Tokyo Olympics: A Game-changer in Japan’s Looming Election Season?
Titli Basu
July 01, 2021
Two key elections are approaching in Japan. As Prime Minister Suga seeks public mandate with just one year's report card amidst a pandemic, his political future is contingent on rapid inoculation and a successful Olympics.
Political winds are blowing in Japan as two key elections are approaching—the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) presidential election in September and the Lower House election as its term ends in October. It would be interesting to see how Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide's political future shapes up as he navigates the domestic politics—balancing public health during a pandemic and the Olympics dream on the one hand, and the inoculation drive and economic recovery on the other. What will be the most immediate decisive issues as Japan heads for a snap election, most likely in September? How are the factional alignments taking shape within the ruling LDP? And, how the kingmakers within the party are positioning themselves?
Prime Minister Suga stepped into office in September 2020 following his predecessor Abe Shinzo’s sudden decision to depart from Kantei owing to health issues. Assuming the responsibility of life and livelihood of people in the middle of a raging global pandemic, especially with an impending election the following year, was certainly not an enviable position. In his maiden policy speech at the Diet in October 2020, Prime Minister Suga categorically stated that one of his top priorities is to host a successful Olympics to demonstrate victory over the COVID-19 pandemic.1 While he started on a high note with an over 70 per cent approval rating last year, public confidence in his administration has gone down with three states of emergency since then. As several prefectures in Japan come out of the third state of emergency and some remain in quasi-emergency on the heels of the Olympics, Suga’s political future hangs in balance with two key elections approaching. In the run-up to the Games and subsequently the elections, his public approval rating stands at 37 per cent in both the NHK2 and The Yomiuri Shimbun3 polls in June, 33 per cent in The Asahi Shimbun poll4 and 31 per cent in the Mainichi Shimbun-Social Survey Research Centre poll in May.5
As Japan hosts the mega-sports event—Olympics (23 July–8 August) and Paralympics Games (24 August –5 September)—one of the crucial responsibilities of Prime Minister Suga would be to ensure that the nation’s much-touted “Recovery and Reconstruction Games” do not turn into a super spreader event. To this end, the inoculation drive has taken a new urgency. Suga has set out clear goals and aims to vaccinate all people above 65 years by the end of July. Japan has reached the goal of one million shots a day and has set up mass vaccination centres in Tokyo and Osaka managed by the Self-Defense Forces. With effective inoculation and a successful Olympics, Prime Minister Suga may be successful in winning public confidence in his administration before heading for elections.
Timing the snap election is also an important decision. The ideal situation for Prime Minister Suga would be to call the snap election in September, after the Paralympics. On the one hand, this will give him a crucial two months to intensify his vaccination drive and secure public health, on the other hand a successful Olympic Games will boost Japan’s pride as the host nation and generate positive public sentiment; both the conditions are absolutely crucial for Suga’s success in securing a public mandate in favour of the LDP in the Lower House election. However, it is worth noting that not all the variables are in his control. How the Delta variant unleashes itself as 15,000 athletes and several thousand officials enter Japan during the Games will have a direct influence on the election outcome.
The stakes are high as Japan has no way out of the Olympics; the cost and complexity of the Olympics contract outweigh opinion polls expressing public reservations in hosting the Games. A recent poll indicates that almost 86 per cent of those surveyed are worried about a possible surge in COVID-19 cases if the Games are hosted. Moreover, Shigeru Omi, who leads the government panel on COVID-19 response, has also weighed in by arguing that it is “unusual” to host the games amid a pandemic. The Tokyo Medical Practitioners Association has urged the government to reconsider hosting the Games. A few corporate leaders have also expressed their concerns, however, the decision on the Olympics is beyond the purview of Prime Minister Suga. The contract between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the Japanese Olympic Committee indicates that the decision on cancelling the Games solely lies with the IOC. Even though the IOC has the authority to cancel the Games in case there is “reasonable ground” to assess whether participants’ safety would be “seriously threatened or jeopardised”,6the financial stakes are enormous since it dispenses 90 per cent of its revenue to sports federations and national Olympic committees. Billions of dollars signed in broadcasting rights further complicate the issue.
The once-postponed Tokyo Games costs around US$ 15.4 billion,7 which is double the original estimation of US$ 7.3 billion when Japan won the bid in 2013. The one-year delay costed US$ 2.8 billion. Meanwhile, some media estimates suggest that the Olympics would cost about US$ 25 billion.8 Olympics was an opportunity for Japan to not only steer foreign tourism but also drive construction investments. However, the economy will have to absorb the dent in the tourism industry as the pandemic has forced Japan to restrict foreign spectators during the Games. An estimation by the Nomura Research Institute argued that while cancelling the Games would cost Japan around US$ 17 billion, the economic loss would be much greater in case a fresh state of emergency is imposed.9
Prime Minister Suga is therefore betting on rapid vaccination. However, Japan has been relatively behind the G7 powers with just 9.2 per cent of the population fully vaccinated and 11 per cent partially vaccinated (till 24 June 2021), compared to 48 per cent fully vaccinated in the United Kingdom, 45.50 per cent in the United States, 35 per cent in Germany, 29 per cent in Italy and 26 per cent in Canada.10 This is essentially because of the additional domestic trials and the two-step approval, initially by Japan’s Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) and followed by the panel of experts in the health ministry, delayed the rollout by a couple of months.11 In addition to this, Japanese have displayed low confidence in vaccines, drawing from its previous experiences.12 However, on the heels of the Olympics, the inoculation drive has gained momentum.
Since a snap election is expected to follow the Olympics, LDP’s factional politics is likely to come into play. Even though Prime Minister Suga has not been affiliated with any faction, in the September 2020 elections, he managed to secure support from five of the seven key LDP factions. So, what has changed since then? Suga’s key contenders last year, both former Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio’s and former Defence Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s position has eroded. Kishida’s standing has been diluted following the outcome of the Upper House by-election in Hiroshima and Ishiba’s position is shaky with a few members leaving his faction. But, going into the party presidential election this time, Suga also has to factor in the reality that, unlike last time, rank-and-file members will be a part of the process.
In the snap election, the kingmakers in the LDP, including former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro and Secretary-General Nikai Toshihiro, will throw their weight behind Prime Minister Suga to avoid any mixed messaging to the public, and consolidate a two-third majority in the Lower House election. But how the factional politics take shape in the party presidential election remains to be seen. An ideal situation for Suga will be to secure a victory for the LDP in the crucial Lower House election, which will further secure his position as the party president. Meanwhile, it is important to keep an eye on how Abe is positioning himself back into the game. While he supports Suga, he has also indicated a preference for Foreign Minister ToshimitsuMotegi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato, Policy Research Chief Hakubun Shimomura and former Foreign Minister Kishida as Suga’s successor.13 Furthermore, media polls have floated predictable names including that of Minister for Administrative Affairs Kono Taro, Environment Minister Koizumi Shinjiro, and former Defence Minister Ishiba as topping the charts. But the LDP election is about manoeuvring factional politics rather than popular support.
As Suga heads for two key elections, he has made a mark with his digitalisation and decarbonisation drive in domestic politics and demonstration of Japan’s leadership in global platforms, be it the G7 summit or the Quad. He has also ensured that he is the first foreign leader to be hosted by President Joseph Biden following the change of guard in Washington. As he seeks public mandate with just one year’s report card amidst a pandemic, Suga’s political future is contingent on rapid inoculation and a successful Olympics.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The tenure of Ebrahim Raisi as Iran's President is not likely to be a smooth sail, considering the immense challenges that lie ahead on both domestic and foreign policy fronts.
The landslide victory of Hojatoleslam Ebrahim Raisi1 in the presidential election held on June 18, 2021 indicates that conservatives (Principlists) will now be in control of all three branches of the government—executive, legislature and judiciary. Yet, the tenure of Ebrahim Raisi as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not likely to be a smooth sail, considering the immense challenges that lie ahead on the domestic front as well as the foreign policy front. In the very first press briefing, Raisi withstood Iran's existing position on the nuclear issue, missile programme and regional activities; additionally, he affirmed the prospects of restoring diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. On the domestic front, the main challenge for his government would be to improve the economic condition of Iran and the standard of living of its people.
The new presidency of ultraconservative Ebrahim Raisi will have to bite the bullet to solve the problems of the Islamic Republic of Iran, something conservatives have discerningly avoided in the past. Since Hassan Rouhani took over the presidency after the tumultuous eight years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, conservatives had conveniently resorted to laying the blame on Rouhani for every crisis that Iran faced, for instance, the decision to raise fuel prices and cutting of associated subsidies in November 2019.2 The conservatives comprised two-thirds of the committee that decided to raise the prices, yet the blame for the price-hike and resulting death of protesters was hurled onto the Rouhani administration. The shooting of the Ukrainian airliner in January 2020 is another such instance.3 Now, given that the conservatives control the presidency, the parliament and the judiciary, the Raisi government can no longer avoid these critical issues that Iran faces.
The issue of low voter turnout in the election indicates the apathy of Iranians about the reforms in the country. Such apathy is bound to come out through public protests unless the public feels the necessary economic recompenses.4 Although protests have been an integral legacy of the Islamic Revolution, the frequency and intensity of the protests have increased in the last few years, with the economic protests of 2017–18, protests over hike in fuel prices in 2019, and in the aftermath of the shooting down of the Ukrainian airliner in January 2020.
To some extent, the grievances behind these protests can be ascribed to the Donald Trump administration's “Maximum Pressure” policy, but this does not undermine the importance of addressing serious policy issues within the Islamic Republic. As such, the new conservative administration can no longer afford to blame Rouhani or Trump. Though the increased use of force has worked to curb the protests so far, the Raisi presidency will have to make palpable and effective policy decisions, otherwise, it would only make conservatives a target of public resentment.
The economic effects of the pandemic have been exacting even for the world's largest economies. However, in the case of Iran, the pandemic exacerbated the existing economic woes. With the Joseph Biden administration in the White House, the Rouhani government had started negotiations to resume the 2015 nuclear deal. Half a dozen rounds of talks have already been conducted, however, no substantive outcomes have emerged so far.
The recovery after the initial COVID-19 shocks has been moderate, and lack of investment either from the inconsequential private sector in Iran or the foreign investment only added to the existing challenges.5 Iranian economy had been in recession for three years mainly due to the US-imposed sanctions; the pandemic-induced oil shocks seem to have worsened the situation. Nonetheless, the structural problems within the Iranian economy would remain a crucial issue of concern for the Raisi government.
In his first press conference, President-elect Raisi insisted that the economy would be his principal concern, alongside poverty alleviation, something he had been highlighting in his populist-oriented campaign. “[t]he message of the Iranian nation was the necessity of a change in the economic situation”, noted Raisi.6 He also pointed out, “Our domestic policy and priorities in this administration will be to improve the business situation and the living conditions of the people.”7 In the short term, the Raisi government can expect some relief through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), however, it cannot be an all-purpose remedy for Iran's economic problems.
Not merely Raisi’s ultraconservative image or his closeness to Supreme Leader, but his reputation regarding human rights would also be his immediate challenge outside Iran. Also, Raisi would be the first Iranian President to be sanctioned by the United States, a label that Raisi hopes would be lifted along with sanctions. As a prosecutor, Raisi was part of the notorious “Death Commission” that allegedly carried out mass executions of political prisoners in 1988.8 Human rights groups worldwide have been pressing on this issue, which could be a big challenge to overcome for the new President. “Everything I’ve done in my time of holding office has been to defend human rights”, Raisi said, defending his actions and role in the Commission.9
Raisi also withstood his ultraconservative credentials by stating a clear “No” as a response to a question about holding talks with President Biden.10 Soon after his victory, Raisi even paid a visit to the incumbent foreign minister, Javad Zarif, during which the JCPOA was the main issue under discussion.11 On the nuclear deal issue, Raisi restated Iran's position vis-à-vis JCPOA, promising continuity from the previous administration. He also added, “Our nation has shown resistance to the pressures, and the world should know that our government's foreign policy does not start with the JCPOA because it will not be limited to the JCPOA.”12 Notably, decoupling the economic benefits and the JCPOA negotiations, he remarked, “we will not tie the economic situation and the conditions of the people to the negotiations.”13 Nevertheless, once the deal comes into force, the Raisi government is likely to sweep through to take the credit of months-long negotiations.
Raisi embraced the question of pursuing cordial relations with Saudi Arabia. He asserted, “Relations with all countries of the world, especially relations with neighbouring countries … there is no obstacle on the part of the Islamic Republic regarding the reopening of embassies between the two countries in relation to Saudi Arabia.”14 This should not come as a surprise as Riyadh and Tehran had been talking in Baghdad, but Raisi’s commitment to fostering relations with Riyadh is a crucial development.15 Meanwhile, he also adhered to Iran’s position on ballistic missiles and its regional activities. “Regional and missile issues are not negotiable”, emphasised Raisi.16
To conclude, the Raisi government is likely to face severe challenges on both internal and external fronts. The new conservative presidency cannot afford to ignore or blame the problems that plague the Islamic Republic. Given the numerous grievances of the public, the protests are likely to continue, and unless tangible benefits are provided to the people, Raisi would be directly exposing his government and the larger conservatives’ bloc to public anger. On the foreign policy front, the challenges would go beyond the question of the JCPOA and include Iran's missile programme and its regional activities. So far, Raisi has not signalled any significant changes, but his personal image would be the immediate foreign policy challenge for the new presidency.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The recent protests in Oman over economic slowdown due to the coronavirus pandemic pose a major economic and political challenge for Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said, the new ruler of Oman.
The pandemic induced economic slowdown in Oman, compounded by the vagaries of the international oil market, has resulted in a series of youth protests in the country. Hundreds of unemployed Omani youth, protesting mass layoffs, took to the streets in May. The government had to use force to quell these protests. For the new Sultan, Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said, these protests amplified the economic and political challenges that lie ahead. Meanwhile, his government has announced 32,000 new employment opportunities and subsidy to private companies employing Omani youth. The fruition of these measures would depend on its success in spurring economic growth. However, whether accommodating the demands of the youth would help Sultan Haitham in securing popular legitimacy and further consolidating his leadership, is something that remains to be seen.
Plummeting Economy
Sultan Qaboos, who ruled for close to 50 years (1970-2020), modernised and transformed Oman through increased economic diversification, industrialisation, natural gas production, infrastructure development and privatisation. Nonetheless, Oman essentially remained an oil-based economy. The oil price crash of 2015-16 led Sultan Qaboos to adopt economic reforms that included a drastic cut in public spending, increased taxation, and reduction in subsidies by 20 per cent. However, these measures subsequently triggered the unrest of 2017-18. Depleting reserves and falling oil prices had led to an economic slowdown and rise in unemployment, especially among the youth.
Largely dependent on the export of hydrocarbons, Oman’s economy has been vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices. It also suffers from structural issues that are unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Oman’s oil production is going through a long-term slowdown. According to the country’s finance ministry, the future growth in reserves will be limited to a successful implementation of enhanced oil recovery techniques.1 Besides, Oman is over-reliant on external funding. As per the Fitch Ratings, Oman faced a higher fiscal deficit and drawdown of fiscal reserves in 2020, and the willingness of lenders to fund Oman’s huge external financing needs will be critical to the sustainability of the country’s government finances.2
The COVID-19 Shock
The succession of Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said in January 2020 generated hope among the youth, but the new ruler inherited a low performing economy that required tough decisions. Before Sultan Haitham came to power, the global economic shock caused by the pandemic had already dealt a blow to the weak economy of Oman. Due to containment measures, the non-hydrocarbon GDP decreased by 10 per cent and the economy contracted by 6.1 per cent in 2020. Sectors such as construction, hospitality, wholesale and retail trade took the heaviest toll. According to the International Monetary Fund, lower oil-generated revenue, economic contraction and fiscal support measures led to the widening of the fiscal shortfalls, and in 2020 Oman’s deficit widened to 17.3 per cent of the GDP.3 Oman had to depend on the issuance of external bonds, the drawdown of deposits and sovereign funds, and proceeds from the privatisation drive. Oman’s debt rose to 81 per cent of the GDP in 2020, from 60 per cent in 2019.4 It is to be noted that, like most other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Oman does not have ample fiscal buffer to rely on.
