore, out of 300 members in Darwish, a special unit of the police force, only 30 women have been recruited into the ranks.7
The factors that propel women’s involvement in organisations like the Al-Shabaab stem from avenging the death of their kins on account of state-sponsored violence or due to ideological commitment. Recruiters exploit the fact that everyone in Al-Shabaab-controlled territories are mandated to receive religious education.8 Women have also married into the group for financial and physical security as the Somali state can provide neither.
Groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria have used coercion to recruit young women into their ranks as suicide bombers. Using a similar strategy as Al-Shabaab’s, they exploit the regressive gender narrative and rely on primarily dispensable foot soldiers, i.e., women and teenage girls, to cause instability and chaos. During the period 2011–17, Al-Shabaab had used 244 women as suicide bombers.9
A predominant factor for women to be involved in violent extremism is economic grievance and poverty. Many women who have joined Al-Shabaab are primarily from poor areas such as Majengo, Garissa and Kwale in Kenya. These women are coerced into joining extremist organisations as fighters or informants, on the pretext of securing job opportunity.10 The terrorist outfits purposefully create a situation where access to resources is denied, rendering the people with no choice but to join the outfit as a means to provide for livelihood.11 Besides, the involvement of their family members and friends in such groups also adds to the pressure. Corruption and lack of political capacities to provide for the people frustrates the local population to join terrorist groups to punish the government and state forces.
Of the several case studies in Africa to understand the role of women in terrorism, security trends in Western Africa and the Sahel provide compelling insights. The region surrounding northern Mali and bordering Niger and Burkina Faso is plagued with multiple violent extremist outfits, including Islamic State affiliate–Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), AQIM, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and others.12
The Islamic State has been openly receptive to including women into the rungs of its organisation and it even has a separate female brigade, ‘Al Khansaa Brigade’.13 The JNIM, while publicly denying the use of women as suicide bombers, does include them as informants and for other domestic support.14 The AQIM, on the other hand, has indulged in the practice of ‘jihadi brides’ and encouraged its members to marry the locals to gain local support.
One of the reasons which add to the complexity of the security situation in Mali is the nexus and linkages between local insurgent rebels and external organised terrorist outfits. One dimension of this linkage is that jihadist leaders marry women of the local communities, thus securing a sense of safety, support and belongingness to the people. A classic example is the case of AQIM leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who married four women from Tuareg and Arab Berabiche communities to ‘expand his network of influence’.15
Mitigation and DDR Measures
The foremost step in addressing this pressing issue is the imperative of government authorities and regional organisations acknowledging this phenomenon. Unfortunately, governments are often guilty of dealing with the threat of violent extremism as ‘mambo yavijana’ (Kiswahili term denoting ‘issues of male youth’), a phrase generally used for describing violent extremism. As a result, governments overlook the fact that women are visibly important actors in the domain of violent extremism. Therefore, there is a need for gender-sensitivisation of counter-terrorism activities.
The success of states’ mitigation strategies is contingent on developing and maintaining cohesive and efficient institutional structures which provide swift justice, holistic development, and security, across fault lines. However, this requires a long-term commitment to rebuilding the state capacities by domestic and regional actors—aided by external support, not interference.
The short-term adhesive that should be applied includes gender sensitising ongoing rehabilitation programmes and demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) measures. This is necessary to aid women who have left behind a life of terror voluntarily or due to the death of their husbands and to help them re-assimilate with the mainstream society that would be wary of accepting them. They need additional support in dealing with the mental anguish of surviving abuse, lack of adequate access to issues relating to women’s health, or finding employment to sustain their families.
Without adequate support, such women could suffer in detention camps or go back to violent activities. This will legitimise the propaganda of terrorist groups about the states’ indifference towards ordinary citizens while elites exploit primary resources, as in Syria’s Al-Hol Camp.16 The absence of security measures and deplorable conditions make the detainees susceptible to recidivism or indoctrination by recruiters who have maintained a visible presence. In addition, the terrorists can use such issues to convince the camp residents that they would fare better living under ISIS’ rule rather than under Kurdish control. The prospects of repatriation to their home countries where they would face persecution or be stripped from their families is another big concern.
The role of regional organisations is also equally important. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) held an event on 19 May 2021, along the margins of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, titled ‘Addressing Gender in Preventing Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Africa: Integrating Women’s Diverse Roles and Voices’.17 UNODC’s regional partners in Africa, like the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, African Union’s (AU) Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism and other organisations, participated in the discussions. It was emphasised that there needs to be a greater understanding on the roles women play in order to develop tailored strategies against violent extremism. The need for building institutional and community resilience, empowerment of women, increase in participation and representation of women in counter-terrorism and criminal justice agencies, among others, was stressed.
As part of fulfilling Aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063, the Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the AU could take steps to recognise the role of women in terrorism.18 With this as a launch pad, additional DDR measures could be taken. AU could empower governments with guidelines to implement the same. Any counter-terrorism measures that do not consider the subtle yet critical roles women play in extremist outfits would be ineffective.
Conclusion
The involvement of women in terrorist activities in Africa is nuanced, multi-layered, and dynamic. Women have advertently or inadvertently proliferated into terrorist outfits and have played supporting and enabling roles in these organisations. Violent extremist groups like the AQIM, JNIM, and others deal with the involvement of women differently. While some encourage and actively enable their role, others publicly denounce women’s inclusion even while relying on them. Furthermore, while some organisations only include women for tactical roles like cooks, recruiters, others have them for strategic roles like suicide bombers and informants.
It is imperative for affected states to engage in capacity-building through a bottom-up approach, taking on board local religious and community representatives. The AU should play an essential role in recognising the role of women in terrorism and tackling the threat the phenomenon poses. Successful state and civil society initiatives against terrorism are also hinged on measures to ensure their ideological defeat. This is because, even if violent extremist actors are eliminated or their organisations are disbanded, their ideological influence continues to foment fear and instability.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The opportunities for digital vaccines as tools to address modern-day chronic health problems are immense.
Digital Vaccines, along with Digital Medicines, are part of an emerging medical field termed Digital Therapeutics that amalgamates medicine with technology to tackle lifestyle ailments. These gamified, digital interventions provide safe and low-risk management of chronic diseases that require constant medical intervention.1 Digital vaccines can transform our medical systems which are generally not equipped to treat lifestyle diseases effectively. These solutions can be utilised by the Indian Armed Forces also to address chronic mental and physical health issues, especially for soldiers stationed in remote areas.
Relevance of Digital Vaccines
The healthcare system, more often than not, fails to provide regular and cheap care to patients suffering from chronic diseases, as it is geared more towards treating acute diseases. Chronic illnesses, which overwhelmingly affect the elderly population, often take a long time to develop and require continuous monitoring. They are caused by unhealthy behavioural choices like poor nutrition, lack of exercise, excessive alcohol use, and smoking. Ailments like diabetes, respiratory diseases, cardiovascular conditions, and physiological illnesses are examples of chronic diseases.
Acute diseases, on the other hand, typically manifest rapidly, last for a short period, and are usually caused by viruses, infections, injuries sustained in accidents, or drug and medication abuse. Diseases like Covid-19, flu, burn injuries, pneumonia are some of the examples of acute diseases. Improved medical sanitation, antibiotics, vaccines, and surgical procedures have led to better treatment of acute conditions and decrease in mortality rates.
Leading health conditions are now linked to chronic diseases that are exacerbated due to lifestyle choices. As a result, our medical systems are ill-equipped to prevent, manage, and contain such chronic diseases. Therefore, digital vaccines, which enable widespread scaling of frequent, personalised interventions at a low cost, may become an essential tool in the prevention and management of chronic disorders.2
Technological Advancements in Digital Therapeutics
With the proliferation of web 3.0 technologies operating in metaverse platforms, wearable technologies, Internet of Things (IoT), and Virtual and Augmented Reality (AR/VR), the development of digital vaccines promises to address multiple medical conditions at much lower cost through constant behavioural interventions. Digital Therapeutics is an intersection of neuroscience, cognitive sciences, heath analytics, and AI-powered mobile VR gaming.3 This differs greatly from telemedicine that usually is just virtual communication between doctors and their patients.
