Dual Charge – An Opportunity to Fix Financial Management in Defence
Amit Cowshish
March 21, 2017
It is important to restore the functional self-sufficiency of the finance division of a ministry which handles 17-18 per cent of the total central government expenditure so that it could discharge its responsibilities without real or perceived pressures.
In what is clearly a stop-gap arrangement, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley is back to holding additional charge of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the second time in less than three years, following the sudden departure of Manohar Parrikar to head a coalition government in Goa. This has set off speculations about the fate of many reforms that the ministry was supposedly working on before the change of guard. The biggest concern seems to be about the impact of a delay in adopting the strategic partnership policy. This is widely seen as a game changer in so far as defence manufacturing in India is concerned.
This concern seems misplaced. During the debate on MoD’s demands for grant for 2017-18, the Finance Minister informed Lok Sabha earlier last week that 147 contracts worth over Rs 2.96 lakh crore had been signed in the last three years and that 134 proposals worth over Rs 4.45 lakh crore had been approved, of which 100 are aimed at ‘buy and make’ in India. These figures do not suggest that the absence of strategic partners has stymied the procurement process or that the Indian industry continues to be a marginal player.
But these figures do raise the question whether the given level of funding would be adequate to honour the contractual obligations in future, and if not, whether the finance ministry would be in a position to raise it. This is not just about the capital budget. As more and more contracts get signed and new equipment is inducted, more funds will also be required under the revenue segment for its exploitation and maintenance.
As per the finance ministry’s own estimates, while there has been an increase of 4.3 per cent in the revenue expenditure in BE 2017-18 over RE 2016-17, it is expected to increase by about 8 per cent and 11 per cent in 2018-19 and 2019-20 respectively, over the previous year’s estimates.1 This sounds encouraging but for the fact that, as per last year’s Medium Term Fiscal Policy Statement, total defence expenditure, including the capital component, is estimated to be about 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2017-18 and 2018-19.2 This implies that, the overall size of the pie remaining the same, an increase in the revenue expenditure could cut into allocations under the capital segment of the defence budget.
It is doubtful whether procurements are being planned keeping in view the likely availability of funds to meet the cash flow requirement in the coming years. Funds are required not only to discharge the committed liabilities related to already signed contracts but also for signing new contracts. The requirement in the latter category would be of immense proportion if contracts are to be signed for everything that is on the shopping list of the armed forces in a compressed timeframe.
The total value of contracts in respect of 134 proposals, mentioned by the Finance Minister, would be more than Rs 4.45 lakh crore. As of now, this is only the estimated cost of all these proposals. But past experience shows that the contracted value is almost always much higher than the estimated cost, especially if the estimates are based on life-cycle costs.
Not all of these 134 proposals are likely to fructify into contracts, but even if half of them do, it is doubtful whether MoD will still have sufficient cushion in the annual allocations for procurement of various types of aircraft, guns, naval vessels, and other equipment for which approval-in-principle (Approval in principle, or AoN, to use the official jargon) is yet to be accorded. This should be an area of interest for the Finance Minister who is currently in a position to look at the issue from both ends.
The Finance Minister could also make use of the fortuitous opportunity he currently has to set the record straight on reduction of allocation at the revised estimates stage every year. One narrative is that the finance ministry does not let some big ticket procurements go through because it needs to withdraw money at the revised estimates stage to meet the fiscal deficit targets. What lends credence to this narrative is the fact that all acquisition proposals exceeding Rs 2,000 crore (raised from Rs 500 crore in 2017) have to be referred to the finance ministry, whether it is for approval by the finance minister (up to Rs 3,000 crore) or for consultation before any proposal, exceeding Rs 3,000 crore, is placed before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for approval.
The counter-narrative is that the allocation is reduced in the revised estimates only after making a realistic assessment, in consultation with MoD, of what the latter will eventually be able to spend by the end of the given financial year. This has led to the demand for the setting up of a roll-over non-lapsable modernisation fund, into which the unutilised balances could be transferred at the end of the year, to be made use of in future years. This demand is backed by the Standing Committee on Defence and what lends a sense of urgency to it is that, probably under pressure from the committee, MoD has reactivated this proposal and referred it to the Ministry of Finance in February 2017.
The debate concerning the setting up of a non-lapsable fund, which is often conducted in the larger context of civil-military relations, does no good to the image of the country. It will go a long way if the Finance Minister were to settle this issue while he is still in a position to do so as the minister in charge of both the ministries that are a party to the debate.
These issues point to inadequate attention being paid to ensuring efficiency in financial management in defence. Such a situation has come about partly because of the progressive sidelining of the MoD’s integrated finance division, headed by a secretary level officer. This gradual process has culminated in all work relating to general administration in respect of officers and staff of the finance division being transferred to the establishment division of the department of defence, headed by a joint secretary.
The orders issued in this behalf in February 2017 are not in consonance with the scheme under which the then defence division of the finance ministry was transferred to the MoD’s administrative control in 1983 with a clear provision that the officers working in the division will be under the administrative control of the head of the finance division. Not to put too fine a point on it, the absorption of the finance division in the establishment division of the department of defence is evidently not just on account of administrative convenience as mentioned in the February notification.
It is important to restore the functional self-sufficiency of the finance division of a ministry which handles 17-18 per cent of the total central government expenditure so that it could discharge its responsibilities without real or perceived pressures from within MoD. If there are problems with the way the finance division has been functioning – and, undoubtedly, there are many – the remedy lies in fixing the problem and not emasculating the division as such by relegating it to insignificance. This issue merits the attention of the finance minister as much as any other issue that he could possibly attend to, to improve financial management in defence while he is still holding dual charge.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Change of Government in Manipur: Glimmer of Hope or Shivers of Anxiety?
Pradeep Singh Chhonkar
March 20, 2017
It would be prudent for the new state government to re-instil confidence among all parties through a total focus on equitable development in both the Hills and the Valley areas and take all stakeholders on board before undertaking any controversial move.
Commentators see the outcome of the recent Assembly elections in Manipur as an interesting twist and topple story. The party in power fell just short of the required number of seats, despite getting the highest number of seats in the Assembly. But the ruling political party at the centre, which emerged from nowhere, managed to obtain not only a significant vote share but also emerge as the second largest party in the state. And it followed this up with a deft game of forging alliances to gain a majority and staking claim to form the government.
While this may be a routine fallout of elections in any other part of the country, what has happened in Manipur could well have the potential of strongly influencing the situation not only within the State but also in the entire Northeast region. It was generally perceived by the tribal peoples within Manipur that the previous State government, which was not amenable to their demands, aspirations and genuine concerns, was mainly surviving on popularity gained from the large vote-base of non-tribals in the State. But this perception has been disproved by the outcome of the Assembly elections. The new state government, seen as an extension of a “development centric” ruling party at the centre, could be seen as a beaming ray of hope amidst the existent volatility and discontent in the State as well as in the region.
Apparently, the Manipur aspect of the ongoing Naga peace talks had a limited range of options for negotiation since no political consensus could be obtained between New Delhi and Imphal on various proposed arrangements. Further, the long pending demand for upgrading the Hill Area Autonomous District Councils from the charter of the Fifth to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution had consistently been turned down by previous governments in the State. However, the new government may now look at the whole issue differently, more so, after the inclusion of NPF (Naga Peoples Front) members in the State cabinet. The new government’s favourable disposition towards the demand for greater autonomy in the Hill districts, therefore, seems well within reach, albeit at the cost of annoying the ‘hardliner’ Meiteis. Such a decision, however, may not be without its associated problems. The demand for enhanced autonomy in the Naga districts of Manipur is seen by a large cross-section of non-Nagas as a step towards accommodating the demand for ‘Greater Nagalim’, which could eventually lead to tampering with the existing territorial boundaries of the state. This may fuel dissent amongst the Meiteis as well as the Kukis, and could well provide impetus to the simmering discontent among those living in the ‘Valley’ areas to take up the issue of reforming the Manipur Land Reform regulations, which are seen to be discriminatory since the Hill tribes have the provision of owning landed property in the Valley whereas the Valley people do not have similar rights in Hill areas. The consequent resentment amongst the Meiteis could re-energise the Inner Line Permit (ILP) movement and their demand for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status.
The creation of new districts in the State, which was announced by the previous government just prior to the conduct of assembly elections despite strong opposition from Naga socio-political organisations, resulted in an indefinite economic blockade (now called off) within the State. The new government could possibly make an attempt to pacify the prevailing discontent, especially amongst the Nagas. However, any move towards revoking the order that created the new districts could trigger trouble, and may not find support especially from non-Naga alliance partners within the government. But, there remains the likelihood of continued pressure from Naga alliance partners on the new government for withdrawing the said notification. The move of creating the new districts seems highly paradoxical. On the one hand, it is likely to facilitate better governance in remote areas and benefit a great many people. But, on the other hand, it is seen as a deliberate design to undermine Naga aspirations for territorial integrity.
The attempts to promulgate three controversial (‘anti-tribal’) Bills by the previous State government were also not received well by the tribal population in Manipur. This had resulted in large-scale dissent amongst the tribals, and was also viewed by a certain cross-section of ‘non-tribals’ as a “deliberate” political game. Any further move in support of these contested Bills could cause resentment especially among the alliance partners representing the tribal areas, whereas the opposition parties may welcome the step.
The alliance partners in the new government belong to the Naga Peoples’ Front (NPF), National Peoples’ Party (NPP), All India Trinamool Congress (AITC), Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) and an Independent Candidate. They all have divergent ideologies from that of the ruling BJP. It would be an uphill task for the new government to sustain a stable configuration for long, as dissent by even a single partner has the potential to bring down the government. Strong and decisive governance under such circumstances, with so many complicated issues at hand could turn out to be extremely challenging for the new leadership. It would, therefore, be prudent for the new government to re-instil confidence among all parties through a total focus on equitable development in both the Hills and the Valley areas and take all stakeholders on board before undertaking any controversial move.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Increased security cooperation and the potential for cooperation in the Middle East peace process are likely to be the key areas of discussion during the impending visit of King Abdullah to India.
Described as preparatory to a state visit by King Abdullah II, the recent discussions between Fayez Tarawneh—Chief of the royal Court of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan—and the Indian leaders reveal an interesting pattern. Breaking from normal protocol, Tarawneh met the Vice-President and Prime Minister and made a courtesy call on the President, thereby indicating the importance that both the countries attach to Jordan. Even more interesting was his meeting with former Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval.
Until two years ago, India’s security related engagements in the Middle East largely revolved around counter-terrorism cooperation with Israel and extradition of suspected terrorists from countries such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). Since the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to UAE in August 2015, a different template is emerging in India’s engagements with the Middle East. Cooperation in a host of security issues such as terrorism, cyber security, terror finance, protection of sea lanes of communication, intelligence sharing and coordination in fighting extremism have been highlighted during Modi’s meetings with leaders of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar. One can safely argue that security would be a major component in India’s engagements with Jordan and would be consecrated during the impending visit of King Abdullah.
This also indicates a paradigm shift in India’s perception of the Hashemite kingdom. Due to their different worldviews, bilateral engagements were minimal during the Cold War. While King Hussein visited in India in December 1963, Vice-President Zakir Hussein visited Jordan in May 1965 and offered prayers in Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest shrine in Islam, when it was under Jordanian rule. An Indian state visit to the Kingdom, however, had to wait until October 2015 when President Pranab Mukherjee visited Jordan as well as Palestine and Israel. No Indian prime minister had ever visited Amman. Minimal trade ties (currently at about USD two billion) and absence of incentives such as energy security, expatriate labourers and remittances kept Jordanians from the Indian radar screen.
Two crucial politico-strategic developments have, however, pushed Jordan to the forefront. During his visit, President Mukherjee described the Hashemite Kingdom as an ‘oasis of peace’ and this was not an exaggeration. Since the outbreak of popular protests starting December 2010, a number of Arab countries have been in turmoil and political instability has become endemic in many countries. In some countries there was a regime change but countries like Libya, Syria and Yemen have plunged into civil war. The collapse of the state in Iraq and Syria was partly responsible for the onset of religious extremism and birth of the Islamic Caliphate or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or daesh as it is commonly referred to in the Arab world.
Since the birth of the Jordanian emirate in the 1920s, the Hashemites have been fighting various forms of extremism. If al-Qaeda was the enemy during the past decade, daesh has emerged as the new adversary. Some of the terror attacks in Jordan in recent months have been linked to ISIS and related radical Islamist groups. Partly due to fears of infiltration by ISIS elements, Jordan has regulated and even barred the entry of Syrian refugees into the country. While UN agencies like United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have put the number of registered Syrian refugees at 657,000, Jordanian officials claim that the country is hosting more than a million (1.4 million) refugees.
Thus, fighting the ISIS it not a choice but a necessity and a survival imperative for Jordan. Indeed, before ascending the throne in June 1999, Abdullah was commanding the Jordanian Special Forces. Hence, unlike other leaders of the region, the Jordanian monarch has a professional understanding of the problems of militant extremism and its ramifications. Consequently, intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation and combating radicalism would be key areas of cooperation between India and Jordan in the coming years.
Secondly, like India, the Hashemites also have a delicate relationship with Israel and Palestine. Historically, geo-political compulsions and regional rivalry resulted in the Hashemites viewing Israel as a benign and friendlier power. Since the late 1940s, there were clandestine but close relations between the two leaderships. The June War of 1967, when Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel, was a notable exception to that bonhomie even though formal relations had to wait until the Oslo accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by Yasser Arafat. The Israel-Jordan peace treaty concluded in 1994 grants the Hashemites special status over Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem.