Political Fallout
The protests in Oman have also highlighted the political challenges for Sultan Haitham. Oman has in the past witnessed protests advocating political reforms and the introduction of political participation. Muscat and other major cities had witnessed protests in 2011-12 soon after the Arab Spring spread in the region. The protests renewed in 2017-18. Though Oman had since 2007 incorporated incremental political reforms by introducing elections for the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) and the Majlis al-Baladiya (Municipal Council), it has not significantly changed the political situation. Oman remains an absolute monarchy, and the youth who aspire for democratic participation remain disenchanted. The recent protests, although largely focused on economic issues, and coming at a time when the government has announced an indefinite postponement of the municipal council elections due in 2021 owing to the Covid-19 pandemic, underline the mounting challenge for Sultan Haitham who was reportedly handpicked by Sultan Qaboos to succeed him. Given the slow pace of political reforms in Oman, the youth are demanding accelerated measures to devolve more power to both chambers of the council of Oman.
Haitham’s Economic Reforms
In the past year-and-a-half, Sultan Haitham has taken a number of measures to revive the economy. First, the 10th five-year plan (2021-25) focuses on economic diversification, fiscal sustainability, labour market, youth employment, investment and the private sector, besides emphasising education, health and skill development.5 The sectors earmarked for economic diversification are agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, transport, energy, mining and tourism. In order to diversify its economy, Oman focuses on attracting foreign capital in non-oil and export-oriented sectors by taking regulatory reform measures and infrastructure development. Second, the government intends to capitalise on its geographic advantage to develop into a regional logistics hub. And third, the government emphasises enforcing local procurement requirement for foreign companies along with the promotion of Omanisation of the workforce.6 Sultan Haitham imposed a 10 per cent budget cut for the government authorities and introduced a five per cent value-added tax in a phased manner currently applicable to businesses earning more than one million Omani Rial (OMR).7 He also minimised grants, reduced the retirement age, and decreased wages for the new hires.
It is apparent from the protests that the reforms were not received well by the Omani youth. Responding to the protests, the government announced new jobs for youth and accelerated Omanisation of the workforce and asked the public sector companies to appoint Omanis in place of foreign staff by July 2021. The foreigners make up more than 40 per cent of Oman’s population of 4.6 million. The government reserved 11 professions in the private sector for the Omani nationals in June 2020. Between March 2020 and March 2021, more than 200,000 migrant workers engaged in the private sector left Oman.8 However, the young population in the Sultanate perceives the private sector as exploitative and seeks jobs in the public sector. The young demography of Oman is getting restless and needs quick solutions to the economic woes, which is a challenging task for Sultan Haitham considering the country’s dependence on oil.
Conclusion
The recent protests have renewed the focus on need for economic and political reforms in Oman, and it is apparent that any short-cut to reforms will not prove beneficial in the long run. The reforms have to be systematic and bring long-term stability to the gulf country with modest oil resources. The economic and political reforms have to go hand-in-hand while time is of the essence. The tact lies in keeping the youth contented while re-inventing the ailing economy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
While Ankara can take respite in President Biden’s decision to continue discussions on contentious issues, it would have to invest more diplomatic capital to overcome the challenges facing its relations with the US.
On June 14, 2021, President Joseph Biden and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a “closed-door” meeting on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit in Brussels. This was the first face-to-face meeting between Erdoğan and Biden since the latter’s inauguration in January 2021.
The bilateral relations between the US and Turkey, both members of NATO and traditional partners, have deteriorated over the years. The first signs of the wedge emerged over growing concerns in the US and European capitals over the authoritarian turn in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey since 2012-13. The handling of the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the crackdown on media and civil society after the 2016 failed coup strained the relations. Policy disagreements over the Syrian conflict and the US support for Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), together with US concerns over Turkey’s decision to buy S-400 missile defence system from Russia, created serious differences between the two sides.
Other outstanding issues included Washington’s refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen, the Pennsylvania-based Islamic scholar and preacher, wanted in Turkey for allegedly inciting the 2016 coup and concerns in the US on serious human rights violations, the crackdown on media and civil society and stifling of the political opposition in Turkey.
Nonetheless, during the Donald Trump administration, the contentious issues were managed through high-level bilateral meetings. Though they were unable to resolve outstanding issues, the Trump-Erdoğan dialogues kept the relations from derailing further. Erdoğan had hoped for developing a similar working relation with President Biden and had expressed such sentiments while congratulating Biden upon his election.1 In one of his televised statements before the meeting, the Turkish president had predicted that the June 14 meeting will be a “harbinger of a new era” in US-Turkey relations.2
Biden, however, had different views on Turkey, and a clear signal came on April 24, when he characterised the 1915 killings of Armenians at the hands of Ottoman soldiers and mercenaries as a “genocide” despite Turkish warnings and protests.3
Reportedly, among the issues that came up for discussion during the 45-minute meeting between Biden and Erdoğan were the US concerns over the deployment of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system by Turkey and the Turkish opposition to continued US support for the SDF in northern Syria.4
For the US, the problem with regard to the deployment of S-400 is its potential facilitation of access to Russian security experts to the NATO and the US military equipment in Turkey. In July 2019, after Ankara received the first consignment of the S-400 missile defence system, the US had removed Turkey from its F-35 fighter jet programme. At the time, a White House statement had said, “The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.”5
Before the June 14 meeting, there were speculations in the Turkish media of a likely breakthrough in resolving the S-400 issue. It was reported that Erdoğan might offer to “deploy the S-400s under US control at the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, without any Russian involvement in their operation and maintenance.”6 However, going by the follow-up briefing about the meeting to the media, no breakthrough came about on the issue.
Jake Sullivan, Biden’s National Security Advisor (NSA), when asked about the discussion during the Biden-Erdoğan meeting, underlined that the S-400 issue was discussed but no resolution could be achieved. He said, “There was a commitment to continue the dialogue on the S-400. And the two teams will be following up on that coming out of the meeting.”7 During a press conference after the meeting, Erdoğan too admitted that there was no resolution on the issue. He said, “On the issue of S-400s, I told (Biden) the same thing I had in the past,” and “I raised the issue of F-35s.”8
From Ankara’s viewpoint, the most contentious issue driving the wedge in bilateral relations with the US is the continuation of US support to the SDF in northern Syria. Turkey considers the SDF as a terrorist organisation because it is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Syrian-Kurdish militia affiliated with Turkey’s outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). For Turkey, the strengthening of SDF-YPG influence in northern Syria across the border from its Kurdish insurgency afflicted southeast region poses a security threat to Turkey. Since early 2019, Turkish armed forces have undertaken a series of military operations in northern Syria to establish a “safe zone” near the Turkey-Syria border.9
During the post-meeting press conference, Erdoğan said that he raised the issue of US support to the SDF and the security threat the “terrorist” organisation poses to Turkey with Biden. He said, “There should be no double standards in anti-terror efforts and it should be known that one terrorist group cannot be defeated with another” referring to the US claims that the SDF is inevitable to defeating the ISIS in Syria.10
While these two issues remained unresolved, an agreement was arrived at the meeting on a potential Turkish mission to secure the Kabul international airport after the planned withdrawal of US forces in September 2021. Sullivan said that Biden and Erdoğan agreed on working together on the issue emphasising that a “clear commitment from the leaders was established that Turkey would play a lead role in securing Hamid Karzai International Airport, and we [US and Turkey] are now working through how to execute against that.”11 President Erdoğan too expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the talks on this issue.
Notably, the meeting came at a time when the relations between the US and Turkey had hit rock bottom due to differences over a slew of domestic, bilateral and regional issues. Turkey had expected a breakthrough after the Biden-Erdoğan meeting but this could not be realised. Although the meeting was termed as “positive” by both sides, it apparently failed to resolve any of the contentious issues.
While Ankara can take respite in President Biden’s statement that the two countries “will continue discussions” and that he is confident the two “will make real progress,” it would need to do more to be able to overcome the challenges facing Turkey’s relations with the US.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The public faith in the constitution and political system in Nepal has eroded drastically in last one year. However, for now, all eyes are set on whether the Supreme Court would validate the President’s May 22 action.
The President of Nepal, Bidya Devi Bhandari, on May 22, exercising her power under Article 76(7) on the advice of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, dissolved the House of Representatives or the Lower House of the Nepal Parliament and announced fresh elections. This decision was taken after political parties failed to form a new government under Article 76(5) of the constitution. The president’s office in a statement said: “While considering the fact that same members have been counted on both sides [K.P. Sharma Oli and Sher Bahadur Deuba], members have supported one another against the party decision and request from the concerned party to disregard their support … both the claims to obtain vote of confidence of the House of Representatives as per the Article 76(5) of the Constitution to be appointed as the Prime Minister do not stand valid.”1 Therefore, neither of them could form a new government by May 21 (9:00 pm), as per the deadline set by the President a day before.
This is the second time the House has been dissolved in last five months. Previously, it was dissolved in December 2020. The Supreme Court, however, had reinstated the House on February 23, 2021, after hearing over a dozen writ petitions questioning the decision to dissolve the House.
Like last year, this time too, the decision to dissolve the House was met with overwhelming resistance from across the Nepali society and the opposition parties. The latter criticised the decision as being authoritarian and anti-constitutional. Prime Minister Oli did not follow the laid out constitutional procedures like testifying confidence in the House within 30 days. He also did not resign after losing the confidence motion on May 10 and again on May 20 this year. The opposition criticised President Bhandari for showing parochialism and also allocating a very short time (21 hours) to the opposition parties to form the government. They have filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court against the decision and a constitutional bench has been formed under the Chief Justice along with four senior judges of the Supreme Court.
The Unfolding Crisis
Despite the promulgation of a new constitution in September 2015, which was supposed to provide political stability, the country has witnessed a recurring political crisis. The top leaders, often, were more interested in grabbing power by punishing rival factions within the party, splitting parties, and stoking anti-India sentiments to shore up nationalism and hide incompetence. In this context, one needs to analyse three major factors that have precipitated the constitutional crisis in Nepal.
First, the intensification of factional conflict in the erstwhile Nepal Communist Party (NCP) due to the failure of the power-sharing deal between the Oli and the Pushp Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda faction. The said political deal was concluded before the formation of the NCP, which came into being with the merger of the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Maoist Centre (MC) in May 2018. As per the deal, it was agreed that: (1) the two leaders would equally share the prime ministerial tenure, 2) Prachanda would hold the co-chairmanship of the NCP with executive powers, (3) sharing of cabinet seats should be in accordance with the pre-election deal (60:40, the CPN-UML got 60 per cent seats and the MC got 40 per cent seats), and (4) the prime minister and the chairman of the party would consult the senior leaders in party matters.2
Since the formation of the NCP, the top leaders of the party have often accused each other of not abiding by the deal. Factionalism reached its zenith in April 2020, when Oli issued an ordinance on the Political Parties Act.3 The objective was to demonstrate his dominant position in the government and within the party to his rival factions. The motive was also to split both the NCP and also the smaller parties of the Terai region who would join the government in case the rival faction led by Prachanda withdraws support. Most importantly, the Chinese initiative of a new power-sharing agreement between Oli and Prachanda in September 2020 could not prevent the party from forming two separate organisational structures within the NCP.
The intra-party factionalism came to an end after the Supreme Court scrapped the merger of the CPN-UML and the MC on March 7, 2021. However, the legacy of factionalism reappeared in the revived CPN-UML. It is believed that the anti-Oli faction led by Madhav Kumar Nepal had voted against the Oli Government on May 10. Some media reports in fact hinted that Madhav Kumar Nepal’s faction of the CPN-UML had allegedly supported a Nepali Congress (NC)-led initiative to form a new government under Article 76(5) on May 20, 2021.4
Second, there has been a lack of clarity on the interpretation of Article 76 and related clauses as the constitution is silent on the following issues:
There is no mention of the ‘resignation’ of the Prime Minister after losing the vote of confidence.
There is also no mention of the ‘requirement of signatures’ of the Members of Parliament (MP) in the government formation claim document after the failure of the Prime Minister to prove the majority under article 76(2, 3 and 5).
The article and related clauses are also silent about whether a government that has lost the confidence vote could form the government again. Similarly, the article does not specify the number of days to be allocated by the President to form a new government.
There is also confusion about whether the Prime Minister who has lost confidence can advise the President to dissolve the House. For example, under article 76(5), until and unless the process for a new government formation is completed, the Prime Minister cannot advise the dissolution of the House. In fact, that was the reason why the Supreme Court had reinstated the House of Representatives on February 23, 2021.
Third, there are pieces of evidence of parliamentary procedural lapse by both the ruling and opposition parties. As enshrined in Article 76, the Prime Minister has to test his/her majority on the floor of the House. Oli only did that on May 10. He skipped the process on May 20. He was supposed to do the floor test on that day since he was reappointed as the Prime Minister on May 13 under Article 76(3). However, he just announced and informed the President that he does not have a majority in the House.
As mentioned in the Nepal Constitution, the Prime Minister has to be ‘relieved’ from the office upon losing the majority in the House. For example, Article 100(6) clearly says “if a motion of no confidence tabled under clause (4) is passed by a majority of the total number of the then members of the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister shall relieve of his or her office.”5 Therefore, as per the abovementioned article, Prime Minister Oli should have resigned after failing to prove the majority in the House.
Interestingly, after Prime Minister Oli’s CPN-UML became the largest party in the House on March 7, 2021, as the NCP ceased to exist as a party, and the MC recalled its ministers from the cabinet on March 13, the opposition parties did not table the no-confidence motion against him.
Implications of the Crisis
The public faith in the country’s constitution and political system has eroded drastically in last one year, since the ordinance related to Political Party Act was issued by the Oli Government in April 2020. The new political system introduced by the constitution has been repeatedly misused by the ruling party. This has set a wrong precedent in the Nepal polity. Public disenchantment towards the new system manifested in a series of rallies and protests. The pro-royalist organisations even began discussing the revival of the monarchical system. During October-November 2020, a series of pro-monarchy rallies were organised across the country.6
Another new trend was division in other political parties in favour or against the constitutional action taken by the Oli Government. For example, factionalism intensified in the Janata Samajwadi Party (JSP), which was formed in April 2020 after the merger of two Terai-based parties - the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Janata Party (JP). Most importantly, some new political alliances -- CPN-UML and JSP, the NC-led alliance with the MC, the Madhav Kumar Nepal faction from the CPN-UML, and the Upendra Yadav faction from the JSP -- were formed based on political opportunism and without any ideological basis.
These intra-party and inter-party bickerings have impacted governance in the country. The government miserably failed to manage the second wave of COVID-19 as the country witnessed a massive surge in COVID-related infections and deaths, and also a downfall in economic growth. There was an increase in unemployment which forced people to engage in illegal activities like gold smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, etc.
No Point Blaming India
Three former prime ministers of Nepal – Prachanda, Sher Bahadur Deuba and Baburam Bhattarai – have accused Prime Minister Oli of dissolving the Parliament at India’s direction. Bhattarai in his joint opinion piece published in The Hindu on May 29 stated that “…Oli is in collusion with Hindu monarchical forces in Nepal and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in India” to dismantle the Nepal Constitution.7 These accusations were made despite India treating the political developments as ‘internal issues’ of the country, and even as the Chinese ambassador conducted open consultation on internal matters of Nepal with political leaders and constitutional authorities of the country.8
The spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement issued on May 26 clearly stated that India views the recent political developments in Nepal as “internal matters” of the country to be dealt under its “own domestic framework and democratic processes.”9 Such accusations appear all the more baseless and unfounded because of the following reasons:
First, it may be noted that Prime Minister Oli has been one of the most influential Chairman of the UML since July 2014. He has also been the most powerful prime minister in the post-constitution period. He had secured close to an absolute majority in the House of Representatives due to the merger of the MC with the CPN-UML in the post-election period. His government also had issue-based support from the SP and the JP until the end of 2019. Therefore, he did not require any external support to remain in power and function independently.
