IADD Reinvigorates India’s Defence Cooperation with African Countries
Ruchita Beri
October 18, 2022
The second India–Africa Defence Dialogue at DefExpo 2022 at Gandhinagar, Gujarat has opened multiple pathways for defence cooperation between India and Africa.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh hosted the Defence Ministers and Heads of delegation from African countries during the second India–Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), organised on the sidelines of DefExpo2022 at Gandhinagar on 18 October 2022. The main theme of the event was ‘Adopting Strategy for Synergizing and Strengthening Defence and Security Cooperation’. The Gandhinagar Declaration was adopted as the outcome document of the IADD. A special cover on the IADD, a brochure of the India–Africa Security Fellowship Programme to be hosted by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi and a volume on India–Africa Defence cooperation, were also released. The IADD will definitely reinvigorate India’s defence cooperation with African countries in training, maritime cooperation, countering terrorism and transfer of defence equipment.
Skills enhancement and capacity building through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme is an important pillar of India’s long-standing partnership with African countries. India’s focus on training and skills enhancement matches with the goal of African countries towards a skills revolution for their youth, as portrayed in African Union’s Agenda 2063, a blueprint for transforming Africa into a global powerhouse. Providing opportunities to defence officers from Africa to study at India’s premier defence training establishments or sending training teams to an African country as per its requirement has been the bedrock of India’s defence cooperation with the region.
The famous African alumni of Indian military training institutions include the current President of Nigeria, Mohammadu Buhari. He was trained at the Defence Services Staff College at Wellington. Similarly, former President of Ghana, Gen FWK Akuffo, had received training at National Defence College, New Delhi. The Gandhinagar Declaration calls for an increase in India’s defence training under ITEC programme, particularly in specialised areas, such as defence technology, cybersecurity, maritime law, ocean governance and peacekeeping. It also recommends deployment of temporary training teams to African countries on request.
Despite the efforts by African countries, conflicts continue to simmer in some parts of the region. Recognising the security challenges faced by African countries, India has supported their efforts towards fostering peace and security through deployment of Indian peacekeepers for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) in the region. India has participated in majority of the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, including those in Congo, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Liberia, Sudan, South Sudan, Abeyi, Western Sahara and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
At Gandhinagar, India has committed to continue its support to UNPKOs in Africa. It will also continue to train officers from African countries at the Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in India. One of the important trends in UN peacekeeping in Africa is the increase in troop-contributing countries from Africa. Rwanda is currently the largest troop-contributing country from the African continent. India is ready to support African countries in augmenting their peacekeeping abilities.
Maritime security is another important pillar of defence cooperation between India and African countries. There is a shared concern over the numerous maritime security challenges such as piracy, maritime terrorism, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, drug trafficking and human trafficking. This concern was highlighted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his landmark address to the Ugandan Parliament in 2018, where he announced the ten guiding principles of India–Africa cooperation.
It is also reflected in India’s cooperative and inclusive vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All) unveiled by Prime Minister Modi during his visit to Mauritius in 2015. Similarly, in 2014, the African Union adopted the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy that focuses not only at the maritime security challenges but also calls for sustainable development of the region’s blue economy. Over the years, India has assisted African countries in surveillance of their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. The Gandhinagar Declaration underlines India’s efforts in this crucial area and calls for sharing best practices and experiences to combat disasters and other challenges.
Countering terrorism is another common challenge that India and African countries face. Several countries in Africa have been dealing with terrorism. In West Africa, Boko Haram has created insecurities within Nigeria and its neighbours. The affiliates of Islamic State and Al Qaida have been terrorising several countries in the Sahel, including Mali. In North Africa, threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or the Al Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM) is continuous. The fighters of Al Shabaab continue their incessant violent activities in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya in East Africa. In Southern Africa, the Cabo Delgado region in northern Mozambique has faced numerous terror attacks in recent years. The troops from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries have brought the situation under control to some extent. However, the threat of terrorism has not gone completely. The African Union has taken several measures to deal with this scourge; nevertheless the threat persists. India has a long experience in dealing with violent terrorism. At Gandhinagar, India has offered to provide counter-terrorism training to African countries.
The IADD held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 provides an opportunity for the African partners to get a clear picture of India’s defence manufacturing capabilities. The current Ukraine crisis has highlighted the importance of diversifying sources of weapons imports. Currently, Russia is the largest exporter of weapons to Africa, followed by China and European countries. The Gandhinagar Declaration reveals that India’s defence public sector company, Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) will open an office in Kenya, while Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) will open an office in Nigeria. This will help in facilitating cooperation in the field of transfer and maintenance of defence equipment.
Finally, the IADD held in Gandhinagar also encourages further research of security issues through offer of fellowships to experts from African countries, under the ‘India–Africa Security Fellowship Programme’ to be hosted by India’s leading think tank on strategic studies, the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). Over the years, the Institute has been involved in conducting research on African issues and has strived for greater interaction between Indian and African experts. It is hoped that this novel step will increase the understanding of numerous security challenges faced by African countries and India and also generate a broader debate and discussion within the respective strategic communities.
In conclusion, the conduct of the India–Africa Defence Dialogue at Gandhinagar, Gujarat has opened multiple pathways for defence cooperation between India and Africa. The IADD is another critical step taken by Prime Minister Modi’s government to accord high priority to India–Africa engagement.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Concerns of radicalisation in SDF-run facilities in Syria remain high, given that reports flag corruption, crime, and deplorable security conditions at these camps.
Tens of thousands of ISIS detainees are housed in temporary prison camps and detention centers in Syria and Iraq by US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).1 Charles Lister, the Director of Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs at the Middle East Institute, warned that the international community is ‘doing nothing to prevent the current generation of detainees from wanting to continue to fight if they get out, and creating a melting pot for the next generation.’2
As reported by Militant Wire, technology and illicit financing are being used by terrorist sympathisers to raise funds for ISIS spouses and children in Syria through encrypted Telegram channels and digital wallets like QIWI. The funds are being raised for two primary reasons—smuggling former detainees from detention camps and targeting low-security detention centres managed by Kurdish militias.3 There are reportedly at least 14 such facilities in North-East Syria.4
The US-backed SDF fighters confront multifaceted challenges of managing these makeshift prisons in a war zone. These areas have also faced large-scale prison breaks. The attack at Gweiron prison in January 2022 was aimed at freeing over 3,000 detainees, including 700 minors.5 ISIS’ news agency, Amaq, claimed that 800 terrorists had been freed.6 The SDF successfully traced around 100 detainees. Such attacks on prison facilities are reminiscent of the prison break in July 2013, when more than 600 prisoners were freed from detention facilities like Abu Ghraib, many of whom later were at the forefront of the military assaults launched by ISIS during its rise to power.
Furthermore, the Kurdish forces appear to have been thrust into a position reminiscent of American forces stationed at Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. There, the confinement of some of the most radicalised elements aligned with extremist Salafist ideology in one space fed the pool that eventually emerged as elements of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and, later, ISIS.
Camps in Al-Hol, in the eastern al-Hasaka governorate, have been at the epicentre of continued recruitment, radicalisation, and violence by ISIS followers.7 As per reports, battle-hardened former fighters are sharing space with impressionable teenagers in converted warehouses and schools.8 Alarmingly, murders, sexual abuse, and unrestricted transit within and outside the detention camps underscore security gaps. Approximately 24 killings have occurred inside the Al-Hol camp alone from January to July 2022, including of a humanitarian worker, where spouses, widows, and children of ISIS fighters have been detained.9
This overflowing space with more than 65,000 residents is where apparently radicalised women are molding the extremist worldview in their wards.10 Support for re-establishing the ISIS’ physical caliphate is allegedly being sustained in these camps, through social media indoctrination, with access to phones made easy, possibly by corrupt patrolling officers.11Cumulatively, these factors have the potential to fuel online violent extremists and terror propagandists, reigniting the diminishing threat of ISIS fighters.
The refusal of several governments, meanwhile, including the British and French, to take back the ‘caliphate’ members to face justice in their countries of origin could foment humanitarian and security crises.12 Timothy Alan Betts, the Acting Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, sounded alarm in July 2022 when he stated that
Conditions are so harsh in northeastern Syria in particular that we are seeing a greater openness by residents to ISIS’s return now than at any time since the fall of the physical “caliphate” in 2019. The more ISIS can leverage local support to train and reorganize; the more sophisticated and frequent their efforts will be to free detainees and recruit in the displaced persons camp.13
The United Kingdom, on its part, runs de-radicalisation programmes like Prevent. Reports flag that authorities have struggled to run separation centres at high-security prisons like HMS Belmarsh efficiently.14 By 2021, only 10 per cent out of 450 British ISIS recruits had been prosecuted by judicial authorities.15 The challenge could grow further in the likelihood of repatriation of remaining fighters and their families. US administrations have called on the UK to take back their nationals from Syria. Reports note that around 16 women and 30 to 60 children—all British nationals—are lodged in SDF-run facilities in Syria.16 While at least 900 British citizens travelled to join ISIS, the precise number of male combatants that remain in detention camps is not clear.
Meanwhile, in Morocco, by July 2021, over 300 ISIS prisoners were lodged in prisons. The authorities are implementing a three-month course focused on economics, religion, and vocational training to ensure their gradual reintegration into the society.17 The Moroccan prison authorities have undertaken this initiative since 2017, with only one person out of the 156 graduates re-convicted for a non-terrorist offence.18 It has also been suggested by experts that by conducting regular risk assessments and special training for prison staff, can de-radicalisation efforts succeed in a given context.19
Conclusion
Concerns of radicalisation in SDF-run facilities in Syria remain high, given that reports flag corruption, crime, and deplorable security conditions at these camps. While prison breaks have also occurred, access to technology and minimal security measures have reinforced the security dilemma facing prison authorities. The possible indoctrination of new recruits in an ideologically charged setting with minimal security measures adds to regional instability. Even if detainees are repatriated to their homelands, their rehabilitation and reintegration are likely to present challenges in those societies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Raksha Mantri’s Visit to Egypt: Significance for India–Africa Defence Cooperation
Ruchita Beri
October 17, 2022
Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s visit to Egypt will concretise India–Africa defence cooperation through training, capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s visit to Egypt from 18 to 20 September 2022 has opened new avenues for defence cooperation. The visit signifies India’s growing defence ties with the African region. The Defence Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with his counterpart General Mohamed Zaki to enhance defence cooperation between the two countries in various sectors including training, joint exercises and defence production. This MoU adds to the list of agreements in defence sector signed between India and various African countries in recent years.
India’s relationship with Egypt can be traced back to the ancient times. The connect between the Nile River Valley and Indus-Saraswati valley civilisation is well recorded. This centuries-old historical, cultural and economic bond has fostered a strong political and defence partnership between the two countries. Egyptian President Abdel Fatah Al Sisi’s visit to India during the India–Africa Forum Summit of 2015 may be considered a turning point in bilateral ties. Recently, Egypt released a postage stamp to commemorate the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations with India in 2022. Egypt is also an important partner in the multilateral arena. It is a dialogue partner in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), became a member of the BRICS bank in 2021 and will be a guest country as India hosts the G20 summit next year.
Defence cooperation between the two countries has been going on since 1960s. Training has been an important component of the relationship. Particularly noteworthy is the training of Egyptian Airforce pilots by India in the 1960s and 70s. In the 1960s, the two countries were also involved in a joint venture to manufacture the famous Helwan HA-300 jet fighter.1 The push for defence cooperation came with the setting up of the formal Joint Defence Committee (JDC) in 2006. The JDC was tasked with identifying areas of defence collaboration. This committee has since met nine times.
Recently, after the decline in COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an increase in bilateral engagements in the field of defence. The first-ever Indian Air Force–Egyptian Air Force Joint Tactical Air Exercise, ‘Desert Warrior’, was held in late October 2021.2 It provided an opportunity to showcase the Su-30 MKI manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and India’s expertise for deeper indigenisation of spares and components. There has been an exchange of visits at the Air Chief level. India’s Air Chief Marshal V.R. Chaudhari visited Cairo in 2021,3 followed by the Egyptian Air Force Chief Mahmoud Foaad Abd El-Gawad’s visit to New Delhi earlier this year. Similarly, there have been several visits of Indian Navy ships to Egypt. In June 2022, the Indian Navy’s largest destroyer, INS Kochi, visited Port Safaga in Egypt.4 INS Kochi also participated in a maritime partnership exercise with the Egyptian Navy.
During the recent visit, the discussion focused on finding ways to enhance military and security cooperation, especially with regard to cooperation in joint manufacturing, transfer, and localisation of technology, with the aim of exploiting the capabilities and infrastructure available in the two countries. In recent years, India has focused on defence indigenisation and co-production through ‘Make in India’ and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-reliant India) initiatives over imports from friendly foreign countries.
Similarly, Egypt being the oldest and largest defence producer in the Arab world, after a political crisis in 2013, and suspension of US military aid for two years, has attempted to revive indigenous defence production through new co-production initiatives with non-US firms.5 This effort to diversify external partners is mainly to reduce dependence on US firms for procurement and co- production. Moreover, the traditional weapon systems produced by Egypt do not respond to urgent needs to combat terrorism in asymmetric warfare. It appears that Egypt is in search of a reliable partner and feels India fulfils the criteria. Similarly, India perceives Egypt as a reliable strategic partner with a similar independent foreign policy outlook.
Implications for India–Africa Defence Cooperation
India’s MoU with Egypt in defence cooperation is the latest agreement signed by India in the African region. India has now signed MoU in defence cooperation with all the littoral states in the Indian Ocean Region, including South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar, as well as with countries such as Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, etc.6 The range of defence cooperation includes training, peacekeeping, maritime cooperation and defence equipment transfers. Besides Egypt, the Raksha Mantri paid a visit to Mozambique in 2019. In August 2022, he had discussions on improving security ties during the Tanzanian Defence Minister, Dr Stergomena Lawrence Tax’s visit to New Delhi. In 2021, the National Security Advisor (NSA) of Nigeria visited India for the first India–Nigeria Strategic dialogue at the level of NSA. Similarly, India’s Deputy NSA Vivek Misri visited Mozambique and Tanzania, earlier this year, for a dialogue on security issues.
India’s desire to enhance defence cooperation with Africa is mainly driven by common security challenges such as rise in terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking. Positive developments such as economic transformation of the continent and growing economic and development cooperation of India with Africa in the last two decades also are an important factor. India has developed a cooperative framework of defence cooperation with Africa guided by the principles of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ (The world is one family).
At the same time, several of Africa’s external partners are using defence cooperation as a tool to enhance their relations with the countries in the region. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia was the largest supplier of weapons to Africa from 2016 to 2020.7 In recent years, China has upped its activities on security issues with African countries. It hosted the 2nd China–Africa Peace and Security Forum Ministerial meeting in July 2022. The action plan unveiled at the last FOCAC meeting at Dakar, Senegal in November 2021, highlighted the growing security cooperation between African countries and China.8 At the same time, there is growing realisation in Africa that Beijing’s terms of engagement are less than desirable. This has given India a window of opportunity to enhance its cooperation with the region.
