Intersecting Geo-economics and Geopolitics: Nord Stream 2 and Europe
Swasti Rao
December 10, 2021
Nord Stream 2, a Russian undersea gas pipeline project that intends to deliver natural gas from Siberia to Germany, currently sits at an intersection of several geopolitical and geo-economic cross-currents that determine the economic security as well as the geostrategic balance of Europe.
Nord Stream 2 (NS-2), a 1200-km long Russian undersea gas pipeline project that intends to deliver natural gas from Siberia to Germany, has been controversial since inception, and is back in news as a major geopolitical flashpoint. Biden administration (the third US administration in succession to oppose the project) imposed on it a fresh round of sanctions on 23 November 2021 under Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019.1 The sanctions came only a couple of weeks after US Senator Jim Risch, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on 5 November 2021, introduced amendments to the FY National Defense Authorization Act that would provide Ukraine with material support in the face of Russian aggression.2 Meant to put pressure on Russia, these sanctions and amendments have come at a time when Russia is deploying troops along the Ukrainian border fuelling speculations of a potential invasion on the lines of Crimea in 2014.3 As per Ukraine’s defence ministry, about 90,000 troops have been deployed in border areas and especially along the vulnerable eastern part of Ukraine where Russia has been fanning separatism since decades.4 Russia, on the contrary, seems to be worried about Ukraine’s military build-up along the same and wants NATO to guarantee against eastward movement.5 Russian position, however, needs to be taken with a pinch of salt because its approach towards gas pipeline politics and isolating Ukraine has been around since almost a decade.
On the economic front, the already sky-high prices of natural gas have jumped by 10 per cent in Europe after Germany's energy regulator Bundesnetzagentur suspended the approval process for Russia's NS-2 gas pipeline in mid-November. The regulator said the Swiss-based "Nord Stream 2 AG" operating company (branch of the Russian Gazprom) first needs to comply with the German law before it could be certified, thereby potentially delaying the project's start date.6 It wants the Russian company behind the project to form a local subsidiary (currently based in Switzerland), to operate the German part of the pipeline.
It can be said that the gas pipeline project sits at an intersection of several geopolitical and geo-economic cross-currents that today determine the economic security as well as the geostrategic balance of Europe.
Ukraine’s Dilemma
NS-2 is one of the several pipelines that Russia has laid underwater in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea to replace pipelines that already run through Eastern Europe, especially through Ukraine. Earlier this year, Hungary too has agreed for a new long-term gas supply deal with Russia that will, once again, bypass Ukraine.7 From the Ukrainian perspective, this project constitutes an “integral element of Moscow’s policy targeted towards the Ukrainian state whose long-time strategic goal is to eliminate Ukraine from the European gas transit network and to weaken the state, also by hitting its budget”.8 Transiting gas from Russia to Europe through Soviet era pipelines, is an integral part of Ukraine’s economy fetching them US$ 2.5–3 billon transit fee per annum.9 The Ukrainian fears find further ground because Russia does not want to extend its gas transit contract with Ukraine after 2024 when the current deal between Naftogaz (Ukrainian gas company) and Gazprom (Russian gas giant) ends. Instead of repairing the already existing facilities at half the price, Russia is interested in replacing those with a new mega expensive NS-2 that will create different gas flows for Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Through bypassing Ukraine, Russia is killing two birds with one stone. Weakening and isolating Ukraine and increasing its influence in Europe, both to the disapproval and dismay of US and NATO. NS-2 has been leveraged as a political weapon by Putin and been responded to in the same spirit by NATO and allies.
Rationale Behind Nord Stream 2
How did NS-2 come about? Central European countries are highly sensitive to Russia–Ukraine relations as one-third of Russian gas exports to Europe travel through Ukraine. In case of erstwhile disputes between the two, Russia had unabashedly turned off its gas pipelines to Ukraine which resulted in millions of Europeans without gas during the winters of 2006 and 2009.10 Hence, some European states started exploring other alternatives to acquire gas supply without disruption and that led to Nord Stream 2 (as well as TurkStream, a southern pipeline that carries gas from Russia to the Balkans via Turkey) in June 2015.11 The European Commission had insisted on the maintenance of gas transit through Ukraine and to keep the Nord Stream project under EU regulations. The first insistence failed but the second was partly fulfilled. Russia from the beginning asserted that European Commission worked under the pressure of Western allies and insisted on the purely economic nature of the project.
Supporters of the project have argued that the pipeline will double supplies of cheap natural gas from Russia to Germany from the original 2011 Nord Stream, which runs parallel to the new project. However, facts tell another story. Repairing the current Ukrainian–Polish pipeline would only cost around €6 billion. The construction of NS-2, however, would cost more than €11 billion.12 Also, in effect, it is merely diverting gas from the pre-existing Ukrainian–Polish pipeline, which means that Europeans will receive the same amount of gas, but from a different source. Further, €11 billion is not the final construction cost of the project because one pipeline alone like the NS-2 will not fulfil its function in isolation. Additional distribution gas pipelines on both Russian and European sides will be needed. Consequently, the overall construction cost of NS-2 route should include all the additional necessary infrastructure required to achieve this objective.13
Additional Leverage for Russia
Gas flowing directly from Russia to Germany by way of the Baltic Sea, would mean that the Russians will be gaining an additional leverage as well as energy monopoly over the Europeans. Additionally, this pipeline could increase Russia’s naval presence in the Baltic Sea, a move that would unsettle the Baltic States.14 Russia’s hybrid warfare against the latter has been a matter of concern for NATO and allies. Along the same lines of targeting Russian population in Crimea in Ukraine, Russia has been deploying strategies to isolate the economically weaker Russian ethnic sections of the Baltic populations to tear away from their respective countries and join Russia. A referendum followed by Russian annexation of these territories cannot be ruled out completely specially after the Crimean experience.15
Europe is wary of the fact that if relations between Europe and Russia were to sour, the Russians could quickly turn off gas supplies to Germany, similar to what it did to Ukraine. It is noteworthy that post Merkel Germany is more sensitive to Russian threats of disrupting geo-strategic balance. Traditionally, Germany has kept politics and economic interests separate when it comes to relations with Russia. However, this equation started changing with Navalny’s (Putin’s detractor) poisoning last year. With the government of the new Chancellor Olaf Sholz, changes have started to appear. Heiko Maas who had been the foreign minister for the past three years and a keen advocate of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has been replaced by Annalena Baerbock, co-leader of the Greens who have a very sceptical view towards Russia and China.16 It is noteworthy that the Foreign Ministers of Germany and France met the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, on the sidelines of the Eastern Partnership Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Brussels on 15 November 2021. There, Germany and France issued a joint statement and reaffirmed their steadfast and unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.17
Implications for Poland
Not only Ukraine, but Poland is also threatened by NS-2 and has already begun to find ways to counter the construction of this pipeline. For example, back in 2018 Poland signed a 20-year liquefied natural gas deal with US with considerable foresight to reduce its dependence on Russia and the NS-2. The deal should provide for 15 per cent of Poland's daily gas needs over the next 20 years.18 Whether Ukraine will choose a similar path is likely, but something only time will tell.
Economic Cost of the Delay
NS-2 has been very expensive to construct and now that it is completed but waiting for German approval while also facing US sanctions, the wait is proving excruciatingly expensive to a pandemic-hit, winter-facing Europe. Germany did perhaps try to rectify its course by concluding a deal with the US in July 2021, which includes an agreement to invest in green energy in Ukraine while addressing concerns over the geopolitical impact of potential dependence on Russian gas.19 However, this deal has to come alongside a more proactive US energy security policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. Decisions such as these will take time to show fruitful results.
Meanwhile, the gas pipeline politics continues to jeopardize Ukraine’s national security, further damaging the pandemic-hit European economy and leaving its people shivering as winter sets in. With the financial stakes running high, the pipeline is likely to become operational sooner than later. However, its political and economic costs should pave way for leading European powers to take a more comprehensive approach towards energy security at large. The realisation of overt dependence on Russian gas is untenable without, on the one hand, engaging in green sources of energy, and on the other, working on gas supplies from Turkmenistan that has the world’s fourth largest natural gas reserves untapped by Europe.20 The geo-economic engagement with Turkmenistan would come at a difficult bargaining with China but should be worth the effort for a gas-craving Europe.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
China’s Inconsequential Bid to Sign Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
Niranjan Chandrashekhar Oak
December 09, 2021
Showing readiness to sign the SEANWFZ treaty seems to be a low-cost, high-return proposition for Beijing. It could be a calculated symbolic gesture having no bearing on the region’s precarious security situation.
At the ASEAN–China Special Summit held on 22 November 2021, to commemorate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN–China dialogue relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that China is ready to sign the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty as early as possible.1 The SEANWFZ, also known as Bangkok Treaty, was opened for signature on 15 December 1995 and came into force on 28 March 1997. China did not sign the treaty for more than two decades, but the recent statement by Xi Jinping indicates that China has felt the need to sign the treaty now when there is an intense debate going on over nuclear issues in the region. It is therefore interesting to analyse whether China’s bid to sign the treaty is really going to make a difference on the ground or it is committing to accede to the treaty because of the inconsequentiality of the action in a real sense.
China and SEANWFZ
SEANWFZ is one of the nine Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ)2 that covers the “territories” of all ASEAN member states and “their respective continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)”3. The inclusion of continental shelves and EEZs in the definition of the NWFZ is one of the two unique clauses of this treaty. The uniqueness of the clause stems from the fact that no other regional NWFZs apply over continental shelves and EEZs of the signatories. The scope is limited to territorial waters. The other distinct clause prohibits state parties to test or use nuclear weapons “anywhere inside or outside the Zone”.4 However, the protocol to the treaty explicitly restricts the use of “nuclear weapons within the SEANWFZ” and not outside it. The inclusion of EEZ in the definition has become a major hindrance for China to accept the treaty.
In the past, China has supported the treaty in principle. The official statement in the late 1990s stated that “the differences between China and ASEAN on the issue of SEANWFZ Treaty [were] not in establishing the NWFZ per se, but about its geographic delimitation”.5 It further declared that “the amended text of the protocol to the treaty presented by ASEAN in April 1999 almost [emphasis added] meet China’s concerns”.6 As the text did not meet China’s expectations completely, Beijing did not accede to the treaty in 1999, despite indicating readiness to do the same.7 Similarly, the Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation White Paper of 2005 principally backed the SEANWFZ.8 However, things did not materialise and ground reality remained the same. Again in 2012, China had announced its intention to sign the treaty but had withdrawn its consent at the last moment.9 Therefore, the present enthusiasm of China to accede to the treaty must be taken with a pinch of salt.
Implications of China Signing the SEANWFZ Treaty
Even if China signs the SEANWFZ treaty, it is unlikely to alter the regional security scenario in a positive manner. First, China is the only Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognised Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), which has a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons or not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or NWFZs unconditionally.10 Thus, it fulfils the negative security assurance enshrined in SEANWFZ anyway without having to alter its nuclear policy or actions on the ground. Second, there are territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) with overlapping EEZs of the claimant states. Since the treaty is applicable over the EEZs of the state parties, the signatories are expected to respect the international law and resolve any issues according to the international law. China’s record in this respect is not encouraging. China claims the entire SCS. The country had discredited the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague verdict over SCS maritime claims in favour of imaginary nine-dash line which has no legal sanctity. Since NWFZ does not cover the central sovereign territory of an existing nuclear weapon state11, China can station nuclear weapons on the reclaimed artificial islands, which are an integral part of SEANWFZ and claim no non-compliance with the treaty.
Third, the SEANWFZ does not “prejudice the rights or the exercise of these rights by any State under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, in particular with regard to freedom of the high seas, rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of ships and aircraft, and consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”12 In other words, the treaty allows passage of nuclear-armed vessels or aircraft in accordance with UNCLOS without any hindrance. Thus, the SEANWFZ won’t impact the Chinese nuclear movement in the region. Fourth, the signing of the protocol by NWS is often accompanied by the interpretive document where the NWS can clearly explain their interpretation of the clauses.13 China’s consent to adopt the treaty in 1999 was incumbent upon written assurance from the ASEAN that the accession to the treaty wouldn’t affect the territorial boundaries of the states.14 Thus, China has enough scope to put conditions while acceding to the treaty. In light of this, the Chinese posture seems to be a mere instrument to gain from the “international legal order without the need to advocate fundamental changes to the letter of the law”.15
Extending an olive branch by showing readiness to sign the SEANWFZ treaty seems to be a low-cost, high-return proposition for Beijing. China seems to have been ruffled by an unexpected announcement of the AUKUS security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Coming close on the heels of the first in-person summit meeting between the Quad members, the AUKUS has invigorated nuclear debate in the region. China sees the Quad and the AUKUS as antithetical to its interests in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the Chinese have been trying to create a fear psychosis in the region, sometimes by making factually incorrect statements. Commentaries in the party mouthpiece, Global Times, claim that the AUKUS pact is “threatening the formation of the regional nuclear-weapon-free zone”.16 Furthermore, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has contended that the AUKUS would “undercut ASEAN countries’ efforts to build an NWFZ in Southeast Asia”.17 The NPT does not consider a nuclear-powered submarine a nuclear weapon.18 Moreover, the passage of nuclear-powered submarines through international waters does not violate NWFZ.
Conclusion
By appearing to be prepared to sign the SEANWFZ treaty, China is trying to portray itself as a Good Samaritan instead of bad boys sabotaging the SEANWFZ. Beijing knows that such a gesture will not put any restriction whatsoever on its nuclear actions in the region. Moreover, Chinese aggressiveness in the SCS against ASEAN members has necessitated Beijing to present a sober face to cool down the tempers. Therefore, President Xi’s assurance to sign the SEANWFZ treaty is likely to be a strategy to appeal to the ASEAN constituency that China is stabilising power in the region as opposed to the US. It is a part of broader psychological operations19 to use such actions to influence regional and international opinion in its favour when various reports predict the Chinese nuclear pile-up in the coming years.20 As the realist school of International Relations argue that international law is just “a tool at the disposal of the most powerful”,21 China has realised that it has acquired enough global heft to employ international law for its benefit. Thus, China’s bid to sign the SEANWFZ treaty is likely to be a calculated symbolic gesture having no bearing on the region’s precarious security situation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Other NWFZs are Latin America and Caribbean NWFZ, South Pacific NWFZ, Africa NWFZ, Central Asia NWFZ, Antarctic Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, Seabed Arms Control Treaty, Mongolia NWFZ.
As the civilian political space shrinks and the capacity of the state gets hobbled by political dissension and internal resistance from forces armed with an alternate blueprint for action, Pakistan is likely to rely more on its anti-India stance to build national unity, seeking especially to suck in the militant religious groups into its orbit.
India’s security is inevitably linked to the strategy adopted by its Western neighbour which has a pronounced anti-India orientation in its foreign and security policy. Therefore, it becomes imperative for India to scan developments in its western neighbourhood continually, and calibrate its security policies in a concomitant manner. It is important in this context to study the recent developments in Pakistan and assess the evolving political and security situation at the internal level. This can be done at three different levels: (i) the nature of interactions between the government and the opposition; (ii) the civil–military relations; and (iii) the internal security situation. Pakistan’s approach towards India also begs scrutiny in light of these developments.
The Government versus Opposition
The relationship between the ruling party and the opposition remains as tenuous as has been ever since Imran Khan assumed power after the contentious ‘stolen’ elections in 2018. The latest audiotapes1 attributed to former Chief Justice of Pakistan Saqib Nisar proves beyond all doubt the deep-state’s plan to hold Nawaz guilty and bring Imran to power was mediated through the judiciary, which points to now restored inter-institutional army–judiciary collaboration to determine the course of politics in Pakistan. The judiciary has even cannibalised itself by trying to feed on some judges who sought to stand up to the military like Qazi Faez Isa, Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui (forced to retire without pension) and Arshad Malik (died under suspicious circumstances).
Amid all this, the opposition has been crying foul without much success, primarily because of the lack of support from what many in Pakistan call khalai makhlook (aliens), or the deep-state. Three years and about 23 public demonstrations/marches (since October 2020) later, there appears to be no love lost between the opposition and the government. However, what keeps Imran going is the backing by the deep-state more than anything else. The ‘miltablishment’ has ensured that the opposition is kept divided on critical issues that could have led to the fall of the government. Nevertheless, the opposition has managed to raise the political temperature from time to time and kept the government guessing about its next moves.
The government, on the other hand, is disregarding the opposition in matters concerning legislation and riding roughshod over their objections on matters of national importance. On 17 November 2021, the government bulldozed 33 bills including some controversial bills it had earlier failed to pass in the lower house.2 The bills in question pertained to the use of electronic voting machines (EVMs) in the coming elections, I-voting for the overseas Pakistanis (both likely to be used for rigging) and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2021 which provides for the punishment of “chemical castration” of the habitual rapist. Najam Sethi, a perceptive observer of Pakistani politics, called the day ‘Black Wednesday’3. It was held that the miltablishment weighed in on the dissenters within the establishment, ensured the votes of the independents to ascertain 221 votes versus 203 votes from the opposition, with the rest 16 opposition members failing to attend because of various reasons.4
The government is also busy bringing out old skeletons from the cupboard to taint the opposition and divert public attention from Saqib Nisar tapes. The now-leaked audiotapes of Maryam5, Nawaz’s daughter, is a case in point. In the tape, she is heard giving out instructions not to give government advertisements to three news channels (92 News, Channel 24 and ARY), while Nawaz Sharif’s party PML-N was in power.
While the leaked tapes are being debated, Imran Khan found time for a tele-interview6 with American scholar Shaykh Hamza Yusuf to dwell on his spiritual journey as a Muslim! The issue of IMF-imposed economic reforms and rising inflation leading the opposition to stage Mehangai March have been pushed out of the news headlines as the public is hooked onto forensic debates on past politics.
