Challenge of Recidivism to Counter-Radicalisation Programmes
Saman Ayesha Kidwai
January 28, 2022
The false compliance present within the radicalised individuals and convicted terrorist offenders pose a considerable threat to the society, following their release from de-radicalisation-based institutions.
For over a decade, counter-radicalisation programmes have been trying to de-radicalise and rehabilitate violent extremists and terrorists. Various countries have developed different counter-radicalisation programmes with varied results.1 In Britain, such programmes have been able to counsel, reclaim and rehabilitate several violent extremists and terrorists. In specific instances, the proportion of rehabilitated individuals is much higher than cases of recidivism2 when violent extremists, released by de-radicalisation-based institutions, have reverted to their violent ways.
In recent times, recidivism has increased, as some of the released terrorists have carried out terrorist acts, including Ahmed Hassan (Parsons Green Bomber; 2017), Usman Khan (the London Bridge attacker; 2019), Kutjim Fejzulai (Central Vienna attacker; 2020), and Ali Harbi Ali (Murderer of Sir Amess; 2021).3 Usman Khan, for example, fatally stabbed two and wounded three people during the London Bridge Attack.4
Some international policy organisations such as the Counter Extremism Project, and think-tanks like the European Policy Centre, have expressed concern that certain individuals receiving therapy at counter-radicalisation centres may have learnt the art of deceiving the psychologists and in passing the tests conducted there to procure an early release from the prisons.5
This is concerning because, through disguised compliance6, the terrorists portray to the authorities that they have been redeemed by the de-radicalisation programmes and have sworn off from committing terrorist offenses in the future. Traditionally, compliance involves altering behaviour at the behest of someone’s direction or request. However, in this instance, the act of submission presented by convicted individuals is simply a deceptive strategy.
Furthermore, what is worrisome is that officials responsible for de-radicalisation programmes, such as Prevent (United Kingdom), have, in some instances, not been able to accurately assess those posing a grave danger to mainstream society. On the whole, the programmes are effective, but the possibility of some cases of recidivism would be there, because psychological and religious counselling can never be an exact science. However, Norwegian de-radicalisation programmes are a case in point because incidents of recidivism there amount to 20 per cent7, one of the lowest worldwide.
Counter-radicalisation experts such as Amanda Paul, have highlighted concerns about the competence of rehab professionals and their training. According to her, “the initial findings on disguised compliance determined that practitioners working on the frontline are poorly equipped and vulnerable to manipulation…the long-term political and human price of this is incalculable”.8 Such events have raised the question of whether or not de-radicalisation initiatives have any potential of success, and their scope in the states’ counter-terrorism strategies. However, this analysis does not argue for the scrapping of de-radicalisation programmes worldwide. These initiatives have proven instrumental in the success of Norway’s restorative-justice-based de-radicalisation programmes9, India’s counter-terrorism initiatives in Kerala and Maharashtra, and Singapore’s de-radicalisation programme, which have been hailed for their efficient outcomes.10 Notably, this is a more desirable alternative than simply incarcerating radicalised individuals who could reform themselves by engaging with de-radicalisation experts.
Moreover, while psychology is relied on to counter radical threats, it is understandably not a foolproof measure, more so because it is a recent phenomenon, requiring at least a few decades to mature and counter threats that have taken considerably longer to evolve and achieve their goals. Yet, if this is deemed insufficient by analysts, they ought to offer alternative solutions to counter challenges emanating from recidivism, beyond the traditional concept of prison sentences.
Radicalisation: Learning From Experiences
Prevent is a vital element of the British government’s counter-terrorism strategy to draw suspected individuals away from violent extremism. It was introduced by the Tony Blair administration in 2003. A strategy subject to severe criticism, it has come under deep scrutiny in the backdrop of the former Tory MP Sir David Amess’s murder in October 2021.11 The perpetrator had been referred to this programme seven years ago, but nothing materialised since it functions voluntarily, and the officials had not deemed him to be a threat serious enough to be referred to MI5, which deals with issues concerning domestic security and counter-intelligence.
This ties together the two complex narratives re-enforcing each other in the terrorism and counter-terrorism domains. The duplicity and false compliance present within the radicalised individuals and convicted terrorist offenders pose a considerable threat to the society following their release. The report released by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King’s College, London attests to the veracity of such claims. Moreover, it claims that prisoners often use their time during imprisonment to reaffirm the commitment towards their cause, whatever it may be.12
Presumably, the violent extremists sentenced to prison or those recommended for de-radicalisation programmes could use this opportunity to undermine the security and law-enforcement apparatus from within while fomenting a similar ideological outlook among like-minded individuals or impressionable recruits during13 or after their farce rehabilitation.
Re-examining Counter-Recidivism Agenda: Pitfalls and Prospects
The professional counsellors reportedly perceive disguised compliance as an indication of severance of ties with violent extremist ideologies. However, this misplaced optimism can have cataclysmic repercussions for the overall community. The officials heading the de-radicalisation programmes outside prisons ought to approach the referred cases with similar caution. Although the lattermost has not committed terrorist acts, their ideological orientation could propel them towards inflicting violence in the foreseeable future.
In both circumstances, terrorists and radicalised individuals could set in motion a chain of events wherein they could create an asymmetrical power dynamic vis-à-vis the state authorities. Through subterfuge, they could hoodwink the law-enforcement officials and mental health professionals, convincing the latter of innocence and commitment towards assimilation with the mainstream society, and adherence to the rule of law. This places the authorities in a significantly vulnerable position as they attempt to decipher and eliminate potential security threats within and outside prison environments.
Admittedly, Islamist jihadists have carried out most of the recognisable terrorist activities in the modern world, and therefore, those adhering to radical interpretations of Islam should remain on the authorities’ radar. On the other hand, it is also relevant to consider factors such as criminals’ past and mental health crises to ascertain who could pose a greater security threat vis-à-vis others. This is crucial because these factors are often the underlying drivers of potential terrorist attacks, while the ideological orientation (Islamist jihadist or white supremacy) serves as the “rationalisation”14 for such acts. Before making a recommendation for an early release, the rehab professionals ought to account for these factors.
The threat of reversion to terrorist activities by convicted offenders has remained around 5–8 per cent15, according to a report released by the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in January 2021. However, the law enforcement and security agencies, and elected representatives ought to issue guidelines (in consultation with counter-terrorism experts and mental health professionals) to reassess the parameters governing existing early release programmes. The RAN is a European network of frontline workers—teachers, healthcare professionals and social workers—working with radicalised and potentially at-risk individuals. Since the same report also mentions that a high risk of re-occurrence of a terrorist act exists within the first few months of the prisoner’s release, it would therefore be advisable for the authorities to take caution while recommending early release, and do so in conjunction with stringent probation and regular monitoring—psychological and surveillance-based—to minimise the risk of recidivism.
While there appears to be a dearth of information about the occurrence of similar events in India, those overseeing the de-radicalisation programmes, ought to overhaul their approach to prevent a similar chain of events within the country. It would be a cataclysmic failure for the security apparatus if the shifting geopolitical reality in South Asia (primarily Afghanistan) was to provide an ideological boost to those undergoing rehabilitation and in the process of being re-assimilated into the mainstream society, thereby causing their relapse. Moreover, India has borne the brunt of exported and home-grown threats such as Islamist jihad, left-wing extremism and separatist insurgencies over the years. Thus, it must learn from the European example.
On the other hand, de-radicalisation programmes ought not to be dismissed just yet. The opportunity to turn the tide around and prevent further radicalisation by improving existing initiatives is an important point for consideration.
The violent acts or lapses in de-radicalisation programmes ought to be understood by policy and security officials as learning experiences, significantly beneficial in preventing recidivism in the future. The authorities ought to also avoid treating a sociological problem such as this purely from a security or policy-based perspective.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the MP-IDSA or of the Government of India.
While India is establishing a strong aviation ecosystem by bringing together all stakeholders including the government, DPSUs, tri-services, academia and industry partners, it is believed that private Indian industries will be the crusaders for the government in defence production, particularly in the UAV vertical.
The Government of India is promoting "Make in India" for self-reliance in the defence sector, which is evident in the several initiatives it has taken that favour potential Indian vendors in terms of indigenisation and technology development. The intention is to encourage Indian firms to design, develop and manufacture defence equipment at the system, subsystem and component levels, with indigenisation and self-reliance as primary focal areas.
In the early 1960s, DRDO and several Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) like Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Limited (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL), Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL), Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), BEML Ltd, Mishra Dhatu Nigam (MIDHANI) and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) including Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) initiated defence production and over a period of time provided tremendous support to our Armed Forces. However, there has always been a gap between the demand and supply of equipment to the defence forces and therefore, till date the tri-services resort to importing critical equipment to meet their operational requirements. Noticeably, policies like ‘Make in India’ and ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’ are aimed at minimising imports by creating a robust ecosystem for nurturing private industries and optimisation of DPSUs and Ordnance Board. At the same time, foreign companies are encouraged to set up design, development and manufacture of military equipment in India so as to boost Indian economy and for creating job opportunities in India.
Defence Procurement Manual, Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 and Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy 2020 encourage innovation and indigenisation in private industries, and are aimed at creating a dynamic, robust and competitive industry base so as to reduce dependence on imports and for promoting exports. The financial assistance to academia for research and development and the recent declaration of celebrating 16 January1 as the ‘Start-Ups Day’ henceforth, shows the government’s seriousness towards rewarding innovation and indigenisation in start-ups. Further, Strategic Partnership Model has been proposed for Indian industries to collaborate withforeign OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) and to seek Transfer of Technology to build the capability to develop and manufacture equipment in India. Additionally, there are other initiatives like setting up Defence Corridors across states, conduct of defence exhibitions, seminars by autonomous bodies like Confederation of Indian Industry, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, etc., and tri-services interactive forums with industries. Programmes like Innovation Defence Excellence (iDEX), Technology Development Fund (TDF), Defence India Start-Up Challenges (DISC) and In-services Innovation Contests with financial back-ups also look promising.
Despite the fact that the defence sector offers an ocean of opportunities for industries and favourable policies are being framed by the Government of India, ongoing global technological advancements in the areas like Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Big Data analysis and mining, solar energy, advanced battery developments, Nano Technology, robotics, formulation of next-generation aviation traffic management systems, etc., could pose aviation challenges in the future.
Considering the government's push for indigenisation in a period of technological disruptions in the defence arena, a need has been felt for conducting research in one of the key specialty defence areas, namely Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The aim of the research is to understand the impact of government initiatives on Indian industries concerning UAS under these dynamic conditions. Further, the research also aims to understand India’s Strategic Military balance in UAS sector compared to its potential neighbours China and Pakistan thereby seeing future roadmap of UAS in India.
Unmanned Aerial Machines are commonly denoted as Unmanned Aircraft/Aerial System (UAS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV), Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV), Loitering Munitions (LM) and Drones. The term UAS has been widely used since the system comprises UAV, Ground systems, Mission Control Stations and other supporting equipment. Irrespective of whether it is for civil or military use, the term UAV or Drones (a component of UAS and being airborne platform) is used by many authors as generic to represent UAS.
Analysts point out that India is at least a decade behind Pakistan and even further behind China in the UAV sector.2 The “iron brothers” Pakistan and China have been closely collaborating in the development of and acquisition of various military platforms and weapons, including combat drones.3 China had relied on UAVs and built a robust aviation programme right from the 1950s. Government support, reliable infrastructure, quality education, research and development have collectively helped China in this domain. Collaboration and joint ventures with other countries and clandestine operations also aided China in its objectives. Pakistan on the other side owes the development of its programme to the PSUs and support extended by China. The private sector also has a significant role to play. PSUs and more private industries focus on medium and small UAVs due to economic affordability, export value and low cost.
Considering the steady growth in the UAV sector across our neighbours, the government’s roadmap for robust aviation corridor and industries’ perspective on defence initiatives, a survey was carried out for Qualitative Analysis keeping into consideration the policies, industry capabilities and threat perception by our neighbours. The survey brought out insights that there is a possibility of immense growth for both civil and military UAVs/drones in future. The industries are inclined towards developing medium, small and mini UAVs including Swarm Drones.4 Economic feasibility, demand across commercial sectors, mass production, qualified manpower in-house with technology help from overseas suppliers, and increased global competitiveness could all be factors for venturing into the small UAVs sector.
Large UAVs, on the other hand, are not given priority for a variety of reasons, including high investment costs, customised specific purpose needs, research and development, the likelihood of a minimum order number, advanced technology, and the lack of a guarantee for fixed orders. Even industry believes that the policies are beneficial to a considerable extent, but that they need to be revised in a few areas. DRDO and DPSUs’ dependency for testing and lab facilities was also inferred. The industry has apprehension about involving academia and this is an important area to ponder upon.5
While India is establishing a strong aviation ecosystem by bringing together all stakeholders, including the government, promotional bodies, DPSUs, tri-services, academia and industry partners, experts believe that in the next 10 to 15 years, private Indian industries will be the crusaders for the government in defence production, particularly in the UAV vertical. Correlation between industries and the economy will also be crucial in the future. The concerns and suggestions shared by the industries must be taken into account and researched in order to provide value to the expanding ecosystem. The insights derived from the research would bring out the industries’ perspective and may add value to government policies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the MP-IDSA or of the Government of India.
While India may not be a major actor in Central Asia yet it remains an important vector in the regional calculus of the Central Asian Republics. India’s multi-alignment should hold it in good stead in navigating the opportunities and challenges in a region which lies at a proverbial stone’s throw from New Delhi.
India’s engagement with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), a region which India considers part of its “extended neighbourhood”, is likely to receive a renewed momentum when the first India–Central Asia Heads of Government meeting takes place on 27 January 2022.1 While the event will ostensibly celebrate 30 years of diplomatic relations between India and CARs, the scope and importance of the summit extend beyond mere diplomatic symbolism. This is particularly relevant at a time when India has sought to reconnect with the ‘Heart of Asia’ amidst tumultuous geo-political churnings in the region.
Geopolitical Tussle in Eurasian Heartland
The salience of Central Asia lies in its geostrategic location comprising the Eurasian Heartland. Straddling a space the size of a continent, it connects Asia with Europe. And along with its vast reserves of natural resources, it blends in with the central position accorded to it by Halford Mackinder in his Heartland thesis.2 Crucially, it provides a ringside view of developments taking place in the countries that it flanks, namely, Russia, China, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.
Today, a new geopolitical contestation appears to be underway in Eurasia. This is reflected in shifting great power rivalries and new strategic equations and alignments. A key driving force behind this transition is the Russia–West confrontation, with the latter seemingly seeking to contain the Kremlin in its immediate neighbourhood. This has led Moscow to reinvent itself in the region. Its “Greater Eurasia” project inherently seeks to preserve its “sphere of influence”.3 However, Russia has been forced to accommodate China in its “near abroad” as a quid pro quo for relying on Beijing to withstand the Western geopolitical pressure. Pertinently, this Russian concession could facilitate China’s rise as a Eurasian powerhouse, potentially altering the regional balance of power. Interestingly, Russia’s latent competition with China runs parallel to their bilateral cooperation against a common adversary. The two countries have closed ranks to insulate the region from the United States (US), given their shared mistrust of Western manoeuvrings in the region.4
In the midst of this Great Power contestation, other regional and extra-regional powers5 including Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and the European Union too have courted the CARs.
Meanwhile, CARs geographical proximity to Afghanistan places them in the frontline of developments taking place on the Afghan chessboard. Crucially, given the linkages between drug trafficking, terrorism and organised crime6, instability emanating from Kabul could create an arc of instability across the entire Eurasian region.
New pressure points also appear to have emerged in the CARs. Prolonged economic slowdown, lack of political freedom, ethnic tensions and rise of radicalisation7 have bred conditions similar to the Arab Spring. If the recent uprising in Kazakhstan is an indication, the region could face more upheavals in the future. Amidst these churnings, Central Asian countries appear to be readjusting their policies. They seem to be looking to strike a balance in maximising their political and economic gains from each actor while preserving their strategic autonomy. A key vector of this strategy has been their focus on both intra-Central Asian as well as broader Eurasian collaborations.
India’s Congruence with CARs
Amidst the ongoing flux in Eurasia, overlapping interests in the economic, energy, health, connectivity, security and defence realms appear to drive India’s engagement with the CARs. In fact, the 4Cs–commerce, capacity enhancement, connectivity and contact–aptly highlight India’s endeavour to establish mutually beneficial long-term economic partnerships.8
Arguably, India fits in well with the CARs quest for strategic autonomy. India’s benign and friendly image anchored in civilisational linkages with the region, its achievements in nation building, and positive economic outlook in an era of slowing global growth are viewed favourably by the Central Asian regimes. Similarly, India’s calibration of a regional cooperative approach, rooted in the resolve to jointly address festering issues, carries a strong resonance among CARs. The Central Asian countries had connected with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2018 articulation of the foundational dimension of Eurasia being ‘SECURE’, wherein S stood for Security of citizens, E for Economic development for all, C for Connecting the region, U for Uniting our people, R for Respect for Sovereignty and Integrity, and E for Environment protection.9
In this context, the regional connectivity initiatives that India has sought to promote through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Ashgabat Agreement potentially provide the landlocked Eurasian countries an option beyond the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). CARs inherently remain suspicious of China’s “infrastructure imperialism” that has cast a shadow on their local economies. In contrast, India has insisted that connectivity projects imbibe inclusivity, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and fiscal prudence.10 These projects could help unlock the India–Central Asia trade potential which is constrained by the lack of direct physical access. Notably, Central Asian trade accounts for less than 1 per cent of India’s overall global trade.11
India also has a good track record of developmental partnerships in the region. And the new US$ 1 billion line of credit should augment this image.12 There exist comparative economic advantages that can be leveraged. Central Asia is a big consumer market, with substantial demand for a range of goods and services, in which India has niche capabilities. These include information technology (IT), capacity building, pharma, agriculture, food processing, health, tourism, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), disaster management, heritage conservation and technical education.