An important development during the recent visit was Rajnath Singh’s invitation to his Egyptian counterpart to the India–Africa Defence Dialogue, scheduled to be held as part of 12th DefExpo at Gandhinagar, Gujarat from 18 to 22 October 2022. The first India–Africa Defence Dialogue was held in February 2020 on the sidelines of DefExpo 2020. India has now institutionalised the dialogue to be held every two years along with the DefExpo.9 The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) is the knowledge partner for the event. Through this meeting, India hopes to enhance partnership with African countries. There is also an expectation that the meeting will give a fillip to India’s defence exports to the region. However, unlike Egypt, a large number of African countries do not have the capacity to purchase these equipment and are dependent on lines of credit from India to facilitate these defence exports. Nevertheless, African countries are diversifying their sources of defence imports and consider India as a trustworthy defence partner.
In conclusion, it can be said that the importance of Africa in India's foreign policy is visible from the increasing number of high-level visits from both sides. It is hoped that Indian Defence Minister’s visit to Egypt will concretise India–Africa defence cooperation which focuses on empowering African countries through training, capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Jammu and Kashmir Floods: The Need for Sustainable Management
Pintu Kumar Mahla
October 06, 2022
Jammu and Kashmir needs a robust early warning system to mitigate the impact of natural disasters.
Floods are a regular feature in India. Every year with varying severity, floods leave behind huge property damage and human lives. On an average, every year floods affect about 75 lakh hectares of land, take about 1,600 lives, and Rs 1,805 crores in damage to public facilities, residences and agriculture.1 In the period June–September 2022, India witnessed a series of severe floods which led to loss of 1,282 lives and US$ 3.1 billion in economic damage.2 The need to mitigate flood disasters in sustainable ways is, therefore, crucial.
The Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is quite vulnerable to floods, particularly the low-lying portions of the Kashmir Valley, including Sonawari, Awantipora, Srinagar, and some parts of Jammu. The upper catchments of the mainstream rivers—Jhelum, Indus, Chenab, and Tawi—witness widespread flooding.3 The floods of 2014 in J&K affected around five million people—“around 4.5 million in Kashmir valley and half a million in the Jammu region. In addition, it caused an estimated loss of Rs. 5,400-5,700 crore to the state's economy.”4 About 7,405 deaths in India were registered due to natural disasters in 2020, of which 959 deaths were caused by floods; J&K alone accounted for 48 deaths.5
More recently, on 8 July 2022, flash floods caused by a cloudburst close to Amarnath in southern Kashmir led to 16 deaths and 40 people went missing. Around 13,041 pilgrims were relocated to safer locations.6 These flood disasters create huge panic among the public which brings into focus the state of disaster management in J&K.
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Systems
In 2005, the Government of India passed the Disaster Management Act.7 It provided for the establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), under the leadership of the Prime Minister, and State Disaster Management Authorities (SDMAs), under the leadership of the corresponding Chief Ministers, with the mission of leading and implementing a comprehensive and integrated approach to disaster management in the country.
J&K was one of the first few states then to pass legislation for natural disasters. In 1955, the Natural Calamities Destroyed Areas Improvement Act was passed for the improvement of towns, villages, and other areas that were ravaged by natural calamities. However, the Act's accessibility did not yield great benefits. Since the enactment of the NDMA 2005, J&K has implemented a number of steps to reduce the loss of life and property caused by natural disasters. The SDMA, the State Executive Committee (SEC), and the District Disaster Management Authorities have been established in accordance with the terms of the NDMA Act.
Issues, however, remain over their effectiveness. The framework, as noted above, deals more with the management of water resources. The topography and terrain of J&K requires a widespread and efficient engineering system. For instance, the state's topography results in frequent cloudbursts. As meteorologists observe, the high altitude and steep gradient encourage the development of cumulonimbus clouds. As a result, more water is shed in larger droplets at a faster rate. In the 12th five-year plan (2012–17), the NITI Aayog cautioned that “hydro-power projects on the Himalayan Rivers may not be viable”8 because the young mountains, i.e., the Himalayas, are eroding at a very high rate. There is little vegetation in the upper catchment to bind the soil. The management of excess water quite clearly becomes challenging in the difficult terrains of the Himalayas.
The frequent floods in J&K raise questions on the administrative ability and engineering response. The death toll, after enacting a disaster management policy 20119 and State Disaster Management Plan (SDMP) 2017,10 has increased (see Table 1). Moreover, in 2019, out of the total 8,145 accidental deaths due to natural disasters, 63 deaths were reported in J&K (excluding Ladakh).11
Table 1: Death due to natural disasters in India and J&K and Ladakh region, 2010–2018
J&K is one of India's most flood-affected regions. After the devastating floods of 2014, the central government devised a detailed plan for managing floods along the Jhelum river and its tributaries.12 The plan was to be implemented in two phases. While the construction on the second phase will begin soon, the first phase is almost finished. The central government had also established a committee to make recommendations for ways to manage floods in future. In its final report, the committee suggested a few long-term solutions, such as adding more flood spillways, building storage facilities on Jhelum tributaries, zoning floodplains, and expanding the capacity of Wular Lake. In addition, a detailed study on flood risks is also being conducted by the Jal Shakti Department in J&K. An Integrated Forecasting System (IFS) with a robust decision support system will also be developed for quick and efficient response to any flood-related calamity in the Union Territory.
However, the imprints of natural disasters on lives and livelihoods demand a more effective disaster risk reduction approach. For instance, it requires a robust early warning system to mitigate the impact of disasters. It is also important to adopt sustainable practices like land management and afforestation with a view to increasing the water retention capacity of the soil and decreasing the intensity of flood flows. Every river has clearly defined banks and floodplains. The floodplains play a critical role not only in nutrient replenishment but also in controlling overflowing rivers naturally. Most of the states have poor regulations over unabated encroachment of floodplains. The Union Territory of J&K is no exception, hence there is an urgent need to frame legislations as per the geological and civil engineering guidelines so as to lessen the impact of floods on the infrastructure.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1.“Floods”, National Disaster Management Authority, Government of India.
2.“2021 Disasters in Numbers”, Emergency Event Database (EM-DAT) Report, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Belgium.
10. strong>“State Disaster Management Plan 2017”, Department of Disaster Management, Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, India.
India’s voting pattern at the United Nations Security Council shows that it is proactive and positive towards the UNSC agenda.
In January 2021, India joined the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for its eighth term as a non-permanent member. India secured 184 votes in the 193-member General Assembly, including all the 55 votes of the Asia-Pacific Group. This massive support can be seen as a befitting acknowledgement of India's growing prominence at the high tables. India's membership came at a time of intensifying great power rivalry and increased anti-multilateral sentiments. The Ukraine war, for instance, has exposed deep divisions in the UNSC. In addition, issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have exacerbated the predicament of multilateral institutions. Consequently, the challenge before India was to help the UNSC to reinvigorate multilateralism. India’s voting response and its August 2021 presidency show that India contributed to expanding the UNSC agenda.
India as a Non-Permanent Member
Before the current term, India was elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC seven times. India served the Council in 1950–51, 1967–68, 1972–73, 1977–78, 1984–85, 1991–92, and 2011–12 (Table 1). Except for the first time, when it represented the Commonwealth group, India has been elected on behalf of the Asian regional grouping. India’s UNSC membership always coincided with some significant events in international politics. These years were testing times for the UNSC. For instance, India's first term in the Council and its first presidency coincided with the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–51). During India's second and third terms, the Council was predominantly focused on heightened tensions in West Asia, notably the two Arab–Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973. Israel's first invasion of Lebanon, the first Gulf War and the conflicts in Libya and Syria were the other major conflict situations that occurred during India's UNSC terms in 1977–78, 1984–85 and 2011–12, respectively.1
Table 1: Overview of India as Non-permanent Member
Year
ResolutionsAdopted
India’s Voting Response
Total
Unanimously or by Consensus
Affirmative
Abstained
1951–1952
18
02
11
05
1967–1968
30
26
03
01
1972–1973
37
10
27
--
1977–1978
41
05
36
--
1984–1985
35
21
14
--
1991–1992
116
100
10
06
2011–1912
118
107
09
02
2021–2022
(till 31 August 2022)
90
68
17
05
Source: Author; Data taken from UNSC Meetings and Outcome Tables, www.un.org
2021–22 Term
For the 2021–22 term, India's primary objective in the UNSC was to implement a new orientation for a reformed multilateral system. This was guided by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘five S’ approach—Samman (Respect), Samvad (Dialogue), Sahyog (Cooperation), Shanti (Peace) and Samriddhi (Prosperity).2 India identified five priorities for the current term: seeking responsible and inclusive solutions; result-oriented measures to counter international terrorism; reformed multilateralism to reflect contemporary realities; streamlining peacekeeping; and technology with a human touch.3
Moreover, in January 2021, India was also elected as the Chair of the Taliban Sanctions Committee, the Chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee and the Vice-Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). It was also elected as one of the Vice-Chairs of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee and the Working Group to monitor the implementation of UNSC sanctions on Al Qaida and the Taliban. In January 2022, India assumed the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).
August 2021 Presidency
One of the most significant occurrences during the current term was India's UNSC presidency in August 2021. India undertook its tenth tenure as President of the UNSC in August 2021 and organised three signature events—open debates on maritime security, peacekeeping, and terrorism. Prime Minister Modi chaired the high-level open debate on maritime security, becoming the first Indian PM to preside over a UNSC meeting. It was the first standalone discussion on maritime security in the UNSC and produced the first presidential statement on the issue. During the debate, India also outlined a five-principle framework that included—removing barriers to maritime trade, resolving maritime disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law, jointly tackling maritime threats from non-state actors and natural disasters, conserving of maritime environment and marine resources, and responsible maritime connectivity.4
The second and third open debate on peacekeeping and terrorist threats were chaired by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. The open debate on terrorist attacks' threats to international peace and security took place on 19 August, the eve of the International Day of Remembrance and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism. During the meeting, Jaishankar reiterated his eight-point counter-terrorism action plan and called for the early adoption of a UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.5 India also asked all nations to commit to zero tolerance for terrorism.
During the open debate on peacekeeping, India proposed a four-point framework for UN peacekeepers to meet contemporary threats. These included the need to employ technologies that are operationally proven, cost-effective, widely available, environmentally friendly, dependable, and field serviceable. Secondly, India called for a solid information and intelligence foundation to ensure early warning and mobilisation of early response. Thirdly, ensuring that technological advancements are readily available on the ground and fourthly, the need for consistent technological training and capacity building for peacekeepers was stressed.6
The other significant issue that came before the Security Council during India’s presidency was the Afghan crisis, which began with the withdrawal of US-NATO troops, followed by the Taliban's takeover of the country in August 2021. As the Council's president, India held a briefing, issued two press statements condemning terrorist attacks, and introduced a resolution to address the crisis. Under India’s presidency, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2593, which demanded that Afghan territory should not be used to threaten or attack any country, shelter or train terrorists, or plan or finance terrorist acts.7 India also called for an inclusive regime that represents all segments of Afghan society.
Voting Response
India’s voting response during the current term shows how responsible India was in the UNSC. From 1 January 2021 to 31 August 2022, UNSC adopted 88 resolutions. Out of these 88, India supported 81 and abstained seven. During this period, the Council failed to adopt two draft resolutions—on Bosnia and Herzegovina and climate change and security. India voted against the resolution on climate change and security as it argued that the UNSC was not the place to discuss the issues of climate change and climate justice.8
Similarly, India supported three out of four resolutions on the agenda relating to the topic of maintenance of international peace and security and abstained on one resolution. India voted in favour of all resolutions UNSC adopted during this period on issues such as terrorism and peacekeeping. Regarding regional conflicts and issues, India supported 40 out of 42 resolutions on Africa. While India supported all resolutions on conflicts in Middle East and Afghanistan, it abstained on three and favoured one resolution on Ukraine crisis (Table 2).
Table 2: India’s Voting Response (2021–22)
Total
Favour
Abstained
Against
Res. adopted
88
81
7
1
Draft not adopted
6
1
Chapter VII Res.
27
27
Issues/Regional Conflicts
Intr. Peace & Security
4
3
1
Terrorist threat
4
4
Peacekeeping
2
2
Africa
42
40
2
Middle East
12
12
Afghanistan
3
3
Ukraine
4
3
3
Source: Author; Data taken from UNSC Meetings and Outcome Tables, www.un.org
India's approach to the Ukrainian crisis, especially its responses in the UNSC, shows its independent and neutral foreign policy. The Ukrainian crisis started in February 2022 and the UNSC has convened nearly 15 meetings on the issue since then. In all these meetings, India has consistently called for restraint on all sides and peaceful settlement of the conflict. In the initial days of the conflict, India’s primary concern was the well-being of more than 20,000 Indian nationals living in Ukraine.9
When the UNSC considered a draft resolution tabled by Albania and the US demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, India abstained, along with China and the United Arab Emirates. In its Explanation of Vote, India said that all efforts should be made for the immediate de-escalation of violence and hostilities and requested the conflicting parties to return to the path of diplomacy.10 Later in February and March, India abstained from voting on a UNSC resolution to refer the Ukraine crisis to the General Assembly and a draft resolution moved by Russia calling for the protection of civilians in Ukraine, respectively.11 On 24 August, India once again abstained on a procedural vote on Ukraine.12
Conclusion
As an elected non-permanent member of the UNSC, India has always played an active role in discussions on all issues related to international peace and security. India sought to prioritise the primacy of a political approach to resolve crises through dialogue and negotiation, including on issues such as Afghanistan and Ukraine. Its UNSC presidency confirmed that India is no longer just a rule-taker, but rather became a rule-shaper at the high tables. It contributed to expanding the UNSC agenda, by bringing vital issues such as technology and peacekeeping, maritime security and counter-terrorism. Similarly, India at the UNSC always preferred to be part of the democratic majority helping in the adoption of broadly acceptable decisions and resolutions. The general perception is that India is a ‘nay-sayer’ in multilateral forums. However, India’s voting pattern shows that its approach is proactive and positive towards the UNSC agenda. From its first term in 1950–51 to its current term (2021–22) in the UNSC, India favoured more than 90 per cent of the resolutions which were adopted unanimously or by consensus. Concerning the resolutions that were adopted through a vote, India cast an affirmative vote on nearly 90 per cent of them. Similarly, India always abstained with other member states and has resorted to abstentions only to showcase its reservation on a particular issue. In short, the 16 years of UNSC experience is an added credential for its claim for permanent membership in the Council.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. CSR Murthy, India in the United Nations: Interplay of Interests and Principles, New Delhi: Sage, p. 91.
Defence Procurement: Negative Lists with Positive Implications
Mukesh Kumar
September 30, 2022
The defence indigenisation lists are expected to promote domestic arms manufacturing and reduce the burden of arms imports.