Civil–Military Tango: On or Over?
Imran Khan Government is often called the ideal hybrid government that the political system of Pakistan has thrown up as a synthesis between (civilian) democracy and its antithesis, (military) dictatorship—perhaps unique to Pakistan and ordained to last for some time, in the absence of unity of political forces to rein in the men in khaki. There were rumours in the country in recent times that the bond between Imran and his uniformed mentors is getting weaker by the day and they were no longer on the same page. There were hypotheses that the army may not be able to cohabit the power-scape with a maverick like Imran for too long.
In fact, Khan had raised the heckle about the military’s unilateral decision to replace former ISI chief Faiz Hameed with Nadeem Ahmed Anjum, leading to speculations that it would lead to further tensions between the powerful deep-state and Imran Khan. Even the matter was hushed up rather early, the gossip-mills in Pakistan were rife with stories of the establishment looking for Imran’s successor. The moderate stance taken by Bilawal Bhutto and Shehbaz Sharif to warm up to the army was being paraded as proof that there was something going on behind the scene. There were even rumours that the military had felt the pulse of the people which was definitely turning against Imran Khan and it was on the lookout for the most obliging political leader from the opposition in the coming elections in 2023.
However, the fall-out of the Nisar tapes seems to have been to the benefit of the Imran Khan Government. The military, cornered by the Nisar tapes and demands from Maryam to investigate as to who were the people pressurising Nisar to convict Nawaz, is likely to find in Imran a natural ally. Therefore, the civil–military relations may remain intact for the time being, with the Imran Khan Government willing to play second fiddle on matters concerning foreign and security policies of the state.
Military–Militant Uneasy Equations
It was not a mere coincidence that the day Imran Khan chose to bulldoze his bills, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik (TLP) leader Saad Hussain Rizvi walked free as per the secret agreement between the TLP and the government. It was termed as a tame ‘surrender’ by analysts in Pakistan.7 The surrender of the State to the Barelvi TLP, which was earlier used by the army to disgrace and discredit the PML-N government, must have sent wrong signals to militant religious groups of other hues to rally popular support to extract similar concessions from the state in future. In fact, the news of talks with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) followed negotiations with TLP. There was a claim that the Afghan Taliban were mediating these talks between the Pakistan military and TTP. There were reports that the TTP had assured to cooperate if its members were released. In an atmosphere of competitive radicalism, such discounts may only complicate matters further for the state. The TTP continues with its narratives against the state and especially the army. The more the state capitulates, the more the religious militant constituency in Pakistan is likely to get emboldened to toe the line of Afghan Taliban. There are many columnists in Pakistani vernacular newspapers to glorify Taliban victory and the method of resistance they adopted to defeat the powerful Americans!
Implications
As the civilian political space shrinks and the capacity of the state get hobbled by political dissension and internal resistance from forces armed with an alternate blueprint for action, Pakistan is likely to rely more on its anti-India stance to build national unity, seeking especially to suck in the militant religious groups into its orbit. Such diversionary tactic to divert their attention towards India on the one hand could be used as a potent weapon both to keep India engaged internally, on the other. Therefore, it is springtime for all anti-India propaganda in the vernacular media in Pakistan today. There is a competition among commentators and newspapers/news channels to outshout and outshine one another in their bid to show India in the poorest of light. It can be a temporary palliative for Pakistan, not a panacea for the multiple existential problems it is confronted with.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
4. The ruling coalition enjoys a majority of 17 votes in the National Assembly. In the Senate, it is behind the opposition by 15 votes and in aggregate terms, in the 440-member joint house, it has 221 votes vis-à-vis 219 votes for the opposition.
Defence Procurement in India: A Historical Perspective
Manish Rana
December 02, 2021
Defence procurement in India needs to adopt a mix of procurement avenues in which the indigenous solutions, foreign equipment and futuristic R&D continue together in a balanced manner. Considering that piecemeal solutions are not effective in the long term, there is a need to adopt a ‘Systems Approach’ to come up with a holistic solution which is enduring and progressive.
Defence procurement in India has come a long way since Independence and today it stands at an inflection point from where the future depends on how correctly we gauge the future and identify the correct requirements and also whether we avoid repeating mistakes as learnt from past experiences. History allows us to learn lessons and use our experiences to move ahead in a better manner. History of defence procurement has shown more than once that piecemeal solutions in an isolated manner are not very effective in the long term and that “Solutions of today, may become problems of tomorrow”.1 Therefore, we need to introduce “Fixes which won’t fail” and nothing can be better than adopting a ‘Systems Approach’ to come up with a holistic solution which is enduring and progressive.
Indian defence industry at the time of independence consisted of small-scale factories and mills in and around military fortifications, which catered to the requirements of the British Indian Army.2 They focused on the production of so-called Quartermaster stores, as importing them from England was not considered economical. It is worth mentioning here that major weapon systems’ production capabilities could not be developed because firstly, it was not considered essential to equip the army with them, and secondly, indigenous production in India proved to be costlier. As a result of this, indigenous capacities were lacking in the country at the time of independence. Even though the need was felt to increase the capacities post independence, it was clear that privatisation was not the way since it required capital and wherewithal which was lacking among the private players then, and also the national objective was to build a socialist form in which the government was responsible for such issues. The responsibility of developing the defence production base in India was taken over by the government through the Industrial Policy enunciated in 1956. Railways and Atomic Energy were other notable areas for which the government decided that the onus would be on the state.3 While other areas over a period of time met more than the envisaged requirement, defence industry somehow could never meet the desired standards. It could be attributed to the interaction amongst elements and sub-systems which formed part of defence procurement system. A detailed look at the cause-and-affect relationships through causal loops hint at the complexity of the problem and fallout of not being able to treat the defence procurement as a ‘System’.
The nascent Public Sector Units could not bridge the gap in capabilities of Armed Forces, not only due to poor management skills and lack of competition in public sector but also due to fast-changing geopolitical realities. Closeness of Pakistan to China and US made the policy-makers realise that the problem needs a ‘fix’ and that too at a faster pace. Indian defence procurement chose to align itself with Russia and major imports started coming in. Though the indigenous capacity development remained a point of concern and licensed production of Russian equipment was introduced so as to have adequate wherewithal to meet our requirements in future. Perhaps, it was not realised at that time that licensed production may increase the Public Sector Units’ output but in absence of ‘Know why’ of the equipment India as a nation would always remain behind the technological loop. The vicious cycle continued and we somehow could never manage to reach the desired state of equipping our armed forces, and men in uniform kept raising the ante for requirement of better equipment.
Then came the liberalisation and opening of the Indian economy. By this time the private industry had started showing some promise and slowly the defence sector started opening itself to private Indian industry. Also the dis-integration of USSR helped the procurement planners to look for alternatives in import and we started increasing our engagements with other defence equipment providers.4 This was a crucial stage for procurement system in India as they were to now move away from ‘single vendor’ procurements to ‘multi-vendor’ procurements. In absence of clear policies and guidelines, a lot of discretion was available with the decision-makers within the procurement system, which led to certain defence procurement scams and also delays due to inaction at times.
The first formal document to guide the present procurement procedures was published in the form of 187th report of Public Accounts Committee in 1989, which led to certain guidelines being issued in 1992.5 After the Group of Ministers’ recommendations post Kargil War, a formal publication called Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) was introduced in 2002 which has gone on to become a guiding document ever since. The DPP has been revised a number of times to cater to various contingencies and to keep it abreast with present realities. The latest version is DAP-2020 and it was introduced in October 2020. Though there is still a feeling that DPP/DAP has over a period of time added more and more layers to defence procurement system and increased the complexity leading to delays in procurement.
Albert Einstein had once stated that the significant problems we face today cannot be solved at the same level of thinking at which they were created.6 Whether the Indian Defence Procurement system today is perfect or otherwise is for anybody to guess, but we need to continue to adapt to new realities and improve the system to make it more efficient. For that we need to think from a different level vis-à-vis the level from which the system was created as such, which will help us arrive at solutions or suggestions for achieving a better future. Systems approach will definitely be effective in reaching that higher level of thinking and will throw up simple and effective solutions to the perceived problems. It will also help us to define and identify the bottlenecks or inefficient practices as such and look at leverage points to get best output with minimal efforts. Till the time we don’t take a holistic approach we may end up taking decisions in a piecemeal manner and come back to fix the problem which may persist again after the first cycle is over.7
Defence procurement in India needs to adopt a mix of procurement avenues in which the indigenous solutions, foreign equipment and futuristic R&D continue together and a healthy balance is stuck between them. It is important to incentivise the indigenous procurement and encourage futuristic R&D while continuing to fill the critical voids with foreign equipment. While this is already happening, there is a need to start planning for the next cycle of procurement today which may start in the next 5 to 10 years. All global procurements being undertaken today should lead to initiation of in-house R&D to replace them with indigenous solutions in the next cycle. Models prepared through Systems Analysis tools, while identifying the present problems and their causes, will also be able to guide us to test future strategies so that they don’t fail in times to come.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization, Currency, 2006.
The coming of Taliban to power in Afghanistan could upset the geopolitical applecart in Central Asia and adjoining regions. The growing association of radical Uyghur groups like the ETIM, with IS-K and the spread of jihadist operations in Central Asia could have significant implications for regional and international powers, particularly for China and its ambitious plans for Silk Road imperialism.
In recent months, China has urged the Taliban government to make a “clean break” with the UN-designated terrorist organisation, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).1 In October 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the acting Taliban Deputy Prime Minister, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, that Beijing expects Kabul to “take effective measures to resolutely crack down on them (c.f. ETIM and related militant groups)”.2
China has reiterated such demands regardless of Taliban’s repeated assurances, such as the one given in September this year by the latter’s spokesperson Suhail Shaheen to the Chinese English daily Global Times that many ETIM members have already left Afghanistan after the Taliban leadership had urged them to migrate.3 China might have been reassured had the Taliban cracked down on ETIM members rather than leave it to Uyghur jihadists to leave the country on their own.
China’s growing concerns with jihadist groups in its neighbourhood notwithstanding, it welcomed Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in mid-August this year by calling it “an end to anarchy”, albeit it has not yet officially recognised Taliban’s government.However, China has since pledged 200 million yuan ($31m, £22m) worth of aid to Afghanistan, including food supplies and coronavirus vaccines.4 In September 2019, the three governments of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan even agreed to officially extend CPEC into Afghanistan, with plans to build a highway between Kabul and Peshawar.5 According to Jason Li of The Stimson Center, “In China’s calculation, the planned extension of the $61 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan could be an essential solution to create a stable and terrorist-free Afghanistan in the long term.”6 Still, relations between the sides hinge on China’s assessment of the Taliban’s commitment to taking action against jihadist groups like the ETIM inside Afghanistan.
ETIM and the Threat to China’s BRI and CPEC
The ETIM is a Uyghur jihadist organisation founded on the objective of creating an independent East Turkestan state out of China’s Western province called Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The UN Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee has listed ETIM as a terrorist organisation since 2002, although the United States removed the group from its list of terrorist organisations in 2020 because it claims “there has been no credible evidence that ETIM continues to exist”.7
Although China calls the group ETIM, the jihadist organisation calls itself Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP). According to a book titled Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China, the group was founded by three individuals—Abdul Hakeem Makhdoom, Abdul Azeez Makhdoom and Abdul Hameed—in 1940 and has been known under various names. However, its main focus has been to incite local uprisings in Xinjiang.
Around the 1980s, the group’s co-founder Abdul Hakeem is said to have started imbibing radical Islamic concepts, which he started to impart to his Uyghur recruits. Although the group first identified itself as the ETIM only in 1997 under the leadership of Hasan Mahsun and Abudukadir Yapuquan, Chinese authorities held the group responsible for carrying out over 200 terrorist attacks in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2001. In 1998, Mahsum moved ETIM's headquarters to Kabul, taking shelter under the then Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Although belonging to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam like the Taliban, the ETIM developed links with Salafi jihadist global terror conglomerates such as Al-Qaeda and some of its members have recently collaborated with the Islamic State (IS) as well, following Taliban’s reluctance to support them.
Terrorism is not necessarily a method of warfare employed by all Uyghur secessionist groups. These would include the Washington-based East Turkistan Government-in-Exile (ETGE), the umbrella World Uyghur Congress, the East Turkistan National Awakening Movement, etc. Although mainly Hanafi Muslims, these non-violent organisations are modern and secular in outlook and do not subscribe to the worldview of the ETIM or even the fundamentalist Taliban. However, the ETIM seems to have increasingly stifled the call for peaceful Uyghur resistance against China. This has undermined an emerging international consensus towards the cause of Uyghur independence.
In fact, the ETIM has conducted gruesome terrorist attacks in China over the years. For instance, they are said to have carried out deadly bus explosions in Kunming and Shanghai in 2008. A riot in Uruqmi (the capital of XUAR) between ethnic Han and Uyghurs is reported to have killed at least 200 in 2009, mostly from the Han community. In 2014, ETIM engineered three significant attacks. In March 2014, 130 people were injured, while 29 died during an attack in Kunming.8 In April 2014, three people lost their lives and about 79 people were wounded during a knife and bomb attack in Urumqi.9 Furthermore, in September 2015, suspected Uyghur terrorists attacked workers and security guards at a coal mine in Aksu City, Xinjiang, leaving at least 50 dead and over 50 injured.
China views the ETIM as a potential threat not only to its internal security, but also as a security hazard for its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Xinjiang is the lynchpin on which the success of the BRI depends on, as vital trade routes run through this region.
The Xinjiang Province, which the ETIM refers to as “East Turkestan”, is a strategically important region having a 76-km border with Afghanistan. In medieval times, it was closely associated with the region taking its name from the famous city of Kashgar. Secessionist Uyghur groups, including the ETIM, claim that China annexed East Turkestan in 1949 and renamed it Xinjiang, which means the “new frontier”. The province is rich in oil and natural gas resources and produces a fifth of the world’s cotton. It is also vital for China to access the broader Central Asian region.10
Taliban: The Tenuous Transition to State Actor
It appears that the Taliban is in a critical stage of its evolution, from being a non-state, fundamentalist militant organisation into a responsible, state actor on the international stage. On the one hand, its fledgling government runs the risk of losing its core fundamentalist constituency in its attempt to gain greater international respectability. On the other hand, the gaining of international recognition is critical for the new dispensation to receive much-needed aid to rescue Afghanistan from a major economic and humanitarian crisis.
For its part, the international community has been asking the Taliban to jettison its jihadist baggage, including its continuing links with global terrorist forces (like Al-Qaeda and ETIM). For a variety of reasons, Taliban may be reluctant to do so, as such a move could challenge many of its core beliefs and even make it renegade in the eyes of old jihadist ‘brethren’, who may now turn hostile against it. Ironically, this might happen soon after the Taliban was being valorised by most Islamists around the world on its so-called “victory” against the US after coming to power in Afghanistan.11 The ETIM itself had effusively congratulated the Taliban on the occasion by calling Taliban’s ascension to power as “a fruit of long and arduous struggle and God’s big gift to Muslims worldwide”.12 Taliban may also fear losing diplomatic leverage against regional and international powers once it severs its ties with fellow jihadists.
Still, China’s dangling of the precious carrot of economic aid and development has made it considerably difficult for the Taliban to refute the charge of jihadist groups like IS-K (Islamic State-Khorasan) that it has sold out its radical cause to gain political power. Thus, the Taliban’s relations with China in the context of its action against the ETIM operatives in Afghanistan have become a litmus test for its future political fortunes. Countries like the US, China and even Pakistan are getting increasingly frustrated with the Taliban’s ambivalent behaviour on the issue of disowning its erstwhile jihadist allies, Al-Qaeda, ETIM and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan respectively.
For its part, China is concerned that the Taliban’s lack of decisive action against the ETIM is allowing the Tehreek-i-Taliban and IS-K to garner support of jihadist Uyghur groups in the region. Before his death in 2019, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Caliph of Islamic State) had issued a call for jihad in the mainland China. The bomb blast at the Gozar-e-Sayed Abad, a Shia Hazara mosque in the northern Afghan city of Kunduz on 8 October 2021 is one of the most recent examples of how IS-K has brought the Chinese state into its line of fire.13 Although this was not a direct attack against the Sino-centric sphere of influence, the IS-K’s decision to disclose the attacker’s ethnic identity as an Uyghur was clearly geared at sending a message that the group was getting closer to terrorist elements against China.
Upsetting the Ethnic Applecart
One of the major challenges for Taliban, even if it finds the political will to crackdown on ETIM militants, is that the Uyghur terrorist group are reported to have about 500 fighters in northern Afghanistan, mostly in Badakhshan. This region has only recently joined Taliban ranks, with several Tajik, Uzbek, Uighur and Chechen ethnic fighters joining the Pashtun-dominated Taliban for the first time.14 These militants have had longstanding ties with ETIM jihadists, as Badakhshan province itself joins the Xinjiang via the Wakhan Corridor. To launch an operation against the ETIM would put Taliban’s tenuous relations with newly raised cadres of non-Pashtun origins. This could threaten Taliban’s attempts to bring all ethnicities of Afghanistan under its fold.
Even China may refrain from placing the Taliban under too much pressure lest the latter decides to turn away and jeopardise Xi Jinping’s pet BRI and CPEC projects. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would be averse to militarily intervene in Afghanistan in any circumstance. China would not risk entering Afghanistan, proverbially known as the “graveyard of empires”15, which would then allow jihadist groups and even some Muslim states to turn against China and undermine its regional aspirations and internal security.16 Having said that China is worried about ETIM’s ties with at least three terrorist groups in the Af-Pak region that have communicated explicitly anti-Chinese positions, and followed through with violence, namely Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, IS-K and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).
