Given the ongoing geopolitical contestations involving great powers, the 2026 RevCon is heading towards a potential failure to reach a consensus document.
The 2015 NPT RevCon ended on an expected dismaying note. The only positive outcome was its endorsement of the recent initiatives to project the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, though not adopting its underlying theme - a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty.
As long as nuclear weapons determine a nation’s power and capability, India must have no hesitation in strengthening its nuclear capability and learn to ‘live with the bomb’.
The RevCon, after abundant manoeuvring and political one-upmanship, finalised quite ‘consensually’ a much diluted and defeatist document that promises to ensure that disarmament remains a dream.
While the United States charges Iran of being in non-compliance with its NPT obligations, Iran points out that the United States and other NPT nuclear weapon states are in non-compliance of Articles IV and VI, among other provisions.
It is unlikely that the Revcon will be able to agree on a credible roadmap for nuclear disarmament although there may be some marginal progress on some issues.
Amongst the challenges that bedevil the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) today, the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) 2010 will have to particularly handle two issues: one, right of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under Article IV over the entire nuclear fuel cycle; two, identification by nuclear weapon states (NWS) of credible moves under Article VI for realising disarmament. In addressing the two interlinked issues, the RevCon has an opportunity to refocus the 40-year-old treaty into an effective instrument of non-proliferation and disarmament—its original twin objectives.
Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences.