In 2013, the government announced Defence Indigenisation Policy and mandated that defence equipment be manufactured with at least 30 per cent of the indigenous content on the overall cost. The Defence Acquisition Policy (DAP), announced in 2020, extended the previous limit to 50 per cent of indigenous content on overall manufacturing costs. It was a significant step that showed the government’s confidence in domestic arms vendors and their capabilities to serve the needs of the Armed Forces.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his address to the nation on 12 May 2020, gave a clarion call for a Self-reliant India, based on five principles—Economy, System, Infrastructure, Demography and Demand. He also announced a special economic package called ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’. Taking it as a pivot point, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) released ‘Negative List’ of defence equipment banning their imports and to push for indigenisation to meet the aspirations of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’. Three such lists have been released so far. This commentary analyses the implications of these lists for the Indian domestic arms sector.
The Negative Lists
On 7 April 2022, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced the third Negative List. The MoD and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) notified the import ban on defence articles under the third Negative List which will be indigenously manufactured between December 2022 and December 2027. The third negative list contains 101 defence articles including Sensors, Complex Systems, Naval Utility Helicopters, Lightweight Tanks, Anti-tank Guns, Medium Altitude Long Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MALE UAV), Loitering Munitions, High Endurance Autonomous Underwater Vehicles and other weapons systems. The import ban will help Indian industry gather orders worth Rs 2,10,000 crores in the next five to seven years.
The list was made after several rounds of close consultation between the MoD, Service Headquarters (SHQ), Department of Defence Production (DDP), Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO), and private companies. The government is taking the necessary steps along with DRDO and all other stakeholders to handhold the industry to ensure self-reliance in defence manufacturing.
To strengthen and promote domestic arms manufacturing, DRDO has signed 30 agreements for the Transfer of Technology (ToT) with 25 industries.1 DRDO has so far signed 1,430 ToT agreements with domestic arms industries, including 450 ToT agreements since 2020. These technologies mainly relate to counter-drone systems, missile warheads, laser directed energy weapon systems, radar systems, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, among others.2
The first two Negative Lists were announced in August 2020 and March 2021, respectively. Under the first list, MoD included 101 items for import ban, progressively effective from December 2020 and December 2024. The second list included 108 items for the import embargo, planned to be implemented between December 2021 and December 2025. With the inclusion of the third negative list, there are now 310 defence articles in total which would be embargoed and developed by domestic vendors.3
After the first two lists, the MoD has accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) approval for 83 projects worth Rs 1.77 crores whereas projects worth Rs 2.94 crores will be generated in the next five to seven years.4 The list announced earlier contained transport aircraft, light combat helicopters, artillery guns, SONAR systems, assault rifles, submarines and corvettes, among others.
Drivers behind Indigenisation Lists
India has been one of the largest importers of arms in the last three decades. India’s arms imports fell by 21 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21, after continuously rising since 1991. SIPRI’s Trend Indicator Value (TIV) indicates that India’s arms imports reduced from US$ 19,432 million to US$ 15,356 million in the last five years.5 However, despite this, India remained the largest arms importer, accounting for 11 per cent of the total global arms import in 2017–21.6
India is striving to cut down defence imports and promote exports of defence equipment made by domestic industry. The draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy 2020 has set an ambitious goal to achieve a defence manufacturing industry with US$ 25 billion turnover by 2025, including the export of military hardware worth US$ 5 billion.7
The Government of India has taken necessary steps to enhance domestic manufacturing and promote arms export in the last several years. These steps have produced fruitful results as India became the 23rd biggest arms exporter in 2017–21.8 India showed a positive growth rate of 119 per cent in arms export between 2012–16 and 2017–21. India is now exporting arms to 42 countries and its major arms recipients are Myanmar (50 per cent), Sri Lanka (21 per cent) and Armenia (11 per cent).9
The Indian industry has been reaching out to many countries, including in Latin America for instance, to showcase its arms for export and for possible co-production and co-development. India has signed a US$ 375 million contract with the Philippines to export three batteries of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles in January 2022. With this success, India is expecting some more big ticket contracts from countries like South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Indonesia and other South-East Asian countries. Nine countries from Africa and South-East Asia have shown interest in the acquisition of DRDO-made Akash missile system.10 Similarly, several countries including the US, Argentina, Philippines, Australia, Egypt and Indonesia have expressed interest in Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, whereas Royal Malaysian Air Forces have already shortlisted LCA Tejas for acquisition programme.11
Another major reason for releasing a negative list or banning the procurement of ‘off-the-shelf’ defence equipment relates to concerns over breach of technical data. Most of the arms are technologically advanced and software-enabled, which can easily be controlled and manipulated and could lead to data breaches. While announcing the third negative list, Rajnath Singh gave reference to US’s harsh sanctions on Chinese tech giant Huawei against its role in stealing data and breaching US national security.12
In 2011, thousands of pages of technical details of India’s Scorpene submarines were leaked. In 2016, The Australian reported that documents on the entire submarine structure, Torpedo-launch system, communication and navigation system, under and above-water sensors, and combat management system were leaked by the officials of Scorpene submarine contractor, DCNS.13 India had signed a US$ 3 billion deal with French shipbuilder DCNS in 2005, to indigenously assemble and build Six Scorpene class submarine in India.
Conclusion
The steps taken by the government to promote domestic defence manufacturing have shown some positive results. After the first two lists were announced, around 31 projects worth Rs 53,839 crores have been contracted from the domestic defence industry by the armed forces. The Indian Armed Forces have contracted around 260 programmes of these items worth Rs 3.5 lakh crores between 2015 and 2022. The import embargo is expected to help generate contracts worth Rs 4 lakh crores from domestic arms industries in the next five years.14 The indigenisation lists are expected to promote domestic arms manufacture and reduce the burden of arms imports.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
If the US and Russia fail to negotiate a successor agreement to New START, there is the possibility of an unrestricted arms race with detrimental implications.
On 8 August 2022, Russia temporarily halted the United States (US) inspections of the former’s nuclear sites agreed under the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) on account of lack of parity and equality vis-à-vis access to the US inspection facilities for Russian inspectors.1 For Moscow, the decision was triggered by the US notification regarding its intention to inspect Russian nuclear sites, although such inspections under the New START treaty were paused due to Covid-19 in early 2020 by mutual consent.2
At the Tenth Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (RevCon) 2022, both countries sounded conciliatory regarding their views on arms control. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a message to the conference, stated that Russia has “fully implemented” its bilateral commitments with the US on nuclear arms reduction. Putin added that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought…”.3
In the same vein, US President Joe Biden asserted that “Even at the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to work together to uphold our shared responsibility to ensure strategic stability. Today, my Administration is ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026.”4 Despite such positive comments, the inspection and verification aspects of the treaty are in trouble. Thus, it is pertinent to discern the challenges before New START and its successor agreement.
First, the US and Russia differ in their threat perceptions vis-à-vis each other’s weapon arsenal. The US is concerned about new Russian weapons such as the air-launched ballistic missile, the nuclear-powered cruise missile and the nuclear-propelled, nuclear-armed unmanned undersea vehicle.5 At the same time, Russians are anxious about the US missile defence systems along with high-precision conventional weapons having a strategic impact.6
Thus, the parties will have to negotiate differing priorities of both countries in the successor treaty. If Washington and Moscow do not find common ground to start negotiations, it would be detrimental to global arms control efforts. According to the U.S. Department of State, the US would have inadequate knowledge about the Russian nuclear forces without the New START’s verification measures, leading to “less information upon which to base decisions about U.S. nuclear forces”.7 The converse of this proposition is that the temporary suspension of inspections will have ramifications for both sides, impacting the global strategic stability during current tumultuous times.
Second, there is a debate about the scope of the new treaty and whether it should include the consequential emerging technological innovations. The emerging technologies include difficult-to-intercept hypersonic missiles, drone swarms that are capable of targeting high-value counterforce or counter command infrastructure,8 cyberattacks against military command and control systems, and anti-satellite capabilities, among others. Military technology has been progressing continuously, and innovations in hypersonic technology have led to new systems that have not been included under the arms control treaty.9
According to Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Sergei Ryabkov, the future agreement on strategic stability between Moscow and Washington should include traditional strategic weapons along with “all nuclear and non-nuclear weapons that can carry out strategic missions”.10 Apart from the new category of weapons, there is a scope for the successor treaty to cover non-strategic and non-deployed warheads, which are out of the scope of the current New START.
Third, China has made spectacular advancements in developing hypersonic missiles and has a massive inventory of its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs). According to Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary, U.S. Department of State, China’s nuclear build-up seems to encompass unique nuclear-powered capabilities and a substantial augmentation of its silo-based ICBM forces. One cannot disregard the destabilising dynamic resulting from Beijing’s quick and covert nuclear build-up.11 A report by the U.S. Department of Defense has predicted that China would likely have 1,000 warheads by 2030 and already has a “nascent nuclear triad with the development of a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and improvement of its ground and sea-based nuclear capabilities”.12 Any future nuclear arms control deal, therefore, will have to include the rapidly increasing Chinese nuclear arsenal.
Gen. Anthony Cotton, slated to be commander of U.S. Strategic Command, warned about China’s rising nuclear arsenal while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15 September 2022. He spoke about China’s shift away from minimal nuclear deterrence and highlighted China’s “bona fide triad”.13 The Committee Chairman, Senator Jack Reed, predicted that the US would enter a trilateral nuclear competition era.14 Thus, there is a legitimate worry about the effects of Chinese nuclear breakthroughs on global strategic stability.
Fourth is an inability of the parties to insulate the treaty from global geopolitical developments. The current pause of the inspections has been preceded by a similar response by the US, where Washington had halted arms control talks with Moscow at the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022.15 Even in 2014, the Obama administration had paused arms control talks post the Crimean crisis.16 Along with the Ukraine crisis, Washington and Moscow have a history of being involved in various global issues, including the far-flung Syrian civil war of 2011 and the ongoing Iran nuclear contentions. Therefore, the former superpowers still hold sway in global politics and possession of more than 90 per cent of nuclear stockpile makes treaties like New START an absolute necessity for the 21st century.
So far, the treaty’s extension has given both sides a clear picture of each other’s strategic forces and has offered Washington and Moscow space to negotiate a new nuclear arms control agreement. Though it is naïve to think that arms control talks can be delinked from extant geopolitical developments, it is extremely desirable to have some mechanism which keeps parties engaged with the treaty obligations irrespective of geopolitical tensions. The New START treaty has a Bilateral Consultative Commission to discuss issues related to the implementation of the treaty. The same has been utilised to resolve the current issue of inspection pause. However, success of such mechanisms depends on state actors’ intent.
Conclusion
While the world has moved away from Cold War-era bipolarity, the US and Russia remain two of the most consequential powers vis-à-vis the nuclear domain. The bilateral arms control treaties have, to some extent, contributed to reducing the risk of nuclear war, enhancing mutual trust between the antagonistic superpowers, reducing the number of nuclear weapons and providing overall strategic stability during the peak of the Cold War rivalry. However, the New START and its successor treaty face credible challenges—one, from a rising China and two, from emerging technologies. The dysfunctional relationship between the US and Russia post the Ukraine crisis has adversely impacted its execution.
If the countries fail to negotiate a successor agreement to New START, China might get a free pass to expand its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, there is the possibility of an unrestricted arms race with significant detrimental implications. The challenges to implementing the treaty are not insurmountable. If the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could successfully negotiate and implement arms control treaties during the peak of the Cold War, the same can be achieved even today.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Ukraine–Russia Conflict and Nuclear Misinformation
Rajiv Nayan
September 23, 2022
The parties involved in the Ukraine–Russia conflict should privilege nuclear risk avoidance measures rather than indulge in nuclear sabre-rattling.
On 21 September 2022, and to an extent, even on 22 September 2022, Indian and international media flashed the statement of President Vladimir Putin that Russia “…will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.”1 Some media reports also carried Putin’s remarks prefacing the above sentence “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people…”.
Both the sentences in combination convey a different meaning as against only the remarks threatening nuclear war. The remarks denoting the nuclear threat, seen in isolation, gives an impression of an aggressive nuclear Russia ready to use its nuclear weapon to accomplish its war aims. The remarks in combination though change the impression of Russia from being a blood-thirsty country to one that intends to defend its territorial integrity through nuclear weapons.
Admittedly, the threat to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has generated intense debates. Putin’s statements brought into focus Russian nuclear policy thinking. Putin stated
“I would like to remind those who make such statements regarding Russia that our country has different types of weapons as well, and some of them are more modern than the weapons NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] countries have. In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.”2
This does give the impression that Putin’s statement was in response to some perceived sabre-rattling by the other side, and Russia was responding to such belligerence.
Putin went on to flag
"Western-encouraged shelling of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant, which poses a threat of a nuclear disaster but also to the statements made by some high-ranking representatives of the leading NATO countries on the possibility and admissibility of using weapons of mass destruction – nuclear weapons – against Russia.”3
Russia has time and again, used nuclear rhetoric to promote its strategic objectives in the conflict. While Putin tried to paint Western countries as a villain by accusing them of threatening to use WMD and blamed them for shelling Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plants, it is difficult to find a single high representative of any NATO country who has publicly threatened to use WMD against Russia. Even so, selective quoting of Putin’s statements on nuclear issues gives the impression of a Russia that is nuclear sabre-rattling.
Information warfare or propaganda, no doubt, is used to mobilise public opinion for and against a country. From the very beginning of this conflict, media has been used as an instrument to wage misinformation warfare. Either select facts or interpretations of the facts are projected to create an illusionary representation. It is to be borne in mind that both Russia and its opponents are indulging in such acts. This kind of information warfare campaigns have become an accepted practice and essential component of hybrid warfare.
Quite significantly, in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, we find that not only the direct parties to the conflict are indulging in this game but also indirect or supporting actors. At times, it appears the agencies or forces involved in this game become autonomous and perhaps exceed their brief. As a result, they become a matter of concern for their own governments or parties. For example, The Washington Post published an investigative report,4 predominantly, shaped by Graphika and the Stanford Internet Observatory study, which underscored secret psychological operations conducted in the Ukraine–Russia conflict and other places.
TheWashington Post report revealed the use of major social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter in the disinformation campaign. The United States Central Command is also accused of influencing foreign countries. Of other activities, the report supposedly found the involvement of the US military organisation in creating some ‘anti-Russian narratives’. It seems the US government took note of the operation and ordered auditing of such activities that amounted to ‘peddling falsehoods’.
Putin’s 21 September 2022 statement though does bring to attention four aspects of Russian nuclear policy, doctrine, or posture. These include an aggressive/offensive nuclear weapon policy; a defensive first use nuclear weapon policy; a retaliatory first use nuclear weapons policy; and a retaliatory second strike nuclear weapons policy. Putin’s statements indicate that the Russian President basically stated a retaliatory second-strike nuclear weapons policy.
Putin accused the other side of indulging in nuclear blackmail. Generally, Western media gives the impression that Putin is blackmailing the world with nuclear threats. Putin though squarely reproached the leadership of the NATO countries for initiating steps to use WMD.
Quite significantly, on the same day that Putin made his nuclear remarks, US President Joseph Biden Jr accused him of making ‘overt nuclear threats against Europe’.5 Later, he reiterated that ‘A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. Interestingly, Biden in his remarks only highlighted Putin’s threat to Europe, and not against the entire NATO, when Putin had threatened to retaliate against NATO WMD threat. It would seem Biden also interpreted or projected the fact to suit his narrative.