Thus, the coming of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan has the potential to upset the geopolitical applecart in Central Asia and adjoining regions. The growing association of radical Uyghur groups, like the ETIM, with IS-K and the spread of jihadist operations in Central Asia could have significant implications for regional and international powers, particularly for China and its ambitious plans for Silk Road imperialism.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Melting of the polar ice-sheets and their scientific inter-linkages to Indian monsoons, necessitate India to undertake scientific studies in the Arctic and Antarctica. An independent PRV with required icebreaking capabilities will be a crucial requirement in this regard. It is also important considering the pace of the geo-political and geo-economic transitions happening in the Arctic.
It has been almost a decade now that India has been trying to either acquire or construct a Polar Research Vessel (PRV), commonly referred to as icebreaker ship, but the goal unfortunately remains unmet. India currently maintains two operational polar scientific research stations in the Antarctica, named Bharati and Maitri. India’s only Arctic research station Himadri is located at Ny-Ålesund in Spitsbergen, Svalbard, Norway. To date, India has undertaken 40 expeditions to Antarctica and has sent 13 expeditions to the Arctic.1 All these polar expeditions have been carried out by chartering foreign PRVs. Melting of the polar ice-sheets and their scientific inter-linkages to Indian monsoons and overall weather phenomenon in the South Asian region, necessitate India to undertake scientific studies in the Arctic and Antarctica.2 Moreover, the pace at which the Arctic in particular, is witnessing geo-political and geo-economic transitions, it is significantly critical for India to have its own independent PRV.
India’s Acquisition Plan for PRV
The main challenge faced in the construction of a PRV is that the Indian shipbuilding companies do not possess the required capabilities. In fact, very few companies in the world have expertise in constructing PRVs.3 The only viable options for India are therefore, to either directly purchase such a vessel or enter into a joint venture. Under the Ministry of Earth Sciences’ Polar and Cryosphere Research (PACER) programme, the Goa-based National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR)4 was tasked with acquiring a PRV.5 In October 2014, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) allocated Rs 1,051.13 crore6 and made NCPOR, an implementing agency.7 Accordingly, in 2017, NCPOR floated global tenders inviting expression of interests from global ship construction companies,8 but cost escalations, design changes and technicalities have significantly delayed India’s acquisition of the PRV. Noting India’s scientific and research operations in the polar regions, India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on ‘Science and Technology, Environment, Forests and Climate Change’, recently called for preparing a realistic plan to expand India’s Polar Research in the next five years.9 Also taking strategic account of China’s investments in terms of infrastructure development in polar regions, India’s Parliamentary Committee has called for allocating required capital expenditure to fulfil India’s scientific infrastructural and strategic needs in the polar regions.
Scientific and Strategic Significance
China currently maintains two large PRVs with advanced icebreaking capabilities and sophisticated scientific instruments onboard. Its MVXue Long is an ice-strengthened cargo ship purchased from Ukraine in 1993. The vessel has been modified and refurbished as per China’s operational requirements in polar regions. China’s MVXuelong 2 or ‘Snow Dragon 2’ is a domestically-built ‘Polar Class-3’ vessel10 with advanced icebreaking capabilities. It can attain the maximum speed of 15 knots and can break ice of 1.5 metre thickness. The vessel is also equipped with a hangar and a landing platform for two helicopters.11 China is currently constructing its third nuclear-powered icebreaker ship.12 With a length of 152 meters, the vessel is to be powered by two 25 MW nuclear reactors with a thermal power output of 200 MW.13 In a recently released policy note by China’s Ministry of Transport, there are also plans of developing new heavy icebreaker ship along with 1,00,000-ton semi-submersible heavy lift vessel in country’s next five-year development plan.14
In 2020, at a maritime trade fair in Shanghai, the Chinese state-owned shipbuilding companies also displayed model designs for a large ice-capable liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier and a specialised model of a heavy icebreaker. The LNG carrier is a 300-meter long and 49.8-meter wide vessel with a capacity of 1,75,000 cubic meters. The vessel is designated as Arc7 ice class-notation as per the Russian classification system and it demonstrates ship operations independently in moderate ice conditions. The proposed vessel is expected to break ice up to 2.1 meters thickness.15 The second design model for special heavy icebreaking operations was outlaid by the Marine Design & Research Institute of China (MARIC). Brief specifications of the vessel enlisted it as a 26,000 ton with an icebreaking capability of 3 meters at a speed of 2 knots with a crew carrying capacity of 180 people. MARIC has labelled it as “one of the strongest icebreakers in the world”.16
Way Forward
An independent PRV with required icebreaking capabilities will be an important requirement for India not only in terms of scientific research but equally for economic and strategic interests in the Arctic. First, the PRV will significantly reduce India’s dependency on foreign charter vessels for logistic supplies and scientific needs. Second, the PRV would enhance the skills and technical expertise of Indian sailors and crew members in polar waters. Third, an independent PRV could make India’s polar missions independent and self-reliant amongst Indian scientists. Fourth, such a vessel would further enable year-round presence and movement of men and material at country’s polar bases. Fifth, with the advent of emerging new technologies (such as Unmanned Underwater Vehicles [UUVs], Submarine Cable networks, and deep sea submersibles) and their reach in polar waters, acquisition of PRV for India would become a necessary asset for undertaking country’s future deep-sea research missions in polar waters. Finally, in terms of strategic context, PRV would enhance the Indian Navy’s operational reach in polar waters. Analysing China’s approach of ‘great leap forward’ style developments in polar infrastructure, it can be argued that it is the right time for India to have a PRV. It is important to mention here that India’s acquisition of its first PRV should not be seen in comparison to other emerging states’ polar infrastructural developments. India’s needs are specific and should be understood from its scientific, economic and strategic perspectives in the polar regions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
10. As per World Meteorological Organization’s sea ice nomenclature Polar Class 3 vessels are capable of year-round operation in second-year ice which may include multiyear ice inclusions.
The increased diplomatic activity in the Middle East (West Asia) with regional leaders engaging each other at various levels and forums, in spite of the continued regional power competition, ideological misgivings and threat perceptions, is a pleasing as well as a puzzling development. For India, this is an opportunity to enhance its diplomatic and economic engagements with the regional countries.
The Middle East or West Asia is witnessing increased diplomatic activity in recent months with regional leaders, who were squabbling among themselves not too long ago, engaging each other at various levels and forums. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have buried their four-year altercation, while Turkey and UAE are engaging in talks, and Iran and Saudi Arabia have admitted to negotiations between their officials. Egypt and Turkey too have indicated the willingness to talks while there is a wider debate on re-admitting Syria into the Arab League fold.
For avid Middle East watchers, these developments are pleasing as well as puzzling because they can bode well for regional security and stability, but there does not seem any apparent push factor for the change in course. It posits the question as to how long this can be sustained, especially when the causal factors, including regional power competition, ideological misgivings and threat perceptions, remain intact. There are no indications, for example, of Iran giving up on its nuclear ambitions or Turkey signalling willingness to reduce regional activism. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Qatar and Israel continue to face the security threats from rival powers and non-state actors, as in the past. What then explains the change of hearts among the regional leaders? Are these tactical moves or an indication of a change in regional geopolitical scenario?
These are all complex questions with no straight or easy answers. There can be several factors forcing the regional leaders to explore the diplomatic route. First and foremost is the post COVID-19 economic scenario. The world witnessed a sharp decline in economic activities during most of 2020 and 2021, and the Middle East too was seriously affected. According to the World Bank, the region’s economies contracted 3.8 per cent in 2020 and are forecast to grow by 2.8 per cent in 2021 and 4.2 per cent in 2022.1 Nonetheless, the challenges in terms of post COVID-19 economic recovery remain “tenuous and uneven” with the microeconomic forecast for a majority of the countries showing slow and painful recovery trajectory. Seen together with the root cause of the Arab Spring and Arab Spring 2.0 protests, that is economic deprivation and youth aspiration, the task for the regional leaders is cut out—either focus on economic recovery or face latent domestic anger, recurring protests and possible instability.
Second, the change could be linked to the new administration in Washington. The US influence in the Middle East plays an important role in determining the foreign policy priorities of regional states. For example, under the Trump administration, the world saw heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf with occasional fears of a direct confrontation between Iran, the US and its regional allies. On the other hand, the US diplomatic efforts led to the signing of Abraham Accords between Israel and four Arab countries—UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan—in late 2020. Under Biden administration the US foreign policy, in general, and Middle East policy, in particular, have promised to follow a different trajectory than under Trump administration. Focus on environmental issues, trans-Atlantic cooperation and human rights and an emphasis on diplomacy and stability is forcing the regional partners of the US to adjust accordingly. One of the first examples of the Middle Eastern countries adjusting to the change in the White House was Saudi Arabia moving to resolve its differences with Qatar by signing the Al-Ula Declaration in January 2021.
Third, there is a combination of domestic and geopolitical considerations that are forcing the regional leaders to undertake a diplomatic route and engage each other, not necessarily with the aim to resolve differences, but certainly to manage them better. For example, Saudi Arabia wants to emerge as a regional economic and business hub to realise, if not all, at least part of the Vision 2030 goals, the pet project of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and without a robust regional trade and business activity this might prove a pipedream. Similarly, there is a change of guard in Iran with a more hardliner government keen to address Iran’s economic challenges and manage public anger. Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan faces one of the most difficult challenges in the run up to the 2023 elections, and wishes to use diplomacy to overcome both economic challenges and declining popularity. The UAE, on the other hand, wants to reinforce its position as a regional diplomatic heavyweight. Iraqi, Egyptian, Jordanian and Qatari leaders too have domestic and regional compulsions to invest in diplomatic initiatives.
Notwithstanding the outcomes of these initiatives, does the new momentum in regional diplomacy offer a window of opportunity for India? New Delhi, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has significantly reoriented its Middle East policy with vigorous bilateral engagements focusing on increasing trade, business and investment activities and strengthening defence and military partnerships. Among the key countries with which India has developed closer partnership since 2014 are Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In a way, the three now form the core of India’s Middle East policy with countries such as Iran, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq, forming the immediate periphery with energy security, safety of Indian community and connectivity considerations. Improved bilateral relations and greater diplomatic engagements have helped India deal with challenges emanating from the region more effectively. For example, evacuation of its nationals from Yemen in 2015, and after the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 or fulfilment of its energy needs after US sanctions on Iran in 2018–19 were smoother than it would have been otherwise.
Greater engagement has also helped Indian diplomacy become more confident in dealing with the regional issues. Earlier, New Delhi was more comfortable balancing regional engagements when faced with conflicting situations such as between Iran and Saudi Arabia or Israel and Palestine. With greater engagements, New Delhi has been able to deal with the conflicting demands without necessarily shying away from leaning to one side if its interests demand, what has been termed as de-hyphenation in India’s Middle East policy.2 India has also signalled that it will no longer be apprehensive of engaging in regional or multilateral initiatives if this serves its interests. For example, the External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, held a meeting with his Israeli, Emirati and US counterparts during his five-day visit to Israel in October 2021 with focus on enhancing India’s economic engagements with the regional bloc emerging under the umbrella of Abraham Accords.
The new regional developments bode well for India in terms of its interests in regional security and stability, but more importantly offer an opportunity for New Delhi to enhance its diplomatic and economic engagements with the regional countries. Trade, business and investments should form the core of the Indian engagements without necessarily needing to take straightforward position on conflicting issues. There are immense economic opportunities that the region offers, especially in non-conventional sectors such as healthcare, tourism, education, sports and entertainment and greater diplomacy can pave the way for Indian industries, businesses and start-ups to partner with the regional businesses.
Undoubtedly, the key objectives of the new diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East are reducing regional tensions and giving impetus to intra-regional economic activities to overcome the challenges posed by the COVID-19, and this certainly offers a window of newer, more and bigger opportunities for India and its business community.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The recent neutralisation of hardcore Maoists, including one of its top leaders, in Gadchiroli District serves as a major setback for CPI (Maoist)’s expansion in the Maharashtra–Madhya Pradesh–Chhattisgarh tri-junction region. A judicious mix of security and developmental interventions would go a long way in tackling Maoist threat.
In a major anti-Maoist operation in the forests of Madintola in Dhanora sub-division of Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra on 13 November 2021, 26 Maoists, including six women combatants, were reported to have been killed. The 10-hour-long operation conducted by the elite C-601 commandos of the Maharashtra Police led to fierce exchange of fire between the police and the Maoists at multiple sites and resulted in the recovery of bodies of the slain Maoists and 29 weapons, comprising five AK-47 rifles, an AK-47 with UBGL attachment, nine SLRs, an INSAS rifle, few .303 rifles, etc.2 The kind of weapons recovered indicates presence of many hardcore Maoists at the encounter site.
Top Maoist leader and Central Committee Member Milind Teltumbde alias Deepak Teltumbde was one among the Maoists killed during the operation. Milind was a member of Maharashtra committee of the CPI (Maoist) and had a reward of Rs 50 lakh on his head. He was brother of a renowned scholar, writer and civil rights activist Anand Teltumbde, who is currently in judicial custody for his alleged involvement in the 2017 Bhima Koregaon case. Keeping into consideration Milind’s stature and decades of contribution to the organisation, the Party high command tasked him with developing the tri-junction of the Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (MMC) states as a potent guerrilla zone for the Maoists, similar to the Dadakaranya Special Zone Committee (DKSZC).
The CPI (Maoist) has often been undertaking organisational restructuring to consolidate its position in the existing core areas. Amidst increasing reverses suffered by the Maoists in south Bastar (Chhattisgarh) in the last five years,3 the Party has been consistently trying to carve out new zones for its operations. Two such potential areas/zones are the tri-junctions of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (MMC) and the Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (KKT).4 This is mainly to divert the attention of the security forces from its core area of Bastar and also to save and replenish their depleting armed strength (cadres and leaders) in the Bastar stronghold.5
CPI (Maoist) ‘New’ Maharashtra–Madhya Pradesh–Chhattisgarh (MMC) Zone
Figure 1
The CPI (Maoist)’s initial forays into the MMC confluence zone started in 2015. After deeply studying the topography and carrying out an in-depth socio-political survey of the adjoining areas along the inter-state borders, three potential stretches were identified by the CPI (Maoist). The new areas cover forested pockets in districts of Gondia in Maharashtra, Balaghat in Madhya Pradesh and northern Rajnandgaon in Chhattisgarh.6 Initially, 58 senior and middle level commanders headed by Darbha divisional commander Surender, were sent to activate this new zone.7 The terrain and demography of the areas were found to be conducive for the expansion of Maoist activities and operations as the areas in the region are mostly backward, densely-forested with sparse tribal inhabitations and more importantly, scantly policed. A small division of the CPI (Maoist) with an estimated strength of 20–30 cadres already active in the region—GRB (Gondia, Rajnandgaon, Balaghat) division—was merged with the team from Bastar to consolidate and further expand their operations up to erstwhile strongholds of Gadchiroli in Maharashtra, Mandla in Madhya Pradesh and parts of Kabirdham and Mungeli districts in Chhattisgarh.8 While Maoist violence is sporadically reported from Rajnandgaon district; Kabirdham and Mungeli districts of Chhattisgarh and Dindori district of Madhya Pradesh are relatively violence-free till now. Mungeli and Dindori have been added to the Ministry of Home Affairs’ list of ‘Maoist-affected districts’ recently.9 Reportedly, around 100 Maoists had entered into Balaghat and Mandla districts of Madhya Pradesh from neighbouring states of Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra. Around six dalams (groups) of Maoists are operating in Balaghat and Mandla districts. Of these, Khatia Mocha Dalam in Mandla came up last year.10 A Maoist document seized by the Chhattisgarh Police suggested that there were about 200 rebels active in the MMC zone in December 2019.11
Notably, the CPI (Maoist) is also believed to be relocating its armed cadres from its Bastar and Andhra–Odisha Border (AOB) strongholds to new safer core areas in the Kanha National Park, Amarkantak forests and Bhoramdoe Tiger Reserve, which are interconnected through impregnable patch of forests located on the borders of Madhya Pradesh (Balaghat and Mandla) and Chhattisgarh (Kabirdham).12 Since the areas do not have many roads and are scantly policed, Maoists are believed to be cultivating their organisational roots in the region, recruiting new cadres and generating human intelligence. According to the Gadchiroli Police, two platoons of ‘Vistar Dalam’ of the CPI (Maoist) are active in the Kanha–Bhoramdeo region. Similarly, the forests of Amarkantak, being highly inaccessible for the security forces, have a strategic significance for Maoists and could prove to be a safe haven for the senior leaders who are under pressure from security forces in Jharkhand and Bastar. Besides, the forest is also close to the Maoist-affected districts of Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh and could provide the Maoists easy passage to these states. The Maoists are consistently trying to develop a new ‘base area’ in the dense Amarkantak forests to intensify their activities/operations in the areas falling under the MMC zone.13
The neutralisation of 26 hardcore Maoists, including the Central Committee member and MMC secretary Milind Teltumbde, in the latest operation by C-60 commandos in Gadchiroli serves a huge setback for the CPI (Maoist)’s expansion designs in the MMC region. Notably, the Maoist stronghold in Gadchiroli has proved to be the fulcrum for not only expanding the Maoist activities in the MMC region but also helps in sustaining Maoist war machinery in south Bastar. The region enables supply of war logistics to other areas of Maoist operations and also offers safe hideouts as well as safe passage for the armed and senior leaders to escape the security radar. Nevertheless, the recent tactical success against the Maoists should not override the security forces’ preparedness as the retaliatory attacks are imminent.
