Emerging Fault Lines between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban
Nazir Ahmad Mir
December 09, 2022
Given the ideological convergence the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has with the Taliban, the latter may not be able or willing to fulfil Pakistan’s demand that its activities be curbed.
It is said that in politics there are no permanent friends or enemies, there are only permanent interests. Therefore, politicians, particularly the rulers of a country, assess long-term implications of the policies that they pursue and take decisions accordingly. The latest rise in terror attacks in Pakistan indicate that the government and the security institutions in the country have failed to calculate the implications of their direct/indirect support to the Taliban. The threat is compounded by the fact that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has announced ending of the ceasefire agreed to in November 2021. Immediately after the announcement, a suicide attack in Quetta, Balochistan killed three and injured many people.1
Insurgents across the world have been able to use their transnational links and support to survive as well as garner support. They do not stay loyal to only one patron, howsoever close they may have been at one point in time. The Taliban are no exception to this rule. The Pakistani state, as advised by many, both internally as well externally, did not factor in the implications of Taliban’s nationalistic stand as well as the challenges they would face once the Taliban reclaimed Kabul. Overlooking these factors, Islamabad seems to have committed a strategic blunder.
Pakistan was jubilant about the removal of the Ashraf Ghani government in Kabul, less so about the withdrawal of the United States (US)-led troops on 15 August 2021. Then Prime Minister Imran Khan had commented on the Taliban’s takeover that the Afghans had “broken the shackles of slavery”2 Many in Pakistan “celebrated” the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s arrival in Kabul for various reasons.3 None of them, however, could fully comprehend the reality that the Taliban, after they were back in power in Kabul, were likely to operate as a state, with their own priorities and challenges.
Hope versus Reality
People who had wished the Taliban in Kabul well were hopeful that Pakistan would not have to support the US efforts in the region anymore. It pleased the anti-America forces in the country which hoped that the allegedly pro-India leaders like Karzai or Ghani would be out of Afghanistan’s politics. More importantly, with the Taliban back in Kabul, it was hoped that ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan will improve significantly. Islamabad threw its full weight behind the Taliban expecting that it would help Pakistan in eliminating the TTP, which posed a major security threat to Pakistan. When many countries were expressing their reservations about Taliban’s ideology and their approach to women, girls and minorities, then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mehmood Qureshi dismissed it as propaganda.4
There were commentators in Pakistan who held that if Afghanistan was to become a pariah state or an unstable country with the Taliban as a nationalistic force too weak to govern, it was going to be a massive challenge for Pakistan. A regime with no coherence within the group and weak control over the country could not act against groups like TTP. Moreover, some reports indicated that anti-Pakistan hatred among common Afghans was intense. Due to various reasons, “Afghans do not consider themselves responsible for their miseries and destruction”, wrote one commentator in an Urdu daily, Nawa-e-Waqt, “but [put the blame on] the policies of Pakistan in Afghanistan”.5
Some experts did warn against the churlish celebrations. Former ambassador Maleeha Lodhi presciently wrote after the fall of Kabul that Islamabad should practice caution “as a fluid situation can encourage cross-border attacks from militant groups based in Afghanistan that Kabul has yet to act against and on which Islamabad should secure ironclad guarantees”.6 According to a report by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) in October 2022, since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, Pakistan witnessed a 51 per cent increase in terror attacks in a single year.7 The latest TTP attack took place on 14 November 2022 after which the main crossing for trade between the two countries, the ‘Friendship Gate’ at the Wesh-Chaman border, had to be closed.8 The attackers came from the Afghan side and killed one security personnel, according to reports.
Taliban confronts Islamabad
The jubilations in Pakistan over the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, therefore, did not last long. Expectedly, the Taliban focused on their national interests once they were back in power. Their immediate security calculations were different from that of Pakistan. Moreover, they shared their ideological moorings with TTP.
At the very beginning of the Taliban 2.0 rule, Pakistan had asked the Taliban to take action against TTP “as a test case” to prove both their power and commitment to their words that they would act against terrorism. “If the Taliban can't address concerns of Pakistan, then who would trust them and their promise of cutting ties to al Qaeda and other such groups”, one Pakistani official was quoted as saying.9 The Taliban always claimed that the Afghan territory would not be used by terrorists against any other state.
However, when the Taliban failed to act against the TTP, capturing the frustrations on the Pakistani side, senior journalist Saleem Safi wrote in Jang that Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan was flawed, based on three assumptions: One, the American presence was the root problem in Afghanistan; two, Ashraf Ghani, Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah were Pakistan’s enemies and the Taliban are friends; and third, there is no connection between the Afghan Taliban and TTP.10
Once the Taliban came to power, these assumptions were proved wrong. Afghanistan under the Taliban helped the TTP to re-unite and re-emerge with full force. They reportedly armed themselves with sophisticated weapons that were left behind by the foreign troops, which could not have occurred with overt or covert Taliban blessings.
The TTP, despite the promises of the Taliban, continued with their offensive and increased their attacks. On 14 April 2022, in an attack in North Waziristan, seven Pakistani soldiers were killed, leading to a harsh exchange of statements between the two countries. The sharp response from Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that
Pakistan has repeatedly requested Afghan Government in last few months to secure Pak-Afghan border region. Terrorists are using Afghan soil with impunity to carry out activities inside Pakistan.11
With the Taliban unwilling or incapable of stopping the terror attacks across the border, Pakistan carried out strikes inside the Afghan territory on 15 April to target terrorists. The reaction from the Taliban officials and the Afghans for violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty was on expected lines. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid warned Pakistan “not to test the patience of Afghans on such issues and not repeat the same mistake again otherwise it will have bad consequences”.12
There is an overwhelming feeling in Pakistan that the Taliban have betrayed their trust and forgotten the material and moral support they had received in their struggle against the Americans. It is not difficult to understand why Pakistan, after backing the Taliban to the hilt, has not recognised their government as legitimate after almost a year.
Conclusion
Given the grave challenges the Taliban face in Afghanistan, it is hard to predict what the future holds for Pakistan–Afghanistan relations. Meanwhile, Pakistan has learnt it the hard way that it has to fight its own war against the TTP. Islamabad may continue to prod the Taliban to take action against the TTP members and stop them from using the Afghan territory against Pakistan. However, given the ideological convergence TTP has with the Taliban and the support that they receive from the people in south-eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban may not be able to fulfil Pakistan’s request.
Not only do they fear of backlash from within their own ranks if they act against the TTP, they also apprehend that if they act against the TTP, its members may join other terror groups like Daesh and Al-Qaeda. They are also perhaps too conscious of the implications of acting at the bidding of Pakistan, especially when there was a perception that they were merely acting as puppets of Pakistan. In their earlier avatar in the 1990s also, the Taliban had refused to recognise the Durand Line as the border between the two countries. Now too, they are likely to pose as uncompromising Afghan nationalists, and not stooges of some other country. All these issues are likely to create rifts and conflicts between the Taliban and Pakistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Escalating Tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban
Saman Ayesha Kidwai
December 09, 2022
Border clashes and failure to act against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have led to rising tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The intensifying conflict between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban is a volatile case of souring patron–client relationship. The Taliban, once seen as ISI’s proxy for controlling Afghanistan and having given Pakistan great ‘strategic depth’, has now turned into a classic example of a strategic blowback. Border clashes, the recent closure of the Chaman-Spin Boldak crossing for a week, the emerging debates on Afghan sovereignty, and Taliban’s unwillingness or incapability to crack down on Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) indicate that the tension between the two countries has escalated in the last few months.
The Taliban Takeover and Pakistan
After the Taliban took over Kabul in August 2021, Islamabad might have felt that it had achieved its desired policy objectives by bringing an allied militia to power in Kabul. It was natural for Pakistan to expect that it would now be able to address the TTP conundrum more effectively.
Decades of violent insurgency, reaching its pinnacle with the massacre at the army school in Peshawar in December 2014 by TTP fighters, is a loss that remains entrenched in the Pakistanis’ memory. Since its emergence in 2007, the TTP has carried out more than 3,000 attacks, killing at least 7,500 individuals, including 2,500 police and armed forces personnel.1 The TTP’s alleged trafficking of weapons left behind after the international coalition’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has been another significant challenge.2
After coming to power, the Taliban reportedly started resisting Pakistani intervention in its domestic affairs. Clashes intensified along the Durand Line— which has never gained legitimacy from any Afghan authority, including the current regime— every time efforts to construct fences at the border were undertaken.3
However, the biggest blowback occurred at the Chaman-Spin Boldak border or the Friendship Gate when an unidentified man killed a Pakistani officer in November 2022.4 The Friendship Gate is the second-busiest trading route after the Torkham crossing.5 Although the Pakistani media accused the perpetrator of being a member of the Afghan Taliban, it was denied by the latter. Nonetheless, an unverified confession was obtained with a Taliban fighter stating that the officer’s killing was retribution for ‘disrespect’ faced by the Afghans in Pakistan.6
The situation has reached a stage where it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that, the Friendship gate, the Torkham border, or even trade routes via the sea, might be closed off for a longer duration to pressurise the economically weak and isolated regime in Kabul to meet Pakistan’s demands concerning its security.
Pakistan has accused the Taliban of providing refuge to hostile elements and allowing the use of Afghan territory as a launch pad for terror strikes.7 In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif outlined the threats posed by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), al-Qaeda, and TTP and remarked on the need to address these security challenges ‘comprehensively…with the support and cooperation of the interim Afghan authorities’. The Taliban meanwhile claimed that these were ‘unsubstantiated concerns and allegations’.8
The TTP–Afghan Taliban–Pakistan Dynamics
There has been more than 50 per cent increase in terrorist attacks across Pakistan within a year since 15 August 2021. There have been more than 400 deaths due to violent acts committed by the TTP during this period.9 With a porous border considered illegitimate by Pashtuns on both sides and the unwillingness of the Afghan Taliban leadership to restrain and betray their jihadist brethren has emboldened the TTP fighters to undertake violent attacks against Pakistan using Afghan soil.
Reports note that nearly 1,000 TTP militants, even those involved in an attack on a school van in October 2022 in the Swat valley, have infiltrated into Pakistan since last year via Afghanistan.10 The United Nations estimates that approximately 5,000 TTP militants and their kin reside on Afghan soil under the Taliban’s protection. Peace talks mediated by Afghanistan’s Minister of Interior Sirajuddin Haqqani between the TTP and Pakistan in the recent past have failed. While there have been no official reactions to border clashes, some of the Afghan Taliban’s foot soldiers have aided the TTP in carrying out attacks against Pakistani armed forces and police personnel. For example, on 30 March 2022, six soldiers had died after an army camp came under attack in the Dera Ismail Khan District.11
Reportedly, following the seizure of Kabul, the Afghan Taliban ensured the release of several imprisoned TTP fighters.12 This shows that despite Islamabad’s pleas, the Afghan Taliban have stood steadfast with the TTP allies, despite the decades-long devastation caused by their Pakistani offshoot and its potential to do worse, possibly as leverage.
Moreover, the American drone strike that neutralised Ayman al-Zawahiri in suburban Kabul, allegedly using Pakistani airspace, and airstrikes carried out by Islamabad in Khost and Kunar provinces, killing at least 47 civilians, raised widespread condemnation of the violation of Afghan sovereignty and territorial integrity.13 In fact, Afghan Interim Defence Minister, Mullah Yaqoob even called for retaliation.14 The pro-Taliban factions took to the streets, protesting against the airstrikes.
Such sentiments have hardened over the past year, prominently visible in Mullah Yaqoob’s refusal to meet Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, during her recent visit.15 Additionally, glowing praises of high-quality wheat supplied by India vis-à-vis deplorable quality delivered by Pakistan in March 2022 signalled widening cracks in their ties.16
Incidents like the verbal sparring between spectators after Afghanistan’s loss to Pakistan in a cricket match in September 2022 reiterate the dismal nature of ties between them. Chants of ‘traitors’ for the Afghans and ‘terrorists’ for the Pakistanis resonated throughout the stadium.17 Overall, such issues might have accelerated the parting of ways between the Taliban and their erstwhile patron and rejuvenated their agenda to chart out an independent path for themselves.
The reported assassination attempt on Pakistan’s Head of Mission in Afghanistan, Ubaid ur Rehman Nizamani in Kabul on 2 December, even as the Taliban assured that no actor would use Afghan soil to harm other countries’ interest, has further vitiated bilateral ties. If Pakistan withdraws or curtails its diplomatic presence due to continued threats to its security and personnel, the Taliban’s isolation could worsen, pushing Afghanistan under greater security and humanitarian strain. A prolonged conflictual situation with the Taliban complicates Pakistan’s internal security situation, at a time when it is already facing the Baloch insurgency, TTP’s resurgence, a plummeting economy, and increasing pressure from the Chinese to secure their investments.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
How China Views the World: An Analysis of the 20th CPC Congress Work Report
Mayuri Banerjee
December 01, 2022
The growing insecurity and threat perceptions articulated in the 20th Party Congress Work Report by Chinese President Xi Jinping indicates that Beijing is likely to become more assertive and belligerent in its international dealings.
The Work Report delivered by President Xi Jinping at the 20th Party Congress has three broad aspects—it reviews the work done by the government in the past five years; it is a framework for future policy measures that will be implemented and goals that will be adopted; and finally, it is a detailed assessment of the international environment and socio-political and security challenges facing China. The Work Report is a significant document enumerating Xi’s vision regarding China’s economic and political development, at a time when Xi begins his third term in office. As regards the foreign affairs, military and national security aspects of the Work Report, two major trends regarding China’s perception about its external environment are notable. First is a concern about systemic uncertainty and growing instability and the second relates to the perception about a hostile external environment.
Uncertainty and Instability a major concern of CCP
The 20th Party Congress Work Report flags concerns about rising uncertainty and instability at the international level. The document notes that since the last Congress in 2017, China’s external environment has been turning increasingly uncertain and unstable. It goes on to elaborate that China has entered a period where risks and challenges are concurrent with strategic opportunities and uncertainties.1 It indicates the possibility of outbreak of major conflict due to the cumulative impact of various crises. It warns that “various black swan and gray rhino events may occur at any time” and China should be ready to “withstand high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms”.2
The wariness exhibited by the latest Work Report was not visible in the recent past Congresses of the CPC. For instance, the 17th Party Congress in 2007 emphasised that in China’s external environment, the balance of power was changing in favour of maintenance of world peace, notwithstanding the presence of volatile elements.3 Similarly, the 2012 and the 2017 reports had only vaguely mentioned about volatile developments and complex changes and highlighted primarily the strategic opportunities that were favourable to China.4 None of these three reports projected China as facing any major systemic instability or uncertainty that could adversely impact it. Moreover, the overall international environment was seen as balanced and stable and geopolitical challenges and resource competition was not seen as disruptive.
