Political pulse is running high as the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) presidential election approaches in Japan. LDP’s political culture has increasingly remained embedded in competing factional interests in pursuit of power and position. How the potential candidates leverage the party’s factional fault lines to pursue their political ambitions to become the party president, and thereby chart their trajectory to become the next Prime Minister will be contingent on their political intelligence, timing, experience and acumen for deal-making. But in case the emerging trend within the younger LDP lawmakers arguing in favour of “free vote” beyond factional dictates gain momentum, it will further complicate the puzzle. In the scheduled party election on 29 September 2021, there are 766 votes, 383 votes by Diet members and another 383 by party members. How candidates are positioned in the factional power play, their popularity among younger LDP lawmakers, and also rank and file will determine the numbers game.

With House of Representatives’ four-year term ending in October, and a general election lined up, LDP elites need a leader who demonstrates statesmanship, political vision, boldness in imagining innovative policy responses, and who enjoys popular support as the party seeks a super-majority in the all-powerful Lower House. There is no space for mediocrity at this juncture given the colossal strategic, economic, governance and public health challenges that awaits the new Prime Minister. Japan cannot afford leadership deficit at this critical juncture. Slipping back to its legacy of revolving-door prime ministers is not an option since it will adversely affect key policy matters.

The Clash of Titans and Suga’s Political Fortune

The approaching election is as much about electing the next party president as it is about the ensuing power struggle between party elites: the longest serving Secretary-General Nikai Toshihiro and the troika of Abe Shinzo, Aso Taro and Amari Akira (3A). According to LDP constitution, the party president appoints the secretary-general, and both work inextricably in running the party machinery.

The larger ambition of the 3A to unseat Secretary-General Nikai with Amari1 and undo the concentration of power in Nikai is a critical variable in the party election. The fault lines between Nikai and the 3A became deep-rooted with the 2019 vote-buying scandal in Hiroshima during the House of Councillors election. Nikai’s heavy-handedness and reluctance to own up responsibility for political scandals involving his faction members touched nerves within the party.2 Moreover, his pro-China orientation was not syncing with the party hawks.

But what started as a high-voltage political battle between the LDP kingmakers has surprisingly led to an unpredictable scenario of ending the road for the incumbent party president and a key aspirant, Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide. Suga was not crafty enough to navigate the turbulent political winds within the party. Despite throwing his hat in the party presidential race early on, with political blessings from the party’s second-in-command Nikai, he perhaps thought it would be a déjà vu moment where Hosoda and Aso factions will extend support automatically, like last September. He perhaps forgot the uncomfortable fact that even though Abe supported Suga to take up his job, he was not his first choice. It was Kishida’s fragile position in that race in relation to Abe’s archenemy and former defence minister Ishiba Shigeru that gave political space to Suga in 2020.3

Cabinet’s waning approval ratings4 and eroding public confidence on his ability to contain the Delta variant raised doubts on Suga’s leadership. Moreover, Suga and the party’s second-in-command, Nikai have not set the best precedent with their up-scale dinner gathering in Ginza ignoring government warnings. There is also a perception that Nikai was a major factor in influencing Prime Minister Suga’s policy response to contain the spread of COVID-19. He reportedly had reservations over imposing state of emergency, and suspending the Go to Travel campaign drawing from his deep ties with the tourism industry.5

LDP’s struggle in recent elections, including Yokohama’s mayoral election where Suga’s candidate Okonogi Hachiro lost to opposition-backed Takeharu Yamanaka in August defined disaster for his political fortune. LDP’s Kanagawa chapter opted not to support Suga’s re-election in the presidential race. Moreover, LDP and its junior coalition partner, the Komeito party did not succeed in winning a combined majority in Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in July. Meanwhile, the outcome of the April by-elections, especially the humiliating defeat in LDP’s traditional bastion in Hiroshima to the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan have posed serious questions.

Sensing his loosening grip on power, Suga made a few last minute desperate, yet failed attempts to secure his presidency. But playing with the idea of rearranging the LDP chessboard with reshuffling top party executives, and consequently undoing his kingmaker, Nikai had few takers, and seen as a clumsy response to his contender Kishida’s proposal on reforming the party governance. It was a little too late. Furthermore, his inability to garner support from Abe and Aso at this critical juncture on the one hand and unsuccessful meetings with younger leaders like Koizumi Shinjiro on the other made him realise that his race ended before it began. 