At the same time, there is a substantial Palestinian population in Jordan including 2.2 million registered as refugees by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). This segment of population often has a tremendous influence upon Jordanian choices. For example, partly due to domestic compulsions in 1990, King Hussein was compelled to side with Saddam Hussein when the Iraqi ruler annexed Kuwait. The Palestinian population is also more vocal in the internal opposition to full normalization of relations with Israel. In recent months, Amman has been part of a four-member Arab quartet (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE being the other three) trying to mediate among different factions of Fatah for selecting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s successor. Thus, Jordan purses a delicate policy vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine.
This Jordanian posture is not different form India’s, which too seeks to maintain its historic ties with the Palestinians amidst the emerging bonhomie with Israel. Since the normalization of relations with Israel in 1992, visits by Indian leaders to Israel have also included visits to Palestine. This practice was continued during the visit of President Mukherjee in October 2015 and of External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in January 2016. During both visits, Indian leaders also visited Jordan. Thus, Jordan has emerged not only as a transit point of India’s engagements with Israel and Palestine but also as a potential bridge. This manifested clearly during the President’s visit when Mukherjee was able to underscore India’s traditional positions towards the Arab world more forcefully in Amman than in Ramallah or Jerusalem. Interestingly, in his earlier avatar, Tarawneh handled the Jordanian peace treaty with Israel.
Thus, increased security cooperation and the potential for cooperation in the Middle East peace process are likely to be the key areas of discussion during the impending visit of King Abdullah to India.
Manjari Singh is a doctoral candidate and Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF) Fellow at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad: Timely, but Unlikely to Succeed
Nazir Ahmad Mir
March 17, 2017
Will the Pakistani civilian leadership cease to placate the Islamist forces for their own electoral gain? Will the Army rein in the jihadis it has been using to retain “strategic depth” in Afghanistan?
Pakistan has, of late, witnessed a sudden spurt in terror attacks. These were, in many ways, unprecedented. Targets were mostly public places and the majority of those killed were civilians. The series of blasts and suicide bombings engulfed the whole of Pakistan, including Punjab: Mall Road, Lahore; Mohmand Agency in FATA; the Sufi shrine in Sehwan; and Awara, Balochistan. Of these, the suicide bomber who blew himself up at the dhamaal celebrations in the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, Sindh and killed over 90 people according to reports, was the most dreadful. In the month of November 2016, a similar kind of attack (either by a suicide bomber or through remote controlled IED) was carried out when the dhamaal was being performed at the shrine of Shah Norani in Khuzdar district of Balochistan; at least 52 were killed and over 100 injured.
The latest spate of terrorist incidents, in which over 150 people were killed, have forced the Pakistani civilian and military leaderships to re-visit what Husain Haqqani called “the complex strategic partnership between political Islamists and Pakistan’s military establishment” which, in his view expressed in 2016, was “far from over”.1 The attacks have impelled the state to take action (again) against home-grown terrorists. Apparently, after vacillating for a long time, the Pakistani civilian and military leaderships have come on one page to take on terrorists of all kinds. Many political commentators in Pakistan had argued that the National Action Plan (NAP) was not implemented in its entirety and many groups were left untouched during the earlier operation against terrorists. With Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad now in full swing, there are many in Pakistan who would doubt whether the state is really intent on clamping down on the so-called “friendly” terror outfits, who have been used as assets by the military for decades.
Divided Society
A majority of the Pakistani population follows a tolerant version of Islam, which remains vulnerable to attack by radical Islamists who regard moderate Islam as bidat¸ which is antagonistic to the spirit of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Unfortunately, the radical groups have been allowed by state institutions, the military in particular, to flourish as “strategic” assets over time “to influence domestic politics and support the military’s political dominance”.2
This trend was visible in the assassination of Salman Taseer, for his act of speaking in support of a Christian woman who was being prosecuted under the country’s infamous blasphemy law, by his security guard, Mumtaz Qadri. Qadri was lionized by the radical outfits. And after his execution by the military court, his funeral was attended by a record crowd who hailed him as a martyr who died for the sake of Islam. A shrine is now being raised above Qadri’s grave.3 Hundreds visit this spot to seek blessings. Interestingly, Qadri belonged to the Barelvi sect, which is conventionally regarded as propagating a moderate and eclectic version of Islam. Ironically, the Wahhabis (and to certain extent Deobandis), who are puritanical in their outlook and more hard-line in their approach to safeguarding Islam, consider Barelvi eclecticism as un-Islamic. The zeal to protect Islam, in the face of real or imagined danger, has induced hard-line sentiments into the minds of liberal Muslims in Pakistan. One of the prominent Urdu dailies carried a long report recently arguing that the troubles being faced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (read Panama leaks) were caused because he allowed the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, the beloved of Prophet Muhammad.4
The use of “Islamic ideology” and the Islamists by the Pakistani political and military leaderships has had hideous impact on the country. It has led to the notion of good and bad terrorists, which remains at the centre of the country’s political discourse. For instance, Hafiz Saeed has been sometimes patronised by the state and at other times “home-arrested”, which the Defence Minister of the country has claimed was done “in the larger interests of the country”.5
However, this position of the government faces a serious contestation from the constituency that Hafiz Saeed has been allowed to carve out over the years. For example, one commentator recently criticized the Defence Minister openly in an Urdu daily thus: “Mr. Asif should not have said that Hafiz Saeed’s arrest was in national interest. … Hafiz Saeed’s arrest is a punishment for his support to the Kashmiris.”6 Going further, the spokesperson of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) reacted to Asif’s statement saying that some people in the government itself were a threat to the country, not Hafiz Saeed.
Even the civilian leadership in Pakistan is a victim of such a good-bad terrorist categorisation. When the inquiry committee report on the Quetta blasts of August 2016 questioned the role of the interior ministry, the Interior Minister was quick to demonise the writer of the report. Defending his meeting with Ahmad Ludhianvi, chief of the proscribed anti-Shi’ite Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat group, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan said in parliament that a distinction between terrorists and Islamist radicals should be maintained.
Will the Operation Succeed?
Against this backdrop, the question that remains imperative for defeating the emboldened terrorists in Pakistan, who have openly threatened further attacks in future in a video released by Jamaat-ul Ahrar, is how comprehensive and intensive Operation “Radd-ul-Fassad” is going to be? Is it a serious all-out operation to defeat not only the active terrorists but the potential breeding-ground of extremism in Pakistan? Or is it a half-hearted move taken in haste to avert public pressure for some time like Operation “Zarb-e-Azb”, which has turned out to be largely a failure at the end. Will the distinction between good and bad Islamists continue to characterise the socio-political discourse in Pakistan?
Operation “Radd-ul-Fasaad” was launched immediately after the latest series of terror attacks. It is meant to rout the radicals who managed to escape “Zarb-e-Azb” and continue to carry out attacks, killing their co-religionists inside Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has emphasised that the battle with terrorists is the battle between right and wrong, which Pakistan cannot afford to lose. He has promised that the operation would be carried out impartially. The Sharif government has called upon the Ulema to find out if it is possible to re-think, at least, the use of Islam for political violence.7 However, Sharif is unlikely to succeed in this regard as he has to confront the religious leadership, which is mostly orthodox.
Further, the earlier operation (Zarb-e-Azb) does not offer much hope for analysts to come to a favourable conclusion. It was initially meant for six months but has dragged on for years. Even after two years, it has not been able to “break the backbone” of terrorism in Pakistan, as was intended by the Army. It has displaced thousands of people and failed to contain the terror elements targeting the Pakistani state. It appears now that the civilian and military leaderships have come to the conclusion that to defeat terror they will have to stop what the political commentator Saleem Safi recently called “use of religion for political and strategic purposes”8 through non-state actors.
There are some inherent constraints that may impede the pace of the operation. Having launched the operation, will the civilian leadership cease to placate the Islamist forces for their own electoral and political gain? Will the Army rein in the jihadis it has been using to retain its “strategic depth” in Afghanistan? Saleem Safi has argued that governments in Pakistan have been overlooking the real causes of terrorism in the country. Unless and until, Safi emphasised, these causes are identified and eliminated, terrorism would keep haunting the country. In a similar vein, Najam Sethi has questioned the wisdom of supporting “some groups” engaged in militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. Sethi would doubt whether the state would act against such elements at all.
For fighting terrorism in Pakistan, the civil and military leaderships will have to bring about a radical change in their foreign policy and security outlook. The Army holds the key to Pakistan’s transformation. It has huge stakes invested in the use of Islam for “strategic” purposes. It remains to be seen, whether it will change its course under Qamar Ahmad Bajwa. If it does not, its future appears doomed.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Haqqani, Husain, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, 2nd Edition, Viking, India, 2016, p. x.
In respect of trade and commerce, some uncertainties are looming over both US-German relations and US-EU relations.
Chancellor Angela Merkel will be engaging in her first substantive summit discussions with President Donald Trump shortly. Both countries are at a sensitive stage in their bilateral relationship. Merkel, a popular, liberal-minded and detail-oriented leader of a cautious and controlled demeanour, has had skirmishes in the recent past with Trump who has a contrasting disposition in the public domain on policy issues and values. It will be noteworthy to observe whether the outcome of the Trump-Merkel summit leads to a realistic appraisal of the prospects and limitations of the US-German relationship, and a modicum of parallelism if not convergence can be achieved as during the Bush and Obama years. Except for the dissonance in US-German relations consequent on Chancellor Schroeder criticizing America’s intervention in Iraq, bilateral relations have been on a balanced and mutually sustaining path. And historically, US-German relations have been a significant factor in the trans-Atlantic partnership both in the economic and security realms.
Trump’s posture during the campaign and even thereafter has struck discordant notes to an extent, especially his demand for higher financial commitment from European partners and concomitantly lesser US involvement in European defence and security matters. But his Defence Secretary George Mattis has provided a corrective by stating that NATO remains the cornerstone of the West’s defence vis-à-vis Russia and in the international strategic milieu. In respect of trade and commerce, however, some uncertainties are looming over both US-German relations as well as US-EU relations.
As far as reducing the US financial contribution to NATO and consequently pressing for an increase in German and other NATO members’ contribution to the trans-Atlantic alliance is concerned, the matter may not be susceptible to an easy resolution. Merkel is likely to resist US pressures in this regard. The fact of the matter is that, the respective shares of USA and Germany to NATO`s budget are 22 and 15 per cent, respectively. At Euro 36 billion in 2015, the German share has not been unreasonably low. According to NATO Secretary General’s report of 2015, the per capita contribution of USA and Germany stood at USD 1865 and 521, respectively. While Merkel may be willing to increase Germany`s financial contribution to NATO, and perhaps augment its commitment on personnel (as on 7 January 2017, Germany fielded 180,000 troops vis-à-vis 1,311,000 by USA, 201,700 by France and 182,000 by Italy), she and the leaders of other major alliance partners may not accept a reduction in US commitment on finances and personnel.
It is to be seen how Trump balances out USA`s global interests and commitments to European security through NATO with Germany playing a more dominant part strategically. A greater German role may be inevitable given the strength of the German economy and Britain`s prospective exit from the European Union and the possibility of a reduction in London`s financial support to NATO. Trump may be realistic enough to appreciate the force multiplier effect of NATO assets and their dispositions vis-à-vis USA`s strategic interests in unstable regions like the Middle East and even in the Balkans.
Trump and Merkel hold substantively differing views on immigration, protection of refugees, deportation of Muslims from USA, and their rehabilitation under special circumstances in Europe, etc. Without directly criticising the latest ban imposed by the Trump administration on the entry of Muslims from select countries, Merkel has continued to express her views espousing support for providing succour and rehabilitation to Muslims fleeing conflict zones such as Syria. While Trump had observed that Merkel`s decision is a catastrophic mistake, Merkel had called for adherence to the UN Convention on Refugees.
In the economic realm, reckoning the fundamentals of their relationship, Trump may find it difficult to alter its present content. His `make America great again` slogan, if implemented to the extent of restricting German investments and exports to USA, with the objective of promoting American domestic industry and employment, may only be counterproductive. German investment in USA is significant amounting to USD 255 billion, and generates nearly 700,000 jobs through US affiliates of German firms. Any disincentive by way of additional fiscal measures by USA on repatriation of profits, higher taxation on German investments, etc. will attract countervailing action by Germany and may adversely impact US exports to Germany valued at approximately USD 50 billion as well as the US domestic industry and the employment scenario. Impediments on German investments in USA may also induce diversion in the flow of German capital and enterprises to Latin America and Africa where Berlin may have long-term economic interests and compete with US interests.
Notwithstanding the above, Trump will try to redress the continuing adverse US-German trade balance on commodities, which reached nearly USD 50 billion by January 2017. Trump has been able to drum up domestic support on the premise that the trade deficit is a threat to US security and prosperity. It is to be seen how Trump manages to increase the prospects of USA`s domestic manufacturing industry and enhance exports to Germany within the framework of an open and expanding world economy. He may also not be naïve to forego the benefits such as the provision of national treatment to US investors in Germany under the existing USA-Germany Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation by forcing its modification and resorting to restrictive fiscal and trade measures. An accusation levelled by Trump and his business associates to the effect that manipulation of the value of the Euro has boosted German exports may be strongly rebutted by Merkel. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble has already attributed the changes in the value of the Euro to economic factors outside Berlin’s control. A prudent alternative for Trump would be to work to make major US exports such as civilian aircraft and their engines as well as automobiles more competitive instead of distorting or altering the existing framework of cooperation pertaining to US-German investment and trade.
Merkel has been more true to her liberal democratic credentials than many European leaders. These have been borne out by her stance on issues like countering political extremism at home and abroad, offering protection to refugees fleeing from terror, and opposing Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The exception has been the Greek financial liquidity crises since 2010, in regard to which Merkel`s government has been insisting on the implementation of a stiff International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed economic bailout package which has only served to undermine various progressive socio-economic measures.