However, recent series of events like the outbreak of the pandemic and its continuing politico-economic impact, the security vacuum caused by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, economic disruption caused by the Ukraine crisis, Sino-US trade war and increasing major power tension in the Indo-Pacific has evoked a feeling that the international situation is fast moving towards unpredictability. As China considers a stable international situation as an essential prerequisite for its national rejuvenation, the high degree of volatility has emerged as a major concern for the CCP.5
Rising Threat Perception
Along with being concerned with international instability, Beijing also appears to consider that the external environment has become hostile to China’s interests. The threat perception is notable as there is pointed emphasis on ensuring “national security” in every respect to combat “risk” and “challenge” emanating from external actors.6 Further, in the context of describing China’s geostrategic environment, the report states that China is confronted with drastic changes in the international landscape, especially external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade and exert maximum pressure on it. Also, it states that “external attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time”.7
It is noteworthy that this is the first time such phrases have been included in the work report to convey the nature of the threat China perceives. While previous work reports do refer to hegemonism of the West and bullying of weaker states by powerful ones to define the negative features of the international environment, they do not delve into specific threats posed to China.8 The worsening relations with the US and other major Western countries over different issues including trade, origin of COVID-19, allegations of violation of human rights in Xinjiang, status of Taiwan, apart from increasing geostrategic and economic competition in the Indo-Pacific, are viewed as the causes of China’s rising threat perception. This in turn has evoked fears of blackmail, containment, and blockade.
Beijing’s Darkening World View
It is noteworthy that concern about international instability, threat perception about the external environment and sense of crises has been underway post-2017. The onset of the trade war with the US, Western criticism of China’s crackdown in the restive regions of Xinjiang and Hong Kong and increasing pushback against China’s power projection in Asia-Pacific has instilled a sense of insecurity in Beijing which has grown in the subsequent years. Various public documents and statements made by Xi himself and other high-level officials proves this.
For instance, China’s threat perception about hostile external environment was evident in the 2019 Chinese National Defence White Paper which underscored the rising threat of militarisation in the Indo-Pacific. The document contended that US actions were undermining the region’s strategic balance, charged that Japan was trying to circumvent post-war mechanisms and develop offensive capabilities, and held that Australia was bent on military expansion.9 Subsequently, in 2020, as a warning of the impending crisis, the Central Party School (which trains Chinese diplomats) in an article published in its flagship journal Study Times stated that a ‘long-term’ struggle was ahead and called on Chinese diplomats to be prepared to fight through adversity.10
Further, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in an interview in 2021 observed that international instability has been exacerbated due to the pandemic and various events like the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Taliban’s victory in Kabul, as well as intensifying confrontation between major powers like Russia and the US.11 Later, in April 2022, Chinese ambassador to the US Qin Gang wrote in the National Interest that the post-war international system has come under the heaviest pressure since the Cold War.12
At the BOAO Forum for Asia in 2022, hinting towards possibility of major conflict between countries, Xi, in his inaugural address stated that while the international community was reeling from the after-effects of the pandemic, traditional security risks are already emerging.13 Xi was more direct at the BRICS conference held few months later where he stated that
Our world today is overshadowed by the dark clouds of Cold War mentality and power politics and beset by constantly emerging traditional and non-traditional security threats…14
Thus, Beijing has been closely following the evolving international situation while debating its impact on Chinese national interests. The work report can therefore be seen as a culmination of China’s recent world view which seems to have further darkened.
Double Down on National Security
One of the important implications of China’s negative perception about its external environment is Beijing’s heightened sensitivity towards national security. Breaking the traditional pattern, this year the work report has a separate section on national security titled Modernizing China’s National Security System and Capacity and Safeguarding National Security and Social Stability.Some of the notable aspects relating to enhancing security across a wide spectrum including economy, major infrastructure, financial institutions, cyberspace, are highlighted and it declares the government’s intent to counter foreign sanctions and interference. It calls for maintaining a high-alert against systemic security risks while stringently cracking down upon infiltration and separatist activities by hostile forces.15
Such an extensive note on augmenting national security in various aspects was seen for the first time in such reports. Previous reports only contained broad affirmations regarding the Party’s focus on strengthening political, military, economic and social stability. More importantly, for the first time, the issue of foreign sanctions and long arm jurisdiction featured prominently in the context of national security.16
The document, consistent with previous work reports, holds a strong military as the primary means for strengthening national security. It also elaborates on the national security goals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and continuing modernisation of the armed forces and national defence. However, unlike the 18th Party Congress work report, it does not talk about increasing mutual trust and cooperation with other countries or active participation in regional and international security affairs.17 Instead, it discusses at length the need to improve synergy between different departments of the military to enhance combat capabilities. Further, in contrast to the 19th Congress work report, which had simply mentioned the party’s responsibilities towards strengthening the army,18 this year’s work report calls for a centralised and proactive approach by strengthening Party’s control over the military and urgent development of strategic deterrence, combat capabilities and enhancing joint operations reconnaissance and joint strike capabilities.
Considering China’s grim perception of the international situation and external threat environment, sensitivity towards national security and focus on harnessing military power was hardly surprising. The concerning aspect is that China could frame national security threats more broadly and be more willing to take risks.19 Xi Jinping, for instance, could resort to risky strategic manoeuvres to retain his strongman image. Furthermore, the proposals regarding strengthening strategic deterrence (used primarily with regard to nuclear forces) and deployment of military forces on a regular basis and in diversified ways could mean that China is normalising the use of military force in dealing with its neighbours or asserting its territorial or maritime claims through military means.
Conclusion
The 20th Party Congress exhibited a number of exceptions. These include Xi Jinping continuing into his third term, delivering a shorter speech than usual and choosing a governing body solely made of his loyalists. Similarly, the work report also differed from previous reports in terms of conveying China’s negative assessment of the international situation, high threat perception and sensitivity towards national security, the leadership’s intent to exercise greater control over the military, urgent development of China’s strategic deterrence and normalisation of use of military forces.
Given the above, the growing insecurity and threat perception as articulated in the work report could lead to tighter controls in the domestic space and especially in the restive regions of Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. Secondly, China might increasingly strive to reduce its international dependence on critical technologies, energy supplies and other essential goods to counter US pressure. Finally, Beijing is likely to become more assertive in its international dealings and project military belligerence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
China is making increasing use of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), among others, to modernise the People’s Liberation Army.
China is deploying advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, automation and robots, quantum computing, big data, 5G networking, and the Internet of Things (IoT), for military purposes. In its 14th Five Year Plan (FYP) (2021–25), China outlined the main aims and objectives of modernising the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including that of ‘elevating the level to being an intelligent force’.1 China seeks to focus on accelerating military modernisation to make the PLA an automated and computerised force by 2027, the 100th anniversary of its founding in 1927. By 2035, PLA aims to become a modernised force in all spheres.2 Nevertheless, analysts note that a significant force reduction from current levels, budget boost and faster adoption of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies will be necessary to hasten the development of an intelligent and informationised force.
Shift from Mechanised to Intelligentised and Informationised Domain
The PLA has been modernising for more than 20 years and has long been described as being "half-mechanized, half-informationized force".3 The PLA is seeking to improve military efficacy by focusing on information technologies—particularly those connected to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), to become an "informatised" force.4 The move from mechanised to informationised force under the cover of intelligent network capabilities, such as IoT, 5G, Big Data and Cloud Computing, are the core ideas of the Chinese military's thinking towards transitioning to a 21st century force.
In essence, intelligent warfare implies the use of 4IR technologies for military use and the exploitation of such technologies to produce ‘intelligent weapons’, like AI-enabled weapons system. China's 2019 defense white paper had noted that ‘informationised conflict and intelligent warfare’ was ‘on the horizon’.5
China believes that the emerging economic and military-technical revolutions will be dominated by AI, big data, human–machine hybrid intelligence, swarm intelligence, automated decision-making, autonomous unmanned systems, and intelligent robots.6 The PLA is adopting 4IR technologies in order to be better prepared for the growing symmetric and asymmetric combat domains, especially in geographical and cyber space. Numerous crucial technologies, including robots, big data, quantum computing, etc., are expected to enable PLA forces to be better prepared, especially at a time when asymmetric warfare is changing the dimensions across battlespace.
In its geopolitical rivalry with the United States, China places a high importance on AI as a crucial technology. Chinese military experts predict that AI will be essential to overtaking the US military as the most powerful armed force in the world.7 As a result, China has developed a plan to take the lead in AI by 2030. Beijing's ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ was published in July 2017, with three key strategic objectives—to raise China's AI industry to the level of the global state-of-the-art; to make significant advances in fundamental AI theory by 2025; and to make China the world leader in AI theory, technology, and applications by 2030.8
China is seeking to ‘infuse AI’ into almost every component of the PLA's operations and equipment. The upgrading of the PLA to intelligent warfare is linked to China's AI plan as well as other significant investments in important technical industries, particularly in the "national defense construction, security assessment, and control capabilities".9
Intelligentised Warfare and Military–Civil Fusion
Chinese military modernisation is expected to become more and more associated with civil technological innovation. The majority of 4IR breakthroughs—particularly in the areas of AI, machine learning, big data, etc.,—are occurring in the commercial sector. Because of this reliance on commercial technology, Military Civil Fusion (MCF), also known as ‘civil–military integration’ (CMI), has become a more crucial military-technological innovation approach.10
MCF is essential to the PLA's embrace of intelligentised combat, as seen by efforts to use AI to this end. The New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan is being seen as the "poster child" for MCF because it takes use of developments in commercial AI to accelerate the development of technology essential for future military modernisation.11
Already, 4IR technologies are being utilised to increase the capabilities of weapons systems like drones (both armed and unarmed).12 MCF has integrated military modernisation with civilian technical innovation in a number of crucial dual-use technology areas.13 MCF has "included deeper integration of military and civilian administration at all levels of government: in national defense mobilization, airspace management and civil air defense, reserve and militia forces, and border and coastal defense”.14
The PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in 2015 and is in charge of space, cyber influence operations and electronic warfare. It has “energetically built ties outside the military arena, signing cooperation agreements with research universities and other research centers for developing enhanced capabilities for integration of 4IR tools to its spherical domain”.15
The ongoing technological denial by the West and the lack of expertise in technological advancement across Chinese research industries, especially in semiconductors, though, are being flagged as some of the reasons that could cause impediments to the PLA’s modernisation plan.16 Therefore, even as China has made progress in its endeavour to harness commercial high technology for the PLA's modernisation efforts and to be combat-ready in line with the needs of the 21st century, there are still obstacles that must be overcome before such 4IR technologies can be widely adopted by the PLA.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
4. See Joe McReynolds and James Mulvenon, “The Role of Informatization in the People’s Liberation Army Under Hu Jintao”, in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Travis Tanner (eds), Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, The United States Army War College, April 2014, pp. 208–10.
5.“China’s National Defence in the New Era”, The Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 24 July 2019.
Russia’s partial mobilisation has also had regional domestic repercussions, especially so in the Central Asian Republics.
On 21 October 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a “partial mobilisation” of up to 3,00,000 military reservists, aged 18 to 50 in the Russian armed forces, to fight on the Ukrainian front. This marked the first such mobilisation since the Second World War. Notably, this development was preceded by the announcement of referendums in the Russia-controlled Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, thereby expanding the scope of Russian armed forces jurisdiction.
By 14 October 2022, approximately 2,00,000 individuals across Russia, including in the politically vibrant capital of Moscow, received their orders to join the Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. This unprecedented mobilisation, though, has also resulted in widespread protests, particularly in the rural regions as well as the Northern Caucasus.1 The fact that the Northern Caucasus comprises predominantly of Muslim citizens has further stoked minority apprehensions of being used as a cannon fodder during this mobilisation.
There has also been an exodus of those seeking to evade conscription to the Central Asian Republics (CARs), barring Turkmenistan which does not provide visa-free access to Russian citizens. Notably, Kazakhstan and to an extent Kyrgyzstan, have welcomed the Russian influx2 while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have maintained a stoic silence. This Russian influx has not only caused domestic reverberations in the CARs but also impacted the migrant Central Asian labour force based in Russia.
Central Asian Migrants in Russia
There are approximately four million Central Asian migrants in Russia. These include two million Uzbeks, one million Tajiks, 2,00,000 Kazakhs, and a slightly lesser number of Kyrgyz.3 These migrants work primarily in Russia’s construction and agricultural sectors. Amidst the economic crisis in Russia, these Central Asian migrants face a daunting future. The surge in outbound airfare4 on account of the large Russian citizens exodus has only restricted their ability to leave the Russian shores.
Meanwhile, the proposed enlistment of Central Asian migrants in the Russian armed forces, facilitated by the Sakharova Migration Centre, is a catch-22 situation. The lure of financial assistance and a reduced waiting period to acquire Russian citizenship is offset by the uncertainty of heading into a dangerous frontline.5 This quandary is further compounded by the fact that Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have warned their citizens of penal action, including imprisonment, if they enlist in the Russian armed forces.6 Notably, close to 40 per cent of Central Asian migrants have expressed willingness to return home.7
Domestic Dynamics
By some accounts, at least 7,00,000 Russians, seeking to avoid conscription, have sought refuge in neighbouring CARs. Their preferred destination is Kazakhstan,8 due to its geographical proximity to Russia, followed by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. This influx, inevitably, affects the CARs. The Russian influx has worsened the regional economic slowdown. Rising inflation and food shortages have made things worse leading to large-scale discontentment.9 Many also see the incoming Russians as a business opportunity. In several cases, house owners, especially in the urban centres, have raised rent by a factor of three while evicting local low-income families and students.10
The Russian influx could also destabilise the domestic financial markets amidst the wide gulf in labour quality11 between locals and the more skilled Russians—the latter potentially monopolising Central Asia’s job markets. These developments could potentially rekindle the historical memory of the repressive Czarist and Soviet rule which in several instances undermined indigenous Central Asian culture.12 Arguably, the existing social contract between the state and the people is at stake.
Moreover, the polarisation and the formation of the “us vs them” camp, anchored in Russophobia, could undermine the domestic Central Asian architecture. Notably, in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, nationalist groups and individuals—Bashtan Bashta Movement and Kuat Ahmatov respectively—could use the influx as an opportunity to flame Russophobia for their political gains. Earlier, the Bashtan Bashta had raised the issue of decolonisation on the pretext of Ukraine.13 They targeted Russia and regional organisations like the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), both of which are Russia-dominated organisations.