Meanwhile, Central Asia retains its potential to be an important resource base for diversifying India’s energy imports. Indo-Central Asian discussions have, unsurprisingly, centred on the acquisition of energy stakes, joint ventures and swap agreements to overcome the problem of routing hydrocarbons. Today, the region’s rich pool of resources could also play a role in the global efforts to build resilient supply chains in a post-pandemic world.
Crucially, India and CARs have a shared interest in regional stability. The security threat emanating from Afghanistan as well as the challenges posed by an uptick in radicalisation and terrorism affect both sides. Their defence and security collaboration, therefore, assumes significance. As a survivor of terrorism, India has developed specific combat skills that can be tapped by CARs. These include counterterror operations, intelligence gathering, training and border protection. In fact, intelligence gathering mechanisms depend, to a large extent, on satellite and information technology tools. India has strong expertise in both these areas.
CARs also remain key pillars of India’s engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This pan-Eurasian organisation has gained traction in the last few years. This includes exploring a regional consensus on issues of security, economic cooperation and connectivity.13 Meanwhile, the support of CARs in this multilateral grouping could be pivotal to tackle the anti-India advocacy promoted by China–Pakistan tandem in Eurasia.
Trilateral cooperation with Russia for the region holds promise.14 Notably, as recent events in Kazakhstan and Afghanistan indicate, Russia retains its key linkages with the region. India and Russia also have a shared concern about China’s rise. Similarly, trilateral cooperation with countries like South Korea and Japan, which enjoy significant goodwill in CARs and have a robust track record of providing regional public goods, could be explored to meet the region’s infrastructure requirements.
Conclusion
The India–Central Asia Summit, being held on 27 January, is a timely event. It is an acknowledgement of India’s continental interests. While India may not be a major actor in Central Asia yet it remains an important vector in the regional calculus of CARs. India’s multi-alignment should hold it in good stead in navigating the opportunities and challenges in a region which lies at a proverbial stone’s throw from New Delhi. Sustaining the ongoing momentum and not reverting to the episodic engagement of the past would be crucial. An Act North Eurasian Policy is perhaps more relevant than ever before.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the MP-IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. H.J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1904, pp. 421–437. According to Mackinder, the most vital sphere of global influence (which Mackinder referred to as the ‘Heartland’ or the ‘pivot region’) lay in Eurasia. The size of the region and the scale of its resources made it the core vector of global geopolitics.
With a display of 1,000 indigenously produced swarm drones during the Beating Retreat, India would become the fourth nation to achieve such a feat, making it a front row actor with a strong foothold in the field of drone technology.
India has announced that a novel “Drone Show” comprising 1,000 swarm drones will light up the sky for about 10 minutes during the Beating Retreat Ceremony on 29 January 2022. It has been designed, conceptualised and produced indigenously under the “Make in India” initiative by Botlab Dynamics, and has been sponsored by the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi and the Department of Science & Technology (DST), Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY).1 With a display of 1,000 indigenously produced swarm drones, India would become the fourth nation to achieve such a feat, making it a front row actor with a strong foothold in the field of drone technology.
The US, Russia and China have carried out such swarm drone displays in the past. In 2020, China tested its swarm drone technology and demonstrated rapid deployment with intensive launching, hovering, precise formation, inspection and precision strike.2 In May 2021, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) showcased various drones like WZ-7 and WZ-8 (Chinese version of US R.Q. 4 “Global Hawk”) at the International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, also known as the Airshow China, signalling the increased importance of drones in its military strategy. According to the Chinese media reports and experts, these surveillance drones are likely to be used over parts of South and East China seas and on the borders with India and Afghanistan.3 At another PLA drill in May 2021, China showcased drone swarms and robots leading to speculations about their possible use during conflicts in the Taiwan Strait.4 The US also, in the past, has conducted various demonstrations of their drone technologies. The US Navy displayed its offensive swarm operations with its LOCUST (Low-Cost Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarming Technology) Drone Swarm that has the capabilities of firing small UAVs from the tube-based launcher.5 In June 2019, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) demonstrated a swarm of autonomous drones to analyse, surround and secure a mock city building. The demonstration was part of DARPA’s Offensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET) programme, which has about 250 drones to accompany smaller infantry units to carry missions in dense urban environments.6
On 15 January 2021, the Indian Army had demonstrated its drone power with a display of Kamikaze mock attacks and first-aid delivery during the Army Day Parade. The 75 indigenously developed drones had displayed the swarming capabilities through an array of Artificial Intelligence enabled offensive missions.7 This display contributed 13 targets at hostile armour mortar positions with troop concentrations, terror hideouts, radar sites and helipads that were brought down. The drones were synchronised with satellite feeds and area correlation technologies.8 The remarkable thing about these swarm drones was that they were a heterogeneous swarm equipped with a quadcopter, a six-rotor mothership drone and small quadcopters with explosives.9
Unlike the US’ homogenous swarms like Perdix Swarm and DARPA’s Gremlins Swarm, India’s drone swarm seems to be an efficient solution that gives a viable option to the military to construct its variable strategic defence mechanisms as per its requirements. India is also developing drone swarms that can be deployed from fast jets. The drones called Air Launched Flexible Asset–Swarm (ALFA–S), developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Newspace Research & Technologies (NRT) Private Limited, are fully networked through electronic data links and are capable of detecting surface to air missile units, enemy radars and aircraft on the ground.10 This project was pushed considering China’s deployment of surface to air missiles at the Ladakh border.11
Another demonstration of a fully operational decentralised swarm of 25 drones was carried out by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at a three-day defence function in Jhansi in November 2021 to mark the 75th year of Indian Independence. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh highlighted the government’s focus on achieving self-reliant, indigenous solutions in the defence sector. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, on 19 November 2021, handed over the indigenously developed military hardware, including the light combat helicopter, drones and electronic warfare systems to the armed forces.12
Though India is a relatively new entrant into this field, compared to Western powers, it appears set to make rapid progress in developing indigenous drone capabilities. However, the first procurement of drones by the Indian Army dates to the 1990s when it acquired UAVs from Israel. It was first used during the Kargil War in 1999 for photo-reconnaissance.13 The DRDO has also been actively working in the development of drones, and the first fully functional unmanned drone system, Rustom-1, took flight in 2009. Recently, India has further extended its drone capabilities in collaboration with the US via the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), and in 2021, it signed a $3 billion deal for procurement of 30 Predator/ MQ 9 drones that have the ability to carry out long-range precision airstrikes.14
In addition, India has signed a pact of 100 explosive-laden drones with Israel’s Elbit Security Systems and Bengaluru-based Alpha Design-led joint venture. These Sky Striker Drones are loitering munition with long-range capabilities of 100 km range loaded with 5 kg warhead. They are GPS enabled and capable of carrying out covert operations at low altitudes. The Indian armed forces have procured these drones to permanently enhance their operational capabilities, making it a force multiplier in futuristic warfare.15
Indian start-ups are expected to play a significant role towards developing indigenous solutions for drone swarms. Many Indian start-ups like Botlab Dynamics and Alpha Design are developing smart indigenous solutions driven by the latest technologies like AI and edge computing. In the commercial sector, India has already come up with a drone policy. The Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) published the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Rules (UAS) in 2021 and updated rules were published on 13 January 2022. Union Civil Aviation Minister Jyotiraditya Scindia stated that by 2030, India has the potential to be a global drone hub through its policy structure, funding incentive and demand structure.16 The drone policy rules do not apply to the armed forces at this point. However, there have been discussions in the military circles about the need for policy implementations to regulate drone use in the defence sector. In consideration of these advancements, the DRDO, the Indian defence industry, and the Indian government need to constructively strengthen the Indian start-up ecosystem in the drone sector by establishing policy implementations, creating funding initiatives, and building a demand structure.
Globally, the demonstration of military capabilities through ceremonial parades and drills signifies the strategic positioning of countries and their military strength and readiness. In the past, India has avoided displaying its nuclear strength due to geopolitical reasons. However, with the changing dynamics of the battlefield and the nature of warfare, India has realised the imperative of strategic positioning in the global military space and therefore the need to demonstrate power. It also indicates the country’s readiness to use these technology-driven warfare mechanisms when required.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
France’s EU Council Presidency and the Rocky Road Ahead
Anandita Bhada
January 25, 2022
The French Presidency has come at a time when the EU needs a liberal and strong nation at the helm of affairs, which can fine-tune relations with other European countries and stand strong for its principles and values. France fits the deal.
France assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) on 1 January 2022 after 14 years. The Council is the legislative arm of the EU which is entrusted with the role to approve, reject or amend its policy matters. It comprises the executives of the 27 member nations of the EU, headed by the president. Each meeting deals with a specific policy matter and is attended only by those ministers in charge of that policy matter in their respective nations.
Europe’s executives have a range of issues to deal with, starting from climate change, energy crisis, the pandemic and European security issues concerning Ukraine, Poland and Baltics. This is the rationale behind the presidency’s agenda, which has been rightfully flagged by Macron at different intervals. Making EU more sovereign, developing a European model of growth, furthering the green agenda, promoting EU as a stabilising power in the Indo-Pacific, deepening ties with the African Union and reorganising the Schengen area are a few targets that Paris wishes to achieve during the presidential tenure.
Priority Areas
The motto of the Presidency is “Recovery, Power and a Sense of Belonging”.1 The challenges faced by Europe are not new but France’s perch at the helm of the Council have raised Europe’s expectations that several of its woes are going to be heard and addressed. Macron has laid out a deeply ambitious agenda, focusing on the pillars of European sovereignty and strategic autonomy.2 To strengthen sovereignty, the EU Strategic Compass would be adopted by March 2022. It offers policy considerations to strengthen defence and security measures of the EU in the areas of capability development, resilience and crisis management.
On the economic front, Paris has envisioned a European model for growth3 which should align economic development with the climate goals in order to be sustainable. It wants to enforce the European Green Deal, as announced by the President last December. Macron aims to achieve a 55 per cent reduction in emissions by 2030 and initiate regulations supporting deforestation-free products. One of the possible solutions is to impose a carbon tax on imported products and switch to cleaner energy sources within the EU.
On the international stage, Macron has laid bare the need for the EU to stop seeing Africa and Mediterranean as a threat and start recognising their strategic advantages.4 Conferences scheduled on Western Balkans, EU–African Union summit and a ministerial forum on the Indo-Pacific reflect the importance Paris attaches to it.
These priorities are inspired by the endeavours of preceding Slovenian Presidency and co-developed with the efforts of future presidencies of the Czech Republic and Sweden.5
Potential Challenges
The French Presidency comes against the backdrop of an ongoing energy crisis knocking on the EU doors since last October. Europe imports 55.6 per cent6 of its total energy from Russia and it cannot afford to upset the latter beyond a certain point. It will have to link self-reliance and ecological sustainability with economic development to beat this crisis.7 Russia has denied any accusations of limiting gas supply to Europe. In fact, it wanted to increase the supply through the inauguration of Nord Stream 2 (NS 2), which is a contentious issue within the EU.
Proponents of NS 2 feel that it will bring down the fuel prices across Europe and provide impetus to the energy-consuming industries. On the other hand, the opponents consider it as a short-term expensive solution, which will increase the European dependence on Russia. France has always supported the use of nuclear energy as an alternative fuel. In fact, 70 per cent of its power industry runs on nuclear energy.8 Its efforts to include the same as a part of the EU taxonomy (EU’s green energy list) might finally bear fruit.
France will have to resolve this crisis amidst Russia–Ukraine border tensions; Russia has amassed more than 1,06,000 troops at the Ukrainian border.9 The EU has come out in support of Ukraine, threatening to impose harsh sanctions on Russia if it does not deter. NATO has reacted to this security situation at European borders by alerting its troops for a possible attack. The movement among NATO troops is making Russia suspicious of the former's eastward expansion, threatening Russian borders and national security. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has demanded “iron-clad, waterproof, bulletproof, legally binding guarantees”10 against any such expansion of either NATO or the EU. NATO has always followed the open door policy and its leaders have refused to make any amendments to that. Holding constructive talks to resolve this will be a challenge for France since the primary demands from either side is a non-starter for the other.
European countries are also blaming Russia for supporting Belarus to ignite the migratory crisis at the Polish borders. Thousands of migrants are being pushed by the Lukashenko regime to enter the EU via Poland. The EU’s claim is that Russia is trying to win concessions for its stand against NATO by building pressure through covert channels like this. Paris will play a significant role at the future NATO–Russia talks to discuss European and Russian security matters. It will have to doubly assure that no European nation feels sidelined or overpowered by the collective NATO decision. To maintain the cohesive structure of the EU, it is very important that decision making is not exclusive.
The raging pandemic is another concern for the French Presidency amidst such turbulent times. The severity of it would consume time and shift the focus from already set targets to issuing guidelines and regulations to curb the spread of the virus. The number of positive cases has only increased since last month, with France topping the list in Europe.
Another time-taking event during the presidential tenure will be the national elections in France, scheduled for April 2022. As the election nears, we will see a shift in focus from the Council Presidency to the domestic campaign. The Electoral Neutrality clause will keep the electoral candidates from making any public appearances (online and offline) a few weeks before the elections. This will leave Paris with only about four months to achieve the set targets. If Macron falls short, it will prove to be an easy advantage for candidates like Marine Le Pen. But, if he uses the presidency to showcase a perfect blend of French and EU’s interests, with Paris at its helm, that will better suit EU needs.
Favourable Aspects to the Presidential Tenure
France has always had a steady interest in promoting stability and a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific, the prime example being the Global Gateway initiative of the EU, which will boost smart and clean links in digital, health, transport and energy systems across the world. Owing to its friendly relations with France and a long coastline in the Indo-Pacific, India is a natural partner for France in this region of the world. Post the AUKUS alliance, it has been making efforts to align with regional powers and groupings like India and the ASEAN to play a significant role in the Pacific waters. Its overseas territories provide the advantage of having 93 per cent of its exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in and around the Indo-Pacific11, making it a geographic reality for France. Its efforts to give the Indo-Pacific region its due significance in the EU maritime and foreign policies started way before the presidency targets were set.
France has also been making in-house efforts by bringing the European power triangle to the forefront. France signed the Franco-Italian treaty last November12 covering cooperation from defence integration to migration. Improving relations between France, Germany and Italy, inked in various pacts and treaties, will further smoothen the presidential tenure for Paris. The newly elected Scholz government has also been supportive of the French efforts in resolving issues across the bloc. Its biggest example being the statement of German Europe Minister Anna Lührmann regarding “agree to disagree on the issue”13 of nuclear energy. This indicates the German will to work together on matters of the EU.
Conclusion
France’s efforts in making the EU take an interest in the Indo-Pacific as the centre stage of geopolitics and geo-economics along with leading the fight to get nuclear counted as a green source of energy are some of the broad areas that might see a push during the presidential tenure. With Olaf Scholz taking charge in Germany, we could see a fresh cooperation emerging not just between the Franco-German leaders but also with Italy’s Mario Draghi. The Presidency has come at a time when the EU needs a liberal and strong nation at the helm of affairs, which can fine-tune relations with other European countries and stand strong for its principles and values. France fits the deal.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
5. The presidency for EU works in a trio of three countries, which agree to broad targets outlined for 18 months. Each presidency also has sub-targets to achieve during its charge of six months, which are supposed to be in congruence with the broad framework. France will lead this trio, followed by the Czech Republic and Sweden.
Given Myanmar’s geostrategic significance and the continuing insurgency threat, disturbances in Myanmar pose a direct and serious policy challenge to India. A calculated realistic approach weighing the evolving ground situation alone will deliver the objectives of India’s foreign policy.
Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla paid a working visit to Myanmar on 22–23 December 2021. His visit came at a time when the decade-long democratisation process in Myanmar stood derailed. Almost a year ago, the military, headed by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, staged a coup overthrowing the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February 2021—the very day the new Parliament was to meet. The Myanmar military now rules through a newly formed body—the State Administrative Council (SAC)—after annulling the November 2020 election results, as per which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won 396 of the 476 (contested) parliamentary seats while the army’s party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), managed to secure only 33 seats. The military refused to accept the results. Even though a large number of ethnic minority voters were excluded, independent election observers did not find any systemic irregularities.1
The National Unity Government (NUG) was set up as a government-in-exile and a Federal Democracy Charter was drafted keeping the ethnic minorities into consideration; it has also attempted to organise a People’s Defence Force with the support of some ethnic armed organisations.2 The Civil Disobedience Movement that followed the coup was brutally suppressed by the military, with reportedly over 1,480 people killed and about 11,583 arrested, as of 14 January 2022, according to a local human rights group called the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.3
The coup and the COVID-19 pandemic have had a negative impact on Myanmar’s economy, which was on the path of reform since 2011. As per the estimates of The Economist Intelligence Unit, Myanmar will be among the worst economic performers in Southeast Asia in 2021–22, despite being one of the top performers before the coup.4
While the West (United States, United Kingdom and the European Union) has resorted to targeted sanctions against Myanmar’s military officials, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) approach has been somewhat ambivalent because of the lack of unity among its members. ASEAN works on the basis of the consensus principle and in that sense each member holds a sort of veto over any decision that has to be taken by the organisation. It may be recalled that the first time that ASEAN ended a meeting without issuing a joint statement was in July 2012 when Cambodia as ASEAN chair refused to allow any mention of the South China dispute under Chinese pressure.
It is to be noted that only eight countries were represented at Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day Parade held on 27 March 2021. These included the Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Defence Attaches of India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. India’s representation underlined the significance India attached to its relations with the Myanmar Government.
Indian Stakes in Myanmar
Given Myanmar’s geostrategic significance and the continuing insurgency threat, disturbances in Myanmar pose a direct and serious policy challenge to New Delhi. As such it constitutes a crucial element in the success of India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’, ‘Act East’ and ‘Indo-Pacific’ policies. It may be recalled that the joint visit of Foreign Secretary Shringla and Army Chief General Naravane in October 2020 was undertaken in the backdrop of the developments in Rakhine and to provide succour in the form of vaccine and other aid to help Myanmar tide over the pandemic.5
Interestingly, Foreign Secretary Shringla’s December 2021 visit coincided with Senior General Hlaing’s announcement of plans to hold a fresh general election in the country in August 2023, after lifting the state of emergency.6 According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Secretary Shringla’s visit was intended to convey to the military rulers the urgency to restore democracy in Myanmar at the earliest. He met not only the military rulers but also the representatives of the NLD, civil society representatives and foreign diplomats. He also reiterated New Delhi’s support for the ASEAN centrality and the Five-Point Consensus 7 that had been announced at the Jakarta Summit on 24 April 2021 (attended also by Senior General Hlaing).
During his visit, Foreign Secretary Shringla handed over one million doses of “Made in India” COVID vaccines and announced a grant of 10,000 tonnes of rice and wheat to Myanmar. He expressed India’s continued support to development projects along the India–Myanmar border, and commitment to expedite ongoing connectivity projects such as the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the Trilateral Highway. The two countries also “reiterated their commitment to ensure that their respective territories would not be allowed to be used for any activities inimical to the other”.8
There are serious security and related factors that need to be kept into consideration when it comes to India–Myanmar relations. The killing of the Commanding Officer of Assam Rifles, Col Viplav Tripathi together with his wife and child and four other security personnel in an ambush in Manipur in November 2021, signalled the revival of insurgent activity on India–Myanmar border in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF) were reactivated.9
The Arakan Army (AA) on the Myanmar side of the border continues to be a source of concern for India. It must be remembered that it was the coordinated operations of the Indian Army and the Tatmadaw under the Operation Sunrise I and II which helped in dealing with the Arakan Army in the period before the coup.10
Another source of concern for the Centre has been the large-scale influx of refugees from Myanmar to the bordering states of Manipur and Mizoram in particular. New Delhi’s directive (10 March 2021) to the four Northeastern States to stem the tide, was countered by Mizoram Chief Minister’s request to the Prime Minister (18 March 2021) to allow Myanmar nationals belonging to the Chin community to be provided asylum on humanitarian ground. This instance once again highlights the need for close coordination among the central and state governments in the sensitive Northeastern region, in shaping our strategy with regard to the government in such an important neighbouring country.
China uses Infrastructure Diplomacy as a powerful foreign policy tool. The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) through Myanmar has only exacerbated India’s concerns regarding the influence of China in Myanmar and the region. Sanctions and boycott by the West could once again lead to the international isolation of Myanmar which would inevitably push it into further dependence on China.
China shares a 2100-km long border with Myanmar and seeks access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar. Its influence in Myanmar had steadily increased during the period of military rule (1962–2011). Chinese influence got a boost with the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Myanmar in January 2020, when over 30 important agreements were signed (including those relating to Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone and Kyaukphyu deep-sea port).11 Earlier in 2018, Myanmar and China had signed an MoU to establish the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a 1700-km corridor meant to connect Kunming to Myanmar’s economic hubs, first to Mandalay and then east to Yangon and west to Kyaukphyu.12
It is the security imperative that prompted India to deepen military-to-military ties, giving them a batter of field guns and building border roads for them. In future, India may consider providing them non-lethal equipment. Significantly, India had also given Myanmar its very first submarine, a Russian-built Project 877 Kilo class boat, in 2020.13 It was reported that Myanmar Navy had already got the submarine training from Pakistan as early as 2013 when it did not have submarines.14 It is to be noted that the very next day after Shringla’s visit, on 24 December 2021, on the 74th anniversary of Myanmar Navy, it commissioned a Type 035 or Ming-class diesel submarine (renamed UMS Minye Kyaw Htin) which it had received from Chinese PLA Navy. China has already sold two refurbished Type 035G submarines to Bangladesh and the newer S26T submarine to Thailand. China has emerged as a key arms supplier to Myanmar. Myanmar’s navy is equipped with a Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missile, while its air force operates several Chinese-built aircraft (including the Chengdu JF-17 Thunder fighter jet and Shaanxi Y-8 transport).15
Summing Up
India once again faces a dilemma on the approach it should take towards Myanmar. On the one hand, India is concerned that the democratic gains made by Myanmar over the previous decades should not be undermined,16 on the other, security interests militate against vitiating our understanding with the Tatmadaw. State Power remained concentrated in the Myanmar military for nearly half a century and hybrid democracy that began to emerge in the last decade (2011–2021) was constrained by the provisions of the 2008 Constitution which still gave considerable leeway to the Military. Myanmar’s ethnic conflict has remained unresolved since its independence in 1948. The ongoing Civil Disobedience Movement in the midst of the pandemic, and China’s growing influence, presents a scenario which appears to defy easy solution in the short term. A cautious approach while engaging other stakeholders at the second track level could possibly guide us to the light at the end of the tunnel. The bottom line is—a hard calculated realistic approach weighing the evolving ground situation alone will deliver the objectives of our foreign policy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) set up the NUG in mid-April 2021. It is composed of the ousted NLD legislators, representatives of the ethnic minorities and other pro-democracy activists and declared Mahn Win Khaing Than as the country’s Prime Minister. A month later, it announced the formation of the People’s Defence Force. Also see, Michael Breen, “A Detour on the Road to Federal Democracy in Myanmar”, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 24 November 2021.
10. Jaideep Chanda, Irrawaddy Imperatives: Reviewing India’s Myanmar Strategy, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2021. Chanda has attempted to unravel for the reader the complex insurgency ridden scenario on the northeastern border.
13. This was the diesel-electric submarine INS Sindhuvir, renamed UMS Minye Theinkhathu, which took part in the Myanmar Navy’s Bandoola fleet exercise in October 2020.
16. While India has taken the principled position that the rule of law and democratic processes in Myanmar must be upheld, India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador T.S. Tirumurti, stated that India encourages “stakeholders to find practical and pragmatic solutions”. See “Remarks by Ambassador T.S. Tirumurti”, General Assembly Informal Meeting on Myanmar, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, New York, 26 February 2021.
India-Myanmar Relations, Myanmar, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Southeast Asia, Northeast India
Understanding Pakistan’s National Security Policy Document
Manzoor Ahmad
January 21, 2022
Pakistan’s NSP, the first such policy document with guidelines for achieving the set national security goals, is a hint towards breaking the inertia and embracing change to forge a more prosperous Pakistan. However, the question is whether it is possible, if Pakistan continues to remain entangled with the past.
Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan launched a public version of the National Security Policy (NSP) document on 14 January which sets out the state’s national security vision.1 It is being flaunted by the Imran Khan-led government as the first such policy document with guidelines for achieving the set national security goals. Before releasing the public version of NSP, the original and classified document was approved in the federal cabinet on 28 December 2021.2
The document has been prepared by National Security Division (NSD) after seven years of consultations with relevant official stakeholders. The document is meant for five years, starting from 2022, and is supposed to be updated by NSD in demanding circumstances that have implications for Pakistan’s security. It can also be updated whenever a new government is formed in the country.3
For a long time, there was a debate in Pakistan that the country lacks a comprehensive national security policy to secure national goals. Often the responses were seen as reactionary, right from joining the US block in the wake of the Cold War to joining the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan and later participating in the US-led war on Afghanistan. In the form of NSP, an attempt has been made to bring traditional and non-traditional strands of security under one umbrella to provide overarching policy guidance.
The NSP is divided into eight sections. Placing economic security at the core, it seeks to identify some national security objectives and priority areas where it wants Pakistan’s federal and provincial governments to invest resources in coming years. Though the document appears extensive on paper, it is silent on how the government of Pakistan and federating units can achieve those objectives. It also identifies many challenges that Pakistan faces, for a change going beyond India, but it does not offer any concrete solution that can help Pakistan to be different from what it has become.
On National Security and National Cohesion
The NSP in the second section conceptualises the national security policy. It places citizen’s security and dignity at the centre. It envisions Pakistan safeguarding its sovereignty by “ensuring national cohesion and harmony, preserving territorial integrity, enhancing economic independence and ensuring the writ of the state.”4 Furthermore, the NSP identifies three challenges that Pakistan’s national security face. These challenges are purely economic in nature. This is where the document seems to have broadened its scope as it looks beyond that perennial “eternal enemy” —India. The three challenges are external imbalance, vertical inequalities and horizontal inequalities. For long-term sustainability, addressing the external imbalance or higher foreign exchange outflow is seen as significant. The vertical inequality manifested in the gap between rich and poor is to be addressed by providing direct support to vulnerable citizens. The disparity in the economic development of various regions is seen as a major concern which the sub-nationalist elements exploit “to generate a narrative of grievance based on underdevelopment in their regions.”5 The horizontal inequalities or more precisely the regional aspirations are supposed to be addressed through development packages.
The NSP uses the catchphrase “unity in diversity” twice and sees it as a guiding principle for national cohesion. However, the document does not offer any solution to curb religious radicalisation in the country. Instead, it identifies Pakistan as “an Islamic state” and sees the unknown external hand involved in shaping the discourse around ethnic, religious and social differences. To counter this, the document calls for the promotion of undefined “inclusive national discourse” and bats for the preservation of the Islamic character as enshrined in the country’s constitution. Can the preservation of Islamic character and promotion of inter-faith harmony really help Pakistan when the state is not ready to free the people from the narrow ideological paradigm of nationalism? The promotion of Pakistan as an Islamic state has proved counterproductive, and the fact that it is not achievable in the modern state system is entirely overlooked. As pointed out by Ashok Behuria in his recent book, the first and foremost step that can help Pakistan to reimagine itself as a stable state is to “deemphasize on Islam as a major referent in the conduct of state affairs”.6
On India and Pakistan’s Territorial Integrity
The fifth section of the document talks about the conventional military threats, maritime competition, deterrence in the South Asian region, space and cyber security issues. It also highlights the increasing role of military and law enforcement agencies in ensuring the defence and territorial integrity of the country.
At the centre of this section is India. Barring the three mentions of the Indian Ocean, the name of India appears 14 times in the document and only once it talks positively about it saying “Pakistan wishes to improve its relationship with India”.7 At all other mentions, the approach is negative. Expressing concerns over the alleged ceasefire violations by India, the document wants Pakistan to shift attention towards the Line of Control and the Working Boundary.
In the case of maritime security, the document without naming any country denounces the self-professed role of any one country as a net security provider in the wider Indian Ocean. The expansion of India’s triad and investment in modern technologies is seen as something that disturbs the regional balance. Again, without naming India or Afghanistan, the policy document sees the prospects of violent conflict growing with the increase in what it calls “regressive and dangerous ideology” in Pakistan’s immediate neighbourhood. The document does not rule out the possibility of use of force “as a deliberate policy choice” by “the adversary” and reiterates the commitment of defending the territory in response to any such misadventure. Such a scenario calls for a renewed focus on strengthening Pakistan’s capabilities including the deterrence regime and an astute investment for modernisation of armed forces.
On Pakistan’s Internal Security
The section on internal security is important in the sense that it talks about issues that have been challenging the writ of the state of Pakistan: Sub-nationalist movements, sectarianism and terrorism. Preventing the formation of alternative centres of power and authority and ensuring the writ of the state in all regions of the country is the policy objective underlined in this section.
Though the realisation that terrorism undermines state stability and national harmony seems timely; the solution offered to address them appears hollow and ineffective. The document aims to address the grievances by addressing the structural deficiency and a sense of deprivation in areas of recruitment and by promoting “a pluralistic anti-terror narrative”. At the same time, the document downplays the challenge of sub-national movements by writing them off as “fringe” elements being exploited by “hostile intelligence agencies”. It also sees the socio-economic disparity as an enabling factor for sub-national aspirations and seeks to employ a four-pronged strategy of engagement like distinguishing reconcilables from irreconcilables (most probably in Baluchistan), cutting off recruitment, constricting financial sources and pursuing targeted socio-economic policies to address this issue. In order to deal with violent extremist ideologies, the document seeks to promote a “united narrative” and expand de-radicalisation programmes. This indeed is going to be the biggest challenge as mainstreaming people who have been trained along the lines of an extremist ideology for decades is not going to be easy.
On Foreign Policy and Kashmir
The policy agenda in a section about foreign policy is set in the backdrop of the continuous changes in the geo-political arena. The document guides Pakistan to adopt a dynamic approach in a world where great power competition defines the race over resources and issue-based partnership is being preferred over regionalism as an alternative mechanism of cooperation. The approach is to leverage political relations for economic gains. Given Pakistan’s geo-economic location, the document sees the country as a melting pot of regional and global economic interests. However, for this to happen, Pakistan would need to prove itself as a responsible state.
The policy document maintains that Pakistan is willing to have a mutually beneficial relationship with all major powers and is committed towards “normalization of relations with its neighbours based on mutual respect and sovereign equality including India”.8 At the same time, it raises the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and blames India for having “hegemonic designs” and responsible for frozen bilateral ties. The document reiterates the same old policy about Jammu and Kashmir that “resolution of Jammu and Kashmir dispute remains a vital national security interest for Pakistan.”9 There is an assertion that Pakistan would continue to provide moral, legal and diplomatic support to the people of Kashmir until they achieve the right to self-determination. It goes on to talk about India’s arms build-up and access to advanced technologies and perceives India’s inclusion into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) despite being a non-signatory to NPT as a major concern.
Pakistan seeks to fulfil all the objectives mentioned in the document and those in the last section like health security, sustainable water management and gender security through what it calls the “whole-of-nation approach” which entails synergising collective effort. There is a hint towards breaking the inertia of the status quo and embracing change to forge a more prosperous Pakistan. However, the question is whether it is possible, if Pakistan continues to remain entangled with the past. Unless and until all institutions in Pakistan work together to define the statecraft in liberal terms and the secular elite stops forging unholy alliances with Islamists who keep on fostering an image of India as an “eternal enemy”, a change seems unlikely.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
In order to maintain a semblance of balance in its ties with its two key strategic partners, Kazakhstan would perhaps have to leverage its geo-strategic importance for both Moscow and Beijing to navigate the new Arctic route.
Kazakhstan, a landlocked nation located in the Eurasian region, relies on neighbouring nations like Turkmenistan (gateway to Iran and Afghanistan), Russia (gateway to Europe) and Uzbekistan (gateway to Tajikistan and Turkey) as gateways for trade.1 Though land routes are considered to be economically effective for small cargo, the same is not true for heavy oversized cargo due to tonnage and bridge limits.2 Therefore, Northern Sea Route is being seen as a viable alternative by Kazakhstan, considering the limitations posed by the land routes.
Quest for Arctic Trade Route
In his article, titled “Kazakhstan Looks for a New Arctic Trade Route”, Malte Humpert argues that Kazakhstan is exploring the Irtysh-Ob river system as an option to gain access to the world’s oceans through the Arctic.3 For this, Kazakhstan has sought to utilise the navigation potential of the Ob-Irtysh River, a transnational river connecting China, Kazakhstan and Russia to Sabetta Port in the Arctic region of Russia. Irtysh is the largest tributary of the Ob River (2,640 kms long), which originates in the Chinese Altai Mountains and flows northwest towards eastern Kazakhstan. Irtysh meets the Ob at the Khanty-Mansiysk area of Russia before flowing into the Arctic Ocean near the Yamal Peninsula.4
Crucially, Russia has used the river’s inland water system for its transportation needs since the Tsarist period. During the Soviet era, this river system was an important transport link in the development of Western Siberian oil and gas complex (WSOGC).5 The cargo transportation through the river increased from 6.3 to 18.5 million tons during the 1950–60s.6
Post the collapse of the Soviet Union, transportation of cargo through the river reduced. However, the potential to revive inland cargo transportation has found a new lease after Russia formulated its Arctic Policy in 2008. The policy focusses on the use of the Russian Arctic Zone as a strategic base with emphasis being placed on the Northern Sea Route being the single focal point for transport and communication, etc.7
Interestingly, Kazakhstan has shown promise in the revival of the Northern Aral Sea thereby showing that it understands the importance and the potential of water navigation.8
Today, Irtysh is one of the few rivers where shipping is possible and river transport is developed. The presence of Kazakhstan’s four main ports—Pavlodar, Semey, Ust Kamenogorsk and Bukhtarminsky—on the Irtysh further enhances its prospects for inland transport (Map 1). The four river ports have the necessary infrastructure for intermodal transportation9 in terms of mechanised handling capacity and storage facilities. Pavlodar has the capacity to handle 13.2 thousand tonnes per working hour, having two berths—one of cargo length (650 m) and the other for passengers (120 m).10 This highlights the capability of Pavlodar port which would act as one of the main ports for the Arctic route from Kazakhstan.