It is unlikely that Trump and Merkel would have a complete convergence of views and postures particularly over refugee rehabilitation in Europe, international efforts to regulate environmental pollution, and reform of the United Nations and especially the Security Council, to flag a few such issues. While agreement may be achieved on countering the sources of extremism such as ISIS in the Middle-East, it is likely that differences would remain on promoting Palestinian statehood. It has been reported that Trump is likely to probe Merkel on the most effective policy for dealing with Putin over a range of issues without entailing a higher economic burden on USA or extended military force deployments. Shades of differences may persist in their respective approaches to dealing with Putin, the Crimea issue and appraisal of sanctions on Russia imposed after the latter`s annexation of Crimea. Nonetheless, the bilateral dialogue may initiate the process of a better understanding of Trump`s inclinations and German compulsions at the strategic level in relation to central and eastern Europe and Russia. Trump may also appreciate the benefit of incremental changes to the existing USA-Germany bilateral trade and commerce-related institutions for mutual benefit.
A realistic dialogue process may also ensue on a reappraisal of the sharing mechanism for financial support to NATO including a cost-effective implementation of the force Readiness Action Plan formulated after the NATO Wales summit in 2015. It is also possible that Germany`s geostrategic position in Europe apropos Russia, its economic growth and resilience, as well as diverse and accommodative relations with an array of middle powers like India, Japan and some of the African and western hemispheric countries will influence Trump to give due weightage to Merkel, particularly when she is expected to lead her Christian Democratic Union and Christian Socialist Party coalition to victory in the September 2017 national elections.
The author, a retired IDAS officer, has served in senior positions in the Governments of India and a State Government.
Defence Expenditure: A Challenge for Defence Economists
Amit Cowshish
March 14, 2017
The basic challenge for defence economists is to demonstrate that there are other feasible ways of skinning the cat during budget formulation. But the challenge is also inextricably linked with the need for rationalisation of defence expenditure.
The only sub-theme that vies for pride of place alongside the debate on the alleged shenanigans of an inept civilian bureaucracy is the gross inadequacy of defence outlays. Governments have come and gone since 1947, but the sluggish trajectory of annual defence budgets continues, interrupted only by pay commissions and wars. It does not require any great power of prophesy to rule out a steep hike in the defence budget in the coming years. The history of the defence budget over the past seven decades should be enough to drive home this truth.
More specifically, the growth in annual defence allocations since 2014 only indicates that it is naive to expect that the gap between the demand projected by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the actual allocations made for defence in the union budget will soon be a thing of the past.
Defence analysts never tire of mentioning the year 2004 when the then outgoing government made a provision for a defence modernisation fund in the interim budget, seen till date as a bold step to address the problems besetting the modernisation of the armed forces. But it is the same political dispensation which, despite being in power now for almost three years, not only has not revived the defence modernisation fund but has also failed to cut the mustard when it comes to raising the defence expenditure.
There is a continuous lament over inadequate funding and this is invariably attributed to politicians and bureaucrats, widely believed to be impervious to the imperatives of defence and security of the country. Apart from being an unfair characterisation, this has served no purpose all these years and is unlikely to be much help in future.
If anything, this narrative has crowded out the academic discussion on how much should be allocated for defence and, more importantly, how could the government of the day meet the expectations of the defence establishment without an adverse impact on other competing sectors, such as health, education and infrastructure.
The dominant view among the strategic studies community in the country is that the defence budget should be pegged at a minimum of three per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Going by this benchmark and without questioning its basis, the defence allocation for 2017-18 should be approximately Rs 2,31,310 crore more than the amount actually allocated in the union budget, excluding defence pensions for which a sum of Rs 85,737 crore has been allocated separately.
This is a huge gap to cover, especially if the fiscal and revenue deficit targets are to be met. The gap cannot also apparently be bridged just by reducing expenditure on other sectors. On the face of it, the government will have to raise its income substantially to be able to almost double the allocation for defence to reach the three per cent of GDP mark. Governments have evidently not been up to this task either because of the serious political cost of raising income through taxation or for other inexplicable reasons. This is where defence economists, and even think tanks, need to step in and suggest a pragmatic way out.
The question that arises every year when the union budget is analysed in seminars and in the media, but remains unanswered, is whether the Finance Minister could actually allocate more funds for defence without, at the same time, causing an adverse impact on other sectors, assuming no positive change in the estimated income. The alternate question would be whether the minister had more options for raising governmental revenues to the extent that allocation for defence could be raised substantially, if not to the extent of three per cent of GDP, without facing any difficulty in giving a rational explanation for rejecting the demand from other sectors for higher allocations.
To answer both the above questions, defence economists will have to deal with a more fundamental set of questions. What should be the pragmatically ideal level of funding? Whether the defence allocation should be fixed at a certain percentage of GDP? If so why? Or, would it be enough to meet the requirement projected by the MoD, irrespective of how much it works out to in terms of percentage of GDP and regardless of the method of costing adopted for working out the requirement.
The basic challenge for defence economists is to demonstrate that there are other feasible ways of skinning the cat during budget formulation. But the challenge is also inextricably linked with the need for rationalisation of defence expenditure, especially if manpower costs cannot be contained in any substantial measure.
There are indeed other steps, such as the creation of joint logistics and theatre commands that could potentially bring down costs and increase operational efficiency. But the thrust for these measures is unlikely to come from within the services or from the political class, unless independent and objective analyses by defence economists points to the imperative of adopting these measures and throws up a roadmap for bringing about these seminal changes.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Sri Lanka’s Fighter Selection – An Opportunity for India
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj
March 10, 2017
From all angles – political, economic, diplomatic and military – India is in a position to meet the SLAF’s potential combat aircraft requirements.
In August 2016, the Sri Lankan government made the announcement that it was seeking to procure between eight and 12 combat aircraft to replace its ageing air force assets. While there has been much speculation about Sri Lanka’s choice – with the Sino-Pak JF-17 reportedly being strongly pushed by Pakistan – it is suggested that this selection process can offer India a unique opportunity both to strengthen military ties with Sri Lanka as well as to make a breakthrough into the aviation export market.
The Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) is facing the prospect of being without a single combat aircraft, despite operating a force with three dedicated combat aircraft squadrons – No.5 with F-7G, the No. 10 with the Kfir C.2/7, and No. 12 with the MiG-27M. The Sri Lankan government revealed that, by August 2016, only a single Kfir (out of seven survivors) was operational, while none of the F.7Gs and MiG-27Ms were operational.1 Cabinet Spokesman and Parliamentary Reforms and Media Minister Gayantha Karunathilaka expressed the situation in stark terms:
“At the moment, only one Kfir aircraft – the remaining six aircrafts cannot be used. We have seven MIG aircrafts and eight other aircrafts but none of them can be used. The Government will consider all offers and select a suitable one…”2
While the government’s official position is that the fleet requirements have not yet been finalized, it is apparent that the SLAF is seeking multi-role combat aircraft to replace its current fleet.3 Aircraft manufacturers will be courting the SLAF. With the JF-17 being pushed strongly, one may soon witness the Russians and Swedes entering the fray with a variant of either the MiG-29 or the Su-27 and the Gripen, respectively. For its part, India may be in a position to use its unique diplomatic and geographic proximity to offer two products – the Tejas and the Advanced Hawk – as possible contenders to meet the SLAF requirement.
It should be noted that India’s foray into military aviation exports has been plagued by missteps, shortfalls in support and poor communications. The sale of Dhruv helicopters to Ecuador was widely hailed, and rightly so, as a major breakthrough for Indian arms export. However, after a number of crashes (several of which were caused by pilot error), the helicopters were withdrawn from use, citing, among other things, poor spares support from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).4 The sale of Chetaks to Suriname was plagued by poor contract management and “financial and administrative obstacles”, which led to the helicopters being ready long before pilots were ready to be trained, leading to a delay in delivery of the helicopters.5 Subsequent supplies of aircraft have been gifts or heavily discounted sales of Chetak and Dhruv helicopters and Dornier Do-228 surveillance aircraft to the Maldives, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Nepal and Bhutan.
Yet, unlike sales to Ecuador and Suriname, India is geographically proximate to Sri Lanka and, if an Indian choice is made, use can be made of Indian Air Force support facilities. Furthermore, India has had a somewhat low-key but nonetheless important role in equipping the SLAF. In the past, India had provided 24 L-70 guns, 24 battle-field surveillance radars, 11 upgraded Super Fledermaus radars, four Indra- I & II radars and 10 mine-protected vehicles to assist in the defence of SLAF air bases. These proved useful against air attack by the former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’s air wing consisting of armed microlight aircraft as well as from LTTE infiltrators.6 India is already a major supplier to the Sri Lankan Navy with two 105m Offshore Patrol Vessels under construction at Goa.7
Should the SLAF desire a supersonic multi-role aircraft, India’s Tejas Mk.1, despite its still being in the developmental phase, could be a viable option. The aircraft has already demonstrated significant capabilities in the air-to-air and air-to-ground roles and the limited number of aircraft being sought by the SLAF lends itself to relatively easy accommodation with HAL’s production schedule and capacity. Moreover, as the Indian Air Force will be undertaking training and conversion activities with the type, Sri Lanka could benefit from this process.
On the other hand, if the SLAF is seeking a cost-effective multi-role aircraft with a relatively low operating cost – and is willing to forego the “prestige” of supersonic aircraft - then the BAE-HAL Advanced Hawk has the potential to meet this requirement. The Advanced Hawk has significant combat capabilities with provision for Brimstone air-to-ground missiles and ASRAAM air-to-air missiles.8 As a subsonic aircraft with a dual training role, the operating costs of the Advanced Hawk would inevitably be lower than any supersonic combat aircraft while still offering substantial combat capability. This combination of capability and cost-effectiveness is an important consideration given the SLAF’s problems with its existing combat assets and the acquisition and operating costs of modern supersonic aircraft.9 In addition, the large fleet of BAE Hawks operated by the Indian Air Force and the strong overhaul and maintenance facilities available in India could make the Advanced Hawk attractive to the SLAF.
If India is desirous of securing this order, it must not treat it as a purely transactional arrangement. The export of Indian combat aircraft would be a major step forward for Indian arms exports and, as such, India should be flexible in respect of prices. India should also not hesitate to offer attractive financing packages and lines of credit at low interest rates to encourage Sri Lanka to “buy Indian” – the lack of such packages reportedly playing a role in the SLAF declining a Pakistani offer of the JF-17.10
From all angles – political, economic, diplomatic and military – India is in a position to meet the SLAF’s potential combat aircraft requirements. It is a rare confluence of circumstances that has the potential to operate in India’s favour if the Indian political, bureaucratic and military-industrial leadership has the will and desire to see a sale of Indian combat aircraft to Sri Lanka become a reality.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
North Korea has blatantly breached the chemical weapons ‘red line’ in the killing of the half-brother of Kim Jong-un in Kuala Lumpur on February 13.
Post the 2003 Iraq war, the debate regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was confined mostly to the realm of nuclear weapons for more than a decade. The perception that WMDs are not for actual use but for deterrence broadly continues to hold in the post Cold War period too. However, it is also a fact that certain categories of WMD like chemical weapons (CW) have been used during the Cold War. In the post Cold War era too, the Syrian conflict and the alleged use of CW to kill the half-brother of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un in Malaysia continues to shine a spotlight on the dangers of the use of such weapons.
In the post 9/11 period, it was professed that the major threat in the realm of WMDs could emerge mainly from the international terror groups. The use of CW in Syria in August 2013 however dealt a blow to this thinking. It was confirmed by the United Nations that the CW were used at a location called Ghouta (suburb in Damascus), killing nearly 1,500 civilians. These weapons were found used at few other locations in Syria during earlier occasions too. President Barack Obama had asserted in 2012 that any possible usage of chemical weapons would amount to crossing a ‘red line’, which would invite a US military response. The military intervention by the US forces in Syria did happen few months after the use of CW by the Syrian forces (or by rebel forces as claimed by the Assad regime).1 CW were also used as the bargaining tools in the West Asian geo-political theatre. One of the reasons for Libya to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by declaring its weapons stockpile during 2004 was Gaddafi’s desperation to normalise relations with the Western world.
North Korea has blatantly breached the CW ‘red line’ in a very peculiar manner in the latest incident. Kim Jong-nam was killed on February 13 at Kuala Lumpur airport while he was waiting to catch a flight. Two women wiped a substance on his face leading to his death within 20 minutes. It has been found that the substance used for this killing was a nerve agent called VX. This agent is considered as one of the most potent chemicals which affects the nervous system and disturbs the functioning of human muscles eventually leading to death. This substance is derived from organophosphate pesticides and its lethal dose ranges from about 10 milligrams via skin contact to 25-30 milligrams, if inhaled.2 This substance has been classified by the United Nations as a WMD.
The attack was a bit of a surprise as Pyongyang had not given any indications regarding a renewed interest in CW. For more than a decade now, North Korea has been attracting global attention by undertaking nuclear tests and launching missiles. They have also undertaken few satellite launches by using their own rockets. By successfully orchestrating an assassination by using CW, North Korea has succeeded in sending a message that they are not averse to using the WMD in their possession. Kim Jong-un is keen to ensure that no challenge emerges to his position from his extended family. From the North Korean point of view, the use of VX agent was a perfect choice, because this agent is known to cause instant death.
The most appalling aspect of the killing was that though the victim died within about 20 minutes, nothing is known to have happened to the women who were seen to have used their hands to apply the VX agent on the face of the victim. This clearly indicates that some successful method has been devised to protect the women from the dangerous affects of the nerve agent. Also, the production of VX is not a simple task and requires a lot of technological sophistication. The major question which remains unanswered though is the manner in which the deadly CW reached Malaysia.