In the same vein, Kuat Ahmatov and his group have held language patrols, including one in 2021, and posted videos on his YouTube channel—Til Maydani Online Party—targeting the Russian language.14 Despite evading arrest and escaping to Ukraine, he continues to have a following in Kazakhstan.15
A growing emphasis on Kazakh nationalism is taking place at a time when Russia–Kazakhstan relations have faced turbulence. Comments and reactions by the Kazakh leadership concerning the War in Ukraine and the referendums conducted,16 presumably driven by the inherent fear of facing similar military aggression, have irked the Kremlin.17 Notably, the large presence of ethnic Russians, particularly in Northern Kazakhstan, would have inevitably increased the Kazakh leadership’s nervousness amidst ongoing irredentism in Ukraine.
Conclusion
Russia’s partial mobilisation has impacted regional domestic dynamics, especially so in the CARs. In the long run, this could foster stronger Russophobia, including towards the Russian minority population residing in Central Asia. At the same time, new alignments could take place in Eurasia amidst Central Asian nations’ emphasis on a multi-vector foreign policy—a euphemism for diversifying relations beyond Russia. This is notwithstanding the fact that the majority of CARs continue to see Russia as an essential partner, reflected in most CARs having abstained from voting on UN resolutions related to Ukraine.18
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Delhi Declaration: Assessing Outcomes of UNSC CTC’s Special Meeting
Saman Ayesha Kidwai
November 16, 2022
The principles encompassing the Delhi Declaration reiterate that India’s core security concerns broadly resonate with the members of the UNSC.
The Delhi Declaration, issued after the Special Meeting of the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in October 2022, signalled multiple symbolic victories for India, in that it affirmed its key security concerns. The document also underlined core dilemmas for the global community, requiring swift resolution, and measures to make that happen.
External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar’s keynote address highlighted how the UNSC CTC has managed to place immense global scrutiny on those actors that ‘turned terrorism into a state-funded enterprise’.1 Likely, this was an implicit condemnation of Pakistan’s foreign policy of destabilising India’s national security and territorial integrity via terrorism. Furthermore, to advance the international fight against eliminating terrorism, India pledged US$ 500,000 to the UN Trust Fund for Counter-Terrorism.2
Nonetheless, challenges persist. Member states have differing perceptions about what constitutes terrorism. Furthermore, implementing the Delhi Declaration will be a painstaking task for any stakeholder because its clauses are non-binding and recurrent threats in South Asia and Africa might hinder regional actors from getting involved in resolving global challenges.
Key themes of the declaration
Representatives of all 15 UNSC member states unanimously approved the declaration, agreeing that UN agencies, civil society actors, and the private sector will need to strengthen counter-terrorism engagement and cooperation collectively, with human rights being at the centre of any initiatives undertaken.
Secondly, most of the clauses incorporated in the declaration’s final draft underlined dilemmas central to India’s fight against radicalisation, violent extremism, and terrorism. Consequently, it provided the political and diplomatic leadership opportune momentum heading into its December 2022 Presidency, ushering in a global shift in perception about critical terrorist threats facing humankind.
Thirdly, the emphasis placed on threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS underlines that member states are cognisant of threats posed by these terrorist organisations, should they resurge to displaying the scale of violence visible in their heyday and their destabilising effects on local communities and regional security architectures.
Finally, discussions about weaponisation of social media, online radicalisation, cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), among other advancements by terrorists, predominated the two-day event and its participants. The terrorists have increasingly relied on social media and encrypted chat forums to target specific areas and gain traction among radicalised individuals.
Additionally, the heightened focus on evolving technologies and their use by terrorist groups affirm that despite states’ use of conventional strategies to defeat them, information technology, UAS, and social media will determine the outcome of counter-terrorism initiatives. Ensuring respect for international law and the need to curb financial terrorism, visible on crowdfunding platforms, were the other critical themes highlighted by the declaration.
Underlying Indian Interests
The principles (of the Delhi Declaration) highlighted below are of critical importance to Indian interests due to its experiences in confronting cross-border terrorism. Some of them have been explained below, using relevant examples.3
“Notes with additional concern the increasing global misuse of UAS by terrorists…into critical infrastructure…and to traffic drugs and arms.”
This clause is of particular significance to Indian law enforcement and security agencies, more so in Punjab and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). J&K is vital in upholding the country’s security calculus due to frequent reports about narcotics and arms seizures from across the border. Overall, it has experienced a 2000 per cent uptick in heroin seizures over the last five years.4
“Notes with concern the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters of internet and other information and communications technologies, including social media platforms…such as the recruitment and incitement… as well as financing, planning, and preparation...”
This clause has a direct correlation with anti-India sentiments brewed by Pakistan-sponsored proxy groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed or their front organisations like The Resistance Front and Kashmir Freedom Fighters, or separatists. These groups have relied on encrypted platforms like Telegram or social media platforms like Twitter to instigate communal tensions and disseminate anti-India rhetoric. They have collectively attempted to weaponise social media outreach for their repeated attempts at recruitment, to glorify violence and the acts of terrorists neutralised by Indian armed forces, and to espouse their violent extremist propaganda.
Moreover, while other arrests were made, on 14 October 2022, J&K State Investigation Agency cracked down on two individuals—Peerzaada Fahad Shah and Abdul Aala Fazili—for using the written word or partaking in ‘narrative terrorism’.5 With the advent of digital media and its ease of distribution and accessibility, non-state actors have latched on to such developments to pursue their destabilising cause of undermining Indian security. Kashmirwala is one such online magazine whose editor, Fazili, published articles, including those authored by Shah, to radicalise the impressionable youth.
“Underlines that terrorists’ opportunity to access safe havens continues to be a significant concern…identify safe havens…bring them to justice…any person who supports, facilitates, participates or …in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts, including by providing safe havens.”
The reason for highlighting this is because one of the primary hurdles in neutralising existing and potential threats stemming from across the Line of Control leads to China. During the past five months, it has consistently vetoed any probability of Pak-based terrorists like Talha Saeed, Shahid Mehmood, Abdul Rahman Makki, and Rauf Asghar being listed as UN-designated terrorist entities under the 1267 al-Qaeda sanctions committee regime.6
India’s unilateral or joint proposals with other countries like the United States have, therefore, faced difficulties in achieving consensus in international and multilateral formats like the UNSC CTC.
Similar attempts by India or interested stakeholders to reform counter-terrorism measures are met with staunch opposition from China and Pakistan, who accuse the former of ‘politicising the counter-terrorism issue’.7
UAS, and their exploitation by terrorists, emerged as one of the key themes during the UNSC’s special meeting, as stated above. The use of drones for narcotics or arms trafficking into J&K for sustaining militancy in the union territory has become a vital cause of concern for Indian security agencies.
Successes and Shortcomings
The principles encompassing the Delhi Declaration laid bare the resounding success of India’s counter-terrorism initiatives globally and how its core security concerns broadly resonate with the members of the UNSC. Additionally, the special meeting marked a milestone as the first UNSC meeting, in any manifestation, to occur in India. Finally, events and testimonies spanning 28 and 29 October 2022 in Mumbai and New Delhi, reinforced India’s resilience in combatting terrorism.
Nonetheless, despite its symbolic victories, analysts need to understand that the document is fraught with challenges, mainly due to its non-binding nature. On the one hand, it did not encapsulate the specific security challenges emanating from the Af-Pak region after the Taliban’s takeover and TTP’s resurgence or the Horn of Africa, where groups like al-Shabaab have caused widespread devastation in Somalia. Nor did it address how the international community can collectively tackle them to prevent a worldwide spill over.
Furthermore, while the Western countries have proven quick to condemn Russian actions in Ukraine, the declaration did not display a similar show of force in explicitly decrying Pakistan’s actions in India. Perhaps, the United States continued dependence on the Pakistani state to sustain its regional counter-terrorism efforts, reflected in the recent sale of F-16s, hinders that from occurring.
Conclusion
As India transitions into the UNSC CTC’s December session, it must deliberate on how the member states can proceed towards practical implementation of at least some of the agreed-upon principles to avoid them becoming redundant and address its core concerns highlighted earlier. Moreover, subsequent meetings should also incorporate a deep-seated understanding of how children bear the impact of technologically driven terrorism and how that challenge can be effectively addressed to curtail non-state actors from exploiting this demographic group for violent purposes. Finally, potential CTC documents must look at how technology and social media can be successfully placed at the forefront of each states’ de-radicalisation strategies to counter terrorist strategies as an effective counter-response.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
4. Saman Ayesha Kidwai, “Narco-Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir”, Commentary, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 12 September 2022.
Technology and Terrorism: Challenges and Way Forward
Sanur Sharma
November 16, 2022
The special meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) held in New Delhi is an important multi-lateral effort to counter malicious use of technology.
Technology is used as a tool for advancements in society and as a means for development. However, due to the ease of availability of new and emerging technologies at lower costs, it is increasingly being leveraged by non-state actors and terrorists. Cyber harassment, virtual warfare, information warfare, cyberattack, and cyber break-ins are all terms used to describe malicious activities caused by the use of computers or related technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), machine learning and blockchain.1 Non-state actors have disabled critical infrastructures by using cyber-attacks, drones and have also secured terror financing through virtual assets like crypto-currency.
Against this backdrop, India hosted the special meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) with the theme ‘Countering the Use of New and Emerging Technology for Terrorist Purposes’.2 The CTC unanimously adopted the Delhi Declaration on 29 October 2022.3 The Declaration called for urgent action to counter the threat posed by the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes and effective implementation of various UN resolutions. It flagged concerns over increased use of cyberspace and other Information Communication Technologies (ICT), including social media.
It was the first meeting of the UNSC-CTC in India since its establishment in 2001. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1373, a counter-terrorism measure in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks in the US.4 The objective of the CTC is to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373. The committee comprises the 15 UNSC members.
Given that India is one of the ten non-permanent members and is also currently serving the two-year Security Council term, the meeting was organised in India. Indian Ambassador to the UN, Ruchira Kamboj, chaired the UNSC-CTC. She noted that while technology had limitless potential and innovations have altered society, it has also led to various challenges, including the spread of political unrest and social upheaval. Social media is being used to target individuals through the spread of misinformation and disinformation, while malicious use of AI, and digital payment technologies are being employed to fund terrorist organisations.5
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in his keynote address emphasised that the internet and social media have become tools of militants and terrorist organisations for spreading propaganda, radicalisation and conspiracy theories for destabilising societies.6 He further flagged that the penetration of new technology is reshaping the contours of international terrorism. He advocated that member states should increase funding for UN organs like United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT). India will contribute US$ 0.5 million to the UN Trust Fund for Counter Terrorism to augment its efforts in providing capacity-building support to member states in preventing and countering the threat of terrorism.7 India also committed to work on three major areas highlighted in the Delhi Declaration. These include Countering Terrorist Exploitation of ICT and Emerging Technologies; Threats and opportunities related to new payment technologies and fundraising methods; and Threats posed by the misuse of unmanned aerial systems (UAS).8
Emerging Challenges and Key Takeaways
Social media use by inimical actors has led to political polarisation, post-truth politics and confirmation bias. AI-enabled tools and software have been widely used to create fake news, through disinformation signal generators and automatic generation of social media accounts. Even countries have employed advanced cyberwarfare operations that use AI to impede weapon systems and shut down critical infrastructures, as seen in the Russia–Ukraine conflict.9 Covid-19 pandemic-related misinformation spread worldwide through social media platforms.10
All such practices cause several security concerns that must be addressed. Proactive measures are required to counter malicious content online, while maintaining freedom of expression and a secure, free, trusted, open and interoperable internet. Financial technologies like virtual assets can be vulnerable to abuse due to the absence of proper regulations and governance measures. For instance, new blockchain technologies like bitcoin and other virtual currencies are based on a decentralised network. Various non-state actors can transfer money through these virtual currencies and indulge in money laundering. In 2017, the ‘Wannacry’ ransomware attack held thousands of computer systems hostage while demanding ransom in bitcoins. It resulted in US$ 8 billion loss to hospitals, businesses and banks across the world.11 A 2019 RAND report notes that terrorist organisations like al Qaeda and its affiliates, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah as well as lone-wolf attackers have used cryptocurrencies for drug trafficking, fund-raising, among other activities.12
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued guidelines in 2018 to regulate virtual assets.13 The FATF also took action against countries like Pakistan in June 2018 for lax regime in countering money laundering and terror funding (Pakistan was removed from the Grey List in October 2022).14 In addition, the increasing use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and drones by state and non-state actors and terrorists have raised wider concerns. It has been evident in numerous instances in Syria, Iraq, UAE and Saudi Arabia, where drones have targeted critical infrastructures and have been used for drug and arms trafficking as well.15 In our own neighbourhood, Pakistan’s non-state actors have also used drones to smuggle narcotics, arms and ammunitions in border areas along Rajasthan and Punjab.16
EAM Jaishankar, earlier at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2022, criticised China for blocking attempts by India and the US to list terrorists responsible for 26/11 at the UNSC.17 He emphasised that all member states must fully cooperate in fighting against terrorism and refrain from providing safe havens. The Delhi Declaration, though, did not include India’s concerns over China’s blocking of terrorist designations at the UNSC.
There is a need to share best practices and build on existing frameworks such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) ‘Berlin Memorandum on Good Practices to Counter Terrorist use of UAS’, as highlighted by the US Representative for UN Management and Reform, at the CTC meeting in New Delhi.18 The Berlin Memorandum identifies 26 practices under four key areas for states’ consideration relating to Assessing the risks, vulnerabilities and raising awareness; Enhancing information sharing, engaging with relevant stakeholders and educating the public; Implementing policies and regulations, establishing crisis planning and; Developing tactical counter measures and technical solutions.19
Way Forward
Coordination between governments, the private sector, the public sector, and civil society is needed to harness new and emerging technologies for global good. While governments need to be vigilant, technology companies will have to monitor the use of technology keeping in mind the OECD principles of governance and OECD AI principles that stress on the need for an effective corporate governance framework, emphasise transparency and highlight the role of stakeholders in corporate governance. 20 The OECD AI principles, in addition, call for the creation of an enabling policy environment, and for building human capacity and international cooperation.21 Companies must be encouraged to put in place measures and enforce them to safeguard their platforms from spreading or hosting extremist content. Taking steps like shutting down or disrupting services can undermine open and free digital services and negatively impact the economy.
India’s current tenure at the UNSC will end in December 2022. The government is making dedicated efforts to make the most of this opportunity and will be hosting a ‘No Money for Terror’ conference in New Delhi on 18–19 November 2022 and also hold a UNSC briefing on challenges facing global counter-terrorism efforts. Societal awareness about this threat is also essential to thwart the challenge of digital terrorism.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The end of the ceasefire in Yemen without any substantial political understanding between the government and the Houthis heightens the risk of escalation of violence.