The Spotlight is on

Unlike Suga’s chaotic political moves, former foreign minister and a key contender in the race, Kishida Fumio has articulated some productive ideas regarding reforming party governance, instituting a government agency under the Cabinet Office to manage COVID-19, and coronavirus stimulus package. Once upon a time, Abe considered him as his successor. But today, in addition to his own faction, support from the Hosoda and Aso faction will be crucial in inching closer to the numbers, but these factions may have their own protégées. It will all culminate into what perks and portfolios Kishida is willing to offer to faction elites on the negotiating table.

Suga’s departure has opened up space for young sharp leaders from LDP’s talent pool, for instance, Kono Taro (Aso faction) who enjoys popular support given his ability to articulate bold vision with his strategically timed book Moving Japan Forward, or taking tough decisions—whether it is cancelling planned deployment of two Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defence systems or taking up the challenge of being a vaccine czar. The tech-savy, Western-educated modern politician with adequate experience in key ministries including defence and foreign affairs may just be the right fit for the top job. But will the old guard make way for the next generation?

Will this party leadership race lead to LDP’s first woman president, and consequently the nation’s first woman prime minister? Female political representation and leadership remains unusually low for an economically advanced democracy as Japan. Even though conservative Takaichi Sanae is gearing up for the race, reportedly with Abe’s support given their ideological proximity, reaching the finish line navigating the male-dominated Japanese politics will be a daunting task, especially with her relatively low ratings in the opinion polls. In her upcoming book, she reportedly supports pursuing a “New Abenomics”.6

Each candidate’s position on key policy directions will crystallise as the campaign starts on September 17, and the series of debate on key verticals like managing COVID-19, economic and fiscal reforms, and foreign and security policy kicks off on September 23.

Abe as an astute politician is seizing the opportunity by positioning himself at the centrestage of LDP politics. Whether the end-game is to remain just the kingmaker, or to attempt his own stint at the premiership someday remains the big question. He has bounced back from his short sabbatical following health concerns, and is working with other power centres like Aso and Amari, in anchoring and advising a few key parliamentary groups, aimed at driving the policy conversation on key subjects, for instance the semiconductor strategy.

Suga’s Exit: Game-Changer for the Opposition

Japan’s opposition leaders are perhaps the most disappointed with his decision to depart from Kantei. With the Lower House election approaching, the opposition strategy was to politically cash in on Suga’s unpopularity, primarily driven by his struggle to contain the COVID-19 crisis. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan along with others including Japanese Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, and the Democratic Party for the People, relied on turning public displeasure vis-à-vis Suga administration’s COVID-19 crisis management into substantial political gains in the Lower House election.7 However, with a new Prime Minister in office in the coming weeks, it is time to revisit their election strategy.

The Way Ahead

Effective leadership is crucial for delivering good governance and manoeuvring through colossal demographic, economic, security, strategic and foreign policy challenges amid a pandemic. Political stability holds the key. To be fair to Prime Minister Suga, his one year report card does demonstrate his commitment to deliver on a few key agenda, from Digital Agency to carbon neutrality by 2050. Even though he lacked the charisma of his predecessor, he successfully advanced Japan’s geo-strategic and geo-economic ambitions at the global stage. While LDP is most certainly expected to win the upcoming Lower House election (probably with a reduced majority), the party cannot afford weak leadership as it will threaten to inject political instability. But the competing names at this early stage of the party race do hold promise for quality leadership in this election season in Japan.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Yora Masao, “The 3A-2F War: The Veiled Election-Year Struggle Inside the LDP”, Nippon.com, 18 August 2021.
• 2. Yora Masao, “The LDP in Search of a Center: Kingmaker Nikai’s Stock Falls as Suga Loses Support”, Nippon.com, 10 February 2021.
• 3. Yukihiro Sakaguchi and Shunsuke Shigeta, “How Japan's Suga Went from Dark Horse to Favorite in PM Race”, Nikkei Asia, 5 September 2020.
• 4. “Suga Cabinet Approval Rate Drops to 29%”, NHK World-Japan, 10 August 2021; “Japan PM Suga Cabinet's Approval Rate Drops to Record Low 31.8%”, Kyodo News, 16 August 2021; “Approval Rate for Suga's Cabinet Stays Below 30%”, The Japan Times, 13 August 2021; Tsubasa Yoda,  “Suga's Approval Rating Plunges Toward Point of No Return”, Nikkei Asia, 27 July 2021.
• 5. “Suga's Deference to LDP Heavyweight Blamed for COVID-19 Policy Delays”, The Japan Times, 12 January 2021.
• 6. Tomohiro Osaki, “Could Japan Soon Have a Female Leader? Sanae Takaichi Emerges as a Contender”, The Japan Times, 5 September 2021.
• 7. Hideki Kitami, “Opposition Desperately Wanted Suga to Stay in Office”, The Asahi Shimbun, 4 September 2021.