Furthermore and quite amusingly, in his 21 September 2022 statement, Putin did not overtly mention that Russia would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against NATO’s threat of using WMD. He basically boasted that Russia possesses better quality weapons than those of NATO. Putin asserted that Russia will ‘certainly make use of all weapon systems available’ and added that it was not a ‘bluff’. In his subsequent statement, Putin rhetorically stated that “Those who are using nuclear blackmail against us should know that the wind rose can turn around.”
In recent months, Russia has been censuring Ukraine and its supporters for bombing the Zaporizhzhya plants and damaging the support systems. Earlier, in February–March 2022, Russia was held responsible for weaponising the nuclear power plants when it was suspected of attacking Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plants. An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team led by Director-General visited Ukraine, and some of its members are still stationed in the country. For sure, it is difficult to admit that Ukraine will damage its own plants and put its citizens at risk. Similarly, it is hard to believe that Russia will damage the plant and harm its soldiers fighting the battle near the plants or those who are stationed in the complex after taking it over.
The conflict, it seems, has acquired its own momentum. Both sides, in order to outgun each other, possibly unintentionally, enter into the danger zone, or are crossing the red lines. Afterward, to escape from global criticisms, both indulge in a misinformation campaign. Both sides are aware of the nuclear taboo, and the sensitivity of the international community about the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which will have disastrous consequences for Ukraine, Russia, and entire Europe. Instead of managing their misdeeds through misinformation campaigns, the parties to the conflict should take serious risk avoidance measures.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The United Kingdom–Rwanda migration asylum plan is not a long-term solution to the issue of illegal migration into the UK and runs the risk of escalating human insecurity further.
The United Kingdom and Rwanda agreed to the Migration and Economic Development Partnership on 14 April 2022. The arrangement allows the UK to send an unspecified number of its asylum seekers to Rwanda. In return, the UK is providing £120 million for a development fund and to cover processing costs for resettled asylum seekers.1 The UK has also committed to host some vulnerable refugees from Rwanda. Since the announcement, the asylum arrangement has received criticism from several international and domestic actors.
Legal Challenges
The first flight to Rwanda on 14 June 2022 was cancelled after a last-minute intervention from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) citing its ‘Rule 39’ provisions. The ruling stated that an Iraqi man named ‘KN’ faced “risk of irreversible harm” if sent to Rwanda.2 UK-based human rights organisations, such as Detention Action and Care4Calais, have also actively and successfully petitioned in UK courts against the removal of several individuals citing threat to their well-being.
The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has claimed that this move interferes with the right to apply for asylum under the 1951 International Refugee Convention of which the UK is a signatory. It not only alters the asylum claim provisions but also threatens the international framework for refugee protection. Additionally, the deal deviates from the guiding objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees that the UK supported in 2018.3
UK’s Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, in tandem with Article 31 of the 1951 Convention, provides refugees with legal protection against penalties. However, this protection is void in case of refugees “not arriving directly” and stopping in other countries before reaching the UK.4Such cases have been particularly chosen for relocation, wherein, dangerous journeys have been made through small boats and lorries. In order to ensure a more equitable distribution of refugees across the continent, the UNHCR has strongly reiterated that asylum-seekers are not required to seek refuge in the first country they enter and are eligible for protection under Article 31.5 Penalties can only be imposed in cases of lawful applications for settlement in other countries before entering the UK.
The arrangement is also incongruent with the international law of ‘non-refoulement’. Article 33 of the refugee convention provides protection from return to not just countries of origin but also includes in its purview third countries where the individual may feel threatened.6 The UK’s recently introduced Nationality and Borders Act 2022 has altered and diluted this criteria of a ‘safe third country’. In addition, the UNHCR guidelines require individuals to have ‘meaningful connections’ with the receiving state.7 Section 16 of the 2022 Act now allows the Secretary of State to remove asylum seekers even in absence of a connection to the third state.8 Such moves undermine and destabilise the international legal provisions dealing with human security. The controversy has also re-ignited the long-standing dissension between domestic laws and international obligations.
It is pertinent to note that the UK–Rwanda partnership is not a legally binding agreement in international law.9 Due to the nature of the agreement, it also lies outside the purview of parliamentary review. While the agreement allows the setting up of a monitoring committee, parties are not allowed to appeal any further in case of violation of obligations. The absence of proper redressal mechanisms endangers the security of relocated individuals. Even if the host country is unable to fulfil its commitments, there is no legal provision for the individuals to move back to the UK. The legal credibility of the Migration Asylum Plan is currently under Judicial Review, with a hearing scheduled for September.
Channel Crossings and Costs
The asylum deal is being championed on the claim that the arrangement dissuades irregular channel crossings and reduces financial burden on the state. The deal, however, has failed to deter Channel crossings. According to the UK’s Ministry of Defence data, in 2022, more than 27,000 people have already crossed the English Channel irregularly to arrive in the UK (see Figure below).10 The statistics are significantly higher than previous years. On 22 August alone, nearly 1,300 migrants crossed the channel, setting a new daily record.11 In addition, according to the Border Force Union, more than 60,000 people are expected to cross the Channel by the end of this year.12
Similarly, the cost saving claims require greater scrutiny. While full details of the financial arrangement have not been revealed, an initial investment of £120 million has been made to Kigali as part of a new ‘Economic Transformation and Integration Fund’. In addition, the UK has also agreed to fund the accommodation, processing and five-year integration costs of each re-located individual.13 Some estimates suggest that the government could spend nearly £20,000–£30,000 for every resettled individual.14 Home Office Minister Tom Pursglove said that “the cost would be similar to the amount of money we are spending on this currently”.15 He claimed that the deal will reduce costs in the long-term. Recently, Yolande Makolo, a spokesperson of the Rwandan government, said that in contrast to the committed 1,000 for the initial phase, the country can currently accommodate only 200 migrants due to inadequate housing facilities.16
The presence of contrary evidence weakens the government’s claims on the intended impact of the policy. As legal challenges cast a pall of doubt over the implementation and the long-term efficacy of the deal, an effective reduction in costs and crossings is not guaranteed. If the deal gets implemented, large-scale removals would be required to actually deter migrations and save costs. More importantly, a migration deterrence deal cannot be expected to work in cases where humans flee persecution and undertake involuntary dangerous journeys in an attempt to save their lives.
Financial support by the UK government might be a helpful way to solve the immediate issues confronting Rwanda. The deal is currently a five-year arrangement. As a result, its long-term ability to support the country and the immigrants remains highly doubtful. In addition, the absence of checks and balances creates a lack of incentive for the recipient state to fulfil its obligations. Whether the finances are being spent on the intended objectives, that is the welfare of relocated asylum seekers, cannot be ensured.
Rwanda’s Suitability as a Host Country
The practical assimilation of these refugees into Rwanda, amidst multiple human security threats, remains debatable. Rwanda already hosts nearly 1,50,000 refugees from several African countries and most unemployed refugees rely solely on state benefits of £35 per month.17 Of its estimated 13 million population, more than half of it survives on less than US$ 2 a day.18 COVID-19 and conflict-induced crises have also reduced the availability of resources to the local population, including access to proper food. Nearly 70 per cent of the population depends on sustainable farming for survival which is inextricably linked with high rural poverty.19 Additionally, Rwanda has a Human Development Index value of just 0.543, with a rank of 160 out of 189 countries.20 Additional refugees will inevitably put more pressure on an inadequate system.
The current agreement only excludes Rwandan nationals, unaccompanied children under 18 years and asylum seekers from EU countries.21 While the UK Home Office has emphasised on a case-by-case approach for removal, certain individuals under threat find no specific mention in the arrangement. These include members of the LGBTQI+ community. The Home Office itself, in its Country Policy and Information Notes (CPIN) report on Rwanda, has recognised instances of “discrimination and intolerance” against members of this community.22 Several human rights organisations have also accused the Rwandan government of unlawful arrests and killings. According to Human Rights Watch, in 2018, Rwandan authorities were alleged to have killed 12 Congolese refugees and arrested 60 over protests against food inadequacy.23 Such reports devalue Rwanda’s ability to follow provisions of the Refugee Convention. The arrangement also abdicates all forms of responsibility from the UK. In case of violation of human rights in Rwanda after relocation, the individuals will only have access to the Rwandan justice system for remedy.
To further assess the suitability and the efficacy of such deals, historical precedence needs to be taken into account. Since 2012, Australia has transferred more than 3,000 refugees to asylum camps in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. In addition to being exorbitant, the plan has failed to deter sea crossings. Australia’s offshore asylum processing systems have also faced allegations of medical neglect and inhumane conditions.24 Similarly, from 2013 to 2018, Israel attempted to formulate a similar secretive arrangement with Rwanda to transfer refugees. As several relocated individuals eventually moved out of Rwanda, the deal was halted after severe international criticism.25
Conclusion
Attention has to be drawn to the concerning precedent that this deal may set. The asylum arrangement runs the risk of triggering similar policy reactions from other European states. Reports suggest that Denmark and Austria are in discussions with Kigali to implement a similar strategy of relocating refugees.26 Additionally, it cannot be guaranteed that these relocated individuals will not attempt to return to their preferred EU country through North Africa and via Central and Western Mediterranean routes.27
Such decisions to outsource migrants falls short of offering long-term structural solutions that target the root cause of the issue. Inadequate systems of protection run the risk of escalating human insecurity further. In a broader inquiry, do such deals then signify a shift away from the global governance structures built for refugee protection, and are such bilateral engagements altering the course of the international refugee protection regime? Are such arrangements also marking a resurgence of the state-centric notion of security and subsequently a shift away from the non-traditional human security approach that the UN intended to advance? As the deal faces legal challenges, better-informed deductions on its success and failures can only be made in the long term.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has witnessed a 2000 per cent surge in heroin-related drug seizures between 2017 and 2022, with significant national security and societal consequences.
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has witnessed a 2000 per cent surge in heroin-related drug seizures between 2017 and 2022—from 3,000 to more than 10,000.1 Most recently, in August 2022, the Border Security Force (BSF) recovered eight packets of heroin worth Rs 8 crores in the Samba district after a wounded terrorist fled back to Pakistan.2 Hundreds of crores worth of illegal consignments have been seized by the J&K police this year alone, particularly in Shopian and Pulwama.
As per the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), there has been more than 75 per cent decrease in net infiltration from across the border between 2018 and 2021 and more than 80 per cent reduction in the number of terrorist incidents during the same period (See table below).3 Despite such efforts by the security forces in eliminating those infiltrating the Line of Control, the drug menace has not abated.
Table 1. Security Situation in J&K
DESCRIPTION
2018
2019
2020
2021
ESTIMATED NET INFILITRATION
143
138
51
34
NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS
417
255
244
229
TERRORISTS KILLED
257
157
221
180
Source: “Development of Jammu & Kashmir”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 22 March 2022.
In April 2022, a charge sheet against nine individuals—three Pakistani handlers and their six operatives in Kashmir—was filed in a special National Investigation Agency (NIA) court in Baramulla. The case concerned seizure of vast sums of arms, narcotics, and ammunition in 2021.4 As per the court documents, those arrested were a part of a network that sourced drugs, arms, and ammunition from across the border.
In May 2022, three people, including a woman, were arrested in Kupwara in a joint operation by the 7 Rashtriya Rifles and the local police for possessing two Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and seven kilograms of narcotics, specifically heroin.5 These items were being transferred to other regions in the Kashmir valley for aiding and abetting terrorism.
In June 2022, J&K police busted a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) module, which was disseminating funds procured from the sale of drugs to their jihadist brethren.6 The authorities also repossessed arms, vehicles, and ammunition from the terrorists. Drones have also been used to deliver opium across the border into J&K.7
Further, inter-state drug and terror links, aided and abetted by Pakistan, have also come to light. J&K’s State Investigation Agency (SIA), in July 2022, filed a charge sheet against five individuals for terror financing following the seizure of Rs 43 lakhs from a taxi en route to Kashmir in November 2021.8 This operation was spearheaded by Muzammil Ahmad Malik, a Pulwama resident, whose responsibility extended to ensuring safe passage of his fellow terrorists and collecting the funds from criminals like Amarbir Singh, operating out of Punjab. Reportedly, Singh is closely affiliated with notorious arms and narcotics trafficker, Baljinder Singh alias Billa Mandiala, accused in over 23 FIRs about extortion and killings.
Earlier in December 2020, Delhi Police had arrested five individuals—three from Kashmir, belonging to the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and the remaining two from Punjab—on narco-terrorism charges.9 Reports noted that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was colluding with Khalistani terrorists and has established a ‘K-2 (Kashmir–Khalistan) desk’ to advance its proxy conflict.10 The elaborate nexus included the involvement of HM terrorists based in Pakistan and over ground workers (OGWs) in Kashmir. The former was tasked with handling the distribution of drugs for sale to their partners in the valley, who would cross state boundaries into Punjab for the illegal sale of drug consignment. The K-2’s sleeper cells engage in financial transactions through hawala channels and have significant youth membership.
Implications
India is the crossroads between the ‘Golden Triangle’ and the ‘Golden Crescent’, two of the most significant opium production and trade hubs connecting South Asia with South East Asia. The drug trade has blossomed, due to weak institutional apparatus in these neighbouring countries, aided and abetted by state-sponsored actors.
Pakistan’s efforts to undermine normalcy in J&K, particularly after the August 2019 constitutional reforms, is rooted in its decades-long proxy war against India. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif admitted to using narcotics to finance anti-India proscribed organisations, during an interview by The Washington Post in September 1994.11 Regardless of the frequent change of guards, little appears to have changed since then.
Narco-terrorism could be a key facilitator of Pakistan’s strategy to undermine efforts to establish peace in the valley. Terrorists are also reportedly using drug money to fund misinformation campaigns.12 LeT’s front organisations like The Resistance Front (TRF) have propped up in the Valley and targeted killings of migrant labourers and members of minority communities like Sikhs and Kashmiri Pandits, have also surged in recent times. Organisations like the TRF are at the forefront of misinformation campaigns to ‘secularise’ militancy in the valley.
Reports note that over 52,000 individuals have become dependent on narcotics, primarily heroin.13 Apart from national security implications, this indicates a health epidemic. The surge in the proportion of people indulging in drug abuse has inevitable ramifications for the state youth’s integration into the polity. The more people fall into this trap, the more they will be unable to assimilate into the workforce and contribute to the economy.
While security forces have effectively clamped down on terrorist activities in J&K, it is equally essential to strengthen soft-power capacities to curb and gradually eliminate growing substance abuse across the state. This is because the drug trade has direct links in the fight against terrorism. Rehabilitation programmes, for example, like those underway at the Drug De-Addiction and Treatment Centre at the Shri Maharaja Hari Singh Hospital in Srinagar, must be duplicated across the valley, especially so in rural areas. Avenues must be provided for addicted persons to seek counselling, and help in reintegration into mainstream society.
