China’s varied winter planning logistics show a broader strategy to gain mastery over high-altitude conditions and increase combat preparedness against India.
Post 2015 reforms, the Western Theatre Command (WTC) of the PLA has been transforming itself into a joint theatre command that can fight wars against an adversary like India. Considering that India and China are involved in a border standoff, any strengthening of WTC’s combat capabilities is likely to have an immense impact on India.
The PLA’s approach to COVID-19 has shown that the military reforms have im-mensely benefited their coordination and response. It has intensified China’s desire to maintain military preparedness and the resolve to demonstrate it too.
Since taking over power in 2012, the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s key initiative has been to make the Communist Party of China (CPC) relevant in the function of China’s political system. However, when Xi Jinping argues for a ‘unified and absolute leadership of the Party, it has become co-terminous with his absolute control of the Party. What does this centralisation of power signify? Given this context, it is imperative to question under whose control is the Chinese Army. That is, does CPC as an organisation hold absolute command over the PLA or it is Xi Jinping who controls it?
It will take some time before the PLA can claim to be a modern military, at par with Western armies, capable of undertaking extended global missions. But the PLA is poised for a “Giant Leap”, and that is bound to dramatically change the ‘balance of power’ dynamics.
This monograph identifies the contexts which have shaped China's military strategy and doctrine. It argues that these have evolved through Party-Military relations as well as through the Chinese leadership's assessment of the international balance of power. In this framework, the monograph has traced the PLA's strategic and doctrinal transformation from a defensive one to one of limited offence, having global aspirations, affecting further changes in China's military strategy and doctrine.
The leadership transition in the Rocket Forces shows that the service is not only integrating with other services but that its officials are increasingly called upon to other services to facilitate joint training and exercises.
If PLA doesn’t change its ‘army-centric’ character and make way for professionals with domain expertise, the higher defence organisation will continue to be weak and the reform only in name.