As the situation in Afghanistan unravels and uncertainties characterise the Asian geo-political landscape, terms such as “bad” and “good” Taliban of yesteryears have become redundant. In the recent turn of events, the Taliban has revealed itself as a hybrid group, blending shades of old and new. The claim that they represent the “Afghan nation” is reflective of a mimetic practice wherein “modern” vocabulary of women rights, emancipation, freedom, peace, amongst others, is being used to receive legitimate recognition from the international community.

The media conferences conducted by the Taliban, cautions one to approach the vocabularies employed by them through filtered frames, and prods us to revisit Susanne Rudolf’s piece1 written in the backdrop of 9/11. Rudolf raised the question of dealing with the “alien other” (then al Qaeda), and problematised the neutrality of concepts. She underlined the limitations of conceptual categories crafted in a dominant socio-cultural environment, being often transposed to other geo-cultural spaces, and argued that while command of Arabic and knowledge of Islamic culture and politics would have helped, area specialists were ignored and their wisdom marginalised while formulating policy. Foregrounding the importance of situated knowledge, she emphasised how local understanding of histories, social processes and world-views can help understand conceptual categories effectively.

While questions like these need to be discussed and debated from both policy and academic perspectives, it holds relevance as regards what and how we “teach” strategic and diplomatic studies to students of International Relations (IR). For instance, content analysis of the two latest news conferences by the Taliban2 raise some fundamental questions regarding the layered conceptual thicket which often resides in vocabularies such as state, order, stability, peace, emancipation, borders, amongst others, that a student of IR uncritically employs while engaging with strategic discourses and events. In the following paragraphs, it is argued that the rise of Taliban, and the choice of words it employs to communicate with the international community is symptomatic not only of the limits of inter-cultural communication, but it also depicts how meanings move across geo-cultural spaces and that “right” vocabularies are being used indeed as a qualifier to join the community of nations.

For instance, the opening lines, “We have expelled the foreigners and I would like to congratulate the whole nation on this. This is pride  not only for a limited number of people. This is a proud moment for the whole nation”3, are instructive. While the term “Afghan nation” reminds one of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined political community—imagined as both limited and sovereign”4, it also indicates difficulty of translating the concept of nation-state across geo-cultural spaces. Employed to consolidate and perpetuate power by the globalised elites in over-developed post-colonial states under the guise of modernity, the project of nation-state gave a distinct meaning to national security, identity and development. As a result, indigenous forms of imagining the political were lost, and resistance movements against the state were often perceived as a threat to order, stability and security.

Against this backdrop, vocabularies employed by the Taliban merit attention. Just reframing them as Taliban 2.0 does not do justice to alternative forms of “situated knowledge” and makes a student of strategic studies impervious to philosophical and cultural categories which offer alternative ways of understanding war and peace. While scholarship on non-Western, post-Western, global International Relations Theory has raised some of these issues, discourses on strategic studies are yet to embrace the meaning and reflect on the consequences of these developments.

A case in point may be the ways through which emancipatory jargon was employed by the Taliban during their 17 August media conference.5 Some significant vocabularies/themes which rest at the interstices of Christian and Islamic intellectual traditions, and can be prone to different interpretations are suggestive of the intersections between philosophy, ideology and strategy.  Terms and themes such as war and peace, rights and duties, and order and border overtly emphasised during the media conference merit some discussion. From a cross-cultural perspective, these terms can have different meanings, thus following a distinct logic or reasoning. In this regard, the invocation of war and peace at different points in the transcript, and how it can be interpreted and the meaning it holds, is instructive for students of strategic studies. For instance, phrases like, “we have expelled the foreigners”, “we want to do away with the factors for conflict”, “the Islamic Emirate does not have any kind of hostility or animosity with anybody; animosities have come to an end and we would like to live peacefully”, emphasises that war in the past was used as a defensive measure by the Taliban, and “jihad” was used in an instrumental manner to push the “foreigners” out. Further, the squaring of “freedom” with “emancipation from occupation” is reminiscent of how the spiritual and revolutionary sentiment contained in Islam is symbolically communicated by the Taliban.

