One of the major highlights of President Xi Jinping’s New Year’s address was the clear emphasis on science, innovation and future industries as the backbone of Chinese modernisation and economic growth for the next five years.
Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered the New Year speech on 31 December 2025.[i] This was keeping with the tradition of delivering a speech on the last day of the year. The address is intended for domestic and international audiences. The address highlights the achievements of the past year, the government’s policy vision, commitment to effective governance, and China’s role on the global stage. For observers, the New Year’s address also signals the government’s potential priorities for the year ahead. Beyond its literal message, the New Year speech plays an important role in constructing China’s national image and its international positioning.
One of the major highlights of this year’s address was the clear emphasis on science, innovation and future industries as the backbone of Chinese modernisation and economic growth for the next five years. This marks a notable shift from the previous focus on “reform and opening up” as the development philosophy. Reform and opening up as a means for enhancing economic vitality was last mentioned in Xi Jinping’s New Year address for 2024. Incidentally, the same address had called for the comprehensive implementation of the “new development pattern”.[ii]
A year later, Xi declared in his 2025 New Year speech that, amid external uncertainty, China would pursue a high level of scientific and technological self-reliance.[iii] This year’s New Year address stated, in unambiguous terms, that China relies on “innovation to empower high-quality development”. Further, science and technology have been deeply integrated into Chinese industries, with breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) and chip development accelerating economic growth.[iv] Evidently, this recalibration in economic policy comes in the backdrop of persisting trade conflicts with the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). It demonstrates that Beijing not only sees emerging technologies as indispensable for economic growth but also as a means of shielding the economy from the weaponisation of trade.
The second highlight of the address was the focus on the anti-corruption campaign. Since the 2020 New Year address, in which Xi claimed that reforms of party and state institutions had been completed, this was the first time the New Year address addressed the anti-corruption crackdowns.[v] While Beijing has continued the anti-corruption drive against “tigers and small flies” over the last five years, which has implicated several high-ranking officials, the subject has not featured in Xi’s New Year addresses. In the latest iteration, linking national development to the “prosperity of the Party”, Xi’s speech referred to the anti-corruption campaign as “removal of saprophytic muscles to promote self-revolution”.[vi] A possible reason for this prominence is to mobilise popular support by shifting attention away from deficiencies that plague the highest leadership towards the Party’s continuous efforts to improve public accountability.
Finally, the exclusion of certain subjects in the speech was also notable. Amid several declarations regarding China’s position on international issues, there was no statement on arms control and disarmament, or on the control and regulation of AI and other emerging technologies. The absence was particularly striking, given that the White Paper on Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation was released in November 2025, following a 20-year gap. Similarly, although Xi announced the launch of the Global Governance Initiative at the SCO Tianjin Summit in September 2025, there was no mention of the International Organisation for Mediation, which was launched in Hong Kong in May 2025 to resolve international disputes between states and private parties. Likewise, even as Xi applauded Hong Kong’s integration with the mainland under the ‘One Country Two Systems’, there was no word of condolence for the victims of the tragic fire accident that occurred at Wang Fuk Court in late November 2025.
It can be inferred from the above that, in terms of policy focus for 2026, issues related to economic and technological modernisation, party discipline and geopolitical manoeuvring will predominate. To that end, certain instances are already notable. On 3 February 2026, China unveiled a major policy document outlining plans for agricultural and rural modernisation under the 15th Five-Year Plan.[vii] Beijing also doubled down on the advancement of emerging technologies. The Chinese state-backed Super Computing Network began trials of locally made AI computing resources.[viii] The anti-corruption campaign has been intensified, as evidenced by the purging of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.[ix] Similarly, in its diplomatic outreach, Beijing held back-to-back talks with Russia and the US on 4 February to discuss the management of bilateral relations in 2026.[x]
As for the grand narrative the speech seeks to propagate, three primary themes run as a common thread in Xi’s New Year Address.