In March 2021, Rs 10 crores was allocated for drug rehabilitation measures as part of J&K’s annual budget.14 To counter the drug menace, the J&K government has also set up counselling centres across all districts, and seminars have been conducted to spread awareness about this challenge. Furthermore, rehabilitation facilities in 10 out of 14 districts have been established under the National Action Plan for Drug Demand Reduction.15
Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha, launching the Nasha Mukt Jammu and Kashmir campaign on 1 September 2022, lauded the ‘zero tolerance’ policy of the state police and anti-narcotics task force and pointed to the seizures of large number of drugs in recent months as indicative of the effectiveness of the policy.16 Continued strong vigil by the state and central security forces and agencies is essential to eliminate nexus between inter-state criminals and Pakistan-sponsored terror modules.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The second India–Africa Defence Dialogue at DefExpo 2022 at Gandhinagar, Gujarat has opened multiple pathways for defence cooperation between India and Africa.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh hosted the Defence Ministers and Heads of delegation from African countries during the second India–Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), organised on the sidelines of DefExpo2022 at Gandhinagar on 18 October 2022. The main theme of the event was ‘Adopting Strategy for Synergizing and Strengthening Defence and Security Cooperation’. The Gandhinagar Declaration was adopted as the outcome document of the IADD. A special cover on the IADD, a brochure of the India–Africa Security Fellowship Programme to be hosted by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi and a volume on India–Africa Defence cooperation, were also released. The IADD will definitely reinvigorate India’s defence cooperation with African countries in training, maritime cooperation, countering terrorism and transfer of defence equipment.
Skills enhancement and capacity building through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme is an important pillar of India’s long-standing partnership with African countries. India’s focus on training and skills enhancement matches with the goal of African countries towards a skills revolution for their youth, as portrayed in African Union’s Agenda 2063, a blueprint for transforming Africa into a global powerhouse. Providing opportunities to defence officers from Africa to study at India’s premier defence training establishments or sending training teams to an African country as per its requirement has been the bedrock of India’s defence cooperation with the region.
The famous African alumni of Indian military training institutions include the current President of Nigeria, Mohammadu Buhari. He was trained at the Defence Services Staff College at Wellington. Similarly, former President of Ghana, Gen FWK Akuffo, had received training at National Defence College, New Delhi. The Gandhinagar Declaration calls for an increase in India’s defence training under ITEC programme, particularly in specialised areas, such as defence technology, cybersecurity, maritime law, ocean governance and peacekeeping. It also recommends deployment of temporary training teams to African countries on request.
Despite the efforts by African countries, conflicts continue to simmer in some parts of the region. Recognising the security challenges faced by African countries, India has supported their efforts towards fostering peace and security through deployment of Indian peacekeepers for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) in the region. India has participated in majority of the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, including those in Congo, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Liberia, Sudan, South Sudan, Abeyi, Western Sahara and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
At Gandhinagar, India has committed to continue its support to UNPKOs in Africa. It will also continue to train officers from African countries at the Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in India. One of the important trends in UN peacekeeping in Africa is the increase in troop-contributing countries from Africa. Rwanda is currently the largest troop-contributing country from the African continent. India is ready to support African countries in augmenting their peacekeeping abilities.
Maritime security is another important pillar of defence cooperation between India and African countries. There is a shared concern over the numerous maritime security challenges such as piracy, maritime terrorism, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, drug trafficking and human trafficking. This concern was highlighted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his landmark address to the Ugandan Parliament in 2018, where he announced the ten guiding principles of India–Africa cooperation.
It is also reflected in India’s cooperative and inclusive vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All) unveiled by Prime Minister Modi during his visit to Mauritius in 2015. Similarly, in 2014, the African Union adopted the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy that focuses not only at the maritime security challenges but also calls for sustainable development of the region’s blue economy. Over the years, India has assisted African countries in surveillance of their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. The Gandhinagar Declaration underlines India’s efforts in this crucial area and calls for sharing best practices and experiences to combat disasters and other challenges.
Countering terrorism is another common challenge that India and African countries face. Several countries in Africa have been dealing with terrorism. In West Africa, Boko Haram has created insecurities within Nigeria and its neighbours. The affiliates of Islamic State and Al Qaida have been terrorising several countries in the Sahel, including Mali. In North Africa, threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or the Al Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM) is continuous. The fighters of Al Shabaab continue their incessant violent activities in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya in East Africa. In Southern Africa, the Cabo Delgado region in northern Mozambique has faced numerous terror attacks in recent years. The troops from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries have brought the situation under control to some extent. However, the threat of terrorism has not gone completely. The African Union has taken several measures to deal with this scourge; nevertheless the threat persists. India has a long experience in dealing with violent terrorism. At Gandhinagar, India has offered to provide counter-terrorism training to African countries.
The IADD held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 provides an opportunity for the African partners to get a clear picture of India’s defence manufacturing capabilities. The current Ukraine crisis has highlighted the importance of diversifying sources of weapons imports. Currently, Russia is the largest exporter of weapons to Africa, followed by China and European countries. The Gandhinagar Declaration reveals that India’s defence public sector company, Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) will open an office in Kenya, while Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) will open an office in Nigeria. This will help in facilitating cooperation in the field of transfer and maintenance of defence equipment.
Finally, the IADD held in Gandhinagar also encourages further research of security issues through offer of fellowships to experts from African countries, under the ‘India–Africa Security Fellowship Programme’ to be hosted by India’s leading think tank on strategic studies, the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). Over the years, the Institute has been involved in conducting research on African issues and has strived for greater interaction between Indian and African experts. It is hoped that this novel step will increase the understanding of numerous security challenges faced by African countries and India and also generate a broader debate and discussion within the respective strategic communities.
In conclusion, the conduct of the India–Africa Defence Dialogue at Gandhinagar, Gujarat has opened multiple pathways for defence cooperation between India and Africa. The IADD is another critical step taken by Prime Minister Modi’s government to accord high priority to India–Africa engagement.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Concerns of radicalisation in SDF-run facilities in Syria remain high, given that reports flag corruption, crime, and deplorable security conditions at these camps.
Tens of thousands of ISIS detainees are housed in temporary prison camps and detention centers in Syria and Iraq by US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).1 Charles Lister, the Director of Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs at the Middle East Institute, warned that the international community is ‘doing nothing to prevent the current generation of detainees from wanting to continue to fight if they get out, and creating a melting pot for the next generation.’2
As reported by Militant Wire, technology and illicit financing are being used by terrorist sympathisers to raise funds for ISIS spouses and children in Syria through encrypted Telegram channels and digital wallets like QIWI. The funds are being raised for two primary reasons—smuggling former detainees from detention camps and targeting low-security detention centres managed by Kurdish militias.3 There are reportedly at least 14 such facilities in North-East Syria.4
The US-backed SDF fighters confront multifaceted challenges of managing these makeshift prisons in a war zone. These areas have also faced large-scale prison breaks. The attack at Gweiron prison in January 2022 was aimed at freeing over 3,000 detainees, including 700 minors.5 ISIS’ news agency, Amaq, claimed that 800 terrorists had been freed.6 The SDF successfully traced around 100 detainees. Such attacks on prison facilities are reminiscent of the prison break in July 2013, when more than 600 prisoners were freed from detention facilities like Abu Ghraib, many of whom later were at the forefront of the military assaults launched by ISIS during its rise to power.
Furthermore, the Kurdish forces appear to have been thrust into a position reminiscent of American forces stationed at Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. There, the confinement of some of the most radicalised elements aligned with extremist Salafist ideology in one space fed the pool that eventually emerged as elements of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and, later, ISIS.
Camps in Al-Hol, in the eastern al-Hasaka governorate, have been at the epicentre of continued recruitment, radicalisation, and violence by ISIS followers.7 As per reports, battle-hardened former fighters are sharing space with impressionable teenagers in converted warehouses and schools.8 Alarmingly, murders, sexual abuse, and unrestricted transit within and outside the detention camps underscore security gaps. Approximately 24 killings have occurred inside the Al-Hol camp alone from January to July 2022, including of a humanitarian worker, where spouses, widows, and children of ISIS fighters have been detained.9
This overflowing space with more than 65,000 residents is where apparently radicalised women are molding the extremist worldview in their wards.10 Support for re-establishing the ISIS’ physical caliphate is allegedly being sustained in these camps, through social media indoctrination, with access to phones made easy, possibly by corrupt patrolling officers.11 Cumulatively, these factors have the potential to fuel online violent extremists and terror propagandists, reigniting the diminishing threat of ISIS fighters.
The refusal of several governments, meanwhile, including the British and French, to take back the ‘caliphate’ members to face justice in their countries of origin could foment humanitarian and security crises.12 Timothy Alan Betts, the Acting Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, sounded alarm in July 2022 when he stated that
Conditions are so harsh in northeastern Syria in particular that we are seeing a greater openness by residents to ISIS’s return now than at any time since the fall of the physical “caliphate” in 2019. The more ISIS can leverage local support to train and reorganize; the more sophisticated and frequent their efforts will be to free detainees and recruit in the displaced persons camp.13
The United Kingdom, on its part, runs de-radicalisation programmes like Prevent. Reports flag that authorities have struggled to run separation centres at high-security prisons like HMS Belmarsh efficiently.14 By 2021, only 10 per cent out of 450 British ISIS recruits had been prosecuted by judicial authorities.15 The challenge could grow further in the likelihood of repatriation of remaining fighters and their families. US administrations have called on the UK to take back their nationals from Syria. Reports note that around 16 women and 30 to 60 children—all British nationals—are lodged in SDF-run facilities in Syria.16 While at least 900 British citizens travelled to join ISIS, the precise number of male combatants that remain in detention camps is not clear.
Meanwhile, in Morocco, by July 2021, over 300 ISIS prisoners were lodged in prisons. The authorities are implementing a three-month course focused on economics, religion, and vocational training to ensure their gradual reintegration into the society.17 The Moroccan prison authorities have undertaken this initiative since 2017, with only one person out of the 156 graduates re-convicted for a non-terrorist offence.18 It has also been suggested by experts that by conducting regular risk assessments and special training for prison staff, can de-radicalisation efforts succeed in a given context.19
Conclusion
Concerns of radicalisation in SDF-run facilities in Syria remain high, given that reports flag corruption, crime, and deplorable security conditions at these camps. While prison breaks have also occurred, access to technology and minimal security measures have reinforced the security dilemma facing prison authorities. The possible indoctrination of new recruits in an ideologically charged setting with minimal security measures adds to regional instability. Even if detainees are repatriated to their homelands, their rehabilitation and reintegration are likely to present challenges in those societies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s visit to Egypt will concretise India–Africa defence cooperation through training, capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s visit to Egypt from 18 to 20 September 2022 has opened new avenues for defence cooperation. The visit signifies India’s growing defence ties with the African region. The Defence Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with his counterpart General Mohamed Zaki to enhance defence cooperation between the two countries in various sectors including training, joint exercises and defence production. This MoU adds to the list of agreements in defence sector signed between India and various African countries in recent years.
India’s relationship with Egypt can be traced back to the ancient times. The connect between the Nile River Valley and Indus-Saraswati valley civilisation is well recorded. This centuries-old historical, cultural and economic bond has fostered a strong political and defence partnership between the two countries. Egyptian President Abdel Fatah Al Sisi’s visit to India during the India–Africa Forum Summit of 2015 may be considered a turning point in bilateral ties. Recently, Egypt released a postage stamp to commemorate the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations with India in 2022. Egypt is also an important partner in the multilateral arena. It is a dialogue partner in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), became a member of the BRICS bank in 2021 and will be a guest country as India hosts the G20 summit next year.
Defence cooperation between the two countries has been going on since 1960s. Training has been an important component of the relationship. Particularly noteworthy is the training of Egyptian Airforce pilots by India in the 1960s and 70s. In the 1960s, the two countries were also involved in a joint venture to manufacture the famous Helwan HA-300 jet fighter.1 The push for defence cooperation came with the setting up of the formal Joint Defence Committee (JDC) in 2006. The JDC was tasked with identifying areas of defence collaboration. This committee has since met nine times.
Recently, after the decline in COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an increase in bilateral engagements in the field of defence. The first-ever Indian Air Force–Egyptian Air Force Joint Tactical Air Exercise, ‘Desert Warrior’, was held in late October 2021.2 It provided an opportunity to showcase the Su-30 MKI manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and India’s expertise for deeper indigenisation of spares and components. There has been an exchange of visits at the Air Chief level. India’s Air Chief Marshal V.R. Chaudhari visited Cairo in 2021,3 followed by the Egyptian Air Force Chief Mahmoud Foaad Abd El-Gawad’s visit to New Delhi earlier this year. Similarly, there have been several visits of Indian Navy ships to Egypt. In June 2022, the Indian Navy’s largest destroyer, INS Kochi, visited Port Safaga in Egypt.4 INS Kochi also participated in a maritime partnership exercise with the Egyptian Navy.
During the recent visit, the discussion focused on finding ways to enhance military and security cooperation, especially with regard to cooperation in joint manufacturing, transfer, and localisation of technology, with the aim of exploiting the capabilities and infrastructure available in the two countries. In recent years, India has focused on defence indigenisation and co-production through ‘Make in India’ and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-reliant India) initiatives over imports from friendly foreign countries.
Similarly, Egypt being the oldest and largest defence producer in the Arab world, after a political crisis in 2013, and suspension of US military aid for two years, has attempted to revive indigenous defence production through new co-production initiatives with non-US firms.5 This effort to diversify external partners is mainly to reduce dependence on US firms for procurement and co- production. Moreover, the traditional weapon systems produced by Egypt do not respond to urgent needs to combat terrorism in asymmetric warfare. It appears that Egypt is in search of a reliable partner and feels India fulfils the criteria. Similarly, India perceives Egypt as a reliable strategic partner with a similar independent foreign policy outlook.
Implications for India–Africa Defence Cooperation
India’s MoU with Egypt in defence cooperation is the latest agreement signed by India in the African region. India has now signed MoU in defence cooperation with all the littoral states in the Indian Ocean Region, including South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar, as well as with countries such as Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, etc.6 The range of defence cooperation includes training, peacekeeping, maritime cooperation and defence equipment transfers. Besides Egypt, the Raksha Mantri paid a visit to Mozambique in 2019. In August 2022, he had discussions on improving security ties during the Tanzanian Defence Minister, Dr Stergomena Lawrence Tax’s visit to New Delhi. In 2021, the National Security Advisor (NSA) of Nigeria visited India for the first India–Nigeria Strategic dialogue at the level of NSA. Similarly, India’s Deputy NSA Vivek Misri visited Mozambique and Tanzania, earlier this year, for a dialogue on security issues.
India’s desire to enhance defence cooperation with Africa is mainly driven by common security challenges such as rise in terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking. Positive developments such as economic transformation of the continent and growing economic and development cooperation of India with Africa in the last two decades also are an important factor. India has developed a cooperative framework of defence cooperation with Africa guided by the principles of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ (The world is one family).
At the same time, several of Africa’s external partners are using defence cooperation as a tool to enhance their relations with the countries in the region. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia was the largest supplier of weapons to Africa from 2016 to 2020.7 In recent years, China has upped its activities on security issues with African countries. It hosted the 2nd China–Africa Peace and Security Forum Ministerial meeting in July 2022. The action plan unveiled at the last FOCAC meeting at Dakar, Senegal in November 2021, highlighted the growing security cooperation between African countries and China.8 At the same time, there is growing realisation in Africa that Beijing’s terms of engagement are less than desirable. This has given India a window of opportunity to enhance its cooperation with the region.