Presently on the backfoot in their strongholds of Bastar and Andhra–Odisha Border, the outlawed outfit is striving hard to develop and activate some ‘base areas’ in and around the tri-junction region (MMC) so as to consolidate its position vis-à-vis security forces. Currently in the ‘strategic defence phase’ in the region, the Party is largely focusing on socialising and identifying with the local tribal population to get their support for the ‘protracted people’s war’, recruiting armed cadres and preserving their areas of operation in the region. The CPI (Maoist) has been increasingly making efforts in the areas to encash on the disenchantment and grievances of the local tribals against the administration.
To tackle it, there is a need to undertake a judicious mix of security and developmental interventions in the region, wherein, development should proceed the security initiatives. While the security measures such as deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) should be employed to tackle the Maoist rebels, the government should emphasise more on development initiatives. As large parts of the region are inhabited by the particularly vulnerable tribal groups (PVTGs) like Baiga, Abujh Marias, etc., ensuring rights and entitlements of local tribal population over the lands and forests traditionally used by them and ensuring them a dignified life in harmony with the local culture and customs may prove to be effective tools for keeping the Maoist extremists at bay.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. C-60, alternately referred as ‘Crack Commandos’ was formed in 1990 as a district-level force to take on the Maoists in the worst-affected district of Gadchiroli. The specialised force was the brainchild of the veteran police officer K. P. Raghuvanshi who was then Superintendent of Police Gadchiroli. The commandos in the force are mainly from the tribal areas (Madia and Gond Adivasis) falling under the Gadchiroli District. The unit has the motto of ‘Veerbhogya Vasundhara’, or ‘The Brave Win the Earth’.
3. In 2017, an intel-led joint operation—‘Prahaar’—was launched in the Maoist strongholds of south Bastar and Dandakaranya. Pushed against the wall, the Maoists in south Bastar were forced to escape to safe havens in the tri-junction of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.
4. In April 2017, Chhattisgarh Police recovered a 25-page Maoist document which was believed to be authored by the ‘MMC Leading team’ in March 2017. The document indicated the CPI (Maoist) attempts to create a new zone along the western border of Chhattisgarh called ‘MMC’.
9. The districts of Mungeli and Dindori were added to the MHA’s list of ‘LWE-affected districts’ in July 2021. These districts will receive additional Central aid and funds under the security related expenditure (SRE) scheme and special infrastructure scheme (SIS) to combat the Maoists. For the list of ‘LWE-affected’ SRE scheme districts, see, “Review of Categorization of Districts Affected by Left Wing Extremism”, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.
Ex Yudh Abhyas 2021: Demonstration of Indo-US High Altitude Military Interoperability
R. Vignesh
November 17, 2021
Targeted towards enhancing cold weather survival skills and tactical offensive operations in high-altitude environment, the latest iteration of Yudh Abhyas has significance for both Indian Army’s strategy for its Northern Borders and the US Army’s Arctic Strategy.
The second phase of the 25th iteration of the Malabar Exercise in October 2021 showcased the interoperability skills of the QUAD navies in the Bay of the Bengal, sending signals of collective resolve for a free and open Indo-Pacific. As the Malabar Exercise concluded on 15 October 2021, another joint military exercise between the armies of the two largest democracies went underway in the far-flung Chugach Mountains of Alaska. Indian soldiers from the 7th Madras Infantry Battalion Group alongside American soldiers from the 40th Cavalry Regiment of the US Army engaged in intense training exercises focusing on combined arms manoeuvres under extreme cold climatic conditions.
Exercise Yudh Abhyas is the largest joint military training between India and the US aimed at tactical level drills and developing interoperability.1 The key focus of the 17th Edition of Yudh Abhyas, conducted recently in Alaska, was on aspects of high-altitude warfare like helicopter-based mobilisation, assault on an enemy position in mountainous terrain and securing critical infrastructure.2 Along with this, a demonstration of the US Military’s drone buster gun, as part of Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS), survival and acclimatisation to the inhospitable terrain during mountain warfare were the other key highlights of the exercise.3 Exercise Yudh Abhyas has been conducted since 2004, hosted alternately between India and the US with the previous iteration of the exercise held in Bikaner, Rajasthan in February 2021. However, the latest iteration does imply significance for both Indian Army’s strategy for its Northern Borders and the US Army’s Arctic Strategy.
Strategic Significance of Yudh Abhyas in Alaska
The location, time, scale, participants and objectives of any joint military exercise can project a signal to a common adversary.4 In this context, the latest iteration of Yudh Abhyas assumes strategic significance as it comes amidst the ongoing impasse in the mountainous terrain of LAC. The Chinese government on several occasions in the past has expressed its apprehensions over India’s joint military exercises with the US and its other allies like Japan and Australia. Yudh Abhyas has also come under the notice of the Chinese government in the past. An article published by the Chinese state-run Global Times views the previous iteration of Yudh Abhyas held in February 2021 as an indicator of the future of Indo-US defence cooperation, as it was the first joint exercise after Joe Biden assumed the presidency in January 2021.5 This article cautions India against engaging in joint military exercises with the US as it labels these exercises as part of a greater American strategy to contain China. The article perceives that the previous iteration of Yudh Abhyas was not directed against China but Pakistan as the location of the exercise was in proximity to the India–Pakistan border.6 Among other things, the article gives insight on China’s insecurity and its perception of India’s enhancement of defence cooperation and interoperability with the US Military being detrimental to its interests.
The location of the latest iteration of the exercise is situated far away in the wilderness of Alaska, and the topography of the terrain bears striking similarities to the rugged mountainous terrain of the Sino-Indian Border along the LAC where the impasse between the two nations continues. Aspects like cold weather combat skills to train troops for survival in Arctic conditions akin to the Himalayas were the central theme of the 14-day-long intense exercises. Although there have been no Chinese reactions to this exercise available in the public domain so far, it would be fair to assume that China must have taken note of the agenda and timing of this exercise. Despite China’s apprehensions, the Indian government has repeatedly made it clear that none of its political and military cooperation forums with the US or any other nation is directed against any third party. This was expressed by the Hon’ble External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in his address to the press with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken during the latter’s visit to India in July 2021.7
Significance for Indian Army’s Strategy for the Northern Borders
As far as the Indian Army is concerned, aspects of Yudh Abhyas 2021 are extremely significant for its strategy of enhancing deterrence along the Northern Borders which has been emphasised in its ‘Land Warfare Doctrine of 2018’. The doctrine describes the Indian Army’s operational strategy along the Northern Borders as force-centric and multi-tiered, characterised by rapid mobilisation through augmentation of force multipliers. The capability to engage the adversary in a self-contained and isolated manner is deemed crucial for Indian Army units deployed along the mountainous terrain of northern borders. To achieve this, the doctrine recommends deployment of highly agile strike formations acclimatised for rapid application in high-altitude environments.8 Towards this end, Yudh Abhyas in Alaska assumes significance, given its focus directed towards cold weather survival skills and tactical offensive operations in high-altitude environment.
Significance for the US Army’s Arctic Strategy
In 2019, the US Department of Defence (DoD) submitted a report to Congress highlighting the strategic significance of the Arctic Region to America’s national security. This report identifies the Arctic region as a key avenue where great power competition with China and Russia poses a direct threat to US’ national security. Here the Arctic has been described as a potential vector for an attack on the US homeland. The report advocates the US Army maintaining credible deterrence in the Arctic by developing a lethal, resilient and agile military capability specially tailored for the mountainous terrain of the Arctic.9 Cold weather training of the US Military personnel for acquiring specialised tactics and procedures of mountain warfare is cited as a vital element in achieving this objective.10
On 12 December 2020, the Arctic Security Dialogue was organised by the Woodrow Wilson International Centre in Washington DC. In this dialogue, top US Army Generals participated and spoke on US Army’s Arctic Strategy. Amongst the most notable speaker in this event was Maj Gen Peter Andrysiak, the former commander of the US Army Alaska. He pointed out several existing capability gaps of the US Army in waging high-altitude warfare including lack of equipment and training for troops. Here he highlighted Yudh Abhyas as a critical platform for the US Army to derive from the Indian Army’s expertise on Mountain Warfare due to the latter’s long history of combat and peacetime operations in the Himalayas.
Citing the US Army’s focus on high-altitude warfare, Gen Andrysiak stated that Yudh Abhyas 2021 will be hosted in Alsaka for this purpose and announced that the future iteration of the exercise will be conducted in the Himalayas in 2022. He further stated that he considers the Yudh Abhyas in conjunction with the US Army’s ‘Arctic Warrior Exercise’ as vital avenues for enhancing US Military’s capability to operate in the Arctic.11 Collective deterrence fostered by the like-minded Arctic and Non-Arctic nations is cited as crucial for a stable and conflict-free Arctic region.12 This is an area where Yudh Abhyas stands in conjunction to the DoD’s report which advocates cooperation with strategic partners as the cornerstone for the US government’s strategic approach towards the Arctic region.
Prospects of Yudh Abhyas Evolving into a Multilateral Exercise
Another aspect about Yudh Abhyas is that it is the only joint military exercise series with the US that continues in a bilateral format. Other bilateral military exercises with the US like the Malabar Exercise for the Navies and the Cope India for the Air Forces have organically evolved into trilateral and multilateral formats assuming greater strategic significance. In the past US had suggested inclusion of Japan in Yudh Abhyas but this was declined by India.13 Evolving geopolitical dynamics of Indo-Pacific have led many democratic nations of the region to look for avenues to bolster their military capability. In this context, the Yudh Abhyas has the potential to be elevated into a platform for enhancing military cooperation of QUAD and other like-minded nations focusing on the land warfare domain akin to the Malabar Exercise for naval warfare.
Conclusion
Over the last decade, military exercises both in the bilateral and multilateral formats have become the mainstay in India’s defence diplomacy with other nations. Since 2010, India has undertaken joint army exercises with 18 countries,14 but what makes the Yudh Abhyas stand out is the fact that it has extensively evolved since its first iteration in 2004. Initially, Yudh Abhyas like all other joint military exercises focused on establishing familiarity between militaries and learning from best practices of each other. Another factor for Yudh Abhyas gaining significance is due to the increasing number of Western platforms being inducted into the Indian military. The induction of C-17 Globemaster strategic airlift aircraft, C-130 Hercules tactical airlift aircraft, Chinook Heavy Lift Helicopters and M777 Ultra-Light Howitzer has taken place over the last decade. These platforms are extensively used by the US Army and have become instrumental in the Indian Army’s operations along the mountainous terrain of the LAC. Adding to this expanding Indo-US defence cooperation has been reflected by a number of agreements over the last five years including Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and the Industrial Security Agreement (ISA).15 These agreements are likely to facilitate the induction of more American platforms in the Indian Military. Exercise Yudh Abhyas acts as a platform for both armies to enhance their interoperability through these commonly used military platforms.
Addressing the Goa Maritime Conclave on 8 November 2021, the Defence Secretary Mr Ajay Kumar stated that aggressive and expansionist behaviour in the Asia-Pacific region is a source of great concern for India’s national security. He reiterated India’s resolve to deter aggressive and expansionist moves both on land and the sea.16 In this context, Yudh Abhyas like the Malabar Exercise, is bound to play a significant role for India and its partners to project credible strategic posturing. As a result, the future iterations of the Yudh Abhyas will be keenly watched by both allies and adversaries of India.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Tajikistan’s Confrontational Stand vis-à-vis Taliban
Jason Wahlang
November 10, 2021
While the international community has maintained a cautious stand vis-à-vis the Taliban, Tajikistan has decisively thrown its weight in support of the resistance movement against the Taliban and has made a clarion call for an inclusive government in Afghanistan.
In recent months there has been a significant expansion of the Taliban power within Afghanistan. It includes areas once controlled by the Northern Alliance—particularly Badakhshan, Takhar and Panjshir, which the Taliban had largely failed to capture in the 1990s. The international community has maintained a cautious stand vis-à-vis the Taliban, but Tajikistan, which shares a border with Afghanistan, has been critical of the Taliban. In almost every speech, even the ones not related to foreign policy, President Emomali Rahmon referred to the misfortunes of the Afghan people under the Taliban.1 Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2021, Rahmon stated that the release of thousands of terrorists by the Taliban has put Afghanistan “on the path to becoming a breeding ground for international terrorism”.2
Based on the reminiscences of the Taliban rule of the past, the changed scenario in Afghanistan has been a constant source of security and economic concerns for Tajikistan. It has decisively thrown its weight in support of a resistance movement against the Taliban and has made a clarion call for the establishment of an inclusive government in Afghanistan.3 Acting Taliban deputy prime ministers Abdul Salam Hanafi and Abdul Ghani Baradar have accused Tajikistan of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.4
Tajikistan was a key supporter of the Northern Alliance in its resistance to the Taliban regime in the 1990s and enjoyed close ties with fellow Tajik leaders from Jamiat-e-Islami, particularly former president Burhanuddin Rabbani and commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, popularly revered as the “Lion of Panjshir”. Recently, in early September, at a time when the Taliban were struggling to extend their control over the Panjshir Valley, Tajikistan posthumously awarded country’s highest honour (Order of Ismoili Somoni) to both Rabbani and Massoud for facilitating and mediating inter-Tajik talks in the period 1993–1996 and making a significant contribution to the peace process in Tajikistan.5 Therefore, Tajikistan’s aversion to dealing with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan should not entirely come as a surprise. Its confrontational stand towards the Taliban can be attributed to the following reasons.
Ethnic Factor
In Afghanistan, where ethnic and tribal disputes are carried over through several generations, the return of a non-inclusive Taliban regime, comprising of majority Pashtuns with a sprinkling of Tajiks and other ethnic groups, has led to growing demand including from Tajikistan for an inclusive and representative government in Kabul.
For much of its recent history, Afghanistan has been ruled by various Pashtun dynasties. In the 1890s, there was a shrill campaign to Pashtunise Afghanistan. With the exception of King Habibullah Kalakani (1929) and former president Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992–2001), both ethnic Tajiks, Pashtuns have dominated Afghanistan’s political history and governance. The emergence of organisations such as Setam-a-Milli (an anti-Pashtun Tajik organisation) and Afghan Millat (a pro-Pashtun organisation) further complicated the inter-ethnic relations in the 1960s.6 Following the Soviet invasion in 1979, the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e-Islami emerged as one of the most powerful anti-Soviet resistance groups. Led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, Jamiat continued to play a significant role in post-Soviet Afghanistan. After the collapse of the Najibullah Government in early 1992, a coalition of mujahideen groups came to power in Kabul. Soon Rabbani took over as the president of Afghanistan. Four years later, with the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 1996, the Tajik militia led by Massoud emerged as a key component of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Though Massoud was killed in a suicide attack two days before 9/11, his forces along with Uzbek and Hazara elements of the Northern Alliance provided vital ground support to the US forces in their effort to overthrow the Taliban regime.
Post 9/11, the Tajiks enjoyed a significant share of influence in the governance, economy and politics of the country.7 However, the return of Taliban to power after two decades has led to a loss of influence for the Tajiks, as well as for the Hazaras and the Uzbeks. It is no surprise that the resistance against the Taliban regime first emerged from the Panjshir Valley, a Tajik stronghold, mainly led by former intelligence chief and vice president Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massoud, son of late commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. Several of these Tajik leaders have found sanctuaries in Tajikistan from where they seem to be guiding the anti-Taliban resistance front, ostensibly with the tacit support of Tajikistan’s leadership.8
Security Concerns
Tajikistan fears that the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan may embolden the radicalised sections within the country to crank a call for ‘jihad’. During the Afghan–Soviet War in the 1980s, many Tajiks had secretly joined the ‘Afghan Jihad’, introducing them to Tajik nationalism and Islamism. Later, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Tajikistan as an independent state in 1991, these radicalised Tajiks formed the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), an opposition to Emomali Rahmon (then Rahmonov) government. Meanwhile, after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 1996, Massoud and Rabbani along with other anti-Taliban resistance leaders had formed the Northern Alliance, a Tajik-dominated coalition. The Northern Alliance needed support bases for launching operations which necessitated a fragile truce between the Rahmon Government and the IRP. It led to the end of the civil war in 1997 and Tajikistan joining the resistance against the Taliban.
With the Taliban making a full comeback, there have been reports of Taliban employing the Tajik terror group Jamaat Ansarullah9 as border guards in the Badakhshan Province.10 It is known in Tajikistan for its strident anti-government views. The possibility of Taliban using Ansarullah fighters to fuel unrest in Tajikistan remains a major security concern for Tajikistan. Therefore, faced with security concerns, Tajikistan has taken defensive measures to reinforce its border security. It includes military drills, increased troop deployment in the border areas and anti-terrorism exercises with China and Russia.11 The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan has also led to a refugee influx in bordering Central Asian states. Tajikistan has taken initiatives to resettle about 1,00,000 Afghan refugees.12 There are, however, concerns about possible infiltration of Ansarullah and pro-Daesh jihadi elements amidst the refugees from Afghanistan.
Russian Factor
Tajikistan is a member of both the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). These are organisations with considerable Russian leverage, therefore, any step taken by Tajikistan vis-à-vis the Taliban is most likely to have Russian support. For now, Russia has refused to recognise the Taliban regime until there is an inclusive government in place13, a stand similar to that of Tajikistan. As a major security provider in the region, Russia has also weighed upon the Taliban to retain its promise of peace with its neighbours, including Tajikistan.14 It has further called upon both Tajikistan and the Taliban to avoid confrontation.15
Conclusion
The Taliban government in Kabul is yet to be formally recognised by any world power. Given Tajikistan’s unease over the developing situation in Afghanistan, the coming months can see a more strident role of Tajikistan. President Rahmon, who had a tough time dealing with the civil war in the 1990s, and has since struggled to keep the militant Islamists under check, would be cautious not to let the past repeat itself. Since Tajikistan is also economically the most fragile country in Central Asia16, threats from regional and international terrorist networks add to its vulnerability. Rahmon may be using the anti-Taliban sentiments among the Tajiks to stoke up nationalistic fervour to consolidate his position vis-à-vis the Islamists in domestic politics.