The second aspect which comes across clearly is the dialectics between rights and duties, which seem to be dependent on each other, and thus cannot be looked at as separate categories.  While labelling their action as a legitimate right, directed towards the hope to make Afghanistan bereft of “internal and external enemies” (the duty), they seem to be emphasising the differentiation between friend and enemy from the lens of political Islam. Further, statements like “the Islamic Emirate is committed to the rights of women within the framework of Sharia” or “Our laws, when it comes to media and other essentials are going to be such that everybody should be able to work but within the framework of the Islamic Sharia laws”6 also seek to communicate that sovereignty does not lie with the state but with the sharia, which is an instance of reconciling tradition and modernity. Whether such reconciliation would be based on ijtihad (reasoned struggle and rethinking) requires a wait and watch approach, and unfortunately, this has been missing on discourses around contemporary and political Islam. This has consequences for the discipline of IR, where scholars often engage with complex issues of cross-cultural communication.  

The third aspect is the statement on the challenges of maintaining order and respecting the existing borders of Afghanistan. This is significant in terms of responding to the potential anxieties of some neighbours—Iran, Pakistan and China—who have explicitly come out in the support of Taliban. For instance, the Taliban noted, “we have all the borders under our control. There is not going to be any case of smuggling of weapons. All the weapons that are being used in fighting are going to be corrected and completed and registered”.rther, they highlight, “we are assuring our countrymen and women and the international community, we will not [...] produce any narcotics…if you remember, we had brought narcotics conte7 Funt production to zero in 2001, but our country was unfortunately occupied by then and the way was paved for reproduction of narcotics, even at the level of the government—everybody was involved. The international community should help us so that we can have alternative crops”.8

While much is being hypothesised about the future of Afghanistan, and the motivation of the involvement and presence of both state and non-state actors, this instance of public communication by the Taliban is an interesting spectacle to problematise, question and reflect on concepts stemming from distinct geo-cultural spaces. It is a reminder that techniques of diplomacy demand that geography and history of ideas be taken seriously by students of strategic studies in particular and IR in general.

Traditional ways of diplomacy and ways of thinking about the “International” are bound to have limitations. While the call for decolonising knowledge in IR needs to be taken seriously, it is important to understand that political systems are grounded in cultures and, as Adda Boseman puts it, “examining cultural infrastructure of nations and political systems become important for understanding International Relations”9. While much work has been done in terms of challenges it pose to the discipline of IR, one is yet to discuss and debate the limitations of conceptual categories and the relevance this holds for strategic studies. What happens when a patently illiberal entity captures a state and uses liberal idiom to legitimise its actions? An appropriate response to this question demands that we examine the rationale behind such mimetic practices and critically explore ways for theorising and responding to such hybridity.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Susanne Rudolf, “The Imperialism of Categories: Situating Knowledge in a Globalizing World”, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 5–14.
• 2. “Transcript of Taliban’s First News Conference in Kabul”, Al Jazeera, 17 August 2021; and “Taliban’s Spokesperson Holds Press Conference” , CGTN, 24 August 2021.
• 3. “Transcript of Taliban’s First News Conference in Kabul”, Al Jazeera, 17 August 2021.
• 4. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections On the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, New York, 2006.
• 5. Al Jazeera, no. 3.
• 6. Ibid.
• 7. Ibid.
• 8. Ibid.
• 9. Adda B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1960.

“Russia continues contacts with all political forces in Afghanistan. This excludes groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. These are purely terrorist groups. The Taliban have a recognized political office with which political representatives Abdullah Abdullah and Hamid Karzai continue to negotiate… The fact that the Taliban are now declaring and proving in practice their readiness to respect the opinion of others, I think, is a positive signal”.1

This recent statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov appears to reflect Russia’s calibrated Afghan approach anchored in realpolitik. Moscow’s embrace of the Taliban, seven years in the making2, is a significant turnaround given their tumultuous history. This includes the Kremlin’s support to the Northern Alliance and the US in tackling the Taliban which had aided militants in Russia’s northern Caucasus and Central Asia, long considered Russia’s soft underbelly.

Today, the Taliban appears to have reciprocated Russia’s overtures. It has not only guaranteed the safety and security of the Russian embassy staff but also recognised Moscow as a key interlocutor.3 The Taliban’s seal of approval was reflected in it identifying Russia, China and Pakistan as the countries with which it has “very good” relations.4 Incidentally, the Russia–Taliban thaw precedes a growing convergence in the Moscow–Beijing–Islamabad triangle. A fully operational local presence in Kabul likely provides Russia with a ring-side view to shape the ongoing political processes.