An important development during the recent visit was Rajnath Singh’s invitation to his Egyptian counterpart to the India–Africa Defence Dialogue, scheduled to be held as part of 12th DefExpo at Gandhinagar, Gujarat from 18 to 22 October 2022. The first India–Africa Defence Dialogue was held in February 2020 on the sidelines of DefExpo 2020. India has now institutionalised the dialogue to be held every two years along with the DefExpo.9 The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) is the knowledge partner for the event. Through this meeting, India hopes to enhance partnership with African countries. There is also an expectation that the meeting will give a fillip to India’s defence exports to the region. However, unlike Egypt, a large number of African countries do not have the capacity to purchase these equipment and are dependent on lines of credit from India to facilitate these defence exports. Nevertheless, African countries are diversifying their sources of defence imports and consider India as a trustworthy defence partner.
In conclusion, it can be said that the importance of Africa in India's foreign policy is visible from the increasing number of high-level visits from both sides. It is hoped that Indian Defence Minister’s visit to Egypt will concretise India–Africa defence cooperation which focuses on empowering African countries through training, capacity-building, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Jammu and Kashmir needs a robust early warning system to mitigate the impact of natural disasters.
Floods are a regular feature in India. Every year with varying severity, floods leave behind huge property damage and human lives. On an average, every year floods affect about 75 lakh hectares of land, take about 1,600 lives, and Rs 1,805 crores in damage to public facilities, residences and agriculture.1 In the period June–September 2022, India witnessed a series of severe floods which led to loss of 1,282 lives and US$ 3.1 billion in economic damage.2 The need to mitigate flood disasters in sustainable ways is, therefore, crucial.
The Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is quite vulnerable to floods, particularly the low-lying portions of the Kashmir Valley, including Sonawari, Awantipora, Srinagar, and some parts of Jammu. The upper catchments of the mainstream rivers—Jhelum, Indus, Chenab, and Tawi—witness widespread flooding.3 The floods of 2014 in J&K affected around five million people—“around 4.5 million in Kashmir valley and half a million in the Jammu region. In addition, it caused an estimated loss of Rs. 5,400-5,700 crore to the state's economy.”4 About 7,405 deaths in India were registered due to natural disasters in 2020, of which 959 deaths were caused by floods; J&K alone accounted for 48 deaths.5
More recently, on 8 July 2022, flash floods caused by a cloudburst close to Amarnath in southern Kashmir led to 16 deaths and 40 people went missing. Around 13,041 pilgrims were relocated to safer locations.6 These flood disasters create huge panic among the public which brings into focus the state of disaster management in J&K.
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Systems
In 2005, the Government of India passed the Disaster Management Act.7 It provided for the establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), under the leadership of the Prime Minister, and State Disaster Management Authorities (SDMAs), under the leadership of the corresponding Chief Ministers, with the mission of leading and implementing a comprehensive and integrated approach to disaster management in the country.
J&K was one of the first few states then to pass legislation for natural disasters. In 1955, the Natural Calamities Destroyed Areas Improvement Act was passed for the improvement of towns, villages, and other areas that were ravaged by natural calamities. However, the Act's accessibility did not yield great benefits. Since the enactment of the NDMA 2005, J&K has implemented a number of steps to reduce the loss of life and property caused by natural disasters. The SDMA, the State Executive Committee (SEC), and the District Disaster Management Authorities have been established in accordance with the terms of the NDMA Act.
Issues, however, remain over their effectiveness. The framework, as noted above, deals more with the management of water resources. The topography and terrain of J&K requires a widespread and efficient engineering system. For instance, the state's topography results in frequent cloudbursts. As meteorologists observe, the high altitude and steep gradient encourage the development of cumulonimbus clouds. As a result, more water is shed in larger droplets at a faster rate. In the 12th five-year plan (2012–17), the NITI Aayog cautioned that “hydro-power projects on the Himalayan Rivers may not be viable”8 because the young mountains, i.e., the Himalayas, are eroding at a very high rate. There is little vegetation in the upper catchment to bind the soil. The management of excess water quite clearly becomes challenging in the difficult terrains of the Himalayas.
The frequent floods in J&K raise questions on the administrative ability and engineering response. The death toll, after enacting a disaster management policy 20119 and State Disaster Management Plan (SDMP) 2017,10 has increased (see Table 1). Moreover, in 2019, out of the total 8,145 accidental deaths due to natural disasters, 63 deaths were reported in J&K (excluding Ladakh).11
Table 1: Death due to natural disasters in India and J&K and Ladakh region, 2010–2018
J&K (including Ladakh)
India
2010
575
25,066
2011
314
23,690
2012
321
22,960
2013
308
22,759
2014
518
20,201
2015
387
10,510
2016
280
8,684
2017
127
7143
2018
131
6891
Source: SK Patel, A. Nanda, G. Singh and S. Patel, “A Review of Disasters in Jammu and Kashmir, and the Ladakh Region in India”, International Journal of Population Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 69–81.
Conclusion
J&K is one of India's most flood-affected regions. After the devastating floods of 2014, the central government devised a detailed plan for managing floods along the Jhelum river and its tributaries.12 The plan was to be implemented in two phases. While the construction on the second phase will begin soon, the first phase is almost finished. The central government had also established a committee to make recommendations for ways to manage floods in future. In its final report, the committee suggested a few long-term solutions, such as adding more flood spillways, building storage facilities on Jhelum tributaries, zoning floodplains, and expanding the capacity of Wular Lake. In addition, a detailed study on flood risks is also being conducted by the Jal Shakti Department in J&K. An Integrated Forecasting System (IFS) with a robust decision support system will also be developed for quick and efficient response to any flood-related calamity in the Union Territory.
However, the imprints of natural disasters on lives and livelihoods demand a more effective disaster risk reduction approach. For instance, it requires a robust early warning system to mitigate the impact of disasters. It is also important to adopt sustainable practices like land management and afforestation with a view to increasing the water retention capacity of the soil and decreasing the intensity of flood flows. Every river has clearly defined banks and floodplains. The floodplains play a critical role not only in nutrient replenishment but also in controlling overflowing rivers naturally. Most of the states have poor regulations over unabated encroachment of floodplains. The Union Territory of J&K is no exception, hence there is an urgent need to frame legislations as per the geological and civil engineering guidelines so as to lessen the impact of floods on the infrastructure.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s voting pattern at the United Nations Security Council shows that it is proactive and positive towards the UNSC agenda.
In January 2021, India joined the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for its eighth term as a non-permanent member. India secured 184 votes in the 193-member General Assembly, including all the 55 votes of the Asia-Pacific Group. This massive support can be seen as a befitting acknowledgement of India's growing prominence at the high tables. India's membership came at a time of intensifying great power rivalry and increased anti-multilateral sentiments. The Ukraine war, for instance, has exposed deep divisions in the UNSC. In addition, issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have exacerbated the predicament of multilateral institutions. Consequently, the challenge before India was to help the UNSC to reinvigorate multilateralism. India’s voting response and its August 2021 presidency show that India contributed to expanding the UNSC agenda.
India as a Non-Permanent Member
Before the current term, India was elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC seven times. India served the Council in 1950–51, 1967–68, 1972–73, 1977–78, 1984–85, 1991–92, and 2011–12 (Table 1). Except for the first time, when it represented the Commonwealth group, India has been elected on behalf of the Asian regional grouping. India’s UNSC membership always coincided with some significant events in international politics. These years were testing times for the UNSC. For instance, India's first term in the Council and its first presidency coincided with the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–51). During India's second and third terms, the Council was predominantly focused on heightened tensions in West Asia, notably the two Arab–Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973. Israel's first invasion of Lebanon, the first Gulf War and the conflicts in Libya and Syria were the other major conflict situations that occurred during India's UNSC terms in 1977–78, 1984–85 and 2011–12, respectively.1
Year
Resolutions Adopted
India’s Voting Response
Total
Unanimously or by Consensus
Affirmative
Abstained
1951–1952
18
02
11
05
1967–1968
30
26
03
01
1972–1973
37
10
27
--
1977–1978
41
05
36
--
1984–1985
35
21
14
--
1991–1992
116
100
10
06
2011–1912
118
107
09
02
2021–2022
(till 31 August 2022)
90
68
17
05
Source: Author; Data taken from UNSC Meetings and Outcome Tables, www.un.org
2021–22 Term
For the 2021–22 term, India's primary objective in the UNSC was to implement a new orientation for a reformed multilateral system. This was guided by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘five S’ approach—Samman (Respect), Samvad (Dialogue), Sahyog (Cooperation), Shanti (Peace) and Samriddhi (Prosperity).2 India identified five priorities for the current term: seeking responsible and inclusive solutions; result-oriented measures to counter international terrorism; reformed multilateralism to reflect contemporary realities; streamlining peacekeeping; and technology with a human touch.3
Moreover, in January 2021, India was also elected as the Chair of the Taliban Sanctions Committee, the Chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee and the Vice-Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). It was also elected as one of the Vice-Chairs of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee and the Working Group to monitor the implementation of UNSC sanctions on Al Qaida and the Taliban. In January 2022, India assumed the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).
August 2021 Presidency
One of the most significant occurrences during the current term was India's UNSC presidency in August 2021. India undertook its tenth tenure as President of the UNSC in August 2021 and organised three signature events—open debates on maritime security, peacekeeping, and terrorism. Prime Minister Modi chaired the high-level open debate on maritime security, becoming the first Indian PM to preside over a UNSC meeting. It was the first standalone discussion on maritime security in the UNSC and produced the first presidential statement on the issue. During the debate, India also outlined a five-principle framework that included—removing barriers to maritime trade, resolving maritime disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law, jointly tackling maritime threats from non-state actors and natural disasters, conserving of maritime environment and marine resources, and responsible maritime connectivity.4
The second and third open debate on peacekeeping and terrorist threats were chaired by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. The open debate on terrorist attacks' threats to international peace and security took place on 19 August, the eve of the International Day of Remembrance and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism. During the meeting, Jaishankar reiterated his eight-point counter-terrorism action plan and called for the early adoption of a UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.5 India also asked all nations to commit to zero tolerance for terrorism.
During the open debate on peacekeeping, India proposed a four-point framework for UN peacekeepers to meet contemporary threats. These included the need to employ technologies that are operationally proven, cost-effective, widely available, environmentally friendly, dependable, and field serviceable. Secondly, India called for a solid information and intelligence foundation to ensure early warning and mobilisation of early response. Thirdly, ensuring that technological advancements are readily available on the ground and fourthly, the need for consistent technological training and capacity building for peacekeepers was stressed.6
The other significant issue that came before the Security Council during India’s presidency was the Afghan crisis, which began with the withdrawal of US-NATO troops, followed by the Taliban's takeover of the country in August 2021. As the Council's president, India held a briefing, issued two press statements condemning terrorist attacks, and introduced a resolution to address the crisis. Under India’s presidency, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2593, which demanded that Afghan territory should not be used to threaten or attack any country, shelter or train terrorists, or plan or finance terrorist acts.7 India also called for an inclusive regime that represents all segments of Afghan society.
Voting Response
India’s voting response during the current term shows how responsible India was in the UNSC. From 1 January 2021 to 31 August 2022, UNSC adopted 88 resolutions. Out of these 88, India supported 81 and abstained seven. During this period, the Council failed to adopt two draft resolutions—on Bosnia and Herzegovina and climate change and security. India voted against the resolution on climate change and security as it argued that the UNSC was not the place to discuss the issues of climate change and climate justice.8
Similarly, India supported three out of four resolutions on the agenda relating to the topic of maintenance of international peace and security and abstained on one resolution. India voted in favour of all resolutions UNSC adopted during this period on issues such as terrorism and peacekeeping. Regarding regional conflicts and issues, India supported 40 out of 42 resolutions on Africa. While India supported all resolutions on conflicts in Middle East and Afghanistan, it abstained on three and favoured one resolution on Ukraine crisis (Table 2).
Total
Favour
Abstained
Against
Res. adopted
88
81
7
1
Draft not adopted
6
1
Chapter VII Res.
27
27
Issues/Regional Conflicts
Intr. Peace & Security
4
3
1
Terrorist threat
4
4
Peacekeeping
2
2
Africa
42
40
2
Middle East
12
12
Afghanistan
3
3
Ukraine
4
3
3
Source: Author; Data taken from UNSC Meetings and Outcome Tables, www.un.org
India's approach to the Ukrainian crisis, especially its responses in the UNSC, shows its independent and neutral foreign policy. The Ukrainian crisis started in February 2022 and the UNSC has convened nearly 15 meetings on the issue since then. In all these meetings, India has consistently called for restraint on all sides and peaceful settlement of the conflict. In the initial days of the conflict, India’s primary concern was the well-being of more than 20,000 Indian nationals living in Ukraine.9
When the UNSC considered a draft resolution tabled by Albania and the US demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, India abstained, along with China and the United Arab Emirates. In its Explanation of Vote, India said that all efforts should be made for the immediate de-escalation of violence and hostilities and requested the conflicting parties to return to the path of diplomacy.10 Later in February and March, India abstained from voting on a UNSC resolution to refer the Ukraine crisis to the General Assembly and a draft resolution moved by Russia calling for the protection of civilians in Ukraine, respectively.11 On 24 August, India once again abstained on a procedural vote on Ukraine.12
Conclusion
As an elected non-permanent member of the UNSC, India has always played an active role in discussions on all issues related to international peace and security. India sought to prioritise the primacy of a political approach to resolve crises through dialogue and negotiation, including on issues such as Afghanistan and Ukraine. Its UNSC presidency confirmed that India is no longer just a rule-taker, but rather became a rule-shaper at the high tables. It contributed to expanding the UNSC agenda, by bringing vital issues such as technology and peacekeeping, maritime security and counter-terrorism. Similarly, India at the UNSC always preferred to be part of the democratic majority helping in the adoption of broadly acceptable decisions and resolutions. The general perception is that India is a ‘nay-sayer’ in multilateral forums. However, India’s voting pattern shows that its approach is proactive and positive towards the UNSC agenda. From its first term in 1950–51 to its current term (2021–22) in the UNSC, India favoured more than 90 per cent of the resolutions which were adopted unanimously or by consensus. Concerning the resolutions that were adopted through a vote, India cast an affirmative vote on nearly 90 per cent of them. Similarly, India always abstained with other member states and has resorted to abstentions only to showcase its reservation on a particular issue. In short, the 16 years of UNSC experience is an added credential for its claim for permanent membership in the Council.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The defence indigenisation lists are expected to promote domestic arms manufacturing and reduce the burden of arms imports.
In 2013, the government announced Defence Indigenisation Policy and mandated that defence equipment be manufactured with at least 30 per cent of the indigenous content on the overall cost. The Defence Acquisition Policy (DAP), announced in 2020, extended the previous limit to 50 per cent of indigenous content on overall manufacturing costs. It was a significant step that showed the government’s confidence in domestic arms vendors and their capabilities to serve the needs of the Armed Forces.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his address to the nation on 12 May 2020, gave a clarion call for a Self-reliant India, based on five principles—Economy, System, Infrastructure, Demography and Demand. He also announced a special economic package called ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’. Taking it as a pivot point, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) released ‘Negative List’ of defence equipment banning their imports and to push for indigenisation to meet the aspirations of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’. Three such lists have been released so far. This commentary analyses the implications of these lists for the Indian domestic arms sector.