The UN-mediated ceasefire between the government and the Houthis in Yemen that began in April this year ended on 2 October as both sides could not agree to extend it further. The announcement of the ceasefire was intended to halt all military attacks, facilitate movement of fuel ships to Hodeida port, commercial flight operations at Sanaa airport, and help in opening of roads in different parts of the country blocked because of the war. The ceasefire was also expected to start a political process to end the war.1 Throughout the period of the truce, both sides have accused the other of violating the ceasefire and attempting to take advantage of the situation.
The UN used the period of truce to further step up negotiations and find a sustainable and long-term future roadmap for peace and stability in the country. It made serious efforts to bring both parties together and assisted in negotiations on their demands. The UN hoped to push for further negotiations during the ceasefire period and extend it further to achieve consensus between the parties. While the six months of continuous ceasefire in the middle of the civil war in Yemen is quite an achievement, it has ended in a much-expected deadlock with continuing uncertainty.
There have been some credible achievements made in the country during the six months of the ceasefire. The truce brought the cross-border attacks to a halt. Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the coalition airstrikes on the Houthis stopped, to a large extent. Civilian casualties dropped by around 60 per cent, flight operations continued from Sanaa and Aden airports and the import of fuel through the Hodeida port increased to cater to the worsening fuel crisis in the country.2 The ceasefire facilitated the distribution of humanitarian aid in the country. On the political front, it created an atmosphere of hope for a renewed dialogue between the two sides.
During negotiations to extend it, trouble arose over the issue of the payment of salaries of government employees. The Houthis demanded that the government pay salaries of all the government employees as a pre-condition for the extension of the truce.3 While the government was willing to pay the salaries of its employees recruited before the Houthis captured Sanaa in 2014, it was hesitant to recognise thousands of people hired by the Houthis who worked for them in the new government.4 The UN, though surprised by the additional demand made by the Houthis regarding payment of salaries to all government employees, remains hopeful of bringing both parties to the negotiating table again.
Before the ceasefire agreement, several rounds of talks were held between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Baghdad mediated by Iraq. Yemen was a key point of discussion between the two countries where the objective was to find a way out of the present conflict. The Saudi–Iran talks were a key driver for agreeing to a ceasefire as both these countries are important regional players in Yemen and have huge stakes in the conflict. Failure to extend the ceasefire is an indication of the fact that the Saudi-Iranian talks have not made much progress in recent months. The Saudi-Iranian talks were expected to be one of the most credible political means to bring peace and stability to Yemen. Yemen, thus, now faces an uncertain situation as there are fears of an escalation of violence.
The unfolding of events during the last six months of the ceasefire reiterates the fact that there is a severe lack of trust between the Yemeni government and the Houthis. Even though it agreed to a ceasefire, the Yemeni government cannot fundamentally accept the Houthis as a major player and cede any political space to them. The Houthis capturing the capital Sanaa and other parts of the country by force and negotiating with the government from a vantage point and demanding their share of power in all political negotiations is a difficult proposition for the government to accept.
On the other hand, the Houthis are sceptical of any political move or negotiation that may weaken their current position, both politically and militarily. They also do not want to lose any popular support they have built up in the last eight years. The UN with support from Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan tried to bridge that gap by implementing the ceasefire to reach an acceptable way out of the current situation. But the non-renewal of the ceasefire now threatens instability.
The situation in the country since the end of the ceasefire remains tense. There has not been any substantial escalation in violence and armed clashes during the month of October, but in a major attack, the Houthis targeted the Al Dhabba oil port in Hadramout in the south of the country on 21 October with drones. The Yemeni government stated that the attack on the oil terminal is a terrorist act and designated the Houthis as a terrorist organisation. The Houthi attack on the oil terminal only adds to the further deterioration of the situation and threatens to reverse whatever little achievements were made during the ceasefire. There is growing uncertainty over the next steps of the government and the Houthis as they assess their future strategies. The ceasefire was a golden opportunity for Yemen to permanently end violence and expedite a political process for long-term peace and stability in the country. It was also proving beneficial for the economic and humanitarian situation in the country. The end of the ceasefire without any substantial political understanding between the government and the Houthis heightens the risk of escalation of violence and a return to the period of uncertainty that existed before the ceasefire.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Eastern Mediterranean: A Natural Gas Hub Worth Exploring
Md. Muddassir Quamar
November 01, 2022
The Eastern Mediterranean offers India strong prospects for import of natural gas, given strong bilateral relations with regional countries, including Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus.
The international energy market has witnessed serious upheavals since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Europe, which significantly depended on Russia for its energy security, has been struggling to find alternative sources. The sanctions on Russia’s oil industry by the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) has led to serious churn in the global energy supplies, already seething with shortages due to sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, the civil war in Libya, and the debilitating impact of Covid-19 on demands. This has led to rise in global energy prices, making the post-pandemic economic recovery even more daunting, including in the US and European countries. The OPEC+ decision on production cuts taken on 5 October 2022,1 therefore, provoked sharp reaction from President Joe Biden who blamed Saudi Arabia, warning it of “consequences” for siding with Russia.2 The Kingdom, on the other hand, responded by underlining its longstanding commitments to stability of the global energy market and denied political manoeuvring.3
While the geopolitical tensions over the global energy production and supplies are unlikely to reduce anytime soon, the existing situation has underlined the need for finding alternative sources of energy. The quest for alternatives has also been accelerated by the growing international concern over global warming and environmental degradation. The focus is on finding alternatives both in terms of clean and renewable sources and newer producers and suppliers.
Natural gas, which compared to oil has lesser CO2 emissions, is being touted as the “bridge fuel” for energy transition in the twenty-first century.4 Regional hubs with prospective large gas fields such as Caspian and Eastern Mediterranean have gained international attention. The case of Eastern Mediterranean region is more interesting because of the way the geopolitics is shaping in recent years leading to greater competition and cooperation among regional countries. The region has gained prominence as an alternative source for supply of cleaner fuel, especially in the context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict.
Gas Exploration in East Med
Over the past decade, the Eastern Mediterranean has witnessed the discovery of a number of gas fields in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of regional countries while further exploration and drilling activities are going on. According to estimates included in two reports from the United States Geological Survey released in 2010, vast energy reserves are deposited in both the Nile Delta and the Levant basins in the Eastern Mediterranean.5 Further deposits are estimated in the Aegean and Ionian Seas. Among the regional countries, Egypt and Israel have made a head start with commercial drilling and supplies through pipeline. Israel has invested in Mari-B, Noa, Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, while Egypt has invested in the Zohr and Noor gas fields. Moreover, after the Israel–Lebanon maritime delimitation deal,6 Israel is expected to start production at the Karish gas field, while Lebanon is likely to accelerate drilling at the Qana field. The success of Egypt and Israel in finding commercial quantities and starting production from onshore gas fields has encouraged others, including Greece, Cyprus and Northern Cyprus, Turkey, Lebanon, Libya and Syria, to seriously undertake exploration activities.
The findings and quest for exploration have also generated squabbling among regional countries to claim territorial waters, EEZs and sections of the continental shelf leading to serious tensions, for example, between Turkey and Greece as well as between Turkey and Egypt. The signing of a MoU between Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) and Turkey in November 2019 on delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean further escalated the tensions. The two have followed it up with an agreement signed in October 2022 on joint hydrocarbon exploration in Libyan waters, further causing stir among those opposed to the maritime deal between the two countries.7
Simultaneously, the possibility of the Eastern Mediterranean region emerging as a new gas production hub has led to efforts at reconciliation and joint exploration. For example, an informal bloc among Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus took formal shape as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in 2019.8. The EMGF, based in Cairo, aims to develop a cooperative mechanism among member countries for exploration, infrastructure development and to supply gas to European and Asian markets. Likewise, the possible economic benefits of gas production and exports encouraged Israel and Lebanon, that otherwise do not share formal ties, to sign a US-mediated maritime demarcation agreement in October 2022.
Prospects for India
India’s energy needs are constantly growing, and are likely to increase exponentially in the coming decades owing to its size and performance of its economy. India is the fastest growing large economy in the world, and its energy needs are also growing faster than any of the G-20 economies. There is a huge disparity, however, in the consumption to production ratio in India, which means that India has to depend on imports to fulfil its energy security needs. Conventionally, the Gulf region has been the mainstay of India’s energy security requirements, supplying 55–60 per cent of its oil and gas needs over the past few years. The Government of India has been trying to diversify India’s energy basket both in terms of increasing renewables and cleaner sources, such as natural gas, wind, solar and hydrogen, as well as finding alternative producers, including from Australia, US, Russia, Latin America and Central Asia. Thus far, however, New Delhi has made only limited efforts to explore the potentials for gas imports from the Eastern Mediterranean region.
There are a number of reasons why India can emerge as a favourable destination for supplies from the Eastern Mediterranean. Firstly, India shares friendly relations with major regional countries, especially Egypt and Israel, both of which are keen to find newer markets for gas supplies. At this point, the majority of India’s gas imports come from Qatar and Australia. Given the emphasis on clean energy, New Delhi can explore imports from both Egyptian and Israeli gas fields. Both spot procurement and long term supply deals can be considered.
Indian oil companies can also look for participating in the exploration activities that can ensure supplies for India in the long term. In addition to Egypt and Israel, India can also explore the possibilities of partnering with Greece and Cyprus in gas exploration which can be lucrative in the future. There are challenges pertaining to regional tensions and uncertainties about maritime jurisdiction but this can be overcome by avoiding investments in disputed areas. The problems related to logistics and transportation can also be overcome given that India has in the past secured supplies from Libya before it got engulfed in the civil war. Further investments in infrastructure developments through mini-lateral initiatives such as the I2U2 and jointly with friendly regional and international powers, including the UAE and France, which are interested in the Eastern Mediterranean, can be explored.
Conclusion
At a time when India’s energy security needs are constantly increasing, it is worth exploring possible newer sources for supply of cleaner sources of energy. The Eastern Mediterranean has in recent years emerged as a major hub for gas exploration with mega findings in the Nile Delta and Levant basins. Although this has caused regional tensions, given competing claims on maritime jurisdiction in the Mediterranean Sea, it has also resulted in cooperation among regional countries for joint exploration and infrastructure development. For India, despite the regional problems, the Eastern Mediterranean offers strong prospects as a source for import of natural gas given its constantly increasing demands, and strong bilateral relations with the regional countries including Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus. At the same time, for the regional countries, India offers a lucrative option as an export destination, given the huge and growing Indian appetite for energy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Biden administration has further reinforced and strengthened US strategic priorities towards the Indo-Pacific, a decade after the ‘Pivot to Asia’ by the Obama administration.
The ‘Pivot to Asia’, the strategic rebalance announced by President Barack Obama in 2011 and early 2012, marked a significant shift in US foreign policy priorities from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. While speaking at the Australian Parliament in November 2011, Obama stated that as a Pacific nation, “the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.”1 The ‘Pivot’ comprised an enhancement of America’s military and security engagement as well as the expansion of its economic and commercial leverage in the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region,2 at a time when it was mired in ‘forever wars’ in the Middle East.3
The pivot was announced at a time when China was becoming more aggressive in its neighbourhood. Its territorial claims spanned the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea, as well as islands in Japanese territorial waters. China also made economic inroads in Southeast Asia through trade-linked incentives. China’s rise severely threatened the regional order and the interests of the US and its allies like Japan and Australia.4
The Pivot was a welcome policy change for US allies in the Asia-Pacific, with analysts noting that the US giving priority to Asia was “long overdue”.5 When the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the ASEAN Secretariat in 2009, ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan stated that her visit showed “the seriousness of the United States to end its diplomatic absenteeism in the region”. Domestic politics, an important driver of American foreign policy, also turned against the US’s continued engagement in the Middle East. As per a 2011 Pew Survey, 57 per cent of the respondents opposed the war in Iraq, while 52 per cent opposed the Afghan war.6
As part of the pivot, the assurances the US made especially to Australia were widely welcomed. The US announced additional troop deployments to Australia, from 250 to 2,500 marines at the Darwin base.7 The US made similar military commitments to Singapore and the Philippines as well, while promising to make US military presence in East Asia “more broadly distributed, more flexible, and more politically sustainable”.8
The US also engaged in negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 Pacific Rim economies—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Obama’s interest in joining this trade deal, as he famously articulated in 2015, was that “if we don't write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region”, indicating clearly the containment tenet of the TPP.9 This was at a time when the trade deficit with China was US$ 282 billion in 2011.10 The TPP assured member states of America’s renewed commitment to the economic integration of the region.11
For US partners in the Indo-Pacific, namely the Philippines, Japan and Australia, the anti-China bend of the pivot was assuring, given that they were engaged in maritime disputes with China. To show the US’ commitment to the pivot, Obama invited Japan, Australia and Vietnam, for the first time, to participate in the joint bilateral US–Philippines naval exercise, Balikatan in 2012.12
However, not all ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia, were comfortable with the idea of the US increasing its troop presence in the Darwin and Guam bases. The Philippines was criticised for opening the region to a higher possibility of great power contestation between the US and China. 13
The US withdrew from the TPP right after Obama’s presidency, even as China’s regional integration initiatives such as the Belt and Road and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) gathered steam. While the Trump administration’s anti-China focus remained intact, the US increasingly dissociated from its commitments to the region. Trump, for instance, withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a cornerstone of Obama’s Pivot, in January 2017. Marking a break from Obama’s emphasis on regional multilateralism, Trump did not attend the ASEAN Summits in 2018, 2019 and 2020, while also declining to be a part of the East Asia Summits of 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020.14 The Trump administration remained engaged with Middle East contentions, curating the Abraham Accords and also withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The security tenet of the Pivot also faced issues on the US–Japan front, due to debates regarding the relocation of US marines from the Futenma base in Okinawa prefecture, to a new base in Henoko Bay in the same prefecture.15 While the Japanese federal government made provisions for the relocation, the local government and the people of Henoko Bay were against it. The recent re-election of Denny Tamaki as Governor of Okinawa, who campaigned on preventing the development of a new base in Henoko, indicates that such sentiments are still strong.16
After the Pivot, there was a noteworthy rise in active military and civilian personnel deployed by the US to Japan. The number of deployed personnel to Japan was 55,278 as of September 2011, and by December 2015, it grew to 78,092. However, under Trump, the number fell to 46,334 as of December 2016. The number of troops stood at 62,722, as of June 2022.17
Even though the Trump administration dis-engaged multilaterally from the region, the ‘Indo-Pacific’ became a construct of significance in US foreign policy during his presidency, as evident from the renaming of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) as the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) in 2018. Additionally, the Trump administration announced the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) in 2018, which outlined a detailed financial breakup for promoting US security and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific Region.18
Under President Joe Biden, meanwhile, a renewed multilateral economic emphasis towards the region as a whole came through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The IPEF’s agenda include trade, supply chain resilience, economic resilience and clean energy and decarbonisation. To strengthen regional security engagements, the Biden administration tabled the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) in May 2021 and the US along with the other Quad member countries announced the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness. The AUKUS agreement between the US, UK and Australia, which involves the transfer of US nuclear naval propulsion technology to Australia, is a further significant move reinforcing the capabilities of a key regional ally to counter security threats. In the latest US National Security Strategy, released on 12 October 2022, the Biden administration argues that “no region will be of more significance to the world and to everyday Americans than the Indo-Pacific”.19
A decade after the pivot, therefore, with an ascendant China looming large in the regional geo-strategic framework, US strategic priorities towards the Indo-Pacific have been well and truly reinforced and strengthened.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. The origin of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, in contemporary geopolitics, is attributed to Shinzo Abe’s 2007 speech to the Indian Parliament titled ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’. The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ was used in the US National Security Strategy of December 2017. Subsequently, the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) was renamed as the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’ was published by the Department of Defense in 2019. Prior to this, the term ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’ was used in 2014 by US officials.