Second, though Prime Minister Oli’s CPN-UML turned into the largest party in the House after the Supreme Court verdict of March 7, 2021, it continued to enjoy a majority till May 4 as the MC did not withdraw its support to the government. However, his party had to explore the possibility of seeking support from the JSP. As a result, in the emerging new political alignment, the JSP emerged as a kingmaker in Nepal politics following the SC verdict.
From the JSP’s point of view (especially for the Mahantha Thakur faction), the political situation provided a golden opportunity to address the remaining Madhesi issues that were not addressed by the 2015 Constitution. The Thakur faction was more seriously looking towards the redressal of Madhesi issues, unlike the Upendra Yadav faction. The Thakur faction was aware that if their demands are accepted by the largest party in the parliament, then the NC would not oppose this political accommodation because the NC is politically dependent on the Terai region. The Thakur faction also felt more comfortable dealing with the CPN-UML because previously when it tried to negotiate with the NC, it remained silent on addressing the Madhesi demands for the fear of losing hill votes. This was perhaps the reason why opposition parties, including the NC, remained silent on the citizenship ordinance, which the President issued on May 23, 2021.
Summing Up
It is clear that Prime Minister Oli has survived in power due to his strong leadership within the party and in the government, support from the MC, failure of the opposition parties to table a no-confidence motion against his government after March 2021, and finally, due to the convergence of interest between the CPN-UML and the Mahantha Thakur faction of the JSP. However, for now, all eyes are set on whether the Supreme Court would validate the President’s action.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
3. The Oli cabinet had introduced two ordinances – related to political parties and the constitutional council, on April 20, 2020. The ordinances were withdrawn after four days due to protests from the opposition parties. The ordinance related to political parties was an attempt to amend an existing provision in the Political Parties Act that requires 40 per cent support from both the party central committee and the parliamentary party to split. After the amendment, a split vote would have required 40 per cent support from either the central committee or the parliamentary party.
History through a Fissionable Lens: 35 Years of the Chernobyl Disaster
Anushka Saxena
June 10, 2021
Even as nuclear safety protocols and processes have been strengthened since the 1986 disaster, learning from Chernobyl should be a continuing, ongoing process.
On April 26, 1986, the fourth reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, while undergoing safety tests, suffered an explosion and went up in flames. A day prior, a workers-day-off at Chernobyl had disrupted the overall flow of work. Safety tests mandated to be run in the day-time were scheduled for the night-shift. The purpose of these tests was simple — to test if the plant can run on a generator if there is a disruption in the electric power supply. These tests, however, resulted in the catastrophic accident.
The wind-blown radioactive isotopes were first registered and detected by Scandinavian countries, mainly Sweden and Finland.1 The news of the accident was made public by the Swedish National Institute of Radiation Protection. The Soviet government clamped down heavily on the flow of information relating to the accident. Even the USSR report of the incident, presented at the Chernobyl conference in Vienna in 1987, was never released to its citizens.2
The destruction of Chernobyl’s Reactor 4 released a cloud of radionuclides that contaminated large areas of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Thousands of workers participated in the mitigation efforts, and got exposed to substantial radiation doses. Nearly eight lakh hectares of agricultural land was rendered unusable in these countries, and timber production was halted on nearly seven lakh hectares of forest.3
The accident highlighted the deficiencies in Soviet nuclear reactor safety protocols, along with inadequacies in reactor design. Valery Legaslov, the Chief of the Commission that investigated the Chernobyl disaster, expressed concern about the safety of similar nuclear reactors operating in Russia and around the world.4 Anatoly Dyatlov, the leading scientist responsible for the tests conducted on the Chernobyl reactors in April 1986, was tried and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment in 1987, for violating safety standards.
The primary issue of concern in the immediate aftermath of the accident was the laxity shown by the authorities in evacuating people from the affected zone. The evacuation of the town of Pripyat, where plant workers lived, for instance, did not start until 36 hours after the disaster. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, in a television address on May 14, 1986, however, affirmed that the government had dealt with the evacuation and safety procedures effectively and criticised Western media for spreading “lies” and “misinformation”.5
Lessons Learned
In the aftermath of Chernobyl, robust efforts were undertaken to strengthen nuclear safety. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for instance, started the Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System (FINAS), in 1992. It is jointly managed by the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).6 FINAS helps participating countries exchange best practices to improve the safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. FINAS has become a significant source of information for nuclear regulators and their technical support organisations.
The IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (OSART) — which first began functioning in 1982 after the Three-Mile Island accident in the US, review the operational safety of nuclear power stations on the territory of member states.7 As of December 2020, the IAEA had conducted 210 OSART missions at 118 nuclear power plants in 37 Member States, with 151 follow-up visits as part of the missions.8
OSART monitoring process involves technical and organisational reviews by international experts, who identify lacunae and key areas needing improvement on nuclear sites, and provide relevant recommendations. Safety-issues of nuclear plant(s) are monitored on a case-by-case basis as well, not just for government nuclear facilities, but for corporate facilities as well (through the Corporate OSART Missions). The safety culture can also be assessed, either as part of OSARTs or a standalone request, by an additional mechanism known as the Independent Safety Culture Assessment (ISCA).
The Chernobyl Forum was formed in 2003, made up of the IAEA, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Bank Group, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), along with representatives from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The Forum released a comprehensive report in 2005, along with a set of guidelines and recommendations for the governments of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine to mitigate the long-term impact of radiation, including New Safe Confinement (NSC) shelters.9
A massive containment structure made of shelter and steel was constructed around Chernobyl’s Reactor 4 in 1986. With aid from the G-7 and the European Commission, a new safe confinement structure was completed in 2019.10 Recent reports note that there is an increase in neutron formation inside Chernobyl’s Reactor Four containment structure due to seepage of rain water and that scientists are contemplating using technological solutions like robots to manage the situation.11
Collectively, EU countries have contributed approximately €600 million for Chernobyl projects since 1991. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development set up a Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) in 1993, so as to seek international cooperation in mitigating the impact of nuclear disasters like that at Chernobyl. Funds collected account have been used to improve the functioning of nuclear power projects in countries like Bulgaria, Lithuania and Russia.12
The EU also provides assistance (technical, educational, and regulatory) to nations under the nuclear safety component of the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme, which has now evolved into a separate programme called European Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC).13
Popular Narrative and Perception Management
Given that the Chernobyl incident happened during the closing stages of the Cold War, it became an important event for highlighting the inadequacies of the Soviet nuclear industry and the government. The propaganda around Chernobyl, even after the end of the Cold War, remains alive. The dramatic incident has been adapted into many film and TV projects. The most recent and prominent was the HBO Miniseries, ‘Chernobyl’. The show, aired first on May 6, 2019, makes the painstaking effort of reminding us that despite all our scientific progress, unheard or suppressed voices, fumbling governance, and taken-for-granted technological flaws can bring life as we know it, to a grinding halt. The American show, however, was criticized by some elements of the Russian media for allegedly misconstruing facts to insult the Russian Federation and its continuing efforts to uphold the legacy of the Chernobyl survivors and scientists.14
Conclusion
Currently, nine RBMK-1000 reactor-powered nuclear plants, incorporating enhanced safety designs, continue to run in the Russian cities of Smolensk, Kursk and St. Petersburg. The Chernobyl accident occurred only seven years after the partial meltdown at the Three-Mile Island nuclear reactor complex in the US. Nuclear disasters like those at the Three-Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima teach us that, sometimes, man-made technology can dangerously slip out of hand. Nuclear safety has come a long way since then, and so has the representation of facts and opinions about the incident. History is both a burden to bear and an opportunity to learn, and learning from the Chernobyl disaster should be a continuing, ongoing process.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Adopting Armed Forces Ethos for National Pandemic Recovery
Rajiv Bhalla
June 07, 2021
The armed forces ethos and sacrificial ideology needs to be earnestly adopted by all our citizens in their individual capacities to help in faster national pandemic recovery.
The COVID 19 pandemic has caused unprecedented suffering worldwide. The second COVID wave in India has caused much suffering, with abysmal public health infrastructure compounding the problem. Massive demand was generated for a short period of time on critical medical facilities and equipment like intensive care unit (ICU) beds and oxygen cylinders.
The various arms of the government, including the armed forces and the railways, for instance, played a critical role in trying to bridge the shortfalls. The nation also received critical help from many countries. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based efforts (like that by the Sikh community), and noble Samaritans worked overtime to help the sick and the needy. Many others also came forward and contributed liberally to the PM CARES Fund.
During the first COVID wave, the government initiated a complete lockdown. While this measure did have an adverse economic fallout, many precious lives were saved. During the second wave, the Union government, probably apprehensive of the adverse economic fallout, left it largely to the state governments to impose curfews and lockdowns, as and when found essential, to break the chain of infection.
The Union and state governments now urgently need to focus their efforts to ensure that relief measures reach those affected by the second wave. Various schemes such as those providing financial support to children orphaned by the disease, are indeed a soothing measure. Caution should continue to be exercised by the authorities and the general public at large so that the abating second wave is capped at the earliest.
While we will undoubtedly show resilience as a nation and recover from the economic slowdown and shrinkage, the families would take a long time to recover from the tragic shock of losing loved ones due to the monstrous second wave, rather, the second tsunami. Many may show courage and fortitude to accept the economic hardships in their stride, but will find it hard to overcome the loss of loved ones.
Despite the loss in economic activity and its medium and long-term fallouts, we need to ensure that we hit the ground running as the situation stabilises further. Most industries and medium/small scale businesses may not be able to achieve pre-pandemic levels of economic activity on their own, but will need active government support.
Though the Finance Ministry has already announced a huge package of Rs 20,00,000 crores, and an array of other measures in the budget of the current financial year, a supplemental blueprint consisting of targeted financial packages for the affected may still need to be initiated.
What is required now is a singular focus towards re-building the country, by all sections of the society. Indians are known for their ingenuity and capability to achieve, and deliver the extraordinary, when the need arises. An important factor that will aid how soon we will be able to get back to our economic growth curve, is the attitudinal change in the mindset of our citizens towards the nation.
The armed forces are a model of an exceptionally cohesive and dedicated organisation with an extremely high degree of patriotism. They are a veritable microcosm of the enormous diversity of our nation. The armed forces ethos and sacrificial ideology, it is suggested here, needs to be earnestly adopted by all our citizens in their individual capacities. They must embrace the motto of ‘Nation Always First’.
‘Young India’ has tremendous latent energy. It is this youth which forms the core of the armed forces. Each one needs to be an instrument of change. The urgency now is to motivate our citizens, primarily the youth, to work towards revival of national confidence and economic activity so that the dark adversity of the times can be converted to an opportunity to excel.
We have numerous examples in history, wherein nations devastated by wars, recovered through the resolve of the people and their dedication to the national cause, supplemented though by significant external assistance.
While the government will have primary responsibility to generate economic growth and address critical gaps in health infrastructure through administrative and policy initiatives, we, as the citizens need to reboot ourselves and make this crisis a tipping point to help usher in a healthy and prosperous India.
Lt Gen (Retd.) Rajiv Bhalla is a former Infantry Officer who headed the Military Training and Military Secretary branches.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The IT Rules 2021 seek to address cyber security concerns of the citizens without infringing on their privacy and personal liberties, while maintaining digital sovereignty at the same time.
The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 were released by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) in February. Social Media intermediaries were given a three-month period to comply with the new rules.1 The government on May 26 issued fresh notice to all social media intermediaries seeking details on the status of compliance with the new rules that came into effect on that day.
Companies like Google, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, Koo, Sharechat, and LinkedIn have shared details with MeitY as per the requirement of the new norms. Twitter sought an extension of the compliance window and called for a constructive dialogue and a collaborative approach from the government to safeguard freedom of expression of the public. WhatsApp also filed a case in the Delhi High Court against the government on grounds that the new rules violated customer privacy. The new Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code have also been challenged by entities like The Wire, LiveLaw and The Quint.
The IT Rules 2021 aim to empower ordinary users of social media platforms and OTT platforms with a mechanism for redressal and timely resolution of their grievance with the help of a Grievance Redressal Officer (GRO) who should be a resident in India. Special emphasis has been given on the protection of women and children from sexual offences, fake news and other misuse of the social media.
Identification of the “first originator of the information” would be required in case of an offence related to sovereignty and integrity of India. A Chief Compliance Officer, a resident of India, also needs to be appointed and that person shall be responsible for ensuring compliance with the Act and Rules. A monthly compliance report mentioning the details of complaints received and action taken on the complaints would be necessary.
The OTT platforms, online news and digital media entities, on the other hand, would need to follow a Code of Ethics. OTT platforms would be called as ‘publishers of online curated content’ under the new rules. They would have to self-classify the content into five categories based on age and use parental locks for age above 13 or higher. They also need to include age verification mechanisms for content classified as ‘Adult’.
A three-level grievance redressal mechanism has been mandated. This includes the appointment of a GRO, self-regulatory bodies registered with the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting (MIB) to look after the Code of Ethics and a Charter for the self-regulating bodies formulated by MIB.
While the new rules were challenged by many on grounds of violation of free speech, the government has clarified that these rules permit social media platforms to operate in India freely but with due accordance to the law. Every entity has to abide by the Constitution of the country and the Rule of Law. Also, as per Article 19 of the Constitution, freedom of speech and expression is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions, especially in case of a threat to national sovereignty and security.
Misuse of Social Media
The rules come at a time when the country is constantly striving to ensure the safety and sovereignty of the cyberspace and of personal data. Social media is increasingly becoming an important part of an individual’s life. WhatsApp currently has a user base of 340 million in the country, accounting for the largest number of subscribers in the world.2 Facebook has 290 million, Twitter 17 million, YouTube 265 million and Instagram, 120 million user base.
With such a huge population dependent on social media platforms, the tech-giants cannot choose to ignore the new and emerging challenges like persistent spread of fake news, rampant abuse of the platforms to share morphed images of women, deep fakes and other contents that threaten the dignity of women and pose a threat to security.
Instances of use of abusive language, defamatory contents and hate speech in these platforms have become very common. The algorithms used by these platforms to optimize views and advertisements often fail to distinguish between relevant or useful content and abusive content and fake news, thereby amplifying them in very little or no time.
In view of such emerging challenges, the Supreme Court in 2018, in the Tehseen S. Poonawalla v/s Union of India case, directed the government to curb and stop dissemination of explosive messages and videos on various social media platforms which have a tendency to incite mob violence and lynching of any kind.3 The Court in 2017 observed that the government may frame necessary guidelines to eliminate child pornography, rape and gang rape imageries, videos and sites in content hosting platforms and other applications.4
The new rules are thus in accordance with the previous Supreme Court observations. As per the rules, intermediaries are mandated to remove or disable contents that are against the safety and dignity of individuals within 24 hours of receiving of complaints. Such complaints can be filed either by the individual or a person on his/her behalf. According to the government, knowing the “first originator of information” (also known as “traceability”) of messages that cause violence, riots, terrorism, rape or threat to national security fall under reasonable exceptions to Right to Privacy - which again is not absolute as per the Constitution.5
Technological Hurdles with Respect to Traceability
Social media companies like WhatsApp have expressed apprehensions about the provisions in the new rules which require them to identify traceability when required to do so by authorities. They contend that this could possibly lead to the breaking the of end-to-end encryption, which in turn can compromise users’ privacy.6
The government, on the other hand, has stated that traceability would only be required in case of “very serious offences” that threaten the sovereignty and integrity of India. Further, it could also be implemented without breaking the end-to-end encryption. The onus, however, will lie on the companies to find a technological solution for the same.