Given below are digital interventions being pursued or in vogue to tackle health conditions.
Covid-19
Personal hygiene, disinfecting surfaces, and social distancing are important lifestyle changes that help reduce the spread of infectious diseases like Covid-19. FriendsLearn is currently working on a digital vaccine delivered through a gamified mobile application that will be culturally sensitive and flexible to use. The start-up aims to use “dynamic neuro-behavioural-physiological modulation” using machine learning models in this endeavour.4
Diabetes
The number of people infected with diabetes is expected to rise to more than 134 million by 2045 in India.5 Type 2 diabetes accounts for the majority of cases which are linked to behavioural tendencies like high-calorie consumption and lack of physical activities. To successfully manage diabetes, patients must engage in a number of behavioural changes that occur outside of the healthcare setting, such as frequent blood sugar monitoring, medication adherence, and insulin self-injection. This puts a lot of pressure on the patients to manage their condition on their own.
Several digital medicine companies have developed solutions to address the diabetes and prediabetes epidemic. These include Text2Move (TTM), a United States-based study, which aims to determine whether automated, personalised, targeted, and motivational text messages could increase activity levels among Type 2 diabetics, thereby improving outcomes and lowering healthcare costs. The BlueStar smartphone app helps patients choose the best time to test blood sugar. As a result, it gives patients a more accurate picture of how their blood sugar fluctuates throughout the day in response to environmental stimuli.6
Cardiovascular diseases
According to the findings of the Global Burden of Disease study, India has an age-standardised cardiovascular disease (CVD) death rate of 272 per 100,000 people, which is significantly higher than the global average of 235.7 Like diabetes, CVD is also linked to lifestyle and behavioural factors that require management of weight. 'Fooya!' is an interactive and immersive gaming platform for kids that works as a digital vaccine. It attempts to encourage lifestyle changes through video games by promoting healthy eating.8
Further, recording a patient's data over time with a granular data set via digital medicines will allow a physician to understand if an intervention will be effective.9 There are wireless blood pressure monitors that are used in conjunction with an app to display blood pressure data. Historic readings are saved and can be accessed via the cloud, allowing either the patient or the physician to identify changes from previous readings.10
Challenges
Despite the promise of digital vaccines, there are a few challenges like privacy and regulation issues. According to research by Mozilla, user privacy is much less protected in mental health apps than in most other types of apps. Privacy is a major concern for digital vaccines interventions, in particular for those that influence behaviour change through intensive monitoring of personal data, such as location, movement, and purchase data.11
Large amounts of aggregated health data may be valuable to third parties (state or non-state actors), incentivizing digital vaccine platforms to sell the data. This can increase the security and privacy risks of the patients. This could complicate the regulation challenges of these platforms for the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO), which is responsible for drug approval, clinical trials, drug standards, quality control of imported drugs in the country.
Digital vaccine platforms could bypass regulations by not directly mentioning the management of chronic conditions but through claims of tackling habit-based challenges like weight loss, smoking, alcohol consumption, and mental distress. The exponential surge in chronic diseases, however, demands approaches that differ from those provided by current medical systems. Therefore, with significant technological advancements and innovation in computer and behavioural science, the opportunities for digital vaccines as tools to address our modern day medical problems are immense.
Digital Vaccine Use-Case: Indian Armed Forces
Digital Vaccines hold tremendous potential for the Indian Armed Forces. Such interventions can be used for treatment of soldiers in remote areas and for treatment of psychological conditions. Many military personnel experience mental health-related issues, especially post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), due to their involvement in highly stressful operations.12
While the role of video games in training personnel is well known, video games (also called ‘serious games’ in the context of mental health) in the form of digital vaccines can also be used for addressing mental health challenges. For example, US DoD’s National Center for Telehealth and Technology (T2) – which coordinates initiatives on digital health tools, has created a Virtual PTSD Experience computer-based program called ‘Second Life’. This is a virtual-reality video game, where the military personnel can create a virtual avatar to navigate through realistic scenarios to address their mental health concerns.13
Research on intensive virtual models showed potential to increase access to evidence-based PTSD treatment for veterans and service persons.14 Serious games in the form of digital vaccines can address issues like PTSD, divorce, emotional distress, and mental health. Indian Armed Forces, too, can initiate digital vaccine programs for their personnel to help curb mental health and other chronic conditions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The French withdrawal from Mali exacerbates the regional security situation.
At the request of the then interim government led by President Dioncounda Traore, France militarily intervened in Mali in 2013, by launching Operation Serval. The operation was authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 The imperatives that drove the French decision included the need to safeguard its economic investments (uranium mining fields in neighbouring Niger), political interests (long-standing close relationship with Mali, Francophone African countries and international obligations as a UNSC permanent member), and security interests (protection of the French diaspora in the region and to prevent the threat of an Islamist takeover).2 Operation Serval was successful in pushing back the rebels to the northern part of Mali. Owing to the spread of these outfits to the neighbouring regions, Operation Barkhane, a counter-terrorism operation in the Sahel region, was launched in August 2014.
Over the years, international missions and regional players have made tremendous efforts to counter the terrorist threat and security challenges. International missions included the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), instituted in 2013 and the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), launched in February 2013. Regional efforts included the G5 Sahel Joint Force launched in 2017—comprising Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The European Special Task Force ‘Operation Takuba’ was also established in March 2020.
Despite such military interventions over the past decade, there has not been much improvement in Mali’s security condition. Apart from being the epicenter of terrorist, jihadist and insurgency activity in the Sahel, Mali also faces threats from vigilantes and communal violence between the farming and herding communities, and is a hub for organised crime and illegal activities like smuggling and drug trafficking. Apart from political instability and the worsening security situation, the Covid-19 pandemic has also weakened the Malian economy, one of the poorest countries in the world.3 The country is dealing with high rates of poverty and unemployment and is heavily dependent on gold exports and oil imports.
Triggering Factors for French Withdrawal
Mali is currently being governed by a transition government led by Col Assimi Goïta, who led two coups in August 2020 and May 2021, with Choguel Kokalla Maïga as the prime minister.4
The military coups exacerbated tensions between France and Mali. France decided in June 2021 to unilaterally end its latest military Operation Barkhane. Later in February 2022, France and its allies announced a ‘coordinated withdrawal’ of their forces due to ‘multiple obstructions’ by the military-led government.5
The triggering factors were the rising tensions and differences with the Junta, delay in elections and the deterioration of bilateral ties. While announcing the decision to withdraw, President Emmanuel Macron stated that “we cannot remain militarily engaged alongside de-facto authorities whose strategy and hidden aims we do not share”.6 The decision of the military government in January 2022 to postpone elections to 2026, the ban on the Danish contingent of Operation Takuba, expelling of the French Ambassador and entry of the Russian-based Wagner Group at the end of 2021 as a security provider, deteriorated the bilateral relationship and fueled the decision on troop withdrawal.
There are additional geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic imperatives underlying the French withdrawal.
Geopolitical Imperatives:France has become increasingly unpopular among its former colonies in Africa. There has been a growing anti-French sentiment, especially in Mali. The local population has been protesting against the nearly decade-long foreign military presence by the former colonial power, that has yielded limited results. In December 2021, local protestors blocked a convoy of French troops repeatedly at multiple instances as it crossed from Burkina Faso and Niger towards Mali.7
Geostrategic Imperatives: With French presidential elections scheduled in April 2022, France was cautious of the execution of its withdrawal. The French government took measures to avoid comparisons with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Prior to the announcement, it held a meeting with the G5 Sahel leaders (except Mali and Burkina Faso due to the Junta rule) and portrayed the exit as a “coordinated withdrawal”.8 At home, there has been a growing domestic public dissatisfaction with France’s prolonged military involvement in Mali.9 Moreover, of the 53 French soldiers killed in Operation Barkhane, 48 had died in Mali.