Given the ideological convergence the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has with the Taliban, the latter may not be able or willing to fulfil Pakistan’s demand that its activities be curbed.
It is said that in politics there are no permanent friends or enemies, there are only permanent interests. Therefore, politicians, particularly the rulers of a country, assess long-term implications of the policies that they pursue and take decisions accordingly. The latest rise in terror attacks in Pakistan indicate that the government and the security institutions in the country have failed to calculate the implications of their direct/indirect support to the Taliban. The threat is compounded by the fact that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has announced ending of the ceasefire agreed to in November 2021. Immediately after the announcement, a suicide attack in Quetta, Balochistan killed three and injured many people.1
Insurgents across the world have been able to use their transnational links and support to survive as well as garner support. They do not stay loyal to only one patron, howsoever close they may have been at one point in time. The Taliban are no exception to this rule. The Pakistani state, as advised by many, both internally as well externally, did not factor in the implications of Taliban’s nationalistic stand as well as the challenges they would face once the Taliban reclaimed Kabul. Overlooking these factors, Islamabad seems to have committed a strategic blunder.
Pakistan was jubilant about the removal of the Ashraf Ghani government in Kabul, less so about the withdrawal of the United States (US)-led troops on 15 August 2021. Then Prime Minister Imran Khan had commented on the Taliban’s takeover that the Afghans had “broken the shackles of slavery”2 Many in Pakistan “celebrated” the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s arrival in Kabul for various reasons.3 None of them, however, could fully comprehend the reality that the Taliban, after they were back in power in Kabul, were likely to operate as a state, with their own priorities and challenges.
Hope versus Reality
People who had wished the Taliban in Kabul well were hopeful that Pakistan would not have to support the US efforts in the region anymore. It pleased the anti-America forces in the country which hoped that the allegedly pro-India leaders like Karzai or Ghani would be out of Afghanistan’s politics. More importantly, with the Taliban back in Kabul, it was hoped that ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan will improve significantly. Islamabad threw its full weight behind the Taliban expecting that it would help Pakistan in eliminating the TTP, which posed a major security threat to Pakistan. When many countries were expressing their reservations about Taliban’s ideology and their approach to women, girls and minorities, then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mehmood Qureshi dismissed it as propaganda.4
There were commentators in Pakistan who held that if Afghanistan was to become a pariah state or an unstable country with the Taliban as a nationalistic force too weak to govern, it was going to be a massive challenge for Pakistan. A regime with no coherence within the group and weak control over the country could not act against groups like TTP. Moreover, some reports indicated that anti-Pakistan hatred among common Afghans was intense. Due to various reasons, “Afghans do not consider themselves responsible for their miseries and destruction”, wrote one commentator in an Urdu daily, Nawa-e-Waqt, “but [put the blame on] the policies of Pakistan in Afghanistan”.5
Some experts did warn against the churlish celebrations. Former ambassador Maleeha Lodhi presciently wrote after the fall of Kabul that Islamabad should practice caution “as a fluid situation can encourage cross-border attacks from militant groups based in Afghanistan that Kabul has yet to act against and on which Islamabad should secure ironclad guarantees”.6 According to a report by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) in October 2022, since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, Pakistan witnessed a 51 per cent increase in terror attacks in a single year.7 The latest TTP attack took place on 14 November 2022 after which the main crossing for trade between the two countries, the ‘Friendship Gate’ at the Wesh-Chaman border, had to be closed.8 The attackers came from the Afghan side and killed one security personnel, according to reports.
Taliban confronts Islamabad
The jubilations in Pakistan over the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, therefore, did not last long. Expectedly, the Taliban focused on their national interests once they were back in power. Their immediate security calculations were different from that of Pakistan. Moreover, they shared their ideological moorings with TTP.
At the very beginning of the Taliban 2.0 rule, Pakistan had asked the Taliban to take action against TTP “as a test case” to prove both their power and commitment to their words that they would act against terrorism. “If the Taliban can't address concerns of Pakistan, then who would trust them and their promise of cutting ties to al Qaeda and other such groups”, one Pakistani official was quoted as saying.9 The Taliban always claimed that the Afghan territory would not be used by terrorists against any other state.
However, when the Taliban failed to act against the TTP, capturing the frustrations on the Pakistani side, senior journalist Saleem Safi wrote in Jang that Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan was flawed, based on three assumptions: One, the American presence was the root problem in Afghanistan; two, Ashraf Ghani, Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah were Pakistan’s enemies and the Taliban are friends; and third, there is no connection between the Afghan Taliban and TTP.10
Once the Taliban came to power, these assumptions were proved wrong. Afghanistan under the Taliban helped the TTP to re-unite and re-emerge with full force. They reportedly armed themselves with sophisticated weapons that were left behind by the foreign troops, which could not have occurred with overt or covert Taliban blessings.
The TTP, despite the promises of the Taliban, continued with their offensive and increased their attacks. On 14 April 2022, in an attack in North Waziristan, seven Pakistani soldiers were killed, leading to a harsh exchange of statements between the two countries. The sharp response from Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that
Pakistan has repeatedly requested Afghan Government in last few months to secure Pak-Afghan border region. Terrorists are using Afghan soil with impunity to carry out activities inside Pakistan.11
With the Taliban unwilling or incapable of stopping the terror attacks across the border, Pakistan carried out strikes inside the Afghan territory on 15 April to target terrorists. The reaction from the Taliban officials and the Afghans for violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty was on expected lines. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid warned Pakistan “not to test the patience of Afghans on such issues and not repeat the same mistake again otherwise it will have bad consequences”.12
There is an overwhelming feeling in Pakistan that the Taliban have betrayed their trust and forgotten the material and moral support they had received in their struggle against the Americans. It is not difficult to understand why Pakistan, after backing the Taliban to the hilt, has not recognised their government as legitimate after almost a year.
Conclusion
Given the grave challenges the Taliban face in Afghanistan, it is hard to predict what the future holds for Pakistan–Afghanistan relations. Meanwhile, Pakistan has learnt it the hard way that it has to fight its own war against the TTP. Islamabad may continue to prod the Taliban to take action against the TTP members and stop them from using the Afghan territory against Pakistan. However, given the ideological convergence TTP has with the Taliban and the support that they receive from the people in south-eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban may not be able to fulfil Pakistan’s request.
Not only do they fear of backlash from within their own ranks if they act against the TTP, they also apprehend that if they act against the TTP, its members may join other terror groups like Daesh and Al-Qaeda. They are also perhaps too conscious of the implications of acting at the bidding of Pakistan, especially when there was a perception that they were merely acting as puppets of Pakistan. In their earlier avatar in the 1990s also, the Taliban had refused to recognise the Durand Line as the border between the two countries. Now too, they are likely to pose as uncompromising Afghan nationalists, and not stooges of some other country. All these issues are likely to create rifts and conflicts between the Taliban and Pakistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Border clashes and failure to act against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have led to rising tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The intensifying conflict between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban is a volatile case of souring patron–client relationship. The Taliban, once seen as ISI’s proxy for controlling Afghanistan and having given Pakistan great ‘strategic depth’, has now turned into a classic example of a strategic blowback. Border clashes, the recent closure of the Chaman-Spin Boldak crossing for a week, the emerging debates on Afghan sovereignty, and Taliban’s unwillingness or incapability to crack down on Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) indicate that the tension between the two countries has escalated in the last few months.
The Taliban Takeover and Pakistan
After the Taliban took over Kabul in August 2021, Islamabad might have felt that it had achieved its desired policy objectives by bringing an allied militia to power in Kabul. It was natural for Pakistan to expect that it would now be able to address the TTP conundrum more effectively.
Decades of violent insurgency, reaching its pinnacle with the massacre at the army school in Peshawar in December 2014 by TTP fighters, is a loss that remains entrenched in the Pakistanis’ memory. Since its emergence in 2007, the TTP has carried out more than 3,000 attacks, killing at least 7,500 individuals, including 2,500 police and armed forces personnel.1 The TTP’s alleged trafficking of weapons left behind after the international coalition’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has been another significant challenge.2
After coming to power, the Taliban reportedly started resisting Pakistani intervention in its domestic affairs. Clashes intensified along the Durand Line— which has never gained legitimacy from any Afghan authority, including the current regime— every time efforts to construct fences at the border were undertaken.3
However, the biggest blowback occurred at the Chaman-Spin Boldak border or the Friendship Gate when an unidentified man killed a Pakistani officer in November 2022.4 The Friendship Gate is the second-busiest trading route after the Torkham crossing.5 Although the Pakistani media accused the perpetrator of being a member of the Afghan Taliban, it was denied by the latter. Nonetheless, an unverified confession was obtained with a Taliban fighter stating that the officer’s killing was retribution for ‘disrespect’ faced by the Afghans in Pakistan.6
The situation has reached a stage where it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that, the Friendship gate, the Torkham border, or even trade routes via the sea, might be closed off for a longer duration to pressurise the economically weak and isolated regime in Kabul to meet Pakistan’s demands concerning its security.
Pakistan has accused the Taliban of providing refuge to hostile elements and allowing the use of Afghan territory as a launch pad for terror strikes.7 In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif outlined the threats posed by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), al-Qaeda, and TTP and remarked on the need to address these security challenges ‘comprehensively…with the support and cooperation of the interim Afghan authorities’. The Taliban meanwhile claimed that these were ‘unsubstantiated concerns and allegations’.8
The TTP–Afghan Taliban–Pakistan Dynamics
There has been more than 50 per cent increase in terrorist attacks across Pakistan within a year since 15 August 2021. There have been more than 400 deaths due to violent acts committed by the TTP during this period.9 With a porous border considered illegitimate by Pashtuns on both sides and the unwillingness of the Afghan Taliban leadership to restrain and betray their jihadist brethren has emboldened the TTP fighters to undertake violent attacks against Pakistan using Afghan soil.
Reports note that nearly 1,000 TTP militants, even those involved in an attack on a school van in October 2022 in the Swat valley, have infiltrated into Pakistan since last year via Afghanistan.10 The United Nations estimates that approximately 5,000 TTP militants and their kin reside on Afghan soil under the Taliban’s protection. Peace talks mediated by Afghanistan’s Minister of Interior Sirajuddin Haqqani between the TTP and Pakistan in the recent past have failed. While there have been no official reactions to border clashes, some of the Afghan Taliban’s foot soldiers have aided the TTP in carrying out attacks against Pakistani armed forces and police personnel. For example, on 30 March 2022, six soldiers had died after an army camp came under attack in the Dera Ismail Khan District.11
Reportedly, following the seizure of Kabul, the Afghan Taliban ensured the release of several imprisoned TTP fighters.12 This shows that despite Islamabad’s pleas, the Afghan Taliban have stood steadfast with the TTP allies, despite the decades-long devastation caused by their Pakistani offshoot and its potential to do worse, possibly as leverage.
Moreover, the American drone strike that neutralised Ayman al-Zawahiri in suburban Kabul, allegedly using Pakistani airspace, and airstrikes carried out by Islamabad in Khost and Kunar provinces, killing at least 47 civilians, raised widespread condemnation of the violation of Afghan sovereignty and territorial integrity.13 In fact, Afghan Interim Defence Minister, Mullah Yaqoob even called for retaliation.14 The pro-Taliban factions took to the streets, protesting against the airstrikes.
Such sentiments have hardened over the past year, prominently visible in Mullah Yaqoob’s refusal to meet Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, during her recent visit.15 Additionally, glowing praises of high-quality wheat supplied by India vis-à-vis deplorable quality delivered by Pakistan in March 2022 signalled widening cracks in their ties.16
Incidents like the verbal sparring between spectators after Afghanistan’s loss to Pakistan in a cricket match in September 2022 reiterate the dismal nature of ties between them. Chants of ‘traitors’ for the Afghans and ‘terrorists’ for the Pakistanis resonated throughout the stadium.17 Overall, such issues might have accelerated the parting of ways between the Taliban and their erstwhile patron and rejuvenated their agenda to chart out an independent path for themselves.
The reported assassination attempt on Pakistan’s Head of Mission in Afghanistan, Ubaid ur Rehman Nizamani in Kabul on 2 December, even as the Taliban assured that no actor would use Afghan soil to harm other countries’ interest, has further vitiated bilateral ties. If Pakistan withdraws or curtails its diplomatic presence due to continued threats to its security and personnel, the Taliban’s isolation could worsen, pushing Afghanistan under greater security and humanitarian strain. A prolonged conflictual situation with the Taliban complicates Pakistan’s internal security situation, at a time when it is already facing the Baloch insurgency, TTP’s resurgence, a plummeting economy, and increasing pressure from the Chinese to secure their investments.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The growing insecurity and threat perceptions articulated in the 20th Party Congress Work Report by Chinese President Xi Jinping indicates that Beijing is likely to become more assertive and belligerent in its international dealings.
The Work Report delivered by President Xi Jinping at the 20th Party Congress has three broad aspects—it reviews the work done by the government in the past five years; it is a framework for future policy measures that will be implemented and goals that will be adopted; and finally, it is a detailed assessment of the international environment and socio-political and security challenges facing China. The Work Report is a significant document enumerating Xi’s vision regarding China’s economic and political development, at a time when Xi begins his third term in office. As regards the foreign affairs, military and national security aspects of the Work Report, two major trends regarding China’s perception about its external environment are notable. First is a concern about systemic uncertainty and growing instability and the second relates to the perception about a hostile external environment.
