Türkiye’s Renewed Engagement with the Gulf
Erdoğan’s October 2025 visit to Kuwait, Qatar and Oman signalled Ankara’s intent to deepen defence and economic relations with the Gulf.
Erdoğan’s October 2025 visit to Kuwait, Qatar and Oman signalled Ankara’s intent to deepen defence and economic relations with the Gulf.
In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut off diplomatic ties with Qatar. They accused Qatar of supporting extremist and terror groups in the region, having close ties with Iran, undermining the security and stability of the Gulf region, and using the satellite television network Al Jazeera as a propaganda machine. They also put up a list of demands before Qatar, to be accepted within 10 days in order to end the boycott.
The nostalgia among a section of the AKP to recreate the Ottoman past through economic and geopolitical integration has been the driving force behind Turkey’s recent assertive postures in regional matters including the Qatar crisis.
While the GCC crisis seems to be de-escalating, there is no end in sight as yet.
It is unrealistic and naïve to expect Qatar to surrender. And it is not beyond diplomacy to work out a face-saving formula
Qatar is the largest supplier of LNG to India, accounting for over 65 per cent of India’s global import and 15 per cent of Qatar’s export of LNG.
It is unlikely that Qatar will agree to align its foreign policy with that of Riyadh and to rein in Al Jazeera.
The decision to target Qatar clearly indicates that the region is now divided into two camps and that the Arab Gulf countries are in no mood to accept neutral players.
Rulers of Gulf states should initiate reforms to accommodate the voices and aspirations of different sections of their societies.
During his November 2008 visit to Oman and Qatar, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed two memoranda of understanding with Oman and three with Qatar. The MOUs with Qatar were on defence and security, investment, energy and manpower development.