Geo-economic Imperatives:France has withdrawn its troops only from Mali and not from the extended region. The troops are being re-deployed to Niger, giving France a base to continue its commitment to conduct anti-terrorist operations in Sahel and overlook its economic investments.10 As a country dependent on nuclear energy for electricity, French companies like Areva have huge investments in the uranium fields in Niger.11 Besides, the operation was proving to be costly for France, which was spending about one billion Euros (US$ 1.14 billion).12 By June 2022, France has handed over its military bases at Tessalit, Kidal, Timbuktu, Gossi and Menaka. The last withdrawal will be from the military base in Gao which would be returned to Malian forces “at the end of the summer”.13
Implications for Mali and the Region
The withdrawal of the French troops creates a security and political vacuum in the region and exacerbates the current security challenges.
Internal Implications: Mali has been left vulnerable to increased jihadist activity and militancy. The security crisis will continue to escalate with terrorist groups consolidating and setting up safe havens in northern parts of Mali. On the other hand, since the withdrawal of French troops and its allies indicates the withdrawal of foreign presence in the country, perhaps the insurgency elements and jihadist outfits would now be willing to negotiate with the Malian authorities. The withdrawal of foreign troops including the MINUSMA was one of the primary demands of these outfits as they perceived these forces to be an interference in the internal affairs of Mali, signifying an inability on the part of the government to handle its own matters.14
Additionally, there will be challenges in routing and distributing the developmental and humanitarian aid that comes into the country. French presence was complementing the efforts of MINUSMA. The mission was dependent on the logistical support and medical infrastructure of Operation Barkhane. MINUSMA Peacekeepers are equipped to protect civilians from attacks by armed groups and authorised to counter asymmetric threats but are not authorised to engage in counter-terrorism activities.15
The security and political vacuum created in Mali with the exit of France is being filled by external players like Russia. Reports indicate that mercenaries from the Wagner group are already stationed in Mali and Russia has given military equipment like combat helicopters and others to Mali.16 Mali has renounced a military cooperation agreement with France and has withdrawn from the G5 Sahel Force. These developments isolate Mali and raise concerns on the success of regional efforts to fight against terrorism in Sahel.
External Implications: In the short-term, the French withdrawal would perhaps cause the security situation in Mali to escalate out of control. There could be an increase in transnational and cross-border terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the developments pose a security threat to countries south of the Sahel. These include the littoral countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana, Togo and others. There has been growing concern about the spillover of jihadi activities towards the Gulf of Guinea.
Macron, while announcing the troop withdrawal, had pointed out that
Côte d'Ivoire President Alassane Ouattara warned that the withdrawal would create a political vacuum and pledged to take steps to enhance border protection.18
Another challenge is the political instability in the West Africa region. The region has witnessed three coups within a year, in Chad (April 2021), Mali (May 2021) and Burkina Faso (January 2022). Political instability would embolden the terrorist outfits who already control large territories in the region. Additionally, there has been an increase in the displacement and migration of people towards neighbouring countries, mostly northern Africa. Regional governments would need to prepare for the challenge of managing this influx.
Conclusion
The French withdrawal from Mali has created a security vacuum in the region. The security situation will likely deteriorate further, rendering Mali vulnerable to an increase in terrorist attacks. The efforts of MINUSMA would also be impacted. Apart from the challenge of tackling the increase in migration to neighbouring countries, the likelihood of the spread of terrorist threat to the littoral countries south of the Sahel has been heightened.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) Initiative aims to enhance regional maritime security via technology and training support.
The Quad is often criticised for underplaying its security agenda for the greater good of consensus-building. The Tokyo Summit in May 2020 may have changed that, with an announcement which is being seen as a clearest signal yet to China on its aggressive tactics at sea. A collaborative effort by the US, India, Japan and Australia—the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) Initiative—is aimed at delivering on the promised goals of enhancing maritime security and shared domain awareness in the region via technology and training support.1 Capacity-building of regional countries to guard against Chinese misadventures near their waters, in essence, is the focus of this effort.
South East Asia is among the key focus regions of this initiative. The White House read-out outlines that the IPMDA will share commercially available satellite data and alert smaller Southeast Asian states on possible territorial intrusions or illicit activity such as illegal fishing, smuggling or piracy in waters within their maritime boundaries.2 China’s muscle-flexing in the South China Sea was discussed by India and the ASEAN leaders during the recently held Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue in New Delhi. For a grouping like the ASEAN, which finds itself at the receiving end of the strategic fallout of US–China competition and Chinese belligerence, capacity-building measures like IPDMA could augment strength.
Aims of the IPMDA
Simply put, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is about having comprehensive position and intentions of all actors at sea in the given area of interest. This requires creation of compilation, correlation and fusion of surveillance data collected from diverse sources, i.e., satellites, radar, reconnaissance planes or human intelligence, in order to detect and identify actors with irregular or threatening behaviour.
Given the vast expanse of the ocean and resources required for comprehensive surveillance at sea, a collaborative approach for information-sharing and domain awareness has remained a major ask. The end goal is to develop among like-minded countries a shared understanding of developments and threats at sea.
The key to this line of effort is to link up existing regional collaboration mechanisms which are already analysing and assessing threats and challenges in their respective areas of interest. Each of the Quad members have their space-based assets for maritime surveillance, which are supplemented by their airborne and land-based sensors.
In addition, the Quad countries support/operate regional fusion centres. These include India’s IOR IFC, Australia-sponsored Pacific Fusion Centre in South Pacific, Japan’s MDA Situational Indication Linkages (MSIL) and the US Navy’s SeaVision platform.3 Protocols exist, as it is, for information-sharing and by creating more linkages with other such mechanisms, the initiative aims to develop the ability to predict patterns for big picture analyses.4
Keeping China in Check
IPMDA is an effort to supplement existing arrangements and is a reiteration that habits of cooperation and trust among like-minded countries can help augment regional capacities through rapid distribution and processing of shared data.5 Official statements explain that integration of three regions—South East Asia, South Asia and the Pacific—and being responsive to their needs as to what “is happening in countries’ territorial waters and in their exclusive economic zones” in real time, drove this effort.6
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing has emerged as a major area of concern. Many regional countries are endowed with vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) but have limited resources for effective monitoring of these zones. IUU Fishing has led to many countries losing fiscal revenues and has had disastrous consequences on conservation and sustainability efforts.
The scale of the challenge is compounded given that most fishing vessels are not obligated to carry any vessel tracking system, i.e., Automatic Identification System (AIS) or Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). Even when they are mandated, as in the case of vessels more than 300 metres, illegal actors go dark by either switching their tracking system off or transmitting false/spurious data as spoof. Identifying such illegal actors requires persistent monitoring of relevant areas with high resolution, surveillance sensors. It is only when you process this data that illicit actors’ patterns of behaviour can be identified. Therefore, the challenge in identifying illegal actors at sea is as much about data collection as it is about data processing. IPMDA aims to address this gap via pooling of resources.
While the stated goal is to contribute towards an effective deployment of maritime assets by regional partners to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters, and combat illegal fishing, the signpost of ‘We are watching you’ to China is not explicitly stated but is implicit. It is no secret that fishing fleets from China have aggressively targeted Indo-Pacific waters and have sparked outrage with frequent clashes. The IPMDA initiative would in practical terms assist in not just identifying Chinese actions but also help push back on its grey-zone activities.
Limitations of the Initiative
Critics have argued that the announcement was the lowest hanging fruit the Quad countries could deliver on, given that the collaborative efforts this initiative aims to institutionalise are already in play. However, the fact is that regional MDA remains far from comprehensive and extensive gaps remain in terms of information sharing. To deter China actively at sea, investments for the long haul in terms of persistent tracking of the vast span of Indo-Pacific are essential for realising the stated goals.