Supplying metadata like phone number of the sender, the time of sending a message, the device it was sent from and its location, could also trace the origin of a message. Interestingly, WhatsApp’s new privacy policy itself has a provision of sharing metadata of its users with its parent company, Facebook, for personalised ads.7 As per latest reports, the Union government has sent a notice to WhatsApp for withdrawal of its new privacy policy which has caused a lot of controversy since its inception.8
The Free Speech Debate
The social media giant, Twitter, has raised concerns regarding free speech over the new IT guidelines. It stated that it would strive to comply with the law but if guided by principles of transparency and freedom of expression under the rule of law. The Delhi High Court on May 31 issued a notice to the microblogging site on a plea filed against it for alleged non-compliance with the new IT rules.9
Failure to comply with the rules could lead to the removal of ‘intermediary’ status (a safe harbour to avoid liability for the content that their users publish) of the companies and could possibly invite sanction or even punishment under the law. The government insists that the rules are neither arbitrary nor sudden, since the draft rules were put up for public comments and several individuals, industrial associations and organizations had responded. The comments were then analysed in detail and an inter-ministerial meeting was also held before finalising them.
The Way Forward
Freedom of speech and expression is the basic tenet of any democracy. However, no freedom is absolute or completely unrestricted. The imperative of striking the right balance between fundamental rights and ascertaining the reasonableness of a restriction has been a constant effort since the adoption of the Constitution. The debate has now reached the digital world. The on-going tussle between private, tech giants who own a substantial amount of Big Data, governments desirous of imposing reasonable restrictions and users worried about issues relating to data privacy and constraints on freedom of speech and expression, is likely to get more complicated before optimum solutions can be arrived at. The IT Rules 2021 seek to address concerns of the citizens without infringing on their privacy and personal liberties, while maintaining digital sovereignty at the same time.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The expected victory of a hardline, conservative candidate in the forthcoming Iranian presidential elections could become a hindrance to fulfilling the country’s economic agenda and lead to greater domestic instability.
Iran’s 13th Presidential elections will be held on June 18, 2021.On May 25, 2021, Iran’s Guardian Council released a list of seven approved candidates for the upcoming presidential election - Saeed Jalili, Seyed Ebrahim Raisi, Alireza Zakani, Seyed Amir Hossein Qazizadeh Hashemi, Mohsen Mehralizadeh, Mohsen Rezaei, and AbdolnaserHemmati.
Many candidates were disqualified, among them former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Vice President EshaqJahangiri and former parliament speaker anda key nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani. President Hassan Rouhani expressed his “disappointment” over the Council’s selection process.1
An October 2020 poll indicated that almost half of the Iranians expressed their displeasure with incumbent President Rouhani’s governance.2One of the main critiques of the government, former President Ahmadinejad emerged as an early frontrunner for the presidential election.3 However, given his growing hostility with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei since 2010, his rejection by the Guardian Council was widely anticipated. Earlier in 2017, his candidacy for the presidential election was also rejected by Khamenei.
The rejection of Jahangiri’s and Larijani’scandidature was unexpected. It was expected that Larijani could draw fair amount of support from the moderate-reformist camp and emerge as one of the main contenders against Chief Justice Ebrahim Raisi.4 While no reasons were given for their rejection, reports noted that corruption charges were possibly one of the reasons held up against them.5 As per recent amendments on eligibility criteria for the post of president, individuals involved in economic offences are not eligible to contest.6
The Candidates
Ayatollah Seyed Ebrahim Raeisi, Judiciary Chief, is the most favoured candidate in the presidential race. He secured more than 15million votes in the 2017 presidential election. Raeisi is the only conservative politician who has the ability to create partisan unity. In fact, most of the candidates from the conservative blocs (also known as the Principalists or Revolutionary front) withdrew their candidacy in his favour this year. These included Hossein Dehghan, the former defence minister, RostanGhasemi, former oil minister, among others.
Along with the hardliners, Raeisi is also supported by the country’s youths.7 Polls conducted by various institutes’ show that Raeisi is leading the presidential poll by a vast margin.8 Former President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure policy” and re-imposition of sanctionshave played a major role in strengthening the hardliners in the Iranian power structures like judiciary, the Guardian Council and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Further, Rouhani’s failure to deliver on key economic promises eroded the appeal of the reformists, with significant anti-government protests held in 2018-2019.
Raeisi has promised to establish a “strong Iran”, and focus on strengthening the country’s economy. He has also pledged to strength economic ties with Iran’s neighbours.9 Raeisi is viewed as the successor to Khamenei,is expected to further strengthen elements of the “resistance economy”, to help Iran achieve economicself-sufficiency.10
Other conservatives like Mohsen Rezaei, the Secretary of the Expediency Council and Saeed Jalili, former Secretary of the Supreme National Security, have pledged to restore the country’s economic stability. Rezaei stated that he will initiate a structural change in the administration of the country.11 Jalili, on the other hand, proposed the idea of a “shadow cabinet” to help compensate for the Rouhani administration’s shortcomings.12 Jalili was among one of the top three candidates in 2013 elections.
Amir Hossein Qazizadeh Hashemi, a former Member of Parliament (MP), is ahardliner,who was one of the main persons behind the passing of the strategic action plan for lifting sanctions last year. As part of the plan, the Iranian government was obliged to reduce its commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal. He promised that he would continue the Vienna dialogue and use better diplomacy in negotiating with the US and lifting the sanctions.13
Alireza Zakani is another conservative who advocates “active and smart diplomacy” to make Iran stronger in the international arena.14 While he prioritises cooperation with countries like China, Zakani views Trump and Biden as two sides of the same coin.15
AbdolnaserHemmati, head of Iran Central Bank and Mohsen Mehr-Alizadeh, former governor, are two candidates who have emerged as the standard bearers for the reformists. Both intend to focus on the internal dynamics of the country. Hemmati, in his campaign, promised to resolve the country’s economic woes by achieving 5 per cent annual growth for the next four years.16 Alizadeh also pledges to focus on the economy, generating investment and creating jobs. On the foreign policy front, it is likely they will follow on the footsteps of Rouhani.
Prognosis
The hashtags “there is no way I will vote” no matter what the candidates promise is widely used on social media platforms like the Twitter.17 It appears that though the failures of reformist government have drastically reduced the number of their support, Iranians also do not wish to have a conservative government. Reports in October 2020 indicated that 11 per cent of the Iranian population support the moderates - a decrease from 14 per cent in 2016, whereas 2 per cent are willing to align with the principalists.18
Many Iranians are planning to boycott the election.19It is likely, therefore, that the turnout for this year would be less as compared to the 2017 presidential election, which registered a 70 per cent turnout.20 This may raise some issues as to the legitimacy of the winner as Iranian authorities often cite the number of voters as a proof of their elections being “legitimate”.
The Guardian Council has chosen more hardliners than moderates for the presidential race. It is a reflection of the country’s contested power structure and political divide between moderates and hardliner that has sharpened over the years. This has been mainly because of two factors, government failure to improve the condition of the Iranian people and policies followed by the Trump administration after withdrawal from the nuclear deal. As the election approaches, talks over reviving the nuclear deal are still to produce any significant results.
The hardliners are backed by the country’s Supreme Leader, who want Raeisi to emerge victorious.21 The other conservatives withdrawing their candidacy to avoid the division of votes at the last moment is perhaps inevitable. Raeisi was among politicians who in 2019 was subject to the US and European Union sanctions.
Raeisi’s probable victory will no doubt strengthen calls for an aggressive stance towards the US. Such an approach will, however, be a hindrance to fulfilling the country’s economic agenda and could lead to greater domestic instability.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Imran Khan's Single National Curriculum: An Overdose of Religion?
Zainab Akhter
June 01, 2021
Imran Khan’s overemphasis on further mainstreaming the religious education might result in increased conflict between his government and the opposition and also the civil society in Pakistan.
After assuming power in August 2018, Prime Minister Imran Khan and his party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) promised to usher in a ‘Naya Pakistan’, one which would be corruption-free and care for the common people. Most importantly, he promised to transform Pakistan into Riyasat-e-Medina (State of Medina), based on the model of governance adopted by Prophet Muhammad during his years of migration to Medina.
Additionally, his government also talked about implementing a Single National Curriculum (SNC) to recast the education system in Pakistan and make sure that private, public schools and madrasas follow a uniform curriculum. Known in Urdu as Yuksaan Taleemi Nizam, it means the same education system for all students irrespective of their economic and social background. The SNC was conceived as ‘One System of Education for All’, which intended to introduce a uniform system “in terms of curriculum, medium of instruction and a common platform of assessment so that all children have a fair and equal opportunity to receive high quality education”.1
According to the Pakistan Education Ministry, multiple comparative studies with the educational curricula of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the United Kingdom (UK) were conducted to align the SNC with international standards.2 However, an article published in Gandhara aptly raised the question as to “why Pakistan needs a curriculum set by the federal government when education was devolved to the provinces through the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010.” It added, “Critics say the SNC is a means of undoing this at the behest of the powerful military establishment that has repeatedly expressed dislike of the 18th Amendment, and they say it’s a way to further indoctrinate an already conservative society.”3
Phases of Implementation
The government announced its much anticipated uniform national curriculum in 2019-20 with the aim of alleviating “disparities in education content across the multiple streams” and offer “equal opportunities” to all children to “receive higher education” and enable them “for upward social mobility”. It also talked about “holistic development of children in the light of emerging international trends and local aspirations” and “smooth inter-provincial mobility of teachers and students”. All this was aimed at ensuring “Social Cohesion and National Integration”.4
In the first phase of SNC, which came into effect in March 2021, efforts are on to develop the curriculum from pre-class one to five. It is being noted that the religious content has dramatically increased with Islamic studies made mandatory for all, including non-Muslim students. The second phase of SNC to develop curriculum for sixth to eighth grade will begin from March 2022, while the third and final phase for ninth to twelfth grade will start from March 2023, the year in which the next general elections are scheduled to be held. If the disproportionate emphasis on Islamic studies at the primary level is any indicator, the emphasis on Islam is going to be the defining feature of the SNC. This has led people to ask whether the government’s one-nation one-curriculum policy is being used as a tool to further Imran Khan’s dream of transforming Pakistan into a ‘truly’ Islamic nation.
According to the Pakistan Education Ministry, the SNC is driven by some key considerations but the teachings of Qur'an and Sunnah tops them all, others being introduction to the Constitution of Pakistan, and the vision of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal. The SNC will be adopted and developed in three phases. In the first phase, which started from March 2021, the government is making it mandatory for students from class one to five to be acquainted with deeniyat (religious books on Islam). In the Urdu textbook for Grade 2, children are being instructed to recite the naat (poem in praise of Prophet Muhammad), and additionally, a chapter on the life and history of Prophet Muhammad is to be introduced for eighth, ninth and tenth classes. While there is a footnote on each page of the textbook instructing teachers not to force non-Muslim children to study Islamic texts, these instructions alone, educationalists say, will be difficult to enforce in classrooms where Muslim and non-Muslim students study together. Also, unlike in the past, English and Urdu have been made compulsory subjects under the SNC.5
The PTI Government is of the view that since every educational institution runs its own curriculum, implementation of a single curriculum is the only way to enforce it in private schools. Madrasas may also be forced to adopt it. Analysts in Pakistan are of the view that religious seminaries should be brought under this umbrella only after taking their stakeholders into confidence (read the religious groups/leaders). If a uniform curriculum is imposed on madrasas forcefully, it may do more harm than good. According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Normal schoolteachers being under-equipped religiously, SNC calls for summoning an army of madressah-educated holy men – hafiz’s and qaris – as paid teachers inside schools. How this will affect the general ambiance and the safety of students is an open question.”6 It has also been observed that “The backdoor entry of seminary teachers into mainstream educational institutions may be the dream of some people but it will be a nightmare for the country. It is something that even Zia did not do. It is poison.”7
Likely Implications
For the critics of SNC, this policy change is more ideological than educational. They would argue that it has an overdose of religion that leads to fear of indoctrination of children at a young stage. Also, there is a fair chance that instead of mainstreaming madrassas, the mainstream teaching will be heavily influenced by the madrasas in the future, considering the fact that Prime Minister, every now and then, talks about making Pakistan “an example for the Islamic world, just like Riyasaat-e-Medina created by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)”.8 As pointed out by Nadeem Paracha, Pervez Musharraf tried to introduce non-religious subjects in madrasas after 9/11 as “they were seen as hotbeds of religious radicalisation.” However, he added, “Not only did the move fail, this ploy also failed to take into account the possibility of radicalisation emerging in private and public schools because of a curriculum heavily influenced by retrogressive ideological biases and distortions.”9
The SNC introduced by the Imran Khan Government is a continuation of the same ploy, Nadeem Paracha further argues, but it is now going the other way: “The overwhelming addition of new religious studies in it suggests that, to make the madressahs agree to accept the teaching of non-religious subjects, the government has decided to bring the madressahs to public and private schools. This is akin to the state’s recent attempt at mainstreaming radical outfits by encouraging them to take part in electoral politics. It is a ploy that most experts would agree is not working.”10
In this grand vision of the government for a unified educational system for all, the children of minority communities do not seem to have any space. In the first phase of the newly introduced SNC, Holy Quran in Arabic and Islamic Studies are being made mandatory. According to the Pakistan Education Ministry, “In 2006, the subject of Islamiat was integrated with General Knowledge up to grade 2 and started as a separate subject from Grade 3 onwards. In the SNC Islamiat starts from grade 1 as a separate subject up to grade 12. Previously the subject of Ethics was designated for non-Muslim students in lieu of Islamiat from Grade 3 onwards. Now a new subject Religious Education has been introduced for non-Muslim students from grade 1 onwards for five minority groups of Pakistan.”11 In such case, students from minority communities may not have any other option but to follow the curriculum imposed on them.
Some Pakistani analysts suggest that the students belonging to religious minorities will also be required to study Islamiat and Deeniyat and may have to take exams on these subjects, if the National Commission of Minorities (representing Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and Kalash tribe) fails to intervene. They argue that the SNC militates against Article 22 of the Pakistan Constitution which safeguards the rights of minorities. It states that “no person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction … if such instruction relates to a religion other than his/her own.”12
The PTI-ruled Punjab is the first province to adopt the SNC but is facing backlash for mismanagement, while the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led government in Sindh has outrightly rejected it. Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) were not well prepared to implement it this year.13 It has to be noted that after the passage of the 18th Amendment, which guarantees more power to the provinces, education remains a provincial matter.14 In Punjab, where PTI has hurriedly introduced the new curriculum from class one to five, there has been an uproar from parents, private publishers and other stakeholders. The parents worry about the sudden change in the medium of teaching, from English to Urdu, which according to them will lead to rote learning.
Questions are also being raised about the credibility of 400 experts consulted for charting out this new curriculum. It also has to be noted that scores of books, which do not comply with the new policy, are being banned On March 20, 2021, 140 human rights activists, parents and educationalists signed an open letter to Prime Minister Imran Khan. According to the signatories, the right to choose the kind of education parents want for their children is a “fundamental human right”.15
The Lahore-based public policy expert, Peter Jacob, and a team of educationalists have found that nine per cent of the content of class three English textbook introduced under the SNC violated Article 22 of the Pakistan Constitution. Some examples highlighted by Jacob include a question on the first page of a model Urdu textbook, which poses the following to class two students: “Do you know that Allah is our creator?”. Similarly, in the English textbook for class one, there is a comprehension passage titled: “Blessings of Allah”, while in class three English textbook, eight-year-olds are instructed to recite the naat, which has been described as a poem that especially praises Prophet Muhammad.16
In a televised debate, PervezHoodbhoyargued that the new curriculum will in no way bring equality among school children. He underlined that there is not only an overdose of religion from the first to the fifth standard, the students are also being forced to learn lines from Quran and recite duas (prayers). With such an overload, where is the place for other minority children, he questioned? He noted, “Madrasa is meant to prepare for the afterlife and the schools are meant to prepare the young minds for this life. How can these be combined?”17
Bringing about such changes in the curriculum may as well be a step towards caving into the right-wing demand to make Pakistan a ‘truly’ Islamic republic. Not long ago, on April 17, 2021, in a series of tweets, Imran Khan stated that he would not give in to the pressures of the Western liberal countries and protect the sanctity of the Prophet (Tahaffuz-e-Namus-e-Risalat) at all costs. A year ago, in May 2020, the PTI Government in Punjab had unanimously passed a resolution on Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat (Movement to Protect the End of Prophethood).18 Recently, on May 09, 2021, Imran Khan during his visit to Saudi Arabia met Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Dr Yousef Al-Othaimeen, in Makkah and called upon the OIC member countries to come together and teach the values of the Prophet to the West. It was also noted in the meeting that following Khan’s letter to the heads of states of various Muslim countries, the OIC Council of Foreign Minister in Niamey had adopted a unanimous resolution on observing March 15 as ‘International Day to Combat Islamophobia’.19
In times to come, Imran Khan’s overemphasis on further mainstreaming the religious education might result in increased conflict between his government and the opposition and also the civil society in Pakistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Two key elections are approaching in Japan. As Prime Minister Suga seeks public mandate with just one year's report card amidst a pandemic, his political future is contingent on rapid inoculation and a successful Olympics.
