Kim will drive the hardest bargain possible and be willing to make only small concessions like maintaining some type of a freeze on future tests of missiles and nuclear weapons.
The standoffs in Doklam and North Korea offer insights on how crisis stability remains subject to the complexities of deterrence, especially in theatres with multiple nuclear-armed states, and what this entails for disarmament.
While thermonuclear weapons are not necessary for maintaining a credible deterrent, they serve the purpose of enabling India to make effective use of its relatively limited fissile material stockpile.
A rational decision maker in the White House does not have all options on the table and cannot start a war without South Korea’s consent. Diplomacy is the only option and this is as obvious as obvious can be.
In the 21st century, nuclear security (NS) risks are more tangible with the probability of nuclear weapons and materials falling into the hands of terrorists becoming more real. The NS threat scenario presents a complex matrix of violent terrorism, Islamist militancy, a proliferation network originating from Pakistan (A. Q. Khan Network) and its spread to Iran, Libya and North Korea. To mitigate nuclear risks and inspire global nuclear confidence, an institutionalized structure is critical for strengthening NS.
The key to calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff lies in ensuring that the Indian armed forces are prepared to meet the threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The advocacy by Pakistani analysts of the Indian disinclination to retaliate massively in response to their use of TNWs on their own soil indicates either a flawed analysis or a bluff that the Indian armed forces would be inclined to call.
A watershed moment for nuclear security was reached when global leaders from more than 50 countries including India and other organisations met successively over six years (2010–2016) to develop an effective and sustainable plan for global nuclear security. At the end of six years, much has been accomplished to improve and upgrade nuclear security in several countries. Despite this perseverance, threats to nuclear security still remain undiminished, primarily because wrong people nursing a malicious agenda desire nuclear and radiological materials.
Given that the NSG may not be able to withhold the India membership question for long, in spite of China’s inconsistent positions, it would be unwise on India’s part to forfeit any advantage it has on the SCS issue.