While Russia has avoided recognising the Taliban government so far, its diplomatic engagement with the Taliban, especially within the Moscow Format, has only grown with time. Russian recognition of the Taliban government in future—along with China and other Central Asian states—would certainly put to test Tajikistan’s position vis-à-vis the Taliban.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
9. Jamaat Ansarullah or ‘Society of Allah’s Soldiers’, known in Afghanistan as ‘Tajik Taliban’, is a terrorist group formed in 2010 by Tajikistan’s opposition commander Amriddin Tabarov. Estimates suggest that the group has about 100–200 members. Since its formation, the organisation has had ties with militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan including the Taliban. See Edward Lemon, “Talking Up Terrorism in Central Asia”,Wilson Centre, No. 38, December 2018; and Mumin Ahmadi, Mullorajab Yusufi and Nigorai Fazliddin, “Taliban Puts Tajik Militants Partially In Charge of Afghanistan's Northern Border”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 27 July 2021.
11. Military drills were conducted in August, September and October 2021. Military drills in August were conducted at the Tajikistan–Afghanistan border including Base 201 and involved more than 500 troops. The Peace Mission Drill was conducted in September as part of the SCO initiative for counter-terrorism. In October, three military drills were held by Russia as part of the CSTO initiatives in Harbmaidon and Momirak training fields in Khatlon Province of Tajikistan near the Afghan–Tajik border. The drills were held during 10–23 October and involved more than 4,000 military personnel. See“Joint Exercise of the Armed Forces of the Three Countries Completed in Tajikistan”,Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 10 August 2021; “Peace Mission-2021 Exercise”,Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, September 2021; and“Russia-Led CSTO to Hold Three Military Drills in Tajikistan this Month”,Asia-Plus Tajikistan, 6 October 2021.
Nord Stream 2, a Russian undersea gas pipeline project that intends to deliver natural gas from Siberia to Germany, currently sits at an intersection of several geopolitical and geo-economic cross-currents that determine the economic security as well as the geostrategic balance of Europe.
Nord Stream 2 (NS-2), a 1200-km long Russian undersea gas pipeline project that intends to deliver natural gas from Siberia to Germany, has been controversial since inception, and is back in news as a major geopolitical flashpoint. Biden administration (the third US administration in succession to oppose the project) imposed on it a fresh round of sanctions on 23 November 2021 under Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019.1 The sanctions came only a couple of weeks after US Senator Jim Risch, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on 5 November 2021, introduced amendments to the FY National Defense Authorization Act that would provide Ukraine with material support in the face of Russian aggression.2 Meant to put pressure on Russia, these sanctions and amendments have come at a time when Russia is deploying troops along the Ukrainian border fuelling speculations of a potential invasion on the lines of Crimea in 2014.3 As per Ukraine’s defence ministry, about 90,000 troops have been deployed in border areas and especially along the vulnerable eastern part of Ukraine where Russia has been fanning separatism since decades.4 Russia, on the contrary, seems to be worried about Ukraine’s military build-up along the same and wants NATO to guarantee against eastward movement.5 Russian position, however, needs to be taken with a pinch of salt because its approach towards gas pipeline politics and isolating Ukraine has been around since almost a decade.
On the economic front, the already sky-high prices of natural gas have jumped by 10 per cent in Europe after Germany's energy regulator Bundesnetzagentur suspended the approval process for Russia's NS-2 gas pipeline in mid-November. The regulator said the Swiss-based "Nord Stream 2 AG" operating company (branch of the Russian Gazprom) first needs to comply with the German law before it could be certified, thereby potentially delaying the project's start date.6 It wants the Russian company behind the project to form a local subsidiary (currently based in Switzerland), to operate the German part of the pipeline.
It can be said that the gas pipeline project sits at an intersection of several geopolitical and geo-economic cross-currents that today determine the economic security as well as the geostrategic balance of Europe.
Ukraine’s Dilemma
NS-2 is one of the several pipelines that Russia has laid underwater in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea to replace pipelines that already run through Eastern Europe, especially through Ukraine. Earlier this year, Hungary too has agreed for a new long-term gas supply deal with Russia that will, once again, bypass Ukraine.7 From the Ukrainian perspective, this project constitutes an “integral element of Moscow’s policy targeted towards the Ukrainian state whose long-time strategic goal is to eliminate Ukraine from the European gas transit network and to weaken the state, also by hitting its budget”.8 Transiting gas from Russia to Europe through Soviet era pipelines, is an integral part of Ukraine’s economy fetching them US$ 2.5–3 billon transit fee per annum.9 The Ukrainian fears find further ground because Russia does not want to extend its gas transit contract with Ukraine after 2024 when the current deal between Naftogaz (Ukrainian gas company) and Gazprom (Russian gas giant) ends. Instead of repairing the already existing facilities at half the price, Russia is interested in replacing those with a new mega expensive NS-2 that will create different gas flows for Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Through bypassing Ukraine, Russia is killing two birds with one stone. Weakening and isolating Ukraine and increasing its influence in Europe, both to the disapproval and dismay of US and NATO. NS-2 has been leveraged as a political weapon by Putin and been responded to in the same spirit by NATO and allies.
Rationale Behind Nord Stream 2
How did NS-2 come about? Central European countries are highly sensitive to Russia–Ukraine relations as one-third of Russian gas exports to Europe travel through Ukraine. In case of erstwhile disputes between the two, Russia had unabashedly turned off its gas pipelines to Ukraine which resulted in millions of Europeans without gas during the winters of 2006 and 2009.10 Hence, some European states started exploring other alternatives to acquire gas supply without disruption and that led to Nord Stream 2 (as well as TurkStream, a southern pipeline that carries gas from Russia to the Balkans via Turkey) in June 2015.11 The European Commission had insisted on the maintenance of gas transit through Ukraine and to keep the Nord Stream project under EU regulations. The first insistence failed but the second was partly fulfilled. Russia from the beginning asserted that European Commission worked under the pressure of Western allies and insisted on the purely economic nature of the project.
Supporters of the project have argued that the pipeline will double supplies of cheap natural gas from Russia to Germany from the original 2011 Nord Stream, which runs parallel to the new project. However, facts tell another story. Repairing the current Ukrainian–Polish pipeline would only cost around €6 billion. The construction of NS-2, however, would cost more than €11 billion.12 Also, in effect, it is merely diverting gas from the pre-existing Ukrainian–Polish pipeline, which means that Europeans will receive the same amount of gas, but from a different source. Further, €11 billion is not the final construction cost of the project because one pipeline alone like the NS-2 will not fulfil its function in isolation. Additional distribution gas pipelines on both Russian and European sides will be needed. Consequently, the overall construction cost of NS-2 route should include all the additional necessary infrastructure required to achieve this objective.13
Additional Leverage for Russia
Gas flowing directly from Russia to Germany by way of the Baltic Sea, would mean that the Russians will be gaining an additional leverage as well as energy monopoly over the Europeans. Additionally, this pipeline could increase Russia’s naval presence in the Baltic Sea, a move that would unsettle the Baltic States.14 Russia’s hybrid warfare against the latter has been a matter of concern for NATO and allies. Along the same lines of targeting Russian population in Crimea in Ukraine, Russia has been deploying strategies to isolate the economically weaker Russian ethnic sections of the Baltic populations to tear away from their respective countries and join Russia. A referendum followed by Russian annexation of these territories cannot be ruled out completely specially after the Crimean experience.15
Europe is wary of the fact that if relations between Europe and Russia were to sour, the Russians could quickly turn off gas supplies to Germany, similar to what it did to Ukraine. It is noteworthy that post Merkel Germany is more sensitive to Russian threats of disrupting geo-strategic balance. Traditionally, Germany has kept politics and economic interests separate when it comes to relations with Russia. However, this equation started changing with Navalny’s (Putin’s detractor) poisoning last year. With the government of the new Chancellor Olaf Sholz, changes have started to appear. Heiko Maas who had been the foreign minister for the past three years and a keen advocate of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has been replaced by Annalena Baerbock, co-leader of the Greens who have a very sceptical view towards Russia and China.16 It is noteworthy that the Foreign Ministers of Germany and France met the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, on the sidelines of the Eastern Partnership Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Brussels on 15 November 2021. There, Germany and France issued a joint statement and reaffirmed their steadfast and unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.17
Implications for Poland
Not only Ukraine, but Poland is also threatened by NS-2 and has already begun to find ways to counter the construction of this pipeline. For example, back in 2018 Poland signed a 20-year liquefied natural gas deal with US with considerable foresight to reduce its dependence on Russia and the NS-2. The deal should provide for 15 per cent of Poland's daily gas needs over the next 20 years.18 Whether Ukraine will choose a similar path is likely, but something only time will tell.
Economic Cost of the Delay
NS-2 has been very expensive to construct and now that it is completed but waiting for German approval while also facing US sanctions, the wait is proving excruciatingly expensive to a pandemic-hit, winter-facing Europe. Germany did perhaps try to rectify its course by concluding a deal with the US in July 2021, which includes an agreement to invest in green energy in Ukraine while addressing concerns over the geopolitical impact of potential dependence on Russian gas.19 However, this deal has to come alongside a more proactive US energy security policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. Decisions such as these will take time to show fruitful results.
Meanwhile, the gas pipeline politics continues to jeopardize Ukraine’s national security, further damaging the pandemic-hit European economy and leaving its people shivering as winter sets in. With the financial stakes running high, the pipeline is likely to become operational sooner than later. However, its political and economic costs should pave way for leading European powers to take a more comprehensive approach towards energy security at large. The realisation of overt dependence on Russian gas is untenable without, on the one hand, engaging in green sources of energy, and on the other, working on gas supplies from Turkmenistan that has the world’s fourth largest natural gas reserves untapped by Europe.20 The geo-economic engagement with Turkmenistan would come at a difficult bargaining with China but should be worth the effort for a gas-craving Europe.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Showing readiness to sign the SEANWFZ treaty seems to be a low-cost, high-return proposition for Beijing. It could be a calculated symbolic gesture having no bearing on the region’s precarious security situation.
At the ASEAN–China Special Summit held on 22 November 2021, to commemorate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN–China dialogue relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that China is ready to sign the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty as early as possible.1 The SEANWFZ, also known as Bangkok Treaty, was opened for signature on 15 December 1995 and came into force on 28 March 1997. China did not sign the treaty for more than two decades, but the recent statement by Xi Jinping indicates that China has felt the need to sign the treaty now when there is an intense debate going on over nuclear issues in the region. It is therefore interesting to analyse whether China’s bid to sign the treaty is really going to make a difference on the ground or it is committing to accede to the treaty because of the inconsequentiality of the action in a real sense.
China and SEANWFZ
SEANWFZ is one of the nine Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ)2 that covers the “territories” of all ASEAN member states and “their respective continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)”3. The inclusion of continental shelves and EEZs in the definition of the NWFZ is one of the two unique clauses of this treaty. The uniqueness of the clause stems from the fact that no other regional NWFZs apply over continental shelves and EEZs of the signatories. The scope is limited to territorial waters. The other distinct clause prohibits state parties to test or use nuclear weapons “anywhere inside or outside the Zone”.4 However, the protocol to the treaty explicitly restricts the use of “nuclear weapons within the SEANWFZ” and not outside it. The inclusion of EEZ in the definition has become a major hindrance for China to accept the treaty.
In the past, China has supported the treaty in principle. The official statement in the late 1990s stated that “the differences between China and ASEAN on the issue of SEANWFZ Treaty [were] not in establishing the NWFZ per se, but about its geographic delimitation”.5 It further declared that “the amended text of the protocol to the treaty presented by ASEAN in April 1999 almost [emphasis added] meet China’s concerns”.6 As the text did not meet China’s expectations completely, Beijing did not accede to the treaty in 1999, despite indicating readiness to do the same.7 Similarly, the Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation White Paper of 2005 principally backed the SEANWFZ.8 However, things did not materialise and ground reality remained the same. Again in 2012, China had announced its intention to sign the treaty but had withdrawn its consent at the last moment.9 Therefore, the present enthusiasm of China to accede to the treaty must be taken with a pinch of salt.
Implications of China Signing the SEANWFZ Treaty
Even if China signs the SEANWFZ treaty, it is unlikely to alter the regional security scenario in a positive manner. First, China is the only Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognised Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), which has a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons or not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or NWFZs unconditionally.10 Thus, it fulfils the negative security assurance enshrined in SEANWFZ anyway without having to alter its nuclear policy or actions on the ground. Second, there are territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) with overlapping EEZs of the claimant states. Since the treaty is applicable over the EEZs of the state parties, the signatories are expected to respect the international law and resolve any issues according to the international law. China’s record in this respect is not encouraging. China claims the entire SCS. The country had discredited the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague verdict over SCS maritime claims in favour of imaginary nine-dash line which has no legal sanctity. Since NWFZ does not cover the central sovereign territory of an existing nuclear weapon state11, China can station nuclear weapons on the reclaimed artificial islands, which are an integral part of SEANWFZ and claim no non-compliance with the treaty.
Third, the SEANWFZ does not “prejudice the rights or the exercise of these rights by any State under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, in particular with regard to freedom of the high seas, rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of ships and aircraft, and consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”12 In other words, the treaty allows passage of nuclear-armed vessels or aircraft in accordance with UNCLOS without any hindrance. Thus, the SEANWFZ won’t impact the Chinese nuclear movement in the region. Fourth, the signing of the protocol by NWS is often accompanied by the interpretive document where the NWS can clearly explain their interpretation of the clauses.13 China’s consent to adopt the treaty in 1999 was incumbent upon written assurance from the ASEAN that the accession to the treaty wouldn’t affect the territorial boundaries of the states.14 Thus, China has enough scope to put conditions while acceding to the treaty. In light of this, the Chinese posture seems to be a mere instrument to gain from the “international legal order without the need to advocate fundamental changes to the letter of the law”.15
Extending an olive branch by showing readiness to sign the SEANWFZ treaty seems to be a low-cost, high-return proposition for Beijing. China seems to have been ruffled by an unexpected announcement of the AUKUS security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Coming close on the heels of the first in-person summit meeting between the Quad members, the AUKUS has invigorated nuclear debate in the region. China sees the Quad and the AUKUS as antithetical to its interests in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the Chinese have been trying to create a fear psychosis in the region, sometimes by making factually incorrect statements. Commentaries in the party mouthpiece, Global Times, claim that the AUKUS pact is “threatening the formation of the regional nuclear-weapon-free zone”.16 Furthermore, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has contended that the AUKUS would “undercut ASEAN countries’ efforts to build an NWFZ in Southeast Asia”.17 The NPT does not consider a nuclear-powered submarine a nuclear weapon.18 Moreover, the passage of nuclear-powered submarines through international waters does not violate NWFZ.
Conclusion
By appearing to be prepared to sign the SEANWFZ treaty, China is trying to portray itself as a Good Samaritan instead of bad boys sabotaging the SEANWFZ. Beijing knows that such a gesture will not put any restriction whatsoever on its nuclear actions in the region. Moreover, Chinese aggressiveness in the SCS against ASEAN members has necessitated Beijing to present a sober face to cool down the tempers. Therefore, President Xi’s assurance to sign the SEANWFZ treaty is likely to be a strategy to appeal to the ASEAN constituency that China is stabilising power in the region as opposed to the US. It is a part of broader psychological operations19 to use such actions to influence regional and international opinion in its favour when various reports predict the Chinese nuclear pile-up in the coming years.20 As the realist school of International Relations argue that international law is just “a tool at the disposal of the most powerful”,21 China has realised that it has acquired enough global heft to employ international law for its benefit. Thus, China’s bid to sign the SEANWFZ treaty is likely to be a calculated symbolic gesture having no bearing on the region’s precarious security situation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd., Beijing, China, July 2019.
As the civilian political space shrinks and the capacity of the state gets hobbled by political dissension and internal resistance from forces armed with an alternate blueprint for action, Pakistan is likely to rely more on its anti-India stance to build national unity, seeking especially to suck in the militant religious groups into its orbit.
India’s security is inevitably linked to the strategy adopted by its Western neighbour which has a pronounced anti-India orientation in its foreign and security policy. Therefore, it becomes imperative for India to scan developments in its western neighbourhood continually, and calibrate its security policies in a concomitant manner. It is important in this context to study the recent developments in Pakistan and assess the evolving political and security situation at the internal level. This can be done at three different levels: (i) the nature of interactions between the government and the opposition; (ii) the civil–military relations; and (iii) the internal security situation. Pakistan’s approach towards India also begs scrutiny in light of these developments.
The Government versus Opposition
The relationship between the ruling party and the opposition remains as tenuous as has been ever since Imran Khan assumed power after the contentious ‘stolen’ elections in 2018. The latest audiotapes1 attributed to former Chief Justice of Pakistan Saqib Nisar proves beyond all doubt the deep-state’s plan to hold Nawaz guilty and bring Imran to power was mediated through the judiciary, which points to now restored inter-institutional army–judiciary collaboration to determine the course of politics in Pakistan. The judiciary has even cannibalised itself by trying to feed on some judges who sought to stand up to the military like Qazi Faez Isa, Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui (forced to retire without pension) and Arshad Malik (died under suspicious circumstances).
Amid all this, the opposition has been crying foul without much success, primarily because of the lack of support from what many in Pakistan call khalai makhlook (aliens), or the deep-state. Three years and about 23 public demonstrations/marches (since October 2020) later, there appears to be no love lost between the opposition and the government. However, what keeps Imran going is the backing by the deep-state more than anything else. The ‘miltablishment’ has ensured that the opposition is kept divided on critical issues that could have led to the fall of the government. Nevertheless, the opposition has managed to raise the political temperature from time to time and kept the government guessing about its next moves.