Political winds are blowing in Japan as two key elections are approaching—the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) presidential election in September and the Lower House election as its term ends in October. It would be interesting to see how Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide's political future shapes up as he navigates the domestic politics—balancing public health during a pandemic and the Olympics dream on the one hand, and the inoculation drive and economic recovery on the other. What will be the most immediate decisive issues as Japan heads for a snap election, most likely in September? How are the factional alignments taking shape within the ruling LDP? And, how the kingmakers within the party are positioning themselves?
Prime Minister Suga stepped into office in September 2020 following his predecessor Abe Shinzo’s sudden decision to depart from Kantei owing to health issues. Assuming the responsibility of life and livelihood of people in the middle of a raging global pandemic, especially with an impending election the following year, was certainly not an enviable position. In his maiden policy speech at the Diet in October 2020, Prime Minister Suga categorically stated that one of his top priorities is to host a successful Olympics to demonstrate victory over the COVID-19 pandemic.1 While he started on a high note with an over 70 per cent approval rating last year, public confidence in his administration has gone down with three states of emergency since then. As several prefectures in Japan come out of the third state of emergency and some remain in quasi-emergency on the heels of the Olympics, Suga’s political future hangs in balance with two key elections approaching. In the run-up to the Games and subsequently the elections, his public approval rating stands at 37 per cent in both the NHK2 and The Yomiuri Shimbun3 polls in June, 33 per cent in The Asahi Shimbun poll4 and 31 per cent in the Mainichi Shimbun-Social Survey Research Centre poll in May.5
As Japan hosts the mega-sports event—Olympics (23 July–8 August) and Paralympics Games (24 August –5 September)—one of the crucial responsibilities of Prime Minister Suga would be to ensure that the nation’s much-touted “Recovery and Reconstruction Games” do not turn into a super spreader event. To this end, the inoculation drive has taken a new urgency. Suga has set out clear goals and aims to vaccinate all people above 65 years by the end of July. Japan has reached the goal of one million shots a day and has set up mass vaccination centres in Tokyo and Osaka managed by the Self-Defense Forces. With effective inoculation and a successful Olympics, Prime Minister Suga may be successful in winning public confidence in his administration before heading for elections.
Timing the snap election is also an important decision. The ideal situation for Prime Minister Suga would be to call the snap election in September, after the Paralympics. On the one hand, this will give him a crucial two months to intensify his vaccination drive and secure public health, on the other hand a successful Olympic Games will boost Japan’s pride as the host nation and generate positive public sentiment; both the conditions are absolutely crucial for Suga’s success in securing a public mandate in favour of the LDP in the Lower House election. However, it is worth noting that not all the variables are in his control. How the Delta variant unleashes itself as 15,000 athletes and several thousand officials enter Japan during the Games will have a direct influence on the election outcome.
The stakes are high as Japan has no way out of the Olympics; the cost and complexity of the Olympics contract outweigh opinion polls expressing public reservations in hosting the Games. A recent poll indicates that almost 86 per cent of those surveyed are worried about a possible surge in COVID-19 cases if the Games are hosted. Moreover, Shigeru Omi, who leads the government panel on COVID-19 response, has also weighed in by arguing that it is “unusual” to host the games amid a pandemic. The Tokyo Medical Practitioners Association has urged the government to reconsider hosting the Games. A few corporate leaders have also expressed their concerns, however, the decision on the Olympics is beyond the purview of Prime Minister Suga. The contract between the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the Japanese Olympic Committee indicates that the decision on cancelling the Games solely lies with the IOC. Even though the IOC has the authority to cancel the Games in case there is “reasonable ground” to assess whether participants’ safety would be “seriously threatened or jeopardised”,6the financial stakes are enormous since it dispenses 90 per cent of its revenue to sports federations and national Olympic committees. Billions of dollars signed in broadcasting rights further complicate the issue.
The once-postponed Tokyo Games costs around US$ 15.4 billion,7 which is double the original estimation of US$ 7.3 billion when Japan won the bid in 2013. The one-year delay costed US$ 2.8 billion. Meanwhile, some media estimates suggest that the Olympics would cost about US$ 25 billion.8 Olympics was an opportunity for Japan to not only steer foreign tourism but also drive construction investments. However, the economy will have to absorb the dent in the tourism industry as the pandemic has forced Japan to restrict foreign spectators during the Games. An estimation by the Nomura Research Institute argued that while cancelling the Games would cost Japan around US$ 17 billion, the economic loss would be much greater in case a fresh state of emergency is imposed.9
Prime Minister Suga is therefore betting on rapid vaccination. However, Japan has been relatively behind the G7 powers with just 9.2 per cent of the population fully vaccinated and 11 per cent partially vaccinated (till 24 June 2021), compared to 48 per cent fully vaccinated in the United Kingdom, 45.50 per cent in the United States, 35 per cent in Germany, 29 per cent in Italy and 26 per cent in Canada.10 This is essentially because of the additional domestic trials and the two-step approval, initially by Japan’s Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) and followed by the panel of experts in the health ministry, delayed the rollout by a couple of months.11 In addition to this, Japanese have displayed low confidence in vaccines, drawing from its previous experiences.12 However, on the heels of the Olympics, the inoculation drive has gained momentum.
Since a snap election is expected to follow the Olympics, LDP’s factional politics is likely to come into play. Even though Prime Minister Suga has not been affiliated with any faction, in the September 2020 elections, he managed to secure support from five of the seven key LDP factions. So, what has changed since then? Suga’s key contenders last year, both former Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio’s and former Defence Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s position has eroded. Kishida’s standing has been diluted following the outcome of the Upper House by-election in Hiroshima and Ishiba’s position is shaky with a few members leaving his faction. But, going into the party presidential election this time, Suga also has to factor in the reality that, unlike last time, rank-and-file members will be a part of the process.
In the snap election, the kingmakers in the LDP, including former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro and Secretary-General Nikai Toshihiro, will throw their weight behind Prime Minister Suga to avoid any mixed messaging to the public, and consolidate a two-third majority in the Lower House election. But how the factional politics take shape in the party presidential election remains to be seen. An ideal situation for Suga will be to secure a victory for the LDP in the crucial Lower House election, which will further secure his position as the party president. Meanwhile, it is important to keep an eye on how Abe is positioning himself back into the game. While he supports Suga, he has also indicated a preference for Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato, Policy Research Chief Hakubun Shimomura and former Foreign Minister Kishida as Suga’s successor.13 Furthermore, media polls have floated predictable names including that of Minister for Administrative Affairs Kono Taro, Environment Minister Koizumi Shinjiro, and former Defence Minister Ishiba as topping the charts. But the LDP election is about manoeuvring factional politics rather than popular support.
As Suga heads for two key elections, he has made a mark with his digitalisation and decarbonisation drive in domestic politics and demonstration of Japan’s leadership in global platforms, be it the G7 summit or the Quad. He has also ensured that he is the first foreign leader to be hosted by President Joseph Biden following the change of guard in Washington. As he seeks public mandate with just one year’s report card amidst a pandemic, Suga’s political future is contingent on rapid inoculation and a successful Olympics.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The tenure of Ebrahim Raisi as Iran's President is not likely to be a smooth sail, considering the immense challenges that lie ahead on both domestic and foreign policy fronts.
The landslide victory of Hojatoleslam Ebrahim Raisi1 in the presidential election held on June 18, 2021 indicates that conservatives (Principlists) will now be in control of all three branches of the government—executive, legislature and judiciary. Yet, the tenure of Ebrahim Raisi as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not likely to be a smooth sail, considering the immense challenges that lie ahead on the domestic front as well as the foreign policy front. In the very first press briefing, Raisi withstood Iran's existing position on the nuclear issue, missile programme and regional activities; additionally, he affirmed the prospects of restoring diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. On the domestic front, the main challenge for his government would be to improve the economic condition of Iran and the standard of living of its people.
The new presidency of ultraconservative Ebrahim Raisi will have to bite the bullet to solve the problems of the Islamic Republic of Iran, something conservatives have discerningly avoided in the past. Since Hassan Rouhani took over the presidency after the tumultuous eight years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, conservatives had conveniently resorted to laying the blame on Rouhani for every crisis that Iran faced, for instance, the decision to raise fuel prices and cutting of associated subsidies in November 2019.2 The conservatives comprised two-thirds of the committee that decided to raise the prices, yet the blame for the price-hike and resulting death of protesters was hurled onto the Rouhani administration. The shooting of the Ukrainian airliner in January 2020 is another such instance.3 Now, given that the conservatives control the presidency, the parliament and the judiciary, the Raisi government can no longer avoid these critical issues that Iran faces.
The issue of low voter turnout in the election indicates the apathy of Iranians about the reforms in the country. Such apathy is bound to come out through public protests unless the public feels the necessary economic recompenses.4 Although protests have been an integral legacy of the Islamic Revolution, the frequency and intensity of the protests have increased in the last few years, with the economic protests of 2017–18, protests over hike in fuel prices in 2019, and in the aftermath of the shooting down of the Ukrainian airliner in January 2020.
To some extent, the grievances behind these protests can be ascribed to the Donald Trump administration's “Maximum Pressure” policy, but this does not undermine the importance of addressing serious policy issues within the Islamic Republic. As such, the new conservative administration can no longer afford to blame Rouhani or Trump. Though the increased use of force has worked to curb the protests so far, the Raisi presidency will have to make palpable and effective policy decisions, otherwise, it would only make conservatives a target of public resentment.
The economic effects of the pandemic have been exacting even for the world's largest economies. However, in the case of Iran, the pandemic exacerbated the existing economic woes. With the Joseph Biden administration in the White House, the Rouhani government had started negotiations to resume the 2015 nuclear deal. Half a dozen rounds of talks have already been conducted, however, no substantive outcomes have emerged so far.
The recovery after the initial COVID-19 shocks has been moderate, and lack of investment either from the inconsequential private sector in Iran or the foreign investment only added to the existing challenges.5 Iranian economy had been in recession for three years mainly due to the US-imposed sanctions; the pandemic-induced oil shocks seem to have worsened the situation. Nonetheless, the structural problems within the Iranian economy would remain a crucial issue of concern for the Raisi government.
In his first press conference, President-elect Raisi insisted that the economy would be his principal concern, alongside poverty alleviation, something he had been highlighting in his populist-oriented campaign. “[t]he message of the Iranian nation was the necessity of a change in the economic situation”, noted Raisi.6 He also pointed out, “Our domestic policy and priorities in this administration will be to improve the business situation and the living conditions of the people.”7 In the short term, the Raisi government can expect some relief through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), however, it cannot be an all-purpose remedy for Iran's economic problems.
Not merely Raisi’s ultraconservative image or his closeness to Supreme Leader, but his reputation regarding human rights would also be his immediate challenge outside Iran. Also, Raisi would be the first Iranian President to be sanctioned by the United States, a label that Raisi hopes would be lifted along with sanctions. As a prosecutor, Raisi was part of the notorious “Death Commission” that allegedly carried out mass executions of political prisoners in 1988.8 Human rights groups worldwide have been pressing on this issue, which could be a big challenge to overcome for the new President. “Everything I’ve done in my time of holding office has been to defend human rights”, Raisi said, defending his actions and role in the Commission.9
Raisi also withstood his ultraconservative credentials by stating a clear “No” as a response to a question about holding talks with President Biden.10 Soon after his victory, Raisi even paid a visit to the incumbent foreign minister, Javad Zarif, during which the JCPOA was the main issue under discussion.11 On the nuclear deal issue, Raisi restated Iran's position vis-à-vis JCPOA, promising continuity from the previous administration. He also added, “Our nation has shown resistance to the pressures, and the world should know that our government's foreign policy does not start with the JCPOA because it will not be limited to the JCPOA.”12 Notably, decoupling the economic benefits and the JCPOA negotiations, he remarked, “we will not tie the economic situation and the conditions of the people to the negotiations.”13 Nevertheless, once the deal comes into force, the Raisi government is likely to sweep through to take the credit of months-long negotiations.
Raisi embraced the question of pursuing cordial relations with Saudi Arabia. He asserted, “Relations with all countries of the world, especially relations with neighbouring countries … there is no obstacle on the part of the Islamic Republic regarding the reopening of embassies between the two countries in relation to Saudi Arabia.”14 This should not come as a surprise as Riyadh and Tehran had been talking in Baghdad, but Raisi’s commitment to fostering relations with Riyadh is a crucial development.15 Meanwhile, he also adhered to Iran’s position on ballistic missiles and its regional activities. “Regional and missile issues are not negotiable”, emphasised Raisi.16
To conclude, the Raisi government is likely to face severe challenges on both internal and external fronts. The new conservative presidency cannot afford to ignore or blame the problems that plague the Islamic Republic. Given the numerous grievances of the public, the protests are likely to continue, and unless tangible benefits are provided to the people, Raisi would be directly exposing his government and the larger conservatives’ bloc to public anger. On the foreign policy front, the challenges would go beyond the question of the JCPOA and include Iran's missile programme and its regional activities. So far, Raisi has not signalled any significant changes, but his personal image would be the immediate foreign policy challenge for the new presidency.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The recent protests in Oman over economic slowdown due to the coronavirus pandemic pose a major economic and political challenge for Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said, the new ruler of Oman.
The pandemic induced economic slowdown in Oman, compounded by the vagaries of the international oil market, has resulted in a series of youth protests in the country. Hundreds of unemployed Omani youth, protesting mass layoffs, took to the streets in May. The government had to use force to quell these protests. For the new Sultan, Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said, these protests amplified the economic and political challenges that lie ahead. Meanwhile, his government has announced 32,000 new employment opportunities and subsidy to private companies employing Omani youth. The fruition of these measures would depend on its success in spurring economic growth. However, whether accommodating the demands of the youth would help Sultan Haitham in securing popular legitimacy and further consolidating his leadership, is something that remains to be seen.
Plummeting Economy
Sultan Qaboos, who ruled for close to 50 years (1970-2020), modernised and transformed Oman through increased economic diversification, industrialisation, natural gas production, infrastructure development and privatisation. Nonetheless, Oman essentially remained an oil-based economy. The oil price crash of 2015-16 led Sultan Qaboos to adopt economic reforms that included a drastic cut in public spending, increased taxation, and reduction in subsidies by 20 per cent. However, these measures subsequently triggered the unrest of 2017-18. Depleting reserves and falling oil prices had led to an economic slowdown and rise in unemployment, especially among the youth.