Uncertainty and Instability a major concern of CCP
The 20th Party Congress Work Report flags concerns about rising uncertainty and instability at the international level. The document notes that since the last Congress in 2017, China’s external environment has been turning increasingly uncertain and unstable. It goes on to elaborate that China has entered a period where risks and challenges are concurrent with strategic opportunities and uncertainties.1 It indicates the possibility of outbreak of major conflict due to the cumulative impact of various crises. It warns that “various black swan and gray rhino events may occur at any time” and China should be ready to “withstand high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms”.2
The wariness exhibited by the latest Work Report was not visible in the recent past Congresses of the CPC. For instance, the 17th Party Congress in 2007 emphasised that in China’s external environment, the balance of power was changing in favour of maintenance of world peace, notwithstanding the presence of volatile elements.3 Similarly, the 2012 and the 2017 reports had only vaguely mentioned about volatile developments and complex changes and highlighted primarily the strategic opportunities that were favourable to China.4 None of these three reports projected China as facing any major systemic instability or uncertainty that could adversely impact it. Moreover, the overall international environment was seen as balanced and stable and geopolitical challenges and resource competition was not seen as disruptive.
However, recent series of events like the outbreak of the pandemic and its continuing politico-economic impact, the security vacuum caused by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, economic disruption caused by the Ukraine crisis, Sino-US trade war and increasing major power tension in the Indo-Pacific has evoked a feeling that the international situation is fast moving towards unpredictability. As China considers a stable international situation as an essential prerequisite for its national rejuvenation, the high degree of volatility has emerged as a major concern for the CCP.5
Rising Threat Perception
Along with being concerned with international instability, Beijing also appears to consider that the external environment has become hostile to China’s interests. The threat perception is notable as there is pointed emphasis on ensuring “national security” in every respect to combat “risk” and “challenge” emanating from external actors.6 Further, in the context of describing China’s geostrategic environment, the report states that China is confronted with drastic changes in the international landscape, especially external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade and exert maximum pressure on it. Also, it states that “external attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time”.7
It is noteworthy that this is the first time such phrases have been included in the work report to convey the nature of the threat China perceives. While previous work reports do refer to hegemonism of the West and bullying of weaker states by powerful ones to define the negative features of the international environment, they do not delve into specific threats posed to China.8 The worsening relations with the US and other major Western countries over different issues including trade, origin of COVID-19, allegations of violation of human rights in Xinjiang, status of Taiwan, apart from increasing geostrategic and economic competition in the Indo-Pacific, are viewed as the causes of China’s rising threat perception. This in turn has evoked fears of blackmail, containment, and blockade.
Beijing’s Darkening World View
It is noteworthy that concern about international instability, threat perception about the external environment and sense of crises has been underway post-2017. The onset of the trade war with the US, Western criticism of China’s crackdown in the restive regions of Xinjiang and Hong Kong and increasing pushback against China’s power projection in Asia-Pacific has instilled a sense of insecurity in Beijing which has grown in the subsequent years. Various public documents and statements made by Xi himself and other high-level officials proves this.
For instance, China’s threat perception about hostile external environment was evident in the 2019 Chinese National Defence White Paper which underscored the rising threat of militarisation in the Indo-Pacific. The document contended that US actions were undermining the region’s strategic balance, charged that Japan was trying to circumvent post-war mechanisms and develop offensive capabilities, and held that Australia was bent on military expansion.9 Subsequently, in 2020, as a warning of the impending crisis, the Central Party School (which trains Chinese diplomats) in an article published in its flagship journal Study Times stated that a ‘long-term’ struggle was ahead and called on Chinese diplomats to be prepared to fight through adversity.10
Further, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in an interview in 2021 observed that international instability has been exacerbated due to the pandemic and various events like the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Taliban’s victory in Kabul, as well as intensifying confrontation between major powers like Russia and the US.11 Later, in April 2022, Chinese ambassador to the US Qin Gang wrote in the National Interest that the post-war international system has come under the heaviest pressure since the Cold War.12
At the BOAO Forum for Asia in 2022, hinting towards possibility of major conflict between countries, Xi, in his inaugural address stated that while the international community was reeling from the after-effects of the pandemic, traditional security risks are already emerging.13 Xi was more direct at the BRICS conference held few months later where he stated that
Thus, Beijing has been closely following the evolving international situation while debating its impact on Chinese national interests. The work report can therefore be seen as a culmination of China’s recent world view which seems to have further darkened.
Double Down on National Security
One of the important implications of China’s negative perception about its external environment is Beijing’s heightened sensitivity towards national security. Breaking the traditional pattern, this year the work report has a separate section on national security titled Modernizing China’s National Security System and Capacity and Safeguarding National Security and Social Stability.Some of the notable aspects relating to enhancing security across a wide spectrum including economy, major infrastructure, financial institutions, cyberspace, are highlighted and it declares the government’s intent to counter foreign sanctions and interference. It calls for maintaining a high-alert against systemic security risks while stringently cracking down upon infiltration and separatist activities by hostile forces.15
Such an extensive note on augmenting national security in various aspects was seen for the first time in such reports. Previous reports only contained broad affirmations regarding the Party’s focus on strengthening political, military, economic and social stability. More importantly, for the first time, the issue of foreign sanctions and long arm jurisdiction featured prominently in the context of national security.16
The document, consistent with previous work reports, holds a strong military as the primary means for strengthening national security. It also elaborates on the national security goals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and continuing modernisation of the armed forces and national defence. However, unlike the 18th Party Congress work report, it does not talk about increasing mutual trust and cooperation with other countries or active participation in regional and international security affairs.17 Instead, it discusses at length the need to improve synergy between different departments of the military to enhance combat capabilities. Further, in contrast to the 19th Congress work report, which had simply mentioned the party’s responsibilities towards strengthening the army,18 this year’s work report calls for a centralised and proactive approach by strengthening Party’s control over the military and urgent development of strategic deterrence, combat capabilities and enhancing joint operations reconnaissance and joint strike capabilities.
Considering China’s grim perception of the international situation and external threat environment, sensitivity towards national security and focus on harnessing military power was hardly surprising. The concerning aspect is that China could frame national security threats more broadly and be more willing to take risks.19 Xi Jinping, for instance, could resort to risky strategic manoeuvres to retain his strongman image. Furthermore, the proposals regarding strengthening strategic deterrence (used primarily with regard to nuclear forces) and deployment of military forces on a regular basis and in diversified ways could mean that China is normalising the use of military force in dealing with its neighbours or asserting its territorial or maritime claims through military means.
Conclusion
The 20th Party Congress exhibited a number of exceptions. These include Xi Jinping continuing into his third term, delivering a shorter speech than usual and choosing a governing body solely made of his loyalists. Similarly, the work report also differed from previous reports in terms of conveying China’s negative assessment of the international situation, high threat perception and sensitivity towards national security, the leadership’s intent to exercise greater control over the military, urgent development of China’s strategic deterrence and normalisation of use of military forces.
Given the above, the growing insecurity and threat perception as articulated in the work report could lead to tighter controls in the domestic space and especially in the restive regions of Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. Secondly, China might increasingly strive to reduce its international dependence on critical technologies, energy supplies and other essential goods to counter US pressure. Finally, Beijing is likely to become more assertive in its international dealings and project military belligerence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
China is making increasing use of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), among others, to modernise the People’s Liberation Army.
China is deploying advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, automation and robots, quantum computing, big data, 5G networking, and the Internet of Things (IoT), for military purposes. In its 14th Five Year Plan (FYP) (2021–25), China outlined the main aims and objectives of modernising the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including that of ‘elevating the level to being an intelligent force’.1 China seeks to focus on accelerating military modernisation to make the PLA an automated and computerised force by 2027, the 100th anniversary of its founding in 1927. By 2035, PLA aims to become a modernised force in all spheres.2 Nevertheless, analysts note that a significant force reduction from current levels, budget boost and faster adoption of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies will be necessary to hasten the development of an intelligent and informationised force.
Shift from Mechanised to Intelligentised and Informationised Domain
The PLA has been modernising for more than 20 years and has long been described as being "half-mechanized, half-informationized force".3 The PLA is seeking to improve military efficacy by focusing on information technologies—particularly those connected to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), to become an "informatised" force.4 The move from mechanised to informationised force under the cover of intelligent network capabilities, such as IoT, 5G, Big Data and Cloud Computing, are the core ideas of the Chinese military's thinking towards transitioning to a 21st century force.
In essence, intelligent warfare implies the use of 4IR technologies for military use and the exploitation of such technologies to produce ‘intelligent weapons’, like AI-enabled weapons system. China's 2019 defense white paper had noted that ‘informationised conflict and intelligent warfare’ was ‘on the horizon’.5
China believes that the emerging economic and military-technical revolutions will be dominated by AI, big data, human–machine hybrid intelligence, swarm intelligence, automated decision-making, autonomous unmanned systems, and intelligent robots.6 The PLA is adopting 4IR technologies in order to be better prepared for the growing symmetric and asymmetric combat domains, especially in geographical and cyber space. Numerous crucial technologies, including robots, big data, quantum computing, etc., are expected to enable PLA forces to be better prepared, especially at a time when asymmetric warfare is changing the dimensions across battlespace.
In its geopolitical rivalry with the United States, China places a high importance on AI as a crucial technology. Chinese military experts predict that AI will be essential to overtaking the US military as the most powerful armed force in the world.7 As a result, China has developed a plan to take the lead in AI by 2030. Beijing's ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ was published in July 2017, with three key strategic objectives—to raise China's AI industry to the level of the global state-of-the-art; to make significant advances in fundamental AI theory by 2025; and to make China the world leader in AI theory, technology, and applications by 2030.8
China is seeking to ‘infuse AI’ into almost every component of the PLA's operations and equipment. The upgrading of the PLA to intelligent warfare is linked to China's AI plan as well as other significant investments in important technical industries, particularly in the "national defense construction, security assessment, and control capabilities".9
Intelligentised Warfare and Military–Civil Fusion
Chinese military modernisation is expected to become more and more associated with civil technological innovation. The majority of 4IR breakthroughs—particularly in the areas of AI, machine learning, big data, etc.,—are occurring in the commercial sector. Because of this reliance on commercial technology, Military Civil Fusion (MCF), also known as ‘civil–military integration’ (CMI), has become a more crucial military-technological innovation approach.10
MCF is essential to the PLA's embrace of intelligentised combat, as seen by efforts to use AI to this end. The New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan is being seen as the "poster child" for MCF because it takes use of developments in commercial AI to accelerate the development of technology essential for future military modernisation.11
Already, 4IR technologies are being utilised to increase the capabilities of weapons systems like drones (both armed and unarmed).12 MCF has integrated military modernisation with civilian technical innovation in a number of crucial dual-use technology areas.13 MCF has "included deeper integration of military and civilian administration at all levels of government: in national defense mobilization, airspace management and civil air defense, reserve and militia forces, and border and coastal defense”.14
The PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in 2015 and is in charge of space, cyber influence operations and electronic warfare. It has “energetically built ties outside the military arena, signing cooperation agreements with research universities and other research centers for developing enhanced capabilities for integration of 4IR tools to its spherical domain”.15
The ongoing technological denial by the West and the lack of expertise in technological advancement across Chinese research industries, especially in semiconductors, though, are being flagged as some of the reasons that could cause impediments to the PLA’s modernisation plan.16 Therefore, even as China has made progress in its endeavour to harness commercial high technology for the PLA's modernisation efforts and to be combat-ready in line with the needs of the 21st century, there are still obstacles that must be overcome before such 4IR technologies can be widely adopted by the PLA.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Russia’s partial mobilisation has also had regional domestic repercussions, especially so in the Central Asian Republics.
On 21 October 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a “partial mobilisation” of up to 3,00,000 military reservists, aged 18 to 50 in the Russian armed forces, to fight on the Ukrainian front. This marked the first such mobilisation since the Second World War. Notably, this development was preceded by the announcement of referendums in the Russia-controlled Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, thereby expanding the scope of Russian armed forces jurisdiction.
By 14 October 2022, approximately 2,00,000 individuals across Russia, including in the politically vibrant capital of Moscow, received their orders to join the Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. This unprecedented mobilisation, though, has also resulted in widespread protests, particularly in the rural regions as well as the Northern Caucasus.1 The fact that the Northern Caucasus comprises predominantly of Muslim citizens has further stoked minority apprehensions of being used as a cannon fodder during this mobilisation.
There has also been an exodus of those seeking to evade conscription to the Central Asian Republics (CARs), barring Turkmenistan which does not provide visa-free access to Russian citizens. Notably, Kazakhstan and to an extent Kyrgyzstan, have welcomed the Russian influx2 while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have maintained a stoic silence. This Russian influx has not only caused domestic reverberations in the CARs but also impacted the migrant Central Asian labour force based in Russia.
Central Asian Migrants in Russia
There are approximately four million Central Asian migrants in Russia. These include two million Uzbeks, one million Tajiks, 2,00,000 Kazakhs, and a slightly lesser number of Kyrgyz.3 These migrants work primarily in Russia’s construction and agricultural sectors. Amidst the economic crisis in Russia, these Central Asian migrants face a daunting future. The surge in outbound airfare4 on account of the large Russian citizens exodus has only restricted their ability to leave the Russian shores.
Meanwhile, the proposed enlistment of Central Asian migrants in the Russian armed forces, facilitated by the Sakharova Migration Centre, is a catch-22 situation. The lure of financial assistance and a reduced waiting period to acquire Russian citizenship is offset by the uncertainty of heading into a dangerous frontline.5 This quandary is further compounded by the fact that Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have warned their citizens of penal action, including imprisonment, if they enlist in the Russian armed forces.6 Notably, close to 40 per cent of Central Asian migrants have expressed willingness to return home.7
Domestic Dynamics
By some accounts, at least 7,00,000 Russians, seeking to avoid conscription, have sought refuge in neighbouring CARs. Their preferred destination is Kazakhstan,8 due to its geographical proximity to Russia, followed by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. This influx, inevitably, affects the CARs. The Russian influx has worsened the regional economic slowdown. Rising inflation and food shortages have made things worse leading to large-scale discontentment.9 Many also see the incoming Russians as a business opportunity. In several cases, house owners, especially in the urban centres, have raised rent by a factor of three while evicting local low-income families and students.10
The Russian influx could also destabilise the domestic financial markets amidst the wide gulf in labour quality11 between locals and the more skilled Russians—the latter potentially monopolising Central Asia’s job markets. These developments could potentially rekindle the historical memory of the repressive Czarist and Soviet rule which in several instances undermined indigenous Central Asian culture.12 Arguably, the existing social contract between the state and the people is at stake.
Moreover, the polarisation and the formation of the “us vs them” camp, anchored in Russophobia, could undermine the domestic Central Asian architecture. Notably, in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, nationalist groups and individuals—Bashtan Bashta Movement and Kuat Ahmatov respectively—could use the influx as an opportunity to flame Russophobia for their political gains. Earlier, the Bashtan Bashta had raised the issue of decolonisation on the pretext of Ukraine.13 They targeted Russia and regional organisations like the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), both of which are Russia-dominated organisations.