The pertinent questions, therefore, are what are the key drivers of Russia’s Afghan policy? And, could these drivers shape the Indo-Russian strategic partnership?

Drivers of Russia’s Afghan Policy

A detailed examination of the subject reveals both tactical and strategic objectives of Russia in engaging with the Taliban which has emerged as the dominant actor in Afghanistan.

Security

Maintaining security and stability in Central Asia which borders Afghanistan seems to be a key pillar of Russia’s Afghan calculus. Instability in Kabul has invariably spilled over into Central Asia in the form of terrorism, organised crime, radicalisation and refugees. Cross-border ethnic linkages and porous boundaries have only facilitated this spill-over.

Russia appears to have identified the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K), an offshoot of the Islamic State of Levant (ISIL) which had lured-in more than 5,000 Russians and Central Asians5, as the most potent threat to Central Asia’s stability.6  Notably, the IS-K’s espousal of Khorasan encompasses Central Asia. It is here that Russia seems to be banking on the Taliban to be a bulwark against the spread of IS-K into Central Asia from Afghanistan. This is largely anchored in the perception of the Taliban focusing inwards and Russia seeking to exploit the adversarial relationship between the Taliban and the IS-K. Crucially for Russia, it appears that the Taliban today largely controls Afghanistan’s northern border with Central Asia.7 This region has also for long been a safe haven for exiled Central Asian militants. Taliban’s assurances of preventing Afghanistan from being a staging ground for instability in Central Asia appears to have carried a strong resonance in Moscow.8 Concomitantly, Taliban’s control of northern boundaries would allow Russia to evaluate the group’s assurances.

Incidentally, Russia’s security concerns seem to be shared by China as well9, given the proximity of restive Xinjiang to Afghanistan. There appears to be growing convergence between Moscow and Beijing to contain the Afghan volatility. In this, they have sought to tap Pakistan’s strong linkages with the Taliban to shape a modus vivendi with the latter. Unsurprisingly, the growing Russia–Pakistan rapprochement10 is a key outcome of Russia’s ongoing Afghan calculus.11

Strategic Objectives

By positioning itself as an interlocutor of the Taliban, anchored in Moscow Format and Extended Troika talks, Russia has emerged as a key stakeholder in the Afghan imbroglio. This could even be viewed as part of Russia’s larger gameplan of projecting itself as an indispensable pole in resolving global and regional issues. Russia’s growing stakes in Afghanistan could help dilute the Western projection of Russia as an isolated power amidst the ongoing Russia–West confrontation.

Incidentally, Russia has long been suspicious of the United States’ strategic objectives in the Eurasian geo-political chessboard, notwithstanding the US presence being a factor of stability for Central Asia in the last two decades. In the past, Russia had accused the US of further weaponising the ISIS in Afghanistan to foment trouble in Central Asia.12

Concomitantly, the US withdrawal has provided Russia new tools in its information warfare with the US. This includes raising questions on US reliability as a strategic partner especially to countries like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine which have increasingly courted the West. Meanwhile, it would be unsurprising if Russia viewed the US exit through the prism of schadenfreude. The USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan three decades ago continues to be viewed as a dark age in Soviet history.13 Today, Russia would pat its own back for accurately reading the Afghan tea-leaves by engaging the Taliban.

Russia’s Afghan Toolkit

A stable political transition in Afghanistan is a key concern for Russia. While acknowledging the Taliban’s dominant position14, it appears that Russia is seeking to replicate its Syrian playbook of connecting with all stakeholders, both internal and external. This has seen Russia engage actors across Afghanistan’s political spectrum as well as extra-regional and regional powers.15 It can be seen as part of the Russian calculus to facilitate an inclusive government led by the Taliban, with perhaps a better chance at restoring peace and stability. Such a political set-up could also command greater international legitimacy especially if the Taliban walk the talk of moderation in its 2.0 avatar. Russia could take credit for any potential success.

It is, therefore, unlikely that Russia will back any resistance movement which could complicate Kremlin’s thaw with the Taliban. Nevertheless, Russia could play a role in bringing the warring sides to the negotiation table.16

An inclusive government in Kabul would allow Russia to recognise it without having to immediately lift its domestic ban on the Taliban. The carrot of legitimacy likely gives Russia some leverage over the Taliban to seek concessions. This is especially relevant in the current climate of the Taliban’s continuing international ostracism.

