The changing nature of warfare, as the twentieth century drew to a close, saw the increased proliferation of conflict between non-state actors and the state. Small wars, wars of liberation, insurgencies, terrorism, proxy wars, sub-conventional warfare and a host of other terminologies emerged that attempted to fingerprint this genre of low spectrum warfare. Initially, it was felt that it was risky to use air power in this kind of warfare and that surface forces were best equipped to fight these wars with only superficial support from air forces.
Army personnel trained and equipped for conventional warfare find themselves at a disadvantage when deployed for sub-conventional operations. The advancement in technology, changing warfare concepts, induction of sophisticated weapons and support equipments and need to handle far too many variables demand deliberate efforts in ensuring recruitment of desired human resource and their training in the army to suit the requirements of conventional as well as sub-conventional warfare.
It is essential to have an army which is capable of responding to conventional as well as sub-conventional warfare requirements with bare minimum turbulence while switching roles from one form of warfare to another.
While the asymmetrical threat will have an effect on warfare at strategic, operational and tactical levels, the threat will be most dramatic at the operational level.
To prevent intelligence failures there is a need to incorporate the additional and fresh areas of intelligence interest brought on by the asymmetric and nuclear dimensions of future conflict.
The nuclear ‘backdrop’ carries dangers even in a single front let alone a ‘two front’ situation, particularly since a move to rescind the NFU tenet of doctrine may be necessary.
Clear higher level directions, strategic and tactical directives are essential for the Army and other security forces trained and equipped for conventional warfare to operate in an extremely challenging and hostile sub-conventional warfare environment. Commanders and troops must understand that they are operating in a tricky situation and their overall aim will always remain achievement of more perfect peace. It simply implies that there is no such thing as a quick military victory. Conduct of counterinsurgency campaigns will invariably extend over a number of years.
Even though the Indian government has begun to encourage participation of private sector in defence systems production, it is not technologically competitive in the global market. The Chinese are giving importance to two factors: first, the civilian high technology market should increase sophisticated dual-use products that are readily available to the military. Developments of new C4ISR capabilities in the military have been a consequent result of improvements in the telecommunications sector.
