Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)

The second Chinese BMD test has a message for India: propel the development of long-range (exo-atmospheric) interception capabilities to mitigate the possibility of further asymmetry on strategic forces.

The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.

The Chinese efforts towards actualization of the ‘offshore defense’ concept which entails the conduct of campaigns in distant waters, strategic deterrence and counterattacks, has an inherent risk of bringing its naval forces on a confrontational course vis-à-vis other maritime forces, particularly the US. To defend itself against overarching US maritime superiority in such a scenario, China has developed its Anti-access and Area Denial (A2AD) concept, predicated mainly around the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.

To counter the consequences flowing from growing ballistic missile proliferation in its neighbourhood, India must expand its BMD programme to include boost phase and mid-course phase intercept capability.

It makes little sense whether a strategic or tactical nuclear weapon is used by Pakistan, since India’s general response would be to carry out a punitive attack on the adversary.

If peace is to prevail in East Asia, Pyongyang must abandon its uranium enrichment programme and all aspects of its nuclear programme should be placed under international monitoring.

In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‘contingency’ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing.

China undertook a BMD test on January 11, 2010, which it claimed was an exoatmospheric interception. Though Beijing was known to be developing missile defence systems for long, there were very few indicators on how far it has gone in terms of technological prowess.

Although the broad contours of India's nuclear doctrine were announced within the days of May 1998 nuclear tests, the formal doctrine was made public only five years later. This article will critically examine the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine in terms of the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 military confrontation with Pakistan. This article concludes that the one-page nuclear doctrine of 2003 remains sketchy and subject to varied interpretations.

In early January 2009, the Financial Times reported “preliminary talks” between US and India on possible sale of systems for an Indian ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield. The daily quoted US embassy officials in New Delhi as saying that technical talks had taken place and that US defence officials had conducted computer simulations with Indian counterparts to demonstrate the capabilities of this technology. The Indian media, and some foreign ones, picked up the story and projected the report as an impending US-India deal on missile defence cooperation.