North Korea is alleged to have the world's third-largest stockpile of CW. They are known to have produced agents like Sarin, VX, Mustard, Tabun and Hydrogen Cyanide. North Korea is one of the three states (apart from Egypt and Sudan) that has not signed or acceded to the CWC. It is believed to be producing CW since the 1980s and is now estimated to have stockpiles of around 25 chemical agents amounting to approximately 5,000 tons. North Korea is also known to have made investments in biological weapons, and believed to be having 12-13 types of biological weapons, including anthrax, plague, among others.3
North Korea has taken the biggest of political risks by using CW at this point in time and that too in a friendly foreign state. North Korea and Malaysia established bilateral relationship more than 45 years ago. Both the states opened embassies at Kuala Lumpur and Pyongyang in 2003. Since 2009, Malaysians did not require a visa to travel to North Korea (and vice versa). After the airport incident, North Koreans are now required to obtain a visa to visit Malaysia.
The incident is also spoiling the important relationship that Pyongyang shares with its all-weather friend, China. Beijing has been extremely upset with the brazen missile testing undertaken by North Korea in recent times. China, which was importing coal from North Korea in spite of the UN sanctions, decided to suspend all imports on February 19. For the Trump administration, dealing with North Korea will continue to be a major challenge. The CWC, considered one of the most successful arms control treaty mechanisms in the world and which would be celebrating its twenty years of existence in April 2017, continues to face serious challenges even today.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Russia’s Policy Shift towards Taliban and Pakistan
Manabhanjan Meher
March 01, 2017
Russia’s efforts to differentiate between the Islamic State and Taliban are a mistake given that both groups share a similar ideology, albeit with slight variations.
For the second time in the last few months, Russia hosted a Conference on Afghanistan in Moscow on February 15, 2017, this time with an expanded representation of six countries – Russia itself, Iran, China, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Interestingly, a key player, the United States, which still maintains 9,800 troops to support the Afghan government’s counter-insurgency efforts against the Taliban, has been kept out of the meeting. But for its part, the US appears to be contemplating an increase in its military commitment, with its commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson, advocating to the Senate Armed Services Committee recently that “a few thousand" more NATO trainers are needed to break the stalemate against the Taliban.1India welcomed the Moscow meeting which brought together countries that have stakes in Afghanistan’s peace and security. However, raising concerns on the Russia-led efforts for talks with the Taliban, External Affairs Ministry Spokesman Vikas Swarup noted that “We underlined that it is up to the government of Afghanistan to decide whom to engage in direct talks.”2
The two regional meetings (the first was held in December 2016) represent Russia’s first post-Soviet attempt to replay the Afghan game and that too in a big way. However, in contrast to the Soviet motivation of propping up the communist government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against a growing insurgency in December 1979, the Russian interest in Afghanistan now is the prevention of the growth and influence of the Islamic State (IS), which, in turn, may have a negative fallout on the security of Central Asia. A further Russian motive in Afghanistan appears to be aimed at keeping the US out of the region.
This major shift in Russia’s Afghanistan policy came immediately after it expressed concerns about the possibility of Afghanistan turning into a safe sanctuary for the Islamic State militants fleeing from Iraq and Syria.3 Speaking at the ‘Heart of Asia’ conference held in Amritsar on December 5, 2016, Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, described the Islamic State as being more dangerous than the Taliban. And three days later, on December 8, 2016, the Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan stated that “Our concern is that Daesh not only threatens Afghanistan, but it is also a potent threat to Central Asia, Pakistan, China, Iran, India and even Russia. We have ties with the Taliban to ensure the security of our political offices, consulates and the security of central Asia.”4
Incontrast, Ahmad Murid Partaw, former Afghan National RepresentativetoUS CENTCOM, asserted that the presence of the IS in Afghanistan has been overemphasized by Russia, China and Iran as a pretext not only to intervene in the country's affairs but also to counter the growing influence of the US in the region. He further stated that “the Af-Pak region is not a suitable ground for proliferation of such rejectionist beliefs enforced by IS and its supporters. This region has been influenced by the Deobandi school of Islam rather than Takfiri version.”5
During the latter half of the 1990s, Russia accused the Taliban of training Chechen rebels and fomenting Central Asian radical Islamic networks. As a result, Russia, in collaboration with Iran and India, supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime. Today, Russia no longer views the Taliban as a major threat to its security and interests. There is even a suspicion among Afghan political leaders and officials that Russia is militarily helping the Taliban, with parliamentarians alleging in the upper house that Russia is supplying arms to the Taliban. However, Russian officials have dismissed such Afghan claims and suspicions. They have said that “We have never ever provided any kind of assistance to Taliban. Instead, Russia is assisting the Afghan government and has provided some light weapons on grant basis to its forces and is running programs to train Afghan police and military personnel in Russian institutions.”6
For its part, the Taliban has begun to respond favourably to Moscow’s outreach. Syed Muhammad Akbar Agha, a former Taliban commander who lives in Kabul and still espouses Islamic rule in Afghanistan, said in an interview toKomsomolskaya Pravda that “We are ready to shake hands with Russia in order to rid ourselves of the scourge of America.” He further noted that “history has proven that we are closer to Russia and the former Soviet republics than to the West.”7
It seems clear that Russia and the Taliban share common concerns about both the Islamic State and the continued US presence in Afghanistan. Such thinking is also shared by China and Iran and consequently Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran are pursuing a policy towards Afghanistan that is very different from that of India.
Meanwhile the Afghan government continues to face a host of security challenges posed by the Taliban forces. As recently as January 10, 2017, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in Kabul that killed more than 30 people and wounded some 70 others including the ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to Afghanistan and the governor of Kandahar province. One analyst even asserts that “the Taliban isn’t interested in peace and security. The jihadist group wants to win the Afghan war and it is using negotiations with regional and international powers to improve its standing.”8
Therefore, to expect that the Taliban would give up its terrorist activities is highly unlikely, which means that Russia will not be able to bring about a reconciliation between Kabul and the Taliban. In addition, Russia also has to contend with the view of the Afghan government, which was articulated by its representative Mohammad Ashraf Haidari at the February 15 meeting in Moscow. Haidari emphasized that the National Unity Government (NUG) is the only legitimate government representing all Afghans. And as for the role of the Taliban in the peace process, he stated that “Taliban lack the national and moral legitimacy to represent the Afghan people, who reject terrorism perpetrated by the Taliban and their foreign terrorist allied networks in the name of Islam—a religion of peace, tolerance, and co-existence.”9
Russia is not only taking a relatively benign view of the Taliban but it is also cosying up to Pakistan, the Taliban’s sponsor. Russia’s decision to send troops to Pakistan for a joint military exercise in September 2016 demonstrated this, especially as it came in the wake of the terrorist attack in Uri carried out by the Pakistan-based and-backed jihadi group Jaish-e-Mohammed. Russia justified its military overture to Pakistan by saying that military cooperation was aimed at fighting against the Islamic State. Kabulov argued that “We understand all concerns of India about your western neighbour…But we cannot combat (terrorism) efficiently and productively and eliminate (it) without the cooperation of Pakistan. We need their cooperation and they should realise their importance and responsibility.”10
Clearly, Moscow’s decision to side with the Taliban and Islamabad has fundamentally changed the peace building efforts in Afghanistan. New Delhi and Kabul, on the other hand, still consider the Taliban and its Pakistani sponsor as the main threats to peace and stability in Afghanistan. India is also against the incorporation of the Taliban into the Afghan government so long as it does not renounce terrorism. For their part, Afghan analysts and lawmakers suggest that the regional countries, particularly Pakistan, have never been honest in fighting terrorism.11 In addition, they allege that the International Community has never pressed Pakistan to wipe terrorists out from its soil.12
Given all this, there is little or no prospect of Russia becoming a successful anchor of peace in Afghanistan. Further, the memory of the Soviet invasion is still fresh in the Afghan mind. And Russia has little chance of succeeding so long as the United States maintains troops in Afghanistan. Russia needs to be mindful of the fact that the rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan can be countered only through close cooperation with Afghanistan’s National Unity Government and the Afghan National Security Forces. Its efforts to differentiate between the Islamic State and Taliban are also a mistake given that both groups share a similar ideology, albeitwith slight variations. Engaging the Taliban for the sake of fighting the Islamic State is likely to further alienate Afghanistan’s National Unity Government as well as other stake holders in the Afghan peace process. That, in turn, would only aggravate the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Bangladesh and the Rohingya: Implications of Refugee Re-location to Thengar Char Island
Gautam Sen
February 28, 2017
Bangladesh may be able to manage the Rohingya refugee problem only as a short-term expedient, albeit with considerable economic implications.
The Bangladesh government has decided to resettle a large group of the more than 300,000 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in an island called `Thengar Char` off the Noakhali district coast. Dhaka has justified this decision by stating that it will be a temporary relocation from Cox`s Bazaar, where the camps are bursting at the seams, living conditions are unhygienic and the refugees are falling prey to human traffickers and narcotic smuggling networks. Its intention is, to start with, relocate 70,000 Rohingya refugees particularly those given shelter after the civil disturbances in Myanmar`s Rakhine state last year. These refugees from the two main over-populated camps at Kutapalong and Nayapara in Cox`s Bazaar district are to be shifted to Thengar Char island, which is basically a shoal that emerged from the sea only 11 years ago.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government has also started soliciting international financial aid for rehabilitating these refugees in Thengar Char. Hasina is reported to have also discussed prospects of aid for this rehabilitation project with the Chancellor Angela Merkel during her recent visit to Germany to attend the Munich Security Conference. Hasina’s government has also mounted a sensitization drive with foreign missions and their representatives in Dhaka as well as with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees with a view to gain international acceptability for the rehabilitation project. The UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, while recently visiting the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox`s Bazaar, neither endorsed Dhaka’s plan for relocating some of these refugees to Thengar Char nor mentioned anything to the contrary.
International agencies like Human Rights Watch have, however, criticized the refugee relocation decision of Bangladesh government on the ground that it would be against the will of the refugees and consequently violate Bangladesh`s obligations to uphold human rights law. It has also been alleged that such action by Bangladesh would tantamount to violating the essence of non-refoulement – a principle of international law that does not permit state authorities to forcibly push back refugees to places from where they fled from or send them to locations against their will. The fact of the matter is that the physical and environmental conditions in Thengar Char are very challenging and at present not conducive for human habitation. There are reports in the media that the Bangladesh government has tasked the army to help in the rehabilitation-cum-relocation process, which implies that an element of coercion or force may be involved in some contingencies.
Thengar Char is an island of approximately 40 square kilometre area, which was declared a reserve forest in 2013. It is located between Sandeep and Hatia islands off the Noakhali district coast near the Megna river estuary abutting the Bay of Bengal. The island is quite remote, to the extent that it can be reached only by a two-hour boat journey from the nearest Bangladesh mainland, though it is at a linear distance of 80 kilometres from Noakhali town. In the diverse and dynamic coastal area where the island is situated, land erosion and subsidence are major problems, and long-term land reclamation is an essential need for viable economic activity. This is also an area afflicted by frequent storms. There is also no mobile telephone connectivity to Thengar Char. The general impression among authoritative international observers and agencies is that Thengar Char is afflicted by `pirates, cyclones and mud.` Some expert agencies in Bangladesh have observed that it may take 15 to 20 years at the least to make this island effectively habitable with basic minimum services and agricultural conditions suitable for subsistence farming.
In the above-stated circumstances, the decision of the Bangladesh government to relocate the Rohingyas refugees at Thengar Char may not apparently be the most appropriate. Apart from harsh living conditions which these refugees will have to countenance in their new living environment, they will also have to face the challenges of a difficult terrain and the illegal activities and influences of contraband dealers. It is also possible that, after relocation in Thengar Char island, some of these refugees may try to leave the place surreptitiously for other countries like Indonesia towards the east as well as to the Indian Sundarbans in the west, notwithstanding that a risky sea journey of nearly 200 kilometres would be involved to the nearest Indian coastal territory. The Government of India should not, therefore, be oblivious to such an eventuality.
Past experience shows that forcible refugee rehabilitation efforts, particularly in inhospitable terrain, and in juxtaposition to living areas of people or nationalities having competing economic interests, are generally not successful. The Thengar Char programme is unlikely to satisfy the socio-economic aspirations of the Rohingya refugees in the near future. Instead, it may turn out to be a continuous source of their discontent, and also have demographic ramifications for the Bangladeshis in that country`s coastal districts as well as in the Sundarbans area which involves both India and Bangladesh.
Bangladesh could have drawn a lesson from the Dandakaranya Development Project (DDP) experiment in India in the 1950s involving the rehabilitation of Bengali refugees from former East Pakistan. The DDP, conceived by Jawaharlal Nehru, was initiated under a cabinet resolution in 1958 and a Dandakaranya Development Authority (DDA) was set up with substantial administrative powers and supporting finances. The project was intended to rejuvenate nearly 207,000 square kilometres of forested area in the common border zone of Odisha, erstwhile Madhya Pradesh and former Andhra Pradesh. Nehru had then observed in a letter to a parliamentarian from West Bengal that the displaced persons who go there should be associated with the Dandakaranya development effort. However, the reality turned out to be otherwise. Harmonization among the administrative efforts of DDA, adjustment with the original inhabitants, i.e., the tribal people in the vicinity, and lack of motivation among the Bengali refugees to imbibe local agro-climatic practices and pattern of subsistence, were not feasible. Ultimately, rehabilitation was at the most partial, and in fact a large number of the refugees relocated to the DDP area migrated back to West Bengal, causing political unrest and other repercussions in the state`s political milieu.
Conditions in Thengar Char are likely to be more unfavourable for the Rohingya refugees as compared to Dandakaranya because the latter are not likely to be treated at par with Bangladeshi citizens by Dhaka owing to political considerations and inadequacy of financial resources. Another fundamental difference between the Dandakaranya and Thengar Char programmes is that, in the former case, rehabilitation was organized for refugees who were to be finally assimilated as citizens, whereas the Bangladesh government has categorically mentioned that the latter is a temporary relocation of the Rohingya refugees without any commitment towards their eventual retention, absorption or citizenship.