Clearer answers on how Quad members will mobilise necessary space-, air- or land-based surveillance assets required for such constant tracking or queries on how demands for additional resource mobilisation will be met, requires further elaboration. India, for one, is already setting up coastal surveillance radar stations (CSRS) in strategically located IOR countries, but has faced problems where demand has exceeded supply.7
For Quad to succeed as a force of public good, a strategic buy-in from South East Asia is essential. Given the region’s scepticism towards the Quad and apprehensions about the Quad’s rhetoric on ASEAN centrality, the IPMDA could serve as a reassuring platform to deliver on the most fundamental requirements on regional maritime security and prove its effectiveness.8 However, time will be of essence, as Quad countries divvy up responsibilities and resources while managing the crunch of post-pandemic economies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Quad has cautiously carved out a practical and cooperative agenda on issues of cybersecurity.
The Tokyo Summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the ‘Quad’, was held on 24 May, 14 months after the first Summit-level meeting held in March 2021. Apart from pledging to advance ‘a common vision of free and open Indo-Pacific through practical cooperation on diverse 21st century challenges’, and ‘uphold the international rules-based order …’, the Quad also highlighted issues like global health security, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, and cyber and space security.1 An assessment of Quad’s cybersecurity initiatives indicate that they are designed keeping into consideration cyber threats from China as well as the Quad’s emphasis on ‘cyber resilience’ rather than on ‘offensive cyber capabilities, which is a more robust way to tackle widespread cybersecurity challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
Quad’s Cybersecurity Initiatives
At the Tokyo Summit, Quad leaders recognised the urgent need for a ‘collective approach to enhancing cybersecurity’ through initiatives like Quad Cybersecurity Partnership guided by the 10 Joint Cyber Principles2 , the first-ever Quad Cybersecurity Day, information-sharing among Quad countries’ Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), and improving software and Managed Service Provider (MSP) security by coordinating cybersecurity standards for Quad governments’ procurement of software.
The Quad’s progress on cybersecurity issues has been encouraging since the September 2021 Summit meeting in Washington, where the members pledged to ‘facilitate public–private cooperation and demonstrate in 2022 the scalability & cybersecurity of open, standard-based technology’. The Quad Senior Cyber Group was also launched then.3 Experts met on 25 March 2022 to discuss strategies to improve cybersecurity in an increasingly digital world with sophisticated cyber threats.4 During the February 2022 Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Quad members reiterated their support for ASEAN neighbours to ‘build resilience and counter disinformation’ while developing coordinated efforts to assist Indo-Pacific partners to address the growing threat of ransomware and capability-building to counter cybercrime.5
Each of these initiatives indicates implicitly the critical security challenges Quad members face, and an understanding of practical deliverables. The Quad Cybersecurity Partnership aims to build resilience to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities and cyber threats by focusing on critical infrastructure protection (led by Australia), supply-chain resilience and security (led by India), workforce development and talent (led by Japan), and software security standards (led by the US). This targeted approach is coherent with the cyber threat trend and patterns in 2021 where multiple ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure led to supply-chain related disruptions all across the world.6
CERTs are nodal agencies that collect, analyse and disseminate information on cyber incidents; take emergency measures and coordinate handling of cybersecurity incidents; forecast and alert cybersecurity incidents and issue guidelines, advisories, and vulnerability reports of information security. Information-sharing and exchange of best practices will help Quad members' CERTs to develop a comprehensive and trust-based strategy for all stakeholders.
The US government and the Five Eyes intelligence partners—the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—issued a joint advisory in March 2022 warning about the ‘increasing cyberattacks by nation-state threat actors’ against managed service providers (MSPs). A MSP is a third-party organisation that maintains a customer's IT infrastructure and end-user systems from a remote location. Because MSPs have privileged access to their customers' networks at all times, successful cyberattacks against them can be disastrous.7 Hence, Quad's attention to MSPs’ security is linked to safeguarding software product supply chains from cyberattacks, especially ransomware attacks as witnessed in 2021.8 Three of the Quad members—India, the US and Japan—were also victims of the 2018 compromise of the MSPs that severely affected the software product supply chains all around the world, an attack that originated from China.9
The Cybersecurity Day campaign is an effort to strengthen cybersecurity awareness and promote action on cybersecurity for countries across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This will enable Quad members to push for the UN Voluntary Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace for norm-building and the promotion of ‘international peace and stability in cyberspace, and to help build the capacity of regional countries’.10
Critical and Emerging Technologies Initiatives
While there is a different working group for Critical and Emerging Technologies, many of its initiatives on 5G supplier diversification, semiconductor supply chains, and global technical standards have a direct impact on cybersecurity. At the Tokyo Summit, Quad members launched the Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains to enhance supply chain resilience.11
The push for having a diverse, competitive and reliable market for semiconductors is due to the complexity of the semiconductor supply chain management, which increases the chances of tampering.12 While China accounts for only 6 per cent of the total value of the global semiconductor supply chain,13 it is China’s manufacturing base and hold on Rare Earth Metals14 which is troublesome for the safety of the semiconductor supply chain.
Further, for the pursuit of ‘open and secure telecommunications technologies’ in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad members have committed to Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) Track 1.5 dialogues with the industry stakeholders. These dialogues will also include a Memorandum of Cooperation in 5G Supplier Diversification, cooperation between Quad for ‘technical exchanges and testbed activity to advance interoperability and telecommunications cybersecurity’.15
The Prague Proposals on Telecommunication Supplier Diversity16 recognises the need for a successful transition to 5G and beyond. This can be achieved through O-RAN interfaces where interoperability standards between suppliers' equipment are supported, and network flexibility is provided at a lesser cost. The O-RAN standards aim to break the RAN market's monolithic nature, where a handful of RAN suppliers offer exclusive equipment and software.17
While there are some cybersecurity concerns pertaining to 5G,18 in comparison to previous generation networks, O-RAN 5G networks might offer greater security and subscriber privacy. As the technology shifts from centralised core and RAN to distributed, virtual networks, security will become more agile and layered.19 Quad’s focus on 5G Supplier Diversification and Open RAN is due to the security threat from Chinese telecommunications companies like Huawei and ZTE that have invested heavily in the development of global 5G standards and have a sizable number of 5G patents.20 It is pertinent to note that many countries have banned Huawei and ZTE 5G equipment.21
While standardisation and promotion of open-source technologies in 5G technologies is the Quad’s focus, it is also committed to cooperation in international standardisation organisations like International Telecommunication Unit (ITU) and Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) through the newly established International Standards Cooperation Network (ISCN).22 Quad's attention to this initiative is due to China's assertive international standards promotion strategy and its China Standards 2035 project,23 which has cybersecurity implications. China's advocacy for cyber sovereignty has aided the country's elevation as a ‘great cyber power’ as it focuses on controlling norms, information, data, next-generation technology and standards.24
Recognising that the above-discussed initiatives require collaboration with academia and the industry to foster innovation in these technologies, Quad has launched the Quad Fellowship and Quad Investor Network. The Quad Fellowship intends to bring 100 students from Quad countries to the US each year to pursue graduate degrees in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) subjects. This will help develop a talented cohort of next-generation STEM leaders who will lead in cutting-edge research and innovation.25 The Quad Investor Network aims to seek funding for critical and emerging technologies within and across the Indo-Pacific, by engaging with an independent consortium of investors.26
Conclusion
While many cyber threat actors are operating in the Indo-Pacific, the attacks from China are particularly politically motivated. Chinese-based actors have indulged in nearly 200 cyber operations since 2005, primarily against the US.27 China has also perpetrated cyber-espionage operations against all Quad members to gain access to critical information. Due to China’s Civil–Military Fusion initiatives, select Chinese universities and research centres in association with Chinese military have been directly involved in these aggressive and successful cyber-espionage operations.28
The Quad’s approach to strengthen cyber resilience through its various initiatives is essential to mitigate such threats. Quad’s ‘practical cooperation’ approach is an attempt to solve existing cybersecurity challenges that affect millions of people in the region and beyond. The Quad has indeed cautiously carved out a practical and cooperative agenda on issues of cyber security.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The exit of Western oil companies from energy projects in the Russian Far East provides opportunities for India to enhance its stakes in these projects.