Largely dependent on the export of hydrocarbons, Oman’s economy has been vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices. It also suffers from structural issues that are unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Oman’s oil production is going through a long-term slowdown. According to the country’s finance ministry, the future growth in reserves will be limited to a successful implementation of enhanced oil recovery techniques.1 Besides, Oman is over-reliant on external funding. As per the Fitch Ratings, Oman faced a higher fiscal deficit and drawdown of fiscal reserves in 2020, and the willingness of lenders to fund Oman’s huge external financing needs will be critical to the sustainability of the country’s government finances.2
The COVID-19 Shock
The succession of Haitham bin Tariq Al-Said in January 2020 generated hope among the youth, but the new ruler inherited a low performing economy that required tough decisions. Before Sultan Haitham came to power, the global economic shock caused by the pandemic had already dealt a blow to the weak economy of Oman. Due to containment measures, the non-hydrocarbon GDP decreased by 10 per cent and the economy contracted by 6.1 per cent in 2020. Sectors such as construction, hospitality, wholesale and retail trade took the heaviest toll. According to the International Monetary Fund, lower oil-generated revenue, economic contraction and fiscal support measures led to the widening of the fiscal shortfalls, and in 2020 Oman’s deficit widened to 17.3 per cent of the GDP.3 Oman had to depend on the issuance of external bonds, the drawdown of deposits and sovereign funds, and proceeds from the privatisation drive. Oman’s debt rose to 81 per cent of the GDP in 2020, from 60 per cent in 2019.4 It is to be noted that, like most other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Oman does not have ample fiscal buffer to rely on.
Political Fallout
The protests in Oman have also highlighted the political challenges for Sultan Haitham. Oman has in the past witnessed protests advocating political reforms and the introduction of political participation. Muscat and other major cities had witnessed protests in 2011-12 soon after the Arab Spring spread in the region. The protests renewed in 2017-18. Though Oman had since 2007 incorporated incremental political reforms by introducing elections for the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) and the Majlis al-Baladiya (Municipal Council), it has not significantly changed the political situation. Oman remains an absolute monarchy, and the youth who aspire for democratic participation remain disenchanted. The recent protests, although largely focused on economic issues, and coming at a time when the government has announced an indefinite postponement of the municipal council elections due in 2021 owing to the Covid-19 pandemic, underline the mounting challenge for Sultan Haitham who was reportedly handpicked by Sultan Qaboos to succeed him. Given the slow pace of political reforms in Oman, the youth are demanding accelerated measures to devolve more power to both chambers of the council of Oman.
Haitham’s Economic Reforms
In the past year-and-a-half, Sultan Haitham has taken a number of measures to revive the economy. First, the 10th five-year plan (2021-25) focuses on economic diversification, fiscal sustainability, labour market, youth employment, investment and the private sector, besides emphasising education, health and skill development.5 The sectors earmarked for economic diversification are agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, transport, energy, mining and tourism. In order to diversify its economy, Oman focuses on attracting foreign capital in non-oil and export-oriented sectors by taking regulatory reform measures and infrastructure development. Second, the government intends to capitalise on its geographic advantage to develop into a regional logistics hub. And third, the government emphasises enforcing local procurement requirement for foreign companies along with the promotion of Omanisation of the workforce.6 Sultan Haitham imposed a 10 per cent budget cut for the government authorities and introduced a five per cent value-added tax in a phased manner currently applicable to businesses earning more than one million Omani Rial (OMR).7 He also minimised grants, reduced the retirement age, and decreased wages for the new hires.
It is apparent from the protests that the reforms were not received well by the Omani youth. Responding to the protests, the government announced new jobs for youth and accelerated Omanisation of the workforce and asked the public sector companies to appoint Omanis in place of foreign staff by July 2021. The foreigners make up more than 40 per cent of Oman’s population of 4.6 million. The government reserved 11 professions in the private sector for the Omani nationals in June 2020. Between March 2020 and March 2021, more than 200,000 migrant workers engaged in the private sector left Oman.8 However, the young population in the Sultanate perceives the private sector as exploitative and seeks jobs in the public sector. The young demography of Oman is getting restless and needs quick solutions to the economic woes, which is a challenging task for Sultan Haitham considering the country’s dependence on oil.
Conclusion
The recent protests have renewed the focus on need for economic and political reforms in Oman, and it is apparent that any short-cut to reforms will not prove beneficial in the long run. The reforms have to be systematic and bring long-term stability to the gulf country with modest oil resources. The economic and political reforms have to go hand-in-hand while time is of the essence. The tact lies in keeping the youth contented while re-inventing the ailing economy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
While Ankara can take respite in President Biden’s decision to continue discussions on contentious issues, it would have to invest more diplomatic capital to overcome the challenges facing its relations with the US.
On June 14, 2021, President Joseph Biden and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a “closed-door” meeting on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit in Brussels. This was the first face-to-face meeting between Erdoğan and Biden since the latter’s inauguration in January 2021.
The bilateral relations between the US and Turkey, both members of NATO and traditional partners, have deteriorated over the years. The first signs of the wedge emerged over growing concerns in the US and European capitals over the authoritarian turn in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey since 2012-13. The handling of the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the crackdown on media and civil society after the 2016 failed coup strained the relations. Policy disagreements over the Syrian conflict and the US support for Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), together with US concerns over Turkey’s decision to buy S-400 missile defence system from Russia, created serious differences between the two sides.
Other outstanding issues included Washington’s refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen, the Pennsylvania-based Islamic scholar and preacher, wanted in Turkey for allegedly inciting the 2016 coup and concerns in the US on serious human rights violations, the crackdown on media and civil society and stifling of the political opposition in Turkey.
Nonetheless, during the Donald Trump administration, the contentious issues were managed through high-level bilateral meetings. Though they were unable to resolve outstanding issues, the Trump-Erdoğan dialogues kept the relations from derailing further. Erdoğan had hoped for developing a similar working relation with President Biden and had expressed such sentiments while congratulating Biden upon his election.1 In one of his televised statements before the meeting, the Turkish president had predicted that the June 14 meeting will be a “harbinger of a new era” in US-Turkey relations.2
Biden, however, had different views on Turkey, and a clear signal came on April 24, when he characterised the 1915 killings of Armenians at the hands of Ottoman soldiers and mercenaries as a “genocide” despite Turkish warnings and protests.3
Reportedly, among the issues that came up for discussion during the 45-minute meeting between Biden and Erdoğan were the US concerns over the deployment of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system by Turkey and the Turkish opposition to continued US support for the SDF in northern Syria.4
For the US, the problem with regard to the deployment of S-400 is its potential facilitation of access to Russian security experts to the NATO and the US military equipment in Turkey. In July 2019, after Ankara received the first consignment of the S-400 missile defence system, the US had removed Turkey from its F-35 fighter jet programme. At the time, a White House statement had said, “The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.”5
Before the June 14 meeting, there were speculations in the Turkish media of a likely breakthrough in resolving the S-400 issue. It was reported that Erdoğan might offer to “deploy the S-400s under US control at the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, without any Russian involvement in their operation and maintenance.”6 However, going by the follow-up briefing about the meeting to the media, no breakthrough came about on the issue.
Jake Sullivan, Biden’s National Security Advisor (NSA), when asked about the discussion during the Biden-Erdoğan meeting, underlined that the S-400 issue was discussed but no resolution could be achieved. He said, “There was a commitment to continue the dialogue on the S-400. And the two teams will be following up on that coming out of the meeting.”7 During a press conference after the meeting, Erdoğan too admitted that there was no resolution on the issue. He said, “On the issue of S-400s, I told (Biden) the same thing I had in the past,” and “I raised the issue of F-35s.”8
From Ankara’s viewpoint, the most contentious issue driving the wedge in bilateral relations with the US is the continuation of US support to the SDF in northern Syria. Turkey considers the SDF as a terrorist organisation because it is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Syrian-Kurdish militia affiliated with Turkey’s outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). For Turkey, the strengthening of SDF-YPG influence in northern Syria across the border from its Kurdish insurgency afflicted southeast region poses a security threat to Turkey. Since early 2019, Turkish armed forces have undertaken a series of military operations in northern Syria to establish a “safe zone” near the Turkey-Syria border.9
During the post-meeting press conference, Erdoğan said that he raised the issue of US support to the SDF and the security threat the “terrorist” organisation poses to Turkey with Biden. He said, “There should be no double standards in anti-terror efforts and it should be known that one terrorist group cannot be defeated with another” referring to the US claims that the SDF is inevitable to defeating the ISIS in Syria.10
While these two issues remained unresolved, an agreement was arrived at the meeting on a potential Turkish mission to secure the Kabul international airport after the planned withdrawal of US forces in September 2021. Sullivan said that Biden and Erdoğan agreed on working together on the issue emphasising that a “clear commitment from the leaders was established that Turkey would play a lead role in securing Hamid Karzai International Airport, and we [US and Turkey] are now working through how to execute against that.”11 President Erdoğan too expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the talks on this issue.
Notably, the meeting came at a time when the relations between the US and Turkey had hit rock bottom due to differences over a slew of domestic, bilateral and regional issues. Turkey had expected a breakthrough after the Biden-Erdoğan meeting but this could not be realised. Although the meeting was termed as “positive” by both sides, it apparently failed to resolve any of the contentious issues.
While Ankara can take respite in President Biden’s statement that the two countries “will continue discussions” and that he is confident the two “will make real progress,” it would need to do more to be able to overcome the challenges facing Turkey’s relations with the US.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The public faith in the constitution and political system in Nepal has eroded drastically in last one year. However, for now, all eyes are set on whether the Supreme Court would validate the President’s May 22 action.
The President of Nepal, Bidya Devi Bhandari, on May 22, exercising her power under Article 76(7) on the advice of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, dissolved the House of Representatives or the Lower House of the Nepal Parliament and announced fresh elections. This decision was taken after political parties failed to form a new government under Article 76(5) of the constitution. The president’s office in a statement said: “While considering the fact that same members have been counted on both sides [K.P. Sharma Oli and Sher Bahadur Deuba], members have supported one another against the party decision and request from the concerned party to disregard their support … both the claims to obtain vote of confidence of the House of Representatives as per the Article 76(5) of the Constitution to be appointed as the Prime Minister do not stand valid.”1 Therefore, neither of them could form a new government by May 21 (9:00 pm), as per the deadline set by the President a day before.
This is the second time the House has been dissolved in last five months. Previously, it was dissolved in December 2020. The Supreme Court, however, had reinstated the House on February 23, 2021, after hearing over a dozen writ petitions questioning the decision to dissolve the House.
Like last year, this time too, the decision to dissolve the House was met with overwhelming resistance from across the Nepali society and the opposition parties. The latter criticised the decision as being authoritarian and anti-constitutional. Prime Minister Oli did not follow the laid out constitutional procedures like testifying confidence in the House within 30 days. He also did not resign after losing the confidence motion on May 10 and again on May 20 this year. The opposition criticised President Bhandari for showing parochialism and also allocating a very short time (21 hours) to the opposition parties to form the government. They have filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court against the decision and a constitutional bench has been formed under the Chief Justice along with four senior judges of the Supreme Court.
The Unfolding Crisis
Despite the promulgation of a new constitution in September 2015, which was supposed to provide political stability, the country has witnessed a recurring political crisis. The top leaders, often, were more interested in grabbing power by punishing rival factions within the party, splitting parties, and stoking anti-India sentiments to shore up nationalism and hide incompetence. In this context, one needs to analyse three major factors that have precipitated the constitutional crisis in Nepal.
First, the intensification of factional conflict in the erstwhile Nepal Communist Party (NCP) due to the failure of the power-sharing deal between the Oli and the Pushp Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda faction. The said political deal was concluded before the formation of the NCP, which came into being with the merger of the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Maoist Centre (MC) in May 2018. As per the deal, it was agreed that: (1) the two leaders would equally share the prime ministerial tenure, 2) Prachanda would hold the co-chairmanship of the NCP with executive powers, (3) sharing of cabinet seats should be in accordance with the pre-election deal (60:40, the CPN-UML got 60 per cent seats and the MC got 40 per cent seats), and (4) the prime minister and the chairman of the party would consult the senior leaders in party matters.2
Since the formation of the NCP, the top leaders of the party have often accused each other of not abiding by the deal. Factionalism reached its zenith in April 2020, when Oli issued an ordinance on the Political Parties Act.3 The objective was to demonstrate his dominant position in the government and within the party to his rival factions. The motive was also to split both the NCP and also the smaller parties of the Terai region who would join the government in case the rival faction led by Prachanda withdraws support. Most importantly, the Chinese initiative of a new power-sharing agreement between Oli and Prachanda in September 2020 could not prevent the party from forming two separate organisational structures within the NCP.
The intra-party factionalism came to an end after the Supreme Court scrapped the merger of the CPN-UML and the MC on March 7, 2021. However, the legacy of factionalism reappeared in the revived CPN-UML. It is believed that the anti-Oli faction led by Madhav Kumar Nepal had voted against the Oli Government on May 10. Some media reports in fact hinted that Madhav Kumar Nepal’s faction of the CPN-UML had allegedly supported a Nepali Congress (NC)-led initiative to form a new government under Article 76(5) on May 20, 2021.4
Second, there has been a lack of clarity on the interpretation of Article 76 and related clauses as the constitution is silent on the following issues:
Third, there are pieces of evidence of parliamentary procedural lapse by both the ruling and opposition parties. As enshrined in Article 76, the Prime Minister has to test his/her majority on the floor of the House. Oli only did that on May 10. He skipped the process on May 20. He was supposed to do the floor test on that day since he was reappointed as the Prime Minister on May 13 under Article 76(3). However, he just announced and informed the President that he does not have a majority in the House.
As mentioned in the Nepal Constitution, the Prime Minister has to be ‘relieved’ from the office upon losing the majority in the House. For example, Article 100(6) clearly says “if a motion of no confidence tabled under clause (4) is passed by a majority of the total number of the then members of the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister shall relieve of his or her office.”5 Therefore, as per the abovementioned article, Prime Minister Oli should have resigned after failing to prove the majority in the House.
Interestingly, after Prime Minister Oli’s CPN-UML became the largest party in the House on March 7, 2021, as the NCP ceased to exist as a party, and the MC recalled its ministers from the cabinet on March 13, the opposition parties did not table the no-confidence motion against him.
Implications of the Crisis
The public faith in the country’s constitution and political system has eroded drastically in last one year, since the ordinance related to Political Party Act was issued by the Oli Government in April 2020. The new political system introduced by the constitution has been repeatedly misused by the ruling party. This has set a wrong precedent in the Nepal polity. Public disenchantment towards the new system manifested in a series of rallies and protests. The pro-royalist organisations even began discussing the revival of the monarchical system. During October-November 2020, a series of pro-monarchy rallies were organised across the country.6
Another new trend was division in other political parties in favour or against the constitutional action taken by the Oli Government. For example, factionalism intensified in the Janata Samajwadi Party (JSP), which was formed in April 2020 after the merger of two Terai-based parties - the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Janata Party (JP). Most importantly, some new political alliances -- CPN-UML and JSP, the NC-led alliance with the MC, the Madhav Kumar Nepal faction from the CPN-UML, and the Upendra Yadav faction from the JSP -- were formed based on political opportunism and without any ideological basis.
These intra-party and inter-party bickerings have impacted governance in the country. The government miserably failed to manage the second wave of COVID-19 as the country witnessed a massive surge in COVID-related infections and deaths, and also a downfall in economic growth. There was an increase in unemployment which forced people to engage in illegal activities like gold smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, etc.
No Point Blaming India
Three former prime ministers of Nepal – Prachanda, Sher Bahadur Deuba and Baburam Bhattarai – have accused Prime Minister Oli of dissolving the Parliament at India’s direction. Bhattarai in his joint opinion piece published in The Hindu on May 29 stated that “…Oli is in collusion with Hindu monarchical forces in Nepal and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in India” to dismantle the Nepal Constitution.7 These accusations were made despite India treating the political developments as ‘internal issues’ of the country, and even as the Chinese ambassador conducted open consultation on internal matters of Nepal with political leaders and constitutional authorities of the country.8
The spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement issued on May 26 clearly stated that India views the recent political developments in Nepal as “internal matters” of the country to be dealt under its “own domestic framework and democratic processes.”9 Such accusations appear all the more baseless and unfounded because of the following reasons:
First, it may be noted that Prime Minister Oli has been one of the most influential Chairman of the UML since July 2014. He has also been the most powerful prime minister in the post-constitution period. He had secured close to an absolute majority in the House of Representatives due to the merger of the MC with the CPN-UML in the post-election period. His government also had issue-based support from the SP and the JP until the end of 2019. Therefore, he did not require any external support to remain in power and function independently.