It is likely that Russia will back a governance model in Afghanistan anchored in local traditions and customs. President Putin’s pubic rebuttal of the failure of the US model of parachuting Western form of governance is indicative of Russia’s strategy.17

Meanwhile, a working relationship with Russia increases Taliban’s scope for manoeuvre vis-à-vis its other backers. Russia could also be a pillar in the Taliban’s quest for international legitimacy.

Opportunities

The ongoing churnings in Kabul present to Moscow an opportunity to consolidate its position as Central Asia’s pre-eminent security provider anchored in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russia has sought to leverage the region’s emerging fear psychosis to strengthen existing regional capacities and step-up military coordination with the Central Asian Republics (CARs).18 This includes the frontline states of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which have traditionally remained outside the CSTO.

Given Russia’s sensitivities to a US military footprint in its immediate neighbourhood, it is unlikely that CARs would now acquiesce to any American request19 for basing rights to carry out air strikes in Afghanistan. This proposed US arrangement could in fact complicate Russia’s and CARs’ emerging equations with the Taliban.

Arguably, Russia’s enhanced military activism dovetails with its attempts at making a comeback in Eurasia at a time when the Kremlin appears to be increasingly squeezed in its “Near Abroad”. The Russian rouble’s crisis and growing Pax Sinica have the potential to undermine Russia’s sphere of influence.

Challenges

The Taliban is not a monolith. There exist questions on its ability to control multiple radical groups especially those operating in the northern borders of Afghanistan who have cross-border ethnic linkages with CARs. The Taliban’s victory could energise these groups. A similar situation could play out in Russia’s northern Caucasus. Drug and weapons trafficking too could see a boost amidst Afghanistan’s international sources of finance20 being increasingly blocked.

Contrary to existing perceptions, Russia’s engagement of the Taliban does not appear to be an indication of the Kremlin’s outright approval of the group. This is reflected in Moscow treading cautiously as evident in Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighting the threat posed by the weapons that the Taliban has forcibly acquired.21 The Taliban spokesperson’s recent refusal to rule out ties with Al Qaeda would likely have upped the ante.

Meanwhile, Russia’s attempts at forming a modus vivendi with the Taliban could be complicated by CARs. Tajikistan, where Russia has a military base, seems to have struck a discordant note. While President Emomali Rahmon’s statement22 criticising the Taliban could be a tactic to protect the interests of Tajik minority in the new Afghanistan political set-up, yet there are certain aces up Dushanbe’s sleeves which could put Russia in a difficult situation. This includes supporting resistance movements. Similarly, growing intra-CARs cooperation23 could upend Russia’s Afghan gameplan.

Meanwhile, withdrawal from Afghanistan would allow the US to channelise its resources towards not only the Indo-Pacific but also Russia’s western neighbourhood.

Afghanistan in the Indo-Russian Strategic Partnership

India and Russia’s Afghan policies have tactically diverged in the recent past, which is evident from their rationale of engaging the Taliban. This is notwithstanding their shared strategic convergence of a stable Afghanistan that is not a staging ground for terrorism.

Nevertheless, the rise of Taliban today is a geo-strategic reality. With Russia emerging as a key interlocutor of the group, Moscow could play a role in facilitating potential dialogue with India, if and when New Delhi decides to do so. The recent positive statements emanating from the Taliban about India could present an opening.

Meanwhile, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) led regional mechanism on Afghanistan, comprising all key regional stakeholders, appears to be gaining traction. Notably, Russia remains a vital pillar of support for India in this Eurasian multilateral grouping.