In the above-mentioned backdrop, Bangladesh may be able to manage the Rohingya refugee problem only as a short-term expedient, though with considerable economic implications. It may try out a model which leads to the rejuvenation of Thengar Char for long-term economic development of the island and its vicinity, while preventing the refugees from mingling with Bangladesh’s population and thus avoiding concomitant internal political and economic tensions in the immediate future. But it is doubtful whether such an expedient will serve its long-term politico-economic and security interests, unless the basic causes of the Rohingya refugee influx into Bangladesh are dealt with.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served in senior appointments with the Government of India and with a State Government.
It is important to restore the functional self-sufficiency of the finance division of a ministry which handles 17-18 per cent of the total central government expenditure so that it could discharge its responsibilities without real or perceived pressures.
In what is clearly a stop-gap arrangement, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley is back to holding additional charge of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the second time in less than three years, following the sudden departure of Manohar Parrikar to head a coalition government in Goa. This has set off speculations about the fate of many reforms that the ministry was supposedly working on before the change of guard. The biggest concern seems to be about the impact of a delay in adopting the strategic partnership policy. This is widely seen as a game changer in so far as defence manufacturing in India is concerned.
This concern seems misplaced. During the debate on MoD’s demands for grant for 2017-18, the Finance Minister informed Lok Sabha earlier last week that 147 contracts worth over Rs 2.96 lakh crore had been signed in the last three years and that 134 proposals worth over Rs 4.45 lakh crore had been approved, of which 100 are aimed at ‘buy and make’ in India. These figures do not suggest that the absence of strategic partners has stymied the procurement process or that the Indian industry continues to be a marginal player.
But these figures do raise the question whether the given level of funding would be adequate to honour the contractual obligations in future, and if not, whether the finance ministry would be in a position to raise it. This is not just about the capital budget. As more and more contracts get signed and new equipment is inducted, more funds will also be required under the revenue segment for its exploitation and maintenance.
As per the finance ministry’s own estimates, while there has been an increase of 4.3 per cent in the revenue expenditure in BE 2017-18 over RE 2016-17, it is expected to increase by about 8 per cent and 11 per cent in 2018-19 and 2019-20 respectively, over the previous year’s estimates.1 This sounds encouraging but for the fact that, as per last year’s Medium Term Fiscal Policy Statement, total defence expenditure, including the capital component, is estimated to be about 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2017-18 and 2018-19.2 This implies that, the overall size of the pie remaining the same, an increase in the revenue expenditure could cut into allocations under the capital segment of the defence budget.
It is doubtful whether procurements are being planned keeping in view the likely availability of funds to meet the cash flow requirement in the coming years. Funds are required not only to discharge the committed liabilities related to already signed contracts but also for signing new contracts. The requirement in the latter category would be of immense proportion if contracts are to be signed for everything that is on the shopping list of the armed forces in a compressed timeframe.
The total value of contracts in respect of 134 proposals, mentioned by the Finance Minister, would be more than Rs 4.45 lakh crore. As of now, this is only the estimated cost of all these proposals. But past experience shows that the contracted value is almost always much higher than the estimated cost, especially if the estimates are based on life-cycle costs.
Not all of these 134 proposals are likely to fructify into contracts, but even if half of them do, it is doubtful whether MoD will still have sufficient cushion in the annual allocations for procurement of various types of aircraft, guns, naval vessels, and other equipment for which approval-in-principle (Approval in principle, or AoN, to use the official jargon) is yet to be accorded. This should be an area of interest for the Finance Minister who is currently in a position to look at the issue from both ends.
The Finance Minister could also make use of the fortuitous opportunity he currently has to set the record straight on reduction of allocation at the revised estimates stage every year. One narrative is that the finance ministry does not let some big ticket procurements go through because it needs to withdraw money at the revised estimates stage to meet the fiscal deficit targets. What lends credence to this narrative is the fact that all acquisition proposals exceeding Rs 2,000 crore (raised from Rs 500 crore in 2017) have to be referred to the finance ministry, whether it is for approval by the finance minister (up to Rs 3,000 crore) or for consultation before any proposal, exceeding Rs 3,000 crore, is placed before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for approval.
The counter-narrative is that the allocation is reduced in the revised estimates only after making a realistic assessment, in consultation with MoD, of what the latter will eventually be able to spend by the end of the given financial year. This has led to the demand for the setting up of a roll-over non-lapsable modernisation fund, into which the unutilised balances could be transferred at the end of the year, to be made use of in future years. This demand is backed by the Standing Committee on Defence and what lends a sense of urgency to it is that, probably under pressure from the committee, MoD has reactivated this proposal and referred it to the Ministry of Finance in February 2017.
The debate concerning the setting up of a non-lapsable fund, which is often conducted in the larger context of civil-military relations, does no good to the image of the country. It will go a long way if the Finance Minister were to settle this issue while he is still in a position to do so as the minister in charge of both the ministries that are a party to the debate.
These issues point to inadequate attention being paid to ensuring efficiency in financial management in defence. Such a situation has come about partly because of the progressive sidelining of the MoD’s integrated finance division, headed by a secretary level officer. This gradual process has culminated in all work relating to general administration in respect of officers and staff of the finance division being transferred to the establishment division of the department of defence, headed by a joint secretary.
The orders issued in this behalf in February 2017 are not in consonance with the scheme under which the then defence division of the finance ministry was transferred to the MoD’s administrative control in 1983 with a clear provision that the officers working in the division will be under the administrative control of the head of the finance division. Not to put too fine a point on it, the absorption of the finance division in the establishment division of the department of defence is evidently not just on account of administrative convenience as mentioned in the February notification.
It is important to restore the functional self-sufficiency of the finance division of a ministry which handles 17-18 per cent of the total central government expenditure so that it could discharge its responsibilities without real or perceived pressures from within MoD. If there are problems with the way the finance division has been functioning – and, undoubtedly, there are many – the remedy lies in fixing the problem and not emasculating the division as such by relegating it to insignificance. This issue merits the attention of the finance minister as much as any other issue that he could possibly attend to, to improve financial management in defence while he is still holding dual charge.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
It would be prudent for the new state government to re-instil confidence among all parties through a total focus on equitable development in both the Hills and the Valley areas and take all stakeholders on board before undertaking any controversial move.
Commentators see the outcome of the recent Assembly elections in Manipur as an interesting twist and topple story. The party in power fell just short of the required number of seats, despite getting the highest number of seats in the Assembly. But the ruling political party at the centre, which emerged from nowhere, managed to obtain not only a significant vote share but also emerge as the second largest party in the state. And it followed this up with a deft game of forging alliances to gain a majority and staking claim to form the government.
While this may be a routine fallout of elections in any other part of the country, what has happened in Manipur could well have the potential of strongly influencing the situation not only within the State but also in the entire Northeast region. It was generally perceived by the tribal peoples within Manipur that the previous State government, which was not amenable to their demands, aspirations and genuine concerns, was mainly surviving on popularity gained from the large vote-base of non-tribals in the State. But this perception has been disproved by the outcome of the Assembly elections. The new state government, seen as an extension of a “development centric” ruling party at the centre, could be seen as a beaming ray of hope amidst the existent volatility and discontent in the State as well as in the region.
Apparently, the Manipur aspect of the ongoing Naga peace talks had a limited range of options for negotiation since no political consensus could be obtained between New Delhi and Imphal on various proposed arrangements. Further, the long pending demand for upgrading the Hill Area Autonomous District Councils from the charter of the Fifth to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution had consistently been turned down by previous governments in the State. However, the new government may now look at the whole issue differently, more so, after the inclusion of NPF (Naga Peoples Front) members in the State cabinet. The new government’s favourable disposition towards the demand for greater autonomy in the Hill districts, therefore, seems well within reach, albeit at the cost of annoying the ‘hardliner’ Meiteis. Such a decision, however, may not be without its associated problems. The demand for enhanced autonomy in the Naga districts of Manipur is seen by a large cross-section of non-Nagas as a step towards accommodating the demand for ‘Greater Nagalim’, which could eventually lead to tampering with the existing territorial boundaries of the state. This may fuel dissent amongst the Meiteis as well as the Kukis, and could well provide impetus to the simmering discontent among those living in the ‘Valley’ areas to take up the issue of reforming the Manipur Land Reform regulations, which are seen to be discriminatory since the Hill tribes have the provision of owning landed property in the Valley whereas the Valley people do not have similar rights in Hill areas. The consequent resentment amongst the Meiteis could re-energise the Inner Line Permit (ILP) movement and their demand for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status.
The creation of new districts in the State, which was announced by the previous government just prior to the conduct of assembly elections despite strong opposition from Naga socio-political organisations, resulted in an indefinite economic blockade (now called off) within the State. The new government could possibly make an attempt to pacify the prevailing discontent, especially amongst the Nagas. However, any move towards revoking the order that created the new districts could trigger trouble, and may not find support especially from non-Naga alliance partners within the government. But, there remains the likelihood of continued pressure from Naga alliance partners on the new government for withdrawing the said notification. The move of creating the new districts seems highly paradoxical. On the one hand, it is likely to facilitate better governance in remote areas and benefit a great many people. But, on the other hand, it is seen as a deliberate design to undermine Naga aspirations for territorial integrity.
The attempts to promulgate three controversial (‘anti-tribal’) Bills by the previous State government were also not received well by the tribal population in Manipur. This had resulted in large-scale dissent amongst the tribals, and was also viewed by a certain cross-section of ‘non-tribals’ as a “deliberate” political game. Any further move in support of these contested Bills could cause resentment especially among the alliance partners representing the tribal areas, whereas the opposition parties may welcome the step.
The alliance partners in the new government belong to the Naga Peoples’ Front (NPF), National Peoples’ Party (NPP), All India Trinamool Congress (AITC), Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) and an Independent Candidate. They all have divergent ideologies from that of the ruling BJP. It would be an uphill task for the new government to sustain a stable configuration for long, as dissent by even a single partner has the potential to bring down the government. Strong and decisive governance under such circumstances, with so many complicated issues at hand could turn out to be extremely challenging for the new leadership. It would, therefore, be prudent for the new government to re-instil confidence among all parties through a total focus on equitable development in both the Hills and the Valley areas and take all stakeholders on board before undertaking any controversial move.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Increased security cooperation and the potential for cooperation in the Middle East peace process are likely to be the key areas of discussion during the impending visit of King Abdullah to India.
Described as preparatory to a state visit by King Abdullah II, the recent discussions between Fayez Tarawneh—Chief of the royal Court of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan—and the Indian leaders reveal an interesting pattern. Breaking from normal protocol, Tarawneh met the Vice-President and Prime Minister and made a courtesy call on the President, thereby indicating the importance that both the countries attach to Jordan. Even more interesting was his meeting with former Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval.
Until two years ago, India’s security related engagements in the Middle East largely revolved around counter-terrorism cooperation with Israel and extradition of suspected terrorists from countries such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). Since the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to UAE in August 2015, a different template is emerging in India’s engagements with the Middle East. Cooperation in a host of security issues such as terrorism, cyber security, terror finance, protection of sea lanes of communication, intelligence sharing and coordination in fighting extremism have been highlighted during Modi’s meetings with leaders of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar. One can safely argue that security would be a major component in India’s engagements with Jordan and would be consecrated during the impending visit of King Abdullah.
This also indicates a paradigm shift in India’s perception of the Hashemite kingdom. Due to their different worldviews, bilateral engagements were minimal during the Cold War. While King Hussein visited in India in December 1963, Vice-President Zakir Hussein visited Jordan in May 1965 and offered prayers in Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest shrine in Islam, when it was under Jordanian rule. An Indian state visit to the Kingdom, however, had to wait until October 2015 when President Pranab Mukherjee visited Jordan as well as Palestine and Israel. No Indian prime minister had ever visited Amman. Minimal trade ties (currently at about USD two billion) and absence of incentives such as energy security, expatriate labourers and remittances kept Jordanians from the Indian radar screen.
Two crucial politico-strategic developments have, however, pushed Jordan to the forefront. During his visit, President Mukherjee described the Hashemite Kingdom as an ‘oasis of peace’ and this was not an exaggeration. Since the outbreak of popular protests starting December 2010, a number of Arab countries have been in turmoil and political instability has become endemic in many countries. In some countries there was a regime change but countries like Libya, Syria and Yemen have plunged into civil war. The collapse of the state in Iraq and Syria was partly responsible for the onset of religious extremism and birth of the Islamic Caliphate or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or daesh as it is commonly referred to in the Arab world.
Since the birth of the Jordanian emirate in the 1920s, the Hashemites have been fighting various forms of extremism. If al-Qaeda was the enemy during the past decade, daesh has emerged as the new adversary. Some of the terror attacks in Jordan in recent months have been linked to ISIS and related radical Islamist groups. Partly due to fears of infiltration by ISIS elements, Jordan has regulated and even barred the entry of Syrian refugees into the country. While UN agencies like United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have put the number of registered Syrian refugees at 657,000, Jordanian officials claim that the country is hosting more than a million (1.4 million) refugees.
Thus, fighting the ISIS it not a choice but a necessity and a survival imperative for Jordan. Indeed, before ascending the throne in June 1999, Abdullah was commanding the Jordanian Special Forces. Hence, unlike other leaders of the region, the Jordanian monarch has a professional understanding of the problems of militant extremism and its ramifications. Consequently, intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation and combating radicalism would be key areas of cooperation between India and Jordan in the coming years.
Secondly, like India, the Hashemites also have a delicate relationship with Israel and Palestine. Historically, geo-political compulsions and regional rivalry resulted in the Hashemites viewing Israel as a benign and friendlier power. Since the late 1940s, there were clandestine but close relations between the two leaderships. The June War of 1967, when Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel, was a notable exception to that bonhomie even though formal relations had to wait until the Oslo accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by Yasser Arafat. The Israel-Jordan peace treaty concluded in 1994 grants the Hashemites special status over Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem.