The Ukraine crisis has led many Western oil and gas companies to terminate their joint energy projects with Russia in the Arctic. This has been due to the fear of Western economic sanctions as well as to mark opposition against Russia for its military operation in Ukraine. Companies like BP, Equinor, ExxonMobil and Shell are some of the major energy giants that are in the process of finding suitable exits from Russian energy projects.1
Sakhalin-1, which is an international consortium of oil and gas development companies in the Russian Far East, has started witnessing similar trends. The US energy giant, ExxonMobil, which owned 30 per cent stake in Sakhalin-1, has already stopped its operations and is expected to formally exit from this joint venture.2 The other entities in Sakhalin-1 are Sakhalin Oil & Gas Development Co. Ltd. (Japan), ONGC Videsh Ltd. (India) and Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf and RN-Astra (Russia). These companies hold 30 per cent, 20 per cent, 11.5 per cent and 8.5 per cent stakes respectively.
Similarly, Sakhalin-2 is an international energy development consortium of Gazprom (Russia), Shell (US-based subsidiary of Royal Dutch), Mitsui & Co. (Japan) and Mitsubishi Corp. (Japan). Shell, which holds 27.5 per cent stake in Sakhalin-2, has announced plans to exit this energy consortium. There were also reports that Japanese companies, Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi Corp., which hold 12.5 per cent and 10 per cent stakes in Sakhalin-2 respectively, were also under strong Western pressure to terminate their partnership with Russia.3 Though Japan has so far resisted this pressure owning to the country’s dire energy needs, uncertainty remains as to the future prospects of this cooperation.
Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 are Russia’s most important integrated oil and gas development projects that operate in one of the world’s harshest climatic conditions. The Sakhalin-1 is estimated to hold approximately 2.3 billion barrels of oil and 17.1 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves.4 Sakhalin 2 accounts for 4 per cent of the world’s total LNG supply.5 The region is prone to earthquakes and requires special technical expertise and engineering skills for exploration. Moreover, the development and operational costs of these projects is much higher.
Russia, therefore, needs reliable long-term partners to develop its Far Eastern regions and sustain its economy. Oil and Gas are sectors whose strength is vital for reviving the Russian economy, post the Ukraine crisis. If European and Western countries become successful in reducing their oil and gas dependency on Russia6 (which they intend to do so in near future), the most viable option for Russia is to tap energy markets in East, South East and South Asian countries. Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, therefore, can become the most promising projects for supplying Russian oil and gas to these markets.
India–Russia Energy equation
Oil and Gas trade between India and Russia remains significantly low, despite Russia being the world’s third largest producer and India being the third largest consumer.7 The most obvious reason for this pertains to the shipping distance, cargo delivery time and cost escalation as a result of long geographical distances between the two countries. India’s energy engagements with Russia, other than the direct purchase of oil and gas, is through ONGC Videsh Limited’s (OVL) direct investments in Russian energy projects.
Apart from Sakhalin-1, OVL holds 100 per cent stake in Russia’s Imperial Energy Corporation and 26 per cent stake in the Vankorneft field. Also, 23.9 per cent stake in Russia’s Vankorneft field and 29.9 per stake in the Taas-Yuryakh field, are jointly held by the consortium of Oil India Limited, Indian Oil Corporation and Bharat PetroResource Limited.8
In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s offer to supply India with cheaper crude oil (US$ 35 lesser than the international market price), was criticised by the West. Indian companies though significantly increased their volumes of oil imports from Russia. India’s total import of Russian oil despite buying additional volumes in March 2022, remained less than 1 per cent of its total oil import.9 These figures increased to 18 per cent in May, 2022 as per a report published by CREA.10
The Western exit from Russian oil projects could become a big opportunity for Indian oil companies to directly invest in Russian energy projects to secure the country’s long-term energy needs. ExxonMobil’s decision to sell its 30 per cent stake from Sakhalin-1 needs to be carefully thought through, and India’s OVL could consider increasing its stakes in Sakhalin-1. Similarly, OVL or a joint consortium of companies led by OVL, could consider buying Shell’s 27.5 per cent stake that it intends to sell in Russia’s Sakhalin-2 project. OVL already maintains the technical expertise required for drilling in these harsh terrains. Therefore, such investments would significantly strengthen and diversify India’s energy supply chains and reduce the country’s dependency on Middle East countries for oil imports.
Strategic Calculus
Both Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 offer tremendous opportunities for India. Though there looms the current fear of Western economic sanctions and other technical shipping hindrances, India needs to pragmatically think through the long-term energy benefits from this region. Western exits from Sakhalin energy projects may negatively impact Russia economically, but it would simultaneously create investment voids, thereby giving a free hand to China to make long-term energy investments. China’s stakes in Sakhalin could enhance geopolitical disparities, owning to the presence of Japan and India as the other two partners in these projects. But, if India becomes successful in increasing its stakes in Sakhalin, it would not only benefit Indian oil refineries with high-grade sweet crude (especially Sokol grade form Sakhalin-111 ) to sustain domestic needs, but Indian oil companies could also process and can further sell Sakhalin crude and its derivatives to South East Asian, South Asian and even European markets.
An increase in energy investments in the Russian Far East would further enhance India–Russia naval cooperation and would significantly strengthen Indian naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. Indian oil shipments coming from the Russian Far East would also be free from piracy risks which remains a threat near the Horn of Africa. One may argue that in an adverse case scenario, China may put a blockade to Indian oil shipments coming from the Russian Far East. But a valid counter argument is the fact that it would be difficult for China to stop Russian oil shipments to India, given the China–Russia strategic partnership. Still, if ever the situation arises, India may also use similar leverage against China on its energy shipments passing through the Malacca Strait.
Shipping Factor and Distance Analysis
India has four major oil refineries located on its eastern coast. These include Haldia Refinery (West Bengal), Paradip Refinery (Odisha), Manali Refinery (Chennai) and Visakhapatnam Refinery (Andhra Pradesh). The shipping distance between Russia’s De-Kastri oil export terminal (Sakhalin-1) and Chennai Port is 9,626 km. It would take approximately 16 days and 15 hours for a large oil cargo ship to cover this distance, running at an average speed of 13 knots. Similarly, the average distance between Korsakov port (Sakhalin-2) and the Indian ports of Haldia, Chennai, Paradip and Visakhapatnam is around 9,256 km (Map 1). At an average speed of 13 knots, it would take approximately 16 days for these oil shipments to reach all major Indian refineries on its eastern coast. This is a significant reduction in travel time as compared to Russian oil coming to India’s western coast from its Baltic Sea ports, for which average transit time is 23 days.
Map 1: Shipping distance between Sakhalin ports and oil refineries on India’s Eastern Coast
If we compare India’s oil shipments coming from US Gulf Coast to Mumbai port, the approximate transit time is 31 days and this further increases to 35–40 days, if the shipments need to reach Indian refineries on the country’s eastern ports.12 The only limitations that currently hinder enhancing India–Russia oil trade relate to payments, availability of shipping vessels and cargo insurances. Western sanctions on shipping companies and insurance providers are hindering the transportation of Russian crude to its required destinations. If India and Russia develop credible mechanisms to bypass Western economic sanctions or can find suitable alternatives complying with international norms, there remains immense potential for both the countries to cooperate in Sakhalin.
Conclusion
India in 2019 issued a US$ 1 billion line of credit for the development of the Russian Far East region.13 The government’s vision inclines well with the current emerging opportunities in Sakhalin. The government is in talks with state-run oil companies to consider increasing their stakes in Russian energy projects.14 Though the Middle East remains India’s most viable choice for energy imports, emerging geopolitics and shifting traditional alliances compels India to diversify its partners. Russia, with its abundant energy resources, coupled with the exit of Western oil companies from its energy projects, offers tremendous opportunity for India.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Agnipath scheme provides an opportunity for the armed forces to leap into the next generation of warfare with a manpower that can embrace technological challenges.
The ‘Agnipath’ scheme has been baptised by fire even before it has been launched and has turned into an ‘Agnipariksha’ for the Government of India. Given the ‘out of the box’ nature of the proposal, many have raised questions about the scheme negatively impacting the ethos of the armed forces that have brought glory to the country.