The government, on the other hand, is disregarding the opposition in matters concerning legislation and riding roughshod over their objections on matters of national importance. On 17 November 2021, the government bulldozed 33 bills including some controversial bills it had earlier failed to pass in the lower house.2 The bills in question pertained to the use of electronic voting machines (EVMs) in the coming elections, I-voting for the overseas Pakistanis (both likely to be used for rigging) and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2021 which provides for the punishment of “chemical castration” of the habitual rapist. Najam Sethi, a perceptive observer of Pakistani politics, called the day ‘Black Wednesday’3. It was held that the miltablishment weighed in on the dissenters within the establishment, ensured the votes of the independents to ascertain 221 votes versus 203 votes from the opposition, with the rest 16 opposition members failing to attend because of various reasons.4
The government is also busy bringing out old skeletons from the cupboard to taint the opposition and divert public attention from Saqib Nisar tapes. The now-leaked audiotapes of Maryam5, Nawaz’s daughter, is a case in point. In the tape, she is heard giving out instructions not to give government advertisements to three news channels (92 News, Channel 24 and ARY), while Nawaz Sharif’s party PML-N was in power.
While the leaked tapes are being debated, Imran Khan found time for a tele-interview6 with American scholar Shaykh Hamza Yusuf to dwell on his spiritual journey as a Muslim! The issue of IMF-imposed economic reforms and rising inflation leading the opposition to stage Mehangai March have been pushed out of the news headlines as the public is hooked onto forensic debates on past politics.
Civil–Military Tango: On or Over?
Imran Khan Government is often called the ideal hybrid government that the political system of Pakistan has thrown up as a synthesis between (civilian) democracy and its antithesis, (military) dictatorship—perhaps unique to Pakistan and ordained to last for some time, in the absence of unity of political forces to rein in the men in khaki. There were rumours in the country in recent times that the bond between Imran and his uniformed mentors is getting weaker by the day and they were no longer on the same page. There were hypotheses that the army may not be able to cohabit the power-scape with a maverick like Imran for too long.
In fact, Khan had raised the heckle about the military’s unilateral decision to replace former ISI chief Faiz Hameed with Nadeem Ahmed Anjum, leading to speculations that it would lead to further tensions between the powerful deep-state and Imran Khan. Even the matter was hushed up rather early, the gossip-mills in Pakistan were rife with stories of the establishment looking for Imran’s successor. The moderate stance taken by Bilawal Bhutto and Shehbaz Sharif to warm up to the army was being paraded as proof that there was something going on behind the scene. There were even rumours that the military had felt the pulse of the people which was definitely turning against Imran Khan and it was on the lookout for the most obliging political leader from the opposition in the coming elections in 2023.
However, the fall-out of the Nisar tapes seems to have been to the benefit of the Imran Khan Government. The military, cornered by the Nisar tapes and demands from Maryam to investigate as to who were the people pressurising Nisar to convict Nawaz, is likely to find in Imran a natural ally. Therefore, the civil–military relations may remain intact for the time being, with the Imran Khan Government willing to play second fiddle on matters concerning foreign and security policies of the state.
Military–Militant Uneasy Equations
It was not a mere coincidence that the day Imran Khan chose to bulldoze his bills, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik (TLP) leader Saad Hussain Rizvi walked free as per the secret agreement between the TLP and the government. It was termed as a tame ‘surrender’ by analysts in Pakistan.7 The surrender of the State to the Barelvi TLP, which was earlier used by the army to disgrace and discredit the PML-N government, must have sent wrong signals to militant religious groups of other hues to rally popular support to extract similar concessions from the state in future. In fact, the news of talks with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) followed negotiations with TLP. There was a claim that the Afghan Taliban were mediating these talks between the Pakistan military and TTP. There were reports that the TTP had assured to cooperate if its members were released. In an atmosphere of competitive radicalism, such discounts may only complicate matters further for the state. The TTP continues with its narratives against the state and especially the army. The more the state capitulates, the more the religious militant constituency in Pakistan is likely to get emboldened to toe the line of Afghan Taliban. There are many columnists in Pakistani vernacular newspapers to glorify Taliban victory and the method of resistance they adopted to defeat the powerful Americans!
Implications
As the civilian political space shrinks and the capacity of the state get hobbled by political dissension and internal resistance from forces armed with an alternate blueprint for action, Pakistan is likely to rely more on its anti-India stance to build national unity, seeking especially to suck in the militant religious groups into its orbit. Such diversionary tactic to divert their attention towards India on the one hand could be used as a potent weapon both to keep India engaged internally, on the other. Therefore, it is springtime for all anti-India propaganda in the vernacular media in Pakistan today. There is a competition among commentators and newspapers/news channels to outshout and outshine one another in their bid to show India in the poorest of light. It can be a temporary palliative for Pakistan, not a panacea for the multiple existential problems it is confronted with.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Defence procurement in India needs to adopt a mix of procurement avenues in which the indigenous solutions, foreign equipment and futuristic R&D continue together in a balanced manner. Considering that piecemeal solutions are not effective in the long term, there is a need to adopt a ‘Systems Approach’ to come up with a holistic solution which is enduring and progressive.
Defence procurement in India has come a long way since Independence and today it stands at an inflection point from where the future depends on how correctly we gauge the future and identify the correct requirements and also whether we avoid repeating mistakes as learnt from past experiences. History allows us to learn lessons and use our experiences to move ahead in a better manner. History of defence procurement has shown more than once that piecemeal solutions in an isolated manner are not very effective in the long term and that “Solutions of today, may become problems of tomorrow”.1 Therefore, we need to introduce “Fixes which won’t fail” and nothing can be better than adopting a ‘Systems Approach’ to come up with a holistic solution which is enduring and progressive.
Indian defence industry at the time of independence consisted of small-scale factories and mills in and around military fortifications, which catered to the requirements of the British Indian Army.2 They focused on the production of so-called Quartermaster stores, as importing them from England was not considered economical. It is worth mentioning here that major weapon systems’ production capabilities could not be developed because firstly, it was not considered essential to equip the army with them, and secondly, indigenous production in India proved to be costlier. As a result of this, indigenous capacities were lacking in the country at the time of independence. Even though the need was felt to increase the capacities post independence, it was clear that privatisation was not the way since it required capital and wherewithal which was lacking among the private players then, and also the national objective was to build a socialist form in which the government was responsible for such issues. The responsibility of developing the defence production base in India was taken over by the government through the Industrial Policy enunciated in 1956. Railways and Atomic Energy were other notable areas for which the government decided that the onus would be on the state.3 While other areas over a period of time met more than the envisaged requirement, defence industry somehow could never meet the desired standards. It could be attributed to the interaction amongst elements and sub-systems which formed part of defence procurement system. A detailed look at the cause-and-affect relationships through causal loops hint at the complexity of the problem and fallout of not being able to treat the defence procurement as a ‘System’.
The nascent Public Sector Units could not bridge the gap in capabilities of Armed Forces, not only due to poor management skills and lack of competition in public sector but also due to fast-changing geopolitical realities. Closeness of Pakistan to China and US made the policy-makers realise that the problem needs a ‘fix’ and that too at a faster pace. Indian defence procurement chose to align itself with Russia and major imports started coming in. Though the indigenous capacity development remained a point of concern and licensed production of Russian equipment was introduced so as to have adequate wherewithal to meet our requirements in future. Perhaps, it was not realised at that time that licensed production may increase the Public Sector Units’ output but in absence of ‘Know why’ of the equipment India as a nation would always remain behind the technological loop. The vicious cycle continued and we somehow could never manage to reach the desired state of equipping our armed forces, and men in uniform kept raising the ante for requirement of better equipment.
Then came the liberalisation and opening of the Indian economy. By this time the private industry had started showing some promise and slowly the defence sector started opening itself to private Indian industry. Also the dis-integration of USSR helped the procurement planners to look for alternatives in import and we started increasing our engagements with other defence equipment providers.4 This was a crucial stage for procurement system in India as they were to now move away from ‘single vendor’ procurements to ‘multi-vendor’ procurements. In absence of clear policies and guidelines, a lot of discretion was available with the decision-makers within the procurement system, which led to certain defence procurement scams and also delays due to inaction at times.
The first formal document to guide the present procurement procedures was published in the form of 187th report of Public Accounts Committee in 1989, which led to certain guidelines being issued in 1992.5 After the Group of Ministers’ recommendations post Kargil War, a formal publication called Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) was introduced in 2002 which has gone on to become a guiding document ever since. The DPP has been revised a number of times to cater to various contingencies and to keep it abreast with present realities. The latest version is DAP-2020 and it was introduced in October 2020. Though there is still a feeling that DPP/DAP has over a period of time added more and more layers to defence procurement system and increased the complexity leading to delays in procurement.
Albert Einstein had once stated that the significant problems we face today cannot be solved at the same level of thinking at which they were created.6 Whether the Indian Defence Procurement system today is perfect or otherwise is for anybody to guess, but we need to continue to adapt to new realities and improve the system to make it more efficient. For that we need to think from a different level vis-à-vis the level from which the system was created as such, which will help us arrive at solutions or suggestions for achieving a better future. Systems approach will definitely be effective in reaching that higher level of thinking and will throw up simple and effective solutions to the perceived problems. It will also help us to define and identify the bottlenecks or inefficient practices as such and look at leverage points to get best output with minimal efforts. Till the time we don’t take a holistic approach we may end up taking decisions in a piecemeal manner and come back to fix the problem which may persist again after the first cycle is over.7
Defence procurement in India needs to adopt a mix of procurement avenues in which the indigenous solutions, foreign equipment and futuristic R&D continue together and a healthy balance is stuck between them. It is important to incentivise the indigenous procurement and encourage futuristic R&D while continuing to fill the critical voids with foreign equipment. While this is already happening, there is a need to start planning for the next cycle of procurement today which may start in the next 5 to 10 years. All global procurements being undertaken today should lead to initiation of in-house R&D to replace them with indigenous solutions in the next cycle. Models prepared through Systems Analysis tools, while identifying the present problems and their causes, will also be able to guide us to test future strategies so that they don’t fail in times to come.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The coming of Taliban to power in Afghanistan could upset the geopolitical applecart in Central Asia and adjoining regions. The growing association of radical Uyghur groups like the ETIM, with IS-K and the spread of jihadist operations in Central Asia could have significant implications for regional and international powers, particularly for China and its ambitious plans for Silk Road imperialism.
In recent months, China has urged the Taliban government to make a “clean break” with the UN-designated terrorist organisation, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).1 In October 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the acting Taliban Deputy Prime Minister, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, that Beijing expects Kabul to “take effective measures to resolutely crack down on them (c.f. ETIM and related militant groups)”.2
China has reiterated such demands regardless of Taliban’s repeated assurances, such as the one given in September this year by the latter’s spokesperson Suhail Shaheen to the Chinese English daily Global Times that many ETIM members have already left Afghanistan after the Taliban leadership had urged them to migrate.3 China might have been reassured had the Taliban cracked down on ETIM members rather than leave it to Uyghur jihadists to leave the country on their own.
China’s growing concerns with jihadist groups in its neighbourhood notwithstanding, it welcomed Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in mid-August this year by calling it “an end to anarchy”, albeit it has not yet officially recognised Taliban’s government. However, China has since pledged 200 million yuan ($31m, £22m) worth of aid to Afghanistan, including food supplies and coronavirus vaccines.4 In September 2019, the three governments of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan even agreed to officially extend CPEC into Afghanistan, with plans to build a highway between Kabul and Peshawar.5 According to Jason Li of The Stimson Center, “In China’s calculation, the planned extension of the $61 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan could be an essential solution to create a stable and terrorist-free Afghanistan in the long term.”6 Still, relations between the sides hinge on China’s assessment of the Taliban’s commitment to taking action against jihadist groups like the ETIM inside Afghanistan.
ETIM and the Threat to China’s BRI and CPEC
The ETIM is a Uyghur jihadist organisation founded on the objective of creating an independent East Turkestan state out of China’s Western province called Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The UN Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee has listed ETIM as a terrorist organisation since 2002, although the United States removed the group from its list of terrorist organisations in 2020 because it claims “there has been no credible evidence that ETIM continues to exist”.7
Although China calls the group ETIM, the jihadist organisation calls itself Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP). According to a book titled Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China, the group was founded by three individuals—Abdul Hakeem Makhdoom, Abdul Azeez Makhdoom and Abdul Hameed—in 1940 and has been known under various names. However, its main focus has been to incite local uprisings in Xinjiang.
Around the 1980s, the group’s co-founder Abdul Hakeem is said to have started imbibing radical Islamic concepts, which he started to impart to his Uyghur recruits. Although the group first identified itself as the ETIM only in 1997 under the leadership of Hasan Mahsun and Abudukadir Yapuquan, Chinese authorities held the group responsible for carrying out over 200 terrorist attacks in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2001. In 1998, Mahsum moved ETIM's headquarters to Kabul, taking shelter under the then Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Although belonging to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam like the Taliban, the ETIM developed links with Salafi jihadist global terror conglomerates such as Al-Qaeda and some of its members have recently collaborated with the Islamic State (IS) as well, following Taliban’s reluctance to support them.
Terrorism is not necessarily a method of warfare employed by all Uyghur secessionist groups. These would include the Washington-based East Turkistan Government-in-Exile (ETGE), the umbrella World Uyghur Congress, the East Turkistan National Awakening Movement, etc. Although mainly Hanafi Muslims, these non-violent organisations are modern and secular in outlook and do not subscribe to the worldview of the ETIM or even the fundamentalist Taliban. However, the ETIM seems to have increasingly stifled the call for peaceful Uyghur resistance against China. This has undermined an emerging international consensus towards the cause of Uyghur independence.
In fact, the ETIM has conducted gruesome terrorist attacks in China over the years. For instance, they are said to have carried out deadly bus explosions in Kunming and Shanghai in 2008. A riot in Uruqmi (the capital of XUAR) between ethnic Han and Uyghurs is reported to have killed at least 200 in 2009, mostly from the Han community. In 2014, ETIM engineered three significant attacks. In March 2014, 130 people were injured, while 29 died during an attack in Kunming.8 In April 2014, three people lost their lives and about 79 people were wounded during a knife and bomb attack in Urumqi.9 Furthermore, in September 2015, suspected Uyghur terrorists attacked workers and security guards at a coal mine in Aksu City, Xinjiang, leaving at least 50 dead and over 50 injured.
China views the ETIM as a potential threat not only to its internal security, but also as a security hazard for its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Xinjiang is the lynchpin on which the success of the BRI depends on, as vital trade routes run through this region.
The Xinjiang Province, which the ETIM refers to as “East Turkestan”, is a strategically important region having a 76-km border with Afghanistan. In medieval times, it was closely associated with the region taking its name from the famous city of Kashgar. Secessionist Uyghur groups, including the ETIM, claim that China annexed East Turkestan in 1949 and renamed it Xinjiang, which means the “new frontier”. The province is rich in oil and natural gas resources and produces a fifth of the world’s cotton. It is also vital for China to access the broader Central Asian region.10
Taliban: The Tenuous Transition to State Actor
It appears that the Taliban is in a critical stage of its evolution, from being a non-state, fundamentalist militant organisation into a responsible, state actor on the international stage. On the one hand, its fledgling government runs the risk of losing its core fundamentalist constituency in its attempt to gain greater international respectability. On the other hand, the gaining of international recognition is critical for the new dispensation to receive much-needed aid to rescue Afghanistan from a major economic and humanitarian crisis.
For its part, the international community has been asking the Taliban to jettison its jihadist baggage, including its continuing links with global terrorist forces (like Al-Qaeda and ETIM). For a variety of reasons, Taliban may be reluctant to do so, as such a move could challenge many of its core beliefs and even make it renegade in the eyes of old jihadist ‘brethren’, who may now turn hostile against it. Ironically, this might happen soon after the Taliban was being valorised by most Islamists around the world on its so-called “victory” against the US after coming to power in Afghanistan.11 The ETIM itself had effusively congratulated the Taliban on the occasion by calling Taliban’s ascension to power as “a fruit of long and arduous struggle and God’s big gift to Muslims worldwide”.12 Taliban may also fear losing diplomatic leverage against regional and international powers once it severs its ties with fellow jihadists.
Still, China’s dangling of the precious carrot of economic aid and development has made it considerably difficult for the Taliban to refute the charge of jihadist groups like IS-K (Islamic State-Khorasan) that it has sold out its radical cause to gain political power. Thus, the Taliban’s relations with China in the context of its action against the ETIM operatives in Afghanistan have become a litmus test for its future political fortunes. Countries like the US, China and even Pakistan are getting increasingly frustrated with the Taliban’s ambivalent behaviour on the issue of disowning its erstwhile jihadist allies, Al-Qaeda, ETIM and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan respectively.
For its part, China is concerned that the Taliban’s lack of decisive action against the ETIM is allowing the Tehreek-i-Taliban and IS-K to garner support of jihadist Uyghur groups in the region. Before his death in 2019, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Caliph of Islamic State) had issued a call for jihad in the mainland China. The bomb blast at the Gozar-e-Sayed Abad, a Shia Hazara mosque in the northern Afghan city of Kunduz on 8 October 2021 is one of the most recent examples of how IS-K has brought the Chinese state into its line of fire.13 Although this was not a direct attack against the Sino-centric sphere of influence, the IS-K’s decision to disclose the attacker’s ethnic identity as an Uyghur was clearly geared at sending a message that the group was getting closer to terrorist elements against China.