The Negative Lists
On 7 April 2022, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced the third Negative List. The MoD and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) notified the import ban on defence articles under the third Negative List which will be indigenously manufactured between December 2022 and December 2027. The third negative list contains 101 defence articles including Sensors, Complex Systems, Naval Utility Helicopters, Lightweight Tanks, Anti-tank Guns, Medium Altitude Long Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MALE UAV), Loitering Munitions, High Endurance Autonomous Underwater Vehicles and other weapons systems. The import ban will help Indian industry gather orders worth Rs 2,10,000 crores in the next five to seven years.
The list was made after several rounds of close consultation between the MoD, Service Headquarters (SHQ), Department of Defence Production (DDP), Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO), and private companies. The government is taking the necessary steps along with DRDO and all other stakeholders to handhold the industry to ensure self-reliance in defence manufacturing.
To strengthen and promote domestic arms manufacturing, DRDO has signed 30 agreements for the Transfer of Technology (ToT) with 25 industries.1 DRDO has so far signed 1,430 ToT agreements with domestic arms industries, including 450 ToT agreements since 2020. These technologies mainly relate to counter-drone systems, missile warheads, laser directed energy weapon systems, radar systems, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, among others.2
The first two Negative Lists were announced in August 2020 and March 2021, respectively. Under the first list, MoD included 101 items for import ban, progressively effective from December 2020 and December 2024. The second list included 108 items for the import embargo, planned to be implemented between December 2021 and December 2025. With the inclusion of the third negative list, there are now 310 defence articles in total which would be embargoed and developed by domestic vendors.3
After the first two lists, the MoD has accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) approval for 83 projects worth Rs 1.77 crores whereas projects worth Rs 2.94 crores will be generated in the next five to seven years.4 The list announced earlier contained transport aircraft, light combat helicopters, artillery guns, SONAR systems, assault rifles, submarines and corvettes, among others.
Drivers behind Indigenisation Lists
India has been one of the largest importers of arms in the last three decades. India’s arms imports fell by 21 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21, after continuously rising since 1991. SIPRI’s Trend Indicator Value (TIV) indicates that India’s arms imports reduced from US$ 19,432 million to US$ 15,356 million in the last five years.5 However, despite this, India remained the largest arms importer, accounting for 11 per cent of the total global arms import in 2017–21.6
India is striving to cut down defence imports and promote exports of defence equipment made by domestic industry. The draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy 2020 has set an ambitious goal to achieve a defence manufacturing industry with US$ 25 billion turnover by 2025, including the export of military hardware worth US$ 5 billion.7
The Government of India has taken necessary steps to enhance domestic manufacturing and promote arms export in the last several years. These steps have produced fruitful results as India became the 23rd biggest arms exporter in 2017–21.8 India showed a positive growth rate of 119 per cent in arms export between 2012–16 and 2017–21. India is now exporting arms to 42 countries and its major arms recipients are Myanmar (50 per cent), Sri Lanka (21 per cent) and Armenia (11 per cent).9
The Indian industry has been reaching out to many countries, including in Latin America for instance, to showcase its arms for export and for possible co-production and co-development. India has signed a US$ 375 million contract with the Philippines to export three batteries of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles in January 2022. With this success, India is expecting some more big ticket contracts from countries like South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Indonesia and other South-East Asian countries. Nine countries from Africa and South-East Asia have shown interest in the acquisition of DRDO-made Akash missile system.10 Similarly, several countries including the US, Argentina, Philippines, Australia, Egypt and Indonesia have expressed interest in Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, whereas Royal Malaysian Air Forces have already shortlisted LCA Tejas for acquisition programme.11
Another major reason for releasing a negative list or banning the procurement of ‘off-the-shelf’ defence equipment relates to concerns over breach of technical data. Most of the arms are technologically advanced and software-enabled, which can easily be controlled and manipulated and could lead to data breaches. While announcing the third negative list, Rajnath Singh gave reference to US’s harsh sanctions on Chinese tech giant Huawei against its role in stealing data and breaching US national security.12
In 2011, thousands of pages of technical details of India’s Scorpene submarines were leaked. In 2016, The Australian reported that documents on the entire submarine structure, Torpedo-launch system, communication and navigation system, under and above-water sensors, and combat management system were leaked by the officials of Scorpene submarine contractor, DCNS.13 India had signed a US$ 3 billion deal with French shipbuilder DCNS in 2005, to indigenously assemble and build Six Scorpene class submarine in India.
Conclusion
The steps taken by the government to promote domestic defence manufacturing have shown some positive results. After the first two lists were announced, around 31 projects worth Rs 53,839 crores have been contracted from the domestic defence industry by the armed forces. The Indian Armed Forces have contracted around 260 programmes of these items worth Rs 3.5 lakh crores between 2015 and 2022. The import embargo is expected to help generate contracts worth Rs 4 lakh crores from domestic arms industries in the next five years.14 The indigenisation lists are expected to promote domestic arms manufacture and reduce the burden of arms imports.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
If the US and Russia fail to negotiate a successor agreement to New START, there is the possibility of an unrestricted arms race with detrimental implications.
On 8 August 2022, Russia temporarily halted the United States (US) inspections of the former’s nuclear sites agreed under the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) on account of lack of parity and equality vis-à-vis access to the US inspection facilities for Russian inspectors.1 For Moscow, the decision was triggered by the US notification regarding its intention to inspect Russian nuclear sites, although such inspections under the New START treaty were paused due to Covid-19 in early 2020 by mutual consent.2
At the Tenth Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (RevCon) 2022, both countries sounded conciliatory regarding their views on arms control. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a message to the conference, stated that Russia has “fully implemented” its bilateral commitments with the US on nuclear arms reduction. Putin added that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought…”.3
In the same vein, US President Joe Biden asserted that “Even at the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to work together to uphold our shared responsibility to ensure strategic stability. Today, my Administration is ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026.”4 Despite such positive comments, the inspection and verification aspects of the treaty are in trouble. Thus, it is pertinent to discern the challenges before New START and its successor agreement.
First, the US and Russia differ in their threat perceptions vis-à-vis each other’s weapon arsenal. The US is concerned about new Russian weapons such as the air-launched ballistic missile, the nuclear-powered cruise missile and the nuclear-propelled, nuclear-armed unmanned undersea vehicle.5 At the same time, Russians are anxious about the US missile defence systems along with high-precision conventional weapons having a strategic impact.6
Thus, the parties will have to negotiate differing priorities of both countries in the successor treaty. If Washington and Moscow do not find common ground to start negotiations, it would be detrimental to global arms control efforts. According to the U.S. Department of State, the US would have inadequate knowledge about the Russian nuclear forces without the New START’s verification measures, leading to “less information upon which to base decisions about U.S. nuclear forces”.7 The converse of this proposition is that the temporary suspension of inspections will have ramifications for both sides, impacting the global strategic stability during current tumultuous times.
Second, there is a debate about the scope of the new treaty and whether it should include the consequential emerging technological innovations. The emerging technologies include difficult-to-intercept hypersonic missiles, drone swarms that are capable of targeting high-value counterforce or counter command infrastructure,8 cyberattacks against military command and control systems, and anti-satellite capabilities, among others. Military technology has been progressing continuously, and innovations in hypersonic technology have led to new systems that have not been included under the arms control treaty.9
According to Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Sergei Ryabkov, the future agreement on strategic stability between Moscow and Washington should include traditional strategic weapons along with “all nuclear and non-nuclear weapons that can carry out strategic missions”.10 Apart from the new category of weapons, there is a scope for the successor treaty to cover non-strategic and non-deployed warheads, which are out of the scope of the current New START.
Third, China has made spectacular advancements in developing hypersonic missiles and has a massive inventory of its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs). According to Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary, U.S. Department of State, China’s nuclear build-up seems to encompass unique nuclear-powered capabilities and a substantial augmentation of its silo-based ICBM forces. One cannot disregard the destabilising dynamic resulting from Beijing’s quick and covert nuclear build-up.11 A report by the U.S. Department of Defense has predicted that China would likely have 1,000 warheads by 2030 and already has a “nascent nuclear triad with the development of a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and improvement of its ground and sea-based nuclear capabilities”.12 Any future nuclear arms control deal, therefore, will have to include the rapidly increasing Chinese nuclear arsenal.
Gen. Anthony Cotton, slated to be commander of U.S. Strategic Command, warned about China’s rising nuclear arsenal while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15 September 2022. He spoke about China’s shift away from minimal nuclear deterrence and highlighted China’s “bona fide triad”.13 The Committee Chairman, Senator Jack Reed, predicted that the US would enter a trilateral nuclear competition era.14 Thus, there is a legitimate worry about the effects of Chinese nuclear breakthroughs on global strategic stability.
Fourth is an inability of the parties to insulate the treaty from global geopolitical developments. The current pause of the inspections has been preceded by a similar response by the US, where Washington had halted arms control talks with Moscow at the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022.15 Even in 2014, the Obama administration had paused arms control talks post the Crimean crisis.16 Along with the Ukraine crisis, Washington and Moscow have a history of being involved in various global issues, including the far-flung Syrian civil war of 2011 and the ongoing Iran nuclear contentions. Therefore, the former superpowers still hold sway in global politics and possession of more than 90 per cent of nuclear stockpile makes treaties like New START an absolute necessity for the 21st century.
So far, the treaty’s extension has given both sides a clear picture of each other’s strategic forces and has offered Washington and Moscow space to negotiate a new nuclear arms control agreement. Though it is naïve to think that arms control talks can be delinked from extant geopolitical developments, it is extremely desirable to have some mechanism which keeps parties engaged with the treaty obligations irrespective of geopolitical tensions. The New START treaty has a Bilateral Consultative Commission to discuss issues related to the implementation of the treaty. The same has been utilised to resolve the current issue of inspection pause. However, success of such mechanisms depends on state actors’ intent.
Conclusion
While the world has moved away from Cold War-era bipolarity, the US and Russia remain two of the most consequential powers vis-à-vis the nuclear domain. The bilateral arms control treaties have, to some extent, contributed to reducing the risk of nuclear war, enhancing mutual trust between the antagonistic superpowers, reducing the number of nuclear weapons and providing overall strategic stability during the peak of the Cold War rivalry. However, the New START and its successor treaty face credible challenges—one, from a rising China and two, from emerging technologies. The dysfunctional relationship between the US and Russia post the Ukraine crisis has adversely impacted its execution.
If the countries fail to negotiate a successor agreement to New START, China might get a free pass to expand its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, there is the possibility of an unrestricted arms race with significant detrimental implications. The challenges to implementing the treaty are not insurmountable. If the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could successfully negotiate and implement arms control treaties during the peak of the Cold War, the same can be achieved even today.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The parties involved in the Ukraine–Russia conflict should privilege nuclear risk avoidance measures rather than indulge in nuclear sabre-rattling.
On 21 September 2022, and to an extent, even on 22 September 2022, Indian and international media flashed the statement of President Vladimir Putin that Russia “…will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.”1 Some media reports also carried Putin’s remarks prefacing the above sentence “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people…”.
Both the sentences in combination convey a different meaning as against only the remarks threatening nuclear war. The remarks denoting the nuclear threat, seen in isolation, gives an impression of an aggressive nuclear Russia ready to use its nuclear weapon to accomplish its war aims. The remarks in combination though change the impression of Russia from being a blood-thirsty country to one that intends to defend its territorial integrity through nuclear weapons.
Admittedly, the threat to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has generated intense debates. Putin’s statements brought into focus Russian nuclear policy thinking. Putin stated
This does give the impression that Putin’s statement was in response to some perceived sabre-rattling by the other side, and Russia was responding to such belligerence.
Putin went on to flag
Russia has time and again, used nuclear rhetoric to promote its strategic objectives in the conflict. While Putin tried to paint Western countries as a villain by accusing them of threatening to use WMD and blamed them for shelling Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plants, it is difficult to find a single high representative of any NATO country who has publicly threatened to use WMD against Russia. Even so, selective quoting of Putin’s statements on nuclear issues gives the impression of a Russia that is nuclear sabre-rattling.
Information warfare or propaganda, no doubt, is used to mobilise public opinion for and against a country. From the very beginning of this conflict, media has been used as an instrument to wage misinformation warfare. Either select facts or interpretations of the facts are projected to create an illusionary representation. It is to be borne in mind that both Russia and its opponents are indulging in such acts. This kind of information warfare campaigns have become an accepted practice and essential component of hybrid warfare.
Quite significantly, in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, we find that not only the direct parties to the conflict are indulging in this game but also indirect or supporting actors. At times, it appears the agencies or forces involved in this game become autonomous and perhaps exceed their brief. As a result, they become a matter of concern for their own governments or parties. For example, The Washington Post published an investigative report,4 predominantly, shaped by Graphika and the Stanford Internet Observatory study, which underscored secret psychological operations conducted in the Ukraine–Russia conflict and other places.
The Washington Post report revealed the use of major social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter in the disinformation campaign. The United States Central Command is also accused of influencing foreign countries. Of other activities, the report supposedly found the involvement of the US military organisation in creating some ‘anti-Russian narratives’. It seems the US government took note of the operation and ordered auditing of such activities that amounted to ‘peddling falsehoods’.
Putin’s 21 September 2022 statement though does bring to attention four aspects of Russian nuclear policy, doctrine, or posture. These include an aggressive/offensive nuclear weapon policy; a defensive first use nuclear weapon policy; a retaliatory first use nuclear weapons policy; and a retaliatory second strike nuclear weapons policy. Putin’s statements indicate that the Russian President basically stated a retaliatory second-strike nuclear weapons policy.
Putin accused the other side of indulging in nuclear blackmail. Generally, Western media gives the impression that Putin is blackmailing the world with nuclear threats. Putin though squarely reproached the leadership of the NATO countries for initiating steps to use WMD.
Quite significantly, on the same day that Putin made his nuclear remarks, US President Joseph Biden Jr accused him of making ‘overt nuclear threats against Europe’.5 Later, he reiterated that ‘A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. Interestingly, Biden in his remarks only highlighted Putin’s threat to Europe, and not against the entire NATO, when Putin had threatened to retaliate against NATO WMD threat. It would seem Biden also interpreted or projected the fact to suit his narrative.
Furthermore and quite amusingly, in his 21 September 2022 statement, Putin did not overtly mention that Russia would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against NATO’s threat of using WMD. He basically boasted that Russia possesses better quality weapons than those of NATO. Putin asserted that Russia will ‘certainly make use of all weapon systems available’ and added that it was not a ‘bluff’. In his subsequent statement, Putin rhetorically stated that “Those who are using nuclear blackmail against us should know that the wind rose can turn around.”