At the same time, there is a substantial Palestinian population in Jordan including 2.2 million registered as refugees by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). This segment of population often has a tremendous influence upon Jordanian choices. For example, partly due to domestic compulsions in 1990, King Hussein was compelled to side with Saddam Hussein when the Iraqi ruler annexed Kuwait. The Palestinian population is also more vocal in the internal opposition to full normalization of relations with Israel. In recent months, Amman has been part of a four-member Arab quartet (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE being the other three) trying to mediate among different factions of Fatah for selecting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s successor. Thus, Jordan purses a delicate policy vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine.
This Jordanian posture is not different form India’s, which too seeks to maintain its historic ties with the Palestinians amidst the emerging bonhomie with Israel. Since the normalization of relations with Israel in 1992, visits by Indian leaders to Israel have also included visits to Palestine. This practice was continued during the visit of President Mukherjee in October 2015 and of External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in January 2016. During both visits, Indian leaders also visited Jordan. Thus, Jordan has emerged not only as a transit point of India’s engagements with Israel and Palestine but also as a potential bridge. This manifested clearly during the President’s visit when Mukherjee was able to underscore India’s traditional positions towards the Arab world more forcefully in Amman than in Ramallah or Jerusalem. Interestingly, in his earlier avatar, Tarawneh handled the Jordanian peace treaty with Israel.
Thus, increased security cooperation and the potential for cooperation in the Middle East peace process are likely to be the key areas of discussion during the impending visit of King Abdullah to India.
Manjari Singh is a doctoral candidate and Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF) Fellow at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Will the Pakistani civilian leadership cease to placate the Islamist forces for their own electoral gain? Will the Army rein in the jihadis it has been using to retain “strategic depth” in Afghanistan?
Pakistan has, of late, witnessed a sudden spurt in terror attacks. These were, in many ways, unprecedented. Targets were mostly public places and the majority of those killed were civilians. The series of blasts and suicide bombings engulfed the whole of Pakistan, including Punjab: Mall Road, Lahore; Mohmand Agency in FATA; the Sufi shrine in Sehwan; and Awara, Balochistan. Of these, the suicide bomber who blew himself up at the dhamaal celebrations in the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan, Sindh and killed over 90 people according to reports, was the most dreadful. In the month of November 2016, a similar kind of attack (either by a suicide bomber or through remote controlled IED) was carried out when the dhamaal was being performed at the shrine of Shah Norani in Khuzdar district of Balochistan; at least 52 were killed and over 100 injured.
The latest spate of terrorist incidents, in which over 150 people were killed, have forced the Pakistani civilian and military leaderships to re-visit what Husain Haqqani called “the complex strategic partnership between political Islamists and Pakistan’s military establishment” which, in his view expressed in 2016, was “far from over”.1 The attacks have impelled the state to take action (again) against home-grown terrorists. Apparently, after vacillating for a long time, the Pakistani civilian and military leaderships have come on one page to take on terrorists of all kinds. Many political commentators in Pakistan had argued that the National Action Plan (NAP) was not implemented in its entirety and many groups were left untouched during the earlier operation against terrorists. With Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad now in full swing, there are many in Pakistan who would doubt whether the state is really intent on clamping down on the so-called “friendly” terror outfits, who have been used as assets by the military for decades.
Divided Society
A majority of the Pakistani population follows a tolerant version of Islam, which remains vulnerable to attack by radical Islamists who regard moderate Islam as bidat¸ which is antagonistic to the spirit of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Unfortunately, the radical groups have been allowed by state institutions, the military in particular, to flourish as “strategic” assets over time “to influence domestic politics and support the military’s political dominance”.2
This trend was visible in the assassination of Salman Taseer, for his act of speaking in support of a Christian woman who was being prosecuted under the country’s infamous blasphemy law, by his security guard, Mumtaz Qadri. Qadri was lionized by the radical outfits. And after his execution by the military court, his funeral was attended by a record crowd who hailed him as a martyr who died for the sake of Islam. A shrine is now being raised above Qadri’s grave.3 Hundreds visit this spot to seek blessings. Interestingly, Qadri belonged to the Barelvi sect, which is conventionally regarded as propagating a moderate and eclectic version of Islam. Ironically, the Wahhabis (and to certain extent Deobandis), who are puritanical in their outlook and more hard-line in their approach to safeguarding Islam, consider Barelvi eclecticism as un-Islamic. The zeal to protect Islam, in the face of real or imagined danger, has induced hard-line sentiments into the minds of liberal Muslims in Pakistan. One of the prominent Urdu dailies carried a long report recently arguing that the troubles being faced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (read Panama leaks) were caused because he allowed the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, the beloved of Prophet Muhammad.4
The use of “Islamic ideology” and the Islamists by the Pakistani political and military leaderships has had hideous impact on the country. It has led to the notion of good and bad terrorists, which remains at the centre of the country’s political discourse. For instance, Hafiz Saeed has been sometimes patronised by the state and at other times “home-arrested”, which the Defence Minister of the country has claimed was done “in the larger interests of the country”.5
However, this position of the government faces a serious contestation from the constituency that Hafiz Saeed has been allowed to carve out over the years. For example, one commentator recently criticized the Defence Minister openly in an Urdu daily thus: “Mr. Asif should not have said that Hafiz Saeed’s arrest was in national interest. … Hafiz Saeed’s arrest is a punishment for his support to the Kashmiris.”6 Going further, the spokesperson of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) reacted to Asif’s statement saying that some people in the government itself were a threat to the country, not Hafiz Saeed.
Even the civilian leadership in Pakistan is a victim of such a good-bad terrorist categorisation. When the inquiry committee report on the Quetta blasts of August 2016 questioned the role of the interior ministry, the Interior Minister was quick to demonise the writer of the report. Defending his meeting with Ahmad Ludhianvi, chief of the proscribed anti-Shi’ite Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat group, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan said in parliament that a distinction between terrorists and Islamist radicals should be maintained.
Will the Operation Succeed?
Against this backdrop, the question that remains imperative for defeating the emboldened terrorists in Pakistan, who have openly threatened further attacks in future in a video released by Jamaat-ul Ahrar, is how comprehensive and intensive Operation “Radd-ul-Fassad” is going to be? Is it a serious all-out operation to defeat not only the active terrorists but the potential breeding-ground of extremism in Pakistan? Or is it a half-hearted move taken in haste to avert public pressure for some time like Operation “Zarb-e-Azb”, which has turned out to be largely a failure at the end. Will the distinction between good and bad Islamists continue to characterise the socio-political discourse in Pakistan?
Operation “Radd-ul-Fasaad” was launched immediately after the latest series of terror attacks. It is meant to rout the radicals who managed to escape “Zarb-e-Azb” and continue to carry out attacks, killing their co-religionists inside Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has emphasised that the battle with terrorists is the battle between right and wrong, which Pakistan cannot afford to lose. He has promised that the operation would be carried out impartially. The Sharif government has called upon the Ulema to find out if it is possible to re-think, at least, the use of Islam for political violence.7 However, Sharif is unlikely to succeed in this regard as he has to confront the religious leadership, which is mostly orthodox.
Further, the earlier operation (Zarb-e-Azb) does not offer much hope for analysts to come to a favourable conclusion. It was initially meant for six months but has dragged on for years. Even after two years, it has not been able to “break the backbone” of terrorism in Pakistan, as was intended by the Army. It has displaced thousands of people and failed to contain the terror elements targeting the Pakistani state. It appears now that the civilian and military leaderships have come to the conclusion that to defeat terror they will have to stop what the political commentator Saleem Safi recently called “use of religion for political and strategic purposes”8 through non-state actors.
There are some inherent constraints that may impede the pace of the operation. Having launched the operation, will the civilian leadership cease to placate the Islamist forces for their own electoral and political gain? Will the Army rein in the jihadis it has been using to retain its “strategic depth” in Afghanistan? Saleem Safi has argued that governments in Pakistan have been overlooking the real causes of terrorism in the country. Unless and until, Safi emphasised, these causes are identified and eliminated, terrorism would keep haunting the country. In a similar vein, Najam Sethi has questioned the wisdom of supporting “some groups” engaged in militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. Sethi would doubt whether the state would act against such elements at all.
For fighting terrorism in Pakistan, the civil and military leaderships will have to bring about a radical change in their foreign policy and security outlook. The Army holds the key to Pakistan’s transformation. It has huge stakes invested in the use of Islam for “strategic” purposes. It remains to be seen, whether it will change its course under Qamar Ahmad Bajwa. If it does not, its future appears doomed.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
In respect of trade and commerce, some uncertainties are looming over both US-German relations and US-EU relations.
Chancellor Angela Merkel will be engaging in her first substantive summit discussions with President Donald Trump shortly. Both countries are at a sensitive stage in their bilateral relationship. Merkel, a popular, liberal-minded and detail-oriented leader of a cautious and controlled demeanour, has had skirmishes in the recent past with Trump who has a contrasting disposition in the public domain on policy issues and values. It will be noteworthy to observe whether the outcome of the Trump-Merkel summit leads to a realistic appraisal of the prospects and limitations of the US-German relationship, and a modicum of parallelism if not convergence can be achieved as during the Bush and Obama years. Except for the dissonance in US-German relations consequent on Chancellor Schroeder criticizing America’s intervention in Iraq, bilateral relations have been on a balanced and mutually sustaining path. And historically, US-German relations have been a significant factor in the trans-Atlantic partnership both in the economic and security realms.
Trump’s posture during the campaign and even thereafter has struck discordant notes to an extent, especially his demand for higher financial commitment from European partners and concomitantly lesser US involvement in European defence and security matters. But his Defence Secretary George Mattis has provided a corrective by stating that NATO remains the cornerstone of the West’s defence vis-à-vis Russia and in the international strategic milieu. In respect of trade and commerce, however, some uncertainties are looming over both US-German relations as well as US-EU relations.
As far as reducing the US financial contribution to NATO and consequently pressing for an increase in German and other NATO members’ contribution to the trans-Atlantic alliance is concerned, the matter may not be susceptible to an easy resolution. Merkel is likely to resist US pressures in this regard. The fact of the matter is that, the respective shares of USA and Germany to NATO`s budget are 22 and 15 per cent, respectively. At Euro 36 billion in 2015, the German share has not been unreasonably low. According to NATO Secretary General’s report of 2015, the per capita contribution of USA and Germany stood at USD 1865 and 521, respectively. While Merkel may be willing to increase Germany`s financial contribution to NATO, and perhaps augment its commitment on personnel (as on 7 January 2017, Germany fielded 180,000 troops vis-à-vis 1,311,000 by USA, 201,700 by France and 182,000 by Italy), she and the leaders of other major alliance partners may not accept a reduction in US commitment on finances and personnel.
It is to be seen how Trump balances out USA`s global interests and commitments to European security through NATO with Germany playing a more dominant part strategically. A greater German role may be inevitable given the strength of the German economy and Britain`s prospective exit from the European Union and the possibility of a reduction in London`s financial support to NATO. Trump may be realistic enough to appreciate the force multiplier effect of NATO assets and their dispositions vis-à-vis USA`s strategic interests in unstable regions like the Middle East and even in the Balkans.
Trump and Merkel hold substantively differing views on immigration, protection of refugees, deportation of Muslims from USA, and their rehabilitation under special circumstances in Europe, etc. Without directly criticising the latest ban imposed by the Trump administration on the entry of Muslims from select countries, Merkel has continued to express her views espousing support for providing succour and rehabilitation to Muslims fleeing conflict zones such as Syria. While Trump had observed that Merkel`s decision is a catastrophic mistake, Merkel had called for adherence to the UN Convention on Refugees.
In the economic realm, reckoning the fundamentals of their relationship, Trump may find it difficult to alter its present content. His `make America great again` slogan, if implemented to the extent of restricting German investments and exports to USA, with the objective of promoting American domestic industry and employment, may only be counterproductive. German investment in USA is significant amounting to USD 255 billion, and generates nearly 700,000 jobs through US affiliates of German firms. Any disincentive by way of additional fiscal measures by USA on repatriation of profits, higher taxation on German investments, etc. will attract countervailing action by Germany and may adversely impact US exports to Germany valued at approximately USD 50 billion as well as the US domestic industry and the employment scenario. Impediments on German investments in USA may also induce diversion in the flow of German capital and enterprises to Latin America and Africa where Berlin may have long-term economic interests and compete with US interests.
Notwithstanding the above, Trump will try to redress the continuing adverse US-German trade balance on commodities, which reached nearly USD 50 billion by January 2017. Trump has been able to drum up domestic support on the premise that the trade deficit is a threat to US security and prosperity. It is to be seen how Trump manages to increase the prospects of USA`s domestic manufacturing industry and enhance exports to Germany within the framework of an open and expanding world economy. He may also not be naïve to forego the benefits such as the provision of national treatment to US investors in Germany under the existing USA-Germany Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation by forcing its modification and resorting to restrictive fiscal and trade measures. An accusation levelled by Trump and his business associates to the effect that manipulation of the value of the Euro has boosted German exports may be strongly rebutted by Merkel. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble has already attributed the changes in the value of the Euro to economic factors outside Berlin’s control. A prudent alternative for Trump would be to work to make major US exports such as civilian aircraft and their engines as well as automobiles more competitive instead of distorting or altering the existing framework of cooperation pertaining to US-German investment and trade.
Merkel has been more true to her liberal democratic credentials than many European leaders. These have been borne out by her stance on issues like countering political extremism at home and abroad, offering protection to refugees fleeing from terror, and opposing Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The exception has been the Greek financial liquidity crises since 2010, in regard to which Merkel`s government has been insisting on the implementation of a stiff International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed economic bailout package which has only served to undermine various progressive socio-economic measures.