In the same vein, Kuat Ahmatov and his group have held language patrols, including one in 2021, and posted videos on his YouTube channel—Til Maydani Online Party—targeting the Russian language.14 Despite evading arrest and escaping to Ukraine, he continues to have a following in Kazakhstan.15
A growing emphasis on Kazakh nationalism is taking place at a time when Russia–Kazakhstan relations have faced turbulence. Comments and reactions by the Kazakh leadership concerning the War in Ukraine and the referendums conducted,16 presumably driven by the inherent fear of facing similar military aggression, have irked the Kremlin.17 Notably, the large presence of ethnic Russians, particularly in Northern Kazakhstan, would have inevitably increased the Kazakh leadership’s nervousness amidst ongoing irredentism in Ukraine.
Conclusion
Russia’s partial mobilisation has impacted regional domestic dynamics, especially so in the CARs. In the long run, this could foster stronger Russophobia, including towards the Russian minority population residing in Central Asia. At the same time, new alignments could take place in Eurasia amidst Central Asian nations’ emphasis on a multi-vector foreign policy—a euphemism for diversifying relations beyond Russia. This is notwithstanding the fact that the majority of CARs continue to see Russia as an essential partner, reflected in most CARs having abstained from voting on UN resolutions related to Ukraine.18
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The principles encompassing the Delhi Declaration reiterate that India’s core security concerns broadly resonate with the members of the UNSC.
The Delhi Declaration, issued after the Special Meeting of the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in October 2022, signalled multiple symbolic victories for India, in that it affirmed its key security concerns. The document also underlined core dilemmas for the global community, requiring swift resolution, and measures to make that happen.
External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar’s keynote address highlighted how the UNSC CTC has managed to place immense global scrutiny on those actors that ‘turned terrorism into a state-funded enterprise’.1 Likely, this was an implicit condemnation of Pakistan’s foreign policy of destabilising India’s national security and territorial integrity via terrorism. Furthermore, to advance the international fight against eliminating terrorism, India pledged US$ 500,000 to the UN Trust Fund for Counter-Terrorism.2
Nonetheless, challenges persist. Member states have differing perceptions about what constitutes terrorism. Furthermore, implementing the Delhi Declaration will be a painstaking task for any stakeholder because its clauses are non-binding and recurrent threats in South Asia and Africa might hinder regional actors from getting involved in resolving global challenges.
Key themes of the declaration
Representatives of all 15 UNSC member states unanimously approved the declaration, agreeing that UN agencies, civil society actors, and the private sector will need to strengthen counter-terrorism engagement and cooperation collectively, with human rights being at the centre of any initiatives undertaken.
Secondly, most of the clauses incorporated in the declaration’s final draft underlined dilemmas central to India’s fight against radicalisation, violent extremism, and terrorism. Consequently, it provided the political and diplomatic leadership opportune momentum heading into its December 2022 Presidency, ushering in a global shift in perception about critical terrorist threats facing humankind.
Thirdly, the emphasis placed on threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS underlines that member states are cognisant of threats posed by these terrorist organisations, should they resurge to displaying the scale of violence visible in their heyday and their destabilising effects on local communities and regional security architectures.
Finally, discussions about weaponisation of social media, online radicalisation, cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), among other advancements by terrorists, predominated the two-day event and its participants. The terrorists have increasingly relied on social media and encrypted chat forums to target specific areas and gain traction among radicalised individuals.
Additionally, the heightened focus on evolving technologies and their use by terrorist groups affirm that despite states’ use of conventional strategies to defeat them, information technology, UAS, and social media will determine the outcome of counter-terrorism initiatives. Ensuring respect for international law and the need to curb financial terrorism, visible on crowdfunding platforms, were the other critical themes highlighted by the declaration.
Underlying Indian Interests
The principles (of the Delhi Declaration) highlighted below are of critical importance to Indian interests due to its experiences in confronting cross-border terrorism. Some of them have been explained below, using relevant examples.3
This clause is of particular significance to Indian law enforcement and security agencies, more so in Punjab and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). J&K is vital in upholding the country’s security calculus due to frequent reports about narcotics and arms seizures from across the border. Overall, it has experienced a 2000 per cent uptick in heroin seizures over the last five years.4
This clause has a direct correlation with anti-India sentiments brewed by Pakistan-sponsored proxy groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed or their front organisations like The Resistance Front and Kashmir Freedom Fighters, or separatists. These groups have relied on encrypted platforms like Telegram or social media platforms like Twitter to instigate communal tensions and disseminate anti-India rhetoric. They have collectively attempted to weaponise social media outreach for their repeated attempts at recruitment, to glorify violence and the acts of terrorists neutralised by Indian armed forces, and to espouse their violent extremist propaganda.
Moreover, while other arrests were made, on 14 October 2022, J&K State Investigation Agency cracked down on two individuals—Peerzaada Fahad Shah and Abdul Aala Fazili—for using the written word or partaking in ‘narrative terrorism’.5 With the advent of digital media and its ease of distribution and accessibility, non-state actors have latched on to such developments to pursue their destabilising cause of undermining Indian security. Kashmirwala is one such online magazine whose editor, Fazili, published articles, including those authored by Shah, to radicalise the impressionable youth.
The reason for highlighting this is because one of the primary hurdles in neutralising existing and potential threats stemming from across the Line of Control leads to China. During the past five months, it has consistently vetoed any probability of Pak-based terrorists like Talha Saeed, Shahid Mehmood, Abdul Rahman Makki, and Rauf Asghar being listed as UN-designated terrorist entities under the 1267 al-Qaeda sanctions committee regime.6
India’s unilateral or joint proposals with other countries like the United States have, therefore, faced difficulties in achieving consensus in international and multilateral formats like the UNSC CTC.
Similar attempts by India or interested stakeholders to reform counter-terrorism measures are met with staunch opposition from China and Pakistan, who accuse the former of ‘politicising the counter-terrorism issue’.7
UAS, and their exploitation by terrorists, emerged as one of the key themes during the UNSC’s special meeting, as stated above. The use of drones for narcotics or arms trafficking into J&K for sustaining militancy in the union territory has become a vital cause of concern for Indian security agencies.
Successes and Shortcomings
The principles encompassing the Delhi Declaration laid bare the resounding success of India’s counter-terrorism initiatives globally and how its core security concerns broadly resonate with the members of the UNSC. Additionally, the special meeting marked a milestone as the first UNSC meeting, in any manifestation, to occur in India. Finally, events and testimonies spanning 28 and 29 October 2022 in Mumbai and New Delhi, reinforced India’s resilience in combatting terrorism.
Nonetheless, despite its symbolic victories, analysts need to understand that the document is fraught with challenges, mainly due to its non-binding nature. On the one hand, it did not encapsulate the specific security challenges emanating from the Af-Pak region after the Taliban’s takeover and TTP’s resurgence or the Horn of Africa, where groups like al-Shabaab have caused widespread devastation in Somalia. Nor did it address how the international community can collectively tackle them to prevent a worldwide spill over.
Furthermore, while the Western countries have proven quick to condemn Russian actions in Ukraine, the declaration did not display a similar show of force in explicitly decrying Pakistan’s actions in India. Perhaps, the United States continued dependence on the Pakistani state to sustain its regional counter-terrorism efforts, reflected in the recent sale of F-16s, hinders that from occurring.
Conclusion
As India transitions into the UNSC CTC’s December session, it must deliberate on how the member states can proceed towards practical implementation of at least some of the agreed-upon principles to avoid them becoming redundant and address its core concerns highlighted earlier. Moreover, subsequent meetings should also incorporate a deep-seated understanding of how children bear the impact of technologically driven terrorism and how that challenge can be effectively addressed to curtail non-state actors from exploiting this demographic group for violent purposes. Finally, potential CTC documents must look at how technology and social media can be successfully placed at the forefront of each states’ de-radicalisation strategies to counter terrorist strategies as an effective counter-response.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The special meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) held in New Delhi is an important multi-lateral effort to counter malicious use of technology.
Technology is used as a tool for advancements in society and as a means for development. However, due to the ease of availability of new and emerging technologies at lower costs, it is increasingly being leveraged by non-state actors and terrorists. Cyber harassment, virtual warfare, information warfare, cyberattack, and cyber break-ins are all terms used to describe malicious activities caused by the use of computers or related technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI), machine learning and blockchain.1 Non-state actors have disabled critical infrastructures by using cyber-attacks, drones and have also secured terror financing through virtual assets like crypto-currency.
Against this backdrop, India hosted the special meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) with the theme ‘Countering the Use of New and Emerging Technology for Terrorist Purposes’.2 The CTC unanimously adopted the Delhi Declaration on 29 October 2022.3 The Declaration called for urgent action to counter the threat posed by the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes and effective implementation of various UN resolutions. It flagged concerns over increased use of cyberspace and other Information Communication Technologies (ICT), including social media.
It was the first meeting of the UNSC-CTC in India since its establishment in 2001. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1373, a counter-terrorism measure in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks in the US.4 The objective of the CTC is to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373. The committee comprises the 15 UNSC members.
Given that India is one of the ten non-permanent members and is also currently serving the two-year Security Council term, the meeting was organised in India. Indian Ambassador to the UN, Ruchira Kamboj, chaired the UNSC-CTC. She noted that while technology had limitless potential and innovations have altered society, it has also led to various challenges, including the spread of political unrest and social upheaval. Social media is being used to target individuals through the spread of misinformation and disinformation, while malicious use of AI, and digital payment technologies are being employed to fund terrorist organisations.5
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in his keynote address emphasised that the internet and social media have become tools of militants and terrorist organisations for spreading propaganda, radicalisation and conspiracy theories for destabilising societies.6 He further flagged that the penetration of new technology is reshaping the contours of international terrorism. He advocated that member states should increase funding for UN organs like United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT). India will contribute US$ 0.5 million to the UN Trust Fund for Counter Terrorism to augment its efforts in providing capacity-building support to member states in preventing and countering the threat of terrorism.7 India also committed to work on three major areas highlighted in the Delhi Declaration. These include Countering Terrorist Exploitation of ICT and Emerging Technologies; Threats and opportunities related to new payment technologies and fundraising methods; and Threats posed by the misuse of unmanned aerial systems (UAS).8
Emerging Challenges and Key Takeaways
Social media use by inimical actors has led to political polarisation, post-truth politics and confirmation bias. AI-enabled tools and software have been widely used to create fake news, through disinformation signal generators and automatic generation of social media accounts. Even countries have employed advanced cyberwarfare operations that use AI to impede weapon systems and shut down critical infrastructures, as seen in the Russia–Ukraine conflict.9 Covid-19 pandemic-related misinformation spread worldwide through social media platforms.10
All such practices cause several security concerns that must be addressed. Proactive measures are required to counter malicious content online, while maintaining freedom of expression and a secure, free, trusted, open and interoperable internet. Financial technologies like virtual assets can be vulnerable to abuse due to the absence of proper regulations and governance measures. For instance, new blockchain technologies like bitcoin and other virtual currencies are based on a decentralised network. Various non-state actors can transfer money through these virtual currencies and indulge in money laundering. In 2017, the ‘Wannacry’ ransomware attack held thousands of computer systems hostage while demanding ransom in bitcoins. It resulted in US$ 8 billion loss to hospitals, businesses and banks across the world.11 A 2019 RAND report notes that terrorist organisations like al Qaeda and its affiliates, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah as well as lone-wolf attackers have used cryptocurrencies for drug trafficking, fund-raising, among other activities.12
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued guidelines in 2018 to regulate virtual assets.13 The FATF also took action against countries like Pakistan in June 2018 for lax regime in countering money laundering and terror funding (Pakistan was removed from the Grey List in October 2022).14 In addition, the increasing use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and drones by state and non-state actors and terrorists have raised wider concerns. It has been evident in numerous instances in Syria, Iraq, UAE and Saudi Arabia, where drones have targeted critical infrastructures and have been used for drug and arms trafficking as well.15 In our own neighbourhood, Pakistan’s non-state actors have also used drones to smuggle narcotics, arms and ammunitions in border areas along Rajasthan and Punjab.16
EAM Jaishankar, earlier at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2022, criticised China for blocking attempts by India and the US to list terrorists responsible for 26/11 at the UNSC.17 He emphasised that all member states must fully cooperate in fighting against terrorism and refrain from providing safe havens. The Delhi Declaration, though, did not include India’s concerns over China’s blocking of terrorist designations at the UNSC.
There is a need to share best practices and build on existing frameworks such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) ‘Berlin Memorandum on Good Practices to Counter Terrorist use of UAS’, as highlighted by the US Representative for UN Management and Reform, at the CTC meeting in New Delhi.18 The Berlin Memorandum identifies 26 practices under four key areas for states’ consideration relating to Assessing the risks, vulnerabilities and raising awareness; Enhancing information sharing, engaging with relevant stakeholders and educating the public; Implementing policies and regulations, establishing crisis planning and; Developing tactical counter measures and technical solutions.19
Way Forward
Coordination between governments, the private sector, the public sector, and civil society is needed to harness new and emerging technologies for global good. While governments need to be vigilant, technology companies will have to monitor the use of technology keeping in mind the OECD principles of governance and OECD AI principles that stress on the need for an effective corporate governance framework, emphasise transparency and highlight the role of stakeholders in corporate governance. 20 The OECD AI principles, in addition, call for the creation of an enabling policy environment, and for building human capacity and international cooperation.21 Companies must be encouraged to put in place measures and enforce them to safeguard their platforms from spreading or hosting extremist content. Taking steps like shutting down or disrupting services can undermine open and free digital services and negatively impact the economy.
India’s current tenure at the UNSC will end in December 2022. The government is making dedicated efforts to make the most of this opportunity and will be hosting a ‘No Money for Terror’ conference in New Delhi on 18–19 November 2022 and also hold a UNSC briefing on challenges facing global counter-terrorism efforts. Societal awareness about this threat is also essential to thwart the challenge of digital terrorism.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The end of the ceasefire in Yemen without any substantial political understanding between the government and the Houthis heightens the risk of escalation of violence.
The UN-mediated ceasefire between the government and the Houthis in Yemen that began in April this year ended on 2 October as both sides could not agree to extend it further. The announcement of the ceasefire was intended to halt all military attacks, facilitate movement of fuel ships to Hodeida port, commercial flight operations at Sanaa airport, and help in opening of roads in different parts of the country blocked because of the war. The ceasefire was also expected to start a political process to end the war.1 Throughout the period of the truce, both sides have accused the other of violating the ceasefire and attempting to take advantage of the situation.
The UN used the period of truce to further step up negotiations and find a sustainable and long-term future roadmap for peace and stability in the country. It made serious efforts to bring both parties together and assisted in negotiations on their demands. The UN hoped to push for further negotiations during the ceasefire period and extend it further to achieve consensus between the parties. While the six months of continuous ceasefire in the middle of the civil war in Yemen is quite an achievement, it has ended in a much-expected deadlock with continuing uncertainty.