With the Afghan political fog potentially lifting post 31 August 2021, Russia appears invested in reaching out to India. This is evident from the recent talks between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin, which led to the two traditional partners establishing an exclusive channel of communication on Afghanistan.24 Incidentally, India is chairing, as part of its two year non-permanent membership of UNSC, the Taliban Sanctions Committee and Counter-Terrorism Committee. It remains to be seen whether India and Russia can harmonise their Afghan policies.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Выступление и ответы на вопросы Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В.Лаврова в ходе встречи с преподавательским составом и студентами Балтийского федерального университета им. И.Канта, Калининград” (Speech and Answers to Questions by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov during a Meeting with the Faculty and Students of the V.I. Kanta, Kaliningrad), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 17 August 2021.
• 2. “Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 27 February 2020.
• 3. “Захват Афганистана талибами” (Capture of Afghanistan by Taliban), Echo Moskvy, 16 August 2021.
• 4. “Как боевики перевоплощаются в чиновников” (Militants Transform into Officials), Kommersant, 18 August 2021.
• 5. “Central Asia”, p. 86, RSiS, 1 January 2021.
• 6. “Comment by the Information and Press Department on the Ceasefire in Afghanistan”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 18 June 2018.
• 7. “Шойгу заявил, что талибы в Афганистане контролируют границу с Узбекистаном и Таджикистаном” (Shoigu said Taliban in Afghanistan Control Border with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), Itar-Tass, 11 August 2021.
• 8. Ibid.
• 9. “Telephone Conversation with President of China Xi Jinping”, President of Russia, 25 August 2021.
• 10. “О предстоящем визите Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова в Пакистан” (Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Upcoming Visit to Pakistan), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 6 April 2021.
• 11. “Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan”, President of Russia, 25 August 2021.
• 12. “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on Washington’s Charges that Russia is Complicit in the Death of US Soldiers in Afghanistan”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 16 April 2021.
• 13. “7 Lessons Russian Strategists Learned From Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan”, The Moscow Times, 10 January 2021.
• 14. “News Conference Following Russian-German Talks”, President of Russia, 20 August 2021.
• 15. “Выступление и ответы на вопросы СМИ Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В.Лаврова в ходе совместной пресс-конференции с Министром иностранных дел и международного сотрудничества Правительства национального единства Ливии Н.Манкуш” (Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at a Joint Press Conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Government of National Unity of Libya Najla Mangoush), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 19 April 2021.
• 16. “Taliban Rule Will Be a 'Threat' to Russia and the World, Top Panjshir Resistance Member Warns”, The Moscow Times, 26 August 2021.
• 17. No. 14.
• 18. “Session of CSTO Collective Security Council”, President of Russia, 23 August 2021.
• 19. “How the U.S. Plans to Fight the War from Afar after Troops Exit Afghanistan”, The New York Times, 15 April 2021.
• 20. “Afghanistan Faces ‘Dire’ Financial Outlook, Warns Former Central Bank Chief”, Financial Times, 19 August 2021.
• 21. “Шойгу заявил об угрозе из-за доставшегося талибам оружия” (Shoigu Spoke about the Threat from Weapons that Taliban has Acquired), Ria Novosti, 24 August 2021.
• 22. “Таджики должны занимать достойное место в будущем правительстве Афганистана” (Tajiks Must Take a Worthy Place in the Future Government of Afghanistan), Kommersant, 26 August 2021.
• 23. “Turkmenistan Hosts Consultative Meeting of Heads of Central Asian States”, Turkmenistan Internet Gazeta, 7 August 2021.
• 24. “Telephone Conversation with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi”, President of Russia, 24 August 2021; and “Telephonic Conversation between Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and President of the Russian Federation H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 24 August 2021.

The COVID-19 pandemic has situated the policy conversation on economic security at the centre stage of national security calculus not just in Washington and European capitals but also in Tokyo. Hard policy choices are at play as high-tech supply chains are redefining the global balance of power, order and values. Key agenda on the high table encompasses mapping vulnerabilities and controlling chokepoints in supply chains, especially semiconductors, advanced batteries for electric vehicles (EV), rare earth and strategic minerals, and pharmaceuticals that are increasingly proving to be game-changers in the Sino-US rivalry. The Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2020 underscored the urgency to craft both a “just-in-time” and “just-in-case”1 design for bolstering economic security and effective risk management.

As Tokyo takes a deep dive into framing its economic security strategy, pressing questions occupy the mind space of policy elites: how to balance the goal of attaining “strategic autonomy” in critical supply chains at the national level, and at the same time pursue “strategic indispensability”2 at the global level by positioning Japan in control of chokepoints in the international supply network? How to ensure that regulating foreign investment in “core” industries through revision of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act is not perceived as unwarranted government intervention eroding predictability3 and further dampen Japan’s already abysmal share4 of inward FDI to GDP? How to compete effectively and create space for Japanese firms globally in patenting 6G solutions instead of playing the catch-up game as witnessed in the case of 5G technology? How to secure Japan’s critical national security infrastructure and institutions from cyber espionage?

Sino-US contest over competing values and ideology is at play. In carving a Sino-centric order, President Xi Jinping relies on not just hard military power but also smart geo-economic tools. Beyond mega-strategic designs like the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is employing targeted programmes including the Thousand Talents Plan, Made in China 2025, and China Standards 2035 in its quest to become a global technology and innovation leader. Thus Washington and its allies are stepping up their game by mainstreaming economic security in policy planning—be it seeking to bolster American power with the US Innovation and Competition Act, or investing in forming an alliance of techno-democracies, or leading the advanced economies in the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative.  