It is unlikely that Trump and Merkel would have a complete convergence of views and postures particularly over refugee rehabilitation in Europe, international efforts to regulate environmental pollution, and reform of the United Nations and especially the Security Council, to flag a few such issues. While agreement may be achieved on countering the sources of extremism such as ISIS in the Middle-East, it is likely that differences would remain on promoting Palestinian statehood. It has been reported that Trump is likely to probe Merkel on the most effective policy for dealing with Putin over a range of issues without entailing a higher economic burden on USA or extended military force deployments. Shades of differences may persist in their respective approaches to dealing with Putin, the Crimea issue and appraisal of sanctions on Russia imposed after the latter`s annexation of Crimea. Nonetheless, the bilateral dialogue may initiate the process of a better understanding of Trump`s inclinations and German compulsions at the strategic level in relation to central and eastern Europe and Russia. Trump may also appreciate the benefit of incremental changes to the existing USA-Germany bilateral trade and commerce-related institutions for mutual benefit.
A realistic dialogue process may also ensue on a reappraisal of the sharing mechanism for financial support to NATO including a cost-effective implementation of the force Readiness Action Plan formulated after the NATO Wales summit in 2015. It is also possible that Germany`s geostrategic position in Europe apropos Russia, its economic growth and resilience, as well as diverse and accommodative relations with an array of middle powers like India, Japan and some of the African and western hemispheric countries will influence Trump to give due weightage to Merkel, particularly when she is expected to lead her Christian Democratic Union and Christian Socialist Party coalition to victory in the September 2017 national elections.
The author, a retired IDAS officer, has served in senior positions in the Governments of India and a State Government.
The views expressed are the author`s own.
The basic challenge for defence economists is to demonstrate that there are other feasible ways of skinning the cat during budget formulation. But the challenge is also inextricably linked with the need for rationalisation of defence expenditure.
The only sub-theme that vies for pride of place alongside the debate on the alleged shenanigans of an inept civilian bureaucracy is the gross inadequacy of defence outlays. Governments have come and gone since 1947, but the sluggish trajectory of annual defence budgets continues, interrupted only by pay commissions and wars. It does not require any great power of prophesy to rule out a steep hike in the defence budget in the coming years. The history of the defence budget over the past seven decades should be enough to drive home this truth.
More specifically, the growth in annual defence allocations since 2014 only indicates that it is naive to expect that the gap between the demand projected by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the actual allocations made for defence in the union budget will soon be a thing of the past.
Defence analysts never tire of mentioning the year 2004 when the then outgoing government made a provision for a defence modernisation fund in the interim budget, seen till date as a bold step to address the problems besetting the modernisation of the armed forces. But it is the same political dispensation which, despite being in power now for almost three years, not only has not revived the defence modernisation fund but has also failed to cut the mustard when it comes to raising the defence expenditure.
There is a continuous lament over inadequate funding and this is invariably attributed to politicians and bureaucrats, widely believed to be impervious to the imperatives of defence and security of the country. Apart from being an unfair characterisation, this has served no purpose all these years and is unlikely to be much help in future.
If anything, this narrative has crowded out the academic discussion on how much should be allocated for defence and, more importantly, how could the government of the day meet the expectations of the defence establishment without an adverse impact on other competing sectors, such as health, education and infrastructure.
The dominant view among the strategic studies community in the country is that the defence budget should be pegged at a minimum of three per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Going by this benchmark and without questioning its basis, the defence allocation for 2017-18 should be approximately Rs 2,31,310 crore more than the amount actually allocated in the union budget, excluding defence pensions for which a sum of Rs 85,737 crore has been allocated separately.
This is a huge gap to cover, especially if the fiscal and revenue deficit targets are to be met. The gap cannot also apparently be bridged just by reducing expenditure on other sectors. On the face of it, the government will have to raise its income substantially to be able to almost double the allocation for defence to reach the three per cent of GDP mark. Governments have evidently not been up to this task either because of the serious political cost of raising income through taxation or for other inexplicable reasons. This is where defence economists, and even think tanks, need to step in and suggest a pragmatic way out.
The question that arises every year when the union budget is analysed in seminars and in the media, but remains unanswered, is whether the Finance Minister could actually allocate more funds for defence without, at the same time, causing an adverse impact on other sectors, assuming no positive change in the estimated income. The alternate question would be whether the minister had more options for raising governmental revenues to the extent that allocation for defence could be raised substantially, if not to the extent of three per cent of GDP, without facing any difficulty in giving a rational explanation for rejecting the demand from other sectors for higher allocations.
To answer both the above questions, defence economists will have to deal with a more fundamental set of questions. What should be the pragmatically ideal level of funding? Whether the defence allocation should be fixed at a certain percentage of GDP? If so why? Or, would it be enough to meet the requirement projected by the MoD, irrespective of how much it works out to in terms of percentage of GDP and regardless of the method of costing adopted for working out the requirement.
The basic challenge for defence economists is to demonstrate that there are other feasible ways of skinning the cat during budget formulation. But the challenge is also inextricably linked with the need for rationalisation of defence expenditure, especially if manpower costs cannot be contained in any substantial measure.
There are indeed other steps, such as the creation of joint logistics and theatre commands that could potentially bring down costs and increase operational efficiency. But the thrust for these measures is unlikely to come from within the services or from the political class, unless independent and objective analyses by defence economists points to the imperative of adopting these measures and throws up a roadmap for bringing about these seminal changes.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
From all angles – political, economic, diplomatic and military – India is in a position to meet the SLAF’s potential combat aircraft requirements.
In August 2016, the Sri Lankan government made the announcement that it was seeking to procure between eight and 12 combat aircraft to replace its ageing air force assets. While there has been much speculation about Sri Lanka’s choice – with the Sino-Pak JF-17 reportedly being strongly pushed by Pakistan – it is suggested that this selection process can offer India a unique opportunity both to strengthen military ties with Sri Lanka as well as to make a breakthrough into the aviation export market.
The Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) is facing the prospect of being without a single combat aircraft, despite operating a force with three dedicated combat aircraft squadrons – No.5 with F-7G, the No. 10 with the Kfir C.2/7, and No. 12 with the MiG-27M. The Sri Lankan government revealed that, by August 2016, only a single Kfir (out of seven survivors) was operational, while none of the F.7Gs and MiG-27Ms were operational.1 Cabinet Spokesman and Parliamentary Reforms and Media Minister Gayantha Karunathilaka expressed the situation in stark terms:
While the government’s official position is that the fleet requirements have not yet been finalized, it is apparent that the SLAF is seeking multi-role combat aircraft to replace its current fleet.3 Aircraft manufacturers will be courting the SLAF. With the JF-17 being pushed strongly, one may soon witness the Russians and Swedes entering the fray with a variant of either the MiG-29 or the Su-27 and the Gripen, respectively. For its part, India may be in a position to use its unique diplomatic and geographic proximity to offer two products – the Tejas and the Advanced Hawk – as possible contenders to meet the SLAF requirement.
It should be noted that India’s foray into military aviation exports has been plagued by missteps, shortfalls in support and poor communications. The sale of Dhruv helicopters to Ecuador was widely hailed, and rightly so, as a major breakthrough for Indian arms export. However, after a number of crashes (several of which were caused by pilot error), the helicopters were withdrawn from use, citing, among other things, poor spares support from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).4 The sale of Chetaks to Suriname was plagued by poor contract management and “financial and administrative obstacles”, which led to the helicopters being ready long before pilots were ready to be trained, leading to a delay in delivery of the helicopters.5 Subsequent supplies of aircraft have been gifts or heavily discounted sales of Chetak and Dhruv helicopters and Dornier Do-228 surveillance aircraft to the Maldives, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Nepal and Bhutan.
Yet, unlike sales to Ecuador and Suriname, India is geographically proximate to Sri Lanka and, if an Indian choice is made, use can be made of Indian Air Force support facilities. Furthermore, India has had a somewhat low-key but nonetheless important role in equipping the SLAF. In the past, India had provided 24 L-70 guns, 24 battle-field surveillance radars, 11 upgraded Super Fledermaus radars, four Indra- I & II radars and 10 mine-protected vehicles to assist in the defence of SLAF air bases. These proved useful against air attack by the former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’s air wing consisting of armed microlight aircraft as well as from LTTE infiltrators.6 India is already a major supplier to the Sri Lankan Navy with two 105m Offshore Patrol Vessels under construction at Goa.7
Should the SLAF desire a supersonic multi-role aircraft, India’s Tejas Mk.1, despite its still being in the developmental phase, could be a viable option. The aircraft has already demonstrated significant capabilities in the air-to-air and air-to-ground roles and the limited number of aircraft being sought by the SLAF lends itself to relatively easy accommodation with HAL’s production schedule and capacity. Moreover, as the Indian Air Force will be undertaking training and conversion activities with the type, Sri Lanka could benefit from this process.
On the other hand, if the SLAF is seeking a cost-effective multi-role aircraft with a relatively low operating cost – and is willing to forego the “prestige” of supersonic aircraft - then the BAE-HAL Advanced Hawk has the potential to meet this requirement. The Advanced Hawk has significant combat capabilities with provision for Brimstone air-to-ground missiles and ASRAAM air-to-air missiles.8 As a subsonic aircraft with a dual training role, the operating costs of the Advanced Hawk would inevitably be lower than any supersonic combat aircraft while still offering substantial combat capability. This combination of capability and cost-effectiveness is an important consideration given the SLAF’s problems with its existing combat assets and the acquisition and operating costs of modern supersonic aircraft.9 In addition, the large fleet of BAE Hawks operated by the Indian Air Force and the strong overhaul and maintenance facilities available in India could make the Advanced Hawk attractive to the SLAF.
If India is desirous of securing this order, it must not treat it as a purely transactional arrangement. The export of Indian combat aircraft would be a major step forward for Indian arms exports and, as such, India should be flexible in respect of prices. India should also not hesitate to offer attractive financing packages and lines of credit at low interest rates to encourage Sri Lanka to “buy Indian” – the lack of such packages reportedly playing a role in the SLAF declining a Pakistani offer of the JF-17.10
From all angles – political, economic, diplomatic and military – India is in a position to meet the SLAF’s potential combat aircraft requirements. It is a rare confluence of circumstances that has the potential to operate in India’s favour if the Indian political, bureaucratic and military-industrial leadership has the will and desire to see a sale of Indian combat aircraft to Sri Lanka become a reality.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
North Korea has blatantly breached the chemical weapons ‘red line’ in the killing of the half-brother of Kim Jong-un in Kuala Lumpur on February 13.
Post the 2003 Iraq war, the debate regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was confined mostly to the realm of nuclear weapons for more than a decade. The perception that WMDs are not for actual use but for deterrence broadly continues to hold in the post Cold War period too. However, it is also a fact that certain categories of WMD like chemical weapons (CW) have been used during the Cold War. In the post Cold War era too, the Syrian conflict and the alleged use of CW to kill the half-brother of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un in Malaysia continues to shine a spotlight on the dangers of the use of such weapons.
In the post 9/11 period, it was professed that the major threat in the realm of WMDs could emerge mainly from the international terror groups. The use of CW in Syria in August 2013 however dealt a blow to this thinking. It was confirmed by the United Nations that the CW were used at a location called Ghouta (suburb in Damascus), killing nearly 1,500 civilians. These weapons were found used at few other locations in Syria during earlier occasions too. President Barack Obama had asserted in 2012 that any possible usage of chemical weapons would amount to crossing a ‘red line’, which would invite a US military response. The military intervention by the US forces in Syria did happen few months after the use of CW by the Syrian forces (or by rebel forces as claimed by the Assad regime).1 CW were also used as the bargaining tools in the West Asian geo-political theatre. One of the reasons for Libya to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by declaring its weapons stockpile during 2004 was Gaddafi’s desperation to normalise relations with the Western world.
North Korea has blatantly breached the CW ‘red line’ in a very peculiar manner in the latest incident. Kim Jong-nam was killed on February 13 at Kuala Lumpur airport while he was waiting to catch a flight. Two women wiped a substance on his face leading to his death within 20 minutes. It has been found that the substance used for this killing was a nerve agent called VX. This agent is considered as one of the most potent chemicals which affects the nervous system and disturbs the functioning of human muscles eventually leading to death. This substance is derived from organophosphate pesticides and its lethal dose ranges from about 10 milligrams via skin contact to 25-30 milligrams, if inhaled.2 This substance has been classified by the United Nations as a WMD.
The attack was a bit of a surprise as Pyongyang had not given any indications regarding a renewed interest in CW. For more than a decade now, North Korea has been attracting global attention by undertaking nuclear tests and launching missiles. They have also undertaken few satellite launches by using their own rockets. By successfully orchestrating an assassination by using CW, North Korea has succeeded in sending a message that they are not averse to using the WMD in their possession. Kim Jong-un is keen to ensure that no challenge emerges to his position from his extended family. From the North Korean point of view, the use of VX agent was a perfect choice, because this agent is known to cause instant death.
The most appalling aspect of the killing was that though the victim died within about 20 minutes, nothing is known to have happened to the women who were seen to have used their hands to apply the VX agent on the face of the victim. This clearly indicates that some successful method has been devised to protect the women from the dangerous affects of the nerve agent. Also, the production of VX is not a simple task and requires a lot of technological sophistication. The major question which remains unanswered though is the manner in which the deadly CW reached Malaysia.
North Korea is alleged to have the world's third-largest stockpile of CW. They are known to have produced agents like Sarin, VX, Mustard, Tabun and Hydrogen Cyanide. North Korea is one of the three states (apart from Egypt and Sudan) that has not signed or acceded to the CWC. It is believed to be producing CW since the 1980s and is now estimated to have stockpiles of around 25 chemical agents amounting to approximately 5,000 tons. North Korea is also known to have made investments in biological weapons, and believed to be having 12-13 types of biological weapons, including anthrax, plague, among others.3
North Korea has taken the biggest of political risks by using CW at this point in time and that too in a friendly foreign state. North Korea and Malaysia established bilateral relationship more than 45 years ago. Both the states opened embassies at Kuala Lumpur and Pyongyang in 2003. Since 2009, Malaysians did not require a visa to travel to North Korea (and vice versa). After the airport incident, North Koreans are now required to obtain a visa to visit Malaysia.