There have been some credible achievements made in the country during the six months of the ceasefire. The truce brought the cross-border attacks to a halt. Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and the coalition airstrikes on the Houthis stopped, to a large extent. Civilian casualties dropped by around 60 per cent, flight operations continued from Sanaa and Aden airports and the import of fuel through the Hodeida port increased to cater to the worsening fuel crisis in the country.2 The ceasefire facilitated the distribution of humanitarian aid in the country. On the political front, it created an atmosphere of hope for a renewed dialogue between the two sides.
During negotiations to extend it, trouble arose over the issue of the payment of salaries of government employees. The Houthis demanded that the government pay salaries of all the government employees as a pre-condition for the extension of the truce.3 While the government was willing to pay the salaries of its employees recruited before the Houthis captured Sanaa in 2014, it was hesitant to recognise thousands of people hired by the Houthis who worked for them in the new government.4 The UN, though surprised by the additional demand made by the Houthis regarding payment of salaries to all government employees, remains hopeful of bringing both parties to the negotiating table again.
Before the ceasefire agreement, several rounds of talks were held between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Baghdad mediated by Iraq. Yemen was a key point of discussion between the two countries where the objective was to find a way out of the present conflict. The Saudi–Iran talks were a key driver for agreeing to a ceasefire as both these countries are important regional players in Yemen and have huge stakes in the conflict. Failure to extend the ceasefire is an indication of the fact that the Saudi-Iranian talks have not made much progress in recent months. The Saudi-Iranian talks were expected to be one of the most credible political means to bring peace and stability to Yemen. Yemen, thus, now faces an uncertain situation as there are fears of an escalation of violence.
The unfolding of events during the last six months of the ceasefire reiterates the fact that there is a severe lack of trust between the Yemeni government and the Houthis. Even though it agreed to a ceasefire, the Yemeni government cannot fundamentally accept the Houthis as a major player and cede any political space to them. The Houthis capturing the capital Sanaa and other parts of the country by force and negotiating with the government from a vantage point and demanding their share of power in all political negotiations is a difficult proposition for the government to accept.
On the other hand, the Houthis are sceptical of any political move or negotiation that may weaken their current position, both politically and militarily. They also do not want to lose any popular support they have built up in the last eight years. The UN with support from Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan tried to bridge that gap by implementing the ceasefire to reach an acceptable way out of the current situation. But the non-renewal of the ceasefire now threatens instability.
The situation in the country since the end of the ceasefire remains tense. There has not been any substantial escalation in violence and armed clashes during the month of October, but in a major attack, the Houthis targeted the Al Dhabba oil port in Hadramout in the south of the country on 21 October with drones. The Yemeni government stated that the attack on the oil terminal is a terrorist act and designated the Houthis as a terrorist organisation. The Houthi attack on the oil terminal only adds to the further deterioration of the situation and threatens to reverse whatever little achievements were made during the ceasefire. There is growing uncertainty over the next steps of the government and the Houthis as they assess their future strategies. The ceasefire was a golden opportunity for Yemen to permanently end violence and expedite a political process for long-term peace and stability in the country. It was also proving beneficial for the economic and humanitarian situation in the country. The end of the ceasefire without any substantial political understanding between the government and the Houthis heightens the risk of escalation of violence and a return to the period of uncertainty that existed before the ceasefire.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Eastern Mediterranean offers India strong prospects for import of natural gas, given strong bilateral relations with regional countries, including Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus.
The international energy market has witnessed serious upheavals since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Europe, which significantly depended on Russia for its energy security, has been struggling to find alternative sources. The sanctions on Russia’s oil industry by the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) has led to serious churn in the global energy supplies, already seething with shortages due to sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, the civil war in Libya, and the debilitating impact of Covid-19 on demands. This has led to rise in global energy prices, making the post-pandemic economic recovery even more daunting, including in the US and European countries. The OPEC+ decision on production cuts taken on 5 October 2022,1 therefore, provoked sharp reaction from President Joe Biden who blamed Saudi Arabia, warning it of “consequences” for siding with Russia.2 The Kingdom, on the other hand, responded by underlining its longstanding commitments to stability of the global energy market and denied political manoeuvring.3
While the geopolitical tensions over the global energy production and supplies are unlikely to reduce anytime soon, the existing situation has underlined the need for finding alternative sources of energy. The quest for alternatives has also been accelerated by the growing international concern over global warming and environmental degradation. The focus is on finding alternatives both in terms of clean and renewable sources and newer producers and suppliers.
Natural gas, which compared to oil has lesser CO2 emissions, is being touted as the “bridge fuel” for energy transition in the twenty-first century.4 Regional hubs with prospective large gas fields such as Caspian and Eastern Mediterranean have gained international attention. The case of Eastern Mediterranean region is more interesting because of the way the geopolitics is shaping in recent years leading to greater competition and cooperation among regional countries. The region has gained prominence as an alternative source for supply of cleaner fuel, especially in the context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict.
Gas Exploration in East Med
Over the past decade, the Eastern Mediterranean has witnessed the discovery of a number of gas fields in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of regional countries while further exploration and drilling activities are going on. According to estimates included in two reports from the United States Geological Survey released in 2010, vast energy reserves are deposited in both the Nile Delta and the Levant basins in the Eastern Mediterranean.5 Further deposits are estimated in the Aegean and Ionian Seas. Among the regional countries, Egypt and Israel have made a head start with commercial drilling and supplies through pipeline. Israel has invested in Mari-B, Noa, Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, while Egypt has invested in the Zohr and Noor gas fields. Moreover, after the Israel–Lebanon maritime delimitation deal,6 Israel is expected to start production at the Karish gas field, while Lebanon is likely to accelerate drilling at the Qana field. The success of Egypt and Israel in finding commercial quantities and starting production from onshore gas fields has encouraged others, including Greece, Cyprus and Northern Cyprus, Turkey, Lebanon, Libya and Syria, to seriously undertake exploration activities.
The findings and quest for exploration have also generated squabbling among regional countries to claim territorial waters, EEZs and sections of the continental shelf leading to serious tensions, for example, between Turkey and Greece as well as between Turkey and Egypt. The signing of a MoU between Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) and Turkey in November 2019 on delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean further escalated the tensions. The two have followed it up with an agreement signed in October 2022 on joint hydrocarbon exploration in Libyan waters, further causing stir among those opposed to the maritime deal between the two countries.7
Simultaneously, the possibility of the Eastern Mediterranean region emerging as a new gas production hub has led to efforts at reconciliation and joint exploration. For example, an informal bloc among Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus took formal shape as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in 2019.8 . The EMGF, based in Cairo, aims to develop a cooperative mechanism among member countries for exploration, infrastructure development and to supply gas to European and Asian markets. Likewise, the possible economic benefits of gas production and exports encouraged Israel and Lebanon, that otherwise do not share formal ties, to sign a US-mediated maritime demarcation agreement in October 2022.
Prospects for India
India’s energy needs are constantly growing, and are likely to increase exponentially in the coming decades owing to its size and performance of its economy. India is the fastest growing large economy in the world, and its energy needs are also growing faster than any of the G-20 economies. There is a huge disparity, however, in the consumption to production ratio in India, which means that India has to depend on imports to fulfil its energy security needs. Conventionally, the Gulf region has been the mainstay of India’s energy security requirements, supplying 55–60 per cent of its oil and gas needs over the past few years. The Government of India has been trying to diversify India’s energy basket both in terms of increasing renewables and cleaner sources, such as natural gas, wind, solar and hydrogen, as well as finding alternative producers, including from Australia, US, Russia, Latin America and Central Asia. Thus far, however, New Delhi has made only limited efforts to explore the potentials for gas imports from the Eastern Mediterranean region.
There are a number of reasons why India can emerge as a favourable destination for supplies from the Eastern Mediterranean. Firstly, India shares friendly relations with major regional countries, especially Egypt and Israel, both of which are keen to find newer markets for gas supplies. At this point, the majority of India’s gas imports come from Qatar and Australia. Given the emphasis on clean energy, New Delhi can explore imports from both Egyptian and Israeli gas fields. Both spot procurement and long term supply deals can be considered.
Indian oil companies can also look for participating in the exploration activities that can ensure supplies for India in the long term. In addition to Egypt and Israel, India can also explore the possibilities of partnering with Greece and Cyprus in gas exploration which can be lucrative in the future. There are challenges pertaining to regional tensions and uncertainties about maritime jurisdiction but this can be overcome by avoiding investments in disputed areas. The problems related to logistics and transportation can also be overcome given that India has in the past secured supplies from Libya before it got engulfed in the civil war. Further investments in infrastructure developments through mini-lateral initiatives such as the I2U2 and jointly with friendly regional and international powers, including the UAE and France, which are interested in the Eastern Mediterranean, can be explored.
Conclusion
At a time when India’s energy security needs are constantly increasing, it is worth exploring possible newer sources for supply of cleaner sources of energy. The Eastern Mediterranean has in recent years emerged as a major hub for gas exploration with mega findings in the Nile Delta and Levant basins. Although this has caused regional tensions, given competing claims on maritime jurisdiction in the Mediterranean Sea, it has also resulted in cooperation among regional countries for joint exploration and infrastructure development. For India, despite the regional problems, the Eastern Mediterranean offers strong prospects as a source for import of natural gas given its constantly increasing demands, and strong bilateral relations with the regional countries including Egypt, Israel, Greece and Cyprus. At the same time, for the regional countries, India offers a lucrative option as an export destination, given the huge and growing Indian appetite for energy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Biden administration has further reinforced and strengthened US strategic priorities towards the Indo-Pacific, a decade after the ‘Pivot to Asia’ by the Obama administration.
The ‘Pivot to Asia’, the strategic rebalance announced by President Barack Obama in 2011 and early 2012, marked a significant shift in US foreign policy priorities from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. While speaking at the Australian Parliament in November 2011, Obama stated that as a Pacific nation, “the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends.”1 The ‘Pivot’ comprised an enhancement of America’s military and security engagement as well as the expansion of its economic and commercial leverage in the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region,2 at a time when it was mired in ‘forever wars’ in the Middle East.3
The pivot was announced at a time when China was becoming more aggressive in its neighbourhood. Its territorial claims spanned the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea, as well as islands in Japanese territorial waters. China also made economic inroads in Southeast Asia through trade-linked incentives. China’s rise severely threatened the regional order and the interests of the US and its allies like Japan and Australia.4
The Pivot was a welcome policy change for US allies in the Asia-Pacific, with analysts noting that the US giving priority to Asia was “long overdue”.5 When the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the ASEAN Secretariat in 2009, ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan stated that her visit showed “the seriousness of the United States to end its diplomatic absenteeism in the region”. Domestic politics, an important driver of American foreign policy, also turned against the US’s continued engagement in the Middle East. As per a 2011 Pew Survey, 57 per cent of the respondents opposed the war in Iraq, while 52 per cent opposed the Afghan war.6
As part of the pivot, the assurances the US made especially to Australia were widely welcomed. The US announced additional troop deployments to Australia, from 250 to 2,500 marines at the Darwin base.7 The US made similar military commitments to Singapore and the Philippines as well, while promising to make US military presence in East Asia “more broadly distributed, more flexible, and more politically sustainable”.8
The US also engaged in negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 Pacific Rim economies—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Obama’s interest in joining this trade deal, as he famously articulated in 2015, was that “if we don't write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region”, indicating clearly the containment tenet of the TPP.9 This was at a time when the trade deficit with China was US$ 282 billion in 2011.10 The TPP assured member states of America’s renewed commitment to the economic integration of the region.11
For US partners in the Indo-Pacific, namely the Philippines, Japan and Australia, the anti-China bend of the pivot was assuring, given that they were engaged in maritime disputes with China. To show the US’ commitment to the pivot, Obama invited Japan, Australia and Vietnam, for the first time, to participate in the joint bilateral US–Philippines naval exercise, Balikatan in 2012.12
However, not all ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia, were comfortable with the idea of the US increasing its troop presence in the Darwin and Guam bases. The Philippines was criticised for opening the region to a higher possibility of great power contestation between the US and China. 13
The US withdrew from the TPP right after Obama’s presidency, even as China’s regional integration initiatives such as the Belt and Road and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) gathered steam. While the Trump administration’s anti-China focus remained intact, the US increasingly dissociated from its commitments to the region. Trump, for instance, withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a cornerstone of Obama’s Pivot, in January 2017. Marking a break from Obama’s emphasis on regional multilateralism, Trump did not attend the ASEAN Summits in 2018, 2019 and 2020, while also declining to be a part of the East Asia Summits of 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020.14 The Trump administration remained engaged with Middle East contentions, curating the Abraham Accords and also withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The security tenet of the Pivot also faced issues on the US–Japan front, due to debates regarding the relocation of US marines from the Futenma base in Okinawa prefecture, to a new base in Henoko Bay in the same prefecture.15 While the Japanese federal government made provisions for the relocation, the local government and the people of Henoko Bay were against it. The recent re-election of Denny Tamaki as Governor of Okinawa, who campaigned on preventing the development of a new base in Henoko, indicates that such sentiments are still strong.16
After the Pivot, there was a noteworthy rise in active military and civilian personnel deployed by the US to Japan. The number of deployed personnel to Japan was 55,278 as of September 2011, and by December 2015, it grew to 78,092. However, under Trump, the number fell to 46,334 as of December 2016. The number of troops stood at 62,722, as of June 2022.17
Even though the Trump administration dis-engaged multilaterally from the region, the ‘Indo-Pacific’ became a construct of significance in US foreign policy during his presidency, as evident from the renaming of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) as the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) in 2018. Additionally, the Trump administration announced the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) in 2018, which outlined a detailed financial breakup for promoting US security and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific Region.18
Under President Joe Biden, meanwhile, a renewed multilateral economic emphasis towards the region as a whole came through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The IPEF’s agenda include trade, supply chain resilience, economic resilience and clean energy and decarbonisation. To strengthen regional security engagements, the Biden administration tabled the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) in May 2021 and the US along with the other Quad member countries announced the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness. The AUKUS agreement between the US, UK and Australia, which involves the transfer of US nuclear naval propulsion technology to Australia, is a further significant move reinforcing the capabilities of a key regional ally to counter security threats. In the latest US National Security Strategy, released on 12 October 2022, the Biden administration argues that “no region will be of more significance to the world and to everyday Americans than the Indo-Pacific”.19
A decade after the pivot, therefore, with an ascendant China looming large in the regional geo-strategic framework, US strategic priorities towards the Indo-Pacific have been well and truly reinforced and strengthened.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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