China’s national image is a key agenda item under Xi Jinping. It is widely held that, despite China’s increased material capabilities and international stature, its image is largely shaped externally by subjective interpretations in the West. Controlling the shaping and dissemination of the country’s national image is regarded as an important component of “discourse power”. Emphasising the importance of this aspect, President Xi, during the 12th collective study session of the 18th CPC Central Committee Political Bureau, urged that the country “must focus on shaping” the national image. He also elaborated on the national image China should strive to build: that of a great civilisation and an eastern power with a clean, people-centric political system, a vibrant economy, social stability, national unity and a clean environment, and as a responsible, socialist major power committed to peaceful and common development.[xi]
In Xi’s New Year speeches, constructing China’s national image is a persistent intent. First, Xi depicts China as governed by a party that is both a strict disciplinarian and a benevolent ruler. This duality emphasises that CPC’s legitimacy is no longer derived solely from economic performance but is also rooted in clean and people-centred governance.[xii] Since Xi came to power in March 2013, a section of the New Year’s address has routinely focused on China’s clean government practices and public accountability. It also aims to inform domestic and international audiences of the CPC’s moral right to lead China. In the 2026 speech, Xi, referring to the Party’s historic purpose, instructed that, “It is necessary to sharpen the original mission, persevere and work for a long time, continue to answer the ‘cave dwelling questions’ in Yan’an, and write the answer sheet of the times worthy of the people”.[xiii]
In addition, Xi promotes a “mass-line” in his New Year addresses, referring to his visits to Chinese provinces and his personal interactions with Chinese citizens regarding their livelihoods and well-being. By sharing these visits, CPC seeks to bolster its claims to people-centric governance that measures economic development through the enhancement of the Chinese individual. Additionally, it portrays Xi as a benevolent ruler mindful of the Chinese public’s daily struggles, thereby framing the CPC as responsive rather than a detached ruling elite.
The second predominant theme in the New Year’s address is China as a flourishing civilisation. This is reflected in high economic growth, technological innovation, military strength and a clean environment, driven by social cohesion and the “tremendous hard work” of people across ethnic lines. The century of national humiliation has always been a dominant theme in China’s political discourse. Under Xi, it has been utilised to advance the narrative of China’s national rejuvenation as a great power. Therefore, Xi’s New Year speeches, even without direct reference to the period of national humiliation, underscore that, despite economic stagnation, technological backwardness, persistent civil strife and weak government structures, economic growth and social development are the “new normal” in China.
Furthermore, by acquiring material capabilities, the country has strengthened its ecological consciousness, ensuring clear skies, clean rivers and thriving grasslands. Thus, the Chinese model of modernisation is considered more environmentally sustainable than the Western model. Accordingly, in his 2026 New Year speech, Xi notes that China’s economic, scientific and technological, and national defence strengths reached new heights, with green mountains and clear waters in the backdrop. He declared that the “thriving China” was made possible through “everyone’s hard work” with people of all ethnicities standing united like “pomegranate seeds”. The New Year addresses do not merely highlight policy successes; by incorporating themes of economic and technological prowess, ecological consciousness and ethnic unity, they present a grand picture of a confident and rejuvenated global power.[xiv]
The second trope is China as a peaceful, responsible power, which seeks to shift the focus from capabilities to intent. In this context, China is not simply a major power amassing material capabilities, but also capable of adopting a more active role on the global stage, influencing the security, economic and political affairs, as Chinese experts recognise that great power status is not conferred solely based on material capabilities but also through demonstrated ability to manage the international order. Accordingly, Xi Jinping’s New Year speeches, in their storytelling style, weave in instances that reinforce China’s commitment to peace and the upholding of the international order.
In this context, the military parades held during commemorative events (traditionally regarded as displays of military strength) are cited each year as evidence of the defensive nature of China’s military power and of peace being innate to Chinese civilisation.[xv] Xi emphasises that the Chinese have sacrificed their lives for peace and China “longs for peace” in a turbulent world. The 2026 New Year’s address states that the grand military parade on the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War will always “inspire” the Chinese people to “treasure peace and create a better future”.[xvi]
Combined with China’s commitment to global peace, the narrative of Beijing’s vision of “building a community with a shared future for mankind”, bolstered by China’s increasing material capabilities, is also promoted to frame China as a responsible stakeholder. Here, China is no longer a passive rule-taker but, strengthened by Chinese-style modernisation, a rule-shaper in global affairs. Its engagements with the international community are portrayed as China’s bid to share the benefits of its development trajectory by striving to create an alternative cooperative security, political and economic order, rather than a zero-sum game. Thus, Chinese development not only drives domestic advancement but also, as a responsible actor, contributes to global stability and prosperity.