Map 1. The Proposed Trade Route for Kazakhstan using the Irtysh River and the inland Kazakh Ports. River Irtysh originates in China, and flows towards Semey and Pavlodar in Kazakhstan. It joins Ob River in Russia that finally terminates at Sabetta port.
When it comes to the Arctic, Russia is the undisputed military and economic superpower.11 Therefore, Kazakhstan, which has a robust partnership with Russia particularly in the economic and security fields, is likely to benefit from engaging Russia in gaining access to the Arctic through Russia. This could open up new economic opportunities for Astana.
The Ob-Irtysh river system penetrates deep into the heart of Eurasia thus offering Kazakhstan an opportunity for direct access to ocean trade lines.12 The river transits through Russia’s Sabetta Port which opens up to the Kara Sea and the Arctic Ocean, providing access to the European and East Asian markets.13
While the existing land trade routes are likely to be more competitive, yet an Arctic maritime route could act as an alternative in the event of a blockade. The feasibility of the project from Russia to Kazakhstan was successfully tested in 2016 by transporting two large chemical reactors, each weighing more than 600 tons, from South Korea to Kazakhstan’s Pavlodar Port using the Northern Sea Route and the inland Ob-Irtysh river system (Map 2).14 Today, Sabetta Port, the largest port on the Northern Sea Route, has seen its cargo handling capacity grow more than five-fold.15
Map 2. The trade route which was used for shipping of the chemical reactors from South Korea to Kazakhstan in 2016.
Source: Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
Since the main focus of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy concept on water resources and water security has been China, it solidifies its relations with China and ensures that it provides further space for diplomatic engagement between them.16 China and Kazakhstan share a cordial relationship. The two nations share two rivers Ili and Irtysh, both of which originate in China and then flow into Kazakhstan. China also accounts for the highest water flowing from abroad into Kazakhstan. This is equal to 18 per cent of the Kazakhstan’s total water availability.17 In 2014, Kazakhstan advocated a foreign policy concept which stated “to continue to improve the legal framework with neighbouring countries on the usage and protection of Trans boundary water resources to enhance water security and water saving” with particular focus on China.18
China also happens to be Kazakhstan’s second largest trading partner and a key pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It has been heavily involved in constructing its biggest dry port at Khorgos connecting Kazakhstan with China through rail.19 With the river associated with the Arctic trade route emerging from China, Kazakhstan is likely to need the support of the upper riparian state, i.e., China to implement the connectivity project.
The flipside regarding the Kremlin’s assistance is that the maritime cooperation is likely to provide Russia with more tools to involve itself in Kazakh affairs. Similarly, China’s treatment of Uighur Muslims in bordering Xinjiang remains an issue of concern for Kazakhstan. While Astana has largely remained silent on this issue, its temporary refuge to four convicted ethnic Kazakh Chinese citizens from Xinjiang in 2020 could act as a bone of contention in the future.20 The fact remains that several ethnic Kazakhs have been detained in Chinese re-education camps in Xinjiang.21
Conclusion
Kazakhstan is exploring alternative trade routes to enhance its economic potential. An Arctic route anchored in in-land waterways could open up Kazakhstan to the rest of the world. The involvement of Russia and China in this alternative route, while crucial for its success, may come at a price. In order to maintain a semblance of balance in its ties with its two key strategic partners, Kazakhstan would perhaps have to leverage its geo-strategic importance for both Moscow and Beijing to navigate the new Arctic route.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Alexander Voronenko, “Project ‘Ob-Irtysh’”,Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education, Khabarovsk State University of Economics and Law, 5 February 2017.
8. Aral Sea is divided between two Central Asian states; the North Aral Sea lies in Kazakhstan and the South Aral Sea in Uzbekistan. While the North Aral Sea has revived, the South Aral Sea is a dried-out basin. See Dene-Hern Chen, “The Country that Brought a Sea Back to Life”, BBC Future, 23 July 2018.
Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement: Roadmap to India’s Strategic Access in the Arctic
Bipandeep Sharma
January 17, 2022
By enabling access to logistics and support facilities at each other’s bases and ports, RELOS would enhance strategic cooperation between India and Russia, and promote their future manoeuvres in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean Region.
India and Russia maintain a rigorous framework of bilateral cooperation. The annual India–Russia summit held in December 2021 in New Delhi led to the signing and acknowledgement of multiple important agreements between the two countries.1 Though several issues of mutual interest were discussed during the summit, agreement on an important Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS) could not be reached.2 RELOS remains to be a crucial agreement between India and Russia as both the countries plan to increase their bilateral investments in the Arctic region and Russian Far East.
What is RELOS?
The Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement is a long-awaited administrative agreement that would enable the militaries of both the countries to access logistics and support facilities at each other’s bases and ports.3 It would facilitate the replenishment of fuel, rations, spare parts and berthing for troops, warships and aircrafts while operating away from home ports and bases during the war and peacetime missions. The agreement would enable maintenance facilities to warships and military aircraft at each other’s bases. RELOS would further ensure smooth use of the host nation’s existing logistics networks which would reduce the overall costs of the mission and provide a strategic edge to each other’s military operations.
Significance for India
India has signed military logistics agreements with several countries in the past. This includes the India–US Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), India–Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and India–Australia Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), demonstrating all the Quad countries. Apart from this, India maintains such military logistics agreements with France, Singapore and South Korea. It is currently in the process of finalising such an agreement with the UK and Vietnam.4 Signing RELOS with Russia would add to greater strategic cooperation between the two countries.
Economic and Geo-strategic Significance
India’s interests in the Arctic region are increasing and it is keen to make investments particularly in the exploration of Russian oil, gas and other rare earth minerals in the near future. It is likely that these investments would increase further in future, therefore some kind of strategic security backing is required to safeguard India’s investments in the Arctic. At present, India does not maintain any port facility or naval base in this region as a whole. An agreement such as RELOS would enable Indian Navy to have greater operational reach in the Arctic. It would provide logistics and other required facilities to Indian naval ships venturing through the region. Further, in case of any hostile situation arising in the region, RELOS would enable greater coordination between the Indian and Russian Navy to respond appropriately in the region. The major Russian naval ports are shown in Map 1.
The Arctic sea-ice along the Russian coast is receding drastically. The Northern Sea Route is humming with shipping activity that is significantly increasing annually. India has openly called for supporting the Russian vision of developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR).5 From Vladivostok in the Far East to Murmansk in the west, Russia maintains a vast stretch of naval port infrastructure along the NSR. As the shipping activity in the NSR increases, Russia is also in the process of reviving its old naval bases of Soviet times and is simultaneously enhancing existing naval port infrastructure in the region. The signing of RELOS between India and Russia, would open India’s access to Russian Arctic naval ports and military bases from Vladivostok to Murmansk and beyond. India, does not have its own full-fledged base or naval docking or refuelling facility in the Arctic, but through RELOS it would have access to all such facilities in the near future. As China’s strategic reach and presence in the Arctic grows with its third heavy (nuclear powered) ice-breaker ship inline for entering into polar waters6 it becomes extremely important for India to have such an agreement as RELOS in conclusion with its traditional strategic partner, Russia.
Strategic Counterweights
India has signed logistics agreements with all its partner Quad countries. Though Russia is openly critical of the Quad and has maintained distance from the alliance, RELOS could strategically act as counterweight leverage to both India and Russia in the Indo-Pacific. The similar lines on which RELOS would enable the Indian Navy’s reach in the Russian Far East and the Arctic region, it would also provide logistics support and easy access of required facilities to the Russian Navy via Indian naval ports and military bases located in the Indian Ocean. RELOS in a way, without involving Russia in the Quad, would facilitate and strengthen Russian naval presence in the Indo-Pacific to any future hostile scenarios in the region. Enhanced naval cooperation between India and Russia through RELOS would not only act as a counterweight to increasing US strategic posturing in the region, but for Russia, it will also balance the strategic power equation with its evolving partner China in the region. It can also be argued that India’s approach to Indo-Pacific closely resembles to that of Russia’s conceptual approach of Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) through which Russia aims to strengthen its geo-economic and geopolitical positioning from Lisbon to Vladivostok.7 Strengthening India–Russia partnership on framework such as RELOS could take Russian vision of GEP further from Vladivostok to Indian Ocean and the Indian vision till the Russian high north.
Conclusion
The bilateral relationship between India and Russia has grown and matured over time, and needs to be carried forward in existing and new areas of mutual interest. The Arctic offers tremendous opportunities for enhancing this cooperation at the helm of which RELOS could act as perfect leverage. India has very limited polar infrastructure and shipping capabilities to operate in the Arctic waters. Russia on the other hand is the only country in the world that maintains a strong dominance over Arctic shipping and other polar infrastructure capabilities required to operate in the region. Therefore, partnering with Russia via an agreement such as RELOS would offer tremendous support and opportunities to India in the Arctic. While India develops its polar-capable infrastructure to support its interest in the Arctic, RELOS would significantly enable India to undertake its Arctic operations with Russian assistance.
Also, the scale at which China is becoming increasingly assertive in the Arctic in terms of infrastructure development, shipping, energy and resource investments projects, and even in decision-making bodies like the Arctic Council, should be noted by India. Though the Indo-Pacific would continue to be a key area of India’s maritime domains, India cannot ignore the physical and geopolitical transitions occurring in the Arctic. India’s priorities in the Arctic are quite different and independent to other countries’ (especially China’s) emerging engagements in the region. India’s primary engagements in the Arctic are focused on understanding scientific interconnections between Arctic sea ice melting and changes in Indian monsoon systems. India still cannot afford to lose the sight of geopolitical and geo-economic transitions emerging in the region, where states like China are pursuing dominant economic and strategic posturing in the region. Therefore, RELOS would initially act as a support mechanism to Indian naval ships venturing into Arctic waters for routine voyages to mark their strategic reach and presence in the region.
Russia has called for rapidly developing Arctic infrastructure to enabling year-round shipping along the NSR8. Moscow has also agreed for supplying oil and gas to India at a “preferential pricing”9 and ship them via the northern Arctic route. India’s support to develop NSR and its call for turning it into an international trade artery show the country’s serious interests in the emerging connectivity routes of the region.10 Under India’s Act East Policy, India has promised a US$ 1 billion Line of Credit for the development of Russian Far East.11 Indian and Russian companies have identified energy, transport and logistics, maritime connectivity, diamond processing, forestry, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, tourism and humanitarian fields as key areas of future cooperation in the Russian Far East.12 Calling Vladivostok a true Sangam, Prime Minister Modi has also called for developing Chennai–Vladivostok Maritime Corridor (CVMC) by connecting the ports of Chennai, Visakhapatnam and Kolkata to that with Vladivostok, Vostochny and Olga on the east coast of Russia.13 Once fully implemented, CVMC will enhance bilateral trade between the two countries to significant levels and it will also serve as an extension to NSR up till the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, RELOS at the center of this would enhance strategic cooperation between India and Russia. It would act as an important existing mechanism to promote future manoeuvres of both the countries in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean Region in times to come.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Sheikh Hasina’s Visit to Maldives Boosts Bilateral Relationship
Anand Kumar
January 13, 2022
The recent visit of Sheikh Hasina to the Maldives provided an opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relationship and enhance connectivity, trade and commerce between the two countries. The visit also signified Bangladesh’s growing importance in the international politics.
The Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina went on a six-day visit to the Maldives from 22 to 27 December 2021. This was her first visit to the archipelagic nation, which took place soon after Bangladesh celebrated the 50th year of its liberation from Pakistan. Though this visit was meant for boosting the bilateral relationship, it also signified that Bangladesh, previously seen as a poor country, has made considerable progress.
On the eve of Hasina’s visit, the Central Bank of Bangladesh announced a loan of US$ 200 million (MVR 3.08 billion) to the Maldives.1 This loan was sought by the Maldivian president Ibrahim Mohamed Solih during his visit to Dhaka in March 2021. Bangladesh saw it as a moment of pride and agreed to give the loan after a meeting took place between the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh and the Central Bank of Bangladesh.2
During the visit, both countries signed three documents and renewed one. The first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on the Recruitment of Health Professionals, while another MoU was on Cooperation in the Areas of Youth and Sports Development. Both sides also signed an Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation. The MoU on the Areas of Healthcare and Medical Sciences was renewed.
Bangladesh gifted 13 military vehicles to the Maldives as a token of friendship. On behalf of Bangladesh, the Chief of Army Staff General SM Shafiuddin Ahmed in a symbolic way handed over the keys of the military vehicles to the Maldives’ Chief of Defence Force Major General Abdullah Shamaal.
While the countries assessed the whole gamut of their bilateral relationship, the main objective of the visit was to address the issue of legal and illegal Bangladeshi migrants in the Maldives.3 Maldives has nearly 1,00,000 Bangladeshis living and working there. It is estimated that half of this population are illegal migrants.4 For Maldives, a small archipelago nation of 4,00,000 people, this large number of Bangladeshi population has become a matter of security concern. In 1988, Maldives saw a coup attempt by a Sri Lankan militant organistion, People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) in league with some Maldivians when Abdul Gayoom was the president.5 Though at that time, the coup was averted with the help of India, a section in Maldives is still apprehensive of growing Bangladeshi population in the country, especially since majority are illegal migrants.
Moreover, both Bangladesh and Maldives have been facing the problem of religious radicalisation. Maldives fears that illegal migration would worsen this problem further. Maldives’ economy is largely based on tourism and any increase in cases of terrorism could adversely affect it. Bangladesh tried to reassure Maldives that it does not allow terror activities on its soil. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Maldivian President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih who also vowed to fight terrorism and extremism together to ensure regional and global peace and prosperity.6
For Bangladesh, sending people abroad to work is an important part of its foreign policy. Bangladesh is the eighth largest foreign remittance receiving country, with its expatriates working in various countries across the world. It received about US$ 21.75 billion remittance in 2020.7 The remittance received from expatriates is an important part of Bangladesh’s GDP, and has also played a significant role in the development of the country which was seen as very backward at the time of its liberation. The crucial role played by the immigrants in bringing prosperity to both the countries was highlighted by Sheikh Hasina during her visit.
Bangladesh actually urged Maldives to accept more migrants from the country, especially doctors. After the pandemic, Maldives wants to improve its healthcare system and needs specialist doctors and nurses. Besides, Maldives is also planning more resorts which could create job opportunities for Bangladeshis. Understandably, Bangladesh wants to seize these opportunities.
During her visit, Hasina tried to address the problems faced by the Bangladeshi population living in Maldives. In a meeting with the Bangladeshi expatriates, Hasina said that the government would make arrangements for the exchange of currencies between Bangladesh and the Maldives, so that the expatriates do not face any problems in sending money back to Bangladesh. She also acknowledged that expatriates are suffering losses as they have to first buy dollars and then send their money to Bangladesh which again is converted in taka. She mentioned that the Probashi Kallyan Bank of Bangladesh has been asked to take appropriate steps in this regard.
To fulfil a long-pending demand of Bangladeshi expatriates in Maldives, US-Bangla Airlines started operating flights to Male, the capital of Maldives from November 2021.8 Hasina also informed the expatriates that Bangladesh Biman Airlines is set to introduce air connectivity with the Maldives via Chennai in India.9
Both the countries have shown interest in enhancing connectivity, trade and commerce. In February 2021, Dhaka and Maldives signed two MoUs— one on the training of Foreign Service officials and another on human resources’ recruitment. Subsequently in March 2021, four more MoUs were signed on trade, tourism, fisheries and health. When the Vice President of the Maldives visited Dhaka in November 2021, he had talked about establishing a direct link between Maldives and Chittagong, an important port of Bangladesh.
The establishment of a direct shipping line between the two countries could help in reducing the transportation cost, since at present the Bangladeshi products need to be exported via Singapore or Colombo. The volume of the present trade between Maldives and Bangladesh is about US$ 7 million. Bangladesh’s imports from Maldives are worth US$ 3 million and its export to the country is worth about US$ 4 million.10 The present exports of Bangladesh to Maldives target its Bangladeshi population living there. However, Maldives too imports its food and other essential items. Bangladesh now also wants to target Maldivians and intends to export vegetables, processed food, ceramics, leather goods, readymade garments, jute products and pharmaceutical products.