Army recruitment policies over the years
To understand what the future holds and if indeed the Agnipath is as radical as it is made out to be, one should place in historical perspective the recruitment policies of the armed forces. In the armed forces, especially so in the Army, soldiers have traditionally come from the same socio-economic strata. Until 1977, soldiers were enlisted only for seven years, plus eight years in reserve, which was then changed to 17 years. In other words, all the major wars fought by the army were won by soldiers on seven-year terms of active duty.
The selection of soldiers then was based only on a certain standard of physical fitness. The written test for examining standards of literacy got introduced in the 1980s. The literacy standards of the recruits were not uniform and they therefore went through lengthy processes of training, as compared to other armies, to bring them up to certain minimum levels of education. The training also helped in improving the health and physique of the soldiers, given the rigorous physical training and better diet provided to them. It was in the 1980s that the army extended the basic training from 36 to 52 weeks, at the end of which they were granted an Army Third Class Certificate of Education. The soldiers also got introduced to specific subjects such as map-reading and other necessary skills.
Defenders of the lingual/caste-based/regional recruitment model overlook the fact that some of the most battle-hardened units in Independent India’s military history had All-India, All-Class compositions. The most notable among these are the Brigade of Guards and the Parachute regiments (Special Forces) as well as the Artillery and Armoured Corps. No doubt, the overall recruitment practice did throw up some anomalies. Personnel from less than 200 districts of India were supplying soldiers to the armed forces. Also, certain classes/communities had higher representation in the military, fuelled no doubt by such concepts like martial races, stemming from the prejudices and biases nurtured by the British.
Current protests in context
It is important to understand why the current protests against the Agnipath recruitment model have gained steam. Unlike the protests against the farm laws that impacted nearly 46 per cent of the population, or the protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) that generated the angst of a particular community, it was not anticipated that a sector that employs less than 0.5 per cent of the workforce or one per thousand capita of population would lead to such widespread protests.
It is important to highlight that the appeal of the armed forces as a profession lies in the fact that the armed forces is open to all Indians purely on a merit-based entry. Secondly, joining the military service is seen as being honourable and patriotic, given the status soldiers have always enjoyed in Indian society. No one can deny the riveting and mesmerising hold of military power and even war itself, on society. Membership of the armed forces is not just an identity but also an opportunity to escape from the anonymity of the rural socio-economic strata of society which supplies the majority of men in uniform. Last but not the least, this profession afforded a security for a lifetime which included a lifetime pension, including medical cover.
The current demonstrations on the street are, therefore, fuelled in part by concerns that the aspirations of the aspirants may not be fulfilled, concerns which are no doubt being fanned by the political opposition, which sees an opportunity to challenge the decisions of the government.
Options before the Government
It is pertinent to highlight the previous instance of the roll-back of the government’s policy on farm laws, on account of the opposition which charged that such laws were anti-farmer and pro-business. Instead of tweaking the laws, the government was forced to withdraw the laws. Subsequently, the Supreme Court-appointed Experts Committee report revealed that a majority of the stakeholders were in favour of those laws while only around 13 per cent were against them. The recall, in effect, stalled reforms in the farm sector.
The current government’s many successes in reforming the national security system include the creation of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), fulfilling the principles of One Rank One Pension (OROP)—which was pending since 1972, the establishment of the National War Memorial, pioneering initiatives to strengthen self-reliance like Make In India, among many others.
In the current context of the protests against the Agnipath scheme, it is a challenging task to set right the narrative that the recruitment policy is against the interests of the youth of the country. It is to the credit of the government that several amendments have been made which indicates that the scheme is not set in stone.
However, what can make the scheme more trustworthy and appealing is changing the method of selection to a national-level examination instead of focusing on regional recruitment. The testing has to be at a national-level, similar to the Combined Defence Service (CDS) exams and a common merit list must be prepared. The qualifying candidates then need to be subjected to an intelligence and aptitude test at the testing centres. This will call for a major change in the existing practice. Based on the various matrices that should include allocations for physical fitness, qualifying marks and medical fitness, a hierarchy of selection criteria can be decided for allotment to various arms and services.
There are apprehensions that biases and prejudices may set in for identifying the soldiers to be retained, four years after recruitment. To address such apprehensions, the percentage considered for retention may be increased to anything between 33 to 50 per cent and the term may be extended to five years, instead of the current four. Furthermore, the retained soldiers have to be again on an all-India merit list, that will take into consideration the achievements and progress made by them, which not only includes the annual appraisals but also the standards of fitness and individual accomplishment, all of which have to be quantified.
As a spin-off, the current agitation has succeeded in kindling interest in post-military employment of soldiers. Many additional benefits, including on the long-standing demand of assured entry into the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) and other organisations, have been announced. This demand has been routinely aired, and was also highlighted by the Group of Ministers report following the Kargil War. The option of lateral entry has to be streamlined and an added commitment could be shown by enrolling all Agniveers to the National Pension Scheme (NPS), with the government footing the additional burden for the service. Their NPS accounts could then be transferred to the CAPF or other organisations that the Agniveers subsequently join.
Finally, there is a need to change the narrative that the government is looking to abdicate its responsibility to soldiers. It needs to be highlighted that the government is looking for a talent pool that is not just qualified, but also capable of being absorbed into the needs of a futuristic army. The fact that the Agnipath is not a short-term contract needs to be emphasised. History has always shown that forces that fail to keep up with technology have been overwhelmed by smaller, more agile and lethal forces. This scheme provides an opportunity for the armed forces to leap into the next generation of warfare with a manpower that can embrace the technological challenges.
The government should also launch public outreach programmes showcasing the advantages that will accrue as a result of its implementation. Instances of youth preventing mob rampages whose sole purpose is to destroy national property have to be highlighted, as they gel with the ethos of soldiering, which is that a true soldier will give his life than destroy what his country stands for.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The new Labor Party government in Australia is likely to show continuity on AUKUS and Quad initiatives in the Indo-Pacific, while policy approaches on Pacific Islands and China, as also on climate change, may get a re-look.
Anthony Albanese won the closely contested general election in Australia in May 2022, marking the return of the Labor Party to power after nine years. Though the election campaign revealed minimal differences in foreign policy positions between the two major parties, it is expected that the change in foreign and security policies is likely to be in the process rather than on substance. Experts believe that there will be a stronger emphasis on bolstering close relationships with regional partners.
Albanese’s first overseas visit was the Quad Leaders’ Meeting at Tokyo on 24 May 2022.1 Before the Quad Summit meet in Tokyo, Albanese stated that the "Quad leaders' meeting is an absolute priority for Australia, there will be some changes in policy, particularly in regard to climate change and our engagement with the world."2
During his address at the Lowy Institute on 10 March 2022, Albanese enunciated three key principles for national security policy.3 These included:
He further articulated that the Labor Government will achieve these objectives and build a more secure and resilient Australia by supporting a stronger Australian Defence Force, prioritise better and smarter cybersecurity, shore-up economic self-reliance, strengthen institutions, deepen partnerships in the region and globally, and take action on climate change.
Australia’s foreign policy is reasonably bipartisan and it has remained apolitical, which helps the relationships with partners in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Albanese has consistently stated in the run up to the elections that his government’s aim will be to “deepen” defence cooperation with close partners like Japan, India, Singapore as well as “bolster our joint capabilities, shape our strategic environment and uphold the rules of the road”.5
On China, Australia’s biggest trading partner, the Labor government has traditionally taken a more nuanced approach. While speaking to The Guardian Australia, Albanese admitted that relations with China "will continue to be difficult".6 Albanese also affirmed that Canberra will continue to stand up for its values and interests, against any aggressive behaviour by China in the region against Australian interests. Albanese further added that he supported the Biden administration's perspective on China—‘competition without catastrophe’—and called for “more considered responses to China's more aggressive positioning in the region than just ramping up rhetoric”.7 Whether Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong will be less forceful than the previous government in dealing with China’s assertiveness and expansionist activities remains to be seen.