In recent months, Russia has been censuring Ukraine and its supporters for bombing the Zaporizhzhya plants and damaging the support systems. Earlier, in February–March 2022, Russia was held responsible for weaponising the nuclear power plants when it was suspected of attacking Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plants. An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team led by Director-General visited Ukraine, and some of its members are still stationed in the country. For sure, it is difficult to admit that Ukraine will damage its own plants and put its citizens at risk. Similarly, it is hard to believe that Russia will damage the plant and harm its soldiers fighting the battle near the plants or those who are stationed in the complex after taking it over.
The conflict, it seems, has acquired its own momentum. Both sides, in order to outgun each other, possibly unintentionally, enter into the danger zone, or are crossing the red lines. Afterward, to escape from global criticisms, both indulge in a misinformation campaign. Both sides are aware of the nuclear taboo, and the sensitivity of the international community about the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which will have disastrous consequences for Ukraine, Russia, and entire Europe. Instead of managing their misdeeds through misinformation campaigns, the parties to the conflict should take serious risk avoidance measures.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The United Kingdom–Rwanda migration asylum plan is not a long-term solution to the issue of illegal migration into the UK and runs the risk of escalating human insecurity further.
The United Kingdom and Rwanda agreed to the Migration and Economic Development Partnership on 14 April 2022. The arrangement allows the UK to send an unspecified number of its asylum seekers to Rwanda. In return, the UK is providing £120 million for a development fund and to cover processing costs for resettled asylum seekers.1 The UK has also committed to host some vulnerable refugees from Rwanda. Since the announcement, the asylum arrangement has received criticism from several international and domestic actors.
Legal Challenges
The first flight to Rwanda on 14 June 2022 was cancelled after a last-minute intervention from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) citing its ‘Rule 39’ provisions. The ruling stated that an Iraqi man named ‘KN’ faced “risk of irreversible harm” if sent to Rwanda.2 UK-based human rights organisations, such as Detention Action and Care4Calais, have also actively and successfully petitioned in UK courts against the removal of several individuals citing threat to their well-being.
The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has claimed that this move interferes with the right to apply for asylum under the 1951 International Refugee Convention of which the UK is a signatory. It not only alters the asylum claim provisions but also threatens the international framework for refugee protection. Additionally, the deal deviates from the guiding objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees that the UK supported in 2018.3
UK’s Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, in tandem with Article 31 of the 1951 Convention, provides refugees with legal protection against penalties. However, this protection is void in case of refugees “not arriving directly” and stopping in other countries before reaching the UK.4 Such cases have been particularly chosen for relocation, wherein, dangerous journeys have been made through small boats and lorries. In order to ensure a more equitable distribution of refugees across the continent, the UNHCR has strongly reiterated that asylum-seekers are not required to seek refuge in the first country they enter and are eligible for protection under Article 31.5 Penalties can only be imposed in cases of lawful applications for settlement in other countries before entering the UK.
The arrangement is also incongruent with the international law of ‘non-refoulement’. Article 33 of the refugee convention provides protection from return to not just countries of origin but also includes in its purview third countries where the individual may feel threatened.6 The UK’s recently introduced Nationality and Borders Act 2022 has altered and diluted this criteria of a ‘safe third country’. In addition, the UNHCR guidelines require individuals to have ‘meaningful connections’ with the receiving state.7 Section 16 of the 2022 Act now allows the Secretary of State to remove asylum seekers even in absence of a connection to the third state.8 Such moves undermine and destabilise the international legal provisions dealing with human security. The controversy has also re-ignited the long-standing dissension between domestic laws and international obligations.
It is pertinent to note that the UK–Rwanda partnership is not a legally binding agreement in international law.9 Due to the nature of the agreement, it also lies outside the purview of parliamentary review. While the agreement allows the setting up of a monitoring committee, parties are not allowed to appeal any further in case of violation of obligations. The absence of proper redressal mechanisms endangers the security of relocated individuals. Even if the host country is unable to fulfil its commitments, there is no legal provision for the individuals to move back to the UK. The legal credibility of the Migration Asylum Plan is currently under Judicial Review, with a hearing scheduled for September.
Channel Crossings and Costs
The asylum deal is being championed on the claim that the arrangement dissuades irregular channel crossings and reduces financial burden on the state. The deal, however, has failed to deter Channel crossings. According to the UK’s Ministry of Defence data, in 2022, more than 27,000 people have already crossed the English Channel irregularly to arrive in the UK (see Figure below).10 The statistics are significantly higher than previous years. On 22 August alone, nearly 1,300 migrants crossed the channel, setting a new daily record.11 In addition, according to the Border Force Union, more than 60,000 people are expected to cross the Channel by the end of this year.12
Source: “What is the UK’s Plan to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda and How Many Could Go?”, BBC News, 8 September 2022.
Similarly, the cost saving claims require greater scrutiny. While full details of the financial arrangement have not been revealed, an initial investment of £120 million has been made to Kigali as part of a new ‘Economic Transformation and Integration Fund’. In addition, the UK has also agreed to fund the accommodation, processing and five-year integration costs of each re-located individual.13 Some estimates suggest that the government could spend nearly £20,000–£30,000 for every resettled individual.14 Home Office Minister Tom Pursglove said that “the cost would be similar to the amount of money we are spending on this currently”.15 He claimed that the deal will reduce costs in the long-term. Recently, Yolande Makolo, a spokesperson of the Rwandan government, said that in contrast to the committed 1,000 for the initial phase, the country can currently accommodate only 200 migrants due to inadequate housing facilities.16
The presence of contrary evidence weakens the government’s claims on the intended impact of the policy. As legal challenges cast a pall of doubt over the implementation and the long-term efficacy of the deal, an effective reduction in costs and crossings is not guaranteed. If the deal gets implemented, large-scale removals would be required to actually deter migrations and save costs. More importantly, a migration deterrence deal cannot be expected to work in cases where humans flee persecution and undertake involuntary dangerous journeys in an attempt to save their lives.
Financial support by the UK government might be a helpful way to solve the immediate issues confronting Rwanda. The deal is currently a five-year arrangement. As a result, its long-term ability to support the country and the immigrants remains highly doubtful. In addition, the absence of checks and balances creates a lack of incentive for the recipient state to fulfil its obligations. Whether the finances are being spent on the intended objectives, that is the welfare of relocated asylum seekers, cannot be ensured.
Rwanda’s Suitability as a Host Country
The practical assimilation of these refugees into Rwanda, amidst multiple human security threats, remains debatable. Rwanda already hosts nearly 1,50,000 refugees from several African countries and most unemployed refugees rely solely on state benefits of £35 per month.17 Of its estimated 13 million population, more than half of it survives on less than US$ 2 a day.18 COVID-19 and conflict-induced crises have also reduced the availability of resources to the local population, including access to proper food. Nearly 70 per cent of the population depends on sustainable farming for survival which is inextricably linked with high rural poverty.19 Additionally, Rwanda has a Human Development Index value of just 0.543, with a rank of 160 out of 189 countries.20 Additional refugees will inevitably put more pressure on an inadequate system.
The current agreement only excludes Rwandan nationals, unaccompanied children under 18 years and asylum seekers from EU countries.21 While the UK Home Office has emphasised on a case-by-case approach for removal, certain individuals under threat find no specific mention in the arrangement. These include members of the LGBTQI+ community. The Home Office itself, in its Country Policy and Information Notes (CPIN) report on Rwanda, has recognised instances of “discrimination and intolerance” against members of this community.22 Several human rights organisations have also accused the Rwandan government of unlawful arrests and killings. According to Human Rights Watch, in 2018, Rwandan authorities were alleged to have killed 12 Congolese refugees and arrested 60 over protests against food inadequacy.23 Such reports devalue Rwanda’s ability to follow provisions of the Refugee Convention. The arrangement also abdicates all forms of responsibility from the UK. In case of violation of human rights in Rwanda after relocation, the individuals will only have access to the Rwandan justice system for remedy.
To further assess the suitability and the efficacy of such deals, historical precedence needs to be taken into account. Since 2012, Australia has transferred more than 3,000 refugees to asylum camps in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. In addition to being exorbitant, the plan has failed to deter sea crossings. Australia’s offshore asylum processing systems have also faced allegations of medical neglect and inhumane conditions.24 Similarly, from 2013 to 2018, Israel attempted to formulate a similar secretive arrangement with Rwanda to transfer refugees. As several relocated individuals eventually moved out of Rwanda, the deal was halted after severe international criticism.25
Conclusion
Attention has to be drawn to the concerning precedent that this deal may set. The asylum arrangement runs the risk of triggering similar policy reactions from other European states. Reports suggest that Denmark and Austria are in discussions with Kigali to implement a similar strategy of relocating refugees.26 Additionally, it cannot be guaranteed that these relocated individuals will not attempt to return to their preferred EU country through North Africa and via Central and Western Mediterranean routes.27
Such decisions to outsource migrants falls short of offering long-term structural solutions that target the root cause of the issue. Inadequate systems of protection run the risk of escalating human insecurity further. In a broader inquiry, do such deals then signify a shift away from the global governance structures built for refugee protection, and are such bilateral engagements altering the course of the international refugee protection regime? Are such arrangements also marking a resurgence of the state-centric notion of security and subsequently a shift away from the non-traditional human security approach that the UN intended to advance? As the deal faces legal challenges, better-informed deductions on its success and failures can only be made in the long term.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has witnessed a 2000 per cent surge in heroin-related drug seizures between 2017 and 2022, with significant national security and societal consequences.
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has witnessed a 2000 per cent surge in heroin-related drug seizures between 2017 and 2022—from 3,000 to more than 10,000.1 Most recently, in August 2022, the Border Security Force (BSF) recovered eight packets of heroin worth Rs 8 crores in the Samba district after a wounded terrorist fled back to Pakistan.2 Hundreds of crores worth of illegal consignments have been seized by the J&K police this year alone, particularly in Shopian and Pulwama.
As per the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), there has been more than 75 per cent decrease in net infiltration from across the border between 2018 and 2021 and more than 80 per cent reduction in the number of terrorist incidents during the same period (See table below).3 Despite such efforts by the security forces in eliminating those infiltrating the Line of Control, the drug menace has not abated.
DESCRIPTION
2018
2019
2020
2021
ESTIMATED NET INFILITRATION
143
138
51
34
NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS
417
255
244
229
TERRORISTS KILLED
257
157
221
180
Source: “Development of Jammu & Kashmir”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 22 March 2022.
In April 2022, a charge sheet against nine individuals—three Pakistani handlers and their six operatives in Kashmir—was filed in a special National Investigation Agency (NIA) court in Baramulla. The case concerned seizure of vast sums of arms, narcotics, and ammunition in 2021.4 As per the court documents, those arrested were a part of a network that sourced drugs, arms, and ammunition from across the border.
In May 2022, three people, including a woman, were arrested in Kupwara in a joint operation by the 7 Rashtriya Rifles and the local police for possessing two Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and seven kilograms of narcotics, specifically heroin.5 These items were being transferred to other regions in the Kashmir valley for aiding and abetting terrorism.
In June 2022, J&K police busted a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) module, which was disseminating funds procured from the sale of drugs to their jihadist brethren.6 The authorities also repossessed arms, vehicles, and ammunition from the terrorists. Drones have also been used to deliver opium across the border into J&K.7
Further, inter-state drug and terror links, aided and abetted by Pakistan, have also come to light. J&K’s State Investigation Agency (SIA), in July 2022, filed a charge sheet against five individuals for terror financing following the seizure of Rs 43 lakhs from a taxi en route to Kashmir in November 2021.8 This operation was spearheaded by Muzammil Ahmad Malik, a Pulwama resident, whose responsibility extended to ensuring safe passage of his fellow terrorists and collecting the funds from criminals like Amarbir Singh, operating out of Punjab. Reportedly, Singh is closely affiliated with notorious arms and narcotics trafficker, Baljinder Singh alias Billa Mandiala, accused in over 23 FIRs about extortion and killings.
Earlier in December 2020, Delhi Police had arrested five individuals—three from Kashmir, belonging to the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and the remaining two from Punjab—on narco-terrorism charges.9 Reports noted that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was colluding with Khalistani terrorists and has established a ‘K-2 (Kashmir–Khalistan) desk’ to advance its proxy conflict.10 The elaborate nexus included the involvement of HM terrorists based in Pakistan and over ground workers (OGWs) in Kashmir. The former was tasked with handling the distribution of drugs for sale to their partners in the valley, who would cross state boundaries into Punjab for the illegal sale of drug consignment. The K-2’s sleeper cells engage in financial transactions through hawala channels and have significant youth membership.
Implications
India is the crossroads between the ‘Golden Triangle’ and the ‘Golden Crescent’, two of the most significant opium production and trade hubs connecting South Asia with South East Asia. The drug trade has blossomed, due to weak institutional apparatus in these neighbouring countries, aided and abetted by state-sponsored actors.
Pakistan’s efforts to undermine normalcy in J&K, particularly after the August 2019 constitutional reforms, is rooted in its decades-long proxy war against India. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif admitted to using narcotics to finance anti-India proscribed organisations, during an interview by The Washington Post in September 1994.11 Regardless of the frequent change of guards, little appears to have changed since then.
Narco-terrorism could be a key facilitator of Pakistan’s strategy to undermine efforts to establish peace in the valley. Terrorists are also reportedly using drug money to fund misinformation campaigns.12 LeT’s front organisations like The Resistance Front (TRF) have propped up in the Valley and targeted killings of migrant labourers and members of minority communities like Sikhs and Kashmiri Pandits, have also surged in recent times. Organisations like the TRF are at the forefront of misinformation campaigns to ‘secularise’ militancy in the valley.
Reports note that over 52,000 individuals have become dependent on narcotics, primarily heroin.13 Apart from national security implications, this indicates a health epidemic. The surge in the proportion of people indulging in drug abuse has inevitable ramifications for the state youth’s integration into the polity. The more people fall into this trap, the more they will be unable to assimilate into the workforce and contribute to the economy.
While security forces have effectively clamped down on terrorist activities in J&K, it is equally essential to strengthen soft-power capacities to curb and gradually eliminate growing substance abuse across the state. This is because the drug trade has direct links in the fight against terrorism. Rehabilitation programmes, for example, like those underway at the Drug De-Addiction and Treatment Centre at the Shri Maharaja Hari Singh Hospital in Srinagar, must be duplicated across the valley, especially so in rural areas. Avenues must be provided for addicted persons to seek counselling, and help in reintegration into mainstream society.
In March 2021, Rs 10 crores was allocated for drug rehabilitation measures as part of J&K’s annual budget.14 To counter the drug menace, the J&K government has also set up counselling centres across all districts, and seminars have been conducted to spread awareness about this challenge. Furthermore, rehabilitation facilities in 10 out of 14 districts have been established under the National Action Plan for Drug Demand Reduction.15
Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha, launching the Nasha Mukt Jammu and Kashmir campaign on 1 September 2022, lauded the ‘zero tolerance’ policy of the state police and anti-narcotics task force and pointed to the seizures of large number of drugs in recent months as indicative of the effectiveness of the policy.16 Continued strong vigil by the state and central security forces and agencies is essential to eliminate nexus between inter-state criminals and Pakistan-sponsored terror modules.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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