President Solih and Sheikh Hasina also expressed their intention to address and counter the threats posed by organised crime, piracy, narcotic and human trafficking, through multilateral and regional forums including Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). In this regard, Bangladesh pointed out that it has assumed the Chairmanship of IORA for the first time, since October 2021. It sought the support of Maldives so that both sides could work together towards greater maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean Region. Solih assured his cooperation to Bangladesh in this regard.11
Bangladesh was also successful in enlisting the support of Maldives on the issue of the forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals. Maldives has criticised Myanmar for the atrocities committed against the Rohingya Muslim community and commended Bangladesh for graciously hosting them. President Solih appreciated Bangladesh’s efforts to offer shelter and protection to the Rohingyas and to facilitate their repatriation to Myanmar.
Bangladesh is graduating from the Least Developed Country (LDC) status by 2026, which means that certain privileges enjoyed by the country as an LDC state would be taken away. To deal with this, Bangladesh aspires to build stronger relations with the regional countries for boosting trade and connectivity. It also wants to ensure that the Bangladeshi migrants working in foreign countries continue to be an important source of its GDP. At the same time, Bangladesh is also trying to show its growing importance in international politics which it has achieved due to the strength of its economy. Hasina’s visit to the Maldives was successful in achieving all these objectives.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The false compliance present within the radicalised individuals and convicted terrorist offenders pose a considerable threat to the society, following their release from de-radicalisation-based institutions.
For over a decade, counter-radicalisation programmes have been trying to de-radicalise and rehabilitate violent extremists and terrorists. Various countries have developed different counter-radicalisation programmes with varied results.1 In Britain, such programmes have been able to counsel, reclaim and rehabilitate several violent extremists and terrorists. In specific instances, the proportion of rehabilitated individuals is much higher than cases of recidivism2 when violent extremists, released by de-radicalisation-based institutions, have reverted to their violent ways.
In recent times, recidivism has increased, as some of the released terrorists have carried out terrorist acts, including Ahmed Hassan (Parsons Green Bomber; 2017), Usman Khan (the London Bridge attacker; 2019), Kutjim Fejzulai (Central Vienna attacker; 2020), and Ali Harbi Ali (Murderer of Sir Amess; 2021).3 Usman Khan, for example, fatally stabbed two and wounded three people during the London Bridge Attack.4
Some international policy organisations such as the Counter Extremism Project, and think-tanks like the European Policy Centre, have expressed concern that certain individuals receiving therapy at counter-radicalisation centres may have learnt the art of deceiving the psychologists and in passing the tests conducted there to procure an early release from the prisons.5
This is concerning because, through disguised compliance6 , the terrorists portray to the authorities that they have been redeemed by the de-radicalisation programmes and have sworn off from committing terrorist offenses in the future. Traditionally, compliance involves altering behaviour at the behest of someone’s direction or request. However, in this instance, the act of submission presented by convicted individuals is simply a deceptive strategy.
Furthermore, what is worrisome is that officials responsible for de-radicalisation programmes, such as Prevent (United Kingdom), have, in some instances, not been able to accurately assess those posing a grave danger to mainstream society. On the whole, the programmes are effective, but the possibility of some cases of recidivism would be there, because psychological and religious counselling can never be an exact science. However, Norwegian de-radicalisation programmes are a case in point because incidents of recidivism there amount to 20 per cent7 , one of the lowest worldwide.
Counter-radicalisation experts such as Amanda Paul, have highlighted concerns about the competence of rehab professionals and their training. According to her, “the initial findings on disguised compliance determined that practitioners working on the frontline are poorly equipped and vulnerable to manipulation…the long-term political and human price of this is incalculable”.8 Such events have raised the question of whether or not de-radicalisation initiatives have any potential of success, and their scope in the states’ counter-terrorism strategies. However, this analysis does not argue for the scrapping of de-radicalisation programmes worldwide. These initiatives have proven instrumental in the success of Norway’s restorative-justice-based de-radicalisation programmes9 , India’s counter-terrorism initiatives in Kerala and Maharashtra, and Singapore’s de-radicalisation programme, which have been hailed for their efficient outcomes.10 Notably, this is a more desirable alternative than simply incarcerating radicalised individuals who could reform themselves by engaging with de-radicalisation experts.
Moreover, while psychology is relied on to counter radical threats, it is understandably not a foolproof measure, more so because it is a recent phenomenon, requiring at least a few decades to mature and counter threats that have taken considerably longer to evolve and achieve their goals. Yet, if this is deemed insufficient by analysts, they ought to offer alternative solutions to counter challenges emanating from recidivism, beyond the traditional concept of prison sentences.
Radicalisation: Learning From Experiences
Prevent is a vital element of the British government’s counter-terrorism strategy to draw suspected individuals away from violent extremism. It was introduced by the Tony Blair administration in 2003. A strategy subject to severe criticism, it has come under deep scrutiny in the backdrop of the former Tory MP Sir David Amess’s murder in October 2021.11 The perpetrator had been referred to this programme seven years ago, but nothing materialised since it functions voluntarily, and the officials had not deemed him to be a threat serious enough to be referred to MI5, which deals with issues concerning domestic security and counter-intelligence.
This ties together the two complex narratives re-enforcing each other in the terrorism and counter-terrorism domains. The duplicity and false compliance present within the radicalised individuals and convicted terrorist offenders pose a considerable threat to the society following their release. The report released by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King’s College, London attests to the veracity of such claims. Moreover, it claims that prisoners often use their time during imprisonment to reaffirm the commitment towards their cause, whatever it may be.12
Presumably, the violent extremists sentenced to prison or those recommended for de-radicalisation programmes could use this opportunity to undermine the security and law-enforcement apparatus from within while fomenting a similar ideological outlook among like-minded individuals or impressionable recruits during13 or after their farce rehabilitation.
Re-examining Counter-Recidivism Agenda: Pitfalls and Prospects
The professional counsellors reportedly perceive disguised compliance as an indication of severance of ties with violent extremist ideologies. However, this misplaced optimism can have cataclysmic repercussions for the overall community. The officials heading the de-radicalisation programmes outside prisons ought to approach the referred cases with similar caution. Although the lattermost has not committed terrorist acts, their ideological orientation could propel them towards inflicting violence in the foreseeable future.
In both circumstances, terrorists and radicalised individuals could set in motion a chain of events wherein they could create an asymmetrical power dynamic vis-à-vis the state authorities. Through subterfuge, they could hoodwink the law-enforcement officials and mental health professionals, convincing the latter of innocence and commitment towards assimilation with the mainstream society, and adherence to the rule of law. This places the authorities in a significantly vulnerable position as they attempt to decipher and eliminate potential security threats within and outside prison environments.
Admittedly, Islamist jihadists have carried out most of the recognisable terrorist activities in the modern world, and therefore, those adhering to radical interpretations of Islam should remain on the authorities’ radar. On the other hand, it is also relevant to consider factors such as criminals’ past and mental health crises to ascertain who could pose a greater security threat vis-à-vis others. This is crucial because these factors are often the underlying drivers of potential terrorist attacks, while the ideological orientation (Islamist jihadist or white supremacy) serves as the “rationalisation”14 for such acts. Before making a recommendation for an early release, the rehab professionals ought to account for these factors.
The threat of reversion to terrorist activities by convicted offenders has remained around 5–8 per cent15 , according to a report released by the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in January 2021. However, the law enforcement and security agencies, and elected representatives ought to issue guidelines (in consultation with counter-terrorism experts and mental health professionals) to reassess the parameters governing existing early release programmes. The RAN is a European network of frontline workers—teachers, healthcare professionals and social workers—working with radicalised and potentially at-risk individuals. Since the same report also mentions that a high risk of re-occurrence of a terrorist act exists within the first few months of the prisoner’s release, it would therefore be advisable for the authorities to take caution while recommending early release, and do so in conjunction with stringent probation and regular monitoring—psychological and surveillance-based—to minimise the risk of recidivism.
While there appears to be a dearth of information about the occurrence of similar events in India, those overseeing the de-radicalisation programmes, ought to overhaul their approach to prevent a similar chain of events within the country. It would be a cataclysmic failure for the security apparatus if the shifting geopolitical reality in South Asia (primarily Afghanistan) was to provide an ideological boost to those undergoing rehabilitation and in the process of being re-assimilated into the mainstream society, thereby causing their relapse. Moreover, India has borne the brunt of exported and home-grown threats such as Islamist jihad, left-wing extremism and separatist insurgencies over the years. Thus, it must learn from the European example.
On the other hand, de-radicalisation programmes ought not to be dismissed just yet. The opportunity to turn the tide around and prevent further radicalisation by improving existing initiatives is an important point for consideration.
The violent acts or lapses in de-radicalisation programmes ought to be understood by policy and security officials as learning experiences, significantly beneficial in preventing recidivism in the future. The authorities ought to also avoid treating a sociological problem such as this purely from a security or policy-based perspective.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the MP-IDSA or of the Government of India.
While India is establishing a strong aviation ecosystem by bringing together all stakeholders including the government, DPSUs, tri-services, academia and industry partners, it is believed that private Indian industries will be the crusaders for the government in defence production, particularly in the UAV vertical.
The Government of India is promoting "Make in India" for self-reliance in the defence sector, which is evident in the several initiatives it has taken that favour potential Indian vendors in terms of indigenisation and technology development. The intention is to encourage Indian firms to design, develop and manufacture defence equipment at the system, subsystem and component levels, with indigenisation and self-reliance as primary focal areas.
In the early 1960s, DRDO and several Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) like Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Limited (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL), Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL), Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), BEML Ltd, Mishra Dhatu Nigam (MIDHANI) and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) including Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) initiated defence production and over a period of time provided tremendous support to our Armed Forces. However, there has always been a gap between the demand and supply of equipment to the defence forces and therefore, till date the tri-services resort to importing critical equipment to meet their operational requirements. Noticeably, policies like ‘Make in India’ and ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’ are aimed at minimising imports by creating a robust ecosystem for nurturing private industries and optimisation of DPSUs and Ordnance Board. At the same time, foreign companies are encouraged to set up design, development and manufacture of military equipment in India so as to boost Indian economy and for creating job opportunities in India.
Defence Procurement Manual, Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 and Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy 2020 encourage innovation and indigenisation in private industries, and are aimed at creating a dynamic, robust and competitive industry base so as to reduce dependence on imports and for promoting exports. The financial assistance to academia for research and development and the recent declaration of celebrating 16 January1 as the ‘Start-Ups Day’ henceforth, shows the government’s seriousness towards rewarding innovation and indigenisation in start-ups. Further, Strategic Partnership Model has been proposed for Indian industries to collaborate with foreign OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) and to seek Transfer of Technology to build the capability to develop and manufacture equipment in India. Additionally, there are other initiatives like setting up Defence Corridors across states, conduct of defence exhibitions, seminars by autonomous bodies like Confederation of Indian Industry, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, etc., and tri-services interactive forums with industries. Programmes like Innovation Defence Excellence (iDEX), Technology Development Fund (TDF), Defence India Start-Up Challenges (DISC) and In-services Innovation Contests with financial back-ups also look promising.
Despite the fact that the defence sector offers an ocean of opportunities for industries and favourable policies are being framed by the Government of India, ongoing global technological advancements in the areas like Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Big Data analysis and mining, solar energy, advanced battery developments, Nano Technology, robotics, formulation of next-generation aviation traffic management systems, etc., could pose aviation challenges in the future.
Considering the government's push for indigenisation in a period of technological disruptions in the defence arena, a need has been felt for conducting research in one of the key specialty defence areas, namely Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The aim of the research is to understand the impact of government initiatives on Indian industries concerning UAS under these dynamic conditions. Further, the research also aims to understand India’s Strategic Military balance in UAS sector compared to its potential neighbours China and Pakistan thereby seeing future roadmap of UAS in India.
Unmanned Aerial Machines are commonly denoted as Unmanned Aircraft/Aerial System (UAS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV), Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV), Loitering Munitions (LM) and Drones. The term UAS has been widely used since the system comprises UAV, Ground systems, Mission Control Stations and other supporting equipment. Irrespective of whether it is for civil or military use, the term UAV or Drones (a component of UAS and being airborne platform) is used by many authors as generic to represent UAS.
Analysts point out that India is at least a decade behind Pakistan and even further behind China in the UAV sector.2 The “iron brothers” Pakistan and China have been closely collaborating in the development of and acquisition of various military platforms and weapons, including combat drones.3 China had relied on UAVs and built a robust aviation programme right from the 1950s. Government support, reliable infrastructure, quality education, research and development have collectively helped China in this domain. Collaboration and joint ventures with other countries and clandestine operations also aided China in its objectives. Pakistan on the other side owes the development of its programme to the PSUs and support extended by China. The private sector also has a significant role to play. PSUs and more private industries focus on medium and small UAVs due to economic affordability, export value and low cost.
Considering the steady growth in the UAV sector across our neighbours, the government’s roadmap for robust aviation corridor and industries’ perspective on defence initiatives, a survey was carried out for Qualitative Analysis keeping into consideration the policies, industry capabilities and threat perception by our neighbours. The survey brought out insights that there is a possibility of immense growth for both civil and military UAVs/drones in future. The industries are inclined towards developing medium, small and mini UAVs including Swarm Drones.4 Economic feasibility, demand across commercial sectors, mass production, qualified manpower in-house with technology help from overseas suppliers, and increased global competitiveness could all be factors for venturing into the small UAVs sector.
Large UAVs, on the other hand, are not given priority for a variety of reasons, including high investment costs, customised specific purpose needs, research and development, the likelihood of a minimum order number, advanced technology, and the lack of a guarantee for fixed orders. Even industry believes that the policies are beneficial to a considerable extent, but that they need to be revised in a few areas. DRDO and DPSUs’ dependency for testing and lab facilities was also inferred. The industry has apprehension about involving academia and this is an important area to ponder upon.5
While India is establishing a strong aviation ecosystem by bringing together all stakeholders, including the government, promotional bodies, DPSUs, tri-services, academia and industry partners, experts believe that in the next 10 to 15 years, private Indian industries will be the crusaders for the government in defence production, particularly in the UAV vertical. Correlation between industries and the economy will also be crucial in the future. The concerns and suggestions shared by the industries must be taken into account and researched in order to provide value to the expanding ecosystem. The insights derived from the research would bring out the industries’ perspective and may add value to government policies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the MP-IDSA or of the Government of India.
While India may not be a major actor in Central Asia yet it remains an important vector in the regional calculus of the Central Asian Republics. India’s multi-alignment should hold it in good stead in navigating the opportunities and challenges in a region which lies at a proverbial stone’s throw from New Delhi.
India’s engagement with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), a region which India considers part of its “extended neighbourhood”, is likely to receive a renewed momentum when the first India–Central Asia Heads of Government meeting takes place on 27 January 2022.1 While the event will ostensibly celebrate 30 years of diplomatic relations between India and CARs, the scope and importance of the summit extend beyond mere diplomatic symbolism. This is particularly relevant at a time when India has sought to reconnect with the ‘Heart of Asia’ amidst tumultuous geo-political churnings in the region.
Geopolitical Tussle in Eurasian Heartland
The salience of Central Asia lies in its geostrategic location comprising the Eurasian Heartland. Straddling a space the size of a continent, it connects Asia with Europe. And along with its vast reserves of natural resources, it blends in with the central position accorded to it by Halford Mackinder in his Heartland thesis.2 Crucially, it provides a ringside view of developments taking place in the countries that it flanks, namely, Russia, China, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.
Today, a new geopolitical contestation appears to be underway in Eurasia. This is reflected in shifting great power rivalries and new strategic equations and alignments. A key driving force behind this transition is the Russia–West confrontation, with the latter seemingly seeking to contain the Kremlin in its immediate neighbourhood. This has led Moscow to reinvent itself in the region. Its “Greater Eurasia” project inherently seeks to preserve its “sphere of influence”.3 However, Russia has been forced to accommodate China in its “near abroad” as a quid pro quo for relying on Beijing to withstand the Western geopolitical pressure. Pertinently, this Russian concession could facilitate China’s rise as a Eurasian powerhouse, potentially altering the regional balance of power. Interestingly, Russia’s latent competition with China runs parallel to their bilateral cooperation against a common adversary. The two countries have closed ranks to insulate the region from the United States (US), given their shared mistrust of Western manoeuvrings in the region.4
In the midst of this Great Power contestation, other regional and extra-regional powers5 including Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and the European Union too have courted the CARs.
Meanwhile, CARs geographical proximity to Afghanistan places them in the frontline of developments taking place on the Afghan chessboard. Crucially, given the linkages between drug trafficking, terrorism and organised crime6 , instability emanating from Kabul could create an arc of instability across the entire Eurasian region.
New pressure points also appear to have emerged in the CARs. Prolonged economic slowdown, lack of political freedom, ethnic tensions and rise of radicalisation7 have bred conditions similar to the Arab Spring. If the recent uprising in Kazakhstan is an indication, the region could face more upheavals in the future. Amidst these churnings, Central Asian countries appear to be readjusting their policies. They seem to be looking to strike a balance in maximising their political and economic gains from each actor while preserving their strategic autonomy. A key vector of this strategy has been their focus on both intra-Central Asian as well as broader Eurasian collaborations.