Upsetting the Ethnic Applecart
One of the major challenges for Taliban, even if it finds the political will to crackdown on ETIM militants, is that the Uyghur terrorist group are reported to have about 500 fighters in northern Afghanistan, mostly in Badakhshan. This region has only recently joined Taliban ranks, with several Tajik, Uzbek, Uighur and Chechen ethnic fighters joining the Pashtun-dominated Taliban for the first time.14 These militants have had longstanding ties with ETIM jihadists, as Badakhshan province itself joins the Xinjiang via the Wakhan Corridor. To launch an operation against the ETIM would put Taliban’s tenuous relations with newly raised cadres of non-Pashtun origins. This could threaten Taliban’s attempts to bring all ethnicities of Afghanistan under its fold.
Even China may refrain from placing the Taliban under too much pressure lest the latter decides to turn away and jeopardise Xi Jinping’s pet BRI and CPEC projects. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would be averse to militarily intervene in Afghanistan in any circumstance. China would not risk entering Afghanistan, proverbially known as the “graveyard of empires”15, which would then allow jihadist groups and even some Muslim states to turn against China and undermine its regional aspirations and internal security.16 Having said that China is worried about ETIM’s ties with at least three terrorist groups in the Af-Pak region that have communicated explicitly anti-Chinese positions, and followed through with violence, namely Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, IS-K and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).
Thus, the coming of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan has the potential to upset the geopolitical applecart in Central Asia and adjoining regions. The growing association of radical Uyghur groups, like the ETIM, with IS-K and the spread of jihadist operations in Central Asia could have significant implications for regional and international powers, particularly for China and its ambitious plans for Silk Road imperialism.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Melting of the polar ice-sheets and their scientific inter-linkages to Indian monsoons, necessitate India to undertake scientific studies in the Arctic and Antarctica. An independent PRV with required icebreaking capabilities will be a crucial requirement in this regard. It is also important considering the pace of the geo-political and geo-economic transitions happening in the Arctic.
It has been almost a decade now that India has been trying to either acquire or construct a Polar Research Vessel (PRV), commonly referred to as icebreaker ship, but the goal unfortunately remains unmet. India currently maintains two operational polar scientific research stations in the Antarctica, named Bharati and Maitri. India’s only Arctic research station Himadri is located at Ny-Ålesund in Spitsbergen, Svalbard, Norway. To date, India has undertaken 40 expeditions to Antarctica and has sent 13 expeditions to the Arctic.1 All these polar expeditions have been carried out by chartering foreign PRVs. Melting of the polar ice-sheets and their scientific inter-linkages to Indian monsoons and overall weather phenomenon in the South Asian region, necessitate India to undertake scientific studies in the Arctic and Antarctica.2 Moreover, the pace at which the Arctic in particular, is witnessing geo-political and geo-economic transitions, it is significantly critical for India to have its own independent PRV.
India’s Acquisition Plan for PRV
The main challenge faced in the construction of a PRV is that the Indian shipbuilding companies do not possess the required capabilities. In fact, very few companies in the world have expertise in constructing PRVs.3 The only viable options for India are therefore, to either directly purchase such a vessel or enter into a joint venture. Under the Ministry of Earth Sciences’ Polar and Cryosphere Research (PACER) programme, the Goa-based National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR)4 was tasked with acquiring a PRV.5 In October 2014, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) allocated Rs 1,051.13 crore6 and made NCPOR, an implementing agency.7 Accordingly, in 2017, NCPOR floated global tenders inviting expression of interests from global ship construction companies,8 but cost escalations, design changes and technicalities have significantly delayed India’s acquisition of the PRV. Noting India’s scientific and research operations in the polar regions, India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on ‘Science and Technology, Environment, Forests and Climate Change’, recently called for preparing a realistic plan to expand India’s Polar Research in the next five years.9 Also taking strategic account of China’s investments in terms of infrastructure development in polar regions, India’s Parliamentary Committee has called for allocating required capital expenditure to fulfil India’s scientific infrastructural and strategic needs in the polar regions.
Scientific and Strategic Significance
China currently maintains two large PRVs with advanced icebreaking capabilities and sophisticated scientific instruments onboard. Its MV Xue Long is an ice-strengthened cargo ship purchased from Ukraine in 1993. The vessel has been modified and refurbished as per China’s operational requirements in polar regions. China’s MV Xuelong 2 or ‘Snow Dragon 2’ is a domestically-built ‘Polar Class-3’ vessel10 with advanced icebreaking capabilities. It can attain the maximum speed of 15 knots and can break ice of 1.5 metre thickness. The vessel is also equipped with a hangar and a landing platform for two helicopters.11 China is currently constructing its third nuclear-powered icebreaker ship.12 With a length of 152 meters, the vessel is to be powered by two 25 MW nuclear reactors with a thermal power output of 200 MW.13 In a recently released policy note by China’s Ministry of Transport, there are also plans of developing new heavy icebreaker ship along with 1,00,000-ton semi-submersible heavy lift vessel in country’s next five-year development plan.14
In 2020, at a maritime trade fair in Shanghai, the Chinese state-owned shipbuilding companies also displayed model designs for a large ice-capable liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier and a specialised model of a heavy icebreaker. The LNG carrier is a 300-meter long and 49.8-meter wide vessel with a capacity of 1,75,000 cubic meters. The vessel is designated as Arc7 ice class-notation as per the Russian classification system and it demonstrates ship operations independently in moderate ice conditions. The proposed vessel is expected to break ice up to 2.1 meters thickness.15 The second design model for special heavy icebreaking operations was outlaid by the Marine Design & Research Institute of China (MARIC). Brief specifications of the vessel enlisted it as a 26,000 ton with an icebreaking capability of 3 meters at a speed of 2 knots with a crew carrying capacity of 180 people. MARIC has labelled it as “one of the strongest icebreakers in the world”.16
Way Forward
An independent PRV with required icebreaking capabilities will be an important requirement for India not only in terms of scientific research but equally for economic and strategic interests in the Arctic. First, the PRV will significantly reduce India’s dependency on foreign charter vessels for logistic supplies and scientific needs. Second, the PRV would enhance the skills and technical expertise of Indian sailors and crew members in polar waters. Third, an independent PRV could make India’s polar missions independent and self-reliant amongst Indian scientists. Fourth, such a vessel would further enable year-round presence and movement of men and material at country’s polar bases. Fifth, with the advent of emerging new technologies (such as Unmanned Underwater Vehicles [UUVs], Submarine Cable networks, and deep sea submersibles) and their reach in polar waters, acquisition of PRV for India would become a necessary asset for undertaking country’s future deep-sea research missions in polar waters. Finally, in terms of strategic context, PRV would enhance the Indian Navy’s operational reach in polar waters. Analysing China’s approach of ‘great leap forward’ style developments in polar infrastructure, it can be argued that it is the right time for India to have a PRV. It is important to mention here that India’s acquisition of its first PRV should not be seen in comparison to other emerging states’ polar infrastructural developments. India’s needs are specific and should be understood from its scientific, economic and strategic perspectives in the polar regions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The increased diplomatic activity in the Middle East (West Asia) with regional leaders engaging each other at various levels and forums, in spite of the continued regional power competition, ideological misgivings and threat perceptions, is a pleasing as well as a puzzling development. For India, this is an opportunity to enhance its diplomatic and economic engagements with the regional countries.
The Middle East or West Asia is witnessing increased diplomatic activity in recent months with regional leaders, who were squabbling among themselves not too long ago, engaging each other at various levels and forums. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have buried their four-year altercation, while Turkey and UAE are engaging in talks, and Iran and Saudi Arabia have admitted to negotiations between their officials. Egypt and Turkey too have indicated the willingness to talks while there is a wider debate on re-admitting Syria into the Arab League fold.
For avid Middle East watchers, these developments are pleasing as well as puzzling because they can bode well for regional security and stability, but there does not seem any apparent push factor for the change in course. It posits the question as to how long this can be sustained, especially when the causal factors, including regional power competition, ideological misgivings and threat perceptions, remain intact. There are no indications, for example, of Iran giving up on its nuclear ambitions or Turkey signalling willingness to reduce regional activism. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Qatar and Israel continue to face the security threats from rival powers and non-state actors, as in the past. What then explains the change of hearts among the regional leaders? Are these tactical moves or an indication of a change in regional geopolitical scenario?
These are all complex questions with no straight or easy answers. There can be several factors forcing the regional leaders to explore the diplomatic route. First and foremost is the post COVID-19 economic scenario. The world witnessed a sharp decline in economic activities during most of 2020 and 2021, and the Middle East too was seriously affected. According to the World Bank, the region’s economies contracted 3.8 per cent in 2020 and are forecast to grow by 2.8 per cent in 2021 and 4.2 per cent in 2022.1 Nonetheless, the challenges in terms of post COVID-19 economic recovery remain “tenuous and uneven” with the microeconomic forecast for a majority of the countries showing slow and painful recovery trajectory. Seen together with the root cause of the Arab Spring and Arab Spring 2.0 protests, that is economic deprivation and youth aspiration, the task for the regional leaders is cut out—either focus on economic recovery or face latent domestic anger, recurring protests and possible instability.
Second, the change could be linked to the new administration in Washington. The US influence in the Middle East plays an important role in determining the foreign policy priorities of regional states. For example, under the Trump administration, the world saw heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf with occasional fears of a direct confrontation between Iran, the US and its regional allies. On the other hand, the US diplomatic efforts led to the signing of Abraham Accords between Israel and four Arab countries—UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan—in late 2020. Under Biden administration the US foreign policy, in general, and Middle East policy, in particular, have promised to follow a different trajectory than under Trump administration. Focus on environmental issues, trans-Atlantic cooperation and human rights and an emphasis on diplomacy and stability is forcing the regional partners of the US to adjust accordingly. One of the first examples of the Middle Eastern countries adjusting to the change in the White House was Saudi Arabia moving to resolve its differences with Qatar by signing the Al-Ula Declaration in January 2021.
Third, there is a combination of domestic and geopolitical considerations that are forcing the regional leaders to undertake a diplomatic route and engage each other, not necessarily with the aim to resolve differences, but certainly to manage them better. For example, Saudi Arabia wants to emerge as a regional economic and business hub to realise, if not all, at least part of the Vision 2030 goals, the pet project of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and without a robust regional trade and business activity this might prove a pipedream. Similarly, there is a change of guard in Iran with a more hardliner government keen to address Iran’s economic challenges and manage public anger. Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan faces one of the most difficult challenges in the run up to the 2023 elections, and wishes to use diplomacy to overcome both economic challenges and declining popularity. The UAE, on the other hand, wants to reinforce its position as a regional diplomatic heavyweight. Iraqi, Egyptian, Jordanian and Qatari leaders too have domestic and regional compulsions to invest in diplomatic initiatives.
Notwithstanding the outcomes of these initiatives, does the new momentum in regional diplomacy offer a window of opportunity for India? New Delhi, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has significantly reoriented its Middle East policy with vigorous bilateral engagements focusing on increasing trade, business and investment activities and strengthening defence and military partnerships. Among the key countries with which India has developed closer partnership since 2014 are Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In a way, the three now form the core of India’s Middle East policy with countries such as Iran, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq, forming the immediate periphery with energy security, safety of Indian community and connectivity considerations. Improved bilateral relations and greater diplomatic engagements have helped India deal with challenges emanating from the region more effectively. For example, evacuation of its nationals from Yemen in 2015, and after the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 or fulfilment of its energy needs after US sanctions on Iran in 2018–19 were smoother than it would have been otherwise.
Greater engagement has also helped Indian diplomacy become more confident in dealing with the regional issues. Earlier, New Delhi was more comfortable balancing regional engagements when faced with conflicting situations such as between Iran and Saudi Arabia or Israel and Palestine. With greater engagements, New Delhi has been able to deal with the conflicting demands without necessarily shying away from leaning to one side if its interests demand, what has been termed as de-hyphenation in India’s Middle East policy.2 India has also signalled that it will no longer be apprehensive of engaging in regional or multilateral initiatives if this serves its interests. For example, the External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, held a meeting with his Israeli, Emirati and US counterparts during his five-day visit to Israel in October 2021 with focus on enhancing India’s economic engagements with the regional bloc emerging under the umbrella of Abraham Accords.
The new regional developments bode well for India in terms of its interests in regional security and stability, but more importantly offer an opportunity for New Delhi to enhance its diplomatic and economic engagements with the regional countries. Trade, business and investments should form the core of the Indian engagements without necessarily needing to take straightforward position on conflicting issues. There are immense economic opportunities that the region offers, especially in non-conventional sectors such as healthcare, tourism, education, sports and entertainment and greater diplomacy can pave the way for Indian industries, businesses and start-ups to partner with the regional businesses.
Undoubtedly, the key objectives of the new diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East are reducing regional tensions and giving impetus to intra-regional economic activities to overcome the challenges posed by the COVID-19, and this certainly offers a window of newer, more and bigger opportunities for India and its business community.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The recent neutralisation of hardcore Maoists, including one of its top leaders, in Gadchiroli District serves as a major setback for CPI (Maoist)’s expansion in the Maharashtra–Madhya Pradesh–Chhattisgarh tri-junction region. A judicious mix of security and developmental interventions would go a long way in tackling Maoist threat.
In a major anti-Maoist operation in the forests of Madintola in Dhanora sub-division of Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra on 13 November 2021, 26 Maoists, including six women combatants, were reported to have been killed. The 10-hour-long operation conducted by the elite C-601 commandos of the Maharashtra Police led to fierce exchange of fire between the police and the Maoists at multiple sites and resulted in the recovery of bodies of the slain Maoists and 29 weapons, comprising five AK-47 rifles, an AK-47 with UBGL attachment, nine SLRs, an INSAS rifle, few .303 rifles, etc.2 The kind of weapons recovered indicates presence of many hardcore Maoists at the encounter site.
Top Maoist leader and Central Committee Member Milind Teltumbde alias Deepak Teltumbde was one among the Maoists killed during the operation. Milind was a member of Maharashtra committee of the CPI (Maoist) and had a reward of Rs 50 lakh on his head. He was brother of a renowned scholar, writer and civil rights activist Anand Teltumbde, who is currently in judicial custody for his alleged involvement in the 2017 Bhima Koregaon case. Keeping into consideration Milind’s stature and decades of contribution to the organisation, the Party high command tasked him with developing the tri-junction of the Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (MMC) states as a potent guerrilla zone for the Maoists, similar to the Dadakaranya Special Zone Committee (DKSZC).
The CPI (Maoist) has often been undertaking organisational restructuring to consolidate its position in the existing core areas. Amidst increasing reverses suffered by the Maoists in south Bastar (Chhattisgarh) in the last five years,3 the Party has been consistently trying to carve out new zones for its operations. Two such potential areas/zones are the tri-junctions of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (MMC) and the Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (KKT).4 This is mainly to divert the attention of the security forces from its core area of Bastar and also to save and replenish their depleting armed strength (cadres and leaders) in the Bastar stronghold.5
CPI (Maoist) ‘New’ Maharashtra–Madhya Pradesh–Chhattisgarh (MMC) Zone
Figure 1
The CPI (Maoist)’s initial forays into the MMC confluence zone started in 2015. After deeply studying the topography and carrying out an in-depth socio-political survey of the adjoining areas along the inter-state borders, three potential stretches were identified by the CPI (Maoist). The new areas cover forested pockets in districts of Gondia in Maharashtra, Balaghat in Madhya Pradesh and northern Rajnandgaon in Chhattisgarh.6 Initially, 58 senior and middle level commanders headed by Darbha divisional commander Surender, were sent to activate this new zone.7 The terrain and demography of the areas were found to be conducive for the expansion of Maoist activities and operations as the areas in the region are mostly backward, densely-forested with sparse tribal inhabitations and more importantly, scantly policed. A small division of the CPI (Maoist) with an estimated strength of 20–30 cadres already active in the region—GRB (Gondia, Rajnandgaon, Balaghat) division—was merged with the team from Bastar to consolidate and further expand their operations up to erstwhile strongholds of Gadchiroli in Maharashtra, Mandla in Madhya Pradesh and parts of Kabirdham and Mungeli districts in Chhattisgarh.8 While Maoist violence is sporadically reported from Rajnandgaon district; Kabirdham and Mungeli districts of Chhattisgarh and Dindori district of Madhya Pradesh are relatively violence-free till now. Mungeli and Dindori have been added to the Ministry of Home Affairs’ list of ‘Maoist-affected districts’ recently.9 Reportedly, around 100 Maoists had entered into Balaghat and Mandla districts of Madhya Pradesh from neighbouring states of Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra. Around six dalams (groups) of Maoists are operating in Balaghat and Mandla districts. Of these, Khatia Mocha Dalam in Mandla came up last year.10 A Maoist document seized by the Chhattisgarh Police suggested that there were about 200 rebels active in the MMC zone in December 2019.11
Notably, the CPI (Maoist) is also believed to be relocating its armed cadres from its Bastar and Andhra–Odisha Border (AOB) strongholds to new safer core areas in the Kanha National Park, Amarkantak forests and Bhoramdoe Tiger Reserve, which are interconnected through impregnable patch of forests located on the borders of Madhya Pradesh (Balaghat and Mandla) and Chhattisgarh (Kabirdham).12 Since the areas do not have many roads and are scantly policed, Maoists are believed to be cultivating their organisational roots in the region, recruiting new cadres and generating human intelligence. According to the Gadchiroli Police, two platoons of ‘Vistar Dalam’ of the CPI (Maoist) are active in the Kanha–Bhoramdeo region. Similarly, the forests of Amarkantak, being highly inaccessible for the security forces, have a strategic significance for Maoists and could prove to be a safe haven for the senior leaders who are under pressure from security forces in Jharkhand and Bastar. Besides, the forest is also close to the Maoist-affected districts of Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh and could provide the Maoists easy passage to these states. The Maoists are consistently trying to develop a new ‘base area’ in the dense Amarkantak forests to intensify their activities/operations in the areas falling under the MMC zone.13
The neutralisation of 26 hardcore Maoists, including the Central Committee member and MMC secretary Milind Teltumbde, in the latest operation by C-60 commandos in Gadchiroli serves a huge setback for the CPI (Maoist)’s expansion designs in the MMC region. Notably, the Maoist stronghold in Gadchiroli has proved to be the fulcrum for not only expanding the Maoist activities in the MMC region but also helps in sustaining Maoist war machinery in south Bastar. The region enables supply of war logistics to other areas of Maoist operations and also offers safe hideouts as well as safe passage for the armed and senior leaders to escape the security radar. Nevertheless, the recent tactical success against the Maoists should not override the security forces’ preparedness as the retaliatory attacks are imminent.