Australian diplomacy and tug of war with China was on display in South Pacific in the recent weeks, after China signed a security deal with Solomon Islands and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited eight Pacific countries in May–June 2022. As Australia is changing its relationship with Pacific nations to a more cooperative one, Wong asserted that Australia would ‘listen (to Pacific Family) because we care what the Pacific has to say’.8
During Wang’s visit, the China–Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision was proposed by China, which caused deep concern among some of the island nations as well as in Canberra and Washington DC, pushing Penny Wong to make two quick trips to the Pacific. Wang Yi had hoped to ink the ambitious deal with 10 South Pacific nations covering cooperation in areas ranging from security aspects to fisheries. Consensus on that deal was elusive but Wang was able to sign bilateral agreements with many of the countries he visited. Concomitantly, Wong met Pacific leaders in Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and conveyed that Australia respected the right of sovereign nations to make their own security decisions, but added that those decisions "have the potential to affect the nature of the security arrangements of the region”.9
Australia’s bilateral relationship with the US, its only treaty-ally in the Indo-Pacific, is likely to continue growing deeper and broader. When the Morrison government announced AUKUS in September 2021, the Labor Party supported the decision. Moreover, Labor Party has maintained that to defend Australia and deter its potential aggressors, the government needs to quickly increase Australia’s strike capabilities. While addressing Lowy Institute, Albanese pointed out that there were some contradictions between the 10-year time-frame as indicated in the 2020 Strategic Update to examine issues of national security and other policy statements that look towards building future defence capabilities.10 Albanese has also talked about the need to address the submarine capability gap in the period until the nuclear-powered submarines are delivered.
The Quad Summit meeting in Tokyo presented an opportunity for Albanese to meet Joe Biden and to reiterate Australia's commitment to the AUKUS security pact with the United States and the United Kingdom, under which Canberra aspires to acquire nuclear-powered submarines and other high-end defence technologies. The new government observes that given the present challenges and geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific, a credible deterrent capability is vital to maintain peace and security in the region. Labor Party has also underscored the need to resource Australian Defence to defend Australia and deter potential aggressors.
At the Lowy Institute address, Albanese observed,
The new Australian government has renewed its focus on Southeast Asia, looking at a broader engagement in the region, rather than the earlier focus on the US–China competition. Southeast Asia has been the pivot of Australian diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, as was demonstrated by Albanese and Wong during their first visit to Indonesia, a major economic and strategic partner, on 6–7 June 2022.12 Albanese is trying to create a new constructive environment in its relationship with Indonesia, and Southeast Asia, as against merely condemning Chinese coercion and expansionist activities in the South China Sea.
As for climate change issues, the Labor government has highlighted the need for firm obligation that Australia will reduce its own carbon footprint in line with the Glasgow Climate Pact 2021 and Paris Accord 2015. Albanese and Wong will look at implementing Labor Party’s promise for a climate infrastructure partnership and recently announced plans to boost development assistance and labour mobility. Under the Labor government, Australia intends to co-host a future global climate summit with Pacific partners. This will address Australia’s security concerns in the region, as also ensure dialogue with Pacific leaders to meet their development requirements. At the Lowy Institute address, Albanese stated that climate change was the “number one issue that Pacific nations are concerned about”. At the Quad Leaders’ Summit also, Albanese articulated climate change as one of the biggest security threats facing the Indo-Pacific.13
The Labor government is likely to broaden trade diversification with a focus on new markets for exports, as also work with businesses to build domestic economic capacities, as part of the Future Made in Australia plan, so that Australia will be “less vulnerable to economic coercion and global shocks…”.14 In addition, Labor Party’s shadow government had released Defence Industry Development Plan which looks at sustenance of defence supply chains, development of self-reliant defence industry and encouraging innovation in both defence and wider industry. Labor Party’s plan for a National Strategic Fleet of Australian-flagged vessels reinforces security of supply for critical resources.
Australia has joined the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which goes beyond the original Quad intent and includes many other Asian and Pacific nations. Canberra supported IPEF and Quad initiatives for larger functional aspects of economic connectivity, supply chain resilience, clean energy initiatives and standards based on just economy. The resilient supply chain initiatives are an effort to protect the region from disruptions and inflationary pressures, as was seen during the pandemic and Russia–Ukraine conflict.
With the new government in Australia, India will look to bolster and broaden the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership as well as have renewed focus on economic and technological cooperation. There are enormous opportunities for growth in cooperation at multilateral bodies, namely Quad and G20, East Asia Summit, among others. Broader synergy between the two nations is expected to continue in maritime security issues as also in non-traditional security matters, namely, energy security, climate change and foreign policy objectives. Analysts will also closely watch India’s bilateral relationship with Labor government on issues of differences, in particular, Russia–Ukraine conflict and developments in Myanmar and Afghanistan.
In conclusion, the Labor government in Australia is likely to strengthen and deepen its strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region by leveraging AUKUS and Quad frameworks. Defence and strategic issues, particularly those against China, may get a re-look. Moreover, the government can be expected to look at Australia’s security and economic engagement in the Pacific and Southeast Asia with new vision and energy, and may take significant and concrete actions to maintain its regional sphere of influence.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Beijing’s pushback against the Washington-backed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is likely to result in an intense regional geo-economic competition.
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), launched in Tokyo on 23 May 2022, is being touted by the US as a mechanism to counter China’s regional economic influence. The four policy pillars of the initiative include digital trade, building of resilient supply chains, fulfilment of clean energy commitments and implementation of fair trade rules with effective taxation and elimination of corruption.1 Reports cite US officials as stating that the initiative will present the Indo-Pacific countries “an alternative to China’s approach and strengthen political and economic ties with partner countries”.2 China has responded strongly to the initiative, calling it an ‘economic NATO’ aimed at stoking regional divisions. Beijing has also moved rapidly to initiate counter-moves against the IPEF.3
IPEF as a cause of anxiety
Chinese analyses of IPEF contend that the economic pact, if implemented, is unlikely to immediately affect Chinese economic interests.4 Highlighting existing China-led cooperative mechanisms like Regional Comprehensive Economic Programme (RCEP) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese policy experts opine that China is better integrated with the region than the US.5 For instance, many South East Asian industries are dependent on China for raw materials which are processed for export to the US or European Union (EU). Further, China’s economic cooperation with the region is also deepening. Besides trade with RCEP countries, China’s trade with ASEAN bloc totalled US$ 212 billion in the first quarter of 2022. Due to China’s large domestic market, South Korea and Japan could also be inclined to strengthen economic cooperation with Beijing under RCEP.6
As regards possibility of China’s economic isolation from the regional economic framework, analysts assert that China cannot be ignored due to its economic influence. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a press briefing on 22 May, claimed that China has emerged as the largest trading partner of most of the countries in the region and those trying to isolate China will eventually isolate themselves.7 A section of Chinese media and members of strategic community reiterated the sentiment.8 Another prominent Chinese commentator argued that it will be impossible to exclude China economically since it is the largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity and the largest trading nation with most of the Asia-Pacific countries.9 Chinese observers conclude that IPEF is bound to fail as it is a ‘political tool’ to target China and devoid of any economic substance which will benefit the Asian region.10
However, a sense of alarm was also perceptible, with Beijing declaring policy measures relating to trade and cooperation in the region while criticising the framework as being divisive at the same time. On the day US President launched the IPEF, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the UN ESCAP summit pledged deeper cooperation with the Indo-Pacific through better BRI projects and higher investments.11 Reportedly, he also promised to proactively pursue China's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement to counter the new trade and economic initiative of the Quad alliance.12
Similarly, the urgency with which Wang toured the Pacific Island Countries offering them ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ demonstrated Beijing’s anxiety regarding IPEF. In a bid to undercut Washington’s network of alliance and consolidate China’s economic and military footprint, Wang offered economic, infrastructural and security cooperation to these island countries and pledged greater support in terms of humanitarian relief and ensuring food security and climate change mitigation.13 Some Chinese observers, though, affirmed the possibility of adverse impact like reduced regional trade and shift in production chain, and suggested that China should strengthen RCEP cooperation through accelerating digital partnership negotiations with the ASEAN members. Moreover, analysts suggested that China should leverage its geographical proximity and attractiveness of its markets to deepen cooperation with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea.14
In view of China’s robust trade linkages with the Indo-Pacific countries, Beijing is confident that economic decoupling is not in the horizon in the near future. However, the cause of its concern is the “exclusive institutional balancing” underlying the idea of IPEF.15 Such institutional balancing can be used to diminish China’s economic edge in the region by pressurising Chinese economy through export controls, import screening and shifting supply chains, which could eventually reduce China’s strategic clout.16
Implications for the region
Anxious about the threat posed by IPEF to China’s regional economic clout, Chinese leaders and analysts have called for enhancing regional economic cooperation. Beijing’s pushback against Washington’s IPEF strategy is likely to result in an intense zero-sum geo-economic competition. China is likely to add more teeth to its regional economic diplomacy. We can, therefore, witness China rolling out more capital investment, technology transfer and infrastructure development plans for the neighbouring countries. For the smaller regional economies, it does offer an opportunity to resist economic domination by one power while simultaneously compelling them to provide public goods tailored to their needs. Further, competition between China and US-led institutions could perhaps drive reforms within these institutions that could lead to an improvement in the regional economic architecture, ensure greater supply chain resilience and enhance intra-regional trade. The increased geo-economic competition in a region with security deficits, though, could also result in greater diplomatic confrontations and further deterioration of regional security.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The change in Turkey’s foreign policy approach in West Asia underlines a desire on part of Ankara to eschew confrontationist politics.