Second, though Prime Minister Oli’s CPN-UML turned into the largest party in the House after the Supreme Court verdict of March 7, 2021, it continued to enjoy a majority till May 4 as the MC did not withdraw its support to the government. However, his party had to explore the possibility of seeking support from the JSP. As a result, in the emerging new political alignment, the JSP emerged as a kingmaker in Nepal politics following the SC verdict.
From the JSP’s point of view (especially for the Mahantha Thakur faction), the political situation provided a golden opportunity to address the remaining Madhesi issues that were not addressed by the 2015 Constitution. The Thakur faction was more seriously looking towards the redressal of Madhesi issues, unlike the Upendra Yadav faction. The Thakur faction was aware that if their demands are accepted by the largest party in the parliament, then the NC would not oppose this political accommodation because the NC is politically dependent on the Terai region. The Thakur faction also felt more comfortable dealing with the CPN-UML because previously when it tried to negotiate with the NC, it remained silent on addressing the Madhesi demands for the fear of losing hill votes. This was perhaps the reason why opposition parties, including the NC, remained silent on the citizenship ordinance, which the President issued on May 23, 2021.
Summing Up
It is clear that Prime Minister Oli has survived in power due to his strong leadership within the party and in the government, support from the MC, failure of the opposition parties to table a no-confidence motion against his government after March 2021, and finally, due to the convergence of interest between the CPN-UML and the Mahantha Thakur faction of the JSP. However, for now, all eyes are set on whether the Supreme Court would validate the President’s action.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Even as nuclear safety protocols and processes have been strengthened since the 1986 disaster, learning from Chernobyl should be a continuing, ongoing process.
On April 26, 1986, the fourth reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, while undergoing safety tests, suffered an explosion and went up in flames. A day prior, a workers-day-off at Chernobyl had disrupted the overall flow of work. Safety tests mandated to be run in the day-time were scheduled for the night-shift. The purpose of these tests was simple — to test if the plant can run on a generator if there is a disruption in the electric power supply. These tests, however, resulted in the catastrophic accident.
The wind-blown radioactive isotopes were first registered and detected by Scandinavian countries, mainly Sweden and Finland.1 The news of the accident was made public by the Swedish National Institute of Radiation Protection. The Soviet government clamped down heavily on the flow of information relating to the accident. Even the USSR report of the incident, presented at the Chernobyl conference in Vienna in 1987, was never released to its citizens.2
The destruction of Chernobyl’s Reactor 4 released a cloud of radionuclides that contaminated large areas of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Thousands of workers participated in the mitigation efforts, and got exposed to substantial radiation doses. Nearly eight lakh hectares of agricultural land was rendered unusable in these countries, and timber production was halted on nearly seven lakh hectares of forest.3
The accident highlighted the deficiencies in Soviet nuclear reactor safety protocols, along with inadequacies in reactor design. Valery Legaslov, the Chief of the Commission that investigated the Chernobyl disaster, expressed concern about the safety of similar nuclear reactors operating in Russia and around the world.4 Anatoly Dyatlov, the leading scientist responsible for the tests conducted on the Chernobyl reactors in April 1986, was tried and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment in 1987, for violating safety standards.
The primary issue of concern in the immediate aftermath of the accident was the laxity shown by the authorities in evacuating people from the affected zone. The evacuation of the town of Pripyat, where plant workers lived, for instance, did not start until 36 hours after the disaster. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, in a television address on May 14, 1986, however, affirmed that the government had dealt with the evacuation and safety procedures effectively and criticised Western media for spreading “lies” and “misinformation”.5
Lessons Learned
In the aftermath of Chernobyl, robust efforts were undertaken to strengthen nuclear safety. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for instance, started the Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System (FINAS), in 1992. It is jointly managed by the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).6 FINAS helps participating countries exchange best practices to improve the safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. FINAS has become a significant source of information for nuclear regulators and their technical support organisations.
The IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (OSART) — which first began functioning in 1982 after the Three-Mile Island accident in the US, review the operational safety of nuclear power stations on the territory of member states.7 As of December 2020, the IAEA had conducted 210 OSART missions at 118 nuclear power plants in 37 Member States, with 151 follow-up visits as part of the missions.8
OSART monitoring process involves technical and organisational reviews by international experts, who identify lacunae and key areas needing improvement on nuclear sites, and provide relevant recommendations. Safety-issues of nuclear plant(s) are monitored on a case-by-case basis as well, not just for government nuclear facilities, but for corporate facilities as well (through the Corporate OSART Missions). The safety culture can also be assessed, either as part of OSARTs or a standalone request, by an additional mechanism known as the Independent Safety Culture Assessment (ISCA).
The Chernobyl Forum was formed in 2003, made up of the IAEA, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Bank Group, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), along with representatives from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The Forum released a comprehensive report in 2005, along with a set of guidelines and recommendations for the governments of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine to mitigate the long-term impact of radiation, including New Safe Confinement (NSC) shelters.9
A massive containment structure made of shelter and steel was constructed around Chernobyl’s Reactor 4 in 1986. With aid from the G-7 and the European Commission, a new safe confinement structure was completed in 2019.10 Recent reports note that there is an increase in neutron formation inside Chernobyl’s Reactor Four containment structure due to seepage of rain water and that scientists are contemplating using technological solutions like robots to manage the situation.11
Collectively, EU countries have contributed approximately €600 million for Chernobyl projects since 1991. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development set up a Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) in 1993, so as to seek international cooperation in mitigating the impact of nuclear disasters like that at Chernobyl. Funds collected account have been used to improve the functioning of nuclear power projects in countries like Bulgaria, Lithuania and Russia.12
The EU also provides assistance (technical, educational, and regulatory) to nations under the nuclear safety component of the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme, which has now evolved into a separate programme called European Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC).13
Popular Narrative and Perception Management
Given that the Chernobyl incident happened during the closing stages of the Cold War, it became an important event for highlighting the inadequacies of the Soviet nuclear industry and the government. The propaganda around Chernobyl, even after the end of the Cold War, remains alive. The dramatic incident has been adapted into many film and TV projects. The most recent and prominent was the HBO Miniseries, ‘Chernobyl’. The show, aired first on May 6, 2019, makes the painstaking effort of reminding us that despite all our scientific progress, unheard or suppressed voices, fumbling governance, and taken-for-granted technological flaws can bring life as we know it, to a grinding halt. The American show, however, was criticized by some elements of the Russian media for allegedly misconstruing facts to insult the Russian Federation and its continuing efforts to uphold the legacy of the Chernobyl survivors and scientists.14
Conclusion
Currently, nine RBMK-1000 reactor-powered nuclear plants, incorporating enhanced safety designs, continue to run in the Russian cities of Smolensk, Kursk and St. Petersburg. The Chernobyl accident occurred only seven years after the partial meltdown at the Three-Mile Island nuclear reactor complex in the US. Nuclear disasters like those at the Three-Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima teach us that, sometimes, man-made technology can dangerously slip out of hand. Nuclear safety has come a long way since then, and so has the representation of facts and opinions about the incident. History is both a burden to bear and an opportunity to learn, and learning from the Chernobyl disaster should be a continuing, ongoing process.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The armed forces ethos and sacrificial ideology needs to be earnestly adopted by all our citizens in their individual capacities to help in faster national pandemic recovery.
The COVID 19 pandemic has caused unprecedented suffering worldwide. The second COVID wave in India has caused much suffering, with abysmal public health infrastructure compounding the problem. Massive demand was generated for a short period of time on critical medical facilities and equipment like intensive care unit (ICU) beds and oxygen cylinders.
The various arms of the government, including the armed forces and the railways, for instance, played a critical role in trying to bridge the shortfalls. The nation also received critical help from many countries. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based efforts (like that by the Sikh community), and noble Samaritans worked overtime to help the sick and the needy. Many others also came forward and contributed liberally to the PM CARES Fund.
During the first COVID wave, the government initiated a complete lockdown. While this measure did have an adverse economic fallout, many precious lives were saved. During the second wave, the Union government, probably apprehensive of the adverse economic fallout, left it largely to the state governments to impose curfews and lockdowns, as and when found essential, to break the chain of infection.
The Union and state governments now urgently need to focus their efforts to ensure that relief measures reach those affected by the second wave. Various schemes such as those providing financial support to children orphaned by the disease, are indeed a soothing measure. Caution should continue to be exercised by the authorities and the general public at large so that the abating second wave is capped at the earliest.
While we will undoubtedly show resilience as a nation and recover from the economic slowdown and shrinkage, the families would take a long time to recover from the tragic shock of losing loved ones due to the monstrous second wave, rather, the second tsunami. Many may show courage and fortitude to accept the economic hardships in their stride, but will find it hard to overcome the loss of loved ones.
Despite the loss in economic activity and its medium and long-term fallouts, we need to ensure that we hit the ground running as the situation stabilises further. Most industries and medium/small scale businesses may not be able to achieve pre-pandemic levels of economic activity on their own, but will need active government support.
Though the Finance Ministry has already announced a huge package of Rs 20,00,000 crores, and an array of other measures in the budget of the current financial year, a supplemental blueprint consisting of targeted financial packages for the affected may still need to be initiated.
What is required now is a singular focus towards re-building the country, by all sections of the society. Indians are known for their ingenuity and capability to achieve, and deliver the extraordinary, when the need arises. An important factor that will aid how soon we will be able to get back to our economic growth curve, is the attitudinal change in the mindset of our citizens towards the nation.
The armed forces are a model of an exceptionally cohesive and dedicated organisation with an extremely high degree of patriotism. They are a veritable microcosm of the enormous diversity of our nation. The armed forces ethos and sacrificial ideology, it is suggested here, needs to be earnestly adopted by all our citizens in their individual capacities. They must embrace the motto of ‘Nation Always First’.
‘Young India’ has tremendous latent energy. It is this youth which forms the core of the armed forces. Each one needs to be an instrument of change. The urgency now is to motivate our citizens, primarily the youth, to work towards revival of national confidence and economic activity so that the dark adversity of the times can be converted to an opportunity to excel.
We have numerous examples in history, wherein nations devastated by wars, recovered through the resolve of the people and their dedication to the national cause, supplemented though by significant external assistance.
While the government will have primary responsibility to generate economic growth and address critical gaps in health infrastructure through administrative and policy initiatives, we, as the citizens need to reboot ourselves and make this crisis a tipping point to help usher in a healthy and prosperous India.
Lt Gen (Retd.) Rajiv Bhalla is a former Infantry Officer who headed the Military Training and Military Secretary branches.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The IT Rules 2021 seek to address cyber security concerns of the citizens without infringing on their privacy and personal liberties, while maintaining digital sovereignty at the same time.
The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 were released by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) in February. Social Media intermediaries were given a three-month period to comply with the new rules.1 The government on May 26 issued fresh notice to all social media intermediaries seeking details on the status of compliance with the new rules that came into effect on that day.
Companies like Google, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, Koo, Sharechat, and LinkedIn have shared details with MeitY as per the requirement of the new norms. Twitter sought an extension of the compliance window and called for a constructive dialogue and a collaborative approach from the government to safeguard freedom of expression of the public. WhatsApp also filed a case in the Delhi High Court against the government on grounds that the new rules violated customer privacy. The new Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code have also been challenged by entities like The Wire, LiveLaw and The Quint.
The IT Rules 2021 aim to empower ordinary users of social media platforms and OTT platforms with a mechanism for redressal and timely resolution of their grievance with the help of a Grievance Redressal Officer (GRO) who should be a resident in India. Special emphasis has been given on the protection of women and children from sexual offences, fake news and other misuse of the social media.
Identification of the “first originator of the information” would be required in case of an offence related to sovereignty and integrity of India. A Chief Compliance Officer, a resident of India, also needs to be appointed and that person shall be responsible for ensuring compliance with the Act and Rules. A monthly compliance report mentioning the details of complaints received and action taken on the complaints would be necessary.
The OTT platforms, online news and digital media entities, on the other hand, would need to follow a Code of Ethics. OTT platforms would be called as ‘publishers of online curated content’ under the new rules. They would have to self-classify the content into five categories based on age and use parental locks for age above 13 or higher. They also need to include age verification mechanisms for content classified as ‘Adult’.
A three-level grievance redressal mechanism has been mandated. This includes the appointment of a GRO, self-regulatory bodies registered with the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting (MIB) to look after the Code of Ethics and a Charter for the self-regulating bodies formulated by MIB.
While the new rules were challenged by many on grounds of violation of free speech, the government has clarified that these rules permit social media platforms to operate in India freely but with due accordance to the law. Every entity has to abide by the Constitution of the country and the Rule of Law. Also, as per Article 19 of the Constitution, freedom of speech and expression is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions, especially in case of a threat to national sovereignty and security.
Misuse of Social Media
The rules come at a time when the country is constantly striving to ensure the safety and sovereignty of the cyberspace and of personal data. Social media is increasingly becoming an important part of an individual’s life. WhatsApp currently has a user base of 340 million in the country, accounting for the largest number of subscribers in the world.2 Facebook has 290 million, Twitter 17 million, YouTube 265 million and Instagram, 120 million user base.
With such a huge population dependent on social media platforms, the tech-giants cannot choose to ignore the new and emerging challenges like persistent spread of fake news, rampant abuse of the platforms to share morphed images of women, deep fakes and other contents that threaten the dignity of women and pose a threat to security.
Instances of use of abusive language, defamatory contents and hate speech in these platforms have become very common. The algorithms used by these platforms to optimize views and advertisements often fail to distinguish between relevant or useful content and abusive content and fake news, thereby amplifying them in very little or no time.
In view of such emerging challenges, the Supreme Court in 2018, in the Tehseen S. Poonawalla v/s Union of India case, directed the government to curb and stop dissemination of explosive messages and videos on various social media platforms which have a tendency to incite mob violence and lynching of any kind.3 The Court in 2017 observed that the government may frame necessary guidelines to eliminate child pornography, rape and gang rape imageries, videos and sites in content hosting platforms and other applications.4
The new rules are thus in accordance with the previous Supreme Court observations. As per the rules, intermediaries are mandated to remove or disable contents that are against the safety and dignity of individuals within 24 hours of receiving of complaints. Such complaints can be filed either by the individual or a person on his/her behalf. According to the government, knowing the “first originator of information” (also known as “traceability”) of messages that cause violence, riots, terrorism, rape or threat to national security fall under reasonable exceptions to Right to Privacy - which again is not absolute as per the Constitution.5
Technological Hurdles with Respect to Traceability
Social media companies like WhatsApp have expressed apprehensions about the provisions in the new rules which require them to identify traceability when required to do so by authorities. They contend that this could possibly lead to the breaking the of end-to-end encryption, which in turn can compromise users’ privacy.6
The government, on the other hand, has stated that traceability would only be required in case of “very serious offences” that threaten the sovereignty and integrity of India. Further, it could also be implemented without breaking the end-to-end encryption. The onus, however, will lie on the companies to find a technological solution for the same.
Supplying metadata like phone number of the sender, the time of sending a message, the device it was sent from and its location, could also trace the origin of a message. Interestingly, WhatsApp’s new privacy policy itself has a provision of sharing metadata of its users with its parent company, Facebook, for personalised ads.7 As per latest reports, the Union government has sent a notice to WhatsApp for withdrawal of its new privacy policy which has caused a lot of controversy since its inception.8
The Free Speech Debate
The social media giant, Twitter, has raised concerns regarding free speech over the new IT guidelines. It stated that it would strive to comply with the law but if guided by principles of transparency and freedom of expression under the rule of law. The Delhi High Court on May 31 issued a notice to the microblogging site on a plea filed against it for alleged non-compliance with the new IT rules.9
Failure to comply with the rules could lead to the removal of ‘intermediary’ status (a safe harbour to avoid liability for the content that their users publish) of the companies and could possibly invite sanction or even punishment under the law. The government insists that the rules are neither arbitrary nor sudden, since the draft rules were put up for public comments and several individuals, industrial associations and organizations had responded. The comments were then analysed in detail and an inter-ministerial meeting was also held before finalising them.
