The BBIN-MVA would enable seamless sub-regional connectivity, deeper integration on economic issues and people-to-people contact between the four counties.
In spite of the existence since October 2006 of a SAARC Disaster Management Centre, the Nepal earthquake brought to the fore the difficulties faced by this organization and its failure to rise to the occasion.
The ten years of Maoist insurgency followed by the political vacuum after the abolition of the monarchy and the delay in the drafting of the Constitution has given credence to the role of external powers in shaping the domestic politics in that country. The book examines the nature of external powers’ role during the political transition in Nepal since 2006. It analyses Nepal’s relations with external powers’ in the framework of ‘small and major powers’.
This book examines the forces and processes which have led to relative political stability or unleashed trends in that direction in some countries of South Asia. It also delves into the factors that have stimulated economic growth in some countries, and impeded economic growth in others. Eminent authors from the region examine how far the positive political and economic trends in the region are irreversible or lend themselves to internal convulsions or external influences. There is also a focus on how far inter-state relations within the region have led to stronger intra-regional co-operation, particularly in the economic field.
It has been a year of unstable regional security with the endless conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s half-hearted struggle against the remnants of the al Qaeda, Sri Lanka’s inability to find a lasting solution to its ethnic problems and Nepal’s new found inclination to seek neutrality between India and China.
The transitional politics in the Himalayan Kingdom has entered choppy waters with the breakaway radical faction of the Maoist party vowing to disrupt the election to a new constituent assembly slated in November this year.
Over the past few years, ‘trilateral economic cooperation’ and ‘vibrant bridge’ have become buzzwords in Nepal’s foreign policy discourse, and have also caught the popular imagination at home in India. These proposals have generated both curiosity and anxiety in Delhi’s diplomatic and academic circles that are otherwise largely indifferent to Nepal. The Chinese diplomats in Delhi also raising the issue with the Indian officials has added to India’s anxiety all the more. With some notable exceptions (e.g., C.
Integrating the restive Tibetan minority with China has been the primary domestic challenge for Beijing. Thus far, its Nepal policy has been crafted essentially to address the Tibetan question. The idea of trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China apparently floated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) in April 2013 was, in effect, first made by the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, in 2012.
Trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China needs to be seen from the perspective of how beneficial it is for all three countries. However, such cooperation cannot be divorced from India’s security concerns and its close relations with Nepal. Moreover, there are several issues that come into question, too. Are there any objectives behind this proposal? Does it involve only developmental cooperation? Does it undermine India’s security interests?
