Somalia

Since the overthrow of its last ruler Siad Barre in 1990, Somalia's conditions have worsened and, barring a few islands of peace, are degenerating rapidly; its waves of insecurity surge beyond its shores. Piracy off Somalia is a consequence of its present volatile insecurity on shore, and 20 years of conflict resolution efforts have come to naught. As piracy increases and anti-piracy operations intensify, efforts at finding lasting peace on shore have run aground.

While India is augmenting the security of the Lakshadweep islands, implementation of the coastal security scheme on the ground has been slow.

As high-profile incidents of piracy become more common off Somalia, strategists have taken to urging the US government to send expeditionary forces ashore. The article uses history and Clausewitzian theory to estimate the nature of the threat and the likely efficacy of a land campaign. Even successful operations would entail costs exceeding the value of the political stakes. For this reason alone, going ashore is inadvisable.

This paper seeks to understand the nature of cooperation between the UN and other IGOs in ongoing conflicts. It will examine the security framework in which these multilateral arrangements were created, the gaps they were trying to cover, and the problems and areas of opportunities.

Most aid groups have pulled out of Somalia because of the continuing dangers. Yet, the World Food Program (WFP) continues to operate in the region, and has been doing so for the past two decades.

Across the globe, a crucial but largely unseen and unheard of force in the Global War on Terrorism is emerging – young, hardened, militant, radicalized recruits from Africa – a force potent enough to compel governments to revise their handbooks on how best to contend with Islamic extremism.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously on 30 November 2009 to extend for another 12 months a mandate for member countries to conduct anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, to include “entering the territorial waters and undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia”. Earlier the same month during a session on “Piracy and the situation in Somalia”, the UNSC members criticised the practice of paying ransom and stated that the coordinated fight by navies from several countries had failed to deter the pirates.

The participation of the PLA Navy in escort missions in foreign waters is a radical departure from the historical point of view because this is the first time that the PLA Navy is carrying out such tasks not in national waters.

Call it China’s new military diplomacy or emerging naval strategy. A Chinese naval fleet arrived in the Gulf of Aden off the Somalian coast on January 6, 2009 to carry out the first escort mission against pirates. On February 18, 2009, in an efficient display of its growing naval capabilities, the fleet completed its twenty first mission (the largest held so far in the series) of escorting merchant ships in this region.

Since 2005, the ‘centre of gravity’ of Asian piracy has clearly shifted westwards from Southeast Asia to the western Indian Ocean. The Somalia-based pirates are on the rampage, capturing vessels of all sizes ranging from yachts to super-tankers and their crew for ransom. This is hardly surprising, considering that the writ of Somalia’s Transitional Government (TFG) does not even run on the entire Somali land territory, and much less on its adjoining seas.