The Way Forward
Freedom of speech and expression is the basic tenet of any democracy. However, no freedom is absolute or completely unrestricted. The imperative of striking the right balance between fundamental rights and ascertaining the reasonableness of a restriction has been a constant effort since the adoption of the Constitution. The debate has now reached the digital world. The on-going tussle between private, tech giants who own a substantial amount of Big Data, governments desirous of imposing reasonable restrictions and users worried about issues relating to data privacy and constraints on freedom of speech and expression, is likely to get more complicated before optimum solutions can be arrived at. The IT Rules 2021 seek to address concerns of the citizens without infringing on their privacy and personal liberties, while maintaining digital sovereignty at the same time.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The expected victory of a hardline, conservative candidate in the forthcoming Iranian presidential elections could become a hindrance to fulfilling the country’s economic agenda and lead to greater domestic instability.
Iran’s 13th Presidential elections will be held on June 18, 2021.On May 25, 2021, Iran’s Guardian Council released a list of seven approved candidates for the upcoming presidential election - Saeed Jalili, Seyed Ebrahim Raisi, Alireza Zakani, Seyed Amir Hossein Qazizadeh Hashemi, Mohsen Mehralizadeh, Mohsen Rezaei, and AbdolnaserHemmati.
Many candidates were disqualified, among them former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Vice President EshaqJahangiri and former parliament speaker anda key nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani. President Hassan Rouhani expressed his “disappointment” over the Council’s selection process.1
An October 2020 poll indicated that almost half of the Iranians expressed their displeasure with incumbent President Rouhani’s governance.2One of the main critiques of the government, former President Ahmadinejad emerged as an early frontrunner for the presidential election.3 However, given his growing hostility with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei since 2010, his rejection by the Guardian Council was widely anticipated. Earlier in 2017, his candidacy for the presidential election was also rejected by Khamenei.
The rejection of Jahangiri’s and Larijani’scandidature was unexpected. It was expected that Larijani could draw fair amount of support from the moderate-reformist camp and emerge as one of the main contenders against Chief Justice Ebrahim Raisi.4 While no reasons were given for their rejection, reports noted that corruption charges were possibly one of the reasons held up against them.5 As per recent amendments on eligibility criteria for the post of president, individuals involved in economic offences are not eligible to contest.6
The Candidates
Ayatollah Seyed Ebrahim Raeisi, Judiciary Chief, is the most favoured candidate in the presidential race. He secured more than 15million votes in the 2017 presidential election. Raeisi is the only conservative politician who has the ability to create partisan unity. In fact, most of the candidates from the conservative blocs (also known as the Principalists or Revolutionary front) withdrew their candidacy in his favour this year. These included Hossein Dehghan, the former defence minister, RostanGhasemi, former oil minister, among others.
Along with the hardliners, Raeisi is also supported by the country’s youths.7 Polls conducted by various institutes’ show that Raeisi is leading the presidential poll by a vast margin.8 Former President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure policy” and re-imposition of sanctionshave played a major role in strengthening the hardliners in the Iranian power structures like judiciary, the Guardian Council and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Further, Rouhani’s failure to deliver on key economic promises eroded the appeal of the reformists, with significant anti-government protests held in 2018-2019.
Raeisi has promised to establish a “strong Iran”, and focus on strengthening the country’s economy. He has also pledged to strength economic ties with Iran’s neighbours.9 Raeisi is viewed as the successor to Khamenei,is expected to further strengthen elements of the “resistance economy”, to help Iran achieve economicself-sufficiency.10
Other conservatives like Mohsen Rezaei, the Secretary of the Expediency Council and Saeed Jalili, former Secretary of the Supreme National Security, have pledged to restore the country’s economic stability. Rezaei stated that he will initiate a structural change in the administration of the country.11 Jalili, on the other hand, proposed the idea of a “shadow cabinet” to help compensate for the Rouhani administration’s shortcomings.12 Jalili was among one of the top three candidates in 2013 elections.
Amir Hossein Qazizadeh Hashemi, a former Member of Parliament (MP), is ahardliner,who was one of the main persons behind the passing of the strategic action plan for lifting sanctions last year. As part of the plan, the Iranian government was obliged to reduce its commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal. He promised that he would continue the Vienna dialogue and use better diplomacy in negotiating with the US and lifting the sanctions.13
Alireza Zakani is another conservative who advocates “active and smart diplomacy” to make Iran stronger in the international arena.14 While he prioritises cooperation with countries like China, Zakani views Trump and Biden as two sides of the same coin.15
AbdolnaserHemmati, head of Iran Central Bank and Mohsen Mehr-Alizadeh, former governor, are two candidates who have emerged as the standard bearers for the reformists. Both intend to focus on the internal dynamics of the country. Hemmati, in his campaign, promised to resolve the country’s economic woes by achieving 5 per cent annual growth for the next four years.16 Alizadeh also pledges to focus on the economy, generating investment and creating jobs. On the foreign policy front, it is likely they will follow on the footsteps of Rouhani.
Prognosis
The hashtags “there is no way I will vote” no matter what the candidates promise is widely used on social media platforms like the Twitter.17 It appears that though the failures of reformist government have drastically reduced the number of their support, Iranians also do not wish to have a conservative government. Reports in October 2020 indicated that 11 per cent of the Iranian population support the moderates - a decrease from 14 per cent in 2016, whereas 2 per cent are willing to align with the principalists.18
Many Iranians are planning to boycott the election.19It is likely, therefore, that the turnout for this year would be less as compared to the 2017 presidential election, which registered a 70 per cent turnout.20 This may raise some issues as to the legitimacy of the winner as Iranian authorities often cite the number of voters as a proof of their elections being “legitimate”.
The Guardian Council has chosen more hardliners than moderates for the presidential race. It is a reflection of the country’s contested power structure and political divide between moderates and hardliner that has sharpened over the years. This has been mainly because of two factors, government failure to improve the condition of the Iranian people and policies followed by the Trump administration after withdrawal from the nuclear deal. As the election approaches, talks over reviving the nuclear deal are still to produce any significant results.
The hardliners are backed by the country’s Supreme Leader, who want Raeisi to emerge victorious.21 The other conservatives withdrawing their candidacy to avoid the division of votes at the last moment is perhaps inevitable. Raeisi was among politicians who in 2019 was subject to the US and European Union sanctions.
Raeisi’s probable victory will no doubt strengthen calls for an aggressive stance towards the US. Such an approach will, however, be a hindrance to fulfilling the country’s economic agenda and could lead to greater domestic instability.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Imran Khan’s overemphasis on further mainstreaming the religious education might result in increased conflict between his government and the opposition and also the civil society in Pakistan.
After assuming power in August 2018, Prime Minister Imran Khan and his party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) promised to usher in a ‘Naya Pakistan’, one which would be corruption-free and care for the common people. Most importantly, he promised to transform Pakistan into Riyasat-e-Medina (State of Medina), based on the model of governance adopted by Prophet Muhammad during his years of migration to Medina.
Additionally, his government also talked about implementing a Single National Curriculum (SNC) to recast the education system in Pakistan and make sure that private, public schools and madrasas follow a uniform curriculum. Known in Urdu as Yuksaan Taleemi Nizam, it means the same education system for all students irrespective of their economic and social background. The SNC was conceived as ‘One System of Education for All’, which intended to introduce a uniform system “in terms of curriculum, medium of instruction and a common platform of assessment so that all children have a fair and equal opportunity to receive high quality education”.1
According to the Pakistan Education Ministry, multiple comparative studies with the educational curricula of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the United Kingdom (UK) were conducted to align the SNC with international standards.2 However, an article published in Gandhara aptly raised the question as to “why Pakistan needs a curriculum set by the federal government when education was devolved to the provinces through the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010.” It added, “Critics say the SNC is a means of undoing this at the behest of the powerful military establishment that has repeatedly expressed dislike of the 18th Amendment, and they say it’s a way to further indoctrinate an already conservative society.”3
Phases of Implementation
The government announced its much anticipated uniform national curriculum in 2019-20 with the aim of alleviating “disparities in education content across the multiple streams” and offer “equal opportunities” to all children to “receive higher education” and enable them “for upward social mobility”. It also talked about “holistic development of children in the light of emerging international trends and local aspirations” and “smooth inter-provincial mobility of teachers and students”. All this was aimed at ensuring “Social Cohesion and National Integration”.4
In the first phase of SNC, which came into effect in March 2021, efforts are on to develop the curriculum from pre-class one to five. It is being noted that the religious content has dramatically increased with Islamic studies made mandatory for all, including non-Muslim students. The second phase of SNC to develop curriculum for sixth to eighth grade will begin from March 2022, while the third and final phase for ninth to twelfth grade will start from March 2023, the year in which the next general elections are scheduled to be held. If the disproportionate emphasis on Islamic studies at the primary level is any indicator, the emphasis on Islam is going to be the defining feature of the SNC. This has led people to ask whether the government’s one-nation one-curriculum policy is being used as a tool to further Imran Khan’s dream of transforming Pakistan into a ‘truly’ Islamic nation.
According to the Pakistan Education Ministry, the SNC is driven by some key considerations but the teachings of Qur'an and Sunnah tops them all, others being introduction to the Constitution of Pakistan, and the vision of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal. The SNC will be adopted and developed in three phases. In the first phase, which started from March 2021, the government is making it mandatory for students from class one to five to be acquainted with deeniyat (religious books on Islam). In the Urdu textbook for Grade 2, children are being instructed to recite the naat (poem in praise of Prophet Muhammad), and additionally, a chapter on the life and history of Prophet Muhammad is to be introduced for eighth, ninth and tenth classes. While there is a footnote on each page of the textbook instructing teachers not to force non-Muslim children to study Islamic texts, these instructions alone, educationalists say, will be difficult to enforce in classrooms where Muslim and non-Muslim students study together. Also, unlike in the past, English and Urdu have been made compulsory subjects under the SNC.5
The PTI Government is of the view that since every educational institution runs its own curriculum, implementation of a single curriculum is the only way to enforce it in private schools. Madrasas may also be forced to adopt it. Analysts in Pakistan are of the view that religious seminaries should be brought under this umbrella only after taking their stakeholders into confidence (read the religious groups/leaders). If a uniform curriculum is imposed on madrasas forcefully, it may do more harm than good. According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Normal schoolteachers being under-equipped religiously, SNC calls for summoning an army of madressah-educated holy men – hafiz’s and qaris – as paid teachers inside schools. How this will affect the general ambiance and the safety of students is an open question.”6 It has also been observed that “The backdoor entry of seminary teachers into mainstream educational institutions may be the dream of some people but it will be a nightmare for the country. It is something that even Zia did not do. It is poison.”7
Likely Implications
For the critics of SNC, this policy change is more ideological than educational. They would argue that it has an overdose of religion that leads to fear of indoctrination of children at a young stage. Also, there is a fair chance that instead of mainstreaming madrassas, the mainstream teaching will be heavily influenced by the madrasas in the future, considering the fact that Prime Minister, every now and then, talks about making Pakistan “an example for the Islamic world, just like Riyasaat-e-Medina created by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)”.8 As pointed out by Nadeem Paracha, Pervez Musharraf tried to introduce non-religious subjects in madrasas after 9/11 as “they were seen as hotbeds of religious radicalisation.” However, he added, “Not only did the move fail, this ploy also failed to take into account the possibility of radicalisation emerging in private and public schools because of a curriculum heavily influenced by retrogressive ideological biases and distortions.”9
The SNC introduced by the Imran Khan Government is a continuation of the same ploy, Nadeem Paracha further argues, but it is now going the other way: “The overwhelming addition of new religious studies in it suggests that, to make the madressahs agree to accept the teaching of non-religious subjects, the government has decided to bring the madressahs to public and private schools. This is akin to the state’s recent attempt at mainstreaming radical outfits by encouraging them to take part in electoral politics. It is a ploy that most experts would agree is not working.”10
In this grand vision of the government for a unified educational system for all, the children of minority communities do not seem to have any space. In the first phase of the newly introduced SNC, Holy Quran in Arabic and Islamic Studies are being made mandatory. According to the Pakistan Education Ministry, “In 2006, the subject of Islamiat was integrated with General Knowledge up to grade 2 and started as a separate subject from Grade 3 onwards. In the SNC Islamiat starts from grade 1 as a separate subject up to grade 12. Previously the subject of Ethics was designated for non-Muslim students in lieu of Islamiat from Grade 3 onwards. Now a new subject Religious Education has been introduced for non-Muslim students from grade 1 onwards for five minority groups of Pakistan.”11 In such case, students from minority communities may not have any other option but to follow the curriculum imposed on them.
Some Pakistani analysts suggest that the students belonging to religious minorities will also be required to study Islamiat and Deeniyat and may have to take exams on these subjects, if the National Commission of Minorities (representing Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and Kalash tribe) fails to intervene. They argue that the SNC militates against Article 22 of the Pakistan Constitution which safeguards the rights of minorities. It states that “no person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction … if such instruction relates to a religion other than his/her own.”12
The PTI-ruled Punjab is the first province to adopt the SNC but is facing backlash for mismanagement, while the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led government in Sindh has outrightly rejected it. Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) were not well prepared to implement it this year.13 It has to be noted that after the passage of the 18th Amendment, which guarantees more power to the provinces, education remains a provincial matter.14 In Punjab, where PTI has hurriedly introduced the new curriculum from class one to five, there has been an uproar from parents, private publishers and other stakeholders. The parents worry about the sudden change in the medium of teaching, from English to Urdu, which according to them will lead to rote learning.
Questions are also being raised about the credibility of 400 experts consulted for charting out this new curriculum. It also has to be noted that scores of books, which do not comply with the new policy, are being banned On March 20, 2021, 140 human rights activists, parents and educationalists signed an open letter to Prime Minister Imran Khan. According to the signatories, the right to choose the kind of education parents want for their children is a “fundamental human right”.15
The Lahore-based public policy expert, Peter Jacob, and a team of educationalists have found that nine per cent of the content of class three English textbook introduced under the SNC violated Article 22 of the Pakistan Constitution. Some examples highlighted by Jacob include a question on the first page of a model Urdu textbook, which poses the following to class two students: “Do you know that Allah is our creator?”. Similarly, in the English textbook for class one, there is a comprehension passage titled: “Blessings of Allah”, while in class three English textbook, eight-year-olds are instructed to recite the naat, which has been described as a poem that especially praises Prophet Muhammad.16
In a televised debate, Pervez Hoodbhoy argued that the new curriculum will in no way bring equality among school children. He underlined that there is not only an overdose of religion from the first to the fifth standard, the students are also being forced to learn lines from Quran and recite duas (prayers). With such an overload, where is the place for other minority children, he questioned? He noted, “Madrasa is meant to prepare for the afterlife and the schools are meant to prepare the young minds for this life. How can these be combined?”17
Bringing about such changes in the curriculum may as well be a step towards caving into the right-wing demand to make Pakistan a ‘truly’ Islamic republic. Not long ago, on April 17, 2021, in a series of tweets, Imran Khan stated that he would not give in to the pressures of the Western liberal countries and protect the sanctity of the Prophet (Tahaffuz-e-Namus-e-Risalat) at all costs. A year ago, in May 2020, the PTI Government in Punjab had unanimously passed a resolution on Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat (Movement to Protect the End of Prophethood).18 Recently, on May 09, 2021, Imran Khan during his visit to Saudi Arabia met Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Dr Yousef Al-Othaimeen, in Makkah and called upon the OIC member countries to come together and teach the values of the Prophet to the West. It was also noted in the meeting that following Khan’s letter to the heads of states of various Muslim countries, the OIC Council of Foreign Minister in Niamey had adopted a unanimous resolution on observing March 15 as ‘International Day to Combat Islamophobia’.19
In times to come, Imran Khan’s overemphasis on further mainstreaming the religious education might result in increased conflict between his government and the opposition and also the civil society in Pakistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pages