Japan, as a potent US ally and the third largest economy, is an important anchor in shaping the rules and standards of the post COVID-19 order. While economic diplomacy has long been an important pillar of Japan’s grand strategy, the policies on economic security are still in the making. Tokyo has aligned its policies with the US and other strategic partners, and positioned itself in an instrumental role in designing several key initiatives, including collectively committing US$ 4.5 billion in quest for Beyond 5G solutions under the US-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership; the Quad group on emerging technologies to coordinate on development of technology standards; leading data governance under Osaka Track; anchoring the Japan–Australia–India Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI); advancing infrastructure development through the US–Japan–Australia Blue Dot Network and so on. In fact, Tokyo has demonstrated credible global leadership in steering trade liberalisation and played a crucial role in agenda and standard setting in mega Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).

Japan is building defence with new legislations and also beefing up its institutional set up. From setting up an economic unit at the National Security Secretariat (NSS) and a Digital Agency; drafting legislations5 with the objective of seamless inter-ministerial coordination in averting outflow of strategic technologies; moving towards a security clearance system; enacting national security related land bill mandating disclosure of foreign ownership near strategic assets; setting up stringent disclosure rules on universities in sensitive research areas like artificial intelligence (AI) and biotechnology; revising Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act to secure sensitive information and technology from foreign state interference, and protecting rare earth industry6 from hostile foreign takeovers; subsidising manufacturers to re-shore and diversify supply chains; extending tax incentives to encourage network service providers to advance secured 5G infrastructure and alleviate supply-chain risks—Japan’s economic security thinking is manifesting.

Framing a robust semiconductor strategy has taken centre stage in Japan’s New Growth Strategy 2021. The Strategy for Semiconductors and the Digital Industry, released by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI),  categorically argues that cutting-edge logic semiconductors, considered the “brain of industry”, is Japan’s weak link,7 and thus Tokyo is aiming to strengthen domestic manufacturing by way of joint ventures with overseas foundries. Japan is looking at working with the US, Taiwan and the Netherlands which possess the materials and manufacturing capability to produce next-generation semiconductors. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has formed a Diet group on semiconductor strategy8 led by Amari Akira and supported by Abe Shinzo and Aso Taro. To attain strategic indispensability in the supply chain, Japan should control choke point technologies in global semiconductor ecosystem and concentrate on areas where it is globally competitive, like advanced materials and production equipment.9 Allocating more resources to develop chip manufacturing technology is vitally important.

Following the pandemic, geo-political complexities have further sharpened the discourse on economic security. The key question is how to safeguard Japanese interests from Chinese “predatory” economics on the one hand and the impact of ensuing Sino-US strategic rivalry on the other? Even before the pandemic induced global recession, the trade war between world’s two leading economies adversely affected Japan given its deeply enmeshed trade and investment roots both in the US and China. Balancing Tokyo’s national interests in the US–China–Japan triangle constitutes a gargantuan challenge. As a stabilizer of the US-led system, Tokyo and Beijing have competing visions of regional order. The US–Japan treaty alliance remains a potent force in defending the rules-based international order, and serves as a global public good in anchoring strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, engaging in a zero-sum game with China, the second largest economy which remains a compelling force in post COVID-19 economic recovery with huge market, and Japan’s largest trading partner, is not an easy choice. Amid this delicate balance, as Tokyo taps into the economic opportunities that China presents, managing risks and buttressing national security is vitally important while doing business with China. While Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) has begun debating economic security within its Foreign Affairs Committee, going ahead, the conversation between the government and the private sector needs to deepen to achieve better synergy. It would entail balancing the national security and economic cost without diluting Japan’s global standing as a pivotal player in promoting rules.  

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2020”, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 17 July 2020.
• 2. “Japan’s Economic Security Strategy in the New Era”, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 9 July 2021.
• 3. Suzuki Kazuto, “Economic Security in the Era of US-China Rivalry”, Nippon.com, 28 July 2021.
• 4. “FDI in Figures”, OECD, April 2020.
• 5. “Japan to Draft Bill on Oversight of Foreign Investment in Critical Industries”, The Japan Times, 28 July 2021.
• 6. “Japan Defends Rare-earths Industry from Unwanted Foreign Takeovers”, Nikkei Asia, 19 August 2021.
• 7. “The Strategy for Semiconductors and the Digital Industry (Summary)”, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2021.
• 8. “LDP Heavyweights Unite to Keep Key Suga Backer in Check”, The Japan Times, 24 May 2021.
• 9. Suzuki Kazuto, no. 3.