India’s Congruence with CARs
Amidst the ongoing flux in Eurasia, overlapping interests in the economic, energy, health, connectivity, security and defence realms appear to drive India’s engagement with the CARs. In fact, the 4Cs–commerce, capacity enhancement, connectivity and contact–aptly highlight India’s endeavour to establish mutually beneficial long-term economic partnerships.8
Arguably, India fits in well with the CARs quest for strategic autonomy. India’s benign and friendly image anchored in civilisational linkages with the region, its achievements in nation building, and positive economic outlook in an era of slowing global growth are viewed favourably by the Central Asian regimes. Similarly, India’s calibration of a regional cooperative approach, rooted in the resolve to jointly address festering issues, carries a strong resonance among CARs. The Central Asian countries had connected with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2018 articulation of the foundational dimension of Eurasia being ‘SECURE’, wherein S stood for Security of citizens, E for Economic development for all, C for Connecting the region, U for Uniting our people, R for Respect for Sovereignty and Integrity, and E for Environment protection.9
In this context, the regional connectivity initiatives that India has sought to promote through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Ashgabat Agreement potentially provide the landlocked Eurasian countries an option beyond the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). CARs inherently remain suspicious of China’s “infrastructure imperialism” that has cast a shadow on their local economies. In contrast, India has insisted that connectivity projects imbibe inclusivity, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and fiscal prudence.10 These projects could help unlock the India–Central Asia trade potential which is constrained by the lack of direct physical access. Notably, Central Asian trade accounts for less than 1 per cent of India’s overall global trade.11
India also has a good track record of developmental partnerships in the region. And the new US$ 1 billion line of credit should augment this image.12 There exist comparative economic advantages that can be leveraged. Central Asia is a big consumer market, with substantial demand for a range of goods and services, in which India has niche capabilities. These include information technology (IT), capacity building, pharma, agriculture, food processing, health, tourism, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), disaster management, heritage conservation and technical education.
Meanwhile, Central Asia retains its potential to be an important resource base for diversifying India’s energy imports. Indo-Central Asian discussions have, unsurprisingly, centred on the acquisition of energy stakes, joint ventures and swap agreements to overcome the problem of routing hydrocarbons. Today, the region’s rich pool of resources could also play a role in the global efforts to build resilient supply chains in a post-pandemic world.
Crucially, India and CARs have a shared interest in regional stability. The security threat emanating from Afghanistan as well as the challenges posed by an uptick in radicalisation and terrorism affect both sides. Their defence and security collaboration, therefore, assumes significance. As a survivor of terrorism, India has developed specific combat skills that can be tapped by CARs. These include counterterror operations, intelligence gathering, training and border protection. In fact, intelligence gathering mechanisms depend, to a large extent, on satellite and information technology tools. India has strong expertise in both these areas.
CARs also remain key pillars of India’s engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This pan-Eurasian organisation has gained traction in the last few years. This includes exploring a regional consensus on issues of security, economic cooperation and connectivity.13 Meanwhile, the support of CARs in this multilateral grouping could be pivotal to tackle the anti-India advocacy promoted by China–Pakistan tandem in Eurasia.
Trilateral cooperation with Russia for the region holds promise.14 Notably, as recent events in Kazakhstan and Afghanistan indicate, Russia retains its key linkages with the region. India and Russia also have a shared concern about China’s rise. Similarly, trilateral cooperation with countries like South Korea and Japan, which enjoy significant goodwill in CARs and have a robust track record of providing regional public goods, could be explored to meet the region’s infrastructure requirements.
Conclusion
The India–Central Asia Summit, being held on 27 January, is a timely event. It is an acknowledgement of India’s continental interests. While India may not be a major actor in Central Asia yet it remains an important vector in the regional calculus of CARs. India’s multi-alignment should hold it in good stead in navigating the opportunities and challenges in a region which lies at a proverbial stone’s throw from New Delhi. Sustaining the ongoing momentum and not reverting to the episodic engagement of the past would be crucial. An Act North Eurasian Policy is perhaps more relevant than ever before.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the MP-IDSA or of the Government of India.
With a display of 1,000 indigenously produced swarm drones during the Beating Retreat, India would become the fourth nation to achieve such a feat, making it a front row actor with a strong foothold in the field of drone technology.
India has announced that a novel “Drone Show” comprising 1,000 swarm drones will light up the sky for about 10 minutes during the Beating Retreat Ceremony on 29 January 2022. It has been designed, conceptualised and produced indigenously under the “Make in India” initiative by Botlab Dynamics, and has been sponsored by the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi and the Department of Science & Technology (DST), Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY).1 With a display of 1,000 indigenously produced swarm drones, India would become the fourth nation to achieve such a feat, making it a front row actor with a strong foothold in the field of drone technology.
The US, Russia and China have carried out such swarm drone displays in the past. In 2020, China tested its swarm drone technology and demonstrated rapid deployment with intensive launching, hovering, precise formation, inspection and precision strike.2 In May 2021, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) showcased various drones like WZ-7 and WZ-8 (Chinese version of US R.Q. 4 “Global Hawk”) at the International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, also known as the Airshow China, signalling the increased importance of drones in its military strategy. According to the Chinese media reports and experts, these surveillance drones are likely to be used over parts of South and East China seas and on the borders with India and Afghanistan.3 At another PLA drill in May 2021, China showcased drone swarms and robots leading to speculations about their possible use during conflicts in the Taiwan Strait.4 The US also, in the past, has conducted various demonstrations of their drone technologies. The US Navy displayed its offensive swarm operations with its LOCUST (Low-Cost Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarming Technology) Drone Swarm that has the capabilities of firing small UAVs from the tube-based launcher.5 In June 2019, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) demonstrated a swarm of autonomous drones to analyse, surround and secure a mock city building. The demonstration was part of DARPA’s Offensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET) programme, which has about 250 drones to accompany smaller infantry units to carry missions in dense urban environments.6
On 15 January 2021, the Indian Army had demonstrated its drone power with a display of Kamikaze mock attacks and first-aid delivery during the Army Day Parade. The 75 indigenously developed drones had displayed the swarming capabilities through an array of Artificial Intelligence enabled offensive missions.7 This display contributed 13 targets at hostile armour mortar positions with troop concentrations, terror hideouts, radar sites and helipads that were brought down. The drones were synchronised with satellite feeds and area correlation technologies.8 The remarkable thing about these swarm drones was that they were a heterogeneous swarm equipped with a quadcopter, a six-rotor mothership drone and small quadcopters with explosives.9
Unlike the US’ homogenous swarms like Perdix Swarm and DARPA’s Gremlins Swarm, India’s drone swarm seems to be an efficient solution that gives a viable option to the military to construct its variable strategic defence mechanisms as per its requirements. India is also developing drone swarms that can be deployed from fast jets. The drones called Air Launched Flexible Asset–Swarm (ALFA–S), developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Newspace Research & Technologies (NRT) Private Limited, are fully networked through electronic data links and are capable of detecting surface to air missile units, enemy radars and aircraft on the ground.10 This project was pushed considering China’s deployment of surface to air missiles at the Ladakh border.11
Another demonstration of a fully operational decentralised swarm of 25 drones was carried out by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at a three-day defence function in Jhansi in November 2021 to mark the 75th year of Indian Independence. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh highlighted the government’s focus on achieving self-reliant, indigenous solutions in the defence sector. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, on 19 November 2021, handed over the indigenously developed military hardware, including the light combat helicopter, drones and electronic warfare systems to the armed forces.12
Though India is a relatively new entrant into this field, compared to Western powers, it appears set to make rapid progress in developing indigenous drone capabilities. However, the first procurement of drones by the Indian Army dates to the 1990s when it acquired UAVs from Israel. It was first used during the Kargil War in 1999 for photo-reconnaissance.13 The DRDO has also been actively working in the development of drones, and the first fully functional unmanned drone system, Rustom-1, took flight in 2009. Recently, India has further extended its drone capabilities in collaboration with the US via the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), and in 2021, it signed a $3 billion deal for procurement of 30 Predator/ MQ 9 drones that have the ability to carry out long-range precision airstrikes.14
In addition, India has signed a pact of 100 explosive-laden drones with Israel’s Elbit Security Systems and Bengaluru-based Alpha Design-led joint venture. These Sky Striker Drones are loitering munition with long-range capabilities of 100 km range loaded with 5 kg warhead. They are GPS enabled and capable of carrying out covert operations at low altitudes. The Indian armed forces have procured these drones to permanently enhance their operational capabilities, making it a force multiplier in futuristic warfare.15
Indian start-ups are expected to play a significant role towards developing indigenous solutions for drone swarms. Many Indian start-ups like Botlab Dynamics and Alpha Design are developing smart indigenous solutions driven by the latest technologies like AI and edge computing. In the commercial sector, India has already come up with a drone policy. The Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) published the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Rules (UAS) in 2021 and updated rules were published on 13 January 2022. Union Civil Aviation Minister Jyotiraditya Scindia stated that by 2030, India has the potential to be a global drone hub through its policy structure, funding incentive and demand structure.16 The drone policy rules do not apply to the armed forces at this point. However, there have been discussions in the military circles about the need for policy implementations to regulate drone use in the defence sector. In consideration of these advancements, the DRDO, the Indian defence industry, and the Indian government need to constructively strengthen the Indian start-up ecosystem in the drone sector by establishing policy implementations, creating funding initiatives, and building a demand structure.
Globally, the demonstration of military capabilities through ceremonial parades and drills signifies the strategic positioning of countries and their military strength and readiness. In the past, India has avoided displaying its nuclear strength due to geopolitical reasons. However, with the changing dynamics of the battlefield and the nature of warfare, India has realised the imperative of strategic positioning in the global military space and therefore the need to demonstrate power. It also indicates the country’s readiness to use these technology-driven warfare mechanisms when required.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The French Presidency has come at a time when the EU needs a liberal and strong nation at the helm of affairs, which can fine-tune relations with other European countries and stand strong for its principles and values. France fits the deal.
France assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) on 1 January 2022 after 14 years. The Council is the legislative arm of the EU which is entrusted with the role to approve, reject or amend its policy matters. It comprises the executives of the 27 member nations of the EU, headed by the president. Each meeting deals with a specific policy matter and is attended only by those ministers in charge of that policy matter in their respective nations.
Europe’s executives have a range of issues to deal with, starting from climate change, energy crisis, the pandemic and European security issues concerning Ukraine, Poland and Baltics. This is the rationale behind the presidency’s agenda, which has been rightfully flagged by Macron at different intervals. Making EU more sovereign, developing a European model of growth, furthering the green agenda, promoting EU as a stabilising power in the Indo-Pacific, deepening ties with the African Union and reorganising the Schengen area are a few targets that Paris wishes to achieve during the presidential tenure.
Priority Areas
The motto of the Presidency is “Recovery, Power and a Sense of Belonging”.1 The challenges faced by Europe are not new but France’s perch at the helm of the Council have raised Europe’s expectations that several of its woes are going to be heard and addressed. Macron has laid out a deeply ambitious agenda, focusing on the pillars of European sovereignty and strategic autonomy.2 To strengthen sovereignty, the EU Strategic Compass would be adopted by March 2022. It offers policy considerations to strengthen defence and security measures of the EU in the areas of capability development, resilience and crisis management.
On the economic front, Paris has envisioned a European model for growth3 which should align economic development with the climate goals in order to be sustainable. It wants to enforce the European Green Deal, as announced by the President last December. Macron aims to achieve a 55 per cent reduction in emissions by 2030 and initiate regulations supporting deforestation-free products. One of the possible solutions is to impose a carbon tax on imported products and switch to cleaner energy sources within the EU.
On the international stage, Macron has laid bare the need for the EU to stop seeing Africa and Mediterranean as a threat and start recognising their strategic advantages.4 Conferences scheduled on Western Balkans, EU–African Union summit and a ministerial forum on the Indo-Pacific reflect the importance Paris attaches to it.
These priorities are inspired by the endeavours of preceding Slovenian Presidency and co-developed with the efforts of future presidencies of the Czech Republic and Sweden.5
Potential Challenges
The French Presidency comes against the backdrop of an ongoing energy crisis knocking on the EU doors since last October. Europe imports 55.6 per cent6 of its total energy from Russia and it cannot afford to upset the latter beyond a certain point. It will have to link self-reliance and ecological sustainability with economic development to beat this crisis.7 Russia has denied any accusations of limiting gas supply to Europe. In fact, it wanted to increase the supply through the inauguration of Nord Stream 2 (NS 2), which is a contentious issue within the EU.
Proponents of NS 2 feel that it will bring down the fuel prices across Europe and provide impetus to the energy-consuming industries. On the other hand, the opponents consider it as a short-term expensive solution, which will increase the European dependence on Russia. France has always supported the use of nuclear energy as an alternative fuel. In fact, 70 per cent of its power industry runs on nuclear energy.8 Its efforts to include the same as a part of the EU taxonomy (EU’s green energy list) might finally bear fruit.
France will have to resolve this crisis amidst Russia–Ukraine border tensions; Russia has amassed more than 1,06,000 troops at the Ukrainian border.9 The EU has come out in support of Ukraine, threatening to impose harsh sanctions on Russia if it does not deter. NATO has reacted to this security situation at European borders by alerting its troops for a possible attack. The movement among NATO troops is making Russia suspicious of the former's eastward expansion, threatening Russian borders and national security. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has demanded “iron-clad, waterproof, bulletproof, legally binding guarantees”10 against any such expansion of either NATO or the EU. NATO has always followed the open door policy and its leaders have refused to make any amendments to that. Holding constructive talks to resolve this will be a challenge for France since the primary demands from either side is a non-starter for the other.
European countries are also blaming Russia for supporting Belarus to ignite the migratory crisis at the Polish borders. Thousands of migrants are being pushed by the Lukashenko regime to enter the EU via Poland. The EU’s claim is that Russia is trying to win concessions for its stand against NATO by building pressure through covert channels like this. Paris will play a significant role at the future NATO–Russia talks to discuss European and Russian security matters. It will have to doubly assure that no European nation feels sidelined or overpowered by the collective NATO decision. To maintain the cohesive structure of the EU, it is very important that decision making is not exclusive.
The raging pandemic is another concern for the French Presidency amidst such turbulent times. The severity of it would consume time and shift the focus from already set targets to issuing guidelines and regulations to curb the spread of the virus. The number of positive cases has only increased since last month, with France topping the list in Europe.
Another time-taking event during the presidential tenure will be the national elections in France, scheduled for April 2022. As the election nears, we will see a shift in focus from the Council Presidency to the domestic campaign. The Electoral Neutrality clause will keep the electoral candidates from making any public appearances (online and offline) a few weeks before the elections. This will leave Paris with only about four months to achieve the set targets. If Macron falls short, it will prove to be an easy advantage for candidates like Marine Le Pen. But, if he uses the presidency to showcase a perfect blend of French and EU’s interests, with Paris at its helm, that will better suit EU needs.
Favourable Aspects to the Presidential Tenure
France has always had a steady interest in promoting stability and a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific, the prime example being the Global Gateway initiative of the EU, which will boost smart and clean links in digital, health, transport and energy systems across the world. Owing to its friendly relations with France and a long coastline in the Indo-Pacific, India is a natural partner for France in this region of the world. Post the AUKUS alliance, it has been making efforts to align with regional powers and groupings like India and the ASEAN to play a significant role in the Pacific waters. Its overseas territories provide the advantage of having 93 per cent of its exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in and around the Indo-Pacific11, making it a geographic reality for France. Its efforts to give the Indo-Pacific region its due significance in the EU maritime and foreign policies started way before the presidency targets were set.
France has also been making in-house efforts by bringing the European power triangle to the forefront. France signed the Franco-Italian treaty last November12 covering cooperation from defence integration to migration. Improving relations between France, Germany and Italy, inked in various pacts and treaties, will further smoothen the presidential tenure for Paris. The newly elected Scholz government has also been supportive of the French efforts in resolving issues across the bloc. Its biggest example being the statement of German Europe Minister Anna Lührmann regarding “agree to disagree on the issue”13 of nuclear energy. This indicates the German will to work together on matters of the EU.
Conclusion
France’s efforts in making the EU take an interest in the Indo-Pacific as the centre stage of geopolitics and geo-economics along with leading the fight to get nuclear counted as a green source of energy are some of the broad areas that might see a push during the presidential tenure. With Olaf Scholz taking charge in Germany, we could see a fresh cooperation emerging not just between the Franco-German leaders but also with Italy’s Mario Draghi. The Presidency has come at a time when the EU needs a liberal and strong nation at the helm of affairs, which can fine-tune relations with other European countries and stand strong for its principles and values. France fits the deal.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Given Myanmar’s geostrategic significance and the continuing insurgency threat, disturbances in Myanmar pose a direct and serious policy challenge to India. A calculated realistic approach weighing the evolving ground situation alone will deliver the objectives of India’s foreign policy.
Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla paid a working visit to Myanmar on 22–23 December 2021. His visit came at a time when the decade-long democratisation process in Myanmar stood derailed. Almost a year ago, the military, headed by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, staged a coup overthrowing the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February 2021—the very day the new Parliament was to meet. The Myanmar military now rules through a newly formed body—the State Administrative Council (SAC)—after annulling the November 2020 election results, as per which Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won 396 of the 476 (contested) parliamentary seats while the army’s party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), managed to secure only 33 seats. The military refused to accept the results. Even though a large number of ethnic minority voters were excluded, independent election observers did not find any systemic irregularities.1
The National Unity Government (NUG) was set up as a government-in-exile and a Federal Democracy Charter was drafted keeping the ethnic minorities into consideration; it has also attempted to organise a People’s Defence Force with the support of some ethnic armed organisations.2 The Civil Disobedience Movement that followed the coup was brutally suppressed by the military, with reportedly over 1,480 people killed and about 11,583 arrested, as of 14 January 2022, according to a local human rights group called the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.3
The coup and the COVID-19 pandemic have had a negative impact on Myanmar’s economy, which was on the path of reform since 2011. As per the estimates of The Economist Intelligence Unit, Myanmar will be among the worst economic performers in Southeast Asia in 2021–22, despite being one of the top performers before the coup.4
While the West (United States, United Kingdom and the European Union) has resorted to targeted sanctions against Myanmar’s military officials, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) approach has been somewhat ambivalent because of the lack of unity among its members. ASEAN works on the basis of the consensus principle and in that sense each member holds a sort of veto over any decision that has to be taken by the organisation. It may be recalled that the first time that ASEAN ended a meeting without issuing a joint statement was in July 2012 when Cambodia as ASEAN chair refused to allow any mention of the South China dispute under Chinese pressure.
It is to be noted that only eight countries were represented at Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day Parade held on 27 March 2021. These included the Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Defence Attaches of India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. India’s representation underlined the significance India attached to its relations with the Myanmar Government.
Indian Stakes in Myanmar
Given Myanmar’s geostrategic significance and the continuing insurgency threat, disturbances in Myanmar pose a direct and serious policy challenge to New Delhi. As such it constitutes a crucial element in the success of India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’, ‘Act East’ and ‘Indo-Pacific’ policies. It may be recalled that the joint visit of Foreign Secretary Shringla and Army Chief General Naravane in October 2020 was undertaken in the backdrop of the developments in Rakhine and to provide succour in the form of vaccine and other aid to help Myanmar tide over the pandemic.5
Interestingly, Foreign Secretary Shringla’s December 2021 visit coincided with Senior General Hlaing’s announcement of plans to hold a fresh general election in the country in August 2023, after lifting the state of emergency.6 According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Secretary Shringla’s visit was intended to convey to the military rulers the urgency to restore democracy in Myanmar at the earliest. He met not only the military rulers but also the representatives of the NLD, civil society representatives and foreign diplomats. He also reiterated New Delhi’s support for the ASEAN centrality and the Five-Point Consensus 7 that had been announced at the Jakarta Summit on 24 April 2021 (attended also by Senior General Hlaing).
During his visit, Foreign Secretary Shringla handed over one million doses of “Made in India” COVID vaccines and announced a grant of 10,000 tonnes of rice and wheat to Myanmar. He expressed India’s continued support to development projects along the India–Myanmar border, and commitment to expedite ongoing connectivity projects such as the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the Trilateral Highway. The two countries also “reiterated their commitment to ensure that their respective territories would not be allowed to be used for any activities inimical to the other”.8
There are serious security and related factors that need to be kept into consideration when it comes to India–Myanmar relations. The killing of the Commanding Officer of Assam Rifles, Col Viplav Tripathi together with his wife and child and four other security personnel in an ambush in Manipur in November 2021, signalled the revival of insurgent activity on India–Myanmar border in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF) were reactivated.9
The Arakan Army (AA) on the Myanmar side of the border continues to be a source of concern for India. It must be remembered that it was the coordinated operations of the Indian Army and the Tatmadaw under the Operation Sunrise I and II which helped in dealing with the Arakan Army in the period before the coup.10
Another source of concern for the Centre has been the large-scale influx of refugees from Myanmar to the bordering states of Manipur and Mizoram in particular. New Delhi’s directive (10 March 2021) to the four Northeastern States to stem the tide, was countered by Mizoram Chief Minister’s request to the Prime Minister (18 March 2021) to allow Myanmar nationals belonging to the Chin community to be provided asylum on humanitarian ground. This instance once again highlights the need for close coordination among the central and state governments in the sensitive Northeastern region, in shaping our strategy with regard to the government in such an important neighbouring country.
China uses Infrastructure Diplomacy as a powerful foreign policy tool. The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) through Myanmar has only exacerbated India’s concerns regarding the influence of China in Myanmar and the region. Sanctions and boycott by the West could once again lead to the international isolation of Myanmar which would inevitably push it into further dependence on China.
China shares a 2100-km long border with Myanmar and seeks access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar. Its influence in Myanmar had steadily increased during the period of military rule (1962–2011). Chinese influence got a boost with the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Myanmar in January 2020, when over 30 important agreements were signed (including those relating to Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone and Kyaukphyu deep-sea port).11 Earlier in 2018, Myanmar and China had signed an MoU to establish the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a 1700-km corridor meant to connect Kunming to Myanmar’s economic hubs, first to Mandalay and then east to Yangon and west to Kyaukphyu.12
It is the security imperative that prompted India to deepen military-to-military ties, giving them a batter of field guns and building border roads for them. In future, India may consider providing them non-lethal equipment. Significantly, India had also given Myanmar its very first submarine, a Russian-built Project 877 Kilo class boat, in 2020.13 It was reported that Myanmar Navy had already got the submarine training from Pakistan as early as 2013 when it did not have submarines.14 It is to be noted that the very next day after Shringla’s visit, on 24 December 2021, on the 74th anniversary of Myanmar Navy, it commissioned a Type 035 or Ming-class diesel submarine (renamed UMS Minye Kyaw Htin) which it had received from Chinese PLA Navy. China has already sold two refurbished Type 035G submarines to Bangladesh and the newer S26T submarine to Thailand. China has emerged as a key arms supplier to Myanmar. Myanmar’s navy is equipped with a Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missile, while its air force operates several Chinese-built aircraft (including the Chengdu JF-17 Thunder fighter jet and Shaanxi Y-8 transport).15
Summing Up
India once again faces a dilemma on the approach it should take towards Myanmar. On the one hand, India is concerned that the democratic gains made by Myanmar over the previous decades should not be undermined,16 on the other, security interests militate against vitiating our understanding with the Tatmadaw. State Power remained concentrated in the Myanmar military for nearly half a century and hybrid democracy that began to emerge in the last decade (2011–2021) was constrained by the provisions of the 2008 Constitution which still gave considerable leeway to the Military. Myanmar’s ethnic conflict has remained unresolved since its independence in 1948. The ongoing Civil Disobedience Movement in the midst of the pandemic, and China’s growing influence, presents a scenario which appears to defy easy solution in the short term. A cautious approach while engaging other stakeholders at the second track level could possibly guide us to the light at the end of the tunnel. The bottom line is—a hard calculated realistic approach weighing the evolving ground situation alone will deliver the objectives of our foreign policy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pakistan’s NSP, the first such policy document with guidelines for achieving the set national security goals, is a hint towards breaking the inertia and embracing change to forge a more prosperous Pakistan. However, the question is whether it is possible, if Pakistan continues to remain entangled with the past.
Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan launched a public version of the National Security Policy (NSP) document on 14 January which sets out the state’s national security vision.1 It is being flaunted by the Imran Khan-led government as the first such policy document with guidelines for achieving the set national security goals. Before releasing the public version of NSP, the original and classified document was approved in the federal cabinet on 28 December 2021.2
The document has been prepared by National Security Division (NSD) after seven years of consultations with relevant official stakeholders. The document is meant for five years, starting from 2022, and is supposed to be updated by NSD in demanding circumstances that have implications for Pakistan’s security. It can also be updated whenever a new government is formed in the country.3
For a long time, there was a debate in Pakistan that the country lacks a comprehensive national security policy to secure national goals. Often the responses were seen as reactionary, right from joining the US block in the wake of the Cold War to joining the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan and later participating in the US-led war on Afghanistan. In the form of NSP, an attempt has been made to bring traditional and non-traditional strands of security under one umbrella to provide overarching policy guidance.
The NSP is divided into eight sections. Placing economic security at the core, it seeks to identify some national security objectives and priority areas where it wants Pakistan’s federal and provincial governments to invest resources in coming years. Though the document appears extensive on paper, it is silent on how the government of Pakistan and federating units can achieve those objectives. It also identifies many challenges that Pakistan faces, for a change going beyond India, but it does not offer any concrete solution that can help Pakistan to be different from what it has become.
On National Security and National Cohesion
The NSP in the second section conceptualises the national security policy. It places citizen’s security and dignity at the centre. It envisions Pakistan safeguarding its sovereignty by “ensuring national cohesion and harmony, preserving territorial integrity, enhancing economic independence and ensuring the writ of the state.”4 Furthermore, the NSP identifies three challenges that Pakistan’s national security face. These challenges are purely economic in nature. This is where the document seems to have broadened its scope as it looks beyond that perennial “eternal enemy” —India. The three challenges are external imbalance, vertical inequalities and horizontal inequalities. For long-term sustainability, addressing the external imbalance or higher foreign exchange outflow is seen as significant. The vertical inequality manifested in the gap between rich and poor is to be addressed by providing direct support to vulnerable citizens. The disparity in the economic development of various regions is seen as a major concern which the sub-nationalist elements exploit “to generate a narrative of grievance based on underdevelopment in their regions.”5 The horizontal inequalities or more precisely the regional aspirations are supposed to be addressed through development packages.
The NSP uses the catchphrase “unity in diversity” twice and sees it as a guiding principle for national cohesion. However, the document does not offer any solution to curb religious radicalisation in the country. Instead, it identifies Pakistan as “an Islamic state” and sees the unknown external hand involved in shaping the discourse around ethnic, religious and social differences. To counter this, the document calls for the promotion of undefined “inclusive national discourse” and bats for the preservation of the Islamic character as enshrined in the country’s constitution. Can the preservation of Islamic character and promotion of inter-faith harmony really help Pakistan when the state is not ready to free the people from the narrow ideological paradigm of nationalism? The promotion of Pakistan as an Islamic state has proved counterproductive, and the fact that it is not achievable in the modern state system is entirely overlooked. As pointed out by Ashok Behuria in his recent book, the first and foremost step that can help Pakistan to reimagine itself as a stable state is to “deemphasize on Islam as a major referent in the conduct of state affairs”.6
On India and Pakistan’s Territorial Integrity
The fifth section of the document talks about the conventional military threats, maritime competition, deterrence in the South Asian region, space and cyber security issues. It also highlights the increasing role of military and law enforcement agencies in ensuring the defence and territorial integrity of the country.
At the centre of this section is India. Barring the three mentions of the Indian Ocean, the name of India appears 14 times in the document and only once it talks positively about it saying “Pakistan wishes to improve its relationship with India”.7 At all other mentions, the approach is negative. Expressing concerns over the alleged ceasefire violations by India, the document wants Pakistan to shift attention towards the Line of Control and the Working Boundary.
In the case of maritime security, the document without naming any country denounces the self-professed role of any one country as a net security provider in the wider Indian Ocean. The expansion of India’s triad and investment in modern technologies is seen as something that disturbs the regional balance. Again, without naming India or Afghanistan, the policy document sees the prospects of violent conflict growing with the increase in what it calls “regressive and dangerous ideology” in Pakistan’s immediate neighbourhood. The document does not rule out the possibility of use of force “as a deliberate policy choice” by “the adversary” and reiterates the commitment of defending the territory in response to any such misadventure. Such a scenario calls for a renewed focus on strengthening Pakistan’s capabilities including the deterrence regime and an astute investment for modernisation of armed forces.
On Pakistan’s Internal Security
The section on internal security is important in the sense that it talks about issues that have been challenging the writ of the state of Pakistan: Sub-nationalist movements, sectarianism and terrorism. Preventing the formation of alternative centres of power and authority and ensuring the writ of the state in all regions of the country is the policy objective underlined in this section.
Though the realisation that terrorism undermines state stability and national harmony seems timely; the solution offered to address them appears hollow and ineffective. The document aims to address the grievances by addressing the structural deficiency and a sense of deprivation in areas of recruitment and by promoting “a pluralistic anti-terror narrative”. At the same time, the document downplays the challenge of sub-national movements by writing them off as “fringe” elements being exploited by “hostile intelligence agencies”. It also sees the socio-economic disparity as an enabling factor for sub-national aspirations and seeks to employ a four-pronged strategy of engagement like distinguishing reconcilables from irreconcilables (most probably in Baluchistan), cutting off recruitment, constricting financial sources and pursuing targeted socio-economic policies to address this issue. In order to deal with violent extremist ideologies, the document seeks to promote a “united narrative” and expand de-radicalisation programmes. This indeed is going to be the biggest challenge as mainstreaming people who have been trained along the lines of an extremist ideology for decades is not going to be easy.
On Foreign Policy and Kashmir
The policy agenda in a section about foreign policy is set in the backdrop of the continuous changes in the geo-political arena. The document guides Pakistan to adopt a dynamic approach in a world where great power competition defines the race over resources and issue-based partnership is being preferred over regionalism as an alternative mechanism of cooperation. The approach is to leverage political relations for economic gains. Given Pakistan’s geo-economic location, the document sees the country as a melting pot of regional and global economic interests. However, for this to happen, Pakistan would need to prove itself as a responsible state.
The policy document maintains that Pakistan is willing to have a mutually beneficial relationship with all major powers and is committed towards “normalization of relations with its neighbours based on mutual respect and sovereign equality including India”.8 At the same time, it raises the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and blames India for having “hegemonic designs” and responsible for frozen bilateral ties. The document reiterates the same old policy about Jammu and Kashmir that “resolution of Jammu and Kashmir dispute remains a vital national security interest for Pakistan.”9 There is an assertion that Pakistan would continue to provide moral, legal and diplomatic support to the people of Kashmir until they achieve the right to self-determination. It goes on to talk about India’s arms build-up and access to advanced technologies and perceives India’s inclusion into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) despite being a non-signatory to NPT as a major concern.
Pakistan seeks to fulfil all the objectives mentioned in the document and those in the last section like health security, sustainable water management and gender security through what it calls the “whole-of-nation approach” which entails synergising collective effort. There is a hint towards breaking the inertia of the status quo and embracing change to forge a more prosperous Pakistan. However, the question is whether it is possible, if Pakistan continues to remain entangled with the past. Unless and until all institutions in Pakistan work together to define the statecraft in liberal terms and the secular elite stops forging unholy alliances with Islamists who keep on fostering an image of India as an “eternal enemy”, a change seems unlikely.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
In order to maintain a semblance of balance in its ties with its two key strategic partners, Kazakhstan would perhaps have to leverage its geo-strategic importance for both Moscow and Beijing to navigate the new Arctic route.
Kazakhstan, a landlocked nation located in the Eurasian region, relies on neighbouring nations like Turkmenistan (gateway to Iran and Afghanistan), Russia (gateway to Europe) and Uzbekistan (gateway to Tajikistan and Turkey) as gateways for trade.1 Though land routes are considered to be economically effective for small cargo, the same is not true for heavy oversized cargo due to tonnage and bridge limits.2 Therefore, Northern Sea Route is being seen as a viable alternative by Kazakhstan, considering the limitations posed by the land routes.
Quest for Arctic Trade Route
In his article, titled “Kazakhstan Looks for a New Arctic Trade Route”, Malte Humpert argues that Kazakhstan is exploring the Irtysh-Ob river system as an option to gain access to the world’s oceans through the Arctic.3 For this, Kazakhstan has sought to utilise the navigation potential of the Ob-Irtysh River, a transnational river connecting China, Kazakhstan and Russia to Sabetta Port in the Arctic region of Russia. Irtysh is the largest tributary of the Ob River (2,640 kms long), which originates in the Chinese Altai Mountains and flows northwest towards eastern Kazakhstan. Irtysh meets the Ob at the Khanty-Mansiysk area of Russia before flowing into the Arctic Ocean near the Yamal Peninsula.4
Crucially, Russia has used the river’s inland water system for its transportation needs since the Tsarist period. During the Soviet era, this river system was an important transport link in the development of Western Siberian oil and gas complex (WSOGC).5 The cargo transportation through the river increased from 6.3 to 18.5 million tons during the 1950–60s.6
Post the collapse of the Soviet Union, transportation of cargo through the river reduced. However, the potential to revive inland cargo transportation has found a new lease after Russia formulated its Arctic Policy in 2008. The policy focusses on the use of the Russian Arctic Zone as a strategic base with emphasis being placed on the Northern Sea Route being the single focal point for transport and communication, etc.7
Interestingly, Kazakhstan has shown promise in the revival of the Northern Aral Sea thereby showing that it understands the importance and the potential of water navigation.8
Today, Irtysh is one of the few rivers where shipping is possible and river transport is developed. The presence of Kazakhstan’s four main ports—Pavlodar, Semey, Ust Kamenogorsk and Bukhtarminsky—on the Irtysh further enhances its prospects for inland transport (Map 1). The four river ports have the necessary infrastructure for intermodal transportation9 in terms of mechanised handling capacity and storage facilities. Pavlodar has the capacity to handle 13.2 thousand tonnes per working hour, having two berths—one of cargo length (650 m) and the other for passengers (120 m).10 This highlights the capability of Pavlodar port which would act as one of the main ports for the Arctic route from Kazakhstan.
