Nuclear

Was the 1998 Pokhran test a historical watershed as many contemporary observers believed? This article looks at its impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, regional security, India’s position in global institutions, and the ongoing global power shift: the non-proliferation regime continued along the old dispute lines; regional conflict behaviour did not change at all; India grew into global institutions not because of nuclear tests but because of her remarkable economic development; the re-arrangement of global power follows more basic trends as well.

India’s ‘dual use’ nuclear policy has been strung out from the beginning between the peaceful atom and military atom as illustrated in Jawaharlal Nehru’s use of the phrase for the country’s nuclear energy programme—‘Janus-faced’. However, the Indian Government has been too influenced by its own rhetoric of peaceful use to equally emphasise the security aspects that the phrase implied.

Kim will drive the hardest bargain possible and be willing to make only small concessions like maintaining some type of a freeze on future tests of missiles and nuclear weapons.

Advanced technologies and supercomputing have accelerated the pace of research and development in the field of nuclear fusion.

The standoffs in Doklam and North Korea offer insights on how crisis stability remains subject to the complexities of deterrence, especially in theatres with multiple nuclear-armed states, and what this entails for disarmament.

While thermonuclear weapons are not necessary for maintaining a credible deterrent, they serve the purpose of enabling India to make effective use of its relatively limited fissile material stockpile.

A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.

In the 21st century, nuclear security (NS) risks are more tangible with the probability of nuclear weapons and materials falling into the hands of terrorists becoming more real. The NS threat scenario presents a complex matrix of violent terrorism, Islamist militancy, a proliferation network originating from Pakistan (A. Q. Khan Network) and its spread to Iran, Libya and North Korea. To mitigate nuclear risks and inspire global nuclear confidence, an institutionalized structure is critical for strengthening NS.

The key to calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff lies in ensuring that the Indian armed forces are prepared to meet the threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The advocacy by Pakistani analysts of the Indian disinclination to retaliate massively in response to their use of TNWs on their own soil indicates either a flawed analysis or a bluff that the Indian armed forces would be inclined to call.