The incident is also spoiling the important relationship that Pyongyang shares with its all-weather friend, China. Beijing has been extremely upset with the brazen missile testing undertaken by North Korea in recent times. China, which was importing coal from North Korea in spite of the UN sanctions, decided to suspend all imports on February 19. For the Trump administration, dealing with North Korea will continue to be a major challenge. The CWC, considered one of the most successful arms control treaty mechanisms in the world and which would be celebrating its twenty years of existence in April 2017, continues to face serious challenges even today.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Russia’s efforts to differentiate between the Islamic State and Taliban are a mistake given that both groups share a similar ideology, albeit with slight variations.
For the second time in the last few months, Russia hosted a Conference on Afghanistan in Moscow on February 15, 2017, this time with an expanded representation of six countries – Russia itself, Iran, China, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Interestingly, a key player, the United States, which still maintains 9,800 troops to support the Afghan government’s counter-insurgency efforts against the Taliban, has been kept out of the meeting. But for its part, the US appears to be contemplating an increase in its military commitment, with its commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson, advocating to the Senate Armed Services Committee recently that “a few thousand" more NATO trainers are needed to break the stalemate against the Taliban.1India welcomed the Moscow meeting which brought together countries that have stakes in Afghanistan’s peace and security. However, raising concerns on the Russia-led efforts for talks with the Taliban, External Affairs Ministry Spokesman Vikas Swarup noted that “We underlined that it is up to the government of Afghanistan to decide whom to engage in direct talks.”2
The two regional meetings (the first was held in December 2016) represent Russia’s first post-Soviet attempt to replay the Afghan game and that too in a big way. However, in contrast to the Soviet motivation of propping up the communist government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against a growing insurgency in December 1979, the Russian interest in Afghanistan now is the prevention of the growth and influence of the Islamic State (IS), which, in turn, may have a negative fallout on the security of Central Asia. A further Russian motive in Afghanistan appears to be aimed at keeping the US out of the region.
This major shift in Russia’s Afghanistan policy came immediately after it expressed concerns about the possibility of Afghanistan turning into a safe sanctuary for the Islamic State militants fleeing from Iraq and Syria.3 Speaking at the ‘Heart of Asia’ conference held in Amritsar on December 5, 2016, Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, described the Islamic State as being more dangerous than the Taliban. And three days later, on December 8, 2016, the Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan stated that “Our concern is that Daesh not only threatens Afghanistan, but it is also a potent threat to Central Asia, Pakistan, China, Iran, India and even Russia. We have ties with the Taliban to ensure the security of our political offices, consulates and the security of central Asia.”4
Incontrast, Ahmad Murid Partaw, former Afghan National Representativeto US CENTCOM, asserted that the presence of the IS in Afghanistan has been overemphasized by Russia, China and Iran as a pretext not only to intervene in the country's affairs but also to counter the growing influence of the US in the region. He further stated that “the Af-Pak region is not a suitable ground for proliferation of such rejectionist beliefs enforced by IS and its supporters. This region has been influenced by the Deobandi school of Islam rather than Takfiri version.”5
During the latter half of the 1990s, Russia accused the Taliban of training Chechen rebels and fomenting Central Asian radical Islamic networks. As a result, Russia, in collaboration with Iran and India, supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime. Today, Russia no longer views the Taliban as a major threat to its security and interests. There is even a suspicion among Afghan political leaders and officials that Russia is militarily helping the Taliban, with parliamentarians alleging in the upper house that Russia is supplying arms to the Taliban. However, Russian officials have dismissed such Afghan claims and suspicions. They have said that “We have never ever provided any kind of assistance to Taliban. Instead, Russia is assisting the Afghan government and has provided some light weapons on grant basis to its forces and is running programs to train Afghan police and military personnel in Russian institutions.”6
For its part, the Taliban has begun to respond favourably to Moscow’s outreach. Syed Muhammad Akbar Agha, a former Taliban commander who lives in Kabul and still espouses Islamic rule in Afghanistan, said in an interview toKomsomolskaya Pravda that “We are ready to shake hands with Russia in order to rid ourselves of the scourge of America.” He further noted that “history has proven that we are closer to Russia and the former Soviet republics than to the West.”7
It seems clear that Russia and the Taliban share common concerns about both the Islamic State and the continued US presence in Afghanistan. Such thinking is also shared by China and Iran and consequently Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran are pursuing a policy towards Afghanistan that is very different from that of India.
Meanwhile the Afghan government continues to face a host of security challenges posed by the Taliban forces. As recently as January 10, 2017, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in Kabul that killed more than 30 people and wounded some 70 others including the ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to Afghanistan and the governor of Kandahar province. One analyst even asserts that “the Taliban isn’t interested in peace and security. The jihadist group wants to win the Afghan war and it is using negotiations with regional and international powers to improve its standing.”8
Therefore, to expect that the Taliban would give up its terrorist activities is highly unlikely, which means that Russia will not be able to bring about a reconciliation between Kabul and the Taliban. In addition, Russia also has to contend with the view of the Afghan government, which was articulated by its representative Mohammad Ashraf Haidari at the February 15 meeting in Moscow. Haidari emphasized that the National Unity Government (NUG) is the only legitimate government representing all Afghans. And as for the role of the Taliban in the peace process, he stated that “Taliban lack the national and moral legitimacy to represent the Afghan people, who reject terrorism perpetrated by the Taliban and their foreign terrorist allied networks in the name of Islam—a religion of peace, tolerance, and co-existence.”9
Russia is not only taking a relatively benign view of the Taliban but it is also cosying up to Pakistan, the Taliban’s sponsor. Russia’s decision to send troops to Pakistan for a joint military exercise in September 2016 demonstrated this, especially as it came in the wake of the terrorist attack in Uri carried out by the Pakistan-based and-backed jihadi group Jaish-e-Mohammed. Russia justified its military overture to Pakistan by saying that military cooperation was aimed at fighting against the Islamic State. Kabulov argued that “We understand all concerns of India about your western neighbour…But we cannot combat (terrorism) efficiently and productively and eliminate (it) without the cooperation of Pakistan. We need their cooperation and they should realise their importance and responsibility.”10
Clearly, Moscow’s decision to side with the Taliban and Islamabad has fundamentally changed the peace building efforts in Afghanistan. New Delhi and Kabul, on the other hand, still consider the Taliban and its Pakistani sponsor as the main threats to peace and stability in Afghanistan. India is also against the incorporation of the Taliban into the Afghan government so long as it does not renounce terrorism. For their part, Afghan analysts and lawmakers suggest that the regional countries, particularly Pakistan, have never been honest in fighting terrorism.11 In addition, they allege that the International Community has never pressed Pakistan to wipe terrorists out from its soil.12
Given all this, there is little or no prospect of Russia becoming a successful anchor of peace in Afghanistan. Further, the memory of the Soviet invasion is still fresh in the Afghan mind. And Russia has little chance of succeeding so long as the United States maintains troops in Afghanistan. Russia needs to be mindful of the fact that the rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan can be countered only through close cooperation with Afghanistan’s National Unity Government and the Afghan National Security Forces. Its efforts to differentiate between the Islamic State and Taliban are also a mistake given that both groups share a similar ideology, albeitwith slight variations. Engaging the Taliban for the sake of fighting the Islamic State is likely to further alienate Afghanistan’s National Unity Government as well as other stake holders in the Afghan peace process. That, in turn, would only aggravate the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Bangladesh may be able to manage the Rohingya refugee problem only as a short-term expedient, albeit with considerable economic implications.
The Bangladesh government has decided to resettle a large group of the more than 300,000 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in an island called `Thengar Char` off the Noakhali district coast. Dhaka has justified this decision by stating that it will be a temporary relocation from Cox`s Bazaar, where the camps are bursting at the seams, living conditions are unhygienic and the refugees are falling prey to human traffickers and narcotic smuggling networks. Its intention is, to start with, relocate 70,000 Rohingya refugees particularly those given shelter after the civil disturbances in Myanmar`s Rakhine state last year. These refugees from the two main over-populated camps at Kutapalong and Nayapara in Cox`s Bazaar district are to be shifted to Thengar Char island, which is basically a shoal that emerged from the sea only 11 years ago.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government has also started soliciting international financial aid for rehabilitating these refugees in Thengar Char. Hasina is reported to have also discussed prospects of aid for this rehabilitation project with the Chancellor Angela Merkel during her recent visit to Germany to attend the Munich Security Conference. Hasina’s government has also mounted a sensitization drive with foreign missions and their representatives in Dhaka as well as with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees with a view to gain international acceptability for the rehabilitation project. The UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, while recently visiting the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox`s Bazaar, neither endorsed Dhaka’s plan for relocating some of these refugees to Thengar Char nor mentioned anything to the contrary.
International agencies like Human Rights Watch have, however, criticized the refugee relocation decision of Bangladesh government on the ground that it would be against the will of the refugees and consequently violate Bangladesh`s obligations to uphold human rights law. It has also been alleged that such action by Bangladesh would tantamount to violating the essence of non-refoulement – a principle of international law that does not permit state authorities to forcibly push back refugees to places from where they fled from or send them to locations against their will. The fact of the matter is that the physical and environmental conditions in Thengar Char are very challenging and at present not conducive for human habitation. There are reports in the media that the Bangladesh government has tasked the army to help in the rehabilitation-cum-relocation process, which implies that an element of coercion or force may be involved in some contingencies.
Thengar Char is an island of approximately 40 square kilometre area, which was declared a reserve forest in 2013. It is located between Sandeep and Hatia islands off the Noakhali district coast near the Megna river estuary abutting the Bay of Bengal. The island is quite remote, to the extent that it can be reached only by a two-hour boat journey from the nearest Bangladesh mainland, though it is at a linear distance of 80 kilometres from Noakhali town. In the diverse and dynamic coastal area where the island is situated, land erosion and subsidence are major problems, and long-term land reclamation is an essential need for viable economic activity. This is also an area afflicted by frequent storms. There is also no mobile telephone connectivity to Thengar Char. The general impression among authoritative international observers and agencies is that Thengar Char is afflicted by `pirates, cyclones and mud.` Some expert agencies in Bangladesh have observed that it may take 15 to 20 years at the least to make this island effectively habitable with basic minimum services and agricultural conditions suitable for subsistence farming.
In the above-stated circumstances, the decision of the Bangladesh government to relocate the Rohingyas refugees at Thengar Char may not apparently be the most appropriate. Apart from harsh living conditions which these refugees will have to countenance in their new living environment, they will also have to face the challenges of a difficult terrain and the illegal activities and influences of contraband dealers. It is also possible that, after relocation in Thengar Char island, some of these refugees may try to leave the place surreptitiously for other countries like Indonesia towards the east as well as to the Indian Sundarbans in the west, notwithstanding that a risky sea journey of nearly 200 kilometres would be involved to the nearest Indian coastal territory. The Government of India should not, therefore, be oblivious to such an eventuality.
Past experience shows that forcible refugee rehabilitation efforts, particularly in inhospitable terrain, and in juxtaposition to living areas of people or nationalities having competing economic interests, are generally not successful. The Thengar Char programme is unlikely to satisfy the socio-economic aspirations of the Rohingya refugees in the near future. Instead, it may turn out to be a continuous source of their discontent, and also have demographic ramifications for the Bangladeshis in that country`s coastal districts as well as in the Sundarbans area which involves both India and Bangladesh.
Bangladesh could have drawn a lesson from the Dandakaranya Development Project (DDP) experiment in India in the 1950s involving the rehabilitation of Bengali refugees from former East Pakistan. The DDP, conceived by Jawaharlal Nehru, was initiated under a cabinet resolution in 1958 and a Dandakaranya Development Authority (DDA) was set up with substantial administrative powers and supporting finances. The project was intended to rejuvenate nearly 207,000 square kilometres of forested area in the common border zone of Odisha, erstwhile Madhya Pradesh and former Andhra Pradesh. Nehru had then observed in a letter to a parliamentarian from West Bengal that the displaced persons who go there should be associated with the Dandakaranya development effort. However, the reality turned out to be otherwise. Harmonization among the administrative efforts of DDA, adjustment with the original inhabitants, i.e., the tribal people in the vicinity, and lack of motivation among the Bengali refugees to imbibe local agro-climatic practices and pattern of subsistence, were not feasible. Ultimately, rehabilitation was at the most partial, and in fact a large number of the refugees relocated to the DDP area migrated back to West Bengal, causing political unrest and other repercussions in the state`s political milieu.
Conditions in Thengar Char are likely to be more unfavourable for the Rohingya refugees as compared to Dandakaranya because the latter are not likely to be treated at par with Bangladeshi citizens by Dhaka owing to political considerations and inadequacy of financial resources. Another fundamental difference between the Dandakaranya and Thengar Char programmes is that, in the former case, rehabilitation was organized for refugees who were to be finally assimilated as citizens, whereas the Bangladesh government has categorically mentioned that the latter is a temporary relocation of the Rohingya refugees without any commitment towards their eventual retention, absorption or citizenship.
In the above-mentioned backdrop, Bangladesh may be able to manage the Rohingya refugee problem only as a short-term expedient, though with considerable economic implications. It may try out a model which leads to the rejuvenation of Thengar Char for long-term economic development of the island and its vicinity, while preventing the refugees from mingling with Bangladesh’s population and thus avoiding concomitant internal political and economic tensions in the immediate future. But it is doubtful whether such an expedient will serve its long-term politico-economic and security interests, unless the basic causes of the Rohingya refugee influx into Bangladesh are dealt with.
The author is a retired IDAS officer, who has served in senior appointments with the Government of India and with a State Government.
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