Map 1. The Proposed Trade Route for Kazakhstan using the Irtysh River and the inland Kazakh Ports. River Irtysh originates in China, and flows towards Semey and Pavlodar in Kazakhstan. It joins Ob River in Russia that finally terminates at Sabetta port.
Source: Malte Humpert, “Kazakhstan Looks to the Arctic for a New Trade Route”, High North News, 5 March 2019.
Prospects
When it comes to the Arctic, Russia is the undisputed military and economic superpower.11 Therefore, Kazakhstan, which has a robust partnership with Russia particularly in the economic and security fields, is likely to benefit from engaging Russia in gaining access to the Arctic through Russia. This could open up new economic opportunities for Astana.
The Ob-Irtysh river system penetrates deep into the heart of Eurasia thus offering Kazakhstan an opportunity for direct access to ocean trade lines.12 The river transits through Russia’s Sabetta Port which opens up to the Kara Sea and the Arctic Ocean, providing access to the European and East Asian markets.13
While the existing land trade routes are likely to be more competitive, yet an Arctic maritime route could act as an alternative in the event of a blockade. The feasibility of the project from Russia to Kazakhstan was successfully tested in 2016 by transporting two large chemical reactors, each weighing more than 600 tons, from South Korea to Kazakhstan’s Pavlodar Port using the Northern Sea Route and the inland Ob-Irtysh river system (Map 2).14 Today, Sabetta Port, the largest port on the Northern Sea Route, has seen its cargo handling capacity grow more than five-fold.15
Map 2. The trade route which was used for shipping of the chemical reactors from South Korea to Kazakhstan in 2016.
Source: Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
Since the main focus of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy concept on water resources and water security has been China, it solidifies its relations with China and ensures that it provides further space for diplomatic engagement between them.16 China and Kazakhstan share a cordial relationship. The two nations share two rivers Ili and Irtysh, both of which originate in China and then flow into Kazakhstan. China also accounts for the highest water flowing from abroad into Kazakhstan. This is equal to 18 per cent of the Kazakhstan’s total water availability.17 In 2014, Kazakhstan advocated a foreign policy concept which stated “to continue to improve the legal framework with neighbouring countries on the usage and protection of Trans boundary water resources to enhance water security and water saving” with particular focus on China.18
China also happens to be Kazakhstan’s second largest trading partner and a key pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It has been heavily involved in constructing its biggest dry port at Khorgos connecting Kazakhstan with China through rail.19 With the river associated with the Arctic trade route emerging from China, Kazakhstan is likely to need the support of the upper riparian state, i.e., China to implement the connectivity project.
The flipside regarding the Kremlin’s assistance is that the maritime cooperation is likely to provide Russia with more tools to involve itself in Kazakh affairs. Similarly, China’s treatment of Uighur Muslims in bordering Xinjiang remains an issue of concern for Kazakhstan. While Astana has largely remained silent on this issue, its temporary refuge to four convicted ethnic Kazakh Chinese citizens from Xinjiang in 2020 could act as a bone of contention in the future.20 The fact remains that several ethnic Kazakhs have been detained in Chinese re-education camps in Xinjiang.21
Conclusion
Kazakhstan is exploring alternative trade routes to enhance its economic potential. An Arctic route anchored in in-land waterways could open up Kazakhstan to the rest of the world. The involvement of Russia and China in this alternative route, while crucial for its success, may come at a price. In order to maintain a semblance of balance in its ties with its two key strategic partners, Kazakhstan would perhaps have to leverage its geo-strategic importance for both Moscow and Beijing to navigate the new Arctic route.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
By enabling access to logistics and support facilities at each other’s bases and ports, RELOS would enhance strategic cooperation between India and Russia, and promote their future manoeuvres in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean Region.
India and Russia maintain a rigorous framework of bilateral cooperation. The annual India–Russia summit held in December 2021 in New Delhi led to the signing and acknowledgement of multiple important agreements between the two countries.1 Though several issues of mutual interest were discussed during the summit, agreement on an important Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS) could not be reached.2 RELOS remains to be a crucial agreement between India and Russia as both the countries plan to increase their bilateral investments in the Arctic region and Russian Far East.
What is RELOS?
The Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement is a long-awaited administrative agreement that would enable the militaries of both the countries to access logistics and support facilities at each other’s bases and ports.3 It would facilitate the replenishment of fuel, rations, spare parts and berthing for troops, warships and aircrafts while operating away from home ports and bases during the war and peacetime missions. The agreement would enable maintenance facilities to warships and military aircraft at each other’s bases. RELOS would further ensure smooth use of the host nation’s existing logistics networks which would reduce the overall costs of the mission and provide a strategic edge to each other’s military operations.
Significance for India
India has signed military logistics agreements with several countries in the past. This includes the India–US Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), India–Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and India–Australia Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), demonstrating all the Quad countries. Apart from this, India maintains such military logistics agreements with France, Singapore and South Korea. It is currently in the process of finalising such an agreement with the UK and Vietnam.4 Signing RELOS with Russia would add to greater strategic cooperation between the two countries.
Economic and Geo-strategic Significance
India’s interests in the Arctic region are increasing and it is keen to make investments particularly in the exploration of Russian oil, gas and other rare earth minerals in the near future. It is likely that these investments would increase further in future, therefore some kind of strategic security backing is required to safeguard India’s investments in the Arctic. At present, India does not maintain any port facility or naval base in this region as a whole. An agreement such as RELOS would enable Indian Navy to have greater operational reach in the Arctic. It would provide logistics and other required facilities to Indian naval ships venturing through the region. Further, in case of any hostile situation arising in the region, RELOS would enable greater coordination between the Indian and Russian Navy to respond appropriately in the region. The major Russian naval ports are shown in Map 1.
Map 1. Major Russian Naval Ports
Source: Dang Wang et al., “Development Situation and Future Demand for the Ports along the Northern Sea Route”, Research in Transportation Business & Management, Vol. 33, December 2019.
Emerging Shipping Connectivity
The Arctic sea-ice along the Russian coast is receding drastically. The Northern Sea Route is humming with shipping activity that is significantly increasing annually. India has openly called for supporting the Russian vision of developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR).5 From Vladivostok in the Far East to Murmansk in the west, Russia maintains a vast stretch of naval port infrastructure along the NSR. As the shipping activity in the NSR increases, Russia is also in the process of reviving its old naval bases of Soviet times and is simultaneously enhancing existing naval port infrastructure in the region. The signing of RELOS between India and Russia, would open India’s access to Russian Arctic naval ports and military bases from Vladivostok to Murmansk and beyond. India, does not have its own full-fledged base or naval docking or refuelling facility in the Arctic, but through RELOS it would have access to all such facilities in the near future. As China’s strategic reach and presence in the Arctic grows with its third heavy (nuclear powered) ice-breaker ship inline for entering into polar waters6 it becomes extremely important for India to have such an agreement as RELOS in conclusion with its traditional strategic partner, Russia.
Strategic Counterweights
India has signed logistics agreements with all its partner Quad countries. Though Russia is openly critical of the Quad and has maintained distance from the alliance, RELOS could strategically act as counterweight leverage to both India and Russia in the Indo-Pacific. The similar lines on which RELOS would enable the Indian Navy’s reach in the Russian Far East and the Arctic region, it would also provide logistics support and easy access of required facilities to the Russian Navy via Indian naval ports and military bases located in the Indian Ocean. RELOS in a way, without involving Russia in the Quad, would facilitate and strengthen Russian naval presence in the Indo-Pacific to any future hostile scenarios in the region. Enhanced naval cooperation between India and Russia through RELOS would not only act as a counterweight to increasing US strategic posturing in the region, but for Russia, it will also balance the strategic power equation with its evolving partner China in the region. It can also be argued that India’s approach to Indo-Pacific closely resembles to that of Russia’s conceptual approach of Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) through which Russia aims to strengthen its geo-economic and geopolitical positioning from Lisbon to Vladivostok.7 Strengthening India–Russia partnership on framework such as RELOS could take Russian vision of GEP further from Vladivostok to Indian Ocean and the Indian vision till the Russian high north.
Conclusion
The bilateral relationship between India and Russia has grown and matured over time, and needs to be carried forward in existing and new areas of mutual interest. The Arctic offers tremendous opportunities for enhancing this cooperation at the helm of which RELOS could act as perfect leverage. India has very limited polar infrastructure and shipping capabilities to operate in the Arctic waters. Russia on the other hand is the only country in the world that maintains a strong dominance over Arctic shipping and other polar infrastructure capabilities required to operate in the region. Therefore, partnering with Russia via an agreement such as RELOS would offer tremendous support and opportunities to India in the Arctic. While India develops its polar-capable infrastructure to support its interest in the Arctic, RELOS would significantly enable India to undertake its Arctic operations with Russian assistance.
Also, the scale at which China is becoming increasingly assertive in the Arctic in terms of infrastructure development, shipping, energy and resource investments projects, and even in decision-making bodies like the Arctic Council, should be noted by India. Though the Indo-Pacific would continue to be a key area of India’s maritime domains, India cannot ignore the physical and geopolitical transitions occurring in the Arctic. India’s priorities in the Arctic are quite different and independent to other countries’ (especially China’s) emerging engagements in the region. India’s primary engagements in the Arctic are focused on understanding scientific interconnections between Arctic sea ice melting and changes in Indian monsoon systems. India still cannot afford to lose the sight of geopolitical and geo-economic transitions emerging in the region, where states like China are pursuing dominant economic and strategic posturing in the region. Therefore, RELOS would initially act as a support mechanism to Indian naval ships venturing into Arctic waters for routine voyages to mark their strategic reach and presence in the region.
Russia has called for rapidly developing Arctic infrastructure to enabling year-round shipping along the NSR8. Moscow has also agreed for supplying oil and gas to India at a “preferential pricing”9 and ship them via the northern Arctic route. India’s support to develop NSR and its call for turning it into an international trade artery show the country’s serious interests in the emerging connectivity routes of the region.10 Under India’s Act East Policy, India has promised a US$ 1 billion Line of Credit for the development of Russian Far East.11 Indian and Russian companies have identified energy, transport and logistics, maritime connectivity, diamond processing, forestry, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, tourism and humanitarian fields as key areas of future cooperation in the Russian Far East.12 Calling Vladivostok a true Sangam, Prime Minister Modi has also called for developing Chennai–Vladivostok Maritime Corridor (CVMC) by connecting the ports of Chennai, Visakhapatnam and Kolkata to that with Vladivostok, Vostochny and Olga on the east coast of Russia.13 Once fully implemented, CVMC will enhance bilateral trade between the two countries to significant levels and it will also serve as an extension to NSR up till the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, RELOS at the center of this would enhance strategic cooperation between India and Russia. It would act as an important existing mechanism to promote future manoeuvres of both the countries in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean Region in times to come.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The recent visit of Sheikh Hasina to the Maldives provided an opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relationship and enhance connectivity, trade and commerce between the two countries. The visit also signified Bangladesh’s growing importance in the international politics.
The Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina went on a six-day visit to the Maldives from 22 to 27 December 2021. This was her first visit to the archipelagic nation, which took place soon after Bangladesh celebrated the 50th year of its liberation from Pakistan. Though this visit was meant for boosting the bilateral relationship, it also signified that Bangladesh, previously seen as a poor country, has made considerable progress.
On the eve of Hasina’s visit, the Central Bank of Bangladesh announced a loan of US$ 200 million (MVR 3.08 billion) to the Maldives.1 This loan was sought by the Maldivian president Ibrahim Mohamed Solih during his visit to Dhaka in March 2021. Bangladesh saw it as a moment of pride and agreed to give the loan after a meeting took place between the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh and the Central Bank of Bangladesh.2
During the visit, both countries signed three documents and renewed one. The first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on the Recruitment of Health Professionals, while another MoU was on Cooperation in the Areas of Youth and Sports Development. Both sides also signed an Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation. The MoU on the Areas of Healthcare and Medical Sciences was renewed.
Bangladesh gifted 13 military vehicles to the Maldives as a token of friendship. On behalf of Bangladesh, the Chief of Army Staff General SM Shafiuddin Ahmed in a symbolic way handed over the keys of the military vehicles to the Maldives’ Chief of Defence Force Major General Abdullah Shamaal.
While the countries assessed the whole gamut of their bilateral relationship, the main objective of the visit was to address the issue of legal and illegal Bangladeshi migrants in the Maldives.3 Maldives has nearly 1,00,000 Bangladeshis living and working there. It is estimated that half of this population are illegal migrants.4 For Maldives, a small archipelago nation of 4,00,000 people, this large number of Bangladeshi population has become a matter of security concern. In 1988, Maldives saw a coup attempt by a Sri Lankan militant organistion, People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) in league with some Maldivians when Abdul Gayoom was the president.5 Though at that time, the coup was averted with the help of India, a section in Maldives is still apprehensive of growing Bangladeshi population in the country, especially since majority are illegal migrants.
Moreover, both Bangladesh and Maldives have been facing the problem of religious radicalisation. Maldives fears that illegal migration would worsen this problem further. Maldives’ economy is largely based on tourism and any increase in cases of terrorism could adversely affect it. Bangladesh tried to reassure Maldives that it does not allow terror activities on its soil. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Maldivian President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih who also vowed to fight terrorism and extremism together to ensure regional and global peace and prosperity.6
For Bangladesh, sending people abroad to work is an important part of its foreign policy. Bangladesh is the eighth largest foreign remittance receiving country, with its expatriates working in various countries across the world. It received about US$ 21.75 billion remittance in 2020.7 The remittance received from expatriates is an important part of Bangladesh’s GDP, and has also played a significant role in the development of the country which was seen as very backward at the time of its liberation. The crucial role played by the immigrants in bringing prosperity to both the countries was highlighted by Sheikh Hasina during her visit.
Bangladesh actually urged Maldives to accept more migrants from the country, especially doctors. After the pandemic, Maldives wants to improve its healthcare system and needs specialist doctors and nurses. Besides, Maldives is also planning more resorts which could create job opportunities for Bangladeshis. Understandably, Bangladesh wants to seize these opportunities.
During her visit, Hasina tried to address the problems faced by the Bangladeshi population living in Maldives. In a meeting with the Bangladeshi expatriates, Hasina said that the government would make arrangements for the exchange of currencies between Bangladesh and the Maldives, so that the expatriates do not face any problems in sending money back to Bangladesh. She also acknowledged that expatriates are suffering losses as they have to first buy dollars and then send their money to Bangladesh which again is converted in taka. She mentioned that the Probashi Kallyan Bank of Bangladesh has been asked to take appropriate steps in this regard.
To fulfil a long-pending demand of Bangladeshi expatriates in Maldives, US-Bangla Airlines started operating flights to Male, the capital of Maldives from November 2021.8 Hasina also informed the expatriates that Bangladesh Biman Airlines is set to introduce air connectivity with the Maldives via Chennai in India.9
Both the countries have shown interest in enhancing connectivity, trade and commerce. In February 2021, Dhaka and Maldives signed two MoUs— one on the training of Foreign Service officials and another on human resources’ recruitment. Subsequently in March 2021, four more MoUs were signed on trade, tourism, fisheries and health. When the Vice President of the Maldives visited Dhaka in November 2021, he had talked about establishing a direct link between Maldives and Chittagong, an important port of Bangladesh.
The establishment of a direct shipping line between the two countries could help in reducing the transportation cost, since at present the Bangladeshi products need to be exported via Singapore or Colombo. The volume of the present trade between Maldives and Bangladesh is about US$ 7 million. Bangladesh’s imports from Maldives are worth US$ 3 million and its export to the country is worth about US$ 4 million.10 The present exports of Bangladesh to Maldives target its Bangladeshi population living there. However, Maldives too imports its food and other essential items. Bangladesh now also wants to target Maldivians and intends to export vegetables, processed food, ceramics, leather goods, readymade garments, jute products and pharmaceutical products.
President Solih and Sheikh Hasina also expressed their intention to address and counter the threats posed by organised crime, piracy, narcotic and human trafficking, through multilateral and regional forums including Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). In this regard, Bangladesh pointed out that it has assumed the Chairmanship of IORA for the first time, since October 2021. It sought the support of Maldives so that both sides could work together towards greater maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean Region. Solih assured his cooperation to Bangladesh in this regard.11
Bangladesh was also successful in enlisting the support of Maldives on the issue of the forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals. Maldives has criticised Myanmar for the atrocities committed against the Rohingya Muslim community and commended Bangladesh for graciously hosting them. President Solih appreciated Bangladesh’s efforts to offer shelter and protection to the Rohingyas and to facilitate their repatriation to Myanmar.
Bangladesh is graduating from the Least Developed Country (LDC) status by 2026, which means that certain privileges enjoyed by the country as an LDC state would be taken away. To deal with this, Bangladesh aspires to build stronger relations with the regional countries for boosting trade and connectivity. It also wants to ensure that the Bangladeshi migrants working in foreign countries continue to be an important source of its GDP. At the same time, Bangladesh is also trying to show its growing importance in international politics which it has achieved due to the strength of its economy. Hasina’s visit to the Maldives was successful in achieving all these objectives.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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