The question is whether China has successfully conveyed the desired narrative to its target audience. Since data on public perception in China remain elusive, open-source records of international surveys help underscore several issues. According to the 2025 Global Survey on China’s Image conducted by Global Times Institute across G20, BRICS and ASEAN countries, reported a favourable international image of China with high acceptance of Xi Jinping’s key concepts like, “building a community with a shared future for mankind” and “lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets”, and “strengthening Party discipline in all respects”, “comprehensively deepening reform”, and “putting people first”.[xvii] The survey reported that foreign respondents held positive attitudes towards strict party reforms, economic growth, and their future role in reforming international governance. The state-owned media Xinhua hailed the survey as evidence of international favourability of China’s rise.
The overwhelmingly positive global public opinion evaluation stands in contrast to the Pew Research Centre survey, published in July 2025, which offered a mixed assessment of China and Xi’s international image. It stated that while China is increasingly seen as the world’s top economy, public opinion still prefers strong economic ties with the US over those with China, and views of China and Xi remain broadly negative.[xviii] The contradictory reports highlight the challenges of assessing perceptual issues. It also points to the difficulty of controlling how audiences abroad accept and negotiate the narratives presented, thereby constructing the desired image. However, over the years, China has accelerated and diversified its image-building efforts through diplomatic engagements, development assistance and civilian exchanges. Also, its self-portrayal narrative is shifting from a victim to a more confident position as a peaceful, emerging global power, an active contributor to global governance, and a custodian of the post-Second World War international order.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
[i] “President Xi Jinping Delivered a New Year’s Message for 2026”, Gazette of the State Council, The State Council, People’s Republic of China, 31 December 2025.
[ii] “President Xi Jinping Delivered a New Year’s Message for 2024”, Gazette of the State Council, The State Council, People’s Republic of China, 31 December 2023.
[iii] “President Xi Jinping Delivered a New Year’s Message for 2025”, Gazette of the State Council, The State Council, People’s Republic of China, 31 December 2024.
[iv] “President Xi Jinping Delivered a New Year’s Message for 2026”, no. 1.
[v] “President Xi Jinping Delivered a New Year’s Message for 2020”, Gazette of the State Council, The State Council, People’s Republic of China, 31 December 2019.
[vi] “President Xi Jinping Delivered a New Year’s Message for 2026”, no. 1.
[vii] Ma Tong and Chi Jingyi, “China’s No.1 Central Document in Starting Year of 15th Five-Year Plan Sets Agricultural Modernization Roadmap, Turning Rural Potential into Growth Momentum”, Global Times, 4 February 2026.
[viii] Coco Feng, “China Trials its Largest Locally Made AI Computing Resource in Major Infrastructure Push”, SCMP, 6 February 2026.
[ix] William Zheng, “China’s Top Uniformed Officer Zhang Youxia Among 2 Generals Under Investigation”, SCMP, 24 January 2026.
[x] Richard Connor, “China’s Xi Holds Calls with Trump, and Putin, on Same Day”, DW, 5 February 2026.
[xi] “Xi Jinping: Let The Whole World Hear and Hear China’s Voice”, People’s Daily—Communist Party of China News Network, Qstheory.cn, 11 January 2019.
[xii] Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung, “Has Xi Jinping Made China’s Political System More Resilient and Enduring?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2022.
[xiii] “President Xi Jinping Delivered a New Year’s Message for 2026”, no. 1.
[xiv] Ibid.
[xv] Enrico Gloria, “Why China Parades Power as Peace”, E-International Relations, 14 September 2025.
[xvi] “President Xi Jinping Delivered a New Year’s Message for 2026”, no. 1.
[xvii] “Full Text: Global Survey on Impression and Understanding of China (2025)”, Global Times, 15 January 2026.
[xviii] Laura Silver, Laura Clancy, Jonathan Schulman, William Miner and Christine Huang, “International Views of China Turn Slightly More Positive”, Pew Research Center, 15 July 2025.