Presently on the backfoot in their strongholds of Bastar and Andhra–Odisha Border, the outlawed outfit is striving hard to develop and activate some ‘base areas’ in and around the tri-junction region (MMC) so as to consolidate its position vis-à-vis security forces. Currently in the ‘strategic defence phase’ in the region, the Party is largely focusing on socialising and identifying with the local tribal population to get their support for the ‘protracted people’s war’, recruiting armed cadres and preserving their areas of operation in the region. The CPI (Maoist) has been increasingly making efforts in the areas to encash on the disenchantment and grievances of the local tribals against the administration.
To tackle it, there is a need to undertake a judicious mix of security and developmental interventions in the region, wherein, development should proceed the security initiatives. While the security measures such as deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) should be employed to tackle the Maoist rebels, the government should emphasise more on development initiatives. As large parts of the region are inhabited by the particularly vulnerable tribal groups (PVTGs) like Baiga, Abujh Marias, etc., ensuring rights and entitlements of local tribal population over the lands and forests traditionally used by them and ensuring them a dignified life in harmony with the local culture and customs may prove to be effective tools for keeping the Maoist extremists at bay.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Targeted towards enhancing cold weather survival skills and tactical offensive operations in high-altitude environment, the latest iteration of Yudh Abhyas has significance for both Indian Army’s strategy for its Northern Borders and the US Army’s Arctic Strategy.
The second phase of the 25th iteration of the Malabar Exercise in October 2021 showcased the interoperability skills of the QUAD navies in the Bay of the Bengal, sending signals of collective resolve for a free and open Indo-Pacific. As the Malabar Exercise concluded on 15 October 2021, another joint military exercise between the armies of the two largest democracies went underway in the far-flung Chugach Mountains of Alaska. Indian soldiers from the 7th Madras Infantry Battalion Group alongside American soldiers from the 40th Cavalry Regiment of the US Army engaged in intense training exercises focusing on combined arms manoeuvres under extreme cold climatic conditions.
Exercise Yudh Abhyas is the largest joint military training between India and the US aimed at tactical level drills and developing interoperability.1 The key focus of the 17th Edition of Yudh Abhyas, conducted recently in Alaska, was on aspects of high-altitude warfare like helicopter-based mobilisation, assault on an enemy position in mountainous terrain and securing critical infrastructure.2 Along with this, a demonstration of the US Military’s drone buster gun, as part of Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS), survival and acclimatisation to the inhospitable terrain during mountain warfare were the other key highlights of the exercise.3 Exercise Yudh Abhyas has been conducted since 2004, hosted alternately between India and the US with the previous iteration of the exercise held in Bikaner, Rajasthan in February 2021. However, the latest iteration does imply significance for both Indian Army’s strategy for its Northern Borders and the US Army’s Arctic Strategy.
Strategic Significance of Yudh Abhyas in Alaska
The location, time, scale, participants and objectives of any joint military exercise can project a signal to a common adversary.4 In this context, the latest iteration of Yudh Abhyas assumes strategic significance as it comes amidst the ongoing impasse in the mountainous terrain of LAC. The Chinese government on several occasions in the past has expressed its apprehensions over India’s joint military exercises with the US and its other allies like Japan and Australia. Yudh Abhyas has also come under the notice of the Chinese government in the past. An article published by the Chinese state-run Global Times views the previous iteration of Yudh Abhyas held in February 2021 as an indicator of the future of Indo-US defence cooperation, as it was the first joint exercise after Joe Biden assumed the presidency in January 2021.5 This article cautions India against engaging in joint military exercises with the US as it labels these exercises as part of a greater American strategy to contain China. The article perceives that the previous iteration of Yudh Abhyas was not directed against China but Pakistan as the location of the exercise was in proximity to the India–Pakistan border.6 Among other things, the article gives insight on China’s insecurity and its perception of India’s enhancement of defence cooperation and interoperability with the US Military being detrimental to its interests.
The location of the latest iteration of the exercise is situated far away in the wilderness of Alaska, and the topography of the terrain bears striking similarities to the rugged mountainous terrain of the Sino-Indian Border along the LAC where the impasse between the two nations continues. Aspects like cold weather combat skills to train troops for survival in Arctic conditions akin to the Himalayas were the central theme of the 14-day-long intense exercises. Although there have been no Chinese reactions to this exercise available in the public domain so far, it would be fair to assume that China must have taken note of the agenda and timing of this exercise. Despite China’s apprehensions, the Indian government has repeatedly made it clear that none of its political and military cooperation forums with the US or any other nation is directed against any third party. This was expressed by the Hon’ble External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in his address to the press with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken during the latter’s visit to India in July 2021.7
Significance for Indian Army’s Strategy for the Northern Borders
As far as the Indian Army is concerned, aspects of Yudh Abhyas 2021 are extremely significant for its strategy of enhancing deterrence along the Northern Borders which has been emphasised in its ‘Land Warfare Doctrine of 2018’. The doctrine describes the Indian Army’s operational strategy along the Northern Borders as force-centric and multi-tiered, characterised by rapid mobilisation through augmentation of force multipliers. The capability to engage the adversary in a self-contained and isolated manner is deemed crucial for Indian Army units deployed along the mountainous terrain of northern borders. To achieve this, the doctrine recommends deployment of highly agile strike formations acclimatised for rapid application in high-altitude environments.8 Towards this end, Yudh Abhyas in Alaska assumes significance, given its focus directed towards cold weather survival skills and tactical offensive operations in high-altitude environment.
Significance for the US Army’s Arctic Strategy
In 2019, the US Department of Defence (DoD) submitted a report to Congress highlighting the strategic significance of the Arctic Region to America’s national security. This report identifies the Arctic region as a key avenue where great power competition with China and Russia poses a direct threat to US’ national security. Here the Arctic has been described as a potential vector for an attack on the US homeland. The report advocates the US Army maintaining credible deterrence in the Arctic by developing a lethal, resilient and agile military capability specially tailored for the mountainous terrain of the Arctic.9 Cold weather training of the US Military personnel for acquiring specialised tactics and procedures of mountain warfare is cited as a vital element in achieving this objective.10
On 12 December 2020, the Arctic Security Dialogue was organised by the Woodrow Wilson International Centre in Washington DC. In this dialogue, top US Army Generals participated and spoke on US Army’s Arctic Strategy. Amongst the most notable speaker in this event was Maj Gen Peter Andrysiak, the former commander of the US Army Alaska. He pointed out several existing capability gaps of the US Army in waging high-altitude warfare including lack of equipment and training for troops. Here he highlighted Yudh Abhyas as a critical platform for the US Army to derive from the Indian Army’s expertise on Mountain Warfare due to the latter’s long history of combat and peacetime operations in the Himalayas.
Citing the US Army’s focus on high-altitude warfare, Gen Andrysiak stated that Yudh Abhyas 2021 will be hosted in Alsaka for this purpose and announced that the future iteration of the exercise will be conducted in the Himalayas in 2022. He further stated that he considers the Yudh Abhyas in conjunction with the US Army’s ‘Arctic Warrior Exercise’ as vital avenues for enhancing US Military’s capability to operate in the Arctic.11 Collective deterrence fostered by the like-minded Arctic and Non-Arctic nations is cited as crucial for a stable and conflict-free Arctic region.12 This is an area where Yudh Abhyas stands in conjunction to the DoD’s report which advocates cooperation with strategic partners as the cornerstone for the US government’s strategic approach towards the Arctic region.
Prospects of Yudh Abhyas Evolving into a Multilateral Exercise
Another aspect about Yudh Abhyas is that it is the only joint military exercise series with the US that continues in a bilateral format. Other bilateral military exercises with the US like the Malabar Exercise for the Navies and the Cope India for the Air Forces have organically evolved into trilateral and multilateral formats assuming greater strategic significance. In the past US had suggested inclusion of Japan in Yudh Abhyas but this was declined by India.13 Evolving geopolitical dynamics of Indo-Pacific have led many democratic nations of the region to look for avenues to bolster their military capability. In this context, the Yudh Abhyas has the potential to be elevated into a platform for enhancing military cooperation of QUAD and other like-minded nations focusing on the land warfare domain akin to the Malabar Exercise for naval warfare.
Conclusion
Over the last decade, military exercises both in the bilateral and multilateral formats have become the mainstay in India’s defence diplomacy with other nations. Since 2010, India has undertaken joint army exercises with 18 countries,14 but what makes the Yudh Abhyas stand out is the fact that it has extensively evolved since its first iteration in 2004. Initially, Yudh Abhyas like all other joint military exercises focused on establishing familiarity between militaries and learning from best practices of each other. Another factor for Yudh Abhyas gaining significance is due to the increasing number of Western platforms being inducted into the Indian military. The induction of C-17 Globemaster strategic airlift aircraft, C-130 Hercules tactical airlift aircraft, Chinook Heavy Lift Helicopters and M777 Ultra-Light Howitzer has taken place over the last decade. These platforms are extensively used by the US Army and have become instrumental in the Indian Army’s operations along the mountainous terrain of the LAC. Adding to this expanding Indo-US defence cooperation has been reflected by a number of agreements over the last five years including Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and the Industrial Security Agreement (ISA).15 These agreements are likely to facilitate the induction of more American platforms in the Indian Military. Exercise Yudh Abhyas acts as a platform for both armies to enhance their interoperability through these commonly used military platforms.
Addressing the Goa Maritime Conclave on 8 November 2021, the Defence Secretary Mr Ajay Kumar stated that aggressive and expansionist behaviour in the Asia-Pacific region is a source of great concern for India’s national security. He reiterated India’s resolve to deter aggressive and expansionist moves both on land and the sea.16 In this context, Yudh Abhyas like the Malabar Exercise, is bound to play a significant role for India and its partners to project credible strategic posturing. As a result, the future iterations of the Yudh Abhyas will be keenly watched by both allies and adversaries of India.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
While the international community has maintained a cautious stand vis-à-vis the Taliban, Tajikistan has decisively thrown its weight in support of the resistance movement against the Taliban and has made a clarion call for an inclusive government in Afghanistan.
In recent months there has been a significant expansion of the Taliban power within Afghanistan. It includes areas once controlled by the Northern Alliance—particularly Badakhshan, Takhar and Panjshir, which the Taliban had largely failed to capture in the 1990s. The international community has maintained a cautious stand vis-à-vis the Taliban, but Tajikistan, which shares a border with Afghanistan, has been critical of the Taliban. In almost every speech, even the ones not related to foreign policy, President Emomali Rahmon referred to the misfortunes of the Afghan people under the Taliban.1 Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2021, Rahmon stated that the release of thousands of terrorists by the Taliban has put Afghanistan “on the path to becoming a breeding ground for international terrorism”.2
Based on the reminiscences of the Taliban rule of the past, the changed scenario in Afghanistan has been a constant source of security and economic concerns for Tajikistan. It has decisively thrown its weight in support of a resistance movement against the Taliban and has made a clarion call for the establishment of an inclusive government in Afghanistan.3 Acting Taliban deputy prime ministers Abdul Salam Hanafi and Abdul Ghani Baradar have accused Tajikistan of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.4
Tajikistan was a key supporter of the Northern Alliance in its resistance to the Taliban regime in the 1990s and enjoyed close ties with fellow Tajik leaders from Jamiat-e-Islami, particularly former president Burhanuddin Rabbani and commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, popularly revered as the “Lion of Panjshir”. Recently, in early September, at a time when the Taliban were struggling to extend their control over the Panjshir Valley, Tajikistan posthumously awarded country’s highest honour (Order of Ismoili Somoni) to both Rabbani and Massoud for facilitating and mediating inter-Tajik talks in the period 1993–1996 and making a significant contribution to the peace process in Tajikistan.5 Therefore, Tajikistan’s aversion to dealing with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan should not entirely come as a surprise. Its confrontational stand towards the Taliban can be attributed to the following reasons.
Ethnic Factor
In Afghanistan, where ethnic and tribal disputes are carried over through several generations, the return of a non-inclusive Taliban regime, comprising of majority Pashtuns with a sprinkling of Tajiks and other ethnic groups, has led to growing demand including from Tajikistan for an inclusive and representative government in Kabul.
For much of its recent history, Afghanistan has been ruled by various Pashtun dynasties. In the 1890s, there was a shrill campaign to Pashtunise Afghanistan. With the exception of King Habibullah Kalakani (1929) and former president Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992–2001), both ethnic Tajiks, Pashtuns have dominated Afghanistan’s political history and governance. The emergence of organisations such as Setam-a-Milli (an anti-Pashtun Tajik organisation) and Afghan Millat (a pro-Pashtun organisation) further complicated the inter-ethnic relations in the 1960s.6 Following the Soviet invasion in 1979, the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e-Islami emerged as one of the most powerful anti-Soviet resistance groups. Led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, Jamiat continued to play a significant role in post-Soviet Afghanistan. After the collapse of the Najibullah Government in early 1992, a coalition of mujahideen groups came to power in Kabul. Soon Rabbani took over as the president of Afghanistan. Four years later, with the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 1996, the Tajik militia led by Massoud emerged as a key component of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Though Massoud was killed in a suicide attack two days before 9/11, his forces along with Uzbek and Hazara elements of the Northern Alliance provided vital ground support to the US forces in their effort to overthrow the Taliban regime.
Post 9/11, the Tajiks enjoyed a significant share of influence in the governance, economy and politics of the country.7 However, the return of Taliban to power after two decades has led to a loss of influence for the Tajiks, as well as for the Hazaras and the Uzbeks. It is no surprise that the resistance against the Taliban regime first emerged from the Panjshir Valley, a Tajik stronghold, mainly led by former intelligence chief and vice president Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massoud, son of late commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. Several of these Tajik leaders have found sanctuaries in Tajikistan from where they seem to be guiding the anti-Taliban resistance front, ostensibly with the tacit support of Tajikistan’s leadership.8
Security Concerns
Tajikistan fears that the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan may embolden the radicalised sections within the country to crank a call for ‘jihad’. During the Afghan–Soviet War in the 1980s, many Tajiks had secretly joined the ‘Afghan Jihad’, introducing them to Tajik nationalism and Islamism. Later, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Tajikistan as an independent state in 1991, these radicalised Tajiks formed the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), an opposition to Emomali Rahmon (then Rahmonov) government. Meanwhile, after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 1996, Massoud and Rabbani along with other anti-Taliban resistance leaders had formed the Northern Alliance, a Tajik-dominated coalition. The Northern Alliance needed support bases for launching operations which necessitated a fragile truce between the Rahmon Government and the IRP. It led to the end of the civil war in 1997 and Tajikistan joining the resistance against the Taliban.
With the Taliban making a full comeback, there have been reports of Taliban employing the Tajik terror group Jamaat Ansarullah9 as border guards in the Badakhshan Province.10 It is known in Tajikistan for its strident anti-government views. The possibility of Taliban using Ansarullah fighters to fuel unrest in Tajikistan remains a major security concern for Tajikistan. Therefore, faced with security concerns, Tajikistan has taken defensive measures to reinforce its border security. It includes military drills, increased troop deployment in the border areas and anti-terrorism exercises with China and Russia.11 The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan has also led to a refugee influx in bordering Central Asian states. Tajikistan has taken initiatives to resettle about 1,00,000 Afghan refugees.12 There are, however, concerns about possible infiltration of Ansarullah and pro-Daesh jihadi elements amidst the refugees from Afghanistan.
Russian Factor
Tajikistan is a member of both the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). These are organisations with considerable Russian leverage, therefore, any step taken by Tajikistan vis-à-vis the Taliban is most likely to have Russian support. For now, Russia has refused to recognise the Taliban regime until there is an inclusive government in place13 , a stand similar to that of Tajikistan. As a major security provider in the region, Russia has also weighed upon the Taliban to retain its promise of peace with its neighbours, including Tajikistan.14 It has further called upon both Tajikistan and the Taliban to avoid confrontation.15
Conclusion
The Taliban government in Kabul is yet to be formally recognised by any world power. Given Tajikistan’s unease over the developing situation in Afghanistan, the coming months can see a more strident role of Tajikistan. President Rahmon, who had a tough time dealing with the civil war in the 1990s, and has since struggled to keep the militant Islamists under check, would be cautious not to let the past repeat itself. Since Tajikistan is also economically the most fragile country in Central Asia16 , threats from regional and international terrorist networks add to its vulnerability. Rahmon may be using the anti-Taliban sentiments among the Tajiks to stoke up nationalistic fervour to consolidate his position vis-à-vis the Islamists in domestic politics.
While Russia has avoided recognising the Taliban government so far, its diplomatic engagement with the Taliban, especially within the Moscow Format, has only grown with time. Russian recognition of the Taliban government in future—along with China and other Central Asian states—would certainly put to test Tajikistan’s position vis-à-vis the Taliban.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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