Turkey’s approach towards its West Asian neighbourhood in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings evoked sharp criticisms from regional countries, which accused Ankara of pursuing a neo-Ottoman and pan-Islamic foreign policy. The regional response partly emerged from the growing popularity of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the Arab streets, at least in the early phase of the uprisings. Turkey, on the other hand, was driven by global power aspirations, as articulated in the Strategic Depth doctrine promulgated by the former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. This contributed to the sharp geopolitical competition among regional powers for influence, and shaped the outcomes of protest movements in countries such as Syria, Egypt and Libya.
Turkey’s confrontationist approach led to serious diplomatic and political backlash leading to deterioration of ties between Ankara and other regional capitals, including Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Turkey–Israel relations had already worsened, prior to Arab Spring, over Ankara’s stand on Israel–Palestine conflict, and support for the militant-Islamist Palestinian movement, Hamas. What this meant was that the so-called policy of “zero-problem” with neighbours turned into “zero-friends” in the neighbourhood.1
A Foreign Policy Rethink?
Since 2021, a discernible shift in Turkey’s approach towards neighbours in West Asia is noticeable. In the past year and a half, Turkey has initiated rapprochement with Israel, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and has also initiated a rethink in its policy towards Syria and Libya. In March 2022, President Isaac Herzog became the first Israeli head of state to visit Ankara since 2007. There have been talks on enhancing bilateral economic ties, especially in the energy sector with an eye on tapping the potential for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean (East Med). Erdoğan termed Herzog’s visit as heralding a “new era” in bilateral relations.2
Turkey and UAE too have taken steps to improve relations. Mohammed Bin Zayed’s visit in November 2021 was a departure from the acrimonious relations since Turkey accused Abu Dhabi of meddling in domestic politics, and funding the July 2016 failed coup. Bin Zayed’s visit paved the way for a return visit by Erdoğan in February 2022. The two countries have focused on economic cooperation with a promise of US$ 10 billion Emirati investment fund in Turkey, and several agreements for collaboration in defence industry, climate change, healthcare, food security and other sectors.3
With Saudi Arabia, the signs of a reconciliation emerged when Turkey’s foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited Riyadh in May 2021. The tense relations between the two regional giants had ruptured over the Jamal Khashoggi murder case wherein the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received international backlash for his alleged involvement. Weeks before Erdoğan visited the Kingdom, and met the King and embraced Bin Salman, a Turkish court suspended the Khashoggi murder trial and decided to transfer it to Saudi Arabia. The focus of the discussion during Erdogan’s visit was again on tapping the economic potential.
In the case of Egypt, although there are no high-level exchange of visits, the two have engaged in delegation-level talks between officials from the foreign ministries focussing on improving trade and commercial ties. Importantly, Ankara has asked Muslim Brotherhood-linked media houses in Turkey to tone down their criticism of the government in Cairo.4 This indicates that Turkey might be ready to be more accommodative of Egyptian concerns vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood than it has been in the past. Ankara has been keen to improve relations with Cairo eyeing the lucrative energy fields in the East Med wherein Egypt has emerged as major player through the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Additionally, Turkey has taken steps to reach out to the Bashar al-Assad regime for peace and stability in Syria, and has reviewed its policy of military intervention in Libya.
Drivers of Change
The most important drivers for the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy approach lie in domestic political and economic developments. Turkey has been struggling with economic challenges since 2017, and the hopes for a recovery in 2019 were dashed with the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. In 2021, the Turkish economy recorded a sharp upturn in GDP growth at 11.7 per cent, but the World Bank has projected a modest growth of 2 per cent for 2022.5 Notwithstanding the uncertain growth trajectory, other economic indicators, including record inflation at 70 per cent in April 2022, devaluation of Lira, rising poverty and Covid-induced slump in tourism and export sectors, underline the seriousness of the economic challenge facing Turkey.6 President Erdoğan in his re-election bid in the 2023 elections does not want to leave any stone unturned to revive the economy, which is vital for winning the vote of his conservative-nationalist support base.
Given that economic situation can harm Erdoğan’s electoral prospects, he is focussing on improving trade and commercial ties with West Asian countries to help recover the export slump. Turkey also depends on imports for both agricultural and manufactured products. That it can also bring the tourists from the regional countries is an additional advantage. Besides Erdogan’s foreign policy failures have become a domestic political issue, which the opposition, buoyed by their performance in the 2019 municipal elections, can raise to undermine the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) electoral prospects. Hence, the chance of presenting Erdogan’s foreign policy volte face as an achievement in an election year can be a worthwhile factor in Ankara’s conduct in the region.
The foreign policy recalibration is also linked to regional and international politics. The Middle East has over the past two years witnessed a shift from geopolitics to geo-economics with many parallel ongoing talks and negotiations including, for example, between Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the rapprochement between the Arab Gulf and Israel after the Abraham Accords. Additionally, Iraq has taken initiatives for talks among regional countries held in Baghdad, while UAE had taken lead in re-inducting Syria into the Arab fold. This can be attributed to several factors but the two most important developments that have impinged on the regional trend are the need for economic recovery after Covid-19 and the change in US approach to the region with the transition from the Trump to the Biden administrations. The flux in international politics and the resultant gradual shift in US focus away from the Middle East is also one of the driving factors for Ankara to pursue a more reconciliatory approach regionally, underlining the desire for recognition as a “middle power” in international politics.
Challenges and Implications
While the change in Turkish approach is refreshing, one cannot ignore the challenges Ankara faces in this pursuit. With Israel, serious difference over the Palestinian issue remain, and Turkey has not indicated any reversal in its policy of supporting Hamas. Similarly, with Egypt and Arab Gulf countries, the challenges remain because of Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, with Saudi Arabia, the claim to global Islamic leadership can adversely impact the reconciliation. More importantly, there is no evidence to suggest an ideational change guiding Turkish foreign policy conduct. That is, Ankara continues to be guided by the neo-Ottoman and pan-Islamic principles that had led to deterioration in ties with the regional countries in the first place. The change in foreign policy conduct are rather tactical wherein the foreign policy managers in Ankara now view a reconciliatory approach as more beneficial in securing Turkey’s interests and advance its regional ambitions.
Nonetheless, the change in Turkey’s foreign policy approach in West Asia can be seen as an encouraging sign that can help reduce regional tensions. It also underlines a desire on part of Ankara to pursue diplomacy rather than confrontationist politics. Seen together with the wider regional trend of diplomatic engagements and geo-economic prospects, Turkey’s foreign policy recalibration generates some hope. Unfortunately, those familiar with the fractious nature of Middle East politics know that